Case 19 singer sewing machine company vs drilon

FACTS: On February 15, 1989, the respondent union filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of the
Singer Sewing Machine Company.

The Company opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the union
members are actually not employees but are independent contractors as
evidenced by the collection agency agreement which they signed.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to right of self-organization

HELD: The Court finds that since private respondents are not employees of
the Company, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Accordingly, there is
no constitutional and legal basis for their “union” to be granted their petition
for direct certification. This Court made this pronouncement in La Suerte
Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of Bureau of Labor Relations,
supra:

. . . The question of whether employer-employee relationship exists is a

primordial consideration before extending labor benefits under the workmen’s
compensation, social security, medicare, termination pay and labor relations
law. It is important in the determination of who shall be included in a
proposed bargaining unit because, it is the sine qua non, the fundamental and
essential condition that a bargaining unit be composed of employees. Failure
to establish this juridical relationship between the union members and the
employer affects the legality of the union itself. It means the ineligibility of the
union members to present a petition for certification election as well as to vote
therein . . . . (At p. 689)
Case 20 cooperative rural bank of davao vs calleja

https://www.scribd.com/document/397222941/Co-Op-Rural-Bank-of-Davao-v-Ferrer-Calleja

case 21 gsis vs kapisanan ng mga manggagawa sa gsis

FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action

participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein
respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG” or the “Union”),
a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit
issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show
cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation
in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought
reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject
employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-
work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively
denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges
against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA
granted the petition and enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued
formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same
facts and events.
CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike
and similar activities available to workers in the private sector. In the
concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are
not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization,
petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees
waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-
disruptive effect of such mass action.
ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid
HELD: NO
The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of
government personnel to self-organization to complement the provision
according workers the right to engage in “peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law.”. It was against the
backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court
resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v.
Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage in
strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the
right of government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike.
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively
recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja.
But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there
are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the
purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national
security.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with
the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the
state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors
such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of
the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed
an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government
service shall be observed.
Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted
mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. 
With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004,
what respondent’s members launched or participated in during that time
partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a
prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity”
refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by
themselves or through their employees’ organization, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands
or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts,
pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating
KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or
participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of
the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance for the period
material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty
eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office
(1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving
the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of
transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707 employees
left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action
on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an
insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.
In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in
October 2004, the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of
exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken a
disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As
events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building
during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince
others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery
disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against
strikes by government personnel.
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the
authority and responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291,
the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS
personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the
filing of administrative charges against the absenting participants of the
October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and
enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he
signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and
doubtless within his jurisdiction.
Case 22 air philippines corp vs bureau of labor relations

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/gr_155395_2006.html
The case initially centered on the union registration of respondent Air Philippines Flight Attendants
Association (APFLAA), which was issued a Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-3-2067-99 by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). APFLAA filed on 17 March 1999 a petition for
certification election as the collective bargaining representative of the flight attendants of APC. After
the Med-Arbiter rendered a ruling ordering the holding of a certification election, such election was
held on 5 August 1999, with majority of the votes cast in favor of APFLAA. 2X

On 25 November 1999, APC filed a Petition for De-Certification and Cancellation of Union
Registration against APFLAA with the DOLE. APC alleged that APFLAA could not be registered as a
labor organization, as its composition consisted of "a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file flight
attendants." Particularly, APC alleged that flight attendants holding the position of "Lead Cabin
Attendant," which according to it is supervisory in character, were among those who comprised
APFLAA.

On 18 July 2001, the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR) Regional Director Alex E. Maraan
rendered a Decision dismissing the petition. The DOLE-NCR held that Article 245 of the Labor Code,
which states that supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in labor organizations of
rank-and-file employees, does not provide a ground for cancellation of union registration, which is
instead governed by Article 239 of the Labor Code. 3X

APC filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal regarding this Decision of the DOLE-NCR. In a
Resolution dated 18 July 2001, the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) denied the appeal, affirming the
rationale of the DOLE-NCR.4X
APC then immediately filed a Petition for Certiorari dated 12 December 2001 with the Court of
Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BLR in denying its appeal. However,
the petition was dismissed outright by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 10 January 2002,
on the ground that APC had "failed to avail of the remedy of a prior Motion for Reconsideration"
before the filing of the certiorari petition, which step, it stressed, is a "condition sine qua non to the
filing of a petition for certiorari."5X

APC filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 5 February 2002, but this too was denied by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution dated 13 September 2002. This time, the appellate court ruled that the
Motion for Reconsideration was "totally defective," for failing to contain the proof of service or
registry return receipts to the respondents. The Court of Appeals even noted that the Affidavit of
Service attached to the Motion for Reconsideration "failed to indicate the registry return receipts of
the registered mails to the respondents."6X

Hence, the present petition.

APC argues that its petition before the Court of Appeals involved mere questions of law, among
which is whether APFLAA’s union registration may be cancelled considering that the union is
allegedly composed of a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees. It is posited that
questions of law may be raised directly in a petition for certiorari without need of a prior motion for
reconsideration.7X

However, it is clear from the petition filed by APC before the Court of Appeals that the issues
involved do not consist of questions of law only. It is insisted therein that employees holding the
position of Lead Cabin Attendants are supervisory employees and hence disallowed from joining a
union of rank-and-file employees.8 On the other hand, APFLAA countered before the DOLE-NCR
and the BLR that only rank-and-file flight attendants comprised its membership. 9 Thus, the very
question of whether Lead Cabin Attendants are indeed supervisory employees appears to be factual
in nature, the proper resolution of which necessitates a factual determination of the actual duties of
Lead Cabin Attendants. Indeed, APC made reference therein to such documents as an employee’s
manual in support of its argument,10 documents that would evidently require factual evaluation before
accorded proper evidentiary value. X

There is admittedly some leeway for the Court of Appeals if it was so minded to give due course to
APC’s petition, notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration. Yet ultimately, the
determination of whether or not to admit a petition attended with such defect falls within the sound
discretion of the Court of Appeals.

Should the Court of Appeals decide, as it did, to dismiss the petition outright on such ground, it
would commit no reversible error of law nor any grave abuse of discretion, considering that the rule
requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the special civil action of
certiorari is well entrenched in jurisprudence.

It also does not escape the attention of the Court that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by APC
before the Court of Appeals was itself fatally defective, allowing the appellate court to deny the same
without having to evaluate its substantial arguments. The action of the appellate court relative to
APC’s missteps is consistent with procedural rules.

Still, the Court has deigned to give a close look at the substantial arguments raised in APC’s petition
before the Court of Appeals.
The DOLE-NCR Regional Director, in dismissing the petition for cancellation, cited our minute
resolution in SPI Technologies Incorporated v. DOLE11 wherein the Court observed that Article
24512 of the Labor Code, the legal basis for the petition for cancellation, merely prescribed the
requirements for eligibility in joining a union and did not prescribe the grounds for cancellation of
union registration.13 Since the filing of this petition, the Court has had occasion to rule, in Tagaytay
Highlands International Golf Club v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO,14 that "[t]he
inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such
inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated
in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 15 of the Labor Code."16X

Clearly then, for the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish that the rank-and-
file union includes ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the
Labor Code, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto,
the minutes of ratification, or in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of
officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly
elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR. 17X

In its Petition for De-certification and Cancellation of Union Registration, APC did not impute on
APFLAA such misrepresentation of the character necessitated under Article 239 (a) and (c) of the
Labor Code. APC merely argued that APFLAA was not qualified to become a legitimate labor
organization by reason of its mixed composition of rank-and-file and supervisory employees; and
that APFLAA committed misrepresentation by making it appear that its composition was composed
purely of rank-and-file employees. Such misrepresentation (if it can be called as such) as alleged by
APC, is not conformable to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code. Indeed, it appears from the
record that APC instead devoted the bulk of its arguments in establishing that supervisory
employees comprised part of the membership of APFLAA, a ground which is not sufficient to cause
the cancellation of union registration. And this is of course all under the assumption that Lead Cabin
Attendants are indeed supervisory employees, a claim consistently denied by APFLAA and which
was not confirmed by either the DOLE-NCR or the BLR.

There may be remedies available to enforce the proscription set forth in Article 245 of the Labor
Code on supervisory employees joining the union of rank-and-file employees. But consistent with
jurisprudence, the rule under Article 245 barring supervisory employees from joining the union of
rank-and-file employees is not a ground for cancellation of union registration. Accordingly, we see no
error on the part of the DOLE-NCR and the BLR in having dismissed APC’s petition, and thus no
cause to compel the Court of Appeals to disregard APC’s procedural errors and accept the petition
for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

Case 23 Philcom Employees Union vs Phil Globsl Communications

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jul2006/gr_144315_2006.html

case 24 colegio de san juan de letran vs association of employees case digest

FACTS: Salvador Abtria, President of respondent

union initiated renegotiations of its CBA with petitioner for
the last two years of CBA’s 5 years lifetime from 1989-
1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of
officers with private respondents Eleanor Ambas as the
newly elected President. Ambas wanted to continue
renegotiation, but petitioner claimed that the CBA was
already prepared for signing. The CBA was submitted to a
referendum which was rejected by the union members.
Later, the union notified the NCMB of its intention to strike
due to petitioners, refusal to bargain. Thereafter, the
parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start
negotiation on a new five-year CBA. The union submitted
its proposals to petitioner, which notified the union that the
same was submitted to its Board of Trustees. Meanwhile,
Ambas work schedule was changed, which she protested
and requested to be submitted to grievance machinery
under the old CBA. Due to petitioners’ inaction, the union
filed a notice of strike. Later, the Ambas was dismissed for
alleged insubordination. Both parties again discussed the
ground rules for the CBA renegotiations; however
petitioner stopped negotiations after allegedly receiving
information that a new group of employees had filed a PCE.
The union struck and the Secretary assumed jurisdiction
ordering all striking workers to return to work. All were
readmitted except Ambas. Public respondent declared
petitioner quilt of ULP and directed reinstatement of Ambas
with back wages.

ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by
refusing to bargain within the union when it unilaterally
suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that a
petition for certification has been filed by another
legitimate labor organization.
2) Whether the termination of the union president amounts
to an interference of the employees’ right to self –
organization.

HELD:
1. No. the duty to bargain collectively includes the mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously
in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
Petitioner failed to make a timely reply to the unions
proposals, thereby violating the proper procedure in
collective bargaining as provided in Article 250. In order to
allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining
process, there must be a valid PCE raising a legitimate
representation issue, in this case, the petition was filed
outside the 60-dayt freedom period; therefore there was
no legitimate representation issue and the filing of the PCE
did not constitute to the ongoing negotiation.

2. Yes, the dismissal was in violation of the employee’s

right to self- organization. The dismissal must be made
pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play wherein the
employers right to terminate the services of an employee
must be exercised in good faith, furthermore, it must not
amount to interfering with, restraining, or coercing,
employees in their right to self- organization. The factual
backdrop of the Ambas termination reveals that such was
done in order to strip the union of the leader; admittedly
management has the prerogative to discipline its
employees for insubordination. But when the exercise of
such management right tends to interfere whit the
employees right to self- organization, it amounts to union-
busting and is therefore a prohibited act.