PY4804 Philosophy of Logic

Week 3: Speech-Act and Deflationary Theories

1. Tarski’s Theory of Truth-Theories

(a) formal constraints:

(i) the object language and metalanguage must be kept distinct, to avoid the paradoxical
consequences of semantic closure

(ii) both object language and metalanguage need to be formally specified

(iii) the definition of truth must respect the standard constraints on good definitions (Haack,
Philosophy of Logics p. 103-4):
(α) no free variable may occur in the definiens which does not also occur in the
definiendum, and
(β) there must be no more than one occurrence of each variable in the definiendum

(iv) the metalanguage must contain adequate resources to refer to expressions of the object
language—names whose denotation can be effectively determined: e.g.

(α) quotation-names

(β) structural descriptive names (i.e. spelling), or

(γ) Gödel numbers (see, e.g., Boolos and Jeffrey, Computability and Logic, ch. 15)

(v) the expressive power of the metalanguage must be at least that of the object language, and

(vi) all undefined terms of the metalanguage must be physicalist, in particular, no semantic
terms may be taken as primitive.
(b) the material constraint: the T-condition or T-scheme. All instances of

(T) X is true iff p

must be derivable in the metalanguage, where what replaces ‘X’ is an effective name of the
object language sentence whose translation into the metalanguage replaces ‘p’. (N.B. ‘iff’ here
is material equivalence, ≡.)

(If the metalanguage extends the object language, so that the “translation” of each object
language sentence into the metalanguage is that sentence itself, the T-scheme is said to be
homophonic.)
(c) Tarski claims that only theories satisfying all these constraints are adequate as theories of truth.

(i) Tarski describes each instance of (T) as a partial definition of truth, that is, a definition of
truth for that sentence referred to by what replaces ‘X’.
(ii) Tarski claims that if the object language is finite (that is, contains only finitely many
sentences) then an adequate definition can be formed by conjoining the partial
definitions—a listiform definition of truth.

(iii) He claims that if the language is infinite (the normal case), no listiform definition is
possible, nor can one resort to generalization, such as

(D) (∀p)(‘p’ is true iff p)

 2

There are two objections to (D):

(α) enclosing the variable ‘p’ in quotation-marks to form a quotation-name forms a

constant name of the seventeenth letter of the alphabet, so instances of (D) are, e.g.
‘p’ is true iff it is snowing
—not what we want.

(β) however, if we allow quotation-functions, e.g., Gödel numbering,  p , the paradoxes

return: let (D´) be (∀p)(  p is true iff p) and let c be the Gödel number of

(∀p)(  p = c ⊃ ¬p).

Then c =  (∀p)(  p = c ⊃ ¬p)  , so by ∀E and reductio, ¬(∀p)(  p = c ⊃ ¬p), i.e.

(∃p)(  p = c & p), whence (∀p)(  p = c ⊃ ¬p), contradiction.

2. Deflationism about Truth

(i) the Disquotation Schema:
(Q) ‘p’ is true iff p
implicitly defines ‘true’, and no explicit definition is possible.
(ii) The deflationary thesis is “that there is no such property as truth and thus there is no need for,
or sense to, a theory of truth distinct from a theory of truth ascriptions” (Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
(iii) (Horwich 1982) “Metaphysical realism stands in opposition to … the deflationist redundancy
theory which denies the existence of surplus meaning and contends that Tarski’s [disquotation]
schema [(‘p’ is true iff p)] is quite sufficient to capture the concept.” (‘Three forms of realism’,
Synthese 51, 1982, p. 182)
(iv) (Horwich 1998) “Deflationism … maintains that … we can suppose that [the truth schemata]
implicitly define [the truth predicate]. Our brute acceptance of their instances constitutes our
grasp of the notion of truth. No conceptual analysis is called for—no definition of the form

‘true’ means ‘F’

… Moreover, there is going to be no non-definitional analysis of truth either … no substantive

discovery of the form
x’s being true consists in x’s having property F.”

(Truth 2e Postscript p. 121)

(v) (Soames) “The leading idea behind deflationism about truth [is] that claims of the sort It is true
that S  and The proposition that S is true are trivially equivalent to S and that this equivalence
is in some sense definitional of the notion of truth.” (Understanding Truth p. 231)

(vi) (Field) “I have argued that ‘correspondence truth’ (whatever exactly that is) is ill-suited to
serve the purpose that disquotational truth serves. In that case, what purposes does it serve? I
take it to be the core of Neurath’s and Ayer’s view, and … Quine’s … that the answer is that it
serves no useful purpose at all, and hence that theorizing about correspondence truth is
pointless at best. Any view that adheres to this position while at the same time … preserving a
 3

use for the word ‘true’ will be called a deflationary conception of truth. ([footnote] I take the
term from Horwich (1982), though there may be differences between my conception of
deflationism and his.)” (‘The deflationary conception of truth’, in Fact, Science and Morality,
ed. G. Macdonald and C. Wright, p. 59)
(vi) (Wright) “Deflationism contends that … the truth predicate[’s] content is wholly fixed by the
principle that

‘p’ is true if and only if p.

… [I]t is merely a device of ‘disquotation’ … [The deflationist] … holds that … the
Disquotational scheme … is (all but) a complete explanation of the truth predicate—a
contention from which he infers, dubiously, that truth is not a ‘substantial property’.” (Truth
and Objectivity pp. 13-15)

3. Redundancy Theories
(i) there is no (real) property of truth, and each proposition means the same as one stating that it is
true:
(R) ‘p’ is true =syn p

(ii) “According to the redundancy theory … we are saying nothing more or less than what we said
in the statement to which we appear to be ascribing truth” (Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy”
(iii) (Horwich) “It was suggested by Frege, Ramsey and Ayer that the forms ‘p’ and ‘It is true that
p’ yield the same sense no matter what declarative English sentence is substituted for ‘p’.”
(Truth p. 38)
(iv) (Soames) “The redundancy theory of truth … referred to by Alfred Tarski as ‘the nihilistic
approach to the theory of truth’ … [says that] there is no such property as truth and the
predicate ‘is true’ is not used to describe anything, … that to say It is true that S or The
proposition that S is true  is just to choose a redundant or long-winded way of saying S … The
word ‘true’ … does not play any logical role, has no descriptive content of its own, and so does
not contribute to the content of what is said.” (Understanding Truth p. 39-40)
(v) the prosentential theory: all uses of ‘true’ can be reduced to the form ‘it is true’: e.g., ‘What the
policeman said is true’ means ‘If the policeman said it is true, it is true’. The phrase ‘it is true’
is a prosentence (on analogy with a pronoun), represented by ‘thatt’: ‘If the policeman said
thatt, then thatt’, i.e. (∀p)(if the policeman said p then p). See, e.g., Kirkham §10.6.

4. Expressivism
(i) Expressivism about an area of discourse says that it is a mistake to suppose that such discourse
has a cognitive purpose in stating some fact; rather it is used to express an attitude.
(ii) Expressivist theories of truth:

(a) the performative (or confirmatory) theory (Strawson):

(α) the redundancy theory, that ‘p’ and ‘it is true that p’ have the same assertive
meaning, is right but inadequate. For ‘it is true that p’ is a performative, and has a
different illocutionary force from (but performs the same locutionary act as) ‘p’;
 4

(β) the illocutionary force of ‘it is true that p’ is that of assent or confirmation, not of
assertion, so that it constitutes a performative utterance;

(γ) ‘is true’ has an assertive “implicature”, namely, that a statement has been made.
(b) the Frege/Geach point:

(α) “A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a
proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be
recognisably the same proposition (Geach, ‘Assertion’, in his Logic Matters pp. 254-
5)

(β) “the corroboration theory of truth … considers only the use of ‘true’ to call a
statement true … [P]redications of ‘true’ or ‘bad’ in if or then clauses, or in clauses
of a disjunction, are just ignored … [To] write off such uses of the terms, as calling
for a different explanation from their use to call things true or bad … would mean
that arguments of the pattern “if x is true (if w is bad) then p; but x is true (w is bad)
ergo p’ contained a fallacy of equivocation, whereas they are in fact clearly valid.”
(Geach, ‘Ascriptivism’, loc. cit. p. 253)

(γ) Strawson is inspired, via Austin, by the same considerations in Frege as is Geach.
The two occurrences of ‘x is true’ have the same (locutionary) content (as x) and so
there is no equivocation.

5. Minimalism
(i) The minimalist theory of truth consists of a list (MT) containing every uncontentious instance
of the equivalence scheme:
(E): 〈p〉 is true ≡ p

(a) (MT) is not a conjunction (contra Kirkham p. 340)

(b) (MT) is not only infinite, indeed not merely uncountable, it is not even set-sized.
(c) the language of (MT) is semantically closed—Horwich makes no distinction between
object language and metalanguage.
(ii) the minimalist conception states that the minimalist theory expresses all that is necessary for an
account of truth.

(iii) the minimalist conception is deflationary but not a redundancy theory (pace Kirkham p. 339,
for Kirkham’s definition of a deflationary theory is different: “the deflationary thesis holds that
there is no property of truth”—p. 307), since many uses of ‘is true’ cannot be eliminated.

(iv) (MT) is a material equivalence (contra Kirkham p. 340), since Horwich thinks the modal
equivalences

〈p〉 is true ⇔ p

can be derived from (MT) because

(a) each instance of (MT) is known a priori and (MT) constitutes an implicit definition of the
meaning of ‘true’, and
(b) such a priori truths are necessary.
 5

Does the minimalist conception count as an answer to the Essence project? No: see §3(i)
below.
(v) (a) the correspondence theory, coherence theory, pragmatist theory and so on are not wrong,
but they do not (just) give an account of truth. They are entailed by (MT) in conjunction
with other theories.
(b) So the order of explanation has changed. Instead of requiring an adequate theory of truth to
entail all instances of (T), we use the list (MT) as the (whole) basis of truth.

6. Propositions
(i) Horwich prefers to predicate truth of propositions.

(ii) Horwich claims that admitting a truth-predicate is equivalent to allowing substitutional

quantification, for
(a) anything that can be said with a truth-predicate can be said without it by substitutional
quantification (cf. the prosentential theory), and
(b) conversely, ‘(∃ sub p)(… p …)’ means that some instance of ‘… p …’ is true.

Horwich always uses substitutional quantification rather than propositional quantification. But
he allows any proposition to be substituted, even those not expressible in any language.
(iii) (a) (MT) for utterances fails to support the modal equivalence ‘“p” is true ⇔ p’. Etchemendy
claims the (T)-schemata are not necessarily, or even naturalistically true (‘Tarski on truth
and logical consequence’, p. 61; cf. Kirkham p. 167, 198). For ‘p’ might have meant
something else (compatibly with the laws of physics).. But it can be expressed as
This(‘p’) is true iff p

where ‘This(‘p’)’ refers to the instance of ‘p’ on the RHS.

(b) (MT) for propositions is immune to the objections from semantic ascent.
(iv) the coherence of the notion of proposition is assured by the possibility of translation.

7. Problems with Minimalism

(i) (MT) cannot explain its own truth (Kirkham p. 347). (MT) is a stipulative definition (Truth 1 e
p. 52). But these words are removed in 2e. 2e says that the minimalist conception is not an
answer to the Metaphysical project, not a conceptual analysis, but that the equivalences in
(MT) are a brute fact. ‘is true’ is an unanalysable predicate governed by (MT). (MT) is
explanatorily basic and truth has no underlying nature.
(ii) Can (MT) explain the Tarski recursions and other generalizations?
(a) Horwich claims it can, e.g. that ‘p and q’ is true iff ‘p’ is true and ‘q’ is true. This follows
from the following instances of (MT):
‘p and q’ is true iff p and q

‘p’ is true iff p

‘q’ is true iff q.
 6

Soames (Understanding Truth p. 247) claims (MT) only generates the instances, not the
generalization:
A conjunction is true iff each conjunct is true,
since one could know every instance without knowing the generalization, for one might
not know that they were all the instance (so a generalization does not follow from its
instances, but requires a supplementary premise that these are all the instances).
(b) Similarly, Horwich claims that (MT) entails that if one proposition materially implies
another, and the first is true, so is the second (Modus Ponens):

Logic yields every instance of (1) (p & (p ⊃ q)) ⊃ q

and so of (2) (〈p〉 is true & (p ⊃ q)) ⊃ (〈q〉 is true) from (1) by (MT)

But we have every instance of (3) (〈p〉 implies 〈q〉) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) by the meaning of ‘implies’

and so (MT) yields every instance of (4) (〈p〉 is true & (〈p〉 implies 〈q〉)) ⊃ (〈q〉 is true) from (2) and (3)

So every instance of (5) 〈(〈p〉 is true & (〈p〉 implies 〈q〉)) ⊃ (〈q〉 is true)〉 is true from (4) by (MT)

Again, that every instance of (5) is true follows from (4) only if (MT) certifies that they are
all the instances.
(c) Reply on Horwich’s behalf: if we distinguish minimalism as the minimalist conception,
from the minimalist theory (MT), perhaps we can use the conception to yield the missing
premise, ‘and these are all the cases’.

(d) Horwich’s actual reply (2e p. 137): perhaps there is a (logically invalid but truth-
preserving!) rule which takes us “from a set of premises attributing to each proposition
some property, F, to the conclusion that all propositions have F”.
(iii) Truth-value gaps: these are impossible, given (MT):

(a) The (T)-scheme, plus the Law of Excluded Middle, entails Bivalence. Let ‘X is false’
mean ‘neg(X) is true’. Then by the (T)-scheme:
X is true ≡ p (*)

and neg(X) is true ≡ ¬p

if (what replaces) ‘X’ denotes (a translation of what replaces) ‘p’. So, given p ∨ ¬p, we
have

X is true or neg(X) is true

i.e. X is true or false.

(b) Kirkham claims (p. 176, 209) that this argument presupposes there are no vague states of
affairs. For suppose (the state of affairs) p is indeterminate. He cites Vision as claiming
that it follows that X is not true, so (*) is false. But Kirkham objects: no 3-valued logic
says so.

Here are the three best-known 3-valued matrices for ‘≡’ (see e.g. Haack Philosophy of
Logics p. 206-7):
 7

Kleene weak matrices Kleene strong matrices L/ ukasiewicz matrices

≡ T I F ≡ T I F ≡ T I F
T T I F T T I F T T I F
I I I I I I I I I I T I
F F I T F F I T F F I T

Note that Kleene’s weak and strong matrices agree on ≡. In all three cases, F ≡ I is
evaluated as I, not F.

Question: if p is I, is ‘X is true’ then F or I? If F, then the material adequacy condition is too

strong a constraint; if I, then the (T)-scheme is acceptable, provided ‘≡’ is modelled by the
L/ ukasiewicz matrix (that is, ‘X is true’ and p always take the same value).

(c) Horwich opts for an epistemic account of vagueness, that is, that there is always a sharp
cut-off, but where that cut-off is, is unknowable. So ‘〈p〉 is true’ does not imply ‘〈p〉 is
determinately true’ and ‘〈p〉 is true or false’ (which holds for all p) does not imply ‘〈p〉 is
determinately true or determinately false’.

(d) emotivism (non-cognitivism, generally): incompatible with minimalism. But the central
idea of these theories, that certain statements function differently from empirical
statements, can be reformulated, says Horwich, while allowing that they are true or false.
(iv) the Liar paradox: (MT) contains all “uncontentious” instances of (E):
(a) the contentious instances appear to be precisely the paradoxical ones. But how are they to
be identified? Is it not up to the theory of truth to identify them? Horwich admits this (2e
p. 136).
(b) Soames (op. cit. p. 247): “we find some T-propositions about ‘higher-level’ (truth-
attributing) propositions fully acceptable, even trivial; others we find puzzling and
pathological; while still others are outright paradoxical. These reactions are not arbitrary.
There is something about our grasp of the notion of truth that grounds them. No account
that leaves this out can be complete.”
(c) the language of (MT) uses a quotation-function, 〈p〉, which leads to paradox independently
of whether the paradoxical instances are included in (MT)—see §1(c)(iii)(β).