Atp-3 3 2 1 Edd V1 e (2) - 2

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NATO STANDARD
ATP-3.3.2.1
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND
PROCEDURES FOR CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT AND AIR INTERDICTION
Edition D Version 1
APRIL 2019
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION
Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN
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RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION
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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]
CAN In accordance with Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Canadian aircrew will not
call "in hot" to avoid confusion with "clear hot". Canadian aircrew and
JTACs will not read line numbers in the CAS brief.
FRA The “TACP/JTAC” terminology used in this document is unclear and may
suggest that this is a single element and that all JTACs are members of
a TACP (which is not the case in a number of NATO nations): TACP
and JTAC are two elements that may be distinct.
Therefore, France understands the terminology “TACP/JTAC” used in
this STANAG as follows:
- Page 2-10 – par. 2.3.c. line 3: TACP (with JTAC capability).
- Page 2-10 – par. 2.3.c. line 4: TACP or JTAC
- Page 2-10 – par. 2.3.d.: TACP (with JTAC capability)
- Page 2-14: JTAC (whether he is member of a TACP or not)
- Page 3-2: TACP, JTAC
- Page 3-3: TACPs, JTACs
- Page 3-81: TACPs and JTACs
- Page 4-1: TACP (with JTAC capability)
- Page 5-64: TACP (with JTAC capability)
- Page 5-67: TACP or JTAC
In addition, even if JTACs are usually employed at the company level, they
can be placed at a higher level. Consequently, in paragraph 3.24.2.a., in
order to cover all configurations, the term "JTACs” is more appropriate than
that of « company JTACs ».
MNE CHAPTER 4, Sections II, V and VI, paragraphs from 0409 to 0411,
paragraph 0413, paragraphs from 0430 to 0433 and paragraphs from 0434
to 0448 cannot be applied because Montenegro doesn’t have airplanes and
armed unmanned aerial vehicles.
POL Polish Joint Terminal Attack Controllers adhere to the tactics, techniques
and procedures (TTPs) for Close Air Support in accordance with Joint
Publication 3-09.3 Close Air Support. Polish Joint Terminal Attack
Controllers are familiar with TTPs laid down in the ATP-3.3.2.1(D) and will
apply them in case of NATO-led operation.
SVN While the Republic of Slovenia (RS) agrees with the principles of
ATP-3-3-2-1, RS bases its principles of Close Air Support (CAS) on the US
Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(TTPs) for Close Air Support (CAS).
USA Paragraph 1.3.9.1: The USA does not accept that a target that offers the
least risk of collateral damage should be chosen. The target should be
chosen based on which best accomplishes the mission while complying
with the obligations of international law, including the law of war. Military
necessity never justifies a breach of international law.
Throughout (At least five instances – 3.19.2.1; 3.21; 3.25.7.1; 3.25.8;
3.25.8.2): The USA does not agree with language that states or implies
effects are ‘achieved’. The USA position is that effects are created to
achieve military objectives; effects are not ends in and of themselves.
Effects are created not achieved.
Paragraph 3.19.2.1: The USA does not agree with the use of ‘kinetic’ as a
euphemism or substitute for ‘lethal’.
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Anything moving has kinetic energy; whether or not the moving object has
lethal capabilities depends on other factors.
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT .................................................................................................................XIII
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction, organization and fundamentals ........................................................................... 1-1

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO FIRE SUPPORT ................................................................................................... 1-1
1.1.1 Fire Power ............................................................................................................................... 1-1
1.1.2 Joint Fires................................................................................................................................. 1-1
1.1.3 Joint Fire Support and Close Air Support ................................................................................. 1-1
1.2 Introduction to Air Power attributes ................................................................................................ 1-2
1.2.1.1 Core Air Power Attributes. ................................................................................................ 1-2
1.2.1.2 Additional Attributes ......................................................................................................... 1-2
1.2.1.3 The Limitations of Air Power ............................................................................................. 1-3
1.3 CAS Fundamentals. ........................................................................................................................... 1-4
1.3.1 Close Air Support (CAS). .......................................................................................................... 1-4
1.3.2 Terminal Attack Control (TAC) ................................................................................................. 1-5
1.3.3 Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO). .................................................................................... 1-5
1.3.4 Use of Close Air Support .......................................................................................................... 1-5
1.3.5 Conditions for Effective Close Air Support .............................................................................. 1-7
1.3.6 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) ............................................................................ 1-9
1.3.6.1 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Planning ................................................................... 1-9
1.3.6.2 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Resources ................................................................. 1-9
1.3.6.3 Execution. ........................................................................................................................ 1-10
1.3.7 Close Air Support Integration ................................................................................................ 1-11
1.3.8 Close Air Support Aircraft Employment Considerations ....................................................... 1-12
1.3.9 Legal Considerations for Conducting Air Operations ............................................................ 1-13
1.3.9.1 Law of armed conflict ...................................................................................................... 1-13
1.3.9.2 Rules of engagement ....................................................................................................... 1-14
1.3.9.3 Collateral damage. ........................................................................................................... 1-15
1.3.9.4 Minimizing Friendly Fire .................................................................................................. 1-15
1.3.9.5 Minimizing Civilian Casualties.......................................................................................... 1-16
CHAPTER 2 - command and control ............................................................................................................... 2-1

2.1 Joint Force air comPonent (Jfac) ....................................................................................................... 2-1
2.1.1 COM JFAC ................................................................................................................................ 2-1
2.1.2 The JFAC .................................................................................................................................. 2-1
2.1.3 JFAC products related to CAS and AI. ...................................................................................... 2-1
2.1.4 Liaison with Component Commands ....................................................................................... 2-3
2.2 Ground Based Command and Control Elements .............................................................................. 2-3
2.3 Airborne Command and Control Elements ....................................................................................... 2-9
2.4 Communications Systems ............................................................................................................... 2-10
2.4.1 Communications Requirements. ........................................................................................... 2-11
2.4.2 Component Communications Nets. ...................................................................................... 2-11
2.4.3 Communications Equipment. ................................................................................................ 2-14
2.5 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance .............................................................................. 2-14
CHAPTER 3 - Planning and requesting ........................................................................................................... 3-1

Section I. Planning Concepts Essential for Close Air Support .......................................................................... 3-1
3.1 Battle Tracking .................................................................................................................................. 3-1
3.2 COordination. .................................................................................................................................... 3-2
3.3 Supported/Supporting Relationship. ................................................................................................ 3-3
3.4 Weapons Release Authority.............................................................................................................. 3-3
3.5 Tactical Risk Assessment. .................................................................................................................. 3-4
3.5.1 Troops in Contact (TIC). ........................................................................................................... 3-5
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3.6 Collateral Damage. ............................................................................................................................ 3-5

3.7 Target Acquisition and Location ....................................................................................................... 3-7
3.8 Correlation and Marking. .................................................................................................................. 3-9
3.8.1 Correlation Techniques and Types of Marks ........................................................................... 3-9
3.8.1.1 Talk-On .............................................................................................................................. 3-9
3.8.1.2 Sensor Talk-On with VDL feed. ........................................................................................ 3-10
3.8.1.3 Marks of opportunity. ..................................................................................................... 3-10
3.8.1.4 Direct Fire Marks. ............................................................................................................ 3-10
3.8.1.5 Indirect Fire (IDF) mark. ................................................................................................... 3-11
3.8.1.6 Air delivered marks .......................................................................................................... 3-12
3.8.1.7 LASER handoff ................................................................................................................. 3-12
3.8.1.8 Marking with IR pointers (IRP) ......................................................................................... 3-13
3.8.1.9 Link-16/SADL (Situation Awareness Data Link) handoff. ................................................. 3-15
3.8.1.10 Radar beacon offset. ..................................................................................................... 3-16
3.8.1.11 Combination. ................................................................................................................. 3-16
3.8.1.12 Marking Friendlies. ........................................................................................................ 3-16
Section II Methods of Attack and Types of Control ....................................................................................... 3-16
3.9 Methods of Attack. ......................................................................................................................... 3-16
3.9.1 Bomb on Coordinates (BOC) .................................................................................................. 3-17
3.9.2 Bomb on Target ..................................................................................................................... 3-18
3.10 Types of control .......................................................................................................................... 3-18
3.10.1 Type 1 Control. ................................................................................................................. 3-19
3.10.2 Type 2 Control. ................................................................................................................. 3-21
3.10.3 Type 3 Control. ................................................................................................................. 3-22
3.10.4 Additional Considerations for All Types of Control........................................................... 3-23
Section III CAS Integration Planning Considerations ..................................................................................... 3-26
3.11 Fire Support Coordination Measures. ........................................................................................ 3-26
3.11.1 Permissive measures ........................................................................................................ 3-27
3.11.1.1 Coordinated Fire Line (CFL). .......................................................................................... 3-27
3.11.1.2 Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). .......................................................................... 3-28
3.11.1.3 Free Fire Area. ............................................................................................................... 3-30
3.11.1.4 Kill Box. .......................................................................................................................... 3-31
3.11.2 Restrictive Measures. ....................................................................................................... 3-31
3.11.2.1 No-Fire Area (NFA)......................................................................................................... 3-31
3.11.2.2 Restrictive Fire Area (RFA). ............................................................................................ 3-33
3.11.2.3 Restrictive Fire Line (RFL). ............................................................................................. 3-34
3.11.2.4 Airspace Coordination Area (ACA) ................................................................................. 3-35
3.12 Airspace Control Means. ............................................................................................................ 3-37
3.13 Procedural Control Means. ........................................................................................................ 3-40
3.13.1 Contact Point (CP)/Initial Point (IP)/Battle Position (BP) Selection. ................................. 3-41
3.13.1.1 Keyhole template. ......................................................................................................... 3-42
3.13.2 Lateral Separation. ............................................................................................................ 3-44
3.13.3 Altitude Separation. .......................................................................................................... 3-44
3.13.3.1 Separation of aircraft from indirect fires. ...................................................................... 3-45
3.13.3.2 Separating multiple flights of aircraft ............................................................................ 3-45
3.13.4 Altitude and Lateral Separation. ....................................................................................... 3-46
3.13.5 Time Separation. ............................................................................................................... 3-46
3.13.5.1 Time on Target (TOT). .................................................................................................... 3-47
3.13.5.2 Time to Target (TTT). ..................................................................................................... 3-47
Section IV Close Air Support Planning Process .............................................................................................. 3-48
3.14 Close Air Support in the Decision-making Process ..................................................................... 3-48
3.14.1 Command and Staff Responsibilities ................................................................................ 3-48
3.14.2 Five Steps to CAS Planning Phase: .................................................................................... 3-50
3.14.2.1 Step 1: Receipt of Mission/Prepare for Mission Analysis. ............................................ 3-50
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3.14.2.2 Step 2: Mission Analysis. ............................................................................................... 3-50

3.14.2.3 Step 3: COA Development. ............................................................................................ 3-52
3.14.2.4 Step 4: COA Analysis/War Game. .................................................................................. 3-53
3.14.2.5 Step 5: Orders Production. ............................................................................................ 3-56
Section V Requesting Close Air Support ........................................................................................................ 3-57
3.15 Air Support requests .................................................................................................................. 3-57
Section VI CAS Planning Considerations- Mission ......................................................................................... 3-60
Types of Missions ..................................................................................................................................... 3-61
3.16 Shaping, close combat, and JSA operations. .............................................................................. 3-61
3.17 Offensive, defensive, and stability operations. .......................................................................... 3-61
3.17.1 CAS in Support of Offensive Operations. .......................................................................... 3-61
3.17.2 CAS in Support of Friendly Defensive Operations. ........................................................... 3-62
3.17.3 CAS in Stability Operations. .............................................................................................. 3-62
Section VII CAS Planning Considerations - Enemy ......................................................................................... 3-63
3.18 General types of targets. ............................................................................................................ 3-63
3.19 Effects. ........................................................................................................................................ 3-63
3.19.1 Operational Effects. .......................................................................................................... 3-63
3.19.2 Physical and functional effects ......................................................................................... 3-63
3.19.2.1 Show of Force Considerations ....................................................................................... 3-64
3.19.2.2 Warning shot ................................................................................................................. 3-65
3.20 Enemy air defenSes .................................................................................................................... 3-65
3.20.1 Countering Threats. .......................................................................................................... 3-66
3.21 Enemy EW capabilities ............................................................................................................... 3-66
Section VIII CAS Planning Considerations – Environment (Terrain, Weather) .............................................. 3-67
3.22 Terrain. ....................................................................................................................................... 3-67
3.22.1 Mountainous Terrain. ....................................................................................................... 3-67
3.22.2 Desert Environment. ......................................................................................................... 3-69
3.22.3 Forested/Jungle Environment. ......................................................................................... 3-70
3.22.4 Urban Environments. ........................................................................................................ 3-71
3.23 Weather. .................................................................................................................................... 3-76
3.23.1 Visibility. ........................................................................................................................... 3-76
3.23.2 Winds ................................................................................................................................ 3-78
3.23.3 Low Cloud Base. ................................................................................................................ 3-79
3.23.4 Extreme temperatures...................................................................................................... 3-80
Section IX CAS Planning Considerations - Troops (Close Air Support Assets) ............................................... 3-80
3.24 C2 Assets. ................................................................................................................................... 3-80
3.24.1 Airborne C2 Assets. ........................................................................................................... 3-81
3.24.2 Ground C2 Assets. ............................................................................................................. 3-81
3.25 JTAC/FAC(A) organic equipment ................................................................................................ 3-82
3.25.1 Communications Equipment. ........................................................................................... 3-82
3.25.2 Target Acquisition and Location Equipment. .................................................................... 3-83
3.25.3 JTAC/ FAC(A) Target Marking Equipment ......................................................................... 3-86
3.25.4 Friendly Forces marking equipment ................................................................................. 3-86
3.25.5 JTAC Operational Platforms. ............................................................................................. 3-87
3.25.6 CAS Aircraft Capabilities ................................................................................................... 3-89
3.25.7 Weapons Effects ............................................................................................................... 3-91
3.25.7.1 Weapons Effects. ........................................................................................................... 3-91
3.25.7.2 Risk Estimate Distance (RED) ......................................................................................... 3-92
3.25.7.3 Weapons’ Guidance Systems. ....................................................................................... 3-93
3.25.7.4 Types of Aviation Weapons ........................................................................................... 3-95
3.25.8 Electronic Warfare Assets In Support of CAS .................................................................. 3-100
3.25.8.1 EW Effects-Based Actions ............................................................................................ 3-101
3.25.8.2 EW Measures ............................................................................................................... 3-101
3.25.8.3 EW in support of CAS ................................................................................................... 3-103
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3.25.9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets. ................................................. 3-104

Section X Close Air Support Planning Considerations - Time Considerations ............................................. 3-104
Section XI LASER Operations ....................................................................................................................... 3-105
3.26 LASER hardware ....................................................................................................................... 3-105
3.27 Categories of LASER operations. .............................................................................................. 3-106
3.28 LASER Target Designator Planning considerations. .................................................................. 3-107
3.29 LASER Weapons employment considerations .......................................................................... 3-113
3.29.1 LASER Guided Bomb employment considerations ......................................................... 3-113
3.29.2 LASER guided missiles employment considerations. ...................................................... 3-113
Section XII- Close Air Support Aircraft Tactics Planning .............................................................................. 3-115
3.30 Fixed-Wing Tactics. ................................................................................................................... 3-116
3.30.1 All-Altitude Tactics. ......................................................................................................... 3-116
3.30.2 Medium/High Altitude Tactics. ....................................................................................... 3-117
3.30.3 Low/Very Low Altitude Tactics. ...................................................................................... 3-119
3.30.4 Rotary-Wing CAS Tactics. ................................................................................................ 3-122
3.30.5 Planning for Bomber Close Air Support .......................................................................... 3-127
3.30.6 Planning for CAS with Unmanned Aerial Systems .......................................................... 3-131
3.30.7 SOF Gunships. ................................................................................................................. 3-134
Section XIII Night and Limited Visibility Considerations. .......................................................................... 3-138
3.31 Categories of limited visibility employment. ............................................................................ 3-138
3.32 BOC and Inertially-Aided Munitions (IAMs). ............................................................................ 3-138
3.32.1 Visual Employment (non-NVD and inoperable/degraded Thermal Imager). ................. 3-139
3.32.2 Visual Employment Mission Planning Considerations. ................................................... 3-139
3.32.3 Visual Employment Mission Execution. .......................................................................... 3-140
3.33 System-Aided Employment. ..................................................................................................... 3-140
3.34 NVD Employment. .................................................................................................................... 3-141
CHAPTER 4 - preparation ............................................................................................................................... 4-1

4.1 Rehearsals ......................................................................................................................................... 4-1
4.1.1 Combined Arms Rehearsal. ..................................................................................................... 4-1
4.1.2 Fire Support Rehearsal. ........................................................................................................... 4-3
4.2 Pre-Combat Preparations ................................................................................................................. 4-6
4.3 Communications ............................................................................................................................... 4-9
4.4 Movement and Positioning. ............................................................................................................ 4-11
CHAPTER 5 - Execution .................................................................................................................................. 5-1

Section I. Introduction to Game plan and CAS Brief........................................................................................ 5-1
5.1 game plan.......................................................................................................................................... 5-1
5.1.1 Coordinated Attack Instructions.............................................................................................. 5-1
5.1.2 Third parties involvement. ...................................................................................................... 5-2
5.1.3 Individual game plan ............................................................................................................... 5-2
5.2 CAS Brief............................................................................................................................................ 5-2
5.2.1 9-line ........................................................................................................................................ 5-2
5.2.2 Remarks ................................................................................................................................... 5-6
5.2.3 Restrictions .............................................................................................................................. 5-7
Section II Close Air Support Target Engagement. .......................................................................................... 5-10
5.3 CAS Target Nomination. .................................................................................................................. 5-10
5.4 JTAC actions for developing CAS brief. ........................................................................................... 5-10
5.4.1 Development of Targeting Data. .......................................................................................... 5-11
5.4.2 Determination of Commander’s Desired Effects. .................................................................. 5-12
5.4.3 Requesting Air Support.......................................................................................................... 5-12
5.4.4 Development of Game Plan. ................................................................................................. 5-12
5.4.5 Development of correlation/marking plan. ........................................................................... 5-15
5.4.6 Development of Attack Geometry. ....................................................................................... 5-16
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Section III Close Air Support Execution Template. ........................................................................................ 5-17

5.4.7 Battle staff coordination prior to aircraft check in. ............................................................... 5-18
5.4.8 Routing/Safety of Flight – ...................................................................................................... 5-19
5.4.9 CAS Aircraft Check-in. ............................................................................................................ 5-20
5.4.10 Situation Update. .............................................................................................................. 5-24
5.4.11 Game Plan. ........................................................................................................................ 5-28
5.4.12 CAS Brief. .......................................................................................................................... 5-30
5.4.13 Remarks and Restrictions ................................................................................................. 5-33
5.4.13.1 REMARKS: ...................................................................................................................... 5-33
5.4.13.2 RESTRICTIONS. ............................................................................................................... 5-34
5.4.14 Readbacks. ........................................................................................................................ 5-36
5.4.15 Correlation. ....................................................................................................................... 5-37
5.4.15.1 Talk-On. ......................................................................................................................... 5-38
5.4.15.2 Enhanced Target Description (ETD). .............................................................................. 5-45
5.4.15.3 Correction from visually-significant marks. ................................................................... 5-47
5.4.15.4 IR Pointer Correlation .................................................................................................... 5-48
5.4.15.5 Aircraft Position Target Designation (APTD).................................................................. 5-51
5.4.15.6 Link-16 handoff. ............................................................................................................. 5-51
5.4.15.7 LASER hand-off. ............................................................................................................. 5-51
5.4.15.8 Aircraft LASER designation on target. ............................................................................ 5-54
5.4.15.9 Additional Considerations. ............................................................................................ 5-54
5.4.16 Attack. ............................................................................................................................... 5-54
5.4.16.1 Clearance to Drop/Fire. ................................................................................................. 5-55
5.4.16.2 Abort Procedures. .......................................................................................................... 5-56
5.4.16.3 Mutual Support. ............................................................................................................ 5-57
5.4.17 Assessment of effectiveness of the attack. ...................................................................... 5-58
5.4.18 Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). ................................................................................... 5-59
5.4.18.1 JTAC/FAC(A) Responsibilities. ........................................................................................ 5-60
5.4.18.2 Aircrew Responsibilities. ................................................................................................ 5-60
5.4.19 Routing / Safety of Flight. ................................................................................................. 5-60
Battle staff coordination after aircraft check out. ............................................................................... 5-61
Section IV Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance into Close Air Support. ..................................... 5-61
Section V.- Emergency Close Air Support. ..................................................................................................... 5-62
Section VI Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Integration ............................................................................. 5-63
5.4.20 FAC(A) Capabilities. ........................................................................................................... 5-64
5.4.21 FAC(A) Duties and Responsibilities. .................................................................................. 5-65
5.4.22 FAC(A) Integration ............................................................................................................ 5-66
5.4.23 Execution with FAC(A) ...................................................................................................... 5-68
Section VII. Joint Fires Observer Integration ................................................................................................. 5-71
5.4.24 JFO Actions. ...................................................................................................................... 5-71
5.4.25 JTAC/FAC(A) mission preparation. .................................................................................... 5-74
5.4.26 Execution template. .......................................................................................................... 5-74
5.4.27 Target Correlation. ............................................................................................................ 5-75
5.4.28 Mission Execution. ............................................................................................................ 5-76
5.4.29 CAS Execution with Non-JTAC Qualified Personnel. ......................................................... 5-77
PART II – AIR INTERDICTION ..................................................................................................................... X
CHAPTER 6 - INTRODUCTION AND FUNDAMENTALS ..................................................................................... 6-1

6.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 6-1
6.2 DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 6-1
6.3 AI MISSIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 6-2
6.4 AI AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................................................ 6-2
6.5 FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................................................................. 6-3
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6.6 CONSIDERATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE AI ................................................................................................ 6-4

6.7 SCAR IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................................................................... 6-4
CHAPTER 7 - COMMAND AND CONTROL ....................................................................................................... 7-1

7.1 OPERATIONAL C2 .............................................................................................................................. 7-1
7.2 TACTICAL C2 ...................................................................................................................................... 7-1
7.3 AIRSPACE ........................................................................................................................................... 7-2
CHAPTER 8 - PLANNING ................................................................................................................................. 8-1

8.1 OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................... 8-1
8.1.1 Conditions for AI missions ....................................................................................................... 8-1
8.1.2 AI mission design ..................................................................................................................... 8-2
8.1.3 Airspace Control ...................................................................................................................... 8-2
8.2 TACTICAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................................... 8-3
8.2.1 Aircrew Skill Set Requirements. .............................................................................................. 8-3
8.2.2 Aircraft Configuration .............................................................................................................. 8-3
8.2.3 Mission Planning...................................................................................................................... 8-4
8.2.3.1 SCAR-specific mission planning ......................................................................................... 8-4
8.2.4 SEAD Considerations ............................................................................................................... 8-5
8.2.5 Acceptable Level of Risk (ALR) ................................................................................................. 8-6
8.2.6 Coordinating Strikes to Maximize Effects on the Targets........................................................ 8-6
8.2.7 Contingencies .......................................................................................................................... 8-7
8.2.8 SCAR Coordinating Instructions / Mission Brief. ..................................................................... 8-8
CHAPTER 9 - EXECUTION ............................................................................................................................... 9-1

9.1 AI MISSION EXECUTION .................................................................................................................... 9-1
9.2 SCAR MISSION EXECUTION ............................................................................................................... 9-1
9.2.1 SCAR Communication .............................................................................................................. 9-1
9.2.1.1 SCAR Check-in .................................................................................................................... 9-1
9.2.1.2 En route ............................................................................................................................. 9-1
9.2.1.3 AI Asset Check-in ............................................................................................................... 9-1
9.2.1.4 SCAR Battlefield Handover ................................................................................................ 9-2
9.2.2 Holding/Deconfliction ............................................................................................................. 9-2
9.2.3 SCAR Mission Working Area Execution ................................................................................... 9-3
KILL BOX.......................................................................................................................................A-1
AI / SCAR mission planning guide ................................................................................................. B-1
NATO ASR TEMPLATE ................................................................................................................... C-1
SCAR MISSION BRIEFING GUIDE ...................................................................................................D-1
SCAR HOLDING / DECONFLICTION PLAN ....................................................................................... E-1
EXAMPLE DT 9-LINE CARD ............................................................................................................ F-1
Full motion video considerations ................................................................................................ G-1
DIGITALLY AIDED CAS (DaCAS) CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................H-1
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................................................. I-1
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ATP-3.3.2.1
PART I – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
XIII Edition D Version 1

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION, ORGANIZATION AND

FUNDAMENTALS
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO FIRE SUPPORT
1.1.1 Fire Power
Firepower is a critical enabler of land combat on the battlefield, primarily through its relationship
with, and contribution to, maneuver. The term firepower is commonly used to describe the
collective offensive capabilities of a military force or, alternatively, the military capability to
direct force at an enemy. Fire Power destroys, neutralizes, suppresses demoralizes and
influences. It can be delivered by sea, land and air platforms. It has physical, psychological
and physiological effects. Firepower provides the force to amplify or enable the effects of
tempo, simultaneity and surprise. Its effectiveness depends on its volume, accuracy, and its
suddenness or unpredictability. It allows force to be applied precisely, different systems to be
concentrated against a single task, and the rapid switching of fire between targets. The
psychological and physiological effects of Fire Power are transient, and should be exploited by
maneuver before they wear off. Hence effective operations require close coordination between
firepower and maneuver. Fire Power and maneuver are two of the Combat Functions, identified
in (land) tactical doctrine.
1.1.2 Joint Fires
Joint Fires (JF) is defined as fires applied during the employment of forces from two or more
components in coordinated action toward a common objective. It includes direct and indirect
fires and is an effects-based approach to operations initiated at the operational level.
1.1.3 Joint Fire Support and Close Air Support
Joint Fire Support (JFS) is defined as the coordinated and integrated employment of land-, air-
and naval fires to create the required effects on ground targets to support operations on ground
in the full spectrum of conflict. It encompasses the integration of fires and effects in order to
influence the adversary forces, installations or functions.
Depending on national doctrine, the Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE) could either
encompass influence elements as e.g. PSYOPS, CIMIC, EW or be incorporated in a wider cell
dealing with overall influence activities.
Close Air Support (CAS) is an element of Joint Fire Support which requires detailed planning,
coordination, and training of ground and supporting air forces for safe and effective execution.
Based on threat and the availability of other means of fire support or supporting arms,
synchronizing CAS in time, space, and purpose with supported ground forces may be the most
detailed and continuous integration task performed by the joint force and component
commanders and staffs.
CAS is used to attack the enemy in support of the commander’s Concept of Operations
(CONOPS), in a variety of environmental conditions, during day or night, and to augment other
supporting fires. The speed, range, and maneuverability of aircraft allow them to attack targets
that other supporting arms may not be able to effectively engage because of limiting factors
such as target type, range, terrain, or the ground scheme of maneuver. The Ground Force
Commander (GFC) is the ultimate authority for the use of all supporting fires in his respective
operational area.
1-1 Edition D Version 1
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The GFC at the lowest level is responsible for the use of supporting fires delivered by CAS
assets unless specifically retained by a higher level commander in the ground force chain of
command. The supported commander establishes the target priority, effects, and timing of
CAS fires within the boundaries of their assigned operations areas. CAS is a key capability for
each of these components to employ fires that destroy, suppress, or neutralize enemy forces
and in turn permit movement, maneuver, and control of territory, populations, and key waters.
1.2 INTRODUCTION TO AIR POWER ATTRIBUTES
AJP 3.3. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations defines the air power as:
‘The ability to use air capabilities to influence the behavior of actors and the course of events.’
In order to maximize effectiveness of air power during joint fires planners must take into
consideration the following air power attributes and limitations.
1.2.1.1 Core Air Power Attributes.
a. Speed.
The speed of aircraft allows military power to be projected rapidly and responsively and to
complete missions quickly. This creates tempo and the potential to exploit time.
b. Reach.
About 70% of the Earth’s surface is water, but all of it is covered by air. This provides
aircraft with unrivalled reach, normally unimpeded by terrain, and opens up all of an
adversary’s resources to attack or influence, however distant or isolated their location.
c. Height.
The advantage of height is an enduring military reality. Air power offers an unparalleled
vantage point; facilitating observation and thereby enabling operations within the land and
maritime domains.
1.2.1.2 Additional Attributes
The speed, reach and height of air power enable and enhance air power’s additional attributes
of ubiquity, agility and concentration. In combination, these provide air power’s characteristic
flexibility as the most responsive and easily scaled tool of national force.
a. Ubiquity.
Air power’s reach, combined with the growing persistence available through air-to-
air refueling and high endurance unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), creates the
attribute of ubiquity. This enables the Alliance to use air power to pose or counter
threats simultaneously, and across a far wider area than surface capabilities.
Unlike land forces, air power is not fixed at specific locations and its light footprint
makes it easier to commit in politically ambiguous circumstances.

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b. Agility.
Air power’s agility stems from its responsiveness, enhanced by the capabilities of
genuinely multi-role platforms. Agility means the Alliance can quickly switch the point
of application within and between operational theatres, sometimes during the same
mission, and create tactical to strategic effects in a variety of air power operational
roles. Agility also means the JTF can easily scale the scope of operations up or
down in response to a change in political guidance or political strategic objectives,
from air-policing at one end of the spectrum to full-scale war fighting at the other.
c. Concentration.
Air power’s speed and reach enables the JTF to concentrate air assets in time and
space to deliver military force when and where it is required. Precision technology
means that significant air power effects can be created without the need for large
numbers of aircraft; imposing psychological shock that may be crucial to military
success.
1.2.1.3 The Limitations of Air Power
Air power has limitations as well as strengths. However, these are relative, not absolute, and
must be understood in context. The most significant are impermanence, limited payload, and
vulnerability.
a. Impermanence.
Although high endurance UAS and air-to-air refueling have increased individual air
assets’ persistence; aircraft still require ground servicing and rearming. However, air
power’s reach and responsiveness can be exploited to hold adversaries at risk
without necessarily maintaining a constant presence in the air. If a continuous
presence is required, multiple assets can be employed serially to satisfy
commanders’ objectives.
b. Limited Payload.
Aircraft design places a practical limit upon the payload that can be carried.
However, miniaturization and precision technology are enabling greater impact with
fewer and smaller weapons whilst the use of air transport aircraft trades-off weight
of payload against advantages in speed and reach.
c. Vulnerability.
The nature of the air environment creates specific vulnerabilities, including: the
relative fragility of air vehicles; the effects of weather on air operations; and the
requirement for basing.

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d. Fragility.
Air platforms are comparatively lightly armored which limits the extent to which it is
sensible to expose them to hostile fire. Whilst tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs), low observable technology and platform protection can be used to mitigate
the operating risk, air planners must be cognizant of the capabilities (and limitations)
of the platforms assigned to a campaign or operation.
e. Weather.
Poor weather can hamper air operations and commanders require accurate, timely
and relevant environmental information in order to maximize the effectiveness of air
systems and missions. However, technological developments have enabled Alliance
air power to operate by day and night in adverse conditions; providing a potential
operational and tactical advantage that can be exploited against less capable
adversaries.
f. Basing.
Like other forms of military power, most air capabilities depend on regional bases
for support. Consequently, diplomacy and upstream engagement may be a key
enabler for air operations in order to secure the necessary access, basing and over-
flight permissions. Deployed land-based air operations also bring a specialist force
protection requirement that Member Nations need to consider when assigning air
assets to an operation or campaign.
1.3 CAS FUNDAMENTALS.
1.3.1 Close Air Support (CAS).
CAS is an air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and
which require detailed integration of each air mission with fire and movement of those forces.
CAS provides ground or amphibious forces with firepower in offensive and defensive
operations, by day or night, to destroy, suppress, neutralize, disrupt, fix or delay enemy forces
in close proximity to friendly ground forces. The firepower and mobility of aircraft can make an
immediate and direct contribution to the surface battle, especially against targets that are either
inaccessible or invulnerable to available surface weapons effects. The variety of targets likely
to be encountered makes it important to be able to employ a variety of weapons and delivery
systems, thus reliable and interoperable communications with the supported force are
essential features in the CAS environment (AJP-3.3).
CAS can be conducted at any place and time friendly forces are in close proximity to enemy
forces. The word “close” does not imply a specific distance; rather, it is situational. The
requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires, or movement is the determining
factor. At times, CAS may be the best means to exploit tactical opportunities in the offense or
defense. CAS provides fires to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay
enemy forces.
Each nation organizes, trains, and equips to employ CAS within its roles as part of the NATO
alliance. As a result, a variety of aircraft are capable of performing CAS. The COM JFC and
staff must be capable of integrating CAS capabilities into the CONOPS.

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1.3.2 Terminal Attack Control (TAC)
Terminal Attack Control is the authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release
clearance to attacking aircraft. A certified and qualified JTAC/FAC(A), in accordance with ATP-
3.3.2.21,will be recognized across NATO as capable and authorized to perform TAC
operations. NATO operational commanders may require additional training and qualifications
for specific operations.
1.3.3 Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO).
Terminal guidance is different from TAC. TGO are those actions that provide electronic,
mechanical, voice, or visual communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons
additional information regarding a specific target location. Various ground elements or aircrews
conducting a wide variety of missions can search for, identify, and provide the location of
targets using systems like Global Positioning System (GPS), LASER designators/range
finders, and aircraft targeting pods. Unless qualified as a JTAC/FAC(A), personnel conducting
TGO do not have the authority to control the maneuver of or grant weapons release to attacking
aircraft. These functions must be done by appropriate command and control (C2) authorities.
Terminal guidance is guidance applied to a weapon between midcourse guidance and arrival
in the vicinity of the target and may be a function of CAS, interdiction, or other missions.
1.3.4 Use of Close Air Support
CAS is used to attack the enemy in support of the commander’s CONOPS, in a variety of
environmental conditions, during day or night, and to augment other supporting fires. The
speed, range, and maneuverability of aircraft allow them to attack targets that other supporting
arms may not be able to effectively engage because of limiting factors such as target type,
range, terrain, or the ground scheme of maneuver. Ground force commanders (GFC) are the
ultimate authority for the use of all supporting fires in their respective operational area. The
ground force commander at the lowest level is responsible for the use of supporting fires
delivered by CAS assets unless specifically retained by a higher level commander in the
ground force chain of command. As supported commanders, responsible ground force
commanders decide the target priority, effects, and timing of CAS fires within an operational
area and optimally make decisions with the advice and guidance of specially trained personnel.
As the supporting commander, the JFAC remains responsible for the planning and
employment of CAS assets provided by the air component.
a. Battlefield Utility.
CAS provides commanders with flexible and responsive fire support. Using CAS,
commanders can take full advantage of battlefield opportunities by massing
firepower to maintain the momentum of an offensive action or reduce operational
and tactical risk. The mobility and speed of aircraft provides commanders with a
means to strike the enemy swiftly and unexpectedly.
1 ATP 3.3.2.2 does not apply to FAC(A) certification and qualification. NATO nations currently develop
their FAC(A) standards independently.
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b. Usage Criteria.
Commanders consider the following criteria in planning for CAS:
(1) Mission and CONOPS.
(2) Enemy disposition, composition, and strength.
(3) Capabilities and limitations of available aircraft and available ordnance

(e.g., on station time, on board precision targeting, precision ordnance circular
error [CE], net explosive weight).
(4) Locations of communications, and special equipment available to JTACs

(e.g., mounted/dismounted, very high frequency [VHF]/ultrahigh frequency
[UHF]/satellite communications [SATCOM], LASER designators, infrared [IR]
pointers, and LASER Range Finders [LRFs]).
(5) Rules of engagement (ROE).
(6) Special instructions (SPINS).
(7) Enemy air defenses and the joint force’s ability to counter them.
(8) Location of friendly troops, requirements necessary to integrate CAS with

the fire and maneuver schemes.
(9) JFC’s apportionment decision, the JFAC’s allocation and JFLC’s

distribution of CAS sorties.
(10) Location of civilians, collateral damage estimate.
c. Targeting.
Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the
appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and
capabilities. While conducting CAS, this may equate to the JTAC selecting a
particular target in a target array. The term targeting employed in this ATP doesn’t
refer to the joint targeting cycle but relates to the combat engagement. For a further
discussion on targeting, refers to AJP-3.9 “Allied joint doctrine for joint targeting” and
ATP-3.9.2 “Allied tactical doctrine for land tactical targeting”. When selecting
targets, JTACs begin with the supported ground force commander’s order or
direction to conduct a CAS attack, and then must consider details such as target
type, mission, enemy air defenses, terrain and weather, available armament, and
response time.
Other considerations include attack geometry, proximity of friendly forces, potential

for collateral damage, capability of available sensors, and other fire support
available. Aircrews retain the primary responsibility for developing weaponeering
recommendations and aircraft employment tactics, while the JTAC focuses on target
effects. JTACs will recommend to the GFC the ordnance to be used and authorize
or deny ordnance employment as directed by the GFC. Additionally, JTACs,
FAC(A)s sand CAS aircrew must expeditiously obtain and report Battle Damage
Assessment (BDA) information. Commanders, JTACs, FAC(A)s and CAS aircrew
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can use BDA to determine if objectives have been met, or whether a re-attack is
necessary.
1.3.5 Conditions for Effective Close Air Support
The conditions for effective CAS are: thoroughly trained personnel with well-developed skills,
effective planning and integration, effective C2, air superiority (especially Suppression of
Enemy Air Defenses [SEAD]), target correlation, marking and/or acquisition, streamlined and
flexible procedures, and appropriate ordnance. Although not a requirement for CAS
employment, favorable environmental conditions improve CAS effectiveness.
a. Effective Training and Proficiency.
CAS training should integrate all maneuver and fire support elements involved in
executing joint fires. Maintaining proficiency allows all players to adapt to rapidly
changing conditions in the operational environment.
b. Planning and Integration.
Effective CAS relies on thorough, coherent planning and detailed integration of air
support into ground operations. The ability to mass joint fire support at a decisive
point and to provide the supporting fires needed to achieve the commander’s
objectives is made possible through detailed integration with ground forces. From
a planner’s perspective, the preferred use of a CAS asset is to have it preplanned
and pre-briefed. Rehearsals provide participants an opportunity to walk through the
operation, to achieve familiarity with terrain, airspace restrictions and procedures,
and to identify shortfalls.
c. Command and Control (C2).
CAS requires an integrated, flexible C2 structure to identify requirements, request

support, prioritize competing requirements, task units, move CAS forces to the target
area, provide threat warning updates, and enhance combat identification (CID)
procedures. Accordingly, C2 requires dependable and interoperable
communications between aircrews, air control agencies, JTACs, ground forces,
supported commander and fire support agencies. Proper planning and C2 of CAS
mission aircraft is essential to achieve air-ground integration. Through the balanced
use of maneuver and movement control, Airspace Control Means (ACMs), and Fire
Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) commanders can facilitate effective and
timely use of joint military assets employed in a CAS role in support of ground forces.
d. Air Superiority.
Air Superiority permits CAS to function without prohibitive interference by the

adversary. Air superiority may range from local or temporary air superiority to control
of the air over the entire operational area. SEAD is an integral part of achieving air
superiority and may be required during CAS attacks.

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e. Correlation and Target Marking.
Correlation is the process by which the JTAC/FAC(A) coordinates and confirms that
the attacking aircraft and/or a third party contributor have acquired the correct target
or mark. Correlation is required on each and every CAS attack.
Marks are aids to correlation. The commander employing CAS can improve its
effectiveness by providing timely and accurate target marks. Target marking builds
situational awareness, identifies specific targets in an array, reduces the possibility
of friendly fire and collateral damage, and facilitates terminal attack control. When
the commander employing CAS foresees a shortfall in ability to mark for CAS, the
commander should request that capability during the planning phase.
f. Streamlined and Flexible Procedures.
Responsive fire support allows a commander to exploit dynamic battlefield

opportunities. Because the modern battlefield can be extremely dynamic, CAS
procedures must also be flexible enough to change targets, tactics, or weapons
rapidly. The requestor is usually in the best position to determine fire support
requirements, and like all fire support, CAS must be responsive to be effective.
Techniques for improving responsiveness include:
(1) Placing JTACs and Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) to facilitate continuous
coordination with ground units, communication with aircraft, and observation
of enemy locations.
(2) Placing CAS assets (aircraft and aircrews) to forward operating locations
near the operational area.
(3) Placing untasked aircrews in a designated ground or airborne alert

status.
(4) Delegating launch authority to subordinate units. Re-task aircraft in

response to target updates and higher priority emerging targets; or re-role
scheduled aircraft on the ATO in response to a higher priority aircraft mission
types (e.g., from AI to CAS). This redirect authority should be delegated to the
lowest tactical level feasible, while allowing adherence to the JFC’s approved
plan.
g. Appropriate Ordnance.
To create the desired effects with CAS, planners, JTACs, and aircrews must match
the appropriate ordnance to the target. For example, cluster and general purpose
munitions are effective against area targets such as troops and vehicles in the open,
but not against hardened targets, and are not advisable for targets where friendly
troops may be affected by the immediate strike or by unexploded ordnance. In all
cases, the supported commander needs to know the type of ordnance expended, in
order to achieve the desired weapon effects, the probability for collateral damage,
and the possible impact on the unit’s current or subsequent mission.

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h. Environmental Conditions.
Favorable environmental conditions improve aircrew effectiveness regardless of

aircraft or weapon capability. Tactical decision aids (e.g., target acquisition weather
software, night vision device (NVD) planning software, IR target/scene simulation
software, and integrated weather analysis aid) assist planners and operators by
providing target and background detection data. Before CAS missions are executed,
the minimum weather conditions must be considered. Targets located solely by
radar or geographic coordinates may not offer the aircrew or JTAC precise enough
information to ensure positive target identification (ID) and avoidance of friendly fire.
Environmental conditions may also limit the operations of one type of platform
without affecting another. For example, RW aircraft can often operate effectively
under low ceilings that might render FW aircraft CAS ineffective, while FW aircraft
can operate above blowing surface dust that might keep helicopters grounded.
Environmental conditions significantly impact the ability to use target marking
devices as well and must be considered for effective CAS missions.
1.3.6 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
In recent conflicts a significant air defense (AD) threat to multinational aircraft wasn’t a
concerning factor. In future conflicts multinational aircrafts may face an enemy equipped with
sophisticated AD threat systems integrated into a well designed overlapping AD umbrella.
These defense systems may seriously decrease the effectiveness of friendly CAS operations.
SEAD operations attack the adversary’s AD posture in order to create favorable conditions for
friendly operations to achieve their objectives with a reduced risk of attrition. For more details
on SEAD see AJP 3.3.1. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Air.
1.3.6.1 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Planning
Effective SEAD requires unity of effort to create a combined arms effect. General guidance for
SEAD planning is provided by the Joint Force Commander (JFC). The JFC uses all assets to
protect friendly forces and exploit threat weaknesses. Component commanders will take this
guidance into account when developing their own plans and operations orders. Detailed SEAD
planning will take place at that command level where the assets to conduct SEAD are
available.
1.3.6.2 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Resources
Each component has its own unique capabilities to suppress adversary AD systems.
Historically, the component directly affected by the threat has assumed the immediate
responsibility for suppressing enemy ADs. However, the distinct capabilities provided by each
component, the diverse combinations these capabilities offer, and the aggregate of total SEAD
capabilities allow allied forces to choose the best means and ways to conduct particular SEAD
operations from the array of available options. Some of these options include aircraft with anti-
radiation missiles (ARMs) and other air-to-surface munitions, EW, AH, direct or indirect fires
(including mortars, artillery, missiles, drones or maritime fires), and direct action by Special
Operation Forces (SOF). SEAD operations can be accomplished through destructive and
disruptive means.

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a. Destructive Means.
Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or the operating
personnel. The effects are cumulative and increase aircraft survivability, but
destructive means may place large demands on the available combat
capabilities/forces. Examples of destructive SEAD capabilities are Anti-radiation
missiles (ARMs), Directed Energy (DE) and other munitions, e.g. bombs, air and
surface-to-surface missiles, drones and artillery.
b. Disruptive Means.
Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay, or neutralize adversary

AD systems to increase aircraft survivability. Disruptive means may be either active
or passive. Active means include ARM, DE, electromagnetic jamming and
electromagnetic deception expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys), tactics such as
deception, avoidance, or evasive flight profiles. Passive means include emission
control, camouflage, IR shielding, warning receivers, and material design features.
1.3.6.3 Execution.
SEAD operations can fall into three categories: Joint Operations Area (JOA) AD system
suppression, localized suppression, and opportune suppression.
a. JOA Air Defense System Suppression.
JOA AD system suppression creates increasingly favorable conditions for allied

operations by disabling adversary AD systems (or major capabilities of those
systems). It should target high payoff AD assets that will result in the greatest
degradation of the adversary’s total system. These targets include adversary ground
radars and associated Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)
for early warning, ground control intercept (GCI), critical communications nodes, and
long-range Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) systems.
b. Localized Suppression.
Localized suppression operations normally have specified time and space

limitations because they support specific operations or missions. They are normally
confined to geographical areas associated with specified ground targets or friendly
transit routes. These operations may occur throughout the JOA for all components
and have time and space limitations because they protect specific operations or
missions. Based on the JFC guidance, the land and maritime components’ fire
support elements and fire support coordination centers will determine the
suppression systems available to conduct localized suppression. Examples of these
capabilities/forces include field artillery, mortars, maritime surface fire, attack
helicopters, EW, and surface-to-surface missiles. JFSEs at all levels and Tactical
Air Control Parties (TACPs), identify potential local SEAD targets and request SEAD
fire support.

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c. Opportune Suppression.
Opportune suppression includes self-defense and offensive attacks against

adversary AD targets of opportunity. It is a continuous operation involving immediate
response to acquired AD targets of opportunity. Many AD threats are not identified
in enough time for planned suppression. The JFC or higher authority will ensure
ROE for opportune suppression (SEAD ROE) are part of the established ROE.
(1) Aircrew Self-defense.
Unless otherwise dictated by the law of armed conflict, restrictions ordinarily

should be imposed only for the safety of friendly forces.
(2) Targets of Opportunity.
SEAD targets of opportunity are those adversary AD systems detected by

surface or airborne sensors or observers within range of available weapons
and not yet targeted. Many SEAD efforts by surface forces may be against
targets of opportunity. Surface and air weapon systems may suppress AD
targets of opportunity whenever capabilities, mission priorities, and ROE
permits. Such suppression operations should be coordinated through the AOC
and/or fire support coordination centers unless autonomous action is
specifically permitted by ROE or other appropriate command. The purpose of
SEAD ROE is to enhance effective suppression of adversary ADs while
minimizing risks to friendly forces.
(3) Targets Acquired by Observers or Controllers.
Many combat elements may often be in a good position to acquire SEAD

targets of opportunity. Observers, spotters, controllers, and liaison officers
from the components have the authority to request suppression for SEAD
targets of opportunity. Such personnel include JTACs, component surveillance
and target acquisition elements, and assets. The observers or controllers will
submit these requests through their respective fire support channels.
(4) Targets Acquired by Aircrews.
When aircrews have acquired SEAD targets of opportunity but have not
engaged them because of mission priorities, system capabilities, or SEAD
ROE, they pass the information to the agency controlling their mission. This
agency immediately passes the targeting data through the appropriate system
or systems to coordinate with the force best suited for targeting.
1.3.7 Close Air Support Integration
For joint air operations, the integration of CAS starts at the operational level during the joint air
tasking cycle. The JFC’s air apportionment decision ensures consistent use of joint air assets
with his targeting priorities, guidance, and objectives. Whether conducting offensive or
defensive operations, commanders plan for CAS at key points throughout the operational area.
Like other joint force capabilities, the JFC prioritizes the use of joint air operations for CAS to
support his CONOPS. The Commander, Joint Force Air Component (COM JFAC) (if
established) provides the JFC with an air apportionment recommendation, after consultation
with other affected component commanders. Each component has the opportunity to influence
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the JFC air apportionment decision. This impacts aircraft allocation for various joint air missions
(e.g., CAS, air interdiction [AI]) and sorties for a given period of time. The COM JFAC allocates
and tasks air capabilities/forces made available based on the JFC’s air apportionment
decision. Along with mission requirements, the COM JFAC positions joint air capabilities/forces
to optimize CAS support to requesting units. The operation order (OPORD), air operations
directive (AOD), air tasking order (ATO), airspace control order (ACO), and SPINS provide the
framework for integrating joint air operations (CAS, AI, etc.) into the JFC’s CONOPS and
provides CAS capabilities consistent with the supported component’s requirements.
1.3.8 Close Air Support Aircraft Employment Considerations
The organizational structure, primary missions, and capabilities of CAS-capable aircraft

determine CAS employment methods. In a multi-national force, the integration of CAS-capable
aircraft allows commanders to take advantage of the distinctly different, but complementary,
capabilities of each platform. Although FW and RW aircraft can both conduct CAS, the
employment considerations of each differ and may vary among NATO members.
a. Generic Considerations.
Commanders and planners typically measure FW and RW aircraft employment in

sorties (one flight by one aircraft). Normally, CAS fighter/attack aircraft fly in groups
of two to four aircraft, thus equaling two to four sorties. Bombers normally fly as
single aircraft or two-ship formations, thus one or two sorties. Area denial munitions
and forward firing ordnance can be optimized to effectively attack any tactical CAS
target in any terrain and under almost any conditions of weather and light, especially
when equipped with advanced sensors.
b. Fixed-Wing Considerations.
Due to inherent speed and range, FW CAS aircraft offer the COM JFC enhanced
versatility and flexibility in delivering combat power when and where directed.
Additionally, FW asset aircrews are trained and equipped to employ the full range of
unguided weapons and precision guided munitions. They are poised to effectively
employ the munitions available in their respective arsenals
c. Rotary-Wing Considerations.
RW attack assets also provide the ability to maneuver and reposition firepower in
response to changing situations. They carry a wide variety of forward firing
munitions, are equipped with advanced sensors, have excellent response and loiter
times, can conduct low altitude or nap of the earth ingress, attacks, and egress, and
have an excellent capability to conduct CAS in diverse terrain and when
accompanying other transport or rescue assets.
NATO members and their respective armed services may or may not consider RW
as performing CAS. Some may operate under Close Combat Attack (CCA)
guidelines and therefore may not require a JTAC to execute the mission. Reference
ATP-49 for CCA missions.

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d. Unmanned Aircraft Close Air Support Employment Considerations
Unmanned aircraft (UA) are often equipped with weapons and sensor capabilities
on a par with most FW aircraft. UA offer the ground force commander additional
joint fire support assets that complement manned FW CAS aircraft and RW attack
helicopters. Some UA have very long on-station times and offer increased
communications connectivity and reach back capability to ground C2 personnel. UA
normally fly single ship and at slow speed, so they cannot be rapidly repositioned in
response to changing situations. When employing UA in CAS, a JTAC uses UA
video to build situational awareness (SA) of the target area and to locate targets that
are in defilade or masked from view on the ground.
Once a target has been found, the JTAC can use the video to talk a CAS aircraft
onto the target and give corrections to follow-on CAS aircraft. In a more complex
scenario, the JTAC can use a LASER target designator (LTD) to designate and/or
mark a target for LASER guided munitions from CAS aircraft onto targets. If the UA
is armed, its weapons payload may be employed using CAS procedures.
Furthermore, UA may be able to provide for LASER spot handoff for other aircraft.
With the use of full motion video or still target imagery, UA are capable of aiding in
the correlation of targets with other CAS participants.
Planning is critical to the integration of UA into CAS operations and requires a

thorough understanding of specific UA capabilities in order to make sound tactical
recommendations. UA operators must understand the tactical situation and be
integrated into mission planning. Liaison officers (LNOs) operating between the
UAS element and the supported unit are critical to effective mission planning and
execution.
1.3.9 Legal Considerations for Conducting Air Operations
Commanders at all levels must plan and execute their missions effectively albeit within the
constraints of international and individual national laws. Ensuring air operations maintain
legitimacy must be a key consideration for the COM JFAC and his/her staff; facilitated by Legal
Advisor (LEGAD) support whose primary role is to ensure air operations are conducted in a
legal manner and in particular in conformity with the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and the
relevant rules of engagement (ROE) if applicable, and otherwise with the other relevant areas
of international and national law.
1.3.9.1 Law of armed conflict
LOAC is a part of international law governing the relations between states. It regulates the
rights and duties of the belligerents in time of armed conflict. Its main purpose is to protect
combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering; to safeguard the fundamental
rights of civilians and persons who fall into the hands of an armed belligerent; and to facilitate
the restoration of peace.
The international security situation may require a broad range of responses, sometimes within
a single operation. Consequently, operations may occur within a complex legal framework
regulating the use of force which may, in turn, restrict the use of lethal force. Each nation
interprets and characterizes the situation and the applicable legal framework – including
relevant international law, Security Council authorizations, and its own domestic law and, in

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some circumstances, host nation law – when making targeting decisions. General descriptions
of the Law of Armed Conflict principles related to targeting are below.
a. Military necessity.
Any target prosecuted must offer a definite military advantage. If there is a choice
between targets in order to realize a similar military advantage, the target that offers
the least risk of collateral damage should be chosen. Military necessity never
justifies a breach of international law.
b. Humanity.
The principle of humanity forbids inflicting unnecessary suffering, injury or

destruction to accomplish legitimate military purposes. Once the military purpose is
achieved, inflicting further suffering, injury or destruction is forbidden.
c. Distinction.
Offensive action must only be directed against military objectives, making a clear
distinction between them, civilian objects and civilians. Feasible precautions are to
be taken in the choice of means and methods of any target prosecution to avoid –
or at least minimize – incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects. Particular care must be taken when considering targets in the vicinity
of entities on the no-strike list.
d. Proportionality.
No engagement may be launched, and any engagement in progress must be

stopped, in which the expected total incidental loss would be excessive in relation
to the direct anticipated military advantage. Note that the application of this rule is
judged not on the actual loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects (or a combination thereof) or the actual military advantage of the attack, but
upon the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof expected and foreseeable at the time the attack was planned,
and the military advantage anticipated. The anticipated military advantage refers to
the advantage to be gained from the attack considered as a whole, and not from
isolated or particular actions. Generally, military advantage is not restricted to
tactical gains, but is linked to wider operational objectives and the strategic end
state.
1.3.9.2 Rules of engagement
Military actions are controlled by ROE which are authorized by the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
for NATO/NATO-led operations on approval of the operational plan (OPLAN). ROE define the
degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that such
application of force is carefully controlled. Should commanders at any level require a change
to the extant ROE in order to carry out their assigned task they may request a change, with
justification, through their command chain. Conformity of any action within any ROE profile in
force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commander’s responsibility to use
only that force which is in accordance with the principles of international law.

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ROE should be timely, appropriate, current, responsive to change and not too specific or
restrictive. It is also essential that adjacent or mutually supporting formations and forces
particularly understand each other’s ROE, as it cannot be assumed that each will react in the
identical fashion to a given situation. This in turn can contribute to confusion, misperceptions
and even fratricide. ROE never limit the right of self-defense, but provide political, legal and
policy direction for the conduct of NATO operations. Even if no rule from a particular series is
included, the relevant principles of law apply.
1.3.9.3 Collateral damage.
For the purpose of collateral damage estimation (CDE), collateral damage is defined as
unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful
military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time.
CDE provides a probability, but not a certainty, of collateral damage for a specific weapon
system. CDE facilitates the legal consideration of proportionality. A formal CDE can only be
accomplished by a certified qualified CDE analyst and must be approved by the appropriate
level commander delineated in the ROE. Typically JTACs are not certified /qualified to do
formal CDE.
1.3.9.4 Minimizing Friendly Fire
Casualties to friendly forces caused by friendly fire are the occasional tragic consequence of
warfare.
a. Causes.
Although occasionally the result of malfunctioning weapons, friendly fire has often
been the result of confusion on the battlefield. Causes include misidentification of
targets, inaccurate target locations or descriptions, target locations incorrectly
transmitted or received, and loss of SA by JTACs, CAS aircrews, requestors, battle
staff, or commanders. Items such as detailed mission planning, standardized
procedures for friendly force tracking and supporting immediate air requests,
realistic training/mission rehearsal, use of friendly tagging or tracking devices, and
effective staff, JTAC and/or ALO coordination, and sound clearance of fires
procedures can significantly reduce the likelihood of friendly fire.
b. Responsibility.
All participants in the CAS employment process are responsible for the effective and
safe planning and execution of CAS. Each participant must make every effort
possible to identify friendly units, enemy forces, and civilians correctly prior to
targeting, clearing fires, and weapons release. Combat Identification (CID) is the
process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the
operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. Depending
on the situation and the operational decisions that must be made, this
characterization may be limited to, friend, enemy, neutral, or non-combatant.
In other situations, other characterizations may be required including, but not limited
to, class, type, nationality, and mission configuration. CID characterizations, when
applied with ROE, enable engagement decisions and the subsequent use, or
prohibition of use, of lethal and non-lethal weaponry to accomplish military
objectives. CID is used for force posturing, C2, and SA as well as shoot, no-shoot
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employment decisions. CID characterizations include signatures of friendly forces

and equipment across the electro-magnetic spectrum. These are often classified as
near or far categories of marking and common examples include the marking of such
by covert or overt means such as strobe, flares, chem. lights and IR signatures.
c. Training.
The joint force, components, and units must conduct joint training and rehearsals,
on a regular basis, that routinely exercise scenarios to simulate situations joint forces
will encounter in the operational environment in order to develop the skill sets and
familiarity required to avoid friendly fire.
1.3.9.5 Minimizing Civilian Casualties
Today the military’s operating environment is increasingly transparent and open to scrutiny.
This is particularly true for incidents of civilian casualties if they occur during highly visible and
readily attributable friendly air attacks. These events are tragic and can have lasting negative
operational and strategic effects, as well as possibly restrict future operations.
a. Causes.
Understanding and selecting alternate choices for fires application may offer the best
opportunity for reducing the likelihood and or impact of civilian casualties.
b. Responsibility.
All participants in the CAS employment process are responsible for the effective and
safe planning and execution of CAS, including positive identification (PID) as
established by theatre ROE and collateral damage estimates as required.
c. Training.
Pre-deployment preparation and review of current CAS ROE, vignettes and lessons
learned in theatre can help to minimize civilian casualties.

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CHAPTER 2 - COMMAND AND CONTROL

CAS requires an integrated, flexible and responsive command and control (C2) structure to
process CAS requirements and dependable, interoperable and secure communications
architecture in order to exercise control. This chapter outlines the agencies involved and
connectivity required for integrated CAS and Joint Fires. For more detailed information see
allied publications AJP 3.3. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations and AArtyP-5
NATO Fire Support Doctrine.
2.1 JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT (JFAC)
2.1.1 COM JFAC
During crisis and conflict, and within a designated AOR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
will appoint a commander joint force air component (COM JFAC) who will conduct Air C2 for a
specific operation.
COMJFAC plans, integrates, allocates, controls and tasks joint air operations based on the
JFC guidance and objectives, in accordance with the air apportionment decision and the
authority, command relationships and responsibilities laid down by the JFC.
COM JFAC serves as the principal air advisor to the JFC. Based on JFC’s direction and
guidance (D&G), COM JFAC is responsible for making recommendations on the employment
of assigned forces to include the apportionment of air assets.
COM JFAC typically exercises operational control over assigned assets and tactical control
over other air capabilities and forces made available for tasking. In Non-Article 5 Crisis
response Operations transfer of authority (TOA) assets will often be accompanied with a
team/person representing the nation of the TOA assets. The appointed representative will be
identified as the “Red Card Holder” and holds the authority to veto on given missions/tasks
according to national directives.
2.1.2 The JFAC
The COM JFAC establishes the guidance and priorities for CAS in CONOPS, operation or
campaign plans, the air apportionment decision, and when assigning capabilities and forces
to the components.
The JFAC conducts joint air operations in accordance with JFC’s intent and concept of the
operation. The JFAC will be formed in order to perform air C2 of Alliance air operations.
Operational C2 relationships will vary depending upon the size, complexity, and location of the
mission. These relationships are established in the Air OPLAN which is specific to the mission.
COM JFAC further conducts the air plan through a periodic air operations directive (AOD),
then through the air tasking order (ATO).
2.1.3 JFAC products related to CAS and AI.
CAS and AI mission execution is ruled by the following JFAC products:
a. AIR CONOPS and Supplements.
They provide the clear and concise statement of COM JFAC’s line of action.
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b. Air Operations Plan (Air OPLAN) and Supplements.
The Air OPLAN and its supplements is a plan for a single series of connected
operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession.
c. Air Operations Directive (AOD).
COM JFAC translates higher-level guidance into tactical level air instructions
through the AOD, which provides direction and guidance to the planning and
execution branches of the JFAC, and forms the basis for the ATO. CAS and AI
missions for the operation are described in the Air Power Contribution to Land
Operations/Air Power Contribution to Maritime Operations ANNEX of the AOD.
d. Airspace Control Plan (ACP)/Air Space Control Order (ACO).
Airspace Control (ACP) is used for deconfliction, identification and to minimize

fratricide. It provides Air Defense (AD) forces with the appropriate means to
maximize the effectiveness of military operations by promoting the ability of Air, Land
and Maritime forces to operate in an efficient, integrated and flexible manner with
the minimum mutual interference and without undue restraint and risk to friendly
forces and neutral Air. The ACO is based on the designation and activation of
Airspace Control Means (ACM) throughout the JOA. Execution of all air missions
from all Component Commands is done only by use of the current daily ACO.
e. Air Tasking Order.
The ATO contains detailed tasking for all pre-planned air missions scheduled to
operate within the JOA during a specific timeframe, which is normally 24hours. It
contains information both on the missions flown under tactical command/tactical
control of the JFAC as well as other missions within the JFC’s assigned area. It also
contains the Special Instructions. Concerning Air Power Contribution to Counter-
Land Operations (APCLO)/Air Power Contribution to Counter-Maritime Operations
(APCMO) missions, in the ATO aircrew can find the appropriate information in order
to plan their mission such as: type of mission; type of assets; number; unit; weapons;
Time on Target (TOT); communication plan; IFF codes; formation/COMAO
synthesis; coordinating – procedural information etc. Changes to the ATO missions
can or may be applied after the initial publishing due to potential operational update
throughout the day via Air Task Message (ATM) or via a new ATO that will be
effective for the rest of the initial period.
f. Special Instructions (SPINS).
SPINS are intended to provide information and direction and guidance that apply to
a longer period than just the ATO period or to more than one part of the ATO. SPINS
should not contain already established procedures. It is a very important document
for planning, executing and coordinating all missions as it clarifies the procedures
that must be followed by all assets operating in the JOA when executing the
assigned mission via the ATO. Normally SPINS are published at the beginning of
the campaign, are included in the ATO (or referred to) and are updated as the
operations are executed. APCLO/APCMO procedural instructions should be (and
normally are) included in the SPINS in order to simplify mission execution especially

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when assets from different nations with different tactical training operate in the same
areas.
g. Operational Tasking Data Link (OPTASK LINK).
The OPTASK LINK specifies the operational management details for tactical data
links of all (link-fitted) players in the operational area. Assets used in different type
of CAS and AI missions may use their data links in order to execute their mission
more effectively. Moreover Data Link improves the Situational Awareness (SA) of
friendly assets by depicting friendly or hostile air and ground assets operating in
vicinity.
h. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
BDA is the assessment of effects resulting from the application of military action,
either lethal or non-lethal, against a military objective (AAP-6). The JFAC contributes
to the BDA process by means of written and verbal reports and available sensor
information. Accuracy of reported BDA during AI missions is highly dependent on
the capabilities of the assigned asset.
2.1.4 Liaison with Component Commands
Effective liaison between forces is essential for coordinated operations and is a key factor in
the success of joint operations. Liaison elements serve as their parent commanders’
representative on matters of capabilities and limitations.
Component Liaisons serve as conduits for direct coordination between their respective CCs
and have the responsibility of presenting component perspectives and considerations
regarding planning and executing Joint air operations. They should possess the authority to
represent their CC on time-sensitive and critical issues and must be equipped and authorized
to communicate directly with their CC. Component Liaisons must be familiar with the details of
all component air, surface and subsurface missions.
2.2 GROUND BASED COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS
Air operations are controlled through an overarching air C2 and Communications and
Information Systems (CIS) structure centered on the JFAC which includes structures,
personnel, procedures and equipment necessary to plan, direct and control air operations .
a. ARS/DARS.
Air Control Center/ Recognized Air Picture Production Center/Sensor Fusion Post
(ARS) and Deployable ARS (DARS) are ground-based integrated C2 elements.
They may be fixed (ARS) or deployable (DARS), static or mobile and can be
provided by an alliance, coalition, as a combined element, or by a single nation. One
or more radars are connected to the ARS/DARS, one of which may be collocated.
Subordinate to the JFAC, and horizontally integrated with tactical C2 and
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance elements, attack and support aircraft,
ARS/DARS is responsible for the decentralized execution of air defense and

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airspace control as well as supporting offensive air operations in a geographic sector

assigned by the JFAC2.
b. Control and Reporting Center (CRC).
CRCs are ground-based airspace control/air defense, air battle management

centers that provide the COM JFAC with a decentralized C2 execution capability.
Critical core competencies of the CRC include air battle execution, surveillance, CID,
data link management, and theatre air defense. The CRC provides a robust
systems/communications hub capability that connects lateral and subordinate joint
and ACCS C2 nodes to the CAOC. CRCs provide safe passage and radar control
and surveillance for CAS aircraft transiting to and from target areas.
c. Wing Operations Center (WOC).
The WOC provides C2 of unit forces and ensures sorties are generated to
accomplish CAS missions as directed by the ATO. The WOC may recommend
weapons load changes based on factors including weapons availability and desired
effects.
d. Air Operations Coordination Center (AOCC).
The AOCC provides an air entity, functionally subordinate to the JFAC, collocated
with a land forces corps HQ. The AOCC provides air expertise and integrates the
liaison and coordination functions relating to air operations which require integration
with other supporting arms and ground forces, including, but not limited to CAS and
AI. The AOCC will also provide a connection for the Air Liaison Element (ALE) team
to the JFAC. For exercises/operations, the AOCC will provide execution-level
coordination of air operations in support of the land component as an extension of a
designated JFAC for the exercise/operation. The AOCC processes, in close
coordination with the corps Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE), include the following:
handling immediate support requests, coordinating the execution of scheduled and
on-call CAS sorties, and coordinating manned/unmanned aircraft transiting through
airspace over the ground force commander’s operational area.
When delegated the authority, the AOCC re-tasks/re-roles/redirects airborne assets,

provides target updates, and launches ground alert aircraft on-call for the ground
maneuver commander, as required. The AOCC’s configuration is flexible and can
be task-organized to support a variety of tactical control requirements. AOCC
assigns and directs attack aircraft to JTACs, serves as the net control station for the
air request net or JARN (Joint Air Request Net) and tactical air direction net and
other functions to facilitate air-ground operations. AOCC coordinates other mission
areas: AI, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), SEAD, and
personnel recovery. The AOCC, as a tactical level element, normally collocates with
the ground component’s senior tactical JFSE and airspace element at the corps
level. Synchronization between the AOCC, JFSE and the airspace control element
is vital to the effective air-ground integration.
In instances where NATO and NATO members’ command and control structures
are integrated with other national or coalition command and control systems an Air
2For a further discussion on ARS/DARS see AJP-3.3 ed. B v.1 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space
Operations”
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Support Operations Center (ASOC) may exist in place of the AOCC. The ASOC will
conduct similar roles in the performance of CAS planning and execution as the
AOCC.
e. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP).
The TACP is the principal air liaison element supporting ground maneuver units.
The TACP has two primary missions: advise ground force commanders and Joint
Fire Support Elements on the capabilities and limitations of air operations, and
provide terminal attack control of CAS. TACPs contribute with JFSE to coordinate
ACMs and FCMs. In coordination with JFSE, TAPCP deconflict the aircraft with other
fire support and airspace users. Both TACP and JFSE closely coordinate for rapid
resolution of airspace users. TACPs may employ JTACs at any echelon, but will
most often place them in a forward position (e.g., the company/team level). Affiliation
of JTACs with services differs among NATO nations, however the functionality
described above is usually the same. The following are usually members of a TACP:
(1) Air Liaison Officer (ALO).
The ALO is the senior TACP member attached to a ground unit who functions
as the primary advisor to the ground force commander on air operations. An
ALO is an expert in the capabilities and limitations of air operations. The ALO
plans and manages CAS in accordance with the ground force commander’s
guidance and intent. An ALO may be assigned at various levels and echelons,
often with a corresponding change in terminology, e.g., Battalion ALO (BALO).
(2) Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC).
The JTAC is a qualified and certified individual, who, most often from a forward
position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other air
operations. The JTAC provides the ground force commander recommendations
on the use of CAS and its integration with ground maneuver. The JTAC must:
(a) Know the enemy situation and the location of friendly units and
civilians.
(b) Know the supported commander’s intent, target priority, desired

effects, and timing of fires.
(c) Know the commanders intent and applicable ROE.
(d) Propose targets of opportunity.
(e) Advise the commander on proper employment of air assets.
(f) Submit requests for CAS.
(g) Control CAS with supported commander’s approval.
(h) Deconflict aircraft and fires from CAS sorties.
(i) Provide initial BDA report.

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Note: In some coalition nations and services JTACs are not issued from the air force. They
perform their JTAC duty as their primary or secondary duty and they are not subordinated to
members of TACP.
f. Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE).
JFSE is the land C2 element deployed in all JFLC HQ from Coy to Corps level
responsible for the overall planning, coordination and employment of all allocated
JFS at all levels. It is the single point of contact for JFS coordination at all levels.
This element should always be tailored to the mission and reinforced by all
necessary liaison cells as required3.
It coordinates national and multinational reconnaissance assets, delivery systems

from artillery, infantry (mortars), army aviation, air forces and naval forces/naval air
forces contributing to JFS. The required JFS capabilities and effects are integrated
at the respective levels in the coordination elements/fire support elements. Major
tasks of all JFSE are JFS planning, coordination and implementation as well as
provision of advice to the commanders and headquarters. Close coordination of the
JFSE with the maneuver forces is indispensable for operational success. The JFS
personnel must know the supported maneuver forces doctrine and the effective
ROE. JFSE establish communications with the maneuver forces in a timely manner
to enable their participation in reconnaissance, operational planning and issuance
of orders. There are the following JFSE for the different command levels:
(1) Company Joint Fire Support Element (Coy-JFSE)
(a) Deployment level: maneuver company,
(b) Typical composition:
1/ Coy Fire Support Officer (Coy-FSO)
2/ Forward Observer (FO) Team
3/ Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC)
4/ Other personnel tailored to mission (e.g. spotter)
(c) Role:
1/ The Fire Support Officer (FSO) advises the maneuver

company commander in all JFS matters, including risk assessment,
2/ Main tasks are target acquisition, location and identification,

local airspace deconfliction and control of the fire of all platforms,
3/ Deconflict available FS resources at the lowest level when

applicable,
4/ Liaise with applicable command and coordination level,
3 For a further information on JFSE see AArtyP-5 “NATO Fire Support Doctrine”.
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5/ Command, control and deploy the sub capabilities (e.g.

JTAC), FO) after coordination with maneuver commander when
applicable.
(d) Skills:
1/ Ability to advise a company commander, to call for fires

(planned and unplanned) and to control and evaluate FS delivered
by air, ground and naval FS assets by integrating all applicable
coordination measures at his level.
(2) Battalion/ Battle Group Joint Fire Support Element (BN/ BG-JFSE)
(a) Deployment level: maneuver maneuver battalion or Battle Group

(BG),
1/ Bn Fire Support Officer (Bn-FSO)
2/ Other personnel tailored to mission (e.g. personnel to

coordinate and/ or deconflict airspace)
(c) Role:
1/ The FSO advises the battalion/BG commander in all JFS

matters, including risk assessment,
2/ Plans, coordinates and prioritizes JFS IAW OPORD,
3/ Coordinates reconnaissance assets attached/ directed to

cooperate and weapon systems employment in time and space in
its AOR IAW effective airspace control measures,
4/ Works on Airspace Coordination and Deconfliction,
5/ Requests weapon systems as needed,
6/ Coordinates all deployed Coy-JFSE in its BN/BG,
7/ Integrates and coordinates all liaison and command cells

provided by supporting elements when applicable,
8/ Deconflicts and coordinates the employment of all available

FS resources at BN/BG level (e.g. prioritized employment of FS
assets),
9/ Liaise with applicable command and coordination level,
10/ Request higher level FS reinforcement,

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11/ If necessary, be able to conduct mission analysis and to plan

the employment of organic land FS assets and to disseminate JFS
order.
(d) Skills:
1/ Ability to integrate fires delivered by air, ground and naval FS

assets;
2/ able to request and/or command and coordinate the

employment of allocated surveillance, target acquisition (STA)
assets;
3/ ability to elaborate a fire plan and to participate in the targeting

loop;
4/ ability to apply and request ACM if necessary.
(3) Brigade (to Corps) Joint Fire Support Element (BG-, DIV- or Corps JFSE
(a) Deployment level: Brigade to Corps level,
1/ Direction / Control cell
2/ Artillery Cell
3/ Army Aviation Cell (AHs) (if required)
4/ Air liaison and coordination element (if required)
5/ Navy Forces Cell (if required) and
6/ Airspace Control and/ or Coordination Cell
7/ Other cells tailored to mission (e.g. Air Defense cell or UAV

cell)
(c) Role:
1/ The BDE-, DIV - or Corps JFSE chief advises the Brigade to

Corps commander in all JFS matter, including risk assessment,
2/ Plans, coordinates and prioritizes JFS in the context of

conduct of operations,
3/ Integrates and coordinates all liaison and command cells

provided by supporting elements, and commands those of the land
component,
4/ Deconflicts the employment of all FS resources from air,

maritime and land components,
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5/ Ensures liaison with applicable command and coordination

levels,
6/ Requests higher level FS reinforcement,
7/ Conducts mission analysis, staff estimate and plans the

employment of organic land FS assets, integrates all FS
reinforcements provided by other components or higher levels,
8/ Disseminates JFS plan including all FS resources provided by

supporting components.
(d) Skills:
1/ Ability to integrate fires delivered by air, ground and naval FS

assets;
2/ Ability to participate in the elaboration and dissemination of

coordination measures applicable for the users of the 2nd and 3rd
dimension as e.g. FSCM;
3/ ability to conduct current and future operations;
4/ ability to cooperate with intelligence cells in order to

coordinate and integrate the employment of sensors in the
comprehensive approach;
5/ ability to employ non-lethal effects in order to guarantee the

dissemination of an integrated effects matrix;
6/ ability to elaborate fire plan and to participate in the targeting

cycle.
2.3 AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS
Airborne C2 manages air assets operating beyond the normal communication coverage of
ground elements and can act either as a self-contained airborne command post or as a relay
for ground based command centers. With properly trained aircrew, airborne C2 performs
functions to expedite C2 while extending the range of radio communications of C2 nodes.
Moreover, airborne C2 platforms ensure continuity of operations in case of ground elements
not yet deployed or disabled. Attack aircraft checking in for CAS or AI targets within an AO
often communicate with airborne C2 due to radio and line-of-sight (LOS) limitations of ground
C2 elements.
Airborne C2 platforms include the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).
a. AWACS. Its primary mission is to conduct air surveillance, identify airborne

objects, and control air operations. AWACS provides the deep look, capability to
support offensive and defensive air operations. It provides low-level and
extended radio coverage for the control of air operations. AWACS provide safe
passage information and radar control and surveillance for aircraft transiting from
base/ships to the target area and back. The AWACS provides JFC with a
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decentralized execution capability. They can support CAS/AI missions by

providing coordination link with the JFAC, AOCC and JSTARS.AWACS provide
imminent threat warning for assets under their control via voice or links.
b. JSTARS. JSTARS provides deep look, ground moving target indicator

radar for real-time detection of moving surface targets, rotating antennas, and
low, slow-flying fixed and rotary wing aircraft and synthetic aperture radar for
stationary targets. The system provides ground situational awareness data to
multiple air and ground C2 nodes. JSTARS provide ground and air commanders
with situation development, targeting, attack planning and limited post attack
assessment information. JSTARS supports CAS/AI missions by providing
targeting information to the AOCC, AWACS and other tactical operations centers.
JSTARS can be used in support of all types of CAS/AI missions.
c. FAC(A).The FAC(A) is a specifically trained and qualified aviation officer

who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in CAS. A FAC (A) is an
airborne extension of the TACP/JTAC. Pending military regulations, FAC(A)s
can serve as another TAC for the TACP/JTAC or augment and extend the
acquisition range of forward observers. The FAC(A) mission is normally
accomplished by a FW (fighter or attack) or RW (attack) aircraft operating either
as a single-ship or two ship. FAC(A) aircraft carry equipment and munitions to aid
in its role. FAC(A)s are capable of performing radio relay, reconnaissance,
indirect fires call-for-fire, asset coordination and deconfliction, BDA, target
marking, designation and coordinate generation as well as coordinate SEAD and
TAC.
d. Tactical Air Coordinator-Airborne [TAC(A)]. The TAC(A) is an extension

of air support control agencies. In the ACCS, the TAC(A) provides
communications relay between the TACP/JTAC and attack aircraft, as well as
other agencies of the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), in the absence
of JSTARS or a FAC(A). Two-ship flights, especially in higher threat
environments, may divide responsibilities so one aircraft fills the normal FAC(A)
role while the second becomes a TAC(A). The TAC(A) expedites CAS aircraft-to-
JTAC handoff during “heavy traffic” CAS operations. TAC(A) tasks may include:
coordination of CAS briefs and attack times; CAS and FAC(A) hand-offs to
terminal attack controllers; relay of threat updates, and BDA to C2 agencies;
coordination of aircraft and surface fire support; coordination of FW and RW
operations; visual reconnaissance; coordination of indirect fire support to include
naval surface fire support (NSFS); and strike coordination and reconnaissance.
2.4 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
CAS missions require a high degree of control exercised through effective communication.
Communications must be flexible and responsive (mission tailored and robust) to ensure that
links between aircraft and ground units are maintained, reducing the chance of friendly fire and
enhancing mission effectiveness. The flexibility and responsiveness of joint force CAS
communications are made possible using a variety of techniques including electromagnetic
spectrum management, countermeasures and emission control (EMCON), and through the
interoperable communications nets of the components.
CAS participants will use the communications nets and architecture of the requesting
component.

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When CAS is executed in joint operations, all participants involved must have the appropriate
data to communicate effectively and successfully. The COM JFAC identifies the
communications requirements associated with CAS. The communications system directorate
satisfies these requirements. It is the responsibility of the COM JFAC to ensure that required
communications data for CAS is published in the joint ATO/SPINS.
Specifically, CAS-capable units and aircrews will need radio frequencies and call signs for
airspace control agencies, ground forces, and for the FAC(A)s/JTACs they will need to contact
during the course of their missions. They will also need identification, friend or foe (IFF) codes
and authentication materials. The supported component communications manager should
establish direct liaison to coordinate the necessary CAS communications data and products to
all elements in the CAS process.
2.4.1 Communications Requirements.
a. Secure Voice/Frequency-Agile Communications.
The preferred means of communication during CAS missions is either using secure
voice or frequency-agile radio systems (e.g., HAVE QUICK, single-channel ground
and airborne radio system [SINCGARS]). Data link should also be used to transmit
information whenever possible. However, do not allow the non-availability of these
methods to hinder the application of CAS, especially in emergency situations or in
the case of dynamic targets.
b. Countermeasures.
Enemy communications jamming, monitoring, and imitative deception interfere with

the air C2 system and can jeopardize the use of CAS. Proper radio procedures are
critical. There are a number of techniques to counter jamming and deception. They
include natural terrain masking, increased signal strength (burn through), brevity,
chattermarks, frequency-agile radios, secure communications, authentication, and
visual signals. No single technique is completely effective by itself. The tactical
environment, available communications equipment, and mission determine the
proper technique.
c. Emission Control.
Emphasize EMCON throughout the planning and training cycles. As the enemy
increases the use of EW, traditional air support communications may become
impossible. This may reduce an aircrew’s ability to conduct immediate missions. A
preplanned mission, however, can be accomplished with minimum communication
between the JTAC/FAC(A) and CAS assets. Appropriate C2 agencies transmits the
brief to the aircrew as early as possible and prior to initial contact with the JTAC.
The aircrew contacts the JTAC, transmits the abort code, and receives the time to
target (TTT) or time on target (TOT).
2.4.2 Component Communications Nets.
This subparagraph describes the communications nets used by air control agencies and
tactical aircraft in the conduct of CAS. In addition to these nets, there are numerous others
within the C2 systems that could be used in extreme situations. These nets are designed to
provide communications redundancy. Nets may be controlled nets with a controlling agency.
Such nets may require explicit permission from the controlling agency to use.
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a. Command/Operations Net (voice).
This net is used for C2 of all maneuver elements within the maneuver force. TACPs
may access this net to obtain commander’s final release authority or to coordinate
with key staff agencies for information such as the disposition and location of forward
friendly units or elements.
b. Fire Support Net (voice).
The primary purpose of this net is to request calls for fire and Facilitate coordination
between maneuver, FCs, field artillery, mortars, and non-field artillery observers.
Aviation may also use this net to coordinate fires. TACPs may access this net to
activate or deactivate airspace coordination areas (ACAs), or for coordinating target
marks and/or suppression fire missions. This net may also be used to contact
forward observers or facilitate control of CAS missions.
c. Operations and Intelligence (O&I) Net.
Various human sources, such as scouts, advanced liaison, multinational force

LNOs, reconnaissance elements, and other human operations or intelligence
gathering entities use this net to pass routine operational and intelligence
information. The O&I net connects observers with their corresponding C2 nodes.
Additionally, this net may be used to determine if specific triggers for CAS have been
met in order to synchronize CAS with ground fire and maneuver. TACPs may access
this net to report or obtain forward operational environment information or facilitate
terminal attack control.
d. Command and Control Net.
Interfaces with other ACCS units (AOCC, CRC, AWACS, JSTARS, and WOC) are
accomplished via high-frequency (HF), tropo-microwave links, and SATCOM
systems. All of these systems should normally be encrypted. These
communications nets are used for command communications traffic, including
operations and scramble orders, coordination, intelligence, and air defense warning.
Whenever possible, reliability and survivability are enhanced by using multiple
systems and redundant switches.
e. Digital Means for Air Support Request (ASR).
Digital is the primary method for transmitting/receiving ASRs. The form can be
transmitted via digital or voice means.
f. Joint Air Request Net.
The JARN is the link between the AOCC and subordinate TACPs for aircraft
coordination and sending immediate air support requests. The AOCC is the net
control station (NCS). The AOCC will activate and operate as many nets as
necessary, contingent with needs, equipment available, and frequencies allocated.
The primary means for requesting immediate air support is the Air Support Request
(ASR).

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g. Air Control Net.
The purpose of this net is to coordinate mission direction of airborne aircraft under
control of the CRC. The AOCC interfaces with the tactical air control net.
h. Tactical Air Direction (TAD) Net.
The TAD net provides a means for the control of aircraft. TAD nets are used by all
of the command and control nodes. The TACPs/JTACs use their UHF/VHF-
amplitude modulation (AM) net for the direction and control of aircraft engaged in
CAS. The TACP is the prime user of this net and is allocated specific frequencies
to conduct tactical operations. The AOCC is also authorized to enter this net to pass
time sensitive information. Due to the extremely time sensitive information passed
on this net, the TAD net assigned to the JTAC or FAC(A) should be reserved for
TAC only.
i. Inflight Report Net.
This UHF-AM net is for the airborne transmission of inflight reports (INFLTREPs) to
the elements of the ACCS. Reports are normally passed to the CRC, AWACS, or
JSTARS and relayed to the CAOC and/or AOCC. The AOCC and CAOC monitor
this net when in range.
j. Guard Net.
The guard net provides an emergency distress net for aircraft. Guard further serves
as a means for air control agencies to advise aircraft of emergency conditions or
serious hazards to flight safety. If able, all aircraft continuously monitor guard.
k. TACP Admin Net.
This net is used to pass urgent administrative, logistic, and command information
between the AOCC and TACP elements.
l. Secure Internet Relay Chat (IRC).
Secure IRC provides a means of communication between intelligence activities,

selected aircraft, AOCC, and IRC equipped TACPs.
m. Data-link nets.
These nets provide digital communications, increased SA, targeting, and de-
confliction. The requesting unit will communicate with the CAS aircraft via the
established providing component net.
n. Common-Air-to-Ground Net (CAG).
This net may be established in order for airborne platforms to communicate directly
with each other and a common ground station. Most often this ground party is the
JTAC or other ground based assets.

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o. Alternate Nets
When communications are lost on the primary nets, CAS can still be conducted
through alternate modes of communication. Communications may be restored using
alternate air support nets or non-air support communications nets.
2.4.3 Communications Equipment.
a. Common Equipment.
Equipment varies from nation to nation though basics such as line-of-sight (LOS),
beyond line-of-sight (LOS), analog and digital systems can be found throughout
NATO. For specifics utilize references such as SPINS and national and alliance
materials.
b. Digital Call-for Fire.
Systems that enable the TACP/JTAC or forward observers to communicate with the
JFSE and to aid in the speed and accuracy of information flow may be used. All
agencies involved with the conduct of fire (COF) should have the capability to
receive and disseminate digital requests for fires if digital means are to be used.
2.5 INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Joint Intelligence Preparation of Operational Environment (JIPOE) is a systematic approach

used by intelligence personnel to analyze the adversary and other relevant aspects of the
operational environment. While intelligence personnel focus on the adversary in relation to the
operational environment, cross-functional joint staff planners at the combatant command and
service component level use the JIPOE process and JIPOE products as well, developing and
assessing their impact on friendly plans and operations. As a whole, this coordinated effort
defines the operational environment, describes the impact of the operational environment on
adversary and friendly courses of action (COAs), evaluates the capabilities of adversary forces
operating in the operational environment, and determines and describe potential adversary
COAs and civilian activities that might impact military operations.
Intelligence preparation for CAS at all levels in the CAS process is largely dependent on
mission and planning time available. Optimum intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) support to CAS begins early in the planning process to include JIPOE and the targeting
process. While it is impossible to account for every conceivable possibility, this early integration
can assist in better target selection, intelligence collection requirements, force allocation, and
follow-on assessment. In turn, this will assist in preparing for immediate re-taskings. While
preplanned CAS benefits most from advanced planning, immediate CAS can still realize the
same benefits. At a minimum, tactical level forces should analyze the operational environment
in terms of military objectives; air, land, and maritime avenues of approach; and the effects of
weather and geography on personnel, CAS operations and weapons systems. The tactical
level evaluation for CAS should concentrate on standard order of battle, factors such as
composition, strength, morale, tactics, and training status of specific tactical units that can
interfere with mission accomplishment. Sources of information include:

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a. Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
Tactical information of potential intelligence or targeting value can be derived from

many different types of human sources. Aside from dedicated HUMINT collectors,
teams like the TACP, combat observation, LNOs, reconnaissance teams, SOF, etc.
may have the most current disposition of the enemy. All have the capability to relay
critical information such as post attack BDA that will aid in the effectiveness of CAS.
CAS aircrews are often in a position to provide and pass critical reconnaissance
information.
b. ISR Systems.
These systems include UAS, JSTARS and variety of other ISR platforms. These
platforms provide classified communications intelligence and electronic intelligence
(ELINT) information which may be used independently or cross-cued with other ISR
platforms to augment or complete the overall intelligence picture.
c. Tactical Reconnaissance Systems.
Some aircraft are equipped with sensors and targeting pods that enable tactical
airborne reconnaissance
d. Ground Surveillance Systems.
Ground surveillance radar provides a mobile, near all-weather ability to detect

objects and provide target locations. The radar is capable of performing a variety of
tasks, including searching avenues of approach, possible enemy attack positions,
assembly areas, or other sectors or areas on a time schedule, at random, or
continuously to report location, size composition, and nature of enemy activity.
Counter fire radars can also provide targeting information on enemy artillery, mortar,
and rocket systems locations.

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CHAPTER 3 - PLANNING AND REQUESTING

Section I. Planning Concepts Essential for Close Air Support
It is critical for JTACs and Tactical Operations Center (TOC) elements to coordinate their
efforts in the planning stage. Key issues such as battle tracking, target nomination, tactical risk
assessment, weapons release authority, methods of attack, types of TAC, airspace
deconfliction and coordination, synchronization and procedures in which a JTAC/FAC(A) will
provide TAC must be clearly understood and carefully planned. Only through effective
coordination can the CAS “team” achieve the supported commander’s objectives for CAS
successfully.
3.1 BATTLE TRACKING
Battle tracking is the process of building and maintaining an overall picture of the operational
environment that is accurate, timely, and relevant. An aspect of battle tracking includes combat
identification. Combat Identification (CID) is use of identification measures to reduce friendly
fire and increase the operational effectiveness of forces and weapon systems.
Successful battle tracking increases the probability of CAS attack success by ensuring its
application at the proper time and place. The level of detail required and scope of the picture
will depend on the mission and information requirements of the joint force. At the tactical level,
the simplest form of battle tracking is the mental and graphic picture built and maintained by
using maps, observations, and battle updates from HHQ. At higher levels, battle tracking is
more complex and takes advantage of digital information systems using multiple sources to
generate a coherent picture of the operational environment.
Effective battle tracking will aid in maintaining and understanding of friendly and enemy
progress, reduce redundant targeting, and reduce the possibility of friendly fire. Effective
methods of battle tracking include maintaining up-to-date maps, imagery, and status boards,
and utilizing computerized tracking and display methods. It is imperative that TACP personnel
remain part of the information flow (e.g., battle drills, spot reports, targeting). Additionally, the
JTAC and TOC must operate with the most current information:
a. FSCMs/ACMs All applicable, i.e.: initial points (IPs), contact points (CPs), battle
positions (BPs), ingress/egress routes, minimum-risk routes (MRRs), ACAs, no-fire
areas (NFAs), restricted operations zones (ROZs), coordinate fire lines (CFLs),
restricted fire lines (RFLs), and fire support coordination lines (FSCLs).
b. Friendly Unit Information. Unit boundaries, phase lines, friendly locations,

observer and scout locations, objectives, engagement areas, and obstacles.
c. Artillery. Current and planned artillery locations and gun-target lines (GTLs).
d. Enemy Locations (including surface-to-air threats).
e. Targeting. Preplanned target locations, CAS target triggers, air requests,

observation plan, and fire support plan, immediate target locations/coordinates and
associated target location error (TLE).
f. Fragmentary Orders, Spot Reports, and ATO Updates.

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g. Communications/Data Link Plan.
3.2 COORDINATION.
Once a target has been nominated, the Joint Terminal Attack Controller/Forward Air Controller
(Airborne) (JTAC/FAC(A)) and Tactical Operations Center (TOC) (or command post) must
coordinate the Close Air Support (CAS) attack with affected maneuver elements. Cross-
boundary clearance of fires, friendly Air Defence Artillery (ADA), and CAS aircraft
ingress/egress routing must be deconflicted and coordinated.
a. Cross-Boundary Clearance of Fires.
Boundaries are the basic maneuver control measure used by commanders to

designate the geographical area for which a particular unit is tactically responsible.
They are restrictive in that no fire support weapons may deliver fires or effects of
fires across a boundary unless those fires are coordinated with the affected unit.
The JFSE/FSO must conduct clearance of fire procedures directly with the cross-
boundary TOC, or the common HHQ TOC.
b. Friendly Air Defenses.
To avoid friendly fire, TOCs should announce “friendly air on station” to subordinate
units. TACP/JTAC and ADA personnel must coordinate Contact Point (CP)/Initial
Point (IP) usage, target location, type and number of aircraft, altitudes, and times on
station. The SPINS and ACO should include MRRs or safe return corridors and
associated procedures for aircraft to return from CAS target areas.
Weapon Control Orders (WCO).
WCO describe the relative degree of fire control of surface-to-air weapons. The
resulting weapon control status (WCS) is the degree of freedom given to that
weapon system (air or ground) under any particular WCO, and will vary depending
on the tactical situation. The Airspace Control and/or Coordination Cell must have
the ability to receive WCO and disseminate WCS for all platforms. The WCO are
defined as follows:
(1) Weapons Free
“Weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively recognized as

friendly.” This is the least restrictive WCO.
(2) Weapons Tight
“Weapons systems may be fired only at targets recognized as hostile.” Positive

identification (PID) can be achieved through a number of means, including
visual identification or meeting other designated hostile act criteria supported by
track correlation.
(3) Weapons Hold
“Weapons systems may only be fired in self-defense or in response to a formal

order.” This is the most restrictive WCO.

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c. Synchronization.
One of the most difficult functions performed by a JFSE is synchronizing CAS with
surface fires. The intent is to coordinate the timing of air support, supporting arms,
and maneuver to achieve the mass of a combined-arms attack. The goal is to
accomplish this without suspending the use of any of the supporting arms or
affecting the scheme of maneuver. An additional goal is to offer a reasonable
measure of protection to aircraft from the effects of friendly surface fires. High
altitude/standoff weapons (e.g., joint direct attack munition [JDAM]) offer the
capability to deconflict both in range and altitude from other supporting fires.
A common time reference is essential to accomplish the high degree of coordination

necessary for effective CAS. All participants (aircrew, observers, JTAC/FAC(A),
AOCC, FC/JFSC, and artillery) must use the same timing method.
3.3 SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING RELATIONSHIP.
In a CAS engagement, the ground force commander that owns the battle space is the
supported commander. Aircrafts providing CAS, TACP/JTACs and observers are supporting
elements. The JTAC is the ground force commander’s direct representative and information
passed by the JTAC with regard to commander’s intent and approval of fires should be viewed
as coming directly from the ground force commander.
In order to assist the supported commander, the aircraft with the highest situational awareness
may be delegated/tactical lead for coordinated attacks, but this authority can only be delegated
by the JTAC.
The execution of a CAS engagement is a two-way dialogue and agreement between the
aircrew and the supported commander; commander’s representative – the JTAC. The JTAC
and aircrew team work together to accomplish the ground force commander’s intent. In the
end, two individuals on either end of the radio are working to assist another individual who
needs aviation fires. Aircrew should, however, interpret a CAS brief as a high constraint, that
is to say, they have to do their best to comply with the CAS brief regarding employment rules
and directives defined by C2 of supporting commander. Supporting elements, including
aircrews, should provide the supported commander with as much information as necessary in
order for the commander to make the appropriate decision.
Once the ground force commander has all the appropriate information, it is the supported
commander’s decision to employ ordnance in the commander’s battlespace. Given that
aircrew have passed all relevant information and situational awareness to the ground force
commander prior to employment and that they have SA to the correct target the responsibility
for the resulting employment falls on the ground force commander, not the aircrew.
3.4 WEAPONS RELEASE AUTHORITY.
The intent is to offer the lowest level supported commander, within the constraints established
during risk assessment, the latitude to authorize weapons employment. In addition to
nominating CAS targets and prior to CAS target engagement, supported commanders also
delegate weapons release authority to JTACs/FAC(A)s. The authority and responsibility for the
expenditure of any ordnance on the battlefield rests with the supported commander. The
supported commander will delegate weapons release clearance authority to JTACs/FAC(A)s
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3.5 TACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT.
In addition to proper battle tracking, the supported commander and staff make continuous
tactical risk assessments. Risk assessments involve the processing of available information
to ascertain a level of acceptable risk to friendly forces or civilians. Based on the current risk
assessment, the supported commander will weigh the benefits and liabilities of authorizing
CAS employment. CAS is not always the best option. Specific levels of risk should not be
associated with each type of control or method of attack. Information to consider when
assessing risk includes:
a. Confidence in and the training of the unit, staff, and key personnel.
b. Timeliness of information.
c. Absence of information.
d. Information flow and communications.
e. Confidence in battle tracking.
(1) Friendly force locations.
(2) Civilian locations.
(3) Enemy locations.
f. Threat information.
(1) Threat to ground forces.
(2) Threat to aircraft.
g. Confidence in targeting information.
(1) Targeting information source and accuracy (HUMINT, signals intelligence,

GEOINT, visual, etc.).
(2) Stationary or moving.
(3) Ability to mark the target.
(4) Level of difficulty for aircrew to acquire mark/target.
h. Ordnance available for attack.
(1) Capabilities.
(2) Limitations.
(3) Restrictions.
(4) Proximity of friendlies/civilians.

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(5) Risk of collateral damage.
3.5.1 Troops in Contact (TIC).
JTACs/FAC(A)s and aircrews should regard friendly ground forces receiving effective fire as
‘troops in contact.’ JTACs/FAC(A)s and aircrews must carefully weigh the choice of munitions
and types of TAC against the risk of friendly fire, (e.g., troops in contact does not necessarily
dictate a specific type of control). ‘Troops in contact’ is an advisory call to increase awareness
and to highlight the urgency of the ground situation; however, a TIC does not remove the
aircrews/JTACs/FAC(A)s responsibility to avoid civilian and friendly troop casualties. ‘Troops
in contact’ requires the supported commander to determine priority of CAS with respect to
other mission impacts.
3.6 COLLATERAL DAMAGE.
Collateral damage is unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that

would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time.
Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) is a more recent term describing any noncombatant wounded or
dead as a result of armed conflict regardless of whether they were engaged deliberately or
accidently. When referring to CAS, CIVCAS is a type of collateral damage.
a. Impacts and Importance.
The failure to mitigate collateral damage below acceptable risk levels may expose
political and military leadership to adverse consequences in assigned military
missions and national security goals. Excessive collateral damage can lead to
reduced public support for operations, more restrictive ROE, early termination of
operations, and prolonging reconstruction operations.
b. Methodology.
The collateral damage estimation methodology (CDEM) does not account for weapon
malfunctions, unknown delivery errors, altered delivery tactics based on operator
judgment, unknown transients, individual marking or adjusting rounds when
employing surface-to-surface ballistic munitions, or secondary explosions.
Formal collateral damage estimates (CDE) can only be accomplished by a

certified/qualified CDE analyst and must be approved by the appropriate level
commander delineated in the ROE. Typically JTACs and CAS planners are not
certified /qualified to do formal CDE
The CDE process does not limit or supersede a commander’s responsibility to

respond to time sensitive targets or inherent right and obligation of self-defense.
However, an understanding of CDEM can assist the CAS planner or JTAC in making
a proportionality decision by answering five basic questions.
(1) Can I make a positive identification (PID) of the object I want to affect?
(PID is the reasonable certainty that a functionally and geospatially defined
object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with the law of armed
conflict and the applicable ROE.)

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(2) Are there protected or collateral objects, civilian or noncombatant

personnel, involuntary or unwitting human shields, or significant environmental
concerns within the effects range of the weapon I would like to use to attack the
target?
(3) Can I mitigate damage to those collateral concerns by striking the target
with a different weapon or with a different method of engagement, yet still
accomplish the mission?
(4) If not, how many civilians and noncombatants do I think will be injured or
killed by this attack?
(5) Are the collateral effects of my attack excessive in relation to the expected
military advantage gained, and do I need to elevate this decision to the next
level of command to attack the target based on the ROE in effect?
c. JTAC/FAC(A) Responsibilities.
All CAS planners employ available resources, within the constraints of mission
accomplishment, time and friendly force protection, to minimize collateral damage.
The primary cause of collateral damage is PID failure. Therefore, JTACs physically
present at the point of air weapons employment, have a responsibility to work with the
supported ground force commander to ensure PID is attained and situational
awareness accounts for both friendly and civilian locations. JTACs/FAC(A)s often
provide final terminal control of CAS weapons which ensure weapons employment is
correct and safe in order to limit collateral damage. JTACs/FAC(A)s can help
minimize and mitigate collateral damage in the following ways:
(1) Understand the major causes of collateral damage.
(a) Failure to positively identify targets as hostile and geospatially

define their location, or failure to identify civilians in the vicinity of the
target.
(b) Improper weapon to target match in a given operational

environment. Ordnance, fusing and delivery method can all have large
impacts on the level of collateral damage and must be appropriately
selected based on mission accomplishment, friendly force protection
and proximity of collateral entities.
(c) Weapon malfunctions. Failure to properly plan attack axis to

mitigate weapon guidance failures or miss distances. Human error or
technology failure can lead to weapons landing off target or large miss
distances resulting in increased collateral damage.
(d) Occasionally, certain targets are of such high strategic importance

that a conscious decision is made by military and political leaders in light
of the collateral risk.

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(2) Apply the proper mitigation techniques.
(a) JTACs/FAC(A)s must be vigilant to identify the presence of non-

combatants and incorporate pattern of life into their targeting decisions
and recommendations to the supported ground force commanders.
JTACs must be proactive and especially careful when using any form of
remote targeting (scout, observer, VDL).
(b) JTACs/FAC(A)s can select ordnance with lower explosive yield,

greater precision, or which have less fragmentation potential if it still
achieves the ground force commander’s intent. In addition,
JTACs/FAC(A)s can specify fusing combinations that lead to lower
collateral damage such as delay fusing to minimize fragmentation, or
airburst fusing to minimize the weapon’s penetration and effect of blast
against a structure. JTACs/FAC(A)s can also select an aim point offset
to bias weapons effects away from nearest collateral concerns if the
ground force commanders’ desired effect will still be met.
(c) JTACs/FAC(A)s must take not only friendly locations but collateral
concerns into account when planning attack axes to mitigate the effects
of weapons landing off target due to human or technological failure.
Properly orienting attack axis so the weapon is moving away from the
nearest collateral concern at the point of impact accounts for possible
misses and orients fragmentation pattern away from the nearest
collateral concern.
(d) JTACs/FAC(A)s must use all means available to ensure target

location is accurate and of sufficient fidelity to achieve mission
objectives. They must also exercise appropriate diligence in target
correlation to ensure the correct target is attacked.
3.7 TARGET ACQUISITION AND LOCATION
JTAC/FAC(A) must be able to generate target coordinates (preplanned and immediate) and
associated TLE of sufficient fidelity to create the desired effects on target through efficient
battle tracking and effective fire support integration. The level of precision and accuracy
required for the target coordinate and TLE will be tactical scenario dependent. TTT/TOT should
not be delayed in order to generate more coordinate precision and/or accuracy if the current
coordinates, TLE, CAS asset, ordnance, and mark plan will create the desired effects.
Through effective use of the concepts of bomb on target (BOT) and bomb on coordinate (BOC),
desired target effects can be created quickly through CAS engagement at the JTAC’s level.
Simultaneously, the target coordinate and TLE must be sufficient to provide an accurate and
timely operational picture at the TOC/JFSE.
In a conventional, linear battlefield, less coordinate accuracy and/or precision may be required
for successful target engagement. The target coordinate serves as an ‘anchor point’ for
TOC/appropriate level fires approval agency and JFSE in order to provide an accurate, timely,
and relevant operational picture.

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A dense urban environment with friendly ground units working cross boundaries with no easily
defined forward line of own troops (FLOT) or forward edge of the battle area will likely require
a very precise and accurate target location with low TLE. Target mensuration provides this
level of accuracy.
Target coordinate mensuration is the process of measurement of a feature or location on

the Earth to determine an absolute latitude, longitude, and height. For targeting applications,
the errors inherent in both the source for measurement as well as the measurement processes
must be understood and reported. Mensuration tools can employ a variety of techniques to
derive coordinates. These may include, but are not limited to, direct read from a digital
databases stereo-pairs in stereo or dual mono mode, multi-image geopositioning, or indirect
imagery correlation. Target coordinate mensuration occurs at the strategic , operational and
tactical levels of war. Due to its importance as a critical function in the kill chain supporting
precision fires, personnel who conduct target coordinate mensuration must be certified to do
so. The targeting process requires due diligence in all facets, to include target coordinate
mensuration.
Target Location Error is the difference between the coordinates generated for a target and
the actual location of that target. TLE is expressed primarily in terms of circular and vertical
errors, or infrequently, as spherical error (SE).
a. Circular error (CE) is the error of the coordinates in the horizontal ground
plane (i.e., circular).
b. Vertical error (VE) is the error of the coordinates in the vertical plane (i.e.,
elevation).
c. Spherical Error (SE) is the error of the coordinates in three dimensional

spherical space (i.e., the combined error of CE and VE).
These errors are expressed as CE90, VE90, and SE90 distances which mean that there is a
90 percent chance that the actual target will be within these circular, vertical, and spherical
distances.
TLE should be communicated when it will significantly affect the likelihood of mission success
or failure. In general, TLE category is not required to either approve a mission or successfully
engage a target with CAS. In order to facilitate the communication of targeting accuracy, TLE
is characterized in six categories. The first row presents the categories of TLE which range
from best (CAT 1) to worst (CAT 6) and are used to classify the accuracy of any coordinate
generating system.
Proper coordinate generation procedures must be followed when stating that a given system
is capable of a specific TLE category. In reality, variables such as digital point positioning
database errors, slant range, altitude, beam divergence of the LASER spot, and aim point on
the target all have significant effects on the accuracy of the coordinate generated.
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Aim point is a significant factor in the TLE of all coordinate generation systems. As an example,
portable tactical imagery tools may be capable of CAT 1 coordinates, but a JTAC may not be
able to produce a CAT 1 solution for a vehicle parked in a field that is not adequately depicted
in the system. Likewise, a FW aircraft/targeting pod combination may be capable of CAT 2
coordinates, but not able to generate a CAT 2 solution for a target/aim point that is not sensor
significant such as a bunker, trench line, or emplacement with overhead cover and
concealment.
3.8 CORRELATION AND MARKING
Correlation is the process by which the JTAC/FAC(A) coordinates and confirms that the
attacking aircraft and/or a third party contributor have acquired the correct target or mark.
Correlation is required on each and every CAS attack.
Marks are aids to correlation. A target mark should be provided for CAS aircraft whenever
needed. Target marks should be planned to include sufficient time for CAS aircrews to observe
them prior to employment. JTACs/FAC(A)s should strive to provide redundant marks when
deemed necessary in case the primary mark fails, is late, or is inaccurate during the terminal
phase of an attack. Examples of redundant mark combinations are LASER/smoke, IR
pointer/tracer, and smoke/talk-on.
The effectiveness of marks can be measured under several parameters. These include
distance from the target, timeliness and the ability to be acquired. While guidelines such as
100-300m and 30-45 seconds are often used, environmental conditions should be factored
into marking. These include both natural and man-made conditions such as wind speed and
direction, marking contrast, and battlefield effects such as smoke and secondary explosions.
Aircrews generally use a combination of sensors and visual lookout to acquire marks and
targets. JTACs/FAC(A) should be generally familiar with aircraft sensor capabilities and
employ marks that take advantage of those capabilities.
Limited visibility and differing perspectives make it difficult to correlate at night. IR illumination
is effective for aircrew using NVGs. IR illumination can be delivered by indirect fire or aircraft.
Battlefield illumination may also be used to illuminate targets. Illumination should be planned
to be offset from the target in order to avoid blooming out aircrew NVGs.
3.8.1 Correlation Techniques and Types of Marks
3.8.1.1 Talk-On
When no mark is available, the CAS target may be correlated by narrative description provided
by the JTAC/FAC(A). Talk-On is a technique that uses verbal description of terrain and
manmade features to lead aircrews eyes from dominant terrain features to target.
a. Advantages.
(1) Does not require additional equipment or coordination.
(2) Does not require the aircraft to be equipped with sensors (for visual
Talk-On).

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b. Disadvantage.
(1) Takes time
(2) Requires proficiency
(3) May be hampered by language proficiency
(4) Difficult or impossible to perform in some types of terrain.
3.8.1.2 Sensor Talk-On with VDL feed.
Talk-Ons can be using EO sensors and SAR radars.VDL enables JTACs to see what aircrew
sees through their sensors which can shorten the time to conduct the Talk-On.
a. Advantage:
(1) Allows JTAC/FAC(A) to see the aircraft sensor picture.
(2) Saves time
b. Disadvantage.
(1) Requires VDL capable aircraft and receiver.
(2) May not work due to jamming.
3.8.1.3 Marks of opportunity.
Anything on the battlefield that can be used to cue aircraft situational awareness to the target
such as other fires in the area, burning structures, vehicle traffic, etc. JTACs/FAC(A)s must
always be prepared for a back-up marking plan or to use marks of opportunity on the battlefield.
Anything the JTAC/FAC(A)s can find to cue aircraft sensors and aircrew eyeballs to the target
may be useful as a mark.
3.8.1.4 Direct Fire Marks.
Direct fire weapons can be used to mark targets. While this method may provide more
accuracy and timeliness than indirect fire marks, its use may be limited by range and the
visibility of the burst from the air and on the battlefield.
Grenade rounds, especially smoke rounds, can be used very effectively as marks.
Tracers can be used very effectively to mark targets in the dark. During times of dusk or dawn
when visibility for naked eye is insufficient, ambient light does not allow for use of NVDs and
thermal crossover limits use of thermal imaging systems tracers fired in bursts may represent
very effective way of marking targets.
FW and RW aircraft can also mark the target with munitions (guns, rockets, missiles, or
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(1) Advantages:
(a) Readily available.
(b) Easy to coordinate for.
(2) Disadvantages.
(a) Depending on target composition, direct fire weapons effects may

penetrate the target and continue on (e.g., a tank round penetrates a wall
and continues on to hit another wall). As the effects may impact beyond
the intended target, and out of view of the JTAC/FAC(A), this may lead to
confusion between the JTAC/FAC(A) and the aircrew as to what is being
marked.
(b) Hard to acquire visually during the day. Firing into the ground short
of the target may kick up dirt, which may be more visible to the aircrew.
This technique must be balanced with the undesirable need to purposely
not shoot the target.
(c) May require the aircraft to hold in specific direction from target in
order to get visibility on mark. JTAC should make every effort to narrow
down the area the aircrew is observing (when conducting visual Talk-On)
or provide coordinates with sufficient accuracy to slew the sensors to
general target area.
(d) Mark effect may dissipate quickly. For this reason the aircrew must
be observing the target area prior to the impact of the mark.
(e) JTACs/FAC(A)s should be aware of vertical surface danger zones

associated with direct fire weapons and consider this when planning
attack geometry for low flying aircraft.
(f) Sensor field of view may be an issue for aircrew using sensors to
acquire the mark. If the mark is outside of the sensor field of view, the
aircrew will not see it.
(g) Sacrifices surprise
(h) Shot may compromise friendly positions
3.8.1.5 Indirect Fire (IDF) mark.
Artillery, naval fires, or mortar fires are an effective means of enabling pilots to visually acquire
the target. Before choosing to mark by artillery, NSFS, or mortars, observers should consider
the danger of exposing these supporting arms to the enemy’s indirect fire acquisition systems,
and the additional coordination between supporting arms required for this mission. Caution
must be applied when using a White Phosphorus (WP) and/or red phosphorous (RP) mark on
a crowded battlefield that the mark is not confused with other activities on the ground. Timing
for marking rounds is situational dependent and must be coordinated prior to commencement
of the attack.

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JTACs/FAC(A)s must calculate weapon times of flight and understand aircrew tactics to ensure
marks impact at the appropriate time. This lead time ensures that the marking round is in
position early enough and remains visible long enough for the JTAC/FAC(A) to provide final
control instructions and for the pilot of the attacking aircraft to acquire the target. Indirect fire
marking rounds are most effective when delivered within 100 meters of the CAS target, but
those within 300 meters of the CAS target are generally considered effective enough to direct
CAS aircraft. When indirect fire marking rounds are not timely or accurate, JTACs/FAC(A)s
should use a backup marking technique or verbal instructions to identify the target to CAS
aircrew. If the situation requires precise marks, observers or spotters can adjust marking
rounds to ensure that accurate marks are delivered to meet the CAS schedule.
a. Advantages.
(1) Day or night (depending on ammunition being used).
(2) Does not require the JTAC to expose his position.
(3) Provides a starting point for talk-ons.
b. Disadvantages.
(1) Takes time to coordinate.
(2) Accuracy of most indirect fires means that a correction from the mark will
generally be required.
(3) Indirect fires must be deconflicted from CAS assets.
(4) Sensor field of view may be an issue for aircrew using sensors to acquire
the mark. If the mark is outside of the sensor field of view, the aircrew will not
see it.
(5) Obscuration from IDF marks must be considered when employing LGWs.
(6) Designation on deck at night may wash out aircrew NVGs.
(7) Sacrifices surprise.
(8) May compromise positions of friendly artillery to enemy counter fire

radars.
3.8.1.6 Air delivered marks
Some aircraft can mark with WP/high explosive rockets, IR pointer, gun tracers, and/or LASER.
3.8.1.7 LASER handoff
Details about use of LASER can be found in Chapter 3, Section XI LASER operations.
a. Advantages.
(1) When set up appropriately, LASER-handoffs are often the quickest way
to cue a LASER Spot Tracker (LST)-equipped aircraft‘s sensors onto a target.
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(2) High confidence in target correlation if appropriate geometries are used.
(3) May be used day or night.
b. Disadvantages.
(1) Requires LTD and LST.
(2) Requires unobstructed LOS between designator, target and sensor.
(3) Requires coordination and geometry set up to ensure aircraft LST does
not track ground LTD.
(4) Marked target must be within FOV of the LST.
(5) Ground LTD LASER marksmanship is often challenging. Low grazing

angles often may cause beam skipping or LASER spillover may occur. Spot
jitter can also be an issue due to ground LASER operators potentially being
under fire.
(6) Modern armor has sensors that detect illumination by LASER and initiate
countermeasures.
(7) In order to ensure aircraft LST acquisition of a LASER mark and complete
correlation prior to an aircraft arriving at its weapons release solution, it may be
necessary to coordinate a target acquisition pass prior to the aircraft beginning
its attack run. This is often a factor when employing stand-off ordnance. LASER
marks may also be used without a target acquisition run.
(8) For ground lasing missions, final attack headings shall be passed when
using LASER handoff as a marking technique to ensure that aircraft are in the
LASER acquisition area. LTL shall be passed.
(9) Susceptible to environmental factors.
3.8.1.8 Marking with IR pointers (IRP)
Ground IR Pointer
IRP are LASER devices that operate on wavelengths that are visible to NVDs. JTACs/FAC(A)s
may use IR pointers and other IR devices to mark targets at night for aircrews that are using
NVDs. Unlike LASER designators, IR pointer devices cannot be used to guide munitions.
The effective range of ground marking devices (like ground force commander’s pointer and IR
zoom LASER illuminator/designator) will vary depending on their power and the amount of
ambient light that is present. Depending on environmental conditions, the entire IR beam or
just a flashlight-type spot around the target may be seen. High ambient light level will decrease
the effectiveness of IR marks but will not negate them completely. During low ambient light
conditions, the entire IR beam should be visible to both aircrew and ground personnel with
night vision devices. The shape of the IR beam will appear narrow or pencil-like at the JTAC’s
position, while the beam will be mushroomed at the target, depending on IRP zoom setting.

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Use IR pointers with caution as they may expose the JTAC to an enemy with night vision
capability. JTACs/FAC(A) must always be prepared to provide and describe distinguishing
characteristic(s) of their IR marker to the aircrew. IR marks should be initiated 20 to 30 seconds
prior to the CAS TOT/TTT, or when requested by the aircrew. JTAC must minimize the target
illumination time. This will minimize the chance of the friendly position being compromised,
especially if the enemy is night vision capable. When working with IR pointers, use night
infrared CAS brevity terms (see paragraph 5.4.15.4 IR Pointer Correlation).
When marking with ground-based IR pointer, aircrew shall be visual the friendly position, either
through friendly position marking (e.g. IR strobe, etc.), or through “roping” the aircraft, “snaking”
the target, etc.
a. Advantage:
(1) Quickly orients NVD-equipped aircrew to target.
b. Disadvantages:
(1) Night only.
(2) When enemy are equipped with NVDs, the use of IR sparkles may expose
the operator and/or result in a loss of surprise.
(3) Low grazing angles may cause skipping and spillover.
(4) Requires coordination to ensure that aircrews acquire the correct end of
the IR sparkle.
(5) Weather (e.g. fog, rain, snow) can severly degrade IR Pointer capabilities.
Airborne IR Pointer
JTAC can mark the target by walking an aircraft‘s IR sparkle onto a target using a verbal
commands.
a. Advantages.
(1) Does not require ground operator to expose his position to an NVD-
capable enemy.
(2) JTAC has visual confirmation of what the aircrew are correlated on.
b. Disadvantages.
(1) Night only.
(2) Enemy equipped with NVDs may become aware they are being targeted.
(3) Weather (e.g. fog, rain, snow) can severely degrade IR Pointer
capabilities.

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 Due to differing perspectives it can be very difficult for a JTAC/FAC(A) to

verbally talk an aircraft‘s SPARKLE onto a target.
Match Sparkle.
Directing the aircrew to overlay their IR SPARKLE onto an IR SPARKLE that is already on
the target. Aircrew will be “heads-out” matching SPARKLEs using their NVDs and slewing
their sensor/sparkle. Aircrew will then look inside to see what is in their sensor field of view.
CAS aircrew must be VISUAL and TALLY or CONTACT SPARKLE when using a ground-
based IR pointer as a mark.
a. Advantages.
(1) Quick.
(2) JTAC/FAC(A) has visual confirmation of what the aircrew are correlated
on.
b. Disadvantages.
(1) Night only.
(2) Requires coordination to ensure aircrews are positioned to acquire the

correct end of the IR sparkle.
(3) With multiple IR sparkles near a target, it may be difficult for the JTAC to
discern if the sparkles are actually on the target due to perspective and
“blooming” of NVGs.
(4) When the enemy is equipped with NVGs, the use of IR sparkles may
expose the operator and/or result in a loss of surprise.
3.8.1.9 Link-16/SADL (Situation Awareness Data Link) handoff.
Aircraft equipped with Link-16/SADL may select (“hook”) a track that has been created on the
Link-16/SADL network. This cues aircraft sensors to the location of that track.
a. Advantage.
(1) Aircraft en route to a target area can receive Link information well before
checking in with the TACP, allowing them to gain SA early.
b. Disadvantages.
(1) Not all aircraft are Link-16 capable.
(2) Most ground-based digital CAS systems are not capable of creating a
track on the Link-16 network without a gateway.
(3) Interoperability across the coalition force.

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3.8.1.10 Radar beacon offset.
a. Advantage:
(1) Day or night, all-weather.
b. Disadvantages.
(1) Requires radar beacons not commonly carried.
(2) Very little aircrew and JTAC/FAC(A) training on the uses of radar beacon
bombing.
3.8.1.11 Combination.
When the tactical situation deems it reasonable, a JTAC/FAC(A) will strive to provide
redundant marks in case the primary mark fails, is late, or is inaccurate during the terminal
phase of an attack. Examples of redundant mark combinations are LASER/ smoke, IR pointer/
tracer and smoke/ Talk-On. When IR pointers or LASER designators are employed,
JTACs/FAC(A)s and CAS aircrew must use standard marking brevity terms and procedures to
ensure CAS aircrews do not confuse the source of the mark or the friendly position with the
target end.
3.8.1.12 Marking Friendlies.
Marking friendlies is the least desirable method of enabling a TALLY on the target. Marking
friendlies can be confusing and should be used cautiously and only when no other method is
available. When conducting a visual target Talk-On, JTACs should mark their position with
devices such as strobe lights, mirrors, or air panels to aid aircrew identification of the friendly
position. Care must be taken to not highlight friendly ground forces positions to the enemy.
Some types of mark used to be VISUAL with friendly positions must be used with caution, as
they may in some instances confuse the aircrew and reveal friendly positions to the enemy,
therefore risks and benefits of marking friendly positions must be carefully considered.
Section II Methods of Attack and Types of Control

3.9 METHODS OF ATTACK.
The method of attack is an agreement between the supported commander, the JTAC/FAC(A)
and the aircraft regarding the aircrew’s correlation requirement and is completely independent
of the type of control.
In CAS, correlation is the process by which the JTAC/FAC(A) coordinates and confirms that
the attacking aircraft and/or a third party contributor have acquired the correct target or mark.
Correlation is required on each and every CAS engagement.
Method of attack conveys the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s intent for the aircraft’s prosecution of the target;
either the aircraft will acquire the target or mark (Bomb on Target-BOT) or correlation will be
provided by system/weapon readback (Bomb on Coordinates- BOC).
JTACs will state the method of attack, whether BOT or BOC, as part of the game plan prior to
the CAS brief.

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These concepts apply to all types of control and all ordnance employed in CAS missions.
JTACs/FAC(A) and CAS aircrew should think of and use these concepts as a clear, concise,
effective manner to communicate the requirements for correlation from CAS aircraft employing
ordnance. Effective use of BOT and BOC concepts to clarify JTAC and CAS requirements for
a CAS engagement will result in more expeditious attacks and help mitigate friendly fire and
collateral damage.
The misapplication of BOT and BOC in tactical scenarios will often result in confusion between
CAS aircraft and JTAC/FAC(A), increased time to kill and potentially cause friendly fire or
collateral damage.
3.9.1 Bomb on Coordinates (BOC)
A BOC attack is used when the JTAC determines that he can create the desired effects against
the target with CAS aircraft employing ordnance on a specified set of coordinates. The
coordinates must be of sufficient fidelity/mensuration to produce the desired effect on the target
and be used for fires approval. If the aircraft is never required to have the TALLY/CAPTURED
the target or CONTACT the mark, it is a BOC attack. The JTAC/FAC(A) does not need to delay
the CAS attack in order to build CAS aircraft awareness to achieve target TALLY/CAPTURE.
If a BOC attack is planned based on the tactical scenario, then unnecessary exposure to the
threat by CAS platforms is minimized; and time is not wasted conducting targeting
confirmation. Great care must be taken to ensure that the target location with the required or
necessary precision and accuracy determined in the commander’s tactical risk assessment is
obtained and entered into the weapon/navigation system.
a. For BOC missions, all aircraft delivering ordnance must readback Line 4
and Line 6 from their system or weapon, as appropriate, in conjunction with Line 8
and required restrictions.
b. Aircrew will not modify coordinates once read back is complete.
BOMB ON COORDINATE ATTACK EXAMPLES INCLUDE:
a. LASER guided weapons employed into a LASER attack zone with the intent
to be guided by a source outside the attacking aircraft flight/section (e.g., [JTAC]
another close air support [CAS] flight/section).
b. Unguided ordnance dropped from medium to high altitude above an

overcast with ability to achieve the supported commander’s intent for CAS.
c. Unguided ordnance dropped from low altitude on coordinates provided by

JTAC/FAC(A) with ability to achieve the supported commander’s intent for CAS.
d. Initially aided munitions employed on a static coordinate sufficient to

achieve the supported commander’s intent for CAS.
e. Weapons employed on a Global Positioning System coordinate and then

lased by an off-board source/JTAC/FAC(A).

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3.9.2 Bomb on Target
A BOT attack requires that the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s intended target or mark are
TALLY/CONTACT/CAPTURED by the aircrew. Coordinate accuracy and precision (to include
TLE) are not as important as the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s ability to aid CAS aircraft in gaining the
target. If at any point during the CAS engagement, the attack aircrews are required to gain
tally/contact/capture the target, it is a BOT attack.
This delivery method is advantageous in numerous tactical situations such as mobile target
sets (whether stationary or moving), low threat environments that support continuous target
observation by CAS aircraft, situations where controllers are not able or do not need to
generate low TLE coordinates, or when targets or marks are TALLY/CONTACT/CAPTURED
by the aircrew.
If a BOT attack is planned based on the tactical scenario, then time should not be wasted
conducting detailed precision and/or accurate target coordinate generation. In many tactical
scenarios suited to BOT attacks, delaying the attack in order to generate a coordinate for BOC
employment will increase the time to kill or result in missed targeting opportunities.
Coordinates provided in the attack brief must be of sufficient fidelity to provide initial cueing to
the attacking aircraft; and be used for fires approval.
For BOT missions, only the flight lead is required to readback lines 4, 6 and 8 in conjunction
with other required restrictions. All attack aircraft will provide readbacks only if requested by
the JTAC/FAC(A).
BOMB ON TARGET EXAMPLES INCLUDE:
a. LASER guided weapons employed into a LASER attack zone and self-
lased by the delivering CAS aircraft
b. Unguided ordnance dropped from any altitude under the weather with CAS
aircraft TALLY or CONTACT and employing off of the correction
c. Correction from mark or reference point
d. Weapons employed on a Global Positioning System coordinate and then

lased by the CAS aircraft
e. Rockets and guns on positively identified targets, or contact a mark and

correction.
3.10 TYPES OF CONTROL
Types of terminal attack control are tools that give the ground force commander the greatest
chance of accomplishing the mission while mitigating friendly fire and collateral damage. The
type of control conveys the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s intent on how best to mitigate risk and his need
to control individual attacks:
a. Type 1, accomplished by visually acquiring the attacking aircraft, assessing

the attack geometry and maintaining control of individual attacks;

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b. Type 2, accomplished by paying particular attention to other measures in

place to reduce risk and maintaining control of individual attacks; or
c. Type 3, accomplished by paying particular attention to other measures in

place to reduce risk and the measures in place allow for multiple attacks within a
single engagement.
Any type of control can be utilized with either method of attack and no type of control is tied to
one particular method of attack.
The three types of control are not ordnance specific but are influenced by the choice of
ordnance, delivery profile and the tactical situation.
The tactical risk assessment determines which type of control (1, 2, or 3) is used. Specific
levels of risk should not be associated with each type of terminal attack control but such may
be considered in a supported commander’s tactical risk assessment. During the fires approval
process at the appropriate unit level, the commander considers the situation and issues
guidance to the JTAC based on recommendations from the staff and associated risks identified
in the tactical risk assessment discussed earlier. The tactical situation will define the risk
associated with a given type of TAC, (e.g., GPS and digital targeting systems used in Type 2
control may be a better mitigation of risk than using Type 1).
Senior commanders may impose restrictions that will prevent subordinate commanders from
choosing certain terminal attack control types. However, the intent is for senior commanders
to provide guidance that allows the lowest level supported commander to make the decision
based on the situation. Type of control may be a decision delegated to the JTAC under certain
conditions.
Type of control shall be passed as part of the game plan before the attack brief for aircrew SA,
but impose no requirement on the aircrew.
It is not unusual to have two types of control in effect at one time for different flights. For
example, a JTAC/FAC(A) may control helicopters working Type 2 control from a BP outside
the JTAC’s field of view (FOV) while simultaneously controlling medium or low altitude FW
attacks under Type 1 or 3 control. .
3.10.1 Type 1 Control.
Type 1 control should be utilized when the visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft and
analysis of attacking aircraft geometry by the JTAC/FAC(A) is the best means available to
ensure mission success and reduce the risk of the attack affecting friendly forces and/or
collateral concerns.
The intent is that the JTAC/FAC(A) is able to assess the attack geometry of the aircraft to
predict the weapon trajectory from release to impact, helping to ensure friendly positions and
collateral damage concerns are safe from undesired weapons effects.
Type 1 control is used when:
a. The JTAC/FAC(A) requires control of individual attacks.
b. The situation requires the JTAC/FAC(A) to visually acquire the attacking

aircraft.
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c. The situation requires the JTAC/FAC(A) to visually acquire the target for
each attack.
d. The JTAC/FAC(A) will withhold clearance until the attacking aircraft has
completed maneuvering on the target (wings level).
Note: Some weapon such as turret mounted guns, door mounted guns, PGMs such as LGW
or IAMs may have such trajectories that do not depend on the nose geometry of the attacking
aircraft during release. Using Type 1 control in these instances will not increase the safety of
own troops and other methods of risk mitigation must be considered. JTAC/FAC(A) may
restrict the type of ordnance used by attacking aircraft to minimize the chance of unwanted
weapons effects from munitions capable of high off boresight trajectories.
Additional consideration should be given to certainty of target correlation, presence of a unique

mark, and proximity of friendly forces. Language barriers when controlling multinational
aircraft, lack of confidence in a particular platform, ability to operate in adverse weather, or
aircrew capability are all examples where visual means of control may be the method of choice.
Type 1 control procedures are as follows:
a. JTAC/FAC(A) will visually acquire the target.
b. JTAC/FAC(A) will send the game plan and CAS brief to attacking aircraft.
c. Attacking aircraft will verify target location correlates with expected target
area using all available means.
d. Aircrew will provide appropriate readbacks.
e. JTAC will provide additional correlation as required (correlation for BOC is

done through readbacks) .
f. Aircraft will provide an “Leaving IP/ IP INBOUND” call if requested.
g. JTAC/FAC(A) will mark/designate target as agreed with the aircrew for BOT
missions.
h. Attack aircraft will provide “IN” call indicating entering terminal phase of air-
to-ground attack prior to weapons release.
i. For BOT missions, attack aircraft must state they are TALLY, or
CAPTURED (target/object).
j. JTAC/FAC(A) will visually acquire the attacking aircraft.
k. JTAC/FAC(A) will analyze attacking aircraft geometry to ensure mission

success and reduce the risk of the attack affecting friendly forces and/or collateral
concerns while maintaining situational awareness of the target area.
l. JTAC/FAC(A) will provide a “CLEARED HOT,” “CONTINUE DRY,” or

“ABORT” based on the above procedures being met for every aircraft in flight,
unless previously agreed otherwise with the aircrew during CAS brief. In the case
of a flight conducting attacks together, the JTAC/FAC(A) may elect to either
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provide a single clearance for the flight or each attack aircraft, based upon the
tactical scenario. JTACs/FAC(A)s must make it clear in the CAS brief to expect
clearance as a flight or individually in the remarks.
Note: In the case where aircraft acquisition/analysis by the JTAC/FAC(A) is difficult or not
possible, attack aircraft may be forced to modify their attack profile to aid in acquisition.
a. the JTAC/FAC(A) requires control of individual attacks and any or all of the
conditions below exist:
b. JTAC/FAC(A) is unable to visually acquire the attacking aircraft at weapons

release.
c. JTAC/FAC(A) is unable to visually acquire the target.
Examples of when Type 2 control may be applicable are night, adverse weather, and high
altitude or standoff weapons employment.
Type 2 control requires control of individual attacks. The JTAC may be able to gain a visual
on the attacking aircraft. While not required, if the tactical situation allows, the JTAC/FAC(A)
should make every effort to gain a visual on the aircraft and assess attack geometry under
Type 2 control in order to provide an additional measure of safety, enhance SA, and be able
to abort the attack if necessary.
Type 2 control procedures are listed in the following subparagraphs:
a. JTAC/FAC(A) visually acquires the target or acquires targeting data from

other assets with accurate real-time targeting information.
b. If targeting data come from an external source and if time and tactical
situation allow, JTAC/FAC(A) should make every effort to verify target location
using all applicable means (crosschecking with map, pulling additional
information from observer, obtain VDL feed from UAS etc.) prior to creating CAS
brief
c. If feasible, JTAC/FAC(A) should coordinate for marking.
d. JTAC/FAC(A) sends game plan and CAS brief to attacking aircraft.
e. Attacking aircraft will verify target location correlates with expected target
area using all appropriate means.
f. Aircrew will provide appropriate readbacks depending on method of attack.
g. JTAC/FAC(A) will conduct correlation as required (may include 3rd party

contributors)
h. If using a targeting pod as the sole means of target acquisition, the aircrew
must clearly communicate what they have positively identified and are tracking
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based on correlation. The aircrew shall state “T-72 CAPTURED (or as passed in
line 5)” to confirm they have acquired and are tracking the target or “(reference
point) CONTACT”
i. Aircraft will provide an “IP INBOUND” call if requested.
j. Attack aircraft will provide the JTAC/FAC(A) with an “IN” call indicating
entering terminal phase of air-to-ground attack prior to weapons release. Aircrew
should make this call at the appropriate time to allow clearance before entering
the release window. If a restriction in the form of a direction or final attack heading
was given in the CAS brief, then it will be included with the IN call. Example: ‘IN
from the South’ or ‘IN heading 360’. All attacking aircraft are required to provide
an “IN” call unless coordinated otherwise.
k. JTAC/FAC(A) will provide a “CLEARED HOT,” “CONTINUE DRY,” or

“ABORT” based on the above procedures being met for every aircraft in flight,
unless previously agreed otherwise with the aircrew during CAS brief. In the case
of a flight conducting attacks together, the JTAC/FAC(A) may elect to either
provide a single clearance for the flight or each attack aircraft, based upon the
tactical scenario. JTACs/FAC(A)s must make it clear in the CAS brief to expect
clearance as a flight or individually in the remarks.
l. For deliveries with weapon times-of-fall greater than 20 seconds, attack

aircraft should transmit “(weapon) AWAY” at weapon’s release with the expected
time of fall if system is capable (e.g., “RIFLE, 22 seconds” or “Two AWAY, 26
seconds).
m. If JTAC/FAC(A) does not have visibility on the target area, BDA can be
provided by the aircrew or 3rd parties involved in the attack.
a. JTAC/FAC(A) requires the ability to provide clearance for multiple attacks

within a single engagement subject to specific attack restrictions, and any or all
of the conditions highlighted in the following text box exist:
The JTAC/FAC(A) must visually acquire the target or utilize targeting data from other asset
with accurate real-time targeting information. All targeting data must be coordinated through
the appropriate supported unit’s battle staff for approval.
JTAC will provide the CAS aircraft with targeting restrictions (e.g., time, geographic
boundaries, final attack heading[s], specific target set). Following mandatory readback by the
CAS asset, the JTAC/FAC(A) then grants a weapons release clearance (“CLEARED TO
ENGAGE”) or calls “TYPE 3 CONTINUE DRY” if weapons release is not intended.
While not required, if the tactical situation allows, the JTAC should make every effort to visually
acquire the aircraft and assess attack geometry under Type 3 control, in order to provide an
additional measure of safety, enhance SA, and be able to abort the attack if necessary.
The JTAC/FAC(A) will monitor radio transmissions and other available digital information to
maintain control of the engagement. The JTAC/FAC(A) maintains abort authority.
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Type 3 is a CAS terminal attack control procedure and should not be confused with TGO, air
interdiction, or other “air support” missions which do not employ a JTAC/FAC(A).
Type 3 control procedures are as follows:

a. JTAC/FAC(A) visually acquires the target or acquires targeting data from
another assets with accurate real-time targeting information.
b. JTAC/FAC(A) passes the game plan and CAS brief to the attacking aircrew.
In addition to other information the briefing shall include in the
remarks/restrictions section:
(1) area for attacks,
(2) restrictions/limitations and
(3) attack time window.
c. Attacking aircraft validates target location by cross-checking that the

position is coincident with the expected target area by using all appropriate
means:
d. The aircrew will provide appropriate readbacks.
e. JTAC/FAC(A) will provide correlation as required (may include 3rd party

contributors)
f. Once satisfied the attacking aircraft are correlated on the appropriate

target(s), the JTAC/FAC(A) will provide attacking aircraft “CLEARED TO
ENGAGE” or “Type 3, CONTINUE DRY.”
g. Prior to initial weapons release, the attack aircraft will provide

“COMMENCING ENGAGEMENT” to the JTAC/FAC(A).
h. JTAC/FAC(A) will continue to monitor the engagement by all means

available (visual, voice, digital, etc.). No other communications are required
unless directed by the JTAC/FAC(A).
i. Attack aircraft will provide “ENGAGEMENT COMPLETE” to the

JTAC/FAC(A).
j. If JTAC/FAC(A) does not have visibility on the target area, BDA can be
provided by the aircrew or 3rd parties involved in the attack.
3.10.4 Additional Considerations for All Types of Control.
a. Changes of Type of Control
The JTAC/FAC(A) maintains the flexibility to change the type of terminal attack
control at any time within guidelines established by the supported commander and
must be coordinated with the appropriate fires approval agency as the type of control
is part of the approved close air support mission. This change must be made prior
to the ‘IN’ call for Type 1 and 2 attacks and the “commencing engagement” call for

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Type 3. If a type change is required after these calls, then the JTAC must abort the
attack and re-brief the aircraft. The JTAC/FAC(A) must ensure that any changes to
the attack brief are adequately conveyed in a timely manner to the attacking aircraft
and that both the terminal controller and the aircrew have the required situational
awareness to safely prosecute the attack.
b. Additional considerations for Type 2 and Type 3 Controls.
Because there is no requirement for the JTAC to visually acquire the target and/or
visually acquire the attacking aircraft in Type 2 or 3 control, JTACs/FAC(A)s may be
required to coordinate CAS attacks using targeting information from 3rd party. The
3rd party can be a scout, UAS, SOF, CAS aircrew, or other asset with real-time
targeting information. The JTAC/FAC(A) maintains control of the attacks, making
clearance or abort calls based on the information provided by these 3rd parties. The
JTAC must consider the timeliness and accuracy of targeting information when
relying on any form of remote targeting. When any form of remote targeting is used
with single source targeting information, targeting data should be routed through the
commander’s battle staff to ensure target validity.
Type 2 and 3 control utilize different measures, other than visually acquiring the
aircraft, to mitigate risk, such as paying strict attention to specified final attack
heading restriction compliance, additional or enhanced correlation procedures for
BOT attacks, potentially requiring readbacks from all attacking aircraft, utilizing
available systems to mark or designate the target, or utilizing available systems to
confirm aircraft target designation (VDL, etc.). Any or all of these measures may be
applicable in the other types of control, but the JTAC/FAC(A) must pay additional
attention to these measures in situations where the JTAC/FAC(A) cannot visually
acquire either the aircraft or target at weapons release to mitigate risk.
c. Technological advancements.
Digital or data link systems capable of displaying aircraft track, sensor point of
interest, etc., significantly enhance situational awareness and the effectiveness of
terminal attack control.
While recent technological advances in weaponry and digital/data link systems have
provided significant enhancements to the CAS mission, it is imperative that
commanders and operators fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the
systems being used. Descriptive dialogue between the JTAC/FAC(A) and aircraft
will often provide the best means of mitigating risk and producing the desired effect
on target. It is essential that standard procedures and terminology be used by all
CAS participants.
Summary of Types of Control and Methods of Attack
Type of Control JTAC/FAC(A) Requirement
JTAC/FAC(A) will visually acquire the target and the

attacking aircraft during the terminal phase of an attack, prior
Type 1
to weapons release, and assess attack aircraft geometry
while maintaining control of individual attacks.

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JTAC/FAC(A) will utilize other measures to mitigate risk

Type 2
while maintaining control of individual attacks.
JTAC/FAC(A) will utilize other measures to mitigate risk and

Type 3 assesses that the measures in place will allow multiple
attacks within the same engagement.
Method of Attack Requirement
Aircraft/aircrew will acquire the target or intended aimpoint

BOT
using the best method available.
Aircraft/aircrew will employ weapons on the specified

BOC
coordinates given in the CAS brief.
d. Post Launch Abort (PLA)
Some guided aviation munitions offer a very limited capability to shift impact point
during time of flight. With CAS weapons the delivery time of flight is typically less
than 30 seconds, the decision for PLA must be made very early in the time of flight
to make any significant change to weapon impact point. Therefore, PLA is a
procedure of last resort.
The battle space owner must authorize the use of PLA and clearly establish the
requirements (CDE, pattern of life, etc.) for the PLA impact point as well as the area
between the PLA impact point and the target. Procedures for PLA execution shall
comply with the traditional fires approval process and need to be established prior
to weapon launch. Friendly forces entering the impact area, a late abort call or an
evolving scene that will result in unacceptable collateral damage are examples of
contingencies where a PLA plan can mitigate dangers or prevent friendly fire.
If the ground force commander wishes to authorize PLA, the JTAC/FAC(A) shall
inform the CAS aircrew in the Restrictions section of the situational update about the
PLA impact point. The PLA impact point must be approved by the supported
commander and the aircrew must explicitly be given PLA authority, including the
criteria for executing the procedure. If the supported commander does not grant
approval, PLA should not be performed and “silence is not consent.” The PLA point
must be transmitted as a restriction and can be expressed as:
(1) specific impact point or
(2) direction and distance from the intended target.
Transmission of an abort point or direction and distance should not be confused with
authority to perform a PLA procedure. JTACs/FAC(A)s and aircrew should exercise
caution before utilizing this procedure in urban areas. Procedures for PLA are as
follows:
(1) Standard CAS brief transmitted.

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(2) Restrictions will include a PLA point or direction/distance as well as the

specific circumstances under which the JTAC/FAC(A) expects the aircrew to
initiate the procedure.
(3) Aircrew readbacks include the PLA instructions.
(4) Mission is approved using standard verbiage already in use. If PLA is

approved, post launch abort approved as briefed must be transmitted.
(5) In the event that the ground force commander or JTAC/FAC(A) needs to
initiate a post launch abort, the directive communication will simply be “Aircraft
call sign Abort!” followed by post launch abort actions to the previously approved
abort point.
An example of a capable post launch abort (PLA) munition is the AGM-114 Hellfire.
Paveway II and GBU-54 are not recommended for PLA.
PLA coordination/execution will affect tempo and therefore is not recommended

unless time permits and the ground force commander desires to incorporate it.
Note: Any delay by the launch platform prior to PLA execution significantly reduces
the ability to actually move the weapon impact point. This tactic also introduces
added uncertainty and risks, is very difficult to execute properly, must be executed
very early in the weapon delivery, and therefore should only be considered in rare
cases. This tactic should not be briefed as a viable option to decision-makers to
reduce collateral damage and should be used only as an option of last resort.
Section III CAS Integration Planning Considerations

Successful employment of both aircraft operations and surface fires requires careful planning
combined with an ability to rapidly coordinate during changing conditions. However, the
JTAC/FAC(A), airspace command and control, and fire support personnel must deconflict
airspace to provide a reasonably safe operating space for aircraft to maneuver and attack
targets. Airspace integration must also accommodate other airspace users to include UASs,
medical evacuation, C2, surveillance, reconnaissance, and transport aircraft. C2 agencies
must ensure transitory aircraft not under a JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s control are made aware of other
aircraft operating in their vicinity. CAS aircraft may require specific deconfliction and
coordination using time, space, and altitude.
3.11 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES.
FSCM are used to coordinate and integrate land, air, and maritime indirect fires to support the
maneuver commander’s intent and operations plan. The purpose of FSCM is to allow the
maximum exploitation of all available FS assets while ensuring the safety of own troops against
the effects of own fires. In the event that fires or the effects of fires are outside the area of
responsibility (AOR) or close to the boundaries, permission/coordination by liaison must be
obtained prior to execution.
It also implies that when requested to clear fires, the command controlling that zone of
operation has a clear responsibility to provide either clearance or denial of clearance to execute
those fires.
More details about FSCMs can be found in AArtyP-5 NATO Fire Support Doctrine.
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3.11.1 Permissive measures
3.11.1.1 Coordinated Fire Line (CFL).
The CFL is a line beyond which conventional surface fire support means (mortars, field
artillery and naval surface fire support ships) may fire at any time within the zone of the
establishing headquarters without additional coordination.
a. Purpose.
The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the attack (using surface fires) of targets
beyond the CFL without the coordination with the maneuver commander in whose
zone of action targets are located and to provide the maneuver commander with an
area within his zone of action where the forces can operate in safety from friendly
indirect fires.
b. Establishment.
Normally, maneuver commanders are responsible for selecting or recommending

the CFL location within their zone of action or sector of defense. Supporting indirect
fire commanders and indirect fire liaison officers from the JFSE at every echelon
should make appropriate recommendations concerning its location. The lowest level
at which a CFL is established is the battalion. A consolidated CFL may be published
for the force as a whole.
c. Location.
The major factor for location should be the range of land-based indirect fire systems.
It does no good to have a measure in place for uncoordinated indirect fires when
there is limited range beyond the measure. The location of the CFL is also based on
such factors as the scheme of maneuver, patrol plans, locations of security forces
and the troop safety desires of the maneuver commander. There is no requirement
for the CFL to be placed on identifiable terrain, but it can be helpful for Forward
Observers (Coy-JFSE) calling in indirect fires. Additional factors such as the limits
of ground observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the
requirement for maximum flexibility in both maneuver and the delivery of supporting
fires should be considered.
d. Dissemination.
Initial and subsequent locations of the CFL are disseminated through the various
JFSE and fire direction centers to maneuver and supporting arms units concerned.
e. Graphic Portrayal.
A dashed black line with the letters CFL followed by the establishing headquarters
and nation above the line. Below the line the effective date-time group is added.

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Caution: Use of the CFL does not eliminate the requirement/ responsibility to coordinate the
airspace required to conduct the mission.
3.11.1.2 Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).
Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or amphibious force

commander to denote coordination requirements for fires by other force elements which
may affect the commander’s current and planned operations. The FSCL applies to fires of
air, ground or sea weapons using any type of ammunition against surface or ground
targets. The establishment of the FSCL must be coordinated with the appropriate
commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against surface or ground targets short of
the fire support coordination line must be conducted under the positive control or
procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious force commander. Unless in
exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL
must coordinate with all affected commanders in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonize
joint objectives. Note: In the context of this definition the term "surface targets" applies to
those in littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations.
The FSCL facilitates the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the
coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a
boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close air support. The FSCL
applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapons systems using any type of
ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected
commanders in sufficient time to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets
beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the
rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to surface attack
operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander.
Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land,
and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this
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coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to
do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources.
a. Purpose.
The primary purpose of the FSCL is to provide a measure for coordination between
ground elements and supporting forces without endangering friendly forces in the
air or on the ground or requiring additional coordination with the establishing
headquarters. The FSCL serves several specific purposes:
(1) It facilitates the expeditious attack of targets beyond it, mainly by aircraft.
(2) It provides ground commanders with sufficient control of aircraft short of

the FSCL to ensure troop safety.
(3) It maximizes employment of weapons where they are most efficient.
b. Establishment.
The FSCL is established by the appropriate land commanders within their

boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting and affected
commanders. In joint or combined operations, the FSCL is usually established by
the highest headquarters.
c. Location.
To facilitate recognition from the air, the FSCL should be located on identifiable
terrain. It should be located beyond the area in which the establishing commander
intends to send patrols or penetration forces or in which he intends to maintain
security forces. When detached forces are deployed beyond the FSCL in the zone
of action of the establishing commander, that commander must establish other
coordination measures to encircle and provide a degree of safety to the detached
forces. A key factor in the placement of the FSCL is the range of organic Indirect
Fire weapon systems.
d. Dissemination.
The location of the FSCL is disseminated by the establishing commanders JFSE to

the JFSE of subordinate, adjacent and higher headquarters, as required.
A solid black line with the letters FSCL followed by the establishing headquarters
and nation above the line. Below the line the name and the effective date-time group
is added.

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3.11.1.3 Free Fire Area.
The FFA is a specific designated area into which any weapon system may fire without
additional co-ordination with the establishing headquarters.
a. Purpose.
The purpose of the FFA is to expedite the attack of targets and facilitate the jettison
of CAS munitions. Units are authorized to fire into the area without further
coordination with the establishing force headquarters.
b. Establishment.
The force staff determines the need for FFA, based on the enemy dispositions and
the current tactical situation. It then recommends the area to be designated a FFA
to the commander. He then requests approval of the recommended FFA from the
force commander or civilian official exercising jurisdiction in the area. Upon approval
of the request, the designated area is declared clear for firing without further
coordination.
c. Location.
The area should be easily identifiable from the air; however, it may be designated
by the use of grid coordinates, a radius around a center point on the ground or
LAT/LONG. If the intent is to jettison ordnance, typically the FFA will be located
behind the friendly forces in an area they will not have to maneuver through. If the
intent is to expeditiously attack targets, typically it will be located short of the FSCL
in an area where friendly forces will not have to maneuver through.

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d. Dissemination.
The commencement and termination of the FFA are specified by date-time group.
The force commander then directs that the geographical limits and effective date-
time group(s) or the area be disseminated to his subordinate units.
An area outlined with a solid black line. The letters FFA followed by the establishing
headquarters and nation are written within the area followed by the name and
effective date-time group for commencement and termination.
3.11.1.4 Kill Box.
For Kill Box procedures see Annex A KILL BOX
3.11.2 Restrictive Measures.
Restrictive measures have the purpose of providing safeguards to friendly forces or objects.
The establishment of a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific
coordination prior to the engagement of those targets affected by the measure. Restrictive
measures include:
3.11.2.1 No-Fire Area (NFA).
The NFA is an area into which no fires or the effects of fires are allowed except if
temporarily authorized by establishing authority or if an adversary force within this area
engages friendly forces.
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a. Purpose.
The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in the area, normally to
protect civilians, populated areas or areas of historical/cultural significance.
b. Establishment.
Typically, the maneuver commander establishes an NFA, but it may be established

by any ground commander within his own zone. On arrival of military forces, the
force commander coordinates the location of an NFA with local authorities
c. Location.
The established area should be readily identifiable from the air but may be
designated by the use of grid lines or by a radius about a center point on the ground.
d. Dissemination.
The locations, designations and effective date-time groups of the areas are
transmitted to all units of the force. All NFAs should be entered in the fire direction
systems and placed on maps and charts as appropriate to ensure safety in the
delivery of fires. The force commander is informed of any changes through constant
liaison.
An area outlined with a solid black line with diagonal lines inside. The letters NFA
are written within the area along with the effective datetime group for
commencement and termination. The area should also be identified by the
designation of the headquarters that established the area.

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3.11.2.2 Restrictive Fire Area (RFA).
The RFA is an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires that exceed
those restrictions are not delivered without co-ordination with the establishing
headquarters.
a. Purpose.
The purpose of an RFA is to regulate fires into an area according to stated

restrictions. These restrictions may vary with locality and time. The RFA is applicable
to conventional and special munitions and their effects delivered by any means. No
fire delivery means may fire into this area without meeting the criteria of the
establishing authority.
b. Establishment.
An RFA may be established by any ground unit commander within his own zone;
however, it is normally established below battalion level. Companies operating
independently, however, could establish RFAs.
c. Location.
The RFA should be located on recognizable terrain and readily identifiable from the
air, but its location can be given by grid coordinates or as a radius from a point.
When RFAs are used to protect a forward unit from friendly fires; e.g.,
reconnaissance teams, the RFA size should be large enough to allow the maneuver
of the unit but not so large as to needlessly restrict fire support in other areas.
d. Dissemination.
The identification of the RFA is disseminated to each level of command, including

the establishing command and all concerned JFSE.
An RFA is portrayed by a solid black line defining the area with the letters RFA, the
designation of the unit establishing the area, the name, any special instructions, and
the effective date-time group written inside the area.

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3.11.2.3 Restrictive Fire Line (RFL).
The RFL is a line established between converging friendly forces (one or both may be
moving) that prohibit all fire or effects from fires across the line without coordination with
the affected force.
a. Purpose.
The purpose of an RFL is to prevent fratricide between converging friendly forces. It

is applicable to conventional and special munitions delivered by any means and the
effects of those munitions.
b. Establishment.
An RFL is established by the common commander of converging forces. In certain

instances, he may delegate establishing authority to the senior commander of the
two converging forces or to the commander of the maneuvering force in a linkup
operation between a moving and a stationary force.
c. Location.
To provide for recognition by all JFSE, the RFL should be located on identifiable
terrain. This is not only because CAS can influence this operation, but also because
the inherent, complex nature of this operation requires simplicity in execution and
coordination of direct weapon system, as well as indirect fire systems. In linkup
operations, the RFL is positioned as close as possible to the stationary force to allow
maximum freedom of maneuver and fire support to the linkup (moving) force.
d. Dissemination.
The location of the RFL is disseminated by the staff of the establishing commander
to the staff of the subordinate, adjacent and higher headquarters as required. It is
further disseminated within each level of command, including the establishing
command and all concerned JFSE.

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A solid black line with the letters RFL followed by the name of the establishing
headquarters and nation above the line. The effective date-time group is written
below the line. See figure B-7.
3.11.2.4 Airspace Coordination Area (ACA)
Formal ACA
A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area established by the appropriate
commander in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires.
The Joint Airspace Coordination Center (JACC) establishes formal ACAs at the
request of the appropriate ground force commander. Formal ACAs require detailed
planning. Although not always necessary, formal ACAs should be considered. The
vertical and lateral limits of the ACA are designed to allow freedom of action for air and
surface fire support for the greatest number of foreseeable targets. Since the fire
direction center (FDC) can determine the trajectory for a specific round or naval asset
firing at a specific target, each target must be evaluated to ensure the trajectories of
the rounds do not penetrate the ACA. The JFSE should consult the FDC when
deciding the altitude of an ACA to determine if that altitude would allow the majority of
targets to be attacked without interference or problems. Formal ACAs are promulgated
in the ACO, ATO, or SPINS. ACAs, while restrictive for artillery, are permissive for
aircraft.
a. Purpose.
The ACA acts as a safety measure for friendly aircraft while allowing other
supporting arms to continue fires in support of the maneuver force. It ensures
aircrew safety and effective use of indirect supporting surface fires by deconfliction
of time and space. It facilitates simultaneous attack of targets near each other with

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aircraft and one or more of the supporting arms. This is the primary way to deconflict
airspace for CAS and assault support.
b. Establishment.
The commander of the unit requesting air support requests ACAs based on the
recommendations of his JFSE. Formal ACAs are established by the airspace control
authority. The ACA should only be used when risk to friendly aircraft is great enough
to justify the attendant loss of surface delivered fires. The extent of the ACA
employed is dependent on the time available.
c. Location.
The ACA should be located on identifiable terrain. The ACA should be kept as simple
as the situation permits. Factors that should be considered in determining the actual
size and shape of the ACA are the type of aircraft, type of ordnance and air defense
threat.
d. Dissemination.
The ACA should be disseminated as early and quickly as possible. The maneuver
unit employing the ACA will disseminate the details to higher and adjacent units and
to JFSEs, which will notify their subordinate elements, as required. A scheduled ACA
will be disseminated with its effective date-time group(s), usually on an overlay. An
on-call ACA is promulgated without its effective date-time group. The information
that describes the ACA includes its designation, minimum and maximum altitudes
(above mean sea level (MSL) or above ground level (AGL)), length (grid
coordinates), width (either side of the center line defined by the grid coordinates),
and the effective date-time group(s).
A formal ACA is shown as an area enclosed by a slid back line. Data includes the
letters ACA, the name, the originating headquarters, minimum and maximum
altitude and effective times.

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Informal ACA.
Informal ACAs can be established using separation plans and Procedural Control
Means (see paragraph 3.13 Procedural Control Means. and may be established by
any supported commander. An informal ACA is an expedient measure designed to
provide immediate, yet temporary control and deconfliction. As such, informal ACAs
are normally short-lived and not as widely disseminated as formal ACAs. Aircraft and
surface fires may be separated by distance (lateral, altitude, or combination of lateral
and altitude) or by time. Informal ACAs can be more difficult for the JFSE and airspace
elements to coordinate and ensure all affected airspace users are informed. JFSE
must ensure restrictions to indirect fires or aircraft are limited to those required to
successfully execute the attack and are coordinated with all affected agencies.
3.12 AIRSPACE CONTROL MEANS.
Details on Airspace Control Procedures and Airspace Control Means can be found in NATO
publications AJP-3.3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control and ATP-3.3.5.1. Joint
Airspace Control Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.
ACMs segregate, control, and/or reserve airspace for Allied operations, and are a means for
positive and procedural ID, thereby reducing the risk of fratricide. In general terms, ACMs can
be broken down into the following groups: air corridors and routes, areas, points, and
procedures and means. The ACMREQ is used to request a specific ACM be specified in a
future ACO or when a change to the present ACO is needed. ACMs are listed and defined at
Annex A to ATP-3.3.5.1. FSCMs also have airspace applicability.
All airspace requirements need to be considered at the Joint Force level and a plan constructed
that provides the best compromise, bearing in mind the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC)
operational priorities. This is the aim of the Airspace Control Plan (ACP) produced by the Joint
Airspace Control Center (JACC). Implementation of the ACP is done through the promulgation
of Airspace Control Orders (ACO), which, in conjunction with Air Tasking Orders (ATO) and
Special Instructions (SPINS) form the basis on which front line forces plan and conduct their
operational missions.

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There is a wide range of ACM that can be used to subdivide the airspace to enable Procedural
deconfliction. Generally, routes can be used by either civil or military aircraft, whilst corridors
and all other ACM are for military use only. All requests for airspace or ACM themselves are
to be made to the JACC who will then decide on the most appropriate ACM to be used. All
requests must include details of why the airspace or ACM is required. The ACP/ACO will
include all ACM that potentially may be required in the Area of Operations (AOO). The daily
ACO and SPINS will nominate which ACM will be used during the specified period and, if
required, include amendments to the ASC structure. If appropriate, ACM for use up to any
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) ON Line and, potentially, beyond must be defined to ensure
deconfliction across all areas of the battlespace in which such problems could occur. Details
of ACM that should be promulgated include:
a. Vertical and horizontal dimensions, qualified by Above Ground Level (AGL),

Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) or Flight Level (FL), as appropriate (the
Transition Altitude is also published in the ACP/ACO).
b. Controlling authority.
c. Restrictions for other users.
d. ACM designator.
Modifications relating to ACM should be specified in the daily ACO/SPINS, including:
a. Number of ACM to which details relate.
b. Any amendments to details previously given.
c. Activation times.
d. Radio frequencies (if applicable).
ACM dimensions and detailed procedures are usually only specified in the ACP/ACO/Op
Orders as they will vary, sometimes substantially, depending on the circumstances in which
they are being used.
The individual ACM are described as follows (list not exhaustive):
a. Air Control Point.
A geographic point used for navigation, command and control, and

communication. They are often used to define the start and end points of all types
of airspace corridors and routes, where they change direction and where they
interconnect.
b. Air Route.
Air Routes (AR) are bi-directional routes established to direct aircraft between
two points, providing minimum risk passage through friendly air defenses.
Generally, the Joint Airspace Co-ordination Center will deconflict AR from
activated zones.
c. Altitude Reservation.
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An Altitude Reservation (ALTRV) is a block altitude, normally medium to high,

reserved for specified aircraft types or usage, such as for transit or if loiter time is
required within a Force Air Coordination Area (FACA), Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR),
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) etc. An ALTRV has mandatory upper and lower
limits and may either have lateral limits or may extend across the whole JOA.
d. Coordination Level (CL).
The Coordination Level is a procedural means to separate fixed and rotary wing
aircraft by determining a level below which fixed wing aircraft should not operate
without prior coordination. Similarly, rotary wing aircraft should not fly above the
Coordination Level without prior approval. The height of the CL will depend on
the requirements of the operation, e.g. a higher CL may be appropriate for Peace
Support Operations (PSO), and a lower CL in forward areas where a high Surface
to- Air Missile (SAM) threat exists. Typically, the height of the CL could be 500 ft
Above Ground Level (AGL) up to the IFF Off line. Beyond the IFF Off line the CL
may reduce 150 ft AGL. However, levels are highly flexible and dependent on the
tactical situation and mission. Allocation of a CL is as a procedural deconfliction
measure and does not imply control of the airspace above or below the level to a
specific component. However, fixed wing aircraft descending below the CL (and
rotary aircraft climbing above the CL) should coordinate all cross-CL movements
through either the ACA or the component whose AOO they are transiting into.
e. High Density Airspace Control Zone.
A HIDACZ is airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the ACA, in which

there is a concentrated employment of numerous and/or varied weapons or
airspace users.. It is used for the synchronization of air and ground operations in
support of the ground and/or amphibious battle. The lateral and vertical
dimensions of HIDACZ will depend on tactical and operational requirements but
should be kept to the minimum required to accomplish the mission. The ability of
the designated control authority to manage the airspace should also influence the
size of the HIDACZ. Procedures for the activation of HIDACZs are published in
the ACP. Pre-planned HIDACZs will be published and activated in the ACO. Air
traffic should avoid HIDACZs unless tasked to operate within them.
Agencies/authorities planning to place any ACM through a HIDACZ are to
coordinate with the appropriate controlling authority. Airspace Coordination within
the HIDACZ will be delegated to the surface force commander who is being
supported by the air operations conducted in the zone. The commander to whom
local airspace coordination is delegated will coordinate aircraft movements within
the HIDACZ in accordance with the broad policies and procedures established in
the main ACP. If the Commander is designated a Subordinate Airspace Control
Authority (SACA), local ASC procedures will be detailed in the SACA’s ACP.
Control exercised by a SACA can be either positive or procedural based, or a mix
of both, including, if appropriate, Dynamic Procedural Control.
f. Restricted Operations Zone.
A Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ) is established in order to reserve airspace

for specific, often singular activities in which the operations of one or more
airspace users is safeguarded (e.g., refueling orbits, terminal approach holding
areas, landing/drop zones, etc.). However, ROZ establishment does not

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guarantee sole use of the airspace but highlights the need for coordination and
deconfliction within the specified volume. The vertical and horizontal dimensions
of a ROZ will be determined by the type of activity being carried out. ROZ for
Army operated UAS may be coordinated directly between the Corps Airspace
Management Element (CAME)/Division Airspace Management Element (DAME),
Air Operations Coordination Center (Land) (AOCC (L)) and the appropriate ACA
or agency to which authority is delegated. Usage of a ROZ must be defined in
the Remarks section in the ACO.
g. Slow Aviation Assets Flight Routes.
Slow Aviation Assets Flight Routes (SAAFR) are established to route slow
moving aircraft in support of ground operations. They may be established by any
component, and, when approved by the JACC, a matrix may be created, as
depicted in Figure 3. However, SAAFR will normally be developed through direct
co-ordination between the appropriate agencies within the Land Component
Command (LCC) such as the CAME/DAME, AOCC (L) and ACA or delegated
agency. SAAFR will be activated and deactivated as operational requirements
dictate.
h. SAAFR are generally established below the Coordination Level and their
dimensions shall be as deemed appropriate to the mission.
The matrix of SAAFR will be specified in the ACP or ACO. The default setting is
that all SAAFR are inactive for the full period of the ACO unless otherwise
notified. SAAFR may only be activated during the ACO period with the authority
of the ACA, or a SACA after close coordination with the Joint Airspace
Coordination Center (JACC) or delegated agency.
SAAFR activation is either pre-notified within the ACO, or, if required at short
notice while the ACO is in force, the JACC or delegated agency must notify all
agencies and units that will or could be affected.
Only air assets so tasked are authorized to use activated SAAFR.
3.13 PROCEDURAL CONTROL MEANS.
JTACs/FAC(A)s and fire support personnel should select separation techniques that require
the least coordination without adversely affecting the ability to safely complete the mission.
Successful integration requires deconfliction methods that facilitate simultaneous multi-
ship/platform CAS and indirect fire operations. To be successful, all participants must be well
versed in ACA terminology and have knowledge of all applicable ACAs in use The goal is to
integrate CAS aircraft with other supporting arms in a manner that quickly achieves the
commander’s objectives and supports the commander’s scheme of maneuver maneuver and
intent.
Procedural control means provide target orientation to aircrew, align aircraft for the attack or
egress, provide separation from other supporting fires, and provide separation from enemy air
defense assets. Procedural control means include CP/IP selection, offset direction, and final
attack heading.

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3.13.1 Contact Point (CP)/Initial Point (IP)/Battle Position (BP) Selection.
The JTAC/FAC(A) selects the CPs/IPs/BPs based on enemy capabilities, target orientation,
friendly location, weather, aircraft capabilities, and FSCMs. CPs and IPs should be visually
significant geographic points whenever possible so that aircrew can visually acquire them in
the event of a degraded navigation systems or GPS-denied environments. IPs and BPs should
be in such distance from target area that allows for safety of the aircraft from enemy AD threat,
during holding and for employment of weapons, typically 5 to 15 NM. Actual distance therefore
depends on anticipated threat, aircraft and weapons used. For example FW PGM delivery run
typically begins about 8-10NM from the target. High altitude aircraft may require IPs in excess
of 20 nautical miles from the target. If ground forces want to achieve surprise the holding
distance should prevent the enemy from spotting the aircraft and reduce the noise to minimum.
IPs/BPs should be positioned over friendly territory, away from known friendly and anticipated
enemy artillery positions. When selecting BPs for helicopters or IPs for low flying aircraft
attention should be paid to terrain hampering LOS communications.
When coordinating the use of stand-off weapons, IP ranges may need to be extended to
ensure appropriate weapon delivery parameters. In some cases, stand-off CAS platforms may
need to apply required terminal deconfliction parameters to the weapon instead of the aircraft.
In this case, the aircrew should communicate an appropriate stand-off IP to the JTAC/FAC(A),
ensuring that the weapon will remain deconflicted throughout its entire route of flight.

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3.13.1.1 Keyhole template.
Keyhole is an efficient method for establishing an IP/BP in the absence of control points or
their location does not sufficiently support target engagement. When CAS aircraft are passed
to a JTAC/FAC(A) from a contact point, the JTAC/FAC(A) should immediately pass an “Echo”
point (typically the target) to those CAS players, and then anchor their hold point off of the
target with a direction and distance.
JTAC/FAC(A) may also send other than target coordinates (for example center of the target
area), however this has to be clearly communicated to the aircrew.
The standard keyhole method is to label each of the cardinal directions with a letter: A – North,
B – East, C – South, D – West and E – Overhead Target and use radials when
cardinal/subcardinal directions are not appropriate. Distances are expressed in nautical miles
(for FW) or kilometers (RW).
FW Aircraft should hold outside the distance given.
For RW the distance given is considered the center of BP.
Note: JTACs/FAC(A)s should remain aware that when target arrays change appreciably—
unlike when using traditional IPs--so will the hold point for the attacking aircraft when using the
keyhole template. This shift of attacking aircraft orbits and hold points must be communicated
clearly. Failure to change the Echo Pt when a target area changes can result in deconfliction
issues with other airborne players.
Note: If holding multiple aircraft around one Echo point the JTAC/FAC(A) should consider
deconflicting all the players also by altitude, as holding patterns of some players may
accidentally overlap during holding.

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(1) If the tactical situation dictates that an IP north of the target is necessary, then holding
instructions for the CAS players might sound like this:
JTAC: “Stang 11, advise when ready to copy echo point.”
CAS Player: “Stang 11, ready to copy.”
JTAC: “Ten-digit grid to follow. NU 87138 50874.”
CAS Player: “I copy NU 87138 50874.”
JTAC: “Stang 11, proceed to Alpha 8, Flight Level 150, report established.”
CAS Player: “Stang 11, established Alpha 8, FL 150.”
(2) Sometimes a cardinal direction is not appropriate for an IP.In these situations, any radial
from the target can be used for holding instructions. For example:
JTAC: “Stang 11, proceed to the 240 at 8, Flight Level 150, report
established.”
CAS A/C: “Stang 11, established 240 at 8, Flight Level 150.”
This template allows for unlimited flexibility in IP selection and precludes the need to generate
IPs for an entire operational area, many of which may never be used. “However, by choosing
the keyhole method, the JTAC/FAC(A) will probably not be able to provide a
visually/geographically significant hold point on which the aircrew can orientate.”

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3.13.2 Lateral Separation.
Lateral separation is effective for coordinating fires against targets that are adequately
separated from flight routes to ensure aircraft protection from the effects of friendly fires.
Lateral separation allows coordinated attacks against two adjacent targets. The informal ACA
should be big enough to allow aircraft to engage the target yet small enough to minimize
restrictions on supporting fire. Divide the target area into two or more engagement zones.
While the separation measure may be described by a MGRS, grid line or latitude/longitude
reference, terrain features have the added advantages of simplicity and constant visual
reference. This is an appropriate technique when aircrews and firing units engage separate
targets and aircraft will not cross GTLs. JTACs must know the GTLs so they can prevent
aircraft from flying through trajectories. For example: “Stay west of the grid line 62” or “Remain
west of the river.”
3.13.3 Altitude Separation.
Altitude is measured in feet and can be expressed as:
a. Height- expressed in feet above ground level (AGL). It is measured by radar

altimeter.
b. Altitude- in feet above mean sea level. It is measured by barometric

altimeter on regional pressure setting.
c. Flight level- in hundreds of feet above mean sea level. Measured by

barometric altimeter set on standard pressure setting.
Other most common way to express altitude are:
a. Angels- altitude in thousands of feet (Angels 15 is altitude 15 thousand

feet).

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b. Base plus altitude. Base number is usually found in daily SPINS. Altitude is
expressed by subtracting the actual altitude from base number. (If base number
is 5 and pilot is flying at 15 000 feet, he reports his altitude as “Base plus 10”).
3.13.3.1 Separation of aircraft from indirect fires.
Altitude separation is effective for coordinating fires when aircraft remain above or below
indirect fire trajectories and their effects, This technique permits indirect fires to continue when
the aircraft must cross the GTL. Avoidance of the indirect fire trajectory and fragmentation
pattern is provided by “stay above” or “stay below” altitude restrictions. When calculating the
safe separation for an aircraft to stay above or below the indirect fire trajectory, the JTAC and
JFSE/FSO use tabular firing tables to determine the ordinate (altitude) of the projectile at the
location where the aircraft will cross the GTL. This altitude is converted to feet above mean
sea level (MSL) and a margin of safety is applied prior to passing the aircraft a “stay above”
or “stay below” altitude (for example, “stay above 5,000 ft MSL”). The JTAC and JFSE/FSO
must coordinate with the firing unit to determine the appropriate entry argument data to use
when referencing the firing tables.
3.13.3.2 Separating multiple flights of aircraft
Technique for separating multiple flights of aircraft by altitude over the same target is also
known as CAS STACK.
When separating multiple flights of aircraft by altitude, JTAC/FAC(A) should assign 2000 ft
block to each flight and if airspace allows, maintain 1000 feet safety buffer between aircraft
working blocks.
JTAC/FAC(A) should make sure all the aircraft in the stack are on the same altimeter pressure
setting.

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3.13.4 Altitude and Lateral Separation.
Altitude and lateral separation is the most restrictive technique for aircrews and may be
required when aircraft must cross the firing unit’s GTL. This is an appropriate technique when
aircraft and firing units engage targets along the GTL or aircraft must cross the GTL. This
requires aircraft to remain above or below indirect fire trajectories. To calculate safe separation
from indirect fires, determine the point where the aircraft will cross the GTL, determine the
ordinate at the selected point and add or subtract the margin of safety. For example, “Stay
west of grid line 62 and remain below 3,000 ft. MSL.” When deconflicting by altitude always
specify in feet MSL.
Altitude and lateral separation is also used to deconflict aircraft in CAS stack during weapons
employment.
3.13.5 Time Separation.
Time separation requires the most detailed coordination and may be required when altitude
restrictions from indirect fire trajectories adversely impact aircraft ordnance delivery (e.g.,
mortar trajectory). The timing of surface fires must be coordinated with aircraft routing. This
technique is appropriate when aircrews and firing units engage the same or nearby targets,
when indirect fire is providing SEAD in coordination with the aircraft attack, or when the target
is being marked by indirect fire. When deconflicting sorties, consider the weapons
fragmentation envelope and the likelihood of secondary explosions. All timing for surface fires
will be based on the specific aircraft event time (TOT/TTT).
If CAS aircrew are unable to comply with the TOT/TTT, CAS aircrew must inform the terminal
controller and should consider requesting an alternate TOT/TTT which can be achieved.
Aircrews can update the clock on check-in with air control/fire support coordination agencies.

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3.13.5.1 Time on Target (TOT).
TOT is a time at which the aircraft bombs are to impact the target and around which other
surface fires can be coordinated. TOT requires minimum communication and is usually
easier to employ than TTTs. All participants, air and ground, must understand the time
standard in use (Zulu or local), and the JTAC/FAC(A) may need to ensure all clocks are
synchronized by providing a time check. GPS provided time is the standard for allied forces
in establishing a common time reference and for setting TOT. Strict adherence to timing
by participants is required for aircraft safety.
3.13.5.2 Time to Target (TTT).
TTT establishes a precise number of minutes and seconds that elapse between an
established time hack and bombs on target. This is an accurate, although infrequently
used method of time control and is easy to implement when few participants are involved.
Sufficient duration for the JFSE/FSO to synchronize indirect fires must be considered.
Additionally, the JTAC/FAC(A) must consider time required for the aircraft to execute the
attack. After the CAS brief, specify the TTT and give the “time hack” (e.g., “TIME TO
TARGET 5+00, READY, READY, HACK”). The JTAC/FAC(A) or providing final control
normally provides the “hack.” Aircrew will acknowledge receipt of the time hack.

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For additional considerations about use of TOT and TTT see paragraph5.2.3 Restrictions
Section IV Close Air Support Planning Process
This section outlines a CAS-related decision-making process that can be applied to deliberate
planning and crisis action planning (CAP), identifies specific CAS-related staff responsibilities,
outlines basic CAS planning considerations, and identifies procedures for requesting CAS and
CAS-related air support. Focus will be at the brigade level and below with the concept of TACP
being part of the JFSE. The JFSE is the primary tactical staff agency responsible for CAS
planning. The planning phase begins when the unit receives the order from higher
headquarters (HHQ).
3.14 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The CAS decision-making process,, is a continuous three-phase cycle that has been tailored
for joint fire support and focused specifically on CAS. The CAS decision-making process
assists the commander and staff in developing the CAS portion of a fire support plan. The
JFSE/fire support officer (FSO) plays a crucial role in the process both as the staff fire support
expert and as a member of the targeting team. CAS planners may include the fire support
staff officers, ALOs, and FAC(A)s/JTACs. CAS planners actively participate with the ground
force commander to provide CAS-related inputs to the fire support plan or OPORD. The
planning phase ends in a published order to subordinate units.
3.14.1 Command and Staff Responsibilities
This section identifies commander and key staff member responsibilities relating to joint fire
support planning. While these members may be from different nations with differing specialties,
the detailed integration requirement inherent in CAS mandates that they work as a team. Key
staff members should make every effort to establish a close relationship with each other and
provide cross talk and professional development opportunities. Only through thorough
understanding and appreciation for each other’s perspective can JFS planners function as an
effective combat team.
a. Supported Commander. Supported commanders are often categorized

as being a ground force commander (GFC), an on-scene commander (OSC) or
both. The GFC is typically in charge of an area of operations and the
corresponding battlespace. This includes any effects that occur within this area.
An OSC usually has a much more limited span of command that is often
temporary in nature but often with the same duties and responsibilities of a GFC.
For example a convoy may be traveling through a battlespace owned by a GFC
separate from the convoy commander but that convoy commander may act as a
OSC when a situation develops. Under the ROE and other guidelines, the OSC
may be able to conduct types of operations without prior or additional coordination
with the GFC. Prior coordination and adherence to establish procedures and
regulations are required in order to inhibit timely execution of self-defense and
other urgent activities. These restrictions may include weapon employment,
target engagement authority, and collateral damage estimates and the OSC and
GFC may have different levels of authority.
The commander’s intent and desired end state must be clearly understood,
particularly how fire support and CAS can aid in achieving the overall mission
objective. Commanders must ensure JFS planners understand the objective,

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scheme of maneuver, C2 requirements, and criteria for specific ROE.

Commanders also provide the risk assessment determination identifying specific
guidance for types of TAC based upon factors such as inputs by the supporting
staff, battlefield conditions and regulations such as ROE, LOAC and SPINS.
b. Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer is the principal staff officer for
all matters concerning military intelligence and counterintelligence. In this
capacity, the intelligence officer provides current and timely CAS targeting
information as well as projected enemy actions. The intelligence officer serves
as the focal point for ISR systems that feed real time or near real time battlefield
intelligence. The intelligence officer is the source of targeting data (e.g.,
subordination or suspected maneuver unit identification, measurable target
locations, collateral damage risks) and other JIPOE information. JFSE has to
liaise with the intelligence cells in order to have:
(1) Updated target array,
(2) Latest IPB products
(3) Updated adversary COA and capabilities,
(4) Mandatory inputs for the targeting cell
(5) Coordinated employment of all collection and dissemination assets
(6) Current information on threat.
c. Operations Officer. The operations officer is the principal staff officer for
ensuring the commander’s intent is met. The operations officer is responsible for
ensuring CAS is fully integrated into the OPORD and fire support plan. Example
designations: S-3, G-3, J-3.
d. Fire Support Officer. The FSO advises the commander on the capabilities,
limitations and employment of all fire support assets available to support his
operations. The primary responsibility of the FSO is to ensure the integration of
the fire support plan with the manoeuver plan, both during planning and
execution. Secondarily the FSO commands and directs his terminal control
elements (Forward Observers, JTACs) and others during planning and execution.
The FSO is also the link to the higher echelons JFSE for the planning and
coordination of the external fire support. The FSO is the commanders advisor for
all joint fire support related matters.
e. Air Liaison Officer. The ALO advises the respective ground force
commanders on the capabilities and limitations of CAS. The ALO should
maintain awareness of the proposed sortie distribution for the respective ground
element. ALOs should work closely with other members of the staff such as the
JFSE to ensure the smooth and effective integration of CAS into the planning
process. The ALO is responsible for the specific planning tasks as indicated in
each step of the CAS planning process.
f. Ground Liaison Officer. The ground LNO is the primary ground officer
assigned to air commander’s staffs, such as fighter wings, air operations centers,
and related HQ. They provide expert advice, information, and interface on all
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matters pertaining to ground operations to enable more effective air planning in

support of ground operations.
g. Legal Adviser. Advise and counsel on the law of armed conflict, other
relevant laws, and applicable policy when considering collateral damage risk to
civilians, civilian structures, and properties associated with CAS attacks.
3.14.2 Five Steps to CAS Planning Phase:
3.14.2.1 Step 1: Receipt of Mission/Prepare for Mission Analysis.
As integral parts of the planning team, the action officers and ALOs should gather all relevant
information and products and be prepared to provide pertinent information from products to
the ground force commander’s staff. The below examples are some of the most common
products:
a. Air order of battle (apportionment, allocation, and distribution decision).
b. ATO.
c. ACO.
d. SPINS.
e. OPORD.
f. Standard operating procedure (SOP).
3.14.2.2 Step 2: Mission Analysis.
CAS planner responsibilities for mission analysis actually begin before the new mission is
received. As part of the ongoing staff estimate, they must continuously monitor and track the
status of fire support systems to include available air support. Specifically, during mission
analysis CAS planners perform the following actions:
a. Update latest products (ATO, ACO, SPINS, etc.).
b. Estimate air combat capability to support the operations.
c. Determine capabilities and limitations of assigned personnel and

equipment (number of JTACs, systems, equipment status, communications
status, etc.- see paragraph 3.25 JTAC/FAC(A) organic equipment).
d. Provide input to the ground force commander’s initial guidance.
e. Determine specified, implied, and mission essential tasks.
f. Consider mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available-time available (METT-T- for detailed considerations see Chapter III,
Sections VI to X).
g. Assist in developing the mission statement.

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h. Anticipate air power required to support the mission based on:
(1) HHQ priorities of fires.
(2) Facts and assumptions.
(3) Weight of effort decisions.
(4) Verification that subordinate TACP elements understand the warning

order and have the ability to support the mission.
i. Provide the following products:
(1) ALO estimation required CAS support.
(2) Available CAS assets.
(3) CAS constraints and restraints (ground and airborne alert CAS response
times, weather limitations, tactical directives, ROE, etc.).
(4) Warning order(s) to subordinate units.
j. Key Considerations. During the mission analysis step, CAS planners

should be familiar with the following elements of the HHQ order:
(1) CONOPS/Scheme of Maneuver. What is the commander’s intent? Is

this an offensive or defensive operation? What type of offensive or defensive
operation (deliberate attack, hasty defense, etc.)? How does ROE impact CAS?
(2) Concept of fires/fire support tasks. What are the commander’s desired
task and purpose for fires? How can CAS contribute? What other joint functions
(C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment) are
affected? Have all CAS assets been properly integrated?
(3) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

(JIPOE). What is the enemy order of battle? What effects will time of day,
terrain, and weather have on CAS operations? What are the likely enemy
avenues of approach?
(4) Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance. What ISR assets are

available? Where are ISR assets positioned? How can CAS operators
communicate directly/indirectly with ISR assets? What are the commander’s
critical information requirements (CCIRs)?
(5) Observation Plan. How can CAS take advantage of available “eyes” on
the battlefield? Are terminal attack control methods (i.e., types of CAS)
considered? Where will JTACs, FAC(A)s or observers be required?
(6) Communications Plan. How will maneuver elements, fire support, and
TACP personnel communicate? Are JTACs integrated into the ground force
communications plan? Are communications plans reliable and redundant?

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k. Preplanned Air Support Request. Once CAS planners have analyzed the
mission and are familiar with CAS requirements, initial Air Support Request (ASR)
should be drafted and submitted. Further refinements to these initial requests
can be forwarded as details become available. Adherence to joint air tasking
cycle time constraints is critical.
3.14.2.3 Step 3: COA Development.
After receiving guidance, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. Guidance and
intent focuses staff creativity toward producing a comprehensive, flexible plan within available
time constraints. During this step, CAS planners:
a. Update latest products (ATO, ACO, SPINS, etc.).
b. Analyze relative combat power. This is typically accomplished by weighing

the individual effectiveness of air platforms against anticipated enemy surface
forces to include air defense threats.
c. Generate options used to develop possible COAs. Options should be

suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.
d. Array initial forces to determine CAS requirements.
e. Develop Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) / Airspace Control

Means (ACMs) (for details see paragraphs 3.11 and 3.12 Airspace Control
Means.
f. Develop the CAS integration plan by examining opportunities for the best
use of air power including the placement of TACP assets.
g. The ALO assists in developing engagement areas, target areas of interest

(TAIs), triggers, objective areas, obstacle plan, and movement plan.
h. Prepare COA statements and sketches (battle graphics). This part involves
brainstorming to mass the most effective combat power against the enemy (CAS,
EW, ISR, and surface-based fire support).
i. Key Considerations. During COA development (for each COA), CAS

planners must consider:
(1) Commander’s Intent. How does the commander intend to use CAS?
What are the objectives? Does CAS facilitate the commander’s ability to
accomplish the mission?
(2) CCIRs. What CCIR can CAS assets provide? Will remote observers such
as JTACs, FAC(A)s or FOs be able to provide critical battlefield information?
How will this information be relayed to the maneuver unit?
(3) Enemy Situation. Where is the enemy and how does he fight (enemy
order of battle)? Where is he going? Where can I kill him or affect his actions?
When will he be there? What can he do to kill or hamper me? How am I going
to kill/influence him?

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(4) Statements and Sketches. Once COA development has started,

sketches of each COA should be made with notes for the staff to better
understand what each can offer the unit. How will CAS aircraft enter/exit the
operational area? Does the CAS overlay reflect artillery positioning areas and
azimuths of fire (AOFs)? Does the plan promote simultaneous engagement of
targets by CAS and surface fires? Has the CAS overlay been shared with all
battlefield operating system elements? Where will JTACs be positioned on the
battlefield? What ACMs and FSCMs are needed to support the COA?
(5) Priority of CAS Fires. Priority of fires (POF) for each COA must be
identified. As part of the POF, priority of CAS fires must also be identified. The
ground maneuver commander establishes which element will receive POF and
priority of CAS. It is also important to make the commander and the
commander’s staff aware of their unit’s priority for CAS relative to other units in
the operational area. Does the element with priority of CAS fires have a
designated JTAC? What if priorities change or CAS is unavailable for the
planned COA? How will changes in priority be communicated with forward
elements and JTACs? Does the priority of CAS support the commander’s intent
for each COA?
j. TACP. The TACP provides the following inputs during COA development:
(1) Specific TACP portions of the following plans:
(a) Observation plan (to include target area, aircraft, and BDA).
(b) Employment plan (e.g., ACAs).
(c) Communications plan.
(2) Evaluation of overall TACP capabilities/limitations:
(a) Personnel.
(b) Equipment.
(3) Consideration of the most effective TAC procedures.
(4) Update initial or submit new ASRs with all information currently
available.
(5) Current geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).
3.14.2.4 Step 4: COA Analysis/War Game.
The planning staff “fights the battle” to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each
COA and to identify which COA best accomplishes the commander’s intent. CAS planners
should:
a. Identify strengths and weaknesses for CAS in each COA.
b. Conduct an initial tactical risk assessment for each COA.

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c. Recommend terminal attack control criteria for commander approval and

the type of control to use and under what conditions.
(1) Determine best locations for JTACs/FAC(A)s.
(2) Plan use of observers and assess communications requirements.
d. Evaluate CAS integration with other fire support assets.
e. Assess effectiveness of ACA and other FSCMs/ACMs.
f. Gather war gaming tools.
(1) Updated ATO/SPINS information.
(2) Decision-making matrices/devices.
(3) Briefing cards/CAS briefs.
(4) Standard conventional load listings.
(5) Aircraft and weapons capabilities information.
(6) Aircraft fuel assumptions.
g. List all friendly forces.
h. CAS aircraft.
(1) Airborne C2.
(2) Ground forces, including fire support assets.
(3) JTACs/FAC(A)s.
(4) Observers/ISR assets.
(5) Other aviation and support assets.
i. List Assumptions.
(1) Aircraft operating altitudes.
(2) Enemy surface to air threat posture.
(3) CAS tactics.
(4) JTAC control procedures in effect. (e.g., ROZ, TRP).
(5) How terrain and weather affects CAS.
j. List known critical events and decision points.

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(1) Line of departure or defend no later than times.
(2) CAS triggers (named areas of interest [NAIs]/TAIs).
(3) ACM/FSCM requirements.
(4) SEAD/marking round requirements.
k. Determine evaluation criteria.
(1) Timeliness.
(2) Accuracy.
(3) Flexibility.
(4) Mass.
(5) Desired effects.
l. Select the war gaming method.
m. Rehearsal of Concept (ROC)/Terrain Model/Sand Table. Commanders

and staffs may use a form of rehearsal called a “ROC drill.” A ROC drill is a
leader and staff rehearsal that usually uses a sand table or similar training aid.
Its primary purpose is to synchronize the actions of all six joint functions (C2,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment).
(1) Map
(2) Radio
(3) Other
n. Select a method to record and display results.
(1) Events log
(2) Timetables
(3) Reaction times etc.
o. War game the battle and assess the results. Did CAS support the
commander’s intent for fires? Was CAS effectively integrated with ground
scheme of maneuver? Was C2 of CAS reliable and effective? Were FSCMs and
ACMs effective in supporting the COA?
p. Fires Paragraph. CAS and other fire support planners begin to refine the
fires paragraph to the OPORD by further developing fire support tasks. The
essential elements of a fire support plan include but are not limited to clear and
concise articulation for the use of CAS by identifying the task, purpose, and effect
of each fire support task.

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(1) Task. Describes the targeting objectives fires must achieve against a
specific enemy formation’s function or capability. Examples include:
(2) “Disrupt movement of third Tank Regiment.”
(3) “Delay Advanced Main Body movement by 2 hours.”
(4) “Limit advance of 32nd Motorized Rifle Regiment.”
(5) “Destroy lead elements of the Forward Security Element.”
q. Purpose. Describes the maneuver or operational purpose for the

task. Examples include:
(1) “To allow 2nd BN to advance to phase line Smith.”
(2) “To seize and hold Objective Panther.”
(3) “To enable Task Force Armor to secure access to Brown’s Pass.”
r. Effects of Fires. Attempts to quantify the successful accomplishment of the

task. Examples:
(1) “CAS destroys 8–10 vehicles vicinity Brown’s Pass; Armor BN secured
Brown’s Pass.”
(2) “CAS disables enemy engineer platoon at point of penetration; 2nd BN

advanced to phase line Smith, seized and held Objective Panther.”
(3) “CAS destroys enemy tanks in main defensive belt; 2nd BN advanced to
phase line Smith, seized and held Objective Panther.”
3.14.2.5 Step 5: Orders Production.
Orders are the means by which the commander expresses to subordinates the following
guidance: objectives, intent, decisive points, and the end state of an operation. This guidance
enables a staff to focus its efforts accordingly. They also help the staff integrate and
synchronize the commander’s decisions and concepts. JFSE members and ALOs should pay
particular attention to the CAS-related portion of HHQ orders. Planners must understand the
commander’s objectives for joint fires CAS and the utilization of CAS to best support the overall
mission objective(s).
The staff prepares the order or plan to implement the selected COA and provides a clear,
concise CONOPS, a scheme of maneuver, and concept of fires. Orders and plans provide all
necessary information that subordinates require for execution, but without unnecessary
constraints that would inhibit subordinate initiative. TACPs should produce the CAS specific
portion of the fire support annex of an OPORD.
Format for orders are listed in STANAG 2014 Formats for Orders and Designation of Timings,
Locations and Boundaries.

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Section V Requesting Close Air Support

3.15 AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS
Air support requests (ASRs) are used to identify the supported commander’s requirements for
supporting air missions. There are two types of ASRs, preplanned and immediate.
a. Preplanned Requests. Those support requirements foreseen early

enough to be submitted to the JFAC HQ before the beginning of the ATO
production cycle, so they can be resourced accordingly, are considered as
preplanned requests.
(1) Precedence. Each preplanned request is assigned precedence by the

requestor, which orders the requests in descending order of importance. It is
refined at subsequent levels of the supported component’s request process
according to the supported commander’s priorities. Detailed preplanned
requests that retain a high precedence through the various echelons of
command will likely result in a scheduled mission line on the ATO.
(2) Amount of Detail. The amount of detail the requester is able to include
in the request is critical. If possible, the requesting unit should identify the target,
location, TOT, and other mission data (e.g., desired effects, FSCMs). This
information will provide more effective coordination and a higher likelihood that
the tasked aircraft will have the proper weapons load for the assigned target.
(3) Timeliness. A high level of detail may not be always available prior to
submitting the preplanned ASRs to the JFAC HQ. In these cases, preplanned
requests can still identify an anticipated requirement (such as CAS) to be
available during a period of time, with the exact time and place to be coordinated
as the battle develops. The requesting commander should provide a time frame,
probable target type, and place where the need for air support is most likely.
The important thing to remember for preplanned requests is to submit the
request in time to allow the JFAC’s battle rhythm and the joint air tasking cycle
planning phases to allocate the appropriate air resources. Then, as the situation
develops, the request can be updated through JFSE with the assistance of the
AOCC referencing the original request number as needed.
(4) Submission. JFSEs and supported component’s planners at each

echelon consolidate their requests and submit them to the next higher HQ as
shown in figure 1. There, the commander and his/her staff consolidate all
requests and approve or deny them. Denied requests should be sent back to
the requesting unit with an explanation. Approved requests are re-prioritized
and assigned a new precedence in accordance with the supported
commander’s desires. Planners from the supported component can prepare
preplanned requests by using the ASR form (see annex C). These forms may
be digitally transmitted. Digital is the preferred method of transmitting/receiving
ASRs.
(5) Coordination. Approved and prioritized requests are forwarded to the

JFACHQ via the ground liaison element (GLE) for inclusion into the ATO
planning cycle.

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Figure 1 - Preplanned Air Support Requests
b. Immediate Requests. Immediate requests arise from situations that

develop outside the normal planning stages of the joint air tasking cycle. Because
these requirements cannot be identified early on, ordnance loads, sensors, or
platforms tailored to the specific request may not be available. During the
execution phase of the joint air tasking cycle, the JFAC HQ staff may need to use
on-alert CAS missions to redirect otherwise tasked missions in order to service
immediate air support requests.
(1) Immediate ASRs submitted after the beginning of the ATO

production cycle but before ATO execution. These requests for air support
will probably be the result of less emergent circumstances where there simply
wasn’t sufficient time or information for them to be submitted as preplanned
ASRs. For these kind of immediate ASRs, the process within the supported
component’s structure should be the same as with the preplanned requests as
shown in figure 2 below. In this case, the ASRs will be forwarded to the GLE if
the ATO hasn’t been released or to the BCE if the ATO has already been
released.

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Figure 2 - Immediate ASRs submitted before ATO execution
(2) Immediate ASRs submitted during ATO’s execution. This type of air
support requests usually result from unanticipated or unplanned needs on the
battlefield, often of an emergency nature.
(a) Joint Air Request Network (JARN). The JARN is the link between
the AOCC and subordinate TACPs for aircraft coordination and sending
immediate air support requests. The AOCC is the net control station
(NCS). The AOCC will activate and operate as many nets as necessary,
contingent with needs, equipment available, and frequencies allocated.
(b) As shown in figure 3, such requests are forwarded from the

requesting unit directly to the Corp’s JFSE by the most effective means
available, voice or digital. The JFSE/ALO at each intermediate HQ
monitors the flow of requests. Silence by intermediate HQ implies consent
to the request. Based on the supported commander’s intent, and after
considering whether organic assets are available to fulfill the request, the
chief of the JFSE, with the assistance of the AOCC/ASOC, will approve
or deny the request. This request will then be forwarded from the Corp to
the JFAC HQ via the BCE.
(c) In case of multiple Corps, the approved requests may be forwarded

to the LCC to avoid redundancy and overtasking before they are sent to

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the BCE. This process should be described in LCC’s operating

procedures.
Figure 3 - Immediate ASRs submitted during ATO execution
(d) Priority. For immediate requests, each ASR is assigned a priority.
(e) Situation Update. When submitting an immediate ASR, the

requesting agency will provide a current situation update to the AOCC.
(f) Request Format. The ASR form is used for immediate ASRs. As
with preplanned digital ASRs are the preferred method of requesting air
support through fire support channels.
Section VI CAS Planning Considerations - Mission

The next few sections address basic planning considerations associated with the METT-T
format. Extensive use of checklists and decision-making tools is recommended to ensure
these considerations are reviewed as part of the CAS planning process. CAS is coordinated
with other maneuver, combat support, and joint forces to form a combined arms team. CAS
provides firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, neutralize, disrupt,
suppress, fix, or delay enemy forces as an element of joint fire support. Commanders use
CAS to gain and employ required capabilities not organic to the force or to augment organic
surface fires. Commanders should plan for the employment of CAS throughout the depth of
their assigned operational area.
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TYPES OF MISSIONS
3.16 SHAPING, CLOSE COMBAT, AND JSA OPERATIONS.
a. Shaping Operations.
Commanders may employ CAS to support operations deep within the operational
area, which may include SOF or conventional forces with a deep operation mission.
In this case, CAS will normally be limited in scope and duration to supporting
maneuver forces or special operations activities against targets in the vicinity of their
assigned operational areas. Shaping operations involving CAS may require
additional coordination to deconflict with other missions such as air interdiction (refer
to the ATO).
b. Close Combat Operations.
A commander generally assigns most available CAS to the unit designated as the
main effort. CAS aircraft and fire support assets can mass with surface forces to
support the commander’s objectives. The speed, range, and firepower of CAS also
make it a valuable asset for exploiting success and attacking a retreating enemy.
c. Joint Security Area Operations.
CAS is effective for countering enemy penetrations. The responsiveness and

firepower of CAS greatly augment the combat power of forces including those in a
JSA. The potential for friendly fire casualties, however, is high in a JSA because of
the larger number of support personnel and activities located there. CAS aircrews
and JTACs must take special care to identify friendly forces and ensure that they
are not subject to direct attack or weapons effects from CAS ordnance delivered
against enemy forces operating in friendly JSAs.
3.17 OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND STABILITY OPERATIONS.
3.17.1 CAS in Support of Offensive Operations.
CAS supports offensive operations with scheduled or on-call missions to destroy, disrupt,
suppress, fix, or delay enemy forces. Commanders employ CAS depending on the type of
offensive operation being conducted: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, or pursuit.
a. Movement to Contact. CAS can be employed to support maneuver forces

providing forward and flank security. Once contact is made, employing CAS
aircraft at the initial point of contact can overwhelm and force the enemy to
prematurely deploy forces. The ground force commander should rapidly augment
organic combat power with CAS to secure time and space to maneuver forces,
gain positional advantage, and seize the initiative. CAS assets might be the first
friendly force to make contact with the enemy. When planning for CAS integration
in a movement to contact, consider possible CAS engagement areas along the
entire axis of advance and friendly force vulnerable flanks.
b. Attack. Commanders plan for and use CAS to support attacks against
enemy forces. CAS can destroy critical enemy units or capabilities before the
enemy can concentrate or establish a defense. CAS can also help fix the enemy
in space or time to support the movement and assault of ground forces. CAS
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may add to the concentration of firepower and the violence against the enemy.
CAS can be utilized to isolate enemy forces on the battlefield and force them to
defend in a direction from which they are unprepared to fight. CAS is incorporated
into the detailed planning and coordination involved in a deliberate attack.
c. Exploitation. Exploitation is an offensive operation that usually follows a

successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy and erode cohesion.
In exploitation, CAS is used to sever escape routes, destroy fleeing forces, and
strike unprotected enemy targets that present themselves as enemy cohesion
deteriorates.
d. Pursuit. In the pursuit, the commander attempts to destroy the combat

effectiveness of the fleeing enemy force as the enemy becomes demoralized and
cohesion and control disintegrate. Because the objective of the pursuit is
destruction of the enemy, CAS can keep direct pressure on the enemy to prevent
them from reorganizing or reconstituting.
3.17.2 CAS in Support of Friendly Defensive Operations.
In defensive operations, commanders employ CAS to interdict, disrupt, or delay attacking

enemy forces. CAS can be distributed to support specific forces in the JSA or main battle area
depending on the type of defense (mobile or area). Commanders may use CAS to:
a. Support Maneuver. Complement maneuver forces and integrate with

surface-delivered fires as part of a combined arms spoiling attack.
b. Support Movement. Support the movement of friendly forces between

positions. Use CAS to augment protection to the front, flank, and rear of the
moving force.
c. Attack Penetrations. Engage enemy units that have bypassed main battle
area forces or penetrated friendly positions. CAS participants must take special
care to identify the location and movement of friendly forces and civilians to
ensure that they are not subject to direct attack or weapons effects.
3.17.3 CAS in Stability Operations.
The employment of CAS during stability operations is significantly different from CAS
employed during major operations. CAS in stability operations is limited in scale and scope.
This is primarily due to the restrictive nature of stability operations which often results in more
restrictive ROE. However, when CAS is effectively employed in stability operations it can prove
to be decisive. The use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) by CAS aircraft is often
preferred by COM JFCs when supporting ground operations intended to destroy high-payoff
targets in urban environments. PGMs allow the commander to limit collateral damage while
creating the desired effects and mitigating adverse effects.
CAS in support of stability operations depends heavily on detailed and timely intelligence,
detailed coordination with maneuver commander’s plan, appropriate munitions, and JTAC with
“eyes on” the intended target. COM JFCs and their staffs should consider the use of CAS
carefully during stability operations. Other roles for CAS in stability operations include: a
flexible and timely forward aerial observation platform, limited defensive capability for troops
in contact, a show of force deterrence option, route and ground convoy security, and an aerial

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quick reaction force. CAS can also provide the COM JFC with certain CCIRs that can Facilitate
the mission.
Section VII CAS Planning Considerations - Enemy

CAS planners must account for the enemy’s disposition, composition, order of battle,
capabilities, and likely COAs. Other enemy considerations include:
3.18 GENERAL TYPES OF TARGETS.
Depending on geospatial location and degree of protection targets can be divided into several
categories:
a. Soft targets have no or very little degree of protection and therefore

multiple weapons can create desired effect
b. Hard targets are protected from weapons´ effects and therefore successful
engagement may require specific weapon
c. Point targets are located at specific location
d. Area targets are spread out at larger area and therefore employment of
weapons that have area effect or employment of multiple munitions is required to
create desired effect
e. Stationary targets are fixed in specific location
f. Moving targets can change their location
3.19 EFFECTS.
Supported commanders must specify the desired operational effects on target. For more
details see AArtyP-5 NATO Fire Support Doctrine, Annex A.
3.19.1 Operational Effects.
These effects are: delay, disrupt, defeat, divert, deter, degrade, dislocate, deny, deceive,
dissuade, limit, interdict, canalize, isolate, block, control area ,separate, fix, contain, compel,
obscure, illuminate, coerce, hinder, hamper, turn, demonstrate, eliminate, prevent, retaliate,
etc.
JTAC/FAC(A) must consider nature of the target and match proper weapon which will create
desired effect.
3.19.2 Physical and functional effects
a. Harassment
It is achieved by repeated, deliberate and intimidating activities intended to

discourage, impede and disrupt.

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b. Suppression
It is intended to degrade targets performance below the level needed to fulfill its
mission objectives. Suppression usually lasts only for limited time period.
Suppression is used to prevent enemy from effective interference with friendly forces
activity.
c. Neutralization
It renders the target temporarily ineffective or unusable. Neutralization results in

adversary personnel or equipment incapable of interfering with particular operation
or the accomplishment of a particular course of action.
d. Destruction
Renders an adversary force combat –ineffective unless it is reconstituted, or so

damaged that it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition
without being entirely rebuilt.
e. Psychological effects
They improve morale of own troops and deter, demoralize and discourage enemy
forces. Actions creating psychological effects usually demonstrate the resolve and
readiness of friendly forces to use lethal ammunitions, if necessary. Psychological
effects are usually created with use of Show of Force and Warning Shots.
3.19.2.1 Show of Force Considerations
The ground commander may determine that the best COA for the current situation is an
escalation of force rather than using lethal fires. The ground commander has many options
available to escalate fires, one of which includes the use of CAS aircraft through a SoF. SoF
seeks to achieve an effect on the ground through non-kinetic means. Through witnessing a
display of potential military capability, the recipient (target) of a SoF may be deterred from their
present course of action. A SoF should clearly demonstrate the intent and capability to employ
kinetic effects if necessary. Generally, a SoF should be conducted with clear potential to
escalate to the use of kinetic means if necessary in order to produce the desired end-state.
The JTAC/FAC(A) employs the same procedures for a SoF as he would for any kinetic event
(see chapter 5, section III CAS Execution Template). The nature and conduct of the SHOF is
at the discretion of the JTAC and aircrew, in accordance with JOA and national restrictions and
tactics.
JTACs should remember that show of force is a nonlethal form of airpower employment and
does not require many of the restrictions normally associated with munitions or LASER
employment. While nonlethal, a show of force should have an intended target and a desired
effect, and must be conducted in accordance with theater ROE and SPINS.
Reasons for SoF. There are several reasons for a JTAC to request a show of force:
a. The aircraft is out of munitions or has the wrong type of munitions to be

effective.

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b. Friendly forces are too close to enemy forces for safe use of weapons. The
current situation does not meet ROE to allow weapons employment.
c. Friendly forces and/or the pilot are unable to get a precise fix on the
enemy’s position.
d. A unit, which the JTAC does not have direct communications with, is in a
“troops in contact” or an escalating situation and the JTAC uses a show of force
to reassure the unit that there is air support on station.
e. Civilians have gathered and the ground force commander would like them
to disperse. The JTAC can use a SoF over the personnel to attempt to disperse
them.
f. Unidentified personnel are displaying possible hostile intentions, and the

ground force commander does not want to escalate to weapons employment.
The JTAC can use a SoF as an escalation of force to determine their true
intentions or cause them to disperse.
Note: Show-of-force maneuvers typically require the aircrew to leave sanctuary and enter
potential threat areas.
3.19.2.2 Warning shot
Warning shots are usually fired using forward firing weapons (rockets and guns).
Procedure for warning shot remains the same as for any kinetic engagement (see
chapter 5, section III CAS Execution Template). Impact area for warning shot must
be carefully chosen, so as the effect is created i.e. must be observable by enemy
forces, but with minimum risk of any collateral damage to include ricochet. Details
about warning shot procedures are usually published in theatre SPINS.
3.20 ENEMY AIR DEFENSES
Valuable enemy targets are usually defended by air defense systems. Each of these systems
must be countered by proper tactics and weapons utilization. Air defenses usually consist of:
a. Automatic weapons are the least sophisticated air defense assets,

however they do represent significant threat to low flying aircraft, especially RW.
Automatic weapons are usually effective at short range. They include infantry
automatic weapons, crew served weapons and turret mounted weapons. RPGs
and ground based ATGMs are also effective against slow moving aircraft such
as RW. Overflying in higher altitudes and employment of standoff weapons
usually suffices to mitigate this threat.
b. Specialized anti-aircraft guns (also known as AAA or triple A- anti aircraft

artillery). They vary from legacy World War II optically aimed light guns (ZPU
series machine guns) to modern sophisticated EO and radar guided systems
(Pantsyr, Tunguska). Optically aimed AAA are difficult to detect and sometimes
they cannot be located until they open fire. AAA coupled with radar is generally
more accurate and can engage aircraft at greater distances and in poor visibility
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c. Surface to Air Missiles are the most sophisticated air defense systems
that represent major threat to aviation. They vary from man portable (MANPADS-
Man Portable Air Defense Systems), through vehicle mounted to stationary air
defense installations. They use several types of guidance (most common are
LASER beam riding, heat seeking and radar). Modern aircraft are equipped with
countermeasures and warning systems that help to mitigate SAM threat.
(1) MANPADS and short range SAMs. MANPADS are the most difficult AD
asset to locate on the battlefield due to their small size and easy proliferation.
For this reason their general presence must be always considered during CAS
planning. Short range SAMs mounted on vehicles are generally easier to locate
and they can be effectively suppressed by direct and indirect fires.
(2) Medium and long range SAMs require significant SEAD effort to create
favorable conditions for CAS missions.
3.20.1 Countering Threats.
Use of “standoff weapons”, employment form high altitudes and varying IP location will
enhance aircraft survivability by reducing exposure and altering attack direction.
JTACs/FAC(A)s should first evaluate different mission profiles, in order to minimize the
aircraft’s exposure to the threat envelope from known or suspected anti-air threats. If aircraft
cannot avoid enemy air defenses, aircraft vulnerability must be balanced against the risk of
exposing SEAD delivery systems. Surface-delivered SEAD involves planning and coordination
by the JFSE and at the maneuver units down to the company level. Air delivered SEAD and
EW must be coordinated and deconflicted in order to provide necessary support during the
time CAS is being conducted. Before requesting CAS that would require SEAD support, fire
support personnel must first consider whether mortars, artillery, or naval fires can range the
target and achieve the desired results. Effective SEAD depends on accurate intelligence on
the position and type of enemy weapons. SEAD is most effective against fixed threats such
as antiaircraft sites and ADA batteries. SEAD is least effective against individual MANPADSs
and highly mobile threats due to the difficulty of accurately targeting these systems. The JFSE,
working with the JTAC/FAC(A) and forward observer, may coordinate surface-delivered SEAD
with target marking.
If the enemy air defense threat is significant, air support may be limited until the threat is
reduced. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) by EW and fires may be required to
facilitate CAS attacks. The primary objective of SEAD is to allow friendly aircraft to operate in
airspace defended by an enemy air defense system — including the target area and
ingress/egress routes. SEAD missions do not guarantee aircraft immunity from enemy air
defenses. SEAD support may be required against air defenses both in and outside the urban
area, with internal SEAD targets more difficult to find and anticipate. An aggressive, proactive
SEAD effort may be necessary during the early stages of urban operations.
3.21 ENEMY EW CAPABILITIES
What is the enemy’s capability to conduct electronic warfare or affect C2 systems?

(communications, navigational aids, and targeting).
From this information, CAS planners anticipate the enemy’s ability to affect the mission, and
the potential influence enemy actions may have on flight tactics. As the threat level increases,
the pre-briefing of aircrews and detailed mission planning becomes even more critical. The

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potential for the threat situation to change during the course of the mission makes
communications and close coordination between the aircrews, control agencies, and the
supported ground force crucial. In-flight updates on enemy activity and disposition along the
flight route and in the target area may require aircrews to alter their original plan and tactics. If
the enemy is successful at disrupting communications, alternatives are planned to ensure
mission accomplishment. Secure voice equipment and frequency-agile radios can overcome
some enemy interference.
Section VIII CAS Planning Considerations – Environment (Terrain, Weather)

Terrain affects following aspects of CAS:
a. Target Acquisition
(1) Target Masking. A target screened by terrain, urban development, or

natural cover may be difficult to acquire. Masking, is not limited to the visual
spectrum.
(2) Thermal Significance. Time of day (thermal crossover), and target

composition and background can affect a target’s vulnerability to detection and
attack by thermal systems.. Familiarity with enemy TTPs aids in mitigating
enemy deception.
(3) Contrast and Brightness. A major factor in target detection is the

contrast of the target against its background. Camouflaged targets against a
background of similar color may be impossible to detect from high altitudes or
significant distances. All targets, regardless of contrast differences, are more
difficult to locate under poor light conditions.
b. Weapons employment
Appropriate weapons must be used to achieve appropriate effects in different types

of terrain.
c. Communications
Quality of communications depends on LOS between aircraft and JTAC on the

ground. Certain types of terrain are known to hamper communications.
d. Threat
Some types of terrain allow for good masking and concealment for threat.
3.22 TERRAIN.
3.22.1 Mountainous Terrain.
a. General Description
Mountainous areas typically have rugged, compartmented terrain with steep slopes
and treacherous mobility. Weather may span the entire spectrum from extreme cold
with ice and snow in winter to extreme heat during the summer. In mountain
operations, the advantages favor the defender, and the focal point is the battle to
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control the high ground. Infantry units are the most suitable force for this type of
combat, particularly when properly supported. Also, the terrain promotes isolated
battles that make C² difficult. Small-unit commanders often operate semi-
independently.
Mountainous terrain may force the enemy to concentrate forces along roads, valleys,
reverse slopes, and deep defiles, where CAS is very effective. However, the terrain
also restricts the attack direction of the CAS strikes. RW assets (CAS, Medevac,
Support) may be limited in use as their payload and ability to safely land, take off or
hover significantly decreases with increased altitude. CAS planners must assume
the enemy will concentrate air defenses along the most likely routes CAS aircraft will
fly. CAS planners must thoroughly identify the air defense systems and target them
to enhance the survivability of CAS assets.
b. Target Acquisition.
This environment emphasizes the issues that surround three dimensional planning
and execution against targets. Horizontal development of terrain may make target
acquisition for aircraft difficult. Assigning specific holding areas that allow for LOS
between aircraft and target area may aid in target acquisition. Mountains may
appear very similar to one another as well as pose issues due to terrain masking.
The vertical axis is less distinguishable from overhead positions and depth
perception can be diminished.
c. Weapons Employment.
Mountainous terrain requires greater planning compared to some other

environments. Impact angles must be calculated differently in regards to sloping
terrain. Clear weapon flights paths to the target are often impeded requiring stricter
final attack headings. Mistakes in target location error especially in the vertical axis
will affect the accuracy of weapon deliveries more so than striking targets on flat
terrain. Considerations such as impact angle, targeting sourcing and weapon
selection can assist in mitigating these issues. Be aware that gravity’s effects on
damage mechanisms are amplified in mountainous terrain. Fragmentation effect
and REDs can be increased as splinters may travel at greater distances in thin air.
Understanding the second and third orders effects on environments at lower
elevations should be factored into any actions taken.
d. Communications.
Greater communication ranges may be possible due to increased LOS ranges

depending on sender/receiver locations. On the other hand these features, such as
elevation and line-of-sight, may also negatively impact communications. Studying
the terrain through map and software analysis during the planning phase and
mission execution can greatly reduce these issues.
e. Threat.
Enemy threats may be positioned to take advantage of increasing elevation of firing

points while terrain can also provide opportunities for the terrain masking of air and
ground forces.

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3.22.2 Desert Environment.
Desert regions are usually located in warm or tropical climate zones, which mean
that there is a combined effect of climate and terrain. Deserts consist of large
stretches of terrain with a passable surface, fairly flat and relatively uninterrupted by
obstacles. There are also areas with great differences in altitude and with steep rock
formations, sometimes even in the nature of a low mountain range, and vast sand
dunes. The lack of water makes the desert an inhospitable region. It is sparsely
populated and has an extremely limited infrastructure. Inhabited areas are few and
far between and are only to be found where there is water. The surface conditions
away from the few roads require equipment with some degree of off-road capability,
such as tracked vehicles. Vegetation is scarce in the desert, which means that
artificial aids have to be used for camouflage.
In general, if good contrast exists between the target and the background, target
detection will be possible at extended ranges. Deserts that have vegetation will
reduce target detection capabilities from standoff ranges. In a desert environment,
target identification by aircrews may be hampered by enemy capability to cover and
conceal potential targets. Camouflage and decoys have proven to be effective
countermeasures in the desert environment and will also delay target acquisition.
In flat desert terrain, lack of visual references will make target talk-on techniques
more difficult in the absence of target marking aids. In flat desert terrain, IP and CP
selection will be impacted by the difficulty selecting points that will be visible from
the air.
In the absence of timely or accurate battlefield tracking information, the ability to

detect potential targets beyond the range where positive identification is possible
could lead to friendly fire. The same is true considering the speed at which forces
are able to move. What was an enemy element at the time of target nomination
could easily be a friendly element soon thereafter.
c. Weapons Employment.
In most cases the desert environment will allow weapons to be employed at

maximum ranges and will provide increased weapons effects due to lack of
obstructions. Targets in reveted positions may only be visible from the air. JTACs
may have trouble designating these types of targets.
d. Communications.
Greater communication ranges may be possible due to increased LOS ranges. Non-
LOS communications will be adversely affected by nonconductive soil. Repeaters
and relay stations may be necessary.

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e. Threat.
CAS aircraft may be more vulnerable in the desert because of the lack of covered
approaches, and both friendly and enemy units are often widely dispersed. Enemy
threats may be able to acquire aircraft at longer ranges.
3.22.3 Forested/Jungle Environment.
The term ‘wood and forest’ will be used to describe expanses of terrain which are
completely covered by trees or where the majority of the area is wooded and where
vehicle movement is largely restricted to roads, clearings and fire breaks,
necessitating different tactics to those employed in more open terrain.
Jungles are vast tropical forest areas which are often combined with mountainous
terrain or swamps. They have extremely dense vegetation with relatively few open
spaces. There are virtually no roads in jungles; paths must be cleared and kept open
by hacking through vegetation. The larger rivers form good approach routes. The
living conditions are tough, not least because of the exhausting climate. Reliable
maps are often unavailable or have limited value because of the lack of orientation
possibilities. The unfavorable terrain can restrict communications and limit the
possibilities for movement. Helicopters are essential for movements and support
tasks. High temperatures and humidity take their toll on equipment and soldiers.
Because of the dense vegetation, the fields of observation and fire are extremely
limited; areas which would normally be designated as key terrain no longer have this
value. The dense vegetation of most jungles makes observation beyond 25 to 50
meters very difficult.
Reception of GPS signal can be poor as signal is blocked by jungle canopy,

therefore accuracy of friendly forces location can be decreased.
Target acquisition may be difficult or impossible under dense jungle canopies for
both the JTAC and aircraft. In these cases every effort must be made to mark the
target by any effective means. Vegetation can hamper use of LASER Range Finders
making generation of target coordinates difficult.
Use of LASER Target Designators will be limited by vegetation blocking the LASER
beam between LTD and targets causing multiple spots. Spot may be undetectable
by LGW seekers and LSTs if it is blocked by canopy. Same limitation may apply for
use of IRPs at night.
Colored smoke or WP rounds may be effective. In thick forest or double and triple
canopy jungles smoke tends to disperse as it rises creating an ambiguous mark.
There may also be a significant delay before smoke breeches thick canopy cover
and is visible to aircraft. Ground-burst artillery designation flares may be effective
in this type of terrain. FAC(A) aircraft that can remain on station may aid the
targeting process due to their increased SA.

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c. Weapons employment.
In forest and jungle terrain, most contact with the enemy is at extremely close range.
If the friendly force has a substantial advantage in fire support, the enemy will most
likely try to close with the friendly force and maintain that close contact. Thus, the
friendly force commander might not be able to use fire support advantage without
increasing the risk of inflicting friendly casualties. Therefore, knowledge of the type
of munitions best suited for jungle/forested terrain and how to employ them is vital.
Ordnance and fusing may have to be tailored to penetrate dense forest or jungle
canopies. Because combat in these environments is usually of such close nature,
the delivery of the munitions must be closely controlled to avoid friendly fire. While
such conditions may increase damage through the fragmentation of foliage, such
conditions may also act as to absorb damage mechanisms. Particular conditions
may require changes in the number of munitions used per target type in comparison
to a more open environment.
d. Communications.
Communications will suffer between the JTAC and aircraft in dense jungles and
forests due to limited LOS. Communications may improve at reduced ranges.
Use airborne C2 platforms such as FAC(A)/TAC(A)as relay stations.
3.22.4 Urban Environments.
a. General Description.
The collective term Urban Environments refer to towns, villages, hamlets, industrial
areas and the associated infrastructure. The extent of their influence on operations
depends on structure, density and size. Built-up areas are normally at road
intersections and often form political, cultural and industrial concentrations.
Furthermore, the largest part of the population usually lives in built-up areas.
The compressed urban environment creates unique considerations for planning and
conducting CAS operations. These include operations in urban canyons,
deconfliction in confined airspace, restrictive ROE, difficulty in threat analysis, the
presence of noncombatants, the potential for collateral damage, and the increased
risk of friendly fire.
b. Target Acquisition
Tall buildings make it difficult for pilots to identify targets and may require specific
attack headings to achieve LOS with the target. Observers may be placed on upper
floors of buildings to improve visibility. There will be an increased need for marking
and designating CAS targets. Recommended items for a JTAC, and FAC(A) as
appropriate, include NVDs, an IR pointer, LRF, LTD, IR strobe light, IR and visible
chemiluminescence lights, spotting scope, multiband radio, pyrotechnics
(smoke/designation), gated LASER intensifier (GLINT) tape, access to a grenade
launcher with designation and smoke rounds, compass, mirror, common objective
graphics, and GPS. The JTAC must plan for redundant communication and marking
tools.

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A single marking tool will not work in all urban environments. A JTAC will only be
able to utilize a ground LASER target designator (GLTD) when in a stationary
position and preferably from an elevated position. In brightly lit objective areas, a
JTAC may consider shooting out street lights to darken the area for use of IR
pointers or if directed by the commander in order to optimize friendly NVDs.
Ground navigation systems may be degraded due to interference induced by

buildings.
IR signatures are affected by the proximity of other buildings and structures. Urban
temperatures are generally higher than rural areas and can be significantly higher
than the surrounding environment. Thermal heating can adversely affect thermal
sights and other IR sensors.
Urban lights may overwhelm aircrew NVDs and render them useless for standard
night formation tactics. Plans may have to be adapted to allow for additional
deconfliction.
The CAS aircraft on station may be required to do aerial reconnaissance to find and
report targets or enemy movement. JTACs will request CAS aircrew to perform
reconnaissance when the threat permits and when not being used to directly deliver
ordnance. This may prevent an unexpected ambush or stop units advancing to
reinforce.
FW aircraft can be used to overfly the unit’s position and reconnoiter adjacent threat
avenues leading into the JTAC’s location. The ground force commander must
decide when organic/attached ground weapons are insufficient for the mission, and
CAS is required.
RW aircraft can be the “eyes” for the supported unit which means the pilots may
need to get very close to see what the maneuver force is experiencing.
JTACs may use a FAC(A), ISR or CAS aircraft to reconnoiter and attack enemy
forces outside the area of immediate engagement in order to prevent further
reinforcement. If the distance between enemy and friendly forces is too close for
the JTAC/FAC(A) to use CAS, or the target is not suitable for the CAS ordnance,
CAS aircrew should provide reconnaissance and assist the JTAC/FAC(A) in
assessing the overall situation. This is most useful for identifying enemy
reinforcements or directing friendly reinforcements.
c. Weapons employment
Historical studies prove that 90 percent of all urban engagements occur where
friendly and enemy forces are within 50 meters of each other, and that urban
engagements using supporting arms occur with less than 250 meters between the
same.
The target set in urban tactical operations will include troops in the open, armored
vehicles, and enemy forces using the urban terrain (buildings) as firing positions or
strong points.

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The JTAC must select the appropriate ordnance to limit the potential of friendly fire,
particularly in an urban environment. The JTAC may not always see the target or
whatever is firing at the unit, but only hear where the rounds are coming from and
see their impacts. The friendly and enemy situation will be changing rapidly even if
only from building to building or room to room inside a building.
The ability of FW and RW aircraft to provide fires may be limited by the structural
makeup of the urban location
The requirements for weapons in the urban environment must focus on rapid
employment, the target set, minimal collateral damage, minimal rubbling, the ability
to employ in proximity to ground forces and with high precision. Whenever ordnance
is delivered, the consequences of collateral damage in the form of friendly fire,
unintended damage or destruction of persons or objects, should be a consideration.
Detailed planning of weapons and delivery tactics will minimize the risk to friendly
forces, civilians, and adjacent buildings/structures.
JTACs will judiciously use FW ordnance when troops are in contact, due to fragment
and overpressure dangers.
Consider combining FW and RW platform capabilities in an urban environment. FW

can often target/designate within urban areas more easily due to the ability to loiter
high above many threat envelopes. Once the FW aircraft has identified and
confirmed the target with the JTAC/FAC(A), it can designate the target with a LASER
to guide precise, low-yield PGMs fired from a RW attack asset holding in a relatively
safe BP.
The capability to minimize collateral damage is essential to protect civilians,

preserve whatever local and international support that might exist, and to reduce the
cost of rebuilding the urban area upon conflict termination. CAS weapons should
minimize rubbling and be deliverable in very close proximity to friendly forces. To
achieve the desired level of destruction, neutralization, or suppression of enemy
CAS targets, it is necessary to tailor the weapons load and fusing to the required
results.
For example, cluster and general purpose munitions would be effective against
troops and vehicles in the open, whereas hardened, mobile, or pinpoint targets may
require specialized weapons such as LASER guided, EO, inertially-aided munitions
(IAMs), or aircraft with special equipment or capabilities. In all cases, the requesting
commander needs to know the type of ordnance to be expended (especially cluster
munitions). To provide effective CAS, the weapons delivery platform must have
adequate sensors to deliver weapons with a high degree of accuracy. The type of
fusing to best destroy a CAS-type target is also critical to weapon selection. This is
extremely critical when diverting sorties from a different kind of mission or target.
d. Threats.
Urban terrain provides excellent cover and concealment for a variety of weapons
systems. The urban environment also affects the employment of antiaircraft
weapons, including AAA, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADSs), and
SAM systems. Light to medium AAA may be employed from ground sites, from the

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tops of buildings, or weapons mounted on civilian vehicles. The terrain may limit
suppression options.
Proper placement of holding airspace is made difficult by widespread threats within

large urban areas. Plan for RW aircraft to operate in a safe sector or area to hold
and roam in order to remain less predictable and adjust for attack timing and
geometry. Awaiting CAS aircraft must hold in airspace over non-hostile terrain, yet
positioned close enough to the fight to allow the aircrew to build SA and deliver
timely support. A JTAC/FAC(A) should recommend positioning aircraft over an
unpopulated area, an area cleared by friendly forces, a neutral area, or body of water
in order to build the aircrew’s SA of the target and friendly locations. Most urban
terrain offers a significant amount of nearby uninhabited natural areas, which may
be used by aircrew awaiting a CAS request.
e. Communications.
Urban terrain presents severe problems in maintaining communications due to man-

made structures that inhibit LOS and absorb or reflect transmitted signals. While
these problems will force a higher degree of decentralization, the combat force
should make every attempt to minimize them. The use of aircraft such as JSTARS,
attack aircraft, UA, and rooftop communicators can minimize the ground based LOS
communication limitations. A detailed, flexible, and redundant C2 plan is essential.
f. Other Considerations.
The JTAC/FAC(A) must provide an extraordinary level of detail in the CAS remarks
section of the brief working from big to small features (funnel approach). If not, then
the pilots must pull details from the JTAC/FAC(A). The “big” portion of the talk-on
brief can be eliminated if the JTAC/FAC(A) can mark either his position or the target
location visually or electronically with an IR pointer, GPS grid, or with reference to a
gridded reference graphic (GRG), for example. Even if a ground JTAC cannot see
the target, TAC hand-off to a FAC(A) can be done. The JTAC must always keep in
mind that his ground perspective is drastically different from the attacking aircraft’s.
The JTAC may not be in a position to observe all buildings containing friendly forces
due to intervening buildings and battlefield confusion. It’s likely that a JTAC will be
marking and engaging targets within 100 meters of his own or friendly positions,
within danger close parameters.
For aircrew survivability, every effort should be made to exploit standoff capabilities
with optics and weapons systems. Historically, 80 percent of urban combat injuries
result from glass shards from blast and overpressure.
g. Navigation.
Navigation over urban terrain can be more difficult than over natural terrain, because
maps do not show the vertical development of urban terrain. Rapid movement from
position to position can often create confusion between aerial and ground observers
as to friendly and enemy locations. Familiarity with the characteristics of urban
terrain allows aircrews to discern key features in this environment. Navigational
aids, such as GPS, have reduced but not eliminated this challenge. The use of the
GRG, GPS, and handheld pointers or designators eases the problems associated
with night navigation, orientation, and target identification.

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Aircrews and ground controllers should perform detailed mission planning to

maximize the effectiveness of all available assets. Regardless of the method
utilized, the critical element is directing CAS aircraft onto the target. A running dialog
should be emphasized after the brief is given. If appropriate, aircrew and
JTACs/FAC(A)s should ensure that the maps and other GEOINT used incorporate
the military grid reference system (MGRS) during pre-mission planning.
h. Gridded Reference Graphic/Urban Grid System.
Detailed gridded maps or photos (GRGs) derived in planning will aid in target
description and location. Roads and buildings may be numbered to speed the target
acquisition process from the air. Prior planning is required to ensure all units, both
on the ground and in the air, have the correct charts or imagery. A GRG (often
referred to as an urban grid system) labels structures and prominent features.
Imagery should contain a north arrow and the picture should be oriented north-up
whenever possible. Easting and northing lines should be labeled at the top and left
side of the GRG.
It is the responsibility of the ground unit that owns a particular operational area to
produce GRGs for that area, ensure dissemination to subordinate, adjacent, and
higher echelons, and maintain version control on the products as they are updated
or revised. The developing unit should consider selecting grid sectors based on what
the aircrew/aircraft sensors can most easily see such as rivers, road junctions,
buildings, bridges, and etc.
The developing unit should avoid over-targeting (i.e., numbering every building in
the city versus numbering the buildings in the expected and adjacent objective area).
Over-targeting can lead to time delays and confusion for FW and RW aircrews when
sorting through numerous pages of a map attempting to find a specific building. For
example, starting with the northwestern section of the zone and continuing
clockwise, immediate structures surrounding the zone will be labeled Al, A2, A3, and
etc. City streets, alleys, and other easily recognizable topographic features can
delineate the boundaries of Alpha, Bravo or Charlie. Numbering the buildings
clockwise, starting at the northwestern most sections, will assist in a quick cueing
process.
i. Target Reference Points (TRPs).
TRPs require labeling buildings or distinctive urban structures in and around the
objective area. These can be labeled TRP#1, TRP#2, and etc. TRPs should be
committed to memory by the JTAC/FAC(A) and aircrew to expedite passing or
interpreting a call for fire. If fire is being received, pass a TRP number, heading,
approximate distance and description of where and what type of fire is being
received.
j. Ground Unit Control Measures.
Establishing objectives and phase lines assists in understanding the ground scheme
of maneuver and is one method to integrate air and ground operations. Consider all
types of maps and charts ranging from joint operations graphic charts and aerial
photos to tourist maps for use in urban environments.

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3.23 WEATHER.
Unfavorable weather can limit effectiveness of CAS missions. Planners must overcome this
shortfall (JSTARS, other airborne C2, remote relay, etc.) or accept this condition as part of the
mission environment. Situational awareness enhancing systems (e.g., synthetic aperture radar
[SAR] and data link type systems) and coordinate seeking weapons improve the ability to
execute CAS in certain tactical situations despite weather limitations. Regardless, favorable
visibility normally improves CAS effectiveness. Ceiling and visibility may affect the decision to
employ low, medium, or high altitude tactics or whether to employ FW or RW assets.
These conditions will also affect the JTAC’s ability to see the target. Weather conditions may
also determine the attack profile of the aircraft. If enemy vehicles are moving, exhaust smoke,
dust trails, and movement can indicate their location. Visibility is more critical for long-range
deliveries (e.g., free-fall bombs/rockets) than it is for short-range deliveries (e.g., retarded
bombs and guns). Thick haze or smoke has a greater effect on low-level attacks than on
steep-dive attacks because horizontal visibility is usually lower than oblique visibility. Reduced
visibility and cloud layers restrict LASER and electro-optically guided ordnance. Target
acquisition is usually easier when the sun is behind the aircraft.
3.23.1 Visibility.
BOC attacks are not limited by visibility, therefore if assets are available and conditions
favorable (JTAC/FAC(A) able to generate precise coordinates, BOC capable aircraft/weapon),
BOC method of attack should be preferred. Limited visibility hinders aircraft’s ability to acquire
targets during BOT attacks
Limited visibility may force the aircraft to maneuver closer to the threat in order to maintain
visual contact with the target. Flying closer to the threat presents an obvious problem. If
conditions of limited visibility other than normally anticipated exist in the AO (such as
precipitation, sandstorms, heavy smoke etc.), they should be briefed by JTAC/FAC(A) to the
aircrew during situation update. Visibility is usually reported in meters or kilometers. If visibility
differs in different directions, the lowest figure is to be reported. Reduced visibility can be
caused by:
a. Presence of manmade or natural obscurants and particles (haze, mist,

precipitation, smoke, sand, dust) in the air.
Presence of particles will generally degrade quality of picture of all optical and
thermal imaging sensors regardless of the time of the day making target acquisition
more difficult. Particles may also hamper use of LASER range finders and LASER
target designators by blocking the LASER beam, decreasing effective range or
causing false reflection (backscatter). They do not limit use of GPS/INS guided
weapons, as long as JTAC/FAC(A) is able to generate target coordinates with
sufficient fidelity. Radars are also not susceptible to this environmental factor,
therefore radar deliveries using aircrafts´ onboard radar or radar guided missiles
against radar significant targets can be the only option under conditions of severely
limited visibility.
b. Changing light conditions during day.
As sun and moon change their position during day it causes different light conditions
that greatly influence ability of all players to visually acquire targets.

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(1) Shadows. Even in broad daylight targets that are located in shadows of
adjacent objects will generally be harder to see by naked eye or optical sensors,
especially when camouflaged.
(2) Sun and moon position. When executing BOT attacks with unguided
ordnance where aiming is done be maneuver of the aircraft in sunny conditions
JTAC/FAC(A) should avoid attack headings into the sun, if tactical situation
allows. Sun may cause multiple glints on the cockpit canopy and HUD, making
aiming difficult. When executing low level attack into the sun the shadows of
objects will be placed on the ground in front of the objects, making outlines of
the objects blurry and they will be severely decreasing aircrews´ ability to
visually PID targets.
Bringing the aircraft from the sun hinders enemy’s ability to visually acquire the
attacking aircraft and reduces accuracy of small arms and optically guided
weapon systems.
When conducting attacks using low level tactics with NVD equipped aircraft
JTAC/FAC(A) should avoid attack headings into the moon or into bright light
source (for example lit up city), as they may wash out the picture in NVGs or
even blind the aircrew.
(3) Darkness/Low level light. Use of NVDs, LLLTV and Thermal Imaging
systems gives to coalition forces significant advantage during night operations.
(4) Thermal Imaging Systems are not limited by amount of ambient light,
because quality of the picture depends on thermal properties and significance
of objects.
(5) Devices that intensify ambient light (NVDs, LLLTV) require some level of
ambient light to produce picture.
(6) Dawn and Dusk. The most difficult times of the day in terms of visibility
are dawn and dusk. Thermal Imaging Systems are subject to Thermal
Crossover, that may severely limit their ability to detect targets. Use of NVD
during dawn and dusk may also be very limited. For JTAC working on the
ground conditions for use of NVDs may already exist, however aircrews
operating several thousand feet AGL may still be exposed to direct sunlight and
therefore their ability to detect objects on the ground is very limited. NVDs
cannot be used yet and targets on the ground are hidden in the darkness.
JTAC/FAC(A) should plan for effective target marking (LASER designators,
ground burst illumination, tracer fire,…) when planning for operations in this time
of the day.
(7) If the weather is clear and a bright moon is available, additional artificial
illumination may not be necessary. If CAS planners are anticipating these
favorable conditions will not exist during planned operations (for example during
some phases of the moon cycle), artificial illumination (using ground or air
delivered overt or covert illumination assets) should be planned for to facilitate
night operations. On the other hand, flares employed under an overcast sky will
highlight the aircraft for enemy defenses. Designation flares can increase the
effects of smoke and haze and further reduce the visibility.

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(8) LASER/IR pointer considerations. Low level light conditions do not

degrade LASER operations (range finding, marking, designation). Visibility of IR
pointers in NVDs will generally increase with decreased ambient light level.
LASER range finders and designators can be used under any lighting conditions
as long as they are coupled with other sensors (Thermal Imaging, NVDs) that
enable visual target acquisition. This will require boresighting of these devices,
which sometimes can be done only in daylight.
(9) Milk bowl effect. Heavy haze will cause a “milk bowl” effect - the absence
of visual cues that allow aircrews to distinguish between the ground/water and
the sky - which severely limits slant-range visibility and may cause spatial
disorientation. Avoid allowing such conditions to drive the aircrews into flying a
more predictable flight path close to a threat.
3.23.2 Winds
Winds may affect availability of CAS aircraft, aircraft tactics, visibility and delivery accuracy of
some weapon systems.
a. Availability of aircraft. Strong crosswind on runways may actually prevent

aircraft from safe takeoff. This limitation is platform dependent and different
nations may apply different safety measures. Some coalition nations do not allow
their aircrews to fly under conditions when wind velocity actually does not allow
for safe landing on parachute, if aircrew has to bail out. Class I and II UAS are
mostly equipped with an engine that does not allow for operations in strong winds.
Changes of position or altitude may take longer than usual, also playtime may be
reduced when operating in windy conditions. Smaller UAS (tactical ISR assets)
may be banned from operations when winds velocity exceeds their limits.
b. Attack headings.
(1) Unguided weapons. When employing unguided bombs, guns or rockets

JTAC/FAC(A) should select attack heading into the wind or with tailwind to ease
aiming to the aircrew. Crosswind will generally complicate aiming solution and
decrease accuracy.
(2) PGMs. LASER guided bombs may require continuous lasing, as winds
may drift the bomb away from the spot, that will be out of weapons´ seekers´
FOV, if delayed lasing is used. Winds have none or very limited effect on
accuracy of GPS/INS guided weapons and guided missiles.
c. Other effects.
(1) Strong winds can pick up dust, sand or dirt and decrease visibility on the
ground level.
(2) Wind can decrease accuracy of indirect fires, making SEAD less effective
or placing marks away from intended impact points. Fires should be adjusted
by an observer to create required effects.
(3) Fires set by impacting ordnance may spread very quickly when aided by
favorable conditions (dry and flammable), causing risk to both, enemy and
friendly forces and possibly increasing potential for collateral damage.
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(4) Smoke which is used for friendly forces marking, target marking or
screening will drift away from its´ point of origin, decreasing desirable effect of
the smoke.
3.23.3 Low Cloud Base.
BOC attacks are not limited by low cloud base, therefore if assets are available and conditions
favorable (JTAC/FAC(A) able to generate precise coordinates, BOC capable aircraft/weapon),
BOC method of attack should be preferred.
If these conditions do not exist and only BOT method of attack can be executed, special
measures must be taken to enable visual acquisition of target by the aircrew and to protect
CAS aircraft from enemy air defenses and terrain collision.
a. Threat considerations. Aircraft flying under low cloud base may be

exposed to enemy small arms fire, MANPADs and Short Range Air Defenses. If
available, Stand of Munitions should be preferred in order to avoid CAS aircraft
flying through threat envelope. If not available, every effort should be made to
provide SEAD with unit’s organic weapons and indirect fire assets to increase
aircraft survivability. Threat locations must be properly briefed to aircrews.
b. Ingress and egress routes must be selected to minimize the time spent
within threat’s envelope. Aircrew must avoid terrain collision and JTAC/FAC(A)
should carefully select ingress and egress routes to enable the aircrew to acquire
target without spending too much effort avoiding obstacles.
c. Flight profiles. Very low cloud base may limit use of some flight profiles
(pop, toss) and limit it to level deliveries only, that do not allow effective use of
guns and rockets. Sometimes level delivery/very shallow dive delivery may be
the only options.
d. Marking. JTAC/FAC(A) should plan for effective marking, as aircrew flying

low level mission will have very limited time for target acquisition and aiming.
e. Weapons considerations.
(1) If standoff munitions (such as antitank guided missiles) are available, they
should be used to allow the aircrew to stay outside of or to minimize the time
spent within threats´ envelope.
(2) Low cloud base may require LASER guided missiles to fly flat trajectory,
which may decrease their maximum effective range.
(3) Use of retarded free fall bombs may be the only bombing option, as non-
retarded bombs would force the aircraft to fly through weapons´ effect zone.
High drag bombs have limited penetration capability against hardened targets.
(4) Most common PW II LASER guided bombs require acquisition of LASER

spot during last 7 seconds of flight, which requires cloud base of roughly 5000ft
AGL.

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3.23.4 Extreme temperatures
a. Cold temperatures
(1) Equipment. Cold may decrease voltage and capacity of batteries of

JTAC’s organic equipment (radio, marking equipment etc.) severely shortening
total operation time of these devices. When planning for operations in extreme
cold environment JTAC should make every effort to store equipment, batteries
and power sources in moderate temperature (inside vehicles, on his body) and
have reserve power sources beyond time frame of the planned operation.
(2) Icing. Cold and high humidity may cause icing. Icing conditions are those
atmospheric conditions that can lead to the formation of water ice on the
surfaces of an aircraft, or within the engine. Most aircraft are equipped with anti-
icing and de-icing measures, however icing represents great danger to any
aviation. Some aircraft will not fly when there are known icing conditions. Most
tactical UAS do not have any anti-icing measures and therefore if these
conditions are known to exist, they will not fly.
b. Hot temperatures
(1) Equipment. Extreme heat may cause overheating of JTACs organic

equipment (radios, LASER target designators). JTACs operating in extremely
hot environment should make every effort to protect their equipment from heat,
if tactical situation allows (i.e. avoid exposure of equipment to direct sunlight,
remove it from the gear occasionally to let it cool down by airflow, apply
additional cooling measures such as wet rag on the surface of the equipment,
check and clean cooler fans on regular basis etc.) Modern equipment will turn
off automatically when overheating is about to occur to prevent damage to the
circuits, however JTAC should make every effort to protect the equipment from
extreme heat.
(2) Aviation. Heat decreases the power of jet engines, therefore most
platforms operating in extremely hot conditions may have severely reduced
weapons payload or playtime unless Air to Air refueled. Loss of
payload/playtime also applies to RW aircraft.
Section IX CAS Planning Considerations - Troops (Close Air Support Assets)

CAS planners must consider C2, ISR, and CAS aircraft, ordnance available and supporting
assets available.
3.24 C2 ASSETS.
A detailed, flexible, and redundant C2 plan is essential. Airborne C2 support systems may
alleviate some of the challenges in C2. Each of these platforms has inherent capabilities and
limitations. Consider each of the available C2 assets and what role they can play to support
the mission. This may generate specific requirements that, in turn, end up as formal requests
for air support. As a minimum, consider the following C2 assets:

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3.24.1 Airborne C2 Assets.
Consider integrating airborne C2 assets to enhance the plan. Are these assets critical and do
they warrant specific requests to HHQ? What is the specific role and function of each? Have
provisions been made to ensure adequate low level communications for C2 of RW attack
assets? As a minimum, review the following:
a. JSTARS.
JSTARS can provide C2 of strike resources in support of a ground conflict. JSTARS

can support a brigade-sized operation with battle management when no AOCC is
available.
b. Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne).
Normally performed by JSTARS or a FAC(A) at the discretion of the controlling

agency, the TAC(A)provides an extension for the AOCC with the goal of extending
the AOCC’s range and ability to send and receive tactical information. The
TAC(A)acts as a communications relay between the JTAC and attack aircraft as well
as other agencies of the ACCS. It also expedites CAS aircraft-to-JTAC hand-off
during “heavy traffic” CAS operations by providing information to CAS assets such
as AO updates and CAS briefs, as well as establishing deconfliction.
3.24.2 Ground C2 Assets.
Ground C2 assets must be integrated to enhance the plan. These assets are critical and
warrant specific consideration by HHQ. What is the specific role and function of each? Have
provisions been made to ensure adequate communications for C2 of all attack assets? As a
minimum, review the following:
a. TACP/JTAC.
While corps through brigade TACPs function primarily as liaisons, BN TACPs and
company JTACs have the primary responsibility of TAC. It is important to consider
TACP capabilities and limitations as well as subordinate or adjacent unit TACPs.
This consideration should include personnel (levels of training and qualification) as
well as equipment serviceability and availability. How will the TACP move, shoot,
and communicate? Which units will the TACP support?
b. Observers.
Observers may aid the JTAC by acquiring or lasing targets. If the JTAC plans to
use an observer, then he must be able to communicate and coordinate with the team
during target marking or TGO.
c. Air Operations Coordination Center/Air Support Operations Center.
Functions as the primary control agency for the execution of CAS in direct support
of ground operations. Normally aligned with the senior tactical ground command HQ
at corps level and below, the AOCC coordinates and directs CAS for land forces.
The AOCC facilitates CAS, air interdiction, SEAD, mobility, and ISR missions within
its assigned operational area. The AOCC is the NCS for immediate ASRs and
monitors aircraft check-in/checkout. Use the form in Appendix A, “Air Strike
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Request,” to ensure the AOCC has all the pertinent information concerning the
mission (see Line 8, “REMARKS” of the form for transmittal to supporting aircrews.
3.25 JTAC/FAC(A) ORGANIC EQUIPMENT
There is no NATO standard specifying minimum list of equipment for JTAC. Annex A to
ATP-3.3.2.2. (Mission Essential Task List- METL) lists tasks that JTACs have to be able to
perform. These tasks imply use of this equipment, however some tasks are caveated and not
all coalition nations are equipped to performed all the tasks.
Minimum equipment list may be stipulated by combatant commanders for specific operations/
theaters.
3.25.1 Communications Equipment.
JTAC/FAC(A) be must be able to establish good secure two way voice/data communications
with CAS aircraft and appropriate Command and Control nodes (HQs, higher echelon TACPs,
AOCC etc.) Frequencies and waveforms to be used for requesting CAS and for
communications with CAS aircraft are usually listed in theater SPINS. Most commonly used
frequencies and waveforms are:
a. VHF FM. Mostly used by ground forces for inter/ intra unit communications.
These frequencies may be used to communicate with some CAS aircraft that are
VHF FM capable. Communications in VHF FM band are mostly limited to Line of
Sight. Communications at greater distances is only possible if there are relay
stations available.
b. UHF AM. The most commonly used for Air to Ground Communications.
UHF communications are strictly limited to the Line of Sight between receiver and
transmitter. This may cause problems in mountainous or urban terrain or when
aircraft are using low level ingress tactics when terrain masking hinders LOS.
c. TACSAT. Satellite communications are mostly used for requesting CAS

when communicating with AOCC or superior HQs. They do not require LOS,
however LOS in mountainous terrain can be sometimes hard to achieve.
d. HF. High frequencies provide non- line of sight communications at greater

distances, up to several thousand kilometers. However establishing good
communications in HF band requires a lot of skills and due to changing
ionospheric conditions during day are not as reliable as TACSAT. Establishing
communications at medium distances (tens to few hundreds kilometers) may also
be very complicated. In theatres that do not have dedicated satellite HF may
represent the only workable Non Line-of- Sight and long distance means of
communications.
e. Commercial Mobile and Satellite phones. Because phones do not provide

secure communications they must not be relied on as primary means of
communications and they must be considered an emergency backup.
JTAC/FAC(A) should be equipped with a minimum 2 multiband LOS/NLOS secure capable

radios. When planning for employment of JTAC/FAC(A) during operation CAS planners should
consider his ability to have good two way communications with CAS aircraft and appropriate
CC agencies when planning observation posts for JTACs.
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CAS planners must provide detailed guidance on use of unsecure nets such as use of code
words and encryption by AMSL (Allied Military Security List) and other means in order to
protect friendly communications from enemy interception and exploitation.
3.25.2 Target Acquisition and Location Equipment.
Organic JTAC target location equipment may include (list not exhaustive):
a. AO Imagery
(1) Maps provide JTAC/FAC(A) good overall Situational Awareness on

surrounding terrain features in the AO, even if the OP does not provide good
visibility on target area. In case of GPS denial collocation with terrain features
using map is the only means available for plotting friendly forces location. Good
map reading skills enable JTAC to provide an aircrew good Talk-On, if it is
required. If target can be collocated with terrain features, map plot can be the
fastest way to generate target coordinates and elevation. Even if JTAC
generates target coordinates using coupled LASER Range Finder and GPS,
these coordinates should be crosschecked with map in order to reveal possible
inaccuracy of these coordinates caused by influence of metallic object (vehicles,
weapons, powerlines) on Digital Magnetic Compass during measurement, if
tactical situation allows. Map should cover the AO where JTAC/FAC(A) is going
to operate and therefore CAS planners should consider the scale of the map
that covers the AO yet provides enough detail. Digital maps used in tactical
tablets or in aircraft´s Multi-Function Displays that enable JTAC/FAC(A) to zoom
in target details greatly enhance overall SA of all players and can expedite target
engagement.
(2) Satellite imagery provides JTACs more details of target area than most
standard military maps. Translating what JTAC sees on the ground to the
aircrew is also much easier with satellite imagery than with map when
conducting Talk-On. If possible satellite imagery should have MGRS overlay to
facilitate plotting of friendly forces and target location.
(3) Gridded Reference Graphic/Urban Grid System. Detailed gridded

maps or photos (GRGs) derived in planning will aid in target description and
location. Roads and buildings may be numbered to speed the target acquisition
process from the air. Prior planning is required to ensure all units, both on the
ground and in the air, have the correct charts or imagery. A GRG (often referred
to as an urban grid system) labels structures and prominent features (It is the
responsibility of the ground unit that owns a particular operational area to
produce GRGs for that area, ensure dissemination to subordinate, adjacent,
and higher echelons, and maintain version control on the products as they are
updated or revised. The developing unit should consider selecting grid sectors
based on what the aircrew/aircraft sensors can most easily see such as rivers,
road junctions, buildings, bridges, and etc. The developing unit should avoid
over-targeting (i.e., numbering every building in the city versus numbering the
buildings in the expected and adjacent objective area). Over-targeting can lead
to time delays and confusion for FW and RW aircrews when sorting through
numerous pages of a map attempting to find a specific building. City streets,
alleys, and other easily recognizable topographic features can delineate the

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boundaries of Alpha, Bravo or Charlie. Numbering the buildings clockwise,

starting at the northwestern most sections, will assist in a quick cueing process.
b. Compass
It is an essential piece of JTAC equipment that enables quick orientation in

cardinal/subcardinal directions on the ground. It enables JTAC to quickly establish
LASER/Pointer to Target Line and to develop safe attack geometry for the aircraft.
When using map plot for the generation of target locations, JTACs must use a
compass to establish direction from friendly position to target in order to achieve
reasonably accurate location.
c. GPS Receivers
They provide quick and reliable means to plot friendly forces position. If coupled with
LASER Range Finder, they can quickly generate target coordinates and elevation.
If target cannot be collocated with terrain features, it may be the only tool to generate
precise target location. GPS receivers require good reception of signal from
satellites to provide accurate positioning, therefore terrain conditions such as urban
terrain with tall buildings, dense foliage in woods, or narrow canyons may decrease
accuracy of such positioning. Commercial GPS receivers are susceptible to enemy
jamming and spoofing and therefore their use in theatres of operation must be
avoided. CAS planners and JTAC/FAC(A) must make sure GPS receiver is loaded
with current crypto keys to ensure secure operation.
d. Binoculars
Optics with sufficient magnification enable JTAC/FAC(A) to acquire targets and to

view target details at greater distances. Military binoculars with mil dot reticles may
enable JTACs to measure distance from own position to targets and distance
between distant objects (terrain features and targets) with reasonable accuracy, if
LASER Range Finder is not available or if target has sensors that are able to detect
illumination by LASER beam.
e. LASER Range Finders
They provide very accurate distance measurements from own position to distant
objects (targets). They can be also used to measure distances and angles between
two distant objects. Most LRFs are equipped with built in Digital Magnetic Compass.
Accuracy of angle measurement with DMC depends on correct calibration that must
be performed in accordance with the manual for specific LRF. Presence of metallic
objects (vehicles, weapons, powerlines) during angle measurements influences
accuracy of such measurement. Therefore if JTAC relies on LRF coupled with GPS
as the only source of target coordinates he must make sure the LRF is properly
calibrated and not influenced by presence of metallic objects.
f. Target locating devices
Devices that incorporate a LRF, magnetic or gyroscopic compass, tilt measurement

devices and GPS. These systems measure the range and angles from its position
provided by the GPS to mathematically derive a target location. If used correctly the
quality of the target location is generally much better than that of hand derived
coordinates. The accuracy of the coordinate is dependent on many variables. Errors
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are induced by inaccurate GPS data, poor azimuth, range and elevation data,
system calibration and user skill. These errors are magnified with range and can
result in significant TLEs. Due to the variables listed previously, TLE may vary from
10 meters at 1 kilometer to more than 300 meters at maximum ranges.
g. Night Vision Devices
NVDs utilize ambient light (from moon, stars and manmade sources) to create visible
picture in low light conditions. If there is not enough ambient light they cannot
produce image with sufficient resolution, especially at greater distances. In areas
with artificial illumination (cities) the presence of bright light sources will lead to bright
corona surrounding the light sources, which will limit visibility of objects in its´ vicinity.
Helmet mounted NVDs usually do not provide any degree of magnification, therefore
acquisition of targets at greater distances is generally more difficult. NVDs with
magnification are usually designed as hand held or weapon mounted. They provide
better resolution at greater distances, however this resolution is still limited by
amount of ambient light. Even when operations are planned for daylight only, JTACs
should always count on the possibility that operations may extend to night hours for
unforeseen circumstances and have always NVD available for this case.
h. Thermal Imaging Systems
TIS (also known as FLIR- Forward Looking Infra Red) produce picture based on
temperature of the objects. Therefore they do not rely on ambient light and generally
produce better picture at greater distances in poor light/night conditions. Their use
is not limited to poor light conditions, they can be used in daylight as well. Contrast
and resolution of the picture depends on difference in temperatures of objects it is
viewing. The greater the difference, the better contrast is achieved. Thermal imaging
systems operate on different wavelengths, thus different systems can produce
different quality of picture under the very same conditions. Some thermal systems
operate on wavelengths that can detect LASER radiation of LASER Target
Designators, therefore they can be used for target correlation when aircraft uses
onboard LTD or to lase targets with ground based LTD at night. Thermal significance
of objects has 2 sources: radiated and reflected heat. Radiated heat is caused by
objects´ internal heat sources. Examples are human body, vehicle engines, terrain
heated by an explosion of ordnance or vehicle tires heated up by friction during
driving. Reflected heat is caused by different thermal properties of materials heated
by external source, usually sunlight during day. Thermal crossover is main limiting
factor for use of thermal imagers. Twice a day (normally after sunrise and after
sunset) temperature of objects will become the same as temperature of their
background, causing objects to blend in with their background. This will lead to
washed out picture and poor quality of image. Due to different thermal properties of
different materials and changing weather conditions this period is hard to specify
precisely during operations. Therefore dawn and dusk are critical periods of the day
for target acquisition by thermal imaging systems. Most thermal imaging systems
are equipped with built in LRF, DMC and GPS receiver and can be used to generate
target coordinates and elevation, however the built in GPS is mostly based on
commercial receivers and therefore coupling the device with military GPS receiver
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i. Video Down Link (VDL) receivers
These devices enable JTAC to receive imagery from ISR platforms that are Video
Down Link capable (UAS, targeting pod equipped CAS aircraft). These systems
enhance JTACs´ ability to detect and locate targets that cannot be detected by
observation from ground position due to terrain masking and obstructed Line of
Sight. Accuracy of derived coordinates is dependent on specific platform
capabilities.
j. Targeting Software
Targeting software is defined as any software that is specifically designed to assist

in target location and elevation. Targeting software may provide other capabilities
but its primary purpose is target location. Navigational software is not considered
targeting software and should not be used to provide targeting data for J series
weapons. Targeting software can be used in conjunction with a LRF,LTD, and
GPS.
3.25.3 JTAC/ FAC(A) Target Marking Equipment
a. Direct Fire Weapons. Basic considerations for use of fires to mark targets
can be found in paragraphs 3.8.1.4 and 5.4.15.3 Correction from visually-
significant marks.
b. IR Pointers. Basic considerations can be found in paragraphs 5.4.15.4 IR

Pointer Correlation and 3.8.1.8 Marking with IR pointers.
c. LASER Target Designators. Details on LTDs can be found in Chapter III,

Section XI LASER operations.
3.25.4 Friendly Forces marking equipment
Even though it is highly undesirable to use marking friendly positions to help aircrews to gain
Tally on intended targets, marking friendly positions may in some situation improve situational
awareness of aircrews and increase safety of CAS missions.
a. Signal panels are the most common markers used to mark friendly position.
Their visibility depends on slant range of the aircraft from marked position (up to
several kilometers) and contrast of the panel again its´ background. As distinctive
color is the primary marking feature of a signal panel, its´ visibility is limited to
naked eye and platforms with sensors that produce color image. Visibility of
signal panels in thermal systems is limited as the temperature of the panel blends
in with its´ background in several minutes. Visibility with NVD systems in
extremely poor. When using a signal panel to mark friendly position JTAC must
consider the possibility the enemy may have observers on elevated OPs and
must place the panel so as it is visible to the aircraft, but not to the enemy. Enemy
may also use deception and use his own overt markers to confuse the aircrew
about friendly/enemy positions.
b. Smoke is very effective way to mark friendly positions. Color of the smoke
to be used for marking friendly positions is usually listed in theatre SPINS. If JTAC
does not have the required color available he may choose to use different color,
but this must be clearly communicated with the aircrew. JTAC must make sure
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the aircrew has eyes/sensors on anticipated friendly position as smoke may

dissipate before the aircrew gets their eyes on friendly position. Smoke is visible
to naked eye, NVDs and thermal system, however thermal systems and NVDs
cannot distinguish the color of the smoke. JTAC must take into consideration that
smoke may reveal friendly position to the enemy and attract enemy fire.
c. Signal mirrors can be visible up to distance of several kilometers,

depending on size of the mirror. Their use is limited to daylight and sunny
weather. If used properly, they can be only visible to the intended recipient and
they do not reveal friendly position to the enemy. Main limitations are:
(1) Aircraft must be visible from the ground
(2) Aircraft must be in good position relative to the position of the sun
(3) Requires practice.
d. IR position markers. There are numerous IR position markers used by

ground forces. These devices can be flashing, programmable, or steady. These
devices vary in intensity and all are visible with NVDs but not with the naked eye.
Flashing devices are easier to visually acquire. When possible, identification of
marking devices should be verbally confirmed with the aircrew to avoid
misidentification with other ground lighting. As with IR pointers, the higher the
ambient light level, the more difficult it will be to acquire these devices.
e. IR Pointers. Used alone or in conjunction with other IR marking devices,

IR pointers are very effective for identifying both friendly and enemy positions.
Depending on environmental conditions, pilots (and enemy personnel) may see
the entire beam or just the flickering of the IR pointer source on the ground.
f. GLINT Tape. Ground forces with GLINT tape may be seen by the SOF
gunship low-light level television, depending on the amount of environmental or
artificial designation in the area. Identification of friendly forces by this manner
should be verified by other means to avoid misidentification. Do not use more
than a 1/2-inch (1x1cm) square for an individual or four 1-inch squares (2,5x 2,5
cm) per vehicle.
g. Friendly Tagging Devices. Units equipped with tagging devices can use
their capability to relay latest position to C2 nodes equipped to receive and
display data. If airborne CAS forces are equipped to receive and/or display this
information, they can use this information to help confirm or update friendly
locations.
3.25.5 JTAC Operational Platforms.
JTACs are required to control CAS mission from a variety of platforms to include those
frequently used such as dismounted and vehicle operations. Occasionally JTAC controllers
are utilized from both air and water-based platforms that require additional steps to ensure
mission success. JTACs must be trained to operate from platforms used by units they are
supporting.

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a. Airborne platforms.
The use of an airborne platform by a JTAC enables the coverage of a larger

battlefield through increased flexibility and a maneuverability advantage when
compared to being on the ground. The ability to quickly position a JTAC across the
battlefield is often the most common reason to operate from an aircraft.
Communications may improve based on increased line-of-site characteristics as
well as increased ability to adjust to friendly or enemy jamming activities.
Limitations also exist and mission planning needs to factor in such limitations as well
as those that are a standard practice. The ability to mark, designate, and provide
types of terminal attack control will be dependent on the capabilities of the airborne
platform. The capability to integrate with the supported ground force commander or
battle staff will also vary and disadvantage and risk must be mitigated. Station time
is also a limitation versus terrestrial placement of a JTAC and is often measurable
in hours versus days or weeks.
Generally, two types of airborne platforms exist in this regard: command and control
aircraft and aircraft designed to scout or attack. The former aircraft often have
improved communication suites and may include members of the battle staff and the
ground force commander to be in the aircraft as well. Such configuration maintains
many elements of the integration possible on the ground and presents a more
thorough situational awareness than a platform which consists of just aircrew and
JTAC. Limitations may include positioning of such aircraft as the JTAC often has
less ability to influence the routing and holding of the aircraft as terminal attack
control may not be the first priority.
When operating out of a scout or attack aircraft, the advantages can be the opposite
of a command and control centric platform. Often the JTAC is the only member of
a battle staff on the aircraft with the remaining personnel being aircrew. As such,
the JTAC has to accomplish external liaison with ground force commanders and
staff in able to perform the mission. Such coordination may slow down the execution
of CAS by less presenting less efficient command and control means. This type of
aircraft often has the ability to mark, designate or act as a strike platform. As the
individual platform characteristics allow, the JTAC may be able to verify targets
through sharing a common visual or system-aided operational picture of the
battlefield with supporting aircraft. Some nations rely on C4ISR platforms to operate
JTACs/FAC(A) from Airborne position. These aircraft offer enhanced C2 capabilities
and operate multi-INT sensor suites (ELINT, EO-IR,….) over the battlefield, thus
contributing to the ground picture.
(1) Fixed-wing. JTACs operating from a fixed-wing aircraft can cover more
of the battlefield than rotary wing as well as better line-of-sight communications.
These advantages can be off-set by a limited visual identification, marking and
targeting capability. Such trade-offs must be considered during the planning
and preparation phases, not during execution.
(2) Rotary-wing. These aircraft share many commonalities with fixed-wing

platforms though some differences exist. The amount of visible battlefield is
often reduced, when compared to fixed-wing, due to operating altitudes as well
as the speed at which one can traverse the battle space. Lower altitudes can
present advantages to include better detail of the ground and lateral vantage

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points. The ability to hover and operate from a battle position can improve target
acquisition in areas with a high amount of overhead cover and interference.
b. Watercraft. Though infrequent when compared to the use of an airborne

platform, JTACs have and continue to operate from watercraft. As with other
platforms the ability to perform the mission must be considered before execution
and includes the same basic elements as found in both land and air-based
platforms. Specifics to plan for in regards to water-based operations include
environmental considerations for equipment, limited maneuverability and routes,
marking and designating. The environment may affect electromagnetic
properties of equipment to include radios, LASERs and visual marking devices.
The propagation, reflection and dispersion should be carefully considered when
employing infra-red and LASER devices and munitions as well as effects upon
propagated waveforms for communications.
c. Vehicles
In order to effectively support maneuver units JTACs should be equipped with

vehicles with the same degree of mobility and protection as the units they are
supporting. Some coalition nations develop specialized JTAC/ Fire support
vehicles equipped with enhanced communications, VDL receivers and target
acquisition units. If JTACs don´t have dedicated specialized vehicles and must
use supported unit´s organic vehicles, they should travel in the vehicle with GFC,
if situation allows in order to allow for good communications between GFC and
JTAC.
3.25.6 CAS Aircraft Capabilities
FW and RW aircraft, their weapons, sensors and capabilities, can be found in various
references to include NATO, national or theatre specific documentation. Most aircraft deployed
to contingency operations are equipped with advanced sensors and weapons, however older
generation or less sophisticated platforms may deliver sufficient effect on the battlefield, if
proper techniques are used by JTAC/FAC(A).
CAS planners should select those combinations of munitions and aircraft offering the required
effect. To create the desired level of destruction, neutralization, or suppression of enemy CAS
targets, the weapons load, arming, and fuse settings must be tailored for the desired results,
if they are available. Most common aircraft sensors and avionics related to CAS are (list not
exhaustive):
a. Head Up Display (HUD) enables the aircrew to view basic flight data
(heading, airspeed, altitude etc.) without looking at the instruments. Aiming
solutions are also displayed on HUD. If target location and elevation are entered
into aircrafts´ navigation kit, it may also display symbol indicating target location
on the ground, if it is within field of view of the HUD. This aids in quick target
correlation and expedites target engagement. Some legacy platforms do not have
head up display, therefore correlation is more difficult and has to be accomplished
by other means, such as Talk-On, enhanced target description or use of marking.

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b. Multi Function displays (MFD) are located on the instrument panel.

During CAS mission they can display digital maps or imagery from aircrafts´
sensors (targeting pods), enabling the aircrew to view and correlate targets.
When discussing target details JTAC must take into consideration that MFDs are
limited in size and therefore small target details may be hard to be distinguished
by the aircrew.
c. LASER Spot Trackers are sensors that detect LASER energy. LSTs are
either embedded into targeting pods, or mounted on the aircraft and bore sighted
with the axis of the aircraft. Due to limited field of view of the sensor TGP optics
must be slewed at the expected target area, or (if mounted on the aircraft) nose
of the aircraft must be pointing at the target that is being illuminated. Symbol of
the LASER spot is displayed either on HUD, if it is within its´ field of view, or on
MFD. Use of LASER designators (ground or airborne) and LSTs greatly expedites
time required for target correlation.
d. Binoculars, if carried on board, enable the aircrew to view the target area
from greater distances/altitudes and with better degree of detail. This benefits
legacy platforms that are not equipped with advanced sensors.. Due to vibration
that is present in the aircraft use of stabilized binoculars is highly desirable.
e. AO Imagery (maps, satellite images, GRGs, mission graphics etc.) greatly

enhance aircrews situational awareness and ability to correlate targets. Imagery
can be carried as hard copy, it can be viewed on MFDs or on tactical tablets
issued to aircrews.
f. NVDs used by aircrews provide the same capabilities and have the same
limitations as those used by JTACs. See paragraph 3.25.2
g. Low Level Light Television (LLLTV) is device that uses ambient light just
like NVDs to create picture. However this device has magnification and can zoom
in/out.
h. Electro Optical (EO) systems are sensors that are used in daylight
conditions. They have optical and digital zoom. Most fielded EO systems do not
distinguish colors, therefore JTAC should avoid using colors when conducting
sensor Talk-On during target correlation. New advanced EO systems have this
capability.
i. Thermal Imaging Systems are either embedded into targeting pods or

mounted on the aircraft. For thermal imaging systems capabilities and limitations
see paragraph 3.25.2
j. Airborne IR pointers can be either handheld operated by the aircrew from

the cockpit or embedded into targeting pods. For basic considerations see
paragraph 3.25.3
k. Airborne LASER designators enable airborne platforms to designate

targets with LASER energy for LASER guided weapons guidance or to mark
targets for other platforms that are LST capable.

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l. Airborne LASER range finders are used to measure distance from

aircrafts´ position to targets to increase delivery accuracy or to determine target
location. Rangefinders can be either embedded into targeting pods or they can
be embedded into aircrafts´ built in sighting system.
m. Video Downlinks (VDL) provide CAS platforms the capability to transmit

imagery from aircraft´s sensors to all users who are equipped with VDL receivers.
n. Radars in air to ground role may be used to facilitate attacks in extremely

adverse weather conditions. When employing Synthetic Aperture Radar or similar
sensors, aircrews must ensure onboard navigational system errors are minimized
and final target designation is accomplished using the highest resolution mapping
scale possible.
o. Datalinks When designating a target using an onboard datalink system,

aircrews must correlate the j-series message symbology by secondary means
(i.e. voice description of location/coordinates, mark location visual cooperation,
targeting pod capture, etc.).
p. Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (HMCS). In an air-to-ground role, the

HMCS is used in conjunction with targeting sensors (Radar, Thermal Imagers,
etc.) and smart weapons to accurately and precisely attack surface targets.
HMCS provides the pilot with aircraft performance, targeting, weaponry, and
threat warning information, regardless of where the pilot is looking, significantly
enhancing pilot SA through the mission.
q. Targeting Pods and Sensor Turrets Most CAS aircraft deployed to

theatre of operations are equipped with Advanced Targeting Pods (ATP) on FW
jets or with sensor turrets (on UAVs, slow moving FW and helicopters) that may
provide these capabilities:
(1) Daylight EO systems
(2) Thermal Imaging
(3) LST
(4) LTD
(5) VDL
(6) Capability to generate precise target coordinates with accuracy sufficient

for employment of GPS/ INS guided munitions
(7) Capability to provide field Collateral Damage Estimation with CDE rings
imagery.
3.25.7 Weapons Effects
3.25.7.1 Weapons Effects.
In order to achieve the desired effect on the battlefield weapons with proper effect must be
employed. Weapons effects include:
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a. Blast effect is achieved by massive overpressure caused by detonation of

high explosives contained in ordnance. Blast is very effective against personnel,
buildings and structures. Overpressure dissipates rapidly with increasing
distance from the impact point.
b. Fragmentation is achieved through high velocity fragments released from

the body of the ordnance during detonation. Fragmentation is the main factor
when deriving Risk Estimate Distances and Minimum Safe distances.
Fragmentation is very effective against personnel and soft targets. Fragmentation
depends on size of weapon and elevation
c. Armor penetration is desired effect against hard targets. It can be

achieved through kinetic energy of rounds from bigger caliber guns, shaped
charges or explosively formed projectiles. Armor penetration is not limited to
armor only, it is generally effective against any hardened targets such as
concrete/reinforced concrete structures and field fortifications. Direct hit must be
achieved to deliver desired effect.
d. Incendiary effect is achieved through high temperature of burning

flammable substances. Is very effective against supplies and personnel. Nearly
all kinds of aviation ordnance have incendiary effects due to high temperature
caused by detonation of explosives. Incendiary effects are sometimes not
desirable due to the fact that they can cause unintended collateral damage.
e. Cratering is an effect caused by detonation of weapon buried in the target.

It is effective against targets such as roads, railways, runways or underground
structures. Thickness of the bomb body, sufficient amount of explosives, impact
velocity and proper fuse setting are essential for achieving required effect on
targets.
3.25.7.2 Risk Estimate Distance (RED)
Risk estimate distances allow the supported commander to estimate the potential danger to
friendly troops from the CAS attack. They are discussed as 0.1 percent probability of
incapacitation (PI) (i.e., 1 in 1,000 PI). Different Factors such as delivery profile, target
elevation, terrain, buildings, trees, etc., can significantly reduce or increase PI.
Caution: NATO does not have standardized REDs. REDs used in training are mostly quoted
from US JFIRE. Parties involved in the planning and execution of CAS and joint fires must be
aware of the REDs that are in effect. This information can be found in SPINS, SOPs and other
governing documents.
Danger Close. Ordnance delivery at or inside the 0.1 percent PI distance will be considered
“danger close.” The supported commander must accept responsibility for the risk to friendly
forces when targets are inside the 0.1 percent PI distance. Risk acceptance is confirmed when
the supported commander passes his initials to the attacking CAS aircraft through the
JTAC/FAC(A), signifying that he accepts the risk inherent in ordnance delivery inside the 0.1
percent PI distance. Attack should be conducted parallel to the FLOT.

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3.25.7.3 Weapons’ Guidance Systems.
a. LASER guidance systems. For principles of LASER weapons see

Chapter III Section XI LASER Operations.
b. EO/IR guidance systems use sensors that lock onto target picture and
guide the weapon to target. Depending on sensor type picture is either in visible
or IR spectrum. Pilot must lock the seeker of the weapon on target prior to launch.
Once seeker is locked onto target and missile is fired it does not require any other
input from the aircraft or JTAC/FAC(A) and guides autonomously, allowing the
aircraft to exit target area or perform defensive maneuver maneuvers, greatly
increasing aircrafts´ survivability.
c. Radar guidance systems use radars to detect targets and home on them
autonomously. Targets must be radar significant and must match missiles´
search algorithm criteria to be targeted. Normally geographical area that is to be
scanned by weapons radar (its´ boundaries) must be entered into weapon by the
aircrew prior to launch, however low TLE is not required. Radar guidance systems
enable target engagement in virtually any weather. Missile locks on target after
launch. Missile will engage any target that matches search criteria within
boundaries that have been entered into weapons navigation system, however
weapon will not distinguish between friendly and hostile target or target that has
been hit and neutralized previously.
d. Radio/ Wire guided weapons are guided by radio commands from launch
platform or by wire that unreels from the missile. This requires launch platform
operator to keep crosshairs on target until weapon impacts, increasing aircrafts´
exposure to air defenses.
e. GPS/Inertially Aided Munitions. These weapons rely on a self-contained

GPS-aided INS, which guides the weapon from the release point to target
coordinates regardless of weather, camouflage, or obscurants. These weapons
require encrypted GPS signals and may require considerable preflight planning
to achieve optimum accuracy depending on weapon type and mission.
(1) Advantages.
(a) Accuracy. When provided three-dimensional target locations of

sufficient accuracy, these weapons can achieve delivery accuracies
exceeding those of LGWs. Accuracy is also unaffected (assuming GPS-
aided guidance) by launch range.
(b) Standoff. These weapons can provide standoff capability at very

long distances. Aircraft and aircrew can increase the standoff capability
of these weapons to potentially avoid threats in the target area. Such
standoff distances may induce the requirement for additional airspace
coordination.

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(c) All weather capability. IAM/GPS-aided munitions will normally

offer an all-weather capability because they do not require designators for
guidance. INS/GPS-aided weapons do not require the aircrew to see the
target, as do unguided munitions, or to maintain a clear LOS to the target
as do LASER-guided munitions. The method of attack (BOT/BOC)
selected still will determine the TTPs to be used.
(d) Multiple target capability. Depending on platform and weapon

variety, the weapons allow one aircraft to strike multiple stationary targets
in one ‘pass’.
(e) Modifiable Impact Angle. By increasing the impact angle of IAM

weapons, the effect of vertical TLE (elevation error) is greatly reduced. Be
cognizant that adjustments to impact angle will alter the weapon effect.
(2) Limitations.
(a) Moving Targets. Single mode IAM/GPS weapons have no inherent

capability against moving targets unless employed with an onboard GMTI
radar. Even then, these weapons still fly to preprogrammed coordinates.
If the target moves between the time it is targeted, and the weapon is
released, the weapon will miss.
(b) Location Error. These weapons require extremely accurate target

location in both the horizontal and vertical plane. Additionally, some
weapons require sufficient time to acquire guidance information following
release. If precise information is not available, the commander must be
advised of the impact on accuracy and subsequent reduction in
effectiveness. (All CAS participants must ensure they are using the same
maps, charts, data bases, and target materials with the same datum
and/or grid reference system. WGS-84 is the NATO assumed standard
unless stated otherwise in the SPINS.)
(c) Malfunctions. The footprint for these weapons in the event of a

malfunction, such as loss of guidance or control fin hard-over, is very large
and, in some cases, increases the probability of friendly fire. When able,
PGMs should be employed parallel to the FLOT.
(3) Planning considerations. IAMs guide to a designated impact angle and

azimuth over the coordinates entered into the munitions via the aircraft system.
Therefore, great care must be taken to ensure that the most accurate target
location (i.e., lowest TLE) is obtained and correctly input into the weapon.
Aircraft altitude and speed can yield significant standoff ranges (in excess of 10
nautical miles). Therefore, it is necessary to deconflict high altitude/long range
release profiles from other systems operating below the release altitudes.
Significant issues exist when using weapons that transit over or around friendly
forces using preprogrammed flight paths and impact points. Once released,
these weapons may not be able to be redirected. IAMs have multiple modes of
employment and may be used with both the BOC and BOT concepts.
(a) Bomb on Coordinates. Using this method the aircrew will use the
coordinates provided by JTAC/FAC(A) as the only means of correlating

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the target. Aircrew will not adjust or refine the coordinates that are passed
by the JTAC/FAC(A) and input them into the weapon’s navigation system.
The tactical scenario and commander’s tactical risk assessment
determine the acceptable TLE. If IAMs are delivered BOC, all aircraft
delivering ordnance must read back Line 4 and Line 6 from their system
or weapon.
(b) Bomb on Target. This method indicates that aircraft are employing
an IAM based on sensor or visual target acquisition, as opposed to
bombing on a coordinate given to the aircrew by external source. Using
this method the aircrew will use the coordinates provided by the
JTAC/FAC(A) to slew onboard sensors (such as thermal imager, ATP or
radar) to the expected target area and correlate the target by visual means
(such as Talk-On). Once the aircrew is Tally target they will use onboard
sensors to refine target coordinates and input them into weapon’s
guidance system. If an IAM is delivered BOT, the coordinates do not have
to be read back from the weapon.
NOTE: Inertially aided munitions flight path geometry may not be predictable when
using visual delivery methods.
f. Dual and Multi Mode Guidance Weapons. Weapons exist that possess
multiple methods of target acquisition. These weapons have been increasing in
prevalence and offer the ability to target under various environmental conditions
and target characteristics. Examples of dual and multi mode weapons guidance
systems are (list not exhaustive): LASER/GPS/INS, EO/GPS, Radar/LASER.
When employing these weapons it is important to be aware of the weapons full
capabilities and limitations and how these correspond to each form of targeting
that such weapons possess. If weapons´ guidance system allows for multiple
guidance options it must be clearly communicated between JTAC/FAC(A) and
the aircrew which guidance system will be used to prevent possible confusion
during execution. JTAC/FAC(A) should not request specific guidance for weapon
but rather describe situation and limitations on the ground with requested effect
on target and allow the aircrew to offer the best guidance option available.
3.25.7.4 Types of Aviation Weapons
a. Guns.
(1) Effect
Effect of guns depend on their caliber and type of ammunition being used.
Caliber of aviation guns varies from small arms calibers used on door mounted
machine guns in helicopters to 105mm howitzer used on AC-130 gunships.
Most fixed wing jets are equipped with 20mm to 30mm caliber guns. Guns are
effective against personnel in the open, light structures and soft skinned
vehicles. Armor piercing rounds can be very effective against armored targets.
30mm gun on A-10 can take out most modern main battle tanks, while 20mm
gun (F-15, F-16, F/A-18) can acheive effect only on soft skinned and lightly
armoured targets. Fragementation effect of High Explosive rounds from most
aviatik gun is limited to several meters from the impact point. Armor Piercing

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Incendiary or High Explosive Incendiary rounds can achieve incendiaryeffect, if

they hit flammable substances such as fuel tanks in vehicles.
(2) Planning considerations.
Guns are usually fired from dive. Impact pattern of aviation guns depends on
diving angle. Shallow diving angle will generally produce linear impact pattern,
length of it depending on length of burst and diving angle. Steeper impact angle
will result in all rounds impacting roughly in the same location. When engaging
linear targets with guns JTAC/FAC(A) must take into consideration size and
orientation of the target when planning attack heading to achieve desired effect.
Ricochet may limit use of guns in environment where there is a risk of collateral
damage, as rounds ricochet from targets may go as far as several hundred
meters. Most guns are fixed to the aircraft and aiming is done by maneuver
maneuver of the aircraft. This requires proficiency of the aircrew. Some aircraft
(Attack helicopters, SOF gunships) have guns with off- axis capability that are
aimed by coupled sensors (helmet mounted displays, sensor turrets) where
aiming by maneuver of the aircraft is not required. JTAC/FAC(A) must take this
into consideration when planning for Type of Control. Guns must be fired at
short distances to achieve accurate hits. This exposes CAS platforms to enemy
air defenses.
b. Rockets
(1) Effect of rockets depends on type of warhead being used. The most
common warheads used on rockets are:
(a) High Explosive Fragmentation- effective against personnel in the

open and soft skinned targets, primary effect being fragmentation with
limited blast and incendiary effect.
(b) High Explosive/Shaped Charge- effective against personnel, soft

skinned targets (fragmentation) and light armor (shaped chargé). Direct
hit must be achieved to enable the shaped chargé to penetrate the armor.
This is usually accomplished by multiple rockets being fired against single
target, rather than precise aiming.
(c) Flechette warheads contain multiple hard metal flechettes. Once

released from the warhead at preset distance from firing point they
continue at high speed towards target with great kinetic energy.
Dispersion pattern and area being covered by flechettes depends on
number of flechettes in one warhead, number of rockets being fired and
diving angle. Flechettes have very good effect against personnel in the
open, personnel hiding in vegetation and soft skinned targets. Their ability
to penetrate light armor is limited.
(d) Smoke warheads can be used for target marking or to create smoke
screen. When using smoke rounds to mark the targets they are usually
fired as single rockets.

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(e) Illumination warheads can produce battlefield illumination in visible

or IR spectrum. Duration of illumination and size of area being illuminated
depends on type of rocket and warhead being used.
(f) LASER guided rockets that have been fielded by many nations in
recent years enable point target first round hit capability at greater
distances due to semi-active LASER seeker guidance system. For
planning considerations see REFERENCE LGM.
(2) Planning considerations. Rockets are considered area weapon,

therefore they are mostly fired in salvos to achieve desired effect. They are
reasonably accurate weapons system, however achieving direct hit on a small
point target is quite difficult. For this reason they are mostly fired in salvos.
Rockets are most commonly carried in rocket pods that contain multiple rockets.
Size of pods and caliber of rockets varies. They are usually fired from a dive.
Length of salvo (number of rockets being fired) and diving angle will determine
impact pattern (see guns considerations). Attack headings with rockets must
therefore be planned in the axis of the target´s orientation, when engaging linear
target. JTAC/FAC(A) should also state size of the target and desired effect to
help the aircrew determine the best flight profile and number of rockets to be
fired in the salvo. Rockets must also be fired at relatively short distances,
therefore their use exposes CAS aircraft to enemy air defenses.
c. General Purpose Bombs
(1) Effects. Primary effect of GP bombs are blast, fragmentation, cratering (if
delayed fuse is used) and limited incendiary. Actual effect depends on bomb
size (weight of bomb body and weight of explosives it contains), impact velocity
and impact angle. Sizes of GP bombs are usually expressed by its´ weight in
pounds or kilograms. Size of the most common NATO bombs used for CAS
varies from 500lbs to 2000lbs. Bombs of the same size can produce different
effects based on the type of fuses being used.
(a) Fuses are devices that enable weapons´ safety, reliability of

operation and heavily influence actual effect. Possible fuse settings are:
1/ Instantaneous fuse setting will cause weapon to detonate

immediately upon impact on target. Primary effects will be blast and
fragmentation with very limited cratering, incendiary depending on
the nature of the target. This effect is required against personnel,
equipment, light structures and soft skinned vehicles in the open.
Effect against heavily armored targets such as main battle tanks will
depend on accuracy of the hit. If direct hit is not achieved the effect
will be limited, however blast may cause the vehicles to flip over or
cause the loss of mobility or firepower.
2/ Delay -fuse will cause weapon to detonate after preset delay

after impact on target. Delay is set in milliseconds, seconds and
possibly minutes and hours. Delayed detonation will cause the
bomb to bury into target prior to detonation. This will reduce blast
and fragmentation and increase cratering effect, reducing overall
bomb collateral damage potential. Delayed fuse setting is also very

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effective against buildings and structures, where bomb penetrates

the surface of the target and detonates inside, causing maximum
damage. Fuse delay can be either pre-set before flight, or changed
from the cockpit. Aircrew must advise JTAC/FAC(A) about fuse
settings/possibility to change fuse setting from the cockpit during
Fighter Check In (see REFERENCE). JTAC/FAC(A) should not
request from the aircrew specific delay setting, but rather request
actual effect on the target. For this reason JTAC/FAC(A) should
state target details such as size of target, materiel it is made of and
required effect in order to facilitate aircrews´ decision on proper fuse
setting. (“Target is 3 story concrete building, we are taking fire from
the ground floor, ground commander wants to neutralize the enemy
in this building“).
3/ Time fuse will activate the weapon after preset delay. This
delay is measured not from the impact, but from release from the
aircraft.
4/ Proximity fuse will detonate the weapon at preset altitude

over target. Primary effects will be blast and fragmentation. This
fuse setting will be very effective against personnel, equipment and
vehicles in trenches and revetments, that would be otherwise
protected from blast and fragmentation caused by surface
detonation. Use of proximity fuse will increase Risk Estimate
Distances and potential for collateral damage.
(2) GP bombs configurations. Bombs can be dropped either in high drag or

low drag configuration.
1/ High Drag GP bombs use devices that are designed to slow

down the fall of the bomb to allow the aircraft to egress safely from
target area prior to weapons´ detonation, protecting friendly aircraft
from effects of the ordnance. Lower impact velocity decreases
kinetic energy and limits bomb´s penetration capability. Retarding
devices are mostly used for dropping GP bombs from low altitudes,
for example when low cloud base limits aircraft´s ability to engage
targets from higher altitudes. The most common flight profile for use
of retarded bomb is level or dive. Use of retarded bombs requires
the aircraft to actually overfly the target increasing the exposure to
enemy air defenses.
2/ Low Drag GP bombs generally require higher release

altitudes to allow the aircraft to stay above the weapons´ effects´
zone. They can be dropped from virtually any flight profile (dive,
level, toss) depending on aircraft aiming system. Kinetic energy and
penetration capability depends on release altitude and aircraft
speed.

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(3) Planning considerations. Delivery accuracy of GP bombs depends

heavily on aircrafts´ aiming system. Because bombs are not guided they are
susceptible to wind shears. Deliveries at shorter distances and from lower
altitudes will generally increase the accuracy of GP bombs, however this will
increase exposure to the enemy air defenses. Impact velocity and impact angle
depends on bombs´ configuration (retarded vs non retard), aircrafts´ speed and
release altitude. Higher impact velocity improves penetration capability of the
bomb
GP bombs´ bodies with add on guidance kits are used to create Guided Bomb
Units (GBUs).
d. Guided bombs
(1) For LGB considerations see Chapter III
(2) For GPS/INS guided munitions employment see Chapter III.
e. Guided missiles
Guided missiles allow CAS aircraft to attack targets with pinpoint accuracy at greater
distances. Most missiles used for CAS were initially designed as antitank missiles,
however specialized versions that have been optimized against buildings and
personnel are being fielded by coalition forces. Primary effect of antitank guided
missiles are:
(1) Effects
(a) Armor penetration of most guided missiles is achieved mostly by

shaped charge. Weapons´ ability to penetrate the armor is usually
expressed by thickness of RHA (Rolled Homogeneous Armor) in
millimeters or inches. As most tanks use layered armor reference to RHA
should be considered very general information. Older missile systems use
unitary shaped charge, that is not effective against newest generation of
main battle tanks equipped with ERA (Explosive Reactive Armor- active
countermeasure that is designed to destroy the missile and disrupt the
effect of the shaped charge), however effect against older models of
MBTs or light armor may still be sufficient. Modern missiles use dual
shaped charges, where the pre-cursor charge is designed to activate the
ERA and clear the path for secondary charge that is designed to burn
through vehicle’s armor. Shaped charges can also penetrate other types
of hardened targets, such as masonry, concrete, reinforces concrete and
field fortifications. Actual effect will depend on the material target is made
of, thickness of the protective body, impact angle and size of the charge.
(b) Fragmentation effect of most missiles is insufficient and personnel

has been known to survive just a few meters from an impact point of a
guided missile. However some models of missiles have been fitted with
fragmentation sleeves to improve fragmentation effect. This type of
upgraded missiles is very effective against personnel and soft skinned
targets.

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(c) Blast effect from anti-tank missiles is quite limited, however

missiles with thermobaric warhead that have been fielded recently have
an excellent blast effect. Thermobaric weapons use two stage detonation
where in the first stage there is explosive matter dispersed in the air and
ignited in the second stage. This causes massive overpressure and
extremely high temperatures, exceeding overpressure and temperature
caused by conventional explosives. They are very effective against
structures and personnel in closed quarters.
(2) Planning considerations.
(a) Guided missiles are very accurate weapon systems with low
collateral damage yield. They provide standoff capability that increases
CAS aircraft survivability.
(b) Most of them require Line of Sight between launching platform and
target prior to launch. JTAC/FAC(A) should plan for adequate type of
control to exploit these capabilities without increasing risk of fratricide or
restricting aircrafts tactics.
(c) Failure of rocket motor during flight of the missile will result in short
impact, therefore missiles should not be launched over friendly positions,
unless tactical situation dictates otherwise.
(d) Modern main battle tanks are equipped with softkill and hardkill
countermeasures that are designed to prevent the missile from killing the
tank. Softkill mechanisms affect missile´s or launcher´s guidance system
resulting in missile missing the target. Hardkill countermeasures destroy
the missile as it approaches the target. Countermeasures are activated by
different sensors such as vehicles radars or LASER illumination detectors.
CAS planners should have detailed knowledge of countermeasures used
in theatre of operations and provide this information to JTAC/FAC(A)s and
CAS aircrews.
(e) Despite the fact guided missiles have low collateral damage yield
JTAC/FAC(A) must take into consideration nature of the target. Shaped
charge penetrating tanks´ armor will only leave small hole in the hull of the
tank, however it may detonate the ammunition stored inside the vehicle
causing massive secondary explosion which will contribute to overall
collateral damage.
3.25.8 Electronic Warfare Assets In Support of CAS
Increasingly complex and sophisticated weapons populate the modern battlefield.

Dependence on the use of electronics and the Electro Magnetic (EM) spectrum to execute
military operations has increased in parallel. Combat in the Electro Magnetic Environment
(EME) is carried out by exploiting electronic/C2 systems and the people that operate or use
them while simultaneously protecting own or friendly use from such exploitation. EW is the
combat discipline for the prosecution of operations in the EME.

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In recent conflicts NATO did not encounter enemy equipped with sophisticated EW systems,
however this may change in the near future. Potential adversaries also have access to a wide
range of systems to support their operations and contribute to their situational awareness.
These include EM ISR sensors; electronic and communications intelligence intercept systems;
wide-ranging and in some instances highly secure EM communications devices such as
cellular phone systems, Wi-Fi and high power cordless phones.
The list of affected NATO systems includes:
a. HF, VHF and satellite communication radios and information systems,
b. battle command systems,
c. GPS systems including those used for timing, and target acquisition,
d. manned and unmanned platform and targeting, navigation and positioning

devices.
EW is military action that exploits EM energy to provide situational awareness and achieve
offensive and defensive effects. EW, the conduct of EMO, is warfare in the EME.
EW effects and capabilities can be applied from the air, land, sea and space by manned,
unmanned, attended, or unattended systems. If not properly coordinated and integrated, the
use of EW may adversely affect friendly forces. Improper EW actions may cause EM fratricide
or eliminate targets of high intelligence value. Units that effectively apply EW capabilities
maintain freedom of action in the EME while denying its use by the enemy. EW control and
coordination is covered in Chapter 4.
3.25.8.1 EW Effects-Based Actions
EW actions are effects-based and comprise of EA, ED and ES. This terminology is primarily
aimed at commanders and operational planners and those engaged in delivering EW effects
at all levels. They are dealt with below.
a. Electronic Attack. EA is the use of EM energy for offensive purposes EA

is employed to destroy, neutralize, deny, degrade, disrupt or deceive adversary’s
C2 capabilities and diminish their opportunities to shape or exploit the operational
environment.
b. Electronic Defense. ED is the use of EM energy to provide protection and

ensure effective friendly use of the EM spectrum.
c. Electronic Surveillance. ES is the use of EM energy to provide situational

awareness and intelligence.
3.25.8.2 EW Measures
EW Measures terminology has a different purpose and is focused on the mechanisms by which
EW works. It is more likely to be the preserve of specialists. The EW measures taken to achieve
effects and support operations have not changed. For exponents of EW, the measures-based
disciplines retain their importance. The annexes that follow this chapter provide guidance on
the measures based disciplines of EW Support Measures (ESM), Electronic Counter Measures

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(ECM) and Electronic Protective Measures (EPM). Additionally Annex 2D provides an

introduction to EW support for Information Operations (Info Ops).
a. Electronic Warfare Support Measures.
That division of EW involving action taken to search for, intercept and identify EM
emissions and locate their source for the purposes of immediate threat recognition.
It provides a source of information required for immediate decisions involving ECM
EPM and other tactical actions. (AAP-6)
ESM in Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Operations.
ESM resources are used to intercept and locate enemy AD emitters. Generally,
airborne ESM resources will be the most effective collectors for EW support to
SEAD. Their elevation relative to the terrain permits a long and uninterrupted line-
of-sight to emitters. However, ground based ESM resources provide an additional
level of support to the tactical commander as Low Level Air Defense (LLAD) systems
may be difficult to detect from the air.
b. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).
ECM is that division of EW involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s

effective use of EMS through the use of EM energy. There are three subdivisions of
ECM: electronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic neutralization (AAP-
6) ECM use EM energy (including directed energy (DE)) to attack an adversary’s
combat capability (particularly his C2 and ISTAR systems). ECM uses EM energy
to temporarily or permanently degrade, disrupt, deny, or neutralize, temporarily or
permanently, an adversary’s combat capability.
(1) Electronic Jamming
Electronic jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of EM

energy, with the object of impairing the effectiveness of electronic devices,
equipment or systems being used by an enemy. (AAP-6)
(2) Electronic Deception
Electronic deception is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration,

absorption or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract
or seduce an enemy or his electronic systems. (AAP-6)
(3) Electronic Neutralization.
Electronic neutralization is the deliberate use of EM energy to either temporarily

or permanently damage enemy devices which rely exclusively on the EM
spectrum. (AAP-6)
ECM in Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Operations. SEAD operations will

also be supported by ECM. Airborne, ground-based and expendable jammers are
used to protect friendly forces engaged in SEAD operations.

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c. Electronic Protective Measures.
That division of EW involving actions taken to ensure effective use of the EMS
despite the enemy's use of EM energy. There are two subdivisions of electronic
protective measures: active electronic protective measures and passive electronic
protective measures.(AAP-6).
Passive measures include:
(1) Reducing power to a level that is sufficient to maintain communications.
(2) Using codes and ciphers.
(3) Use of encryption whenever available.
(4) Using directional antenna.
(5) Careful siting to reduce the risk of detection and degrade the accuracy of
adversary DF.
(6) The use of SOPs to reduce the need for communications and keep EM
emissions to a minimum.
(7) The use of SOPs for countering enemy jamming and deception.
(8) Strict Emission Control (EMCON) measures, which either forbid or limit
EM emissions during certain phases of the battle.
(9) The use of technical measures which affect the design of electronic
equipment (eg. encryption, spread spectrum) to reduce the risk of detection.
Active measures include:
(1) Changing frequencies.
(2) Re-radiation of a signal using reflectors or repeaters.
3.25.8.3 EW in support of CAS
Pre-mission.
Electronic warfare (EW) consideration is integral to the success of CAS in many environments.
The spectrum of capabilities is wide and may include activities to jam or spoof enemy
communication and intelligence gathering abilities. However, these EW activities may have
inadvertent effects on friendly force capabilities as well. Planning conducted through
Electronic Warfare Officers (EWO) and GLOs can help mitigate any effects through proper
planning and deconfliction by understanding the capabilities and limitations of supporting EW
assets. This includes ground based as well air based platforms and the interaction between
them.

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On-station.
Integrate EW support into the command and control of assets supporting CAS. This includes
airspace and sensor management and will maximize effectiveness while minimizing any
potential negative effects. Use knowledge gained during the planning process to deconflict
EW from itself as well as non-EW assets.
3.25.9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets.
Use all sources of ISR. Assets that may be used include:
a. UAS and JSTARS feeds, strike aircraft with targeting pods
b. ELINT sources,
c. scout reconnaissance
d. troop reports
e. JTAC/FAC(A) observations,
f. Artillery radars
g. feeds from elements of air command and control systems(ACCS).
h. HUMINT sources.
These elements are specifically tailored for ISR roles and normally report through established
intelligence channels. Resultant data can be passed to and used by JTACs via electronic or
voice links to complement the operational environment picture.
Nontraditional ISR assets should also be considered on an as needed basis. For example,
many strike aircraft contain organic ISR capabilities for imaging, ELINT, and ground moving
target indicator tracking. Although possibly limited in FOV (Field of View) resolution, or scope
of operations when compared to traditional sources, nontraditional ISR data from strike aircraft
has the advantage of being focused, flexible, and more readily adjusted to suit the JTAC’s
immediate needs.
Aircrew, JTACs and CAS planners should make every effort to become familiar with the
capabilities and limitations of traditional and nontraditional methods, particularly in reference
to their ability to distinguish between individual combatants and noncombatants on the
battlefield.
Section X Close Air Support Planning Considerations - Time Considerations

Time is the critical element in coordinating events and massing fires to create the combined
arms effect of ground and air forces.
a. Time Available for Planning. Planners must estimate the amount of time
necessary to plan the mission, effect the coordination, and execute the mission
to support the ground force commander. Inadequate planning time will result in
reduced effectiveness and increased risk to aircrews and ground troops alike.
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b. Air Tasking Cycle. The specific theatre or operations area will have
established ATO cycle “cut off” times for preplanned requests. CAS requirements
that do not meet the established cut off times are submitted as a change to the
ATO through the combat operations division of the CAOC or as an immediate
request per theatre/operations SOPs.
c. Synchronization. Synchronization of maneuver and fires is critical.

Whenever possible, use GPS provided time to synchronize actions.
Section XI LASER Operations

LASER-guided systems provide the coalition force with the ability to locate and engage targets
with an increased first-round hit probability. They can effectively engage a wide range of
targets, including moving targets.
LASER operations supplement other CAS procedures and are not substitutes for other
planning and execution procedures and techniques. In any LASER-designating situation,
strive for simplicity and use all available resources to help ensure first-pass success.
3.26 LASER HARDWARE
a. LASER Target Designators
LTDs are devices that are used to illuminate targets with LASER energy. LTDs
operate on wavelength that is invisible to human eye. Most designators are class
4 LASERs and they can cause damage to human eye, if not handled with caution.
Coded LTDs emit LASER energy with unique Pulse Repetition Frequency and
require input of specific LASER codes for operation. Purpose of PRF is to harmonize
the designator and seeker interface, therefore the LASER designator Pulse
Repetition Frequency must be matched to the PRF setting on the weapon or tracker.
PRF is matched to a specific LASER Code (see STANAG 3733- LASER PULSE
REPETITION FREQUENCIES (PRF), PULSE ENERGIES AND EFFECTIVE
DESIGNATION RANGE OF LASER SYSTEMS FOR TARGET DESIGNATION
AND WEAPON GUIDANCE). LASER code is expressed as 4 digit number always
starting with 1. PRF on most LTDs is adjustable and must match the PRF setting on
the weapon or tracker. LTDs can be either ground (GLTD) or airborne (ALTD).
(1) GLTD ranges vary from 10 meters to 20 km, their actual ability to
designate target depending heavily on size of the target, stability of the lasing
platform and atmospheric conditions.
(2) ALTDs are carried on aircraft and provide the same function as the GLTD.
ALTDs are capable of very long range lasing and are normally employed below
30,000 ft AGL
b. LASER-Guided Weapons.
All LGWs home on PRF-coded reflected LASER energy. Some LGWs require target
designation before launch and during the entire time of flight. Other LGWs require
target designation only during the terminal portion of flight. Most LGWs require
designation until weapon impact. Typical LGWs are:

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(1) LASER-Guided Bombs (LGBs).Paveway II, III, and enhanced

Paveway III (GPS aided), as well as hybrid weapons such as a LASER JDAM
and dual mode LGB.
(2) LASER-Guided Missiles (LGMs). AGM-65E LASER Maverick and AGM-

114 Hellfire. LGMs generally provide greater standoff launch ranges than LGBs.
Greater range provides increased survivability for aircrews operating in a high
threat environment. Aircrews and JTACs must exercise caution when launching
LGMs from behind friendly troops. The final decision to release standoff LGMs
from behind friendly positions in a CAS environment rests with the supported
commander.
c. LASER Spot Trackers and See Spot Devices.
LSTs are LASER sensors that provide heads up display cueing for aircraft equipped
with these systems. While scanning for LASER energy, these systems have a
limited FOV that depends on range and switch settings. Target acquisition involves
the use of an LST carried by the aircraft and a LTD aimed by a ground team or
another aircraft. The LST is used to acquire the LASER “spot” to assist in visual or
sensor aided attacks. In general, the chances of acquisition are improved when
cueing aids such as target marks, landmarks, and INS/GPS coordinates help the
pilot point the LST in the direction of the target.
Additional considerations
For off-board LASER designation, the JTAC/FAC(A) will confirm the LASER code prior to CAS
execution. For ground-based LASER designation, the JTAC shall pass final attack headings
to ensure the attacking aircraft is in the LASER acquisition area and not the LASER safety
zones. The LTL shall be passed during the CAS mission briefing in the Remarks section. This
paragraph provides CAS-specific TTP and background information on LASER-guided system
employment.
The CAS aircrew can also confuse the LASER source with the intended target. When
employing LASERs to mark, include the call sign of the lasing entity along with the 4-digit
LASER code in the remarks portion of the CAS briefing “Blackjack LASER, code 1688”. The
JTAC/FAC(A) will use the LASER code passed by aircrew set in any LASER guided weapons
(LGWs) they briefed during the CAS check-in briefing. In the remarks section of the CAS
Brief, JTACs/FAC(A) shall provide final attack headings to ensure that the attacking aircraft is
in the LASER acquisition area and not in a LASER safety zone, and shall provide the LASER-
to-target-line (LTL) in degrees magnetic from the LASER designator operator to the target. For
LASER designation, the aircrew will provide a ten second warning to activate the designation.
3.27 CATEGORIES OF LASER OPERATIONS.
Thereare into two primary categories: target acquisition, and weapons guidance.
a. Target Acquisition (also known as LASER Hand Off or LASER

Marking).

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Using a LTD to provide energy for an aircraft’s LST. Aircraft LST display provides
cueing to aircrew. . An aircrew can use the LST to visually locate the target. LTD
may be ground-based or from another aircraft. Once the aircrew locates the target,
they can conduct an accurate attack using unguided ordnance. LASER-guided
systems improve the delivery accuracy of unguided ordnance. Aircraft equipped with
LASER designators can also be “talked onto” the target by the JTAC/FAC(A), then
self-designate the target and deliver the weapon or, in some cases, confirm the
correct target with an airborne LTD.
b. Weapons Terminal Guidance (Also known as designation).
Weapons guidance allows a LGW to home in on reflected LASER energy placed on

a target by an LTD. This allows precision delivery of weapons, some at standoff
distances.
Employment of LGWs in conjunction with coded LTDs is either autonomous or

assisted.
(1) Autonomous LGW employment uses the CAS aircraft’s onboard LTD for
terminal weapons guidance. Most aircraft capable of delivering LGWs can
provide on-board autonomous self-designation. This is also called “self-
lasing”.
(2) Assisted LGW employment uses an off-board LTD for terminal weapons
guidance. This is typically accomplished by a ground team operating a GLTD
(such as a ground/vehicle LASER target designator, also known as “ground
lasing”) or another aircraft (known as “buddy lasing”). Aircraft without on-
board ALTDs that can carry and deliver LGBs require assisted LGB
employment.
Note: The PRF of LGBs is normally only adjustable prior to flight and cannot be
changed once airborne.
3.28 LASER TARGET DESIGNATOR PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.
a. LASER Limitations
LASER-guided systems provide additional capabilities, but also have distinct

limitations. There are five basic considerations for using LSTs or LGWs:
(1) LOS must exist between the designator and the target and between the
target and the LST/LGW.
(2) PRF codes of the LASER designator and the LST/LGW must be
compatible.
(3) The direction of attack must allow the LST/LGW to sense enough reflected
LASER energy from the target for the seeker to acquire and lock-on the target.
(4) The LASER target designator must designate the target at the correct
time, and for the correct length of time. If the length of time is insufficient, the
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seeker head could break lock and the flight pattern of the LGW becomes
unpredictable.
(5) The delivery system must release the LGW within the specific LGW
delivery envelope to ensure the weapon can physically reach the target. There
is an increased hazard to friendly forces when aircrews release weapons behind
friendly positions. The final decision to release standoff LGWs from behind
friendly positions in a CAS environment rests with the maneuver commander.
b. LASER Code Setting.
LSTs must be set to the same code as the coded LTD for the user to see the target
being lased. Most missiles such as Maverick and Hellfire can be adjusted in-flight
prior to launch. In the case of airborne LSTs, the aircrew can select PRF codes for
the LST while in flight. All coded ALTDs, with few exceptions, can change codes
while airborne. The JTAC/FAC(A) will have to coordinate efforts to ensure both the
aircraft and designators are on the same code. Coordination for the LTD to match
the LGW code is conducted through the ATO, AOCC, or JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s CAS brief.
Sometimes, a LTD will serve the dual purpose of target designation for a coded
LASER acquisition/spot tracker and terminal weapons guidance for LGWs. In these
cases, the LTD, LST, and the LGW must have the same code. LASER codes are
always passed as four-digits to avoid confusion. When briefing LST-equipped
aircraft, include the four-digit LASER code and LTL in accordance with the CAS
briefing format. If aircraft check in with a different code, then it is the
JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s responsibility to make appropriate corrections. Even if the aircraft
is capable of self-designation, the JTAC should have a backup GLTD ready if it is
available.
c. Environmental conditions
Environmental conditions can affect LASER designators and seeker head

performance. Tactics and techniques must consider low clouds and fog, smoke,
haze, snow and rain, solar saturation, and other visually limiting phenomena.
(1) Atmospheric Scatter. A seeker may detect scattered radiation that is

caused by suspended matter in the atmosphere. It can occur even on clear
days. This phenomenon can cause false seeker lock-on and target indications
within short distances from the LASER exit port. This is also referred to as
backscatter.
(2) Atmospheric attenuation. Matter suspended in the atmosphere can

severely reduce the transmitted LASER energy on surface of the target thereby
preventing reflection from the target of sufficient energy for lock-on by LSTs or
LGWs. Attenuation will increase with increased amount of matter in the
atmosphere and increasing distance between LTD, target and weapon’s seeker.
LTDs with higher power output are more likely to deliver sufficient LASER
energy onto target.
(3) Battlefield obscurants. Smoke, dust, and other particulates in the air may
attenuate or reflect the LASER beam. LASER energy reflected from such
particles may also present a false target to the tracker or the munitions.
Backscatter refers to a portion of the LASER energy that is scattered back in

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the direction of the seeker by an obscurant. Since backscatter energy competes

with the reflected energy from the target, a seeker may attempt to lock onto the
obscurant rather than the target. LASER operators can reduce the effect of
enemy obscurants by following some simple rules of thumb. Positioning is a
key to reducing the degradation obscurants imposed on LASER performance.
(4) Environmental Dispersion. Environmental conditions may disperse the

LASER’s beam potentially causing the beam’s energy and path to disperse or
be redirected. Examples include water covered surfaces, crusted snow and ice.
These and other factors may also induce diversion and reflection as mentioned
below.
(5) False Seeker Lock-on. LASER seekers may occasionally lock-on to other
reflected energy instead of the target. Even in optimum conditions the seeker
may incorrectly lock onto the LTD or the atmospheric scatter present along the
LASER beam. In this case, a seeker is most likely to detect stray energy only
in the immediate vicinity of the designator. To help to minimize seeker lock-on
of the designator position due to LOS with the LTD optical port, the designator
should be masked from the seeker field of view. The designator can be masked
by terrain, vegetation, or means of a temporary screen such as blankets or a
tarp. Due to the threat of false seeker lock-on, it is imperative that JTACs
conduct follow-on correlation after a LASER hand-off has been attempted.
d. Positioning of LASER target designator
Consider positioning LASERs on flanks or on high ground where smoke is likely to

be less heavy along the LOS and repositioning from an obscured to a non-obscured
position.
Use multiple LASERs and transfer the mission from an obscured LASER to a non-
obscured LASER.
Podium effect occurs when spot is blocked from the seeker. Examples are LGB
dropped on heading that will prevent the seeker from seeing the spot due to
orientation of surface of the target which is being lased. When lasing target for LGB
JTAC should carefully observe the target, determine how is the surface of the target
oriented, choose appropriate place for LASER spot and assign proper attack
heading which meets safety cone criteria and enables weapon to detect LASER spot
(over left or right shoulder). When lasing target for LGM (that can fly low or high
trajectory) JTAC should select attack heading where no obstacle will block the spot
from weapon seekers field of view during flight if it flies low (flat) trajectory.
e. Beam divergence, target size, and spillover.
LASER beam widens with increasing distance from the source of the beam. This is
known as beam divergence, its´ value being expressed in angular units called
miliradians (mrad). If a LTD has a beam divergence of 1 milliradian, its spot would
have a diameter of approximately one meter at a distance of one thousand meters
in front of the designator. If this spot were aimed at a three meter by three meter
box three thousand meters away the LASER spot would be as wide and tall as the
box. The LASER spot size is a function of beam divergence and the distance from
the LASER designator to the target. Reticles on most LTDs enable LASER

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operators to determine size and precise position of the spot on actual target. This
knowledge is critical when placing LASER spot on difficult targets such as main
battle tanks.
(1) Overspill is caused by the LASER spot either being too large or only
partially placed on the target. Any LASER energy traveling beyond the target
may be reflected back to the weapon and cause erroneous guidance. JTAC can
prevent the spillover from happening by aiming LASER beam at the bottom of
the target, so as target works as backstop and no LASER energy travels beyond
the target. However great care must be taken to avoid underspill or entrapment.
(2) Underspill (also known as flashlight effect) occurs when LASER energy
of a LASER beam which is aimed at the bottom of the target is spilled on the
ground and on objects in front of the target, causing false or multiple spots that
may lead to erroneous guidance. JTAC can prevent the underspill from
happening by raising the beam higher on the target, however great care must
be taken to avoid overspill.
(3) Entrapment is an effect which occurs when LASER spot is aimed into
position where it cannot be detected by weapons´ seeker or LST. Examples are
threadwell of a tank or LASER being fired into open window of a building). JTAC
should carefully observe the target and consider where to place the LASER
spot, especially when lasing distant targets or targets with complicated shape
(armor, vehicles).
f. Target reflectivity.
Quality of LASER spot depends on surface of the target. There are two types of
reflections (see NU STANAG 3606/ ASRP-04 “LASER Safety Evaluations for
Outdoor Military Environments”) :
(1) Specular reflection occurs on smooth and shiny surfaces (glass,

polished metals, periscopes on armored vehicles). Specular reflector acts as
mirror and therefore very little energy is accumulated on target. Most LASER
energy is reflected under the same angle it hit the surface of the target. As very
little energy is accumulated on the surface seeker may not detect enough
LASER energy to guide the weapon to target. Illuminating specular surfaces
should therefore be avoided during operations.
(2) Diffuse reflection occurs on rough and matt surfaces. Most LASER
energy is accumulated on the surface of the target with very little energy being
reflected, resulting in good spot. Diffuse reflection is desired during LASER
operations.
(3) Wet surface reflection lies between specular and diffuse reflection and
quality of spot is therefore unpredictable.
g. Stability of the lasing platform.
Spot Jitters caused by instability of the lasing platform. Spot will bounce on or around
the target. JTAC should select the most stable platform available to stabilize the
LASER beam when lasing target (lean the designator on the backpack, use tripod
etc.).
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h. Target countermeasures.
Modern armored vehicles have sensors that can detect the LASER energy and that
are able to initiate active or passive countermeasures (such as smoke screen or
active hard/softkill countermeasures) in a fraction of a second. They may also
indicate direction of the LASER source to the crew, enabling them to rapidly acquire
and neutralize the source by fire. CAS planners should provide intel on capabilities
of these countermeasures. If these countermeasures exist JTAC should avoid lasing
directly the target and place the LASER spot next to target as close as possible.
LGBs should deliver sufficient effect on armoured vehicles even if direct hit is not
achieved. When lasing for LGMs JTAC should shift the spot onto target immediately
prior to impact.
i. Lasing Designation Time
Reducing LASER operating time is important in a LASER countermeasure

environment or when using battery-operated designators. Designation time must be
long enough to guarantee mission success.
If using LASERs (ground or airborne) to mark the target, LASER designation must
be selective and timely as lengthy LASER emissions may compromise friendly
positions.
When conducting target designation the aircrew may request a longer LASER-on
time based on munitions characteristics. If communications are unreliable, the
JTAC/FAC(A) should begin designating 20 seconds before TOT or with 20 seconds
remaining on TTT (unless the aircrew is using loft delivery). LASER designation time
with LGBs delivered from a loft profile will vary depending on the weapon being
delivered. Refer to appropriate tactics manuals for loft LASER designation time
rules of thumb.
(1) Continuous lasing is commenced before or immediately after weapon

release and lasts until weapon impacts. When bombs are dropped from fast
moving jets it may result in shallow impact angle (or even ricochet from hard
target) due to flat trajectory, or possibly weapon impacting short of the target
due to loss of kinetic energy caused by extensive time of weapon´s maneuvers.
When dropped from slow moving platforms (UAS, turboprop fixed wing) impact
angle will remain the same as when delayed lasing is used. However continuous
lasing increases probability of weapon´s seeker detecting the spot,
consequently increasing probability of hit under conditions.
(2) Delayed lasing starts in predetermined time prior to expected weapons´

impact and lasts until impact. It will result in steeper impact angle, which is
generally more desirable. However extended period of time when the weapon
falls without guidance may result in bomb being drifted away by the winds when
seeker which has limited field of view will not detect spot. It may result in bomb
completely missing the target. As time of flight of the bomb is not known to the
LO pilot must determine precise time when LASER designation should be
initiated based on information from aircrafts´ ballistic computer or available
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JTAC/FAC(A) and aircrew should consider whether to use continuous or delayed

lasing based on CAS aircraft performance, nature of the target, desired effect and
atmospheric conditions. If steep angle of impact or direct hit is required delayed
lasing should be used. In windy weather where there is risk of bomb being drifted
away from the target during flight continuous lasing should be used. Also when
conducting BOC with LASER target designator and when unable to generate precise
target coordinates continuous lasing will increase probability of seeker detecting the
spot and increasing probability of hit.
When conducting assisted LASER operations aircrew, JTAC/FAC(A) and LO

(ground or airborne) must determine if continuous or delayed lasing will be used
prior to commencing the attack. Good two way communications between all
participants and understanding of the game plan by all parties contributing to the
attack is critical.
j. Final Attack Headings.
JTACs/FAC(A)s provide aircrews with an attack heading. The attack heading must
allow LST or weapon´s seeker to acquire the reflected LASER energy. Due to the
possibility of false target indications, final attack headings must avoid the 20-degree
safety exclusion zone. The safety zone is a 20-degree wedge whose apex is at the
target, extends10 degrees either side of the LASER to target Line (LTL), and
extends from the surface to infinity. The optimal attack zone is a 120 degree wedge
whose apex is at the target and extends 60 degrees either side of the LASER
designator –to-target line.
Aircrews release or launch LGWs so the reflected LASER energy will be within the
seeker FOV at the appropriate time. The maximum allowable attack angle (LASER-
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to-target/seeker-to-target) depends upon the characteristics of the weapon system

employed. If the angle is too large, the seeker will not receive enough reflected
energy to sense the LASER spot.
3.29 LASER WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
3.29.1 LASER Guided Bomb employment considerations
Paveway II GBU-12 is the most common LGB used for CAS. These general considerations
may not apply to other types of LGBs. CAS planners should make every effort to familiarize
JTAC/FAC(A)s with weapons that are used in theatre of operations, their TTPs and limitations.
a. Altitudes
In order to achieve hit the bomb must be guided during terminal phase of the fall.
Designation must last at least 7 seconds, last 5 seconds prior to impact being critical.
Therefore minimum release height of the weapon should be at least 5000 ft AGL
(corresponds roughly to 7 seconds of TOF). If released from higher altitude cloud
base should be at minimum 5000ft AGL to allow enough time for weapon´s guidance
system to detect spot and steer the bomb to its´ target.
b. Winds
When LASER safety procedures and tactical situation allows LGBs should be
dropped with these preferences:
(1) Tailwind
(2) Headwind
(3) Crosswind
Those considerations may vary between types of aircraft, due to the geometry of the
weapon’s release basket. For instance for slow movers (RPAs, turboprop) the
impact angle hardly varies and tailwind release may increase the risk to drop LGBs
outside the weapon’s envelope.
3.29.2 LASER guided missiles employment considerations.
a. LASER Maverick employment considerations.
(1) In the event the LASER signal is lost, the weapon will safe itself and
overfly the target. The Maverick system allows aircrew to engage targets
designated by either air or ground sources with in-flight selectable PRF codes.
(2) Delivery aircraft must have unobstructed LOS to the target to achieve
Maverick lock-on.
(3) The missile must lock on to the LASER source prior to launch.

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(4) The Maverick and the LASER designator must be set to the same PRF
code prior to weapon delivery.
(5) For other than self-designation, the attack heading must be adjusted to
optimize the reflected LASER energy.
b. Hellfire employment considerations.
(1) The Hellfire is an air-to-surface LGM system designed to defeat individual

hard point and soft targets. It is guided by ground or airborne LASER
designators to rapidly engage multiple targets. It has in flight selectable PRF
codes.
(2) The Hellfire system should use PRF codes in the range of 1111 to 1488
to achieve the highest probability of hit. UA may use PRF codes in the range
of 1111 to 1788 due to the absence of pronounced jitter resulting from the
airframe.
(3) The Hellfire system allows the aircrew to conduct multiple, rapid launches
using one or two designation codes simultaneously. UA can employ up to four
Hellfire simultaneously. The aircrew can assign missiles to search for two codes
simultaneously. The aircrew can set or change the missile PRF code from the
cockpit. If launching subsequent missiles (all set on the same PRF code) the
JTAC/FAC(A) designator shifts the LASER designator to the next target prior to
missile impact. If using two designators (each set to a different PRF code) the
missile launch interval can be as low as two seconds. The use and coordination
of multiple designators present a complex problem for the aircrew and the
JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s designator.
(4) The Hellfire missile uses last pulse logic in case of underspill and to
protect the designator. The missile will hit the most distant LASER spot within
the seeker FOV.
(5) The Hellfire is unimpeded by ceilings of 2,000 ft AGL and above. For
employment under ceilings below 2,000 ft the aircrew will vary the missile mode,
designator delay, and employment range to shape the trajectory. The rule of
thumb minimum ceiling for Hellfire employment is 500 ft AGL.
(6) The Hellfire can be employed in a lock-on before launch (LOBL) or lock-
on after launch (LOAL) mode.
(7) LOBL is when the missile seeker locks onto properly coded LASER
energy prior to the missile launch. The missile seeker must have direct LOS
with the designated target for this launch mode to work properly. LOBL gives a
higher probability of hit when the aircraft is close to the target. It is also used to
confirm the aircraft is within missile launch constraints, that the missile “sees”
the correct LASER code and target, and when the threat or environment does
not require delayed designation.
(8) LOAL is when the missile seeker locks onto the coded LASER energy
after the missile is launched and is in flight. This method allows the aircrew to
launch the missile without LOS to the target. This reduces the exposure of
launch aircraft, helps defeat LASER countermeasures by delaying the
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designation, and extends the missile range when using a remote designator.
LOAL has three different trajectories that can be used based on required
obstacle clearance requirements and cloud ceiling limitations. They are LOAL-
Direct (lowest trajectory), LOAL-LO, and LOAL-HI (highest trajectory).
(9) Safety considerations for Hellfire designator safety zone.
(10) Attacks on Multiple Targets. Multiple missiles attacking multiple high

threat targets reduce the aircrew’s exposure. Rapid fire reduces LASER
operating time when engaging multiple targets. During rapid fire, the aircrew
uses a minimum of 8 seconds between missiles. For UA a minimum of 0.3
seconds is used to ensure simultaneous impacts. Use longer intervals based
on experience, terrain, target array, and battlefield obscuration. During multiple
missile launches, the JTAC/FAC(A) designator must be sure that subsequent
missiles can receive reflected LASER energy without interruption. Dust and
smoke from initial missile detonations can block or interrupt reception of LASER
energy by follow-on missiles. The JTAC/FAC(A) designator should consider
wind speed and direction when selecting multiple targets. Working targets from
downwind to upwind reduces the impact of post detonation dust and smoke.
Multiple missile launches require close coordination and timing.
Section XII- Close Air Support Aircraft Tactics Planning
This section identifies some basic TTP used by aircrews to conduct CAS. Standardized
procedures and tactics provide a baseline for further refinement and improvement. This
section describes basic FW and RW CAS aircraft tactics. Tactics are ever changing and must
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be adapted to the specific situation. JTACs must be familiar with these as well as advanced
CAS tactics. Aircrew will ultimately decide aircraft tactics but must ensure the tactics used fall
within any constraints issued by the JTAC/FAC(A).
3.30 FIXED-WING TACTICS.
3.30.1 All-Altitude Tactics.
a. Coordinated Attacks.
Coordinated attacks include multiple flights of aircraft using either combined or

sectored tactics in conjunction with some type of deconfliction measure. The
JTAC/FAC(A) must approve use of coordinated attacks. The JTAC/FAC(A) may
designate a flight/section lead with the highest SA to lead the coordinated attacks.
Coordinating flights for attacking the same target/target area can add firepower to
the attack and help to split target defenses. While the JTAC/FAC(A) and aircrews
must conduct the attack using a common frequency, the aircrews can use a separate
frequency to conduct inter-flight coordination (e.g., ordnance deconfliction, timing
between flight members).
b. Type of Attack.
The type of attack is principally based solely on the avenue to the target, and does
not apply to the target itself. Example: “Combined/sequential/visual” means the
avenue to the target is shared airspace; timing on target is sequential, with the
trailing flight taking visual spacing on the leading flight’s last attacker.
“Sectored/sequential/1 minute” means the avenue to the target is sectored (using
an acknowledged sector), and timing on target is sequential with the trailing flight
taking one minute spacing from the leading flight’s TOT.
The following procedural guidelines are considered standard:
(1) Aircraft egressing from the target have the right-of-way.
(2) The JTAC/FAC(A) must approve re-attacks (after coordination with the
ground force commander).
(3) If an aircraft enters another flight’s sector, the aircrew will immediately
notify the other flight, the JTAC/FAC(A), and deconflict or exit that sector.
(4) JTAC/FAC(A) and aircrew must coordinate munitions that may enter the
other flight’s sector before the attack.
c. Re-attacks.
The aircrew’s goal is to complete a successful attack on the first pass. Re-attacks
may be required for the following reasons: multiple targets remaining in the target
area; desired effects not created on first attack; and aircraft reconnaissance/BDA.
JTAC/FAC(A) must authorize all re-attacks. JTACs authorize re-attacks after
assessing the need for a re-attack, aircraft vulnerability to enemy fire, and probability
of success. The JTAC/FAC(A) may provide additional target marks for the re-attack
and can describe the target location using the last mark, last hit, terrain features, or
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friendly positions. The re-attack may engage other targets within a specific target
area as long as PID is obtained or maintained by the JTAC and/or the attacking
aircraft and appropriate coordination is conducted. For any retargeting or attacks on
alternate targets, controllers must ensure the affected sorties have appropriate
munitions and fuses on board. Additionally, controllers and pilots must ensure
appropriate safe distances from friendly forces are considered for any new munitions
and fuses assigned. Due to the prevalence of mixed weapons loads,
JTACs/FAC(A)s and aircrews must ensure follow on munitions used in re-attacks
still meet the ground force commander’s intent and JTAC/FAC(A) restrictions before
expending ordnance.
d. Egress. While operating in a high-threat or non-permissive environment,

the need for a rapid egress may delay the ability to rendezvous and regain mutual
support. Egress instructions and rendezvous should avoid conflict with ingress
routes and IPs of other flights. Egress instructions may be as detailed as ingress
instructions. Egress fire support coordination and deconfliction requirements are
the same as those used during ingress. Upon attack completion, aircrews follow
the egress instructions and either execute a re-attack, return to the CP/IP for
further tasking, or return to base.
3.30.2 Medium/High Altitude Tactics.
Medium/high altitude tactics are flown above approximately 8,000 ft. above ground level (AGL).
High altitude bombing can be described as “bombing with the height of release over 15,000 ft.
AGL.” These tactics are employed when slant range and altitude can be used to negate local
threat systems. For visual deliveries, the local weather conditions must include sufficient
visibility and ceilings for the desired/required weapons deliveries to be employed. Terrain must
also be considered when selecting employment altitudes. More time may be available for
target acquisition, but bombing accuracy with unguided munitions may be degraded.
a. Advantages of medium/high altitude tactics include:
(1) All flight members can continuously observe the target area, marks, and
hits from other aircraft.
(2) Lower fuel consumption and increased time on station.
(3) Reduced navigation difficulties.
(4) Improved formation control.
(5) Improved mutual support.
(6) Allows considerable maneuver airspace and allows aircrews to

concentrate on mission tasks instead of terrain avoidance tasks.
(7) Communications between aircrews and control agencies are less affected
by terrain.
(8) Reduces exposure to AAA and man-portable IR SAMs.
(9) More flexibility in attack axis selection.

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(10) Easier timing of TOT.
(11) Improved performance of guided weapons using steeper impact angle.
(12) Improved LASER-guided bomb (LGB) self-lasing options and targeting

pod capture capability.
(13) Improved ability to deconflict aircraft with altitude, in addition to timing and
lateral deconfliction measures. Potential to use more aircraft within smaller
lateral confines via an aircraft “stack”.
b. Disadvantages of medium/high altitude tactics include:
(1) Enemy acquisition systems can detect the attack force at long range,
allowing the enemy to prepare its air defenses.
(2) Requires local air superiority.
(3) May require high weather ceilings and good visibility when using LASER
guided or other weapons requiring visual target acquisition by the aircrew (may
not be a limiting factor when the ground force commander authorizes use of
IAMs).
(4) May make it difficult for the JTAC/FAC(A) to visually acquire the aircraft.
(5) Visual target acquisition can be more difficult from higher altitudes and
slant ranges.
(6) Greater potential for reduced accuracy of non-guided weapons attributed

to wind effects and piper placement during visual designations (size of piper
relative to target at high altitude).
c. Ingress. The higher altitude of the aircraft often makes receiving situation
updates from extended ranges feasible. This enables the aircrew to build SA
prior to entering the immediate target area. JTACs/FAC(A)s may route CAS
aircraft to the target area via IPs, control points, geographic references, dead
reckoning (time, distance, and heading), or a combination of these techniques.
JTACs/FAC(A)s should use caution to not send friendly aircraft into
uncoordinated adjacent unit airspace or known areas of concentrated enemy air
defense. Multiple attack flights can be deconflicted using vertical and horizontal
separation.
d. CAS Aircraft Observation and Holding Patterns. When possible, CAS

aircraft should be given enough airspace to hold in an area of relatively low AAA
activity that provides a good position to observe the target area. JTACs/FAC(A)s
should not restrict attack aircraft to specific observation or holding patterns but
should specify the observation or holding area (HA) that will best accomplish the
mission. Considerations for observation or HA and altitude selection include:
artillery GTLs and maximum ordinate (MAXORD), adjacent unit operations,
weather conditions such as sun position and clouds, terrain and threat locations
and activity, and other attack aircraft either on station or inbound. Typical holding
patterns include the following:

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(1) Racetrack: An oval holding pattern with straight legs of at least 10 miles
in length and with standard-rate 180 degree turns on each end. Bomber aircraft
may require holding between 10-40 miles from the target, with 10-15 mile legs.
(2) Figure 8:The same as the racetrack pattern except the turns at each end
of the pattern are made toward the target area and are 230 degrees of turn
instead of 180 degrees.
(3) Wheel Orbit: Circle around the designated target. Appropriate for
nonlinear battlefields with “pockets” of enemy activity.
e. Attack. Types of Delivery:
(1) Level Deliveries: Used for guided and unguided free-fall weapons.
Release points may have bomb ranges outside of visual range. Because of the
long bomb ranges and weapons profiles, nose position may not be indicative of
where weapons will impact.
(2) Dive Deliveries: Used for guided, unguided, and forward firing ordnance,
these dive deliveries of 5 to 60 degrees. Most modern fighter aircraft delivery
systems incorporate some type of continuously computed impact point (CCIP)
display. CCIP allows the aircrew to accurately deliver ordnance without having
to fly predictable wings level passes.
(3) Dive Toss: These deliveries provide increased standoff by using aircraft
systems to compute release points similar to loft deliveries. The target is
designated in the weapon system’s computer by the aircrew at an extended
slant range with the aircraft in a dive. The weapon is then released as the
aircraft’s dive angle is decreased.
3.30.3 Low/Very Low Altitude Tactics.
Low/very low altitude tactics are flown below approximately 8,000 ft. AGL. Low altitude
bombing can be described as bombing with the height of release between 500 and 8,000 ft.
AGL. Very low can be described as a height below 500 ft. AGL. These tactics may be
employed when threat system capabilities, weather conditions, or weapon delivery parameters
preclude aircraft operating at higher altitudes.
a. Advantages:
(1) Decreases enemy acquisition systems ability to detect the attack force at
long range, decreasing the enemy’s time available to prepare its air defenses.
(2) May be used when local air superiority has not been achieved.
(3) May be used with low weather ceilings and poor visibility.
(4) Degrades enemy ground control intercept radar coverage, denying

intercept information to enemy fighters and forcing enemy aircraft to rely on
visual or onboard acquisition systems.

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(5) May improve target acquisition and accuracy of weapons delivery due to
shorter slant ranges at low altitude.
(6) May allow easier assessment of aircraft geometry relative to the

target/friendlies during CAS terminal attack control.
b. Disadvantages:
(1) Navigation is demanding and requires a high level of aircrew skill.
(2) Terrain avoidance tasks and formation control become primary tasks,
decreasing time to concentrate on mission tasks.
(3) Observation of the target area, the marks, and hits from other aircraft are
limited prior to the attack, which increases the difficultly of properly acquiring the
target during the attack. This difficulty can be offset by a thorough enhanced
target description, which requires more time coordinating and holding in
between attacks.
(4) Higher fuel consumption and decreased time on station.
(5) Terrain may reduce communications effectiveness between aircrews and

control agencies, such as the JTAC/FAC(A) due to LOS limitations.
(6) Attack timing and geometry are more critical than in higher altitude tactics.
(7) Exposes aircraft and aircrew to small arms, MANPADS, and AAA.
c. Ingress. Aircrews and mission planners may employ support aircraft and
other countermeasures to degrade threat system effectiveness. Aircrews,
JTACs/FAC(A) s, and air controllers select routes that avoid known threat
weapon envelopes. Routes should include course changes to confuse and
deceive the enemy concerning the intended target area. During simultaneous
CAS with helicopter and FW aircraft, CAS aircrew must be under the control of
the JTAC to transit above or below the coordination altitude. Low altitude FW
CAS CPs and IPs will likely require lateral deconfliction with helicopter HAs and
BPs. Formations are used to complicate enemy radar resolution and improve
lookout capability against enemy fighters. Aircrews plot, brief, and study the
ingress routes to gain the maximum advantage from terrain masking. Entry
should be delayed into a heavily defended target area until the aircrew has a clear
understanding of the mission. The expected threat intensity and sophistication
influence the selection of ingress tactics. JTACs/FAC(A)s and aircrews tailor
communications and control requirements to counter the threat. Normally, control
of CAS flights is handed over to the JTAC/FAC(A) at the control point. In a limited
communications environment, scheduled missions may be the primary method
used to limit the required communications. Proper planning increases the
chances for mission success even if there is little or very difficult radio
communications after the flight becomes airborne.
d. Attack. During low/very low altitude attacks, many of the same

considerations apply as in high/medium altitude attacks. However, aircrews will
have less time to acquire the target and position their aircraft for a successful
attack. When planning ordnance and attack profiles, consider the requirement
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for fragmentation pattern avoidance in the low altitude environment. The final
run-in from the IP to the target is the most crucial phase of the CAS mission.
Aircrew tasks intensify as the aircrew must follow a precise timing and attack
profile. The terrain dictates the type of formation flown by the attack element.
Figure illustrates the attack phase of a typical FW CAS mission.
e. Types of Delivery:
(1) Level. Deliver ordnance with a wings level pass over the target.
(2) Loft. To execute a loft delivery, the aircrew proceeds inbound to the target
from the IP. At a calculated point, the aircrew starts a loft maneuver pull up.
Once released, the weapon continues an upward trajectory while the aircrew
executes follow-on tactics or egresses the target area. After the weapon
reaches the apex of its trajectory, it follows a ballistic path to impact.
(3) Pop-up. To execute a pop-up delivery, the aircrew proceeds to the target
from the IP at low/very low altitude. As the aircrew nears the target, they pop-
up to the desired altitude and execute a level or dive delivery.
(4) Dive Deliveries. Used for both free fall and forward firing ordnance.
These deliveries typically use dive angles of 5 to 45 degrees.

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f. Combination Low/Very Low, Medium, and High Altitude. Aircrews can

combine low/very low and medium altitude tactics to gain the advantages of both
while reducing the disadvantages of each. The en route portion of the flight is
normally beyond the range of enemy air defense weapons and flown at a medium
or high altitude. The attack force descends to low/very low altitude to avoid
detection by certain enemy SAM threats and/or gain surprise.
3.30.4 Rotary-Wing CAS Tactics.
NATO members and respective services utilize RW differently to include whether or not CAS
is a supported mission. Some utilize close combat attack and follow procedures and formats
that differ from the CAS brief. Prior coordination is key to integrating NATO RW assets into a
CAS mission. RW that perform CCA and not CAS should adhere to ATP-49.
a. Operating Altitudes. The following are altitude ranges for RW aircraft:
(1) High - Above 3,000 ft. AGL.
(2) Medium - 500 to 3,000 ft. AGL.
(3) Low - Below 500 ft. AGL.

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b. Launch and Departure Procedures. The appropriate controlling agency

issues launch orders through the proper C2 or fire support agency. Attack
helicopters can be launched and moved to HAs, forward assembly areas, forward
arming and refueling points, or directly into an attack or support by fire position
depending on mission or current situation.
c. Threat Considerations. In an environment where small arms and RPGs

are the predominant threat, attack helicopter aircrews will normally elevate in
order to stay out of the effective range of the weapons systems, usually operating
at medium altitude. Specific altitudes selected will depend on the mission en
route. For example, if the mission en route is to conduct visual reconnaissance,
the helicopters will select the lowest altitude that will allow them to effectively use
their sensors while avoiding the heart of the small-arms threat envelope. When
transiting urban areas attack helicopters may elect to transit at roof top level to
minimize exposure time. In general, attack helicopters will avoid urban areas
unless they are conducting an attack.
d. Day versus Night. Altitudes will normally vary for the same area of
operations from day to night time, and will depend heavily on threat, weather, and
terrain. In open desert, helicopters will normally decrease their altitude as lighting
conditions decay in order to maintain visual reference with the ground. Over
urban areas, attack helicopters can often operate more safely than during the
daytime, but will elevate high enough to avoid being belly-lit by cultural lighting,
usually operating in the 1,500-3,000 ft. AGL block.
e. Communications. CAS planners must consider the threat environment

and RW CAS TTP in use when planning for communications connectivity and
support. Maintaining communications with RW CAS platforms is often difficult
because their operating altitudes can hinder LOS connectivity. Every attempt
should be made to overcome these shortcomings with an airborne C2 asset,
ground relay nodes, tethered array, or some other method of extending low
altitude communications coverage in order to maintain C2 of RW assets after
launch.
f. En Route Phase Tactics.
(1) Purpose. Ideally, en route tactics (route, altitude, and airspeed selection,
terrain flight profile, and formations) allow attack helicopter aircrews to avoid
concentrations of enemy air defenses, prevent early acquisition, avoid
detection, or allow the attack helicopters to remain outside of the effective range
of certain threat systems.
(2) Navigation. En route navigation tactics depend on the threat, need for
and availability of support aircraft, friendly air defense requirements, weather,
and fuel. As aircrews approach the target area, probable point of enemy
contact, or areas with a high IR SAM threat, they fly lower and with increased
caution to move undetected by the enemy. Aircrews use terrain flight (TERF) to
deny/degrade the enemy’s ability to detect or locate the flight visually, optically,
or electronically. When flying terrain flight profiles, aircrews may maneuver
laterally within a corridor or maneuver area compatible with the ground scheme
of maneuver and assigned route structures. Within the corridor, aircrews can
use a weaving or unpredictable path to avoid detection by the enemy. En route

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TERF profiles fall into three categories: low level, contour, and nap-of-the-earth
(NOE).
(3) Low Level. Conduct low-level flight at a constant altitude (normally

100-200 ft AGL) and airspeed. Low level flight reduces or avoids enemy
detection or observation.
(4) Contour. Contour flight conforms to the contour of the earth or vegetation
to conceal aircraft from enemy observation or detection. Aircrews use contour
flight until reaching a higher threat area. Contour flight is normally conducted
from 50-100 ft AGL.
(5) Nap of the Earth (NOE). NOE flight is as close to the earth’s surface as
vegetation and obstacles permit while following the earth’s contours. Terrain
and vegetation provide cover and concealment from enemy observation and
detection. NOE flight uses varying airspeed and altitude AGL based on the
terrain, weather, ambient light, and enemy situation.
g. Ingress Phase Tactics.
Ingress tactics apply from arrival at the release point or HA until the target attack
phase begins at the BP.
RW CAS can be performed with or without HAs or BPs. JTACs/FAC(A)s and

aircrews select HAs and BPs that are tactically sound, support the scheme of
maneuver, and are coordinated with other supporting arms.
(a) Holding Areas. HAs may be established throughout the battlefield

to be used by helicopters awaiting targets or missions. These HAs serve
as informal ACAs while they are in use. HAs provide the attack helicopter
aircrews an area in which to loiter. HAs may be established during
planning, referred to by name or number, and activated/established during
operations.
(b) Battle Positions. BPs are maneuver maneuvering areas containing

firing points (FPs) for attack helicopters. Like HAs, BPs serve as informal
ACAs while in use. Planning considerations and methods of
establishment for BPs are the same as those involved in the use of HAs.
(2) Attack Helicopter Control Points. In addition to normal CAS control

points, attack helicopter aircrews can use special attack helicopter control
points.
(3) Techniques of Movement. Due to proximity to the threat, aircrews use

TERF to move during ingress to the BP. If aircrews are close to friendly artillery
and mortars, they use TERF in conjunction with ACMs to deconflict with artillery
and mortar trajectories. Particularly when conducting terrain flight, helicopter
movement must be coordinated with the applicable FC/JFSEC. Aircrews use
three techniques of movement: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding
overwatch
(a) Traveling. Traveling is a technique that aircrews use when enemy

contact is remote. The flight moves at a constant speed using low-level or
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contour terrain flight. Movement should be as constant as the terrain

allows. Traveling allows rapid movement in relatively secure areas.
(b) Traveling Overwatch. Traveling overwatch is a technique that

aircrews use when enemy contact is possible. The flight moves using
contour or NOE terrain flight. While caution is justified, speed is desirable.
The flight consists of two major elements: the main element and the
overwatch element. The overwatch element may contain multiple sub-
elements. The main element maintains continuous forward movement.
The overwatch elements move to provide visual and weapons coverage
of the main element. The overwatch elements provide weapons coverage
of terrain from which the enemy might fire on the main element.
(c) Bounding Overwatch. Bounding overwatch is a technique that

aircrews use when enemy contact is imminent. The flight moves using
NOE terrain flight. Movement is deliberate and speed is not essential. The
flight consists of two elements. One element moves or “bounds” while the
other element takes up an overwatch position. The overwatch element
covers the bounding elements from covered, concealed positions that
offer observation and fields of fire.
(4) Communications and Control. Flexibility allows a variety of

communication and control procedures. However, TERF and techniques of
movement may restrict the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s ability to communicate with low
flying aircraft. Typically, communications may not be desirable during the
ingress phase. To preserve operations security, aircrews can land to receive
face-to-face mission briefs and mission-essential information from the
supported commander or JTAC/FAC(A) before leaving the HA. An airborne
relay may be used to maintain communications.
h. Attack Phase Tactics (Within the BP).
(1) Control. Once the aircrew reaches the BP, the JTAC/FAC(A) or mission
commander issues final instructions to the flight. Aircrews select individual FPs
and remain masked while awaiting the TOT/TTT or the order to attack.
(2) Attack Tactics. Specific techniques used to attack a target are the choice
of the air mission commander. Choose attack tactics considering the threat,
target size and vulnerability, weather, terrain, accuracy requirements, weapons
effectiveness, and fragmentation patterns.
(a) Hovering Fire. Hovering fire is performed when the aircraft is

stationary or has little forward motion. Aircrews perform hovering fire after
unmasking from a defilade position or when standing off in a safe area.
To prevent being targeted by enemy weapons, aircrews maintain the
hovering fire position only for short periods, and deliver indirect hovering
fire hidden from the enemy by terrain when able. After delivering hovering
fire, aircrews remask or displace. Hovering fire is the most effective profile
for delivering precision guided munitions. Hovering fire may reduce the
accuracy of unguided ordnance (rockets, canon/gun fire) because the
aircraft can be less stable in a hover. Often, a wingman will suppress the

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target with rocket and gunfire while the flight lead fires PGMs to reduce
the vulnerability of the flight.
(b) Running Fire. Running fire is performed when the aircraft is in level,
forward flight. Forward flight may add stability to the aircraft and improve
the accuracy of unguided ordnance. Running fire may reduce an aircrew’s
vulnerability to enemy air defenses by providing a moving target and by
producing a smaller signature than a hover would because of less dust
and debris. While performing running fire, aircrews can use direct and
indirect fire techniques. Aircrews deliver direct fire when they have an
unobstructed view of the target, and indirect fire when they cannot see the
target.
(c) Diving Fire. Diving fire is delivered while the aircraft is at altitude
and in descending forward flight. If delivering unguided ordnance, diving
fire may produce the most accurate results. Using diving fire the aircrew
can remain above or outside the threat envelope. Diving fire is often
employed by attack helicopters operating in an overhead position. The
overhead position allows the aircrew to maintain high SA, look down into
urban settings, maintain a constant weapons solution, and deliver more
accurate fires. The overhead pattern does leave the attack helicopters
continuously exposed to enemy fire. The altitude of an overhead pattern
will reduce vulnerability to small arms and RPGs, but increases tracking
time and reduces background clutter for an IR SAM shot. Risk versus
benefit must always be weighed by the aircrews when considering the
overhead pattern.

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(3) Disengagement and Egress Tactics. Following actions on the objective

area or when the attack helicopters’ time on station is complete, the flight will
conduct a check out and egress via planned or assigned routing. Tactical
considerations for the egress and return to force in terms of airspeed, altitude,
formation, and TTP are the same as for the inbound en route phase. RW attack
assets may use a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) to refuel and
rearm, extending their ability to provide support to the troops on the ground.
When complete with the mission, the attack helicopter aircrew will make every
attempt to provide BDA and a mission report (MISREP) via the ALO’s C2
system. The connectivity plan for the low altitude block will enhance the flow of
information from attack helicopters to decision makers allowing for timely
decisions regarding follow on sorties and support required, as well as vital
information flow on the enemy and friendly force situations.
3.30.5 Planning for Bomber Close Air Support
a. En route. Bomber en route times can extend upwards of 12 hours before

arriving in theatre. Depending on communications equipment, aircraft could arrive
on station with threat and situation information that is not current. Voice satellite

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may not be available for the ground party, but should be used if available. If
beyond LOS communications equipment is available SA, regarding ongoing
engagements may be passed well before a bomber arrives on station to support
ground forces. Every attempt should be made to use secure communications.
b. Pre-attack.
(1) Station time. Bombers may remain on station 8 hours or more,

depending on air refueling capability in the area and transit time.
(2) Data link. The CAOC may relay information from the JTAC/FAC(A).
(3) Orbit. B-1s typically operate in the mid to high 20s while B-2s or B-52s
can operate up into the high 30s and even low 40s. Bombers will typically look
at the target or at least verify the target location/coordinates passed by the
JTAC/FAC(A) using their onboard targeting sensors (radar and/or advance
targeting pod [ATP]) from distances as far as 40 nautical miles and as near as
5 nautical miles from the target area, depending on optimum sensor
parameters. The B-1 and B-52 use advanced electro-optics (Sniper and
Litening Advanced Targeting Pods (ATPs)) and are able to observe general
target areas from this distance, but may require LSS, IR pointer, or VDL to
positively identity targets once they turn inbound. The JTAC/FAC(A) should not
unnecessarily restrict the orbit location as IAMs may not require a traditional
track to the target. Orbit locations should be selected based on proximity to
threats and friendly locations or in the interest of maintaining the element of
surprise and avoiding aircraft visual/audible detection by the enemy-based on
ground forces assessment and recommendation. Consideration must be given
to aircraft jet engine noise abatement (day and night) and visual observation of
aircraft or contrails if ground forces are trying to maintain the element of
surprise. Generally, bombers avoiding the use of afterburner will not be heard
and very difficult to visually detect outside 5 nautical miles from the target area
when above 20,000 ft. MSL. Bombers may also have the capability to neutralize
threats while en route to the CAS orbit.

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20 NM legs
Up to 10 NM turns
c. Attack phase.
(1) Target Considerations. Bombers traditionally employ weapons on given

coordinates. Coordinate passage does not provide positive ID of the actual
target and careful consideration should be given with respect to the target
environment, location of friendlies, and the type of control being employed.
Targeting pod usage with video feeds can provide positive target ID in these
instances. Both the B-52 and B-1 can generate coordinates using targeting
pods, but should provide anticipated accuracy categorization upon initial check-
in with JTACs.
(2) Talk-on. Bombers can self-generate target coordinates and elevation

when the target signature is radar or EO/IR significant. JTAC/FAC(A) cuing is
crucial for either bomber to locate typical CAS targets.
(3) Urban Environment. Because bombers have a larger turn radius and
typically employ at higher altitudes, positive ID of targets in urban environments
will be more challenging. The effects of ‘urban canyons’ on target identification
can be minimized from higher altitudes and higher lookdown angles. When
using IAMs, accurate coordinate collection in urban environments is critical.
Maximum use of LSS, IR pointer, and VDL is warranted in these urban settings.
In the absence of VDL, the talk-on in such an environment (radar and/or
targeting pod) will be extensive. In all cases, careful attention must be paid to
the correct coordinates being passed. TTP for designation and marking devices
should be carefully employed to avoid erroneous coordinate collection or
grazing unintended targets with an IR pointer or LASER spot.
(4) Because of weapon release/launch altitudes, the bomber will normally

have a greater standoff range from the target than fighter aircraft. Typical IAM
launch acceptability region (LAR), i.e., release points can extend 6-12 nautical
miles from the target. Bombers can give a splash time prior to release. This
time may vary by +/- 10 seconds depending on the weapon type and
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programmed impact parameters. Communication problems are possible due to

terrain and distance from the target. The flight lead or mission commander in
the bomber formation will deconflict aircraft and weapons flight paths and assign
targets to a particular bomber if multiple targets are to be attacked
simultaneously. The flight lead or mission commander will pass deconfliction
measures to the JTAC.
(5) Non-pod equipped bombers cannot attack a target with visual cues only,
but crew or formation can accept map Talk-Ons and multiple CAS briefs. The
preferred coordinate format is DD-MM.MMMM (degrees decimal minutes).
MGRS can be used but additional time from CAS brief receipt to readback may
be necessary for coordinate conversion.
Note: The B-1 can accept MGRS and latitude/longitude equally without taking
time to convert coordinates.
(6) Target Marking.
(7) The preferred technique of target marking is via lasing if

required/available. Smoke and flares may be very useful in armed over watch
or convoy support and/or initial marking of friendly position if situation warrants.
(8) Crews will never place radar crosshairs or targeting pod on friendly
locations while in bomb mode to avoid potential friendly fire.
d. Ordnance Employment.
(1) The bomber has the ability to attack several desired point of impact (DPI)
on a single pass using IAMs. Each DPI could be attacked with different
ordnance.
(2) The bomber can employ a wide range of weapons per pass in large
numbers if desired or they can make many passes employing smaller amounts
per pass. Bomber crews are trained to weaponeer targets real-time with tabbed
data. The JTAC/FAC(A) should pass the desired effects, target area size and
true axis or cardinal direction (if applicable) in the CAS brief remarks. If the
JTAC/FAC(A) passes the target centroid, i.e., desired mean point of impact,
coordinates for area targets, the crew will build a weapon pattern around this
point. The aircrew will confirm that the effects of the selected weapons pattern
do not violate risk estimate distances.
(3) Expect level deliveries for all bomber weapon releases.
e. Post Attack Phase.
(1) Re-attack times can range from as short as 5 minutes to as long as 20

minutes depending on the complexity of the re-attack (weapon reassignments,
weapons system troubleshooting, fire correction/adjustment), threat
environment, and quantity/type of weapons employed.
(2) Targeting-pod equipped bombers can provide extensive BDA due to their
ability to loiter over the target area, depending upon the threat environment.

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3.30.6 Planning for CAS with Unmanned Aerial Systems
This section identifies capabilities, planning considerations, and tactics used by UASs to
support and conduct CAS operations.
a. UAS capabilities vary between different platforms and need to be known

for proper employment. Many newer UASs have the capability to be, or already
are, armed and can provide extremely accurate fires with LASER-guided and
GPS-aided weapons. The current remote video terminals used by ground forces
allow the UAS FMV to be viewed directly by ground forces. UAS capabilities may
include:
(1) EO. Permits color identification; limited utility at night with

illuminated/lighted targets.
(2) Thermal Imaging Systems. Allows for day or night working in the IR
spectrum and allows for some or limited visibility through dust and smoke (Note:
thermal crossover, clouds, and thermal blooming in the target area will degrade
performance of Thermal Imagers).
(3) Near-IR passive night optics works the same spectrum as NVGs.
(4) LTD marks for LSTs or provides terminal guidance of LASER-guided

ordnance; desirable for UASs to have the ability to change LTD pulse repetition
frequency (PRF) codes in flight. (Note: considerations for airframe sensor
masking leading to LTD termination can become an issue depending on flight
profiles and UA type.)
(5) IR pointer permits nighttime marking of targets for NVD-capable platforms

or personnel.
(6) SAR provides detailed pictures of radar significant objects and geo-
features regardless of weather.
(7) Moving target indicator allows for automatic tracking/cueing of sensors

onto moving targets.
(8) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced conventional

weapons detection.
(9) LASER- and GPS-guided weapons with high off-bore sight capability that
enables a wide field of view for target or marking acquisition.
(10) Increased communications connectivity (possibly including data links)

and reach back capability.
(11) Electronic Warfare capabilities allow for enhanced sensing, detection and
prosecution of targets in the electromagnetic spectrum.
b. UAS planning considerations. UASs, either FW or RW, operate using

the same CAS procedures as manned aircraft, to include airborne LASER

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procedures. There are some unique considerations that need to be addressed

when utilizing UASs.
(1) UASs should follow the same procedures given by the JTAC/FAC(A) as
manned aircraft.
(2) Communications capabilities/detailed plan for lost communications.
(3) Lost link procedures and UAS contingency routes.
(4) Control at the lowest tactical level or at the command level best suited to
exploit the UAS FMV, sensors, imagery, communications, and weapons
payload capabilities.
(5) Difficult to re-task certain UAS in flight over large distances due to low
transit airspeeds.
(6) UASs require detailed integration and deconfliction for operations and
airspace. Coordination with higher and adjacent units must include UAS
operating areas and altitudes.
(7) UASs must adhere to all LASER restrictions.
(8) When being supported by armed UA, the required attack profiles or orbits
needed to launch weapons have to be planned for to include the deconfliction
with other aircraft in the area, in the same manner as any other airborne
weapons delivering platform.
(9) A UAS with radio relay payloads in the UHF and VHF frequency range
can act as a low-flying, surrogate satellite. This capability allows ground forces
to communicate, in an urban environment or mountainous terrain, over long
distances using standard man-portable radios.
(10) Weather is a major consideration for UAS flight operations, particularly the
launch and recovery. Sensor degradation may occur in less than optimal
weather conditions.
(11) UASs that fly low and have a large visual signature or a loud engine noise
will alert enemy forces, or may give away friendly positions. Atmospheric
conditions must be considered in a UA’s flight profile to best utilize the aircraft
for its given mission.
(12) Some UASs are equipped with class-3 and class-4 LASERs. Planners
must ensure planning occurs for nominal ocular hazard distance if working with
ground forces or piloted aircraft as manned aircraft may fly through the LASER
unexpectedly. Additionally, ground forces may be illuminated with reflected
LASER energy or may be looking up at the UAS. Proper coordination and tactics
will minimize this risk.

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c. Armed UAS Tactics.
(1) Briefing. The standard CAS brief and CAS check-in format is used by
UAS flight crews, however the standard control points and IP matrix used by
current high performance manned strike/fighter aircraft are usually too far away
to be of use to an armed UA due to their slow speed (60-250 knots).
(2) Orbiting. The UA will generally orbit over the target area for weapons
delivery, using the following flight profiles.
(a) Wheel Figure depicts a “wheel” orbit profile used when there is no
restriction or required final attack heading and terrain features or urban
development do not mask the target. Orbit size will vary based on
ordnance, sensor capability, and target, but a wheel orbit is typically
between 5 km (2.5 nautical miles) and 8 km (4.5 nautical miles) ground
range around the target. The orbit distance should allow the UA to
maintain PID of the target and remain in position to quickly achieve attack
parameters if terrain or urban development is masking the target during
portions of the orbit the UAS pilot may off-set to minimize masking.
(b) Figure 8.The “figure-8” track and the “racetrack” pattern may be
used when restrictions to final attack headings are required for airspace
deconfliction purposes or other considerations. These restrictions
include: friendly positions, collateral damage concerns, terrain/urban
development, or if cluttered or congested airspace precludes UAS CAS
operations.

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3.30.7 SOF Gunships.
The SOF gunship is a uniquely capable CAS platform. Due to the precision fires, control
system and sensor capabilities, ground SA, and flight profile the SOF gunship does not usually
require a Type of control, “Cleared Hot,” “Cleared to Engage,” or a JTAC to control their fires.
The SOF gunship uses the call for fire depicted below as its standard format, but is able to
accept a CAS brief for PGM engagements (AC-130W) or when pre-coordinated for gun
engagements. If JTAC/FAC(A) is on scene, the SOF gunship will work directly with them. This
section covers the TTP used by ground maneuver units and the SOF gunship aircrews.
a. SOF Gunship Considerations.

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b. Sensor Alignment/Gun Tweak. The SOF gunship should complete

airborne sensor alignment and gun tweak (test fire) procedures prior to any
mission. Only under extreme circumstances will a mission be attempted without
performing a sensor alignment/gun tweak. Planners will normally allot 30 minutes
for sensor alignment/gun tweak.
c. Ingress Tactics. The main consideration in selecting en route tactics is the

avoidance of enemy detection and fires. SOF gunship crews conduct an
extensive threat assessment using all available intelligence, and combine the
threat assessment with a careful study of the terrain in order to establish the
ingress/egress routes, loiter areas, refueling tracks, and altitudes.
(1) Coordination. The SOF gunship aircrew will make every effort to
establish radio contact while en route to speed acquisition of the tactical
situation and authenticate the JTAC/FAC(A) or ground party if no JTAC is on
scene.
(2) Orbiting. If no preplanned targets exist, the aircraft will normally proceed
to a designated orbit area and contact the ground party (JTAC, C2 agency, etc.)
to report on station and await tasking.
d. SOF gunship Call For Fire. SOF gunship aircrews use the SOF gunship
call for fire (see Figures In addition to the standard briefing items, the following
items are mandatory for SOF gunships: a detailed threat description, marking of
friendly locations, identifiable ground features, and the ground force
commander’s willingness to accept “danger close.” Because the SOF gunship is
capable of extended loiter, SOF gunship crews can work a series of targets with
a single ground party. In these cases, the call for fire briefing format can be
abbreviated but must include: magnetic bearing and range to the target in meters
from the friendly position to the target; and a brief description of the target.

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e. Locating Friendly Positions. Normally, the first consideration in the

attack phase is to identify the friendly position. Various aids may be used by
friendly ground forces to expedite acquisition (e.g., strobe lights, flares, GLINT
tape). In addition, there are several electronic beacons that may be used to assist
in locating friendly forces. The SOF gunship crew will maintain radio contact with
the ground forces at all times during firing.
f. Considerations for Close-in Fires. Due to the accuracy of the gunship

fire control system, ordnance can be delivered very close to friendly positions.
However, several Factors must be considered:
(1) Terrain Features. Firing down an incline can cause considerable miss
distances.
(2) Burst Pattern. Consider the lethal areas of fragmentation for the various
types of ordnance (105, 40, 30, and 25 millimeter).
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(3) Cover. Due to the combination of precision and low-yield munitions

employed by this platform, ground forces may minimize the risk of injury by
taking cover in a danger close situation.
g. Parameters for Attacking the Target. The type of target, its value, the
proximity of friendly forces, and the damage already inflicted will determine the
munitions selection, type ammunition, and the number of rounds required to
successfully attack the target. Munitions selection should not be dictated to the
SOF gunships, but rather provide the desired effects.
h. Procedures. One factor that distinguishes the SOF gunship from other
weapon systems, other than precision night strike capability, is its ability to deliver
firepower under conditions of low ceilings and/or poor visibility. When employing
the SOF gunship with radar beacons, the JTAC/FAC(A) must give all target
ranges and bearings from the location of the beacon. The beacon should be
located as close as is practical to the perimeter of friendly forces. Shorter offset
distances allow for more accurate weapons delivery. For longer offset distances
first round accuracy may be reduced.

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Section XIII Night and Limited Visibility Considerations.
The execution of limited visibility or night CAS missions is difficult. Fundamental CAS
procedures still apply at night. However, limited visibility and adverse weather CAS demands
a higher level of proficiency that can only come about through dedicated, realistic CAS training.
JTACs, ALOs, ground units, and aircrews must routinely train together during these conditions.
In addition to training, limited visibility CAS relies heavily on systems and sensors due to the
pilot’s limited ability to visually distinguish friendly positions from targets. Aircraft and
JTACs/FAC(A)s can perform night CAS using artificial illumination or with NVDs. Specific
attack and delivery techniques vary depending on the amount of illumination, the specific
capability of the CAS aircraft, and equipment available to the JTAC/FAC(A). For these
reasons, limited visibility operations require additional coordination and equipment.
The challenges of identifying friendly and enemy locations, identifying targets, and maintaining
SA become acute in the night or adverse weather CAS environment. The entire training,
equipping, planning, tasking, and execution process must recognize these challenges.
a. Advantages. The most important advantage of night and adverse weather

CAS is the limitation it imposes on enemy optically-directed AAA and optical/IR-
guided SAMs. Selectively placed airborne and ground illumination may further
degrade enemy night vision capabilities while preserving or enhancing those of
friendly forces.
b. Disadvantages. Darkness and weather can impose several limitations on

CAS employment. During periods of low illumination and reduced visibility, both
CAS aircrews and ground forces may have difficulty in acquiring targets and
accurately locating enemy and friendly forces. Accurate target marking plays a
vital role in target acquisition. Low ceilings may require CAS aircraft to operate
in the low to very low altitude environment. Consideration must be given to target
marking, SEAD, and fires deconfliction. CAS aircraft operating in the low to very
low environment will also have reduced target acquisition times.
3.31 CATEGORIES OF LIMITED VISIBILITY EMPLOYMENT.
3.32 BOC AND INERTIALLY-AIDED MUNITIONS (IAMS).
Weapons can be delivered at night or through the weather to a set of coordinates by properly
equipped aircraft. The effectiveness of an IAM depends upon the tactical situation (type of
target, desired weapons effects, target movement, etc.) and the accuracy, or TLE of the target
coordinates (to include elevation) and the CEP of the munitions themselves. In addition, CAS
planners, JTACs, and aircrew must ensure that the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84)
coordinate datum plane is used by both controller and weapon delivery platform when
employing IAMs. Datum planes should be verified prior to deployment/mission as part of
deployment/mission checklist and coordinated or confirmed with the AOCC and/or higher
echelons. Significant errors can result if different datums or excessive TLEs are used.

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3.32.1 Visual Employment (non-NVD and inoperable/degraded Thermal

Imager).
During night visual employment, JTACs/FAC(A)s and aircrews must contend with lower
ambient light conditions, and use battlefield fires, or artificial designation to successfully attack
targets. Threat permitting, the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s requirement to see the CAS aircraft may
require use of aircraft lights or flares.
3.32.2 Visual Employment Mission Planning Considerations.
a. Low Ceilings. Low ceilings may force the aircraft to maintain lower
altitudes. Flares dropped below low ceilings may not produce the desired results.
Low ceilings will further complicate deconfliction between aircraft holding at
control points.
b. Terrain. Knowledge of the terrain is a crucial aspect of any night CAS

mission. Be thoroughly familiar with the general terrain as well as the highest
terrain and obstructions in the immediate target area.
c. Illumination
(1) Non-Illuminated. The capability to attack targets without artificial

designation depends on several variables:
(a) Distinguish the need to attack general versus desired mean point of
impact.
(b) Total ambient and cultural lighting in the target area.
(c) Contrast between targets and their background.
(d) Lighted versus unlighted targets.
(e) Minimum acceptable slant range to the target due to threats.
(f) Theatre restrictions.
(2) Rapidly changing ambient lighting conditions (dusk/dawn). At dawn

and dusk, controllers and aircrew must adapt to rapidly changing light
conditions, and visual acuity limitations when transitioning from NVDs to optical
vision (or vice versa). Therefore, use all available means to ensure correct
target identification. These means include, but are not limited to referencing
significant terrain features, using external marks such as smoke or designation
rounds, and employing targeting pods and/or other on-board sensors and
navigation systems. If necessary, controllers and aircrew may need to alter
attack geometry or change timing to mitigate the negative effects of increasing
or decreasing ambient light conditions.
(3) Artificial Illumination. In most cases, CAS aircrews will be using night
vision goggles (NVGs) or Thermal Imaging equipment and will not require overt
designation of the target area. However, flare employment is essential for low-
designation night operations without NVGs. If at all possible, do not illuminate

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friendly positions. Any designation introduced into the battle area must be
coordinated with the ground force commander prior to flare release.
(a) Ground-Delivered Flares. Artillery or mortar flares are not as bright

as some aircraft delivered flares and will not burn as long.
(b) Aerial Designation Flares. These can be either in the covert or

overt part of the light spectrum of the provided designation. They typically
provide designation from between four and eight minutes. Selection
should be made based on the desired effect and any tactical
considerations.
(c) Ground Designation Flares. ‘Logs’ are designed to illuminate

while on the ground and burn for a longer period then aerial designation
flares. Normally, two logs are used to provide a distance and directional
reference. A line of logs can also establish a sector. Logs should be
dropped on cardinal headings unless run-in restrictions, friendly positions,
or strong winds dictate otherwise. Logs are used for a variety of purposes:
marking a lucrative target area, sectoring a search area, marking an area
boundary to stay within, and/or marking an IP.
(d) Designation Rockets. Rockets provide an excellent point-and-

shoot capability for target designation. As with other categories of flares
the burn time and provided designation varies by time, intensity and light
spectrum.
(e) Marks. WP rockets/shells are widely used marking devices. The

WP detonation is an obvious flash with a one to five second afterglow.
The WP bloom will cast a visible shadow with good moon-like designation.
Flares, explosive ordnance, burning targets, enemy muzzle flashes,
tracers, and various marking rounds can be employed to provide target
identification.
3.32.3 Visual Employment Mission Execution.
Friendly positions, winds, and the threat will determine the position and direction of the
weapons delivery pattern. Prior to allowing aircraft to illuminate or mark a target at night,
coordinate with the commander so that precautions are made to preserve own troop night
vision or prevent enemy observation of own troop locations.
3.33 SYSTEM-AIDED EMPLOYMENT.
System-aided target acquisition and weapons delivery methods are relied upon more during
night and adverse weather. While these system-aided employment options can be used
independently, combining the systems increases the probability of mission success. These
systems include LASER, EO/IR (to include targeting pods), radar, GPS and/or IAMs, and
helmet-mounted cueing systems (HMCSs).
a. LASER. Night procedures for target designation by LASER are the same
as those used during daytime operations. However, adverse weather may limit
the use of LASERs. Cloud cover and precipitation as well as battlefield conditions
(smoke, dust, haze, and other obscurants) can seriously degrade LASER
effectiveness.
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b. EO/IR systems. Cloud cover, humidity, precipitation, thermal crossover,

and battlefield conditions (smoke, dust, or other obscurants) may degrade IR and
low light level television effectiveness.
c. Radar. Radar deliveries are an option in certain instances. During severe

weather or when the target cannot be marked, this type of weapons delivery may
be the only option available. In order to perform a radar delivery, the target or
offset aimpoint (s) must be radar significant.
These errors increase the risk of friendly fire as the distance to friendly troops
decreases to within the TLE.
d. HMCS. In an air-to-ground role, the HMCS is used in conjunction with

targeting sensors (Radar, Thermal Imagers, etc.) and smart weapons to
accurately and precisely attack surface targets. HMCS provides the pilot with
aircraft performance, targeting, weaponry, and threat warning information,
regardless of where the pilot is looking, significantly enhancing pilot SA through
the mission.
3.34 NVD EMPLOYMENT.
NVDs are an additional sensor for aircrews to use together with other systems to find and
attack targets. Maneuver forces and aircrews must ensure there is no confusion between
conventional and NVD terms. JTACs/FAC(A)s must be equipped with IR marking devices to
fully integrate with supported maneuver forces and exploit the potential of NVDs.
a. Weather. Target area weather can effect designation. An overcast sky can
decrease effective designation but may also highlight an attacking aircraft to the
threat, especially night-vision-capable threats. Smoke, haze, and precipitation
will degrade NVD capabilities; however, NVDs still increase the pilot’s awareness
of the battlefield.
b. Artificial Designation. Various flares and artificial designation can be

used effectively at night with NVDs. They provide a very accurate reference for
target area identification and can establish run-in lines. Log designation is
funneled skyward and does not illuminate the surrounding terrain. Due to the
halo effect of the flare, it is best to place the log away from the actual target to
prevent it from reducing NVD effectiveness.
c. Marks.
(1) IR-marking devices provide the perfect complement to NVDs and allow
the pilot to identify both friendly and enemy positions. As a result, the
combination of NVDs and IR marking devices allows safe, accurate employment
in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Particular care must be taken to
ensure that friendly location is not confused with target location.
(2) Ground Unit IR Marking Devices. There are numerous IR pointers in

use by ground units. These pointers vary in intensity and are all visible with
NVDs but not with the naked eye. The effective range of ground marking devices
(like ground force commander’s pointer and IR zoom LASER
illuminator/designator) will vary depending on their power and the amount of
designation that is present. Depending on environmental conditions, the entire
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IR beam or just a flashlight-type spot around the target may be seen. High
designation levels will decrease the effectiveness of IR marks but will not negate
them completely. During low designation conditions, the entire IR beam should
be visible to both aircrew and ground personnel with night vision devices. The
shape of the IR beam will appear narrow or pencil-like at the JTAC’s position,
while the beam will be mushroomed at the target. When working with IR
pointers, try to minimize the target designation time. This will minimize the
chance of the friendly position being compromised, especially if the enemy is
night vision capable.
(3) Airborne IR Marking Devices. Airborne marking devices include

advanced targeting pods, weapon-mounted, as well as hand-held pointing
devices. Effective range will vary depending on their power and the amount of
designation and environmental conditions present, but usually these devices
function extremely well in good conditions from medium altitude. They may be
set to pulse or maintain a steady beam. High-designation levels will decrease
the effectiveness of IR marks but will not negate them completely. These
devices may be used to increase JTAC/FAC(A) and aircrew SA by marking the
target or matching the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s SPARKLE for target. Aircraft equipped
with these devices must coordinate with the JTAC/FAC(A) prior to their use.
(4) Artillery. Artillery marking round effects are enhanced with NVDs. The
HE/WP round is obvious upon detonation and will be visible for one to two
minutes. Burning embers may be seen up to 10 minutes after impact. Artillery
flares that provide bright visible light are not normally used for NVD operations
because they are not covert. However, IR designation rounds may be available
for use by the firing element. Smoke rounds provides smoke and burning
embers that may be seen as far as several kilometers.
(5) WP Rockets. WP rockets produce a brilliant flash lasting one to five

seconds. The radiated heat from the rocket usually can be seen for one to five
minutes after impact, depending on the terrain.
(6) Aircraft Ordnance. In general, all free-fall munitions (e.g., MK 82, MK 84,
etc.) will cause an initial flash and may cause fires that are useful as marks.
Depending on terrain, these weapons will heat up the ground in the impact area
that will be detectable even in the absence of fire. This is usable as a mark for
a short period of time and can also be used for adjustments.
d. Friendly Marking.
Ground forces can illuminate their position with IR devices or other friendly tagging
devices. The current battlefield (all sides) is rife with pointing and marking devices
due to their low cost and wide availability. Ground forces should always be prepared
to provide distinguishing marker characteristics to supporting aircrew. IR lights
should be placed where aircrew overhead can visually acquire and maintain sight of
friendly positions.
(1) IR position markers. There are numerous IR position markers used by

ground forces. These devices can be flashing, programmable, or steady. These
devices vary in intensity and all are visible with NVDs but not with the naked
eye. Flashing devices are easier to visually acquire. When possible,

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identification of marking devices should be verbally confirmed with the aircrew

to avoid misidentification with other ground lighting. As with IR pointers, the
higher the ambient designation, the more difficult it will be to acquire these
devices.
(2) IR Pointers. Used alone or in conjunction with other IR marking devices,

IR pointers are very effective for identifying both friendly and enemy positions.
Depending on environmental conditions, pilots (and enemy personnel) may see
the entire beam or just the flickering of the IR pointer source on the ground.
Clearance parameters. Parameters for ground and air based IR marking
devices for a BOT employment. Anytime IR pointers are employed to mark the
target, attacking aircrew will call ‘VISUAL’ for confirmation of the friendly mark
and either ‘TALLY’ for the target or ‘CONTACT SPARKLE’ on each and every
pass/attack prior to receiving clearance. In either case, this communications
brevity indicates CAS aircrews have distinguished the source end (friendly) from
the target end (enemy) of the mark. Standard IR pointer communications
should still be followed until a “CEASE SPARKLE” command is given.
(3) CAS Briefing Form. When using IR target pointer/illuminators, indicate the
target mark type in line 7 of the CAS Briefing Form with “IR” or “IR pointer.”
Additionally, include the pointer-to-target line in the remarks section of the CAS
briefing form.
(4) GLINT Tape. Ground forces with GLINT tape may be seen by the SOF
gunship low-light level television, depending on the amount of environmental or
artificial designation in the area. Identification of friendly forces by this manner
should be verified by other means to avoid misidentification. Do not use more
than a 1/2-inch square for an individual or four 1-inch squares per vehicle.
(5) Friendly Tagging Devices. Units equipped with tagging devices can use
their capability to relay latest position to C2 nodes equipped to receive and
display data. If airborne CAS forces are equipped to receive and/or display this
information, they can use this information to help confirm or update friendly
locations.

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CHAPTER 4 - PREPARATION
Introduction
Preparation consists of activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct
operations including, but not limited to, the following: rehearsals, movement, and observations.
Once the plan is formulated and approved by the commander, it should be rehearsed. This
includes primary and redundant connectivity and control methodology. Observers must be
identified and their communications capabilities verified. Consideration must be given to the
methods of tactical movement throughout the battlefield. The overall observation plan should
be feasible, executable, and tactically sound. Preparation by the TACP/JTAC, fire support
assets, and maneuver staff is critical to the synchronized execution of joint fires.
Coordination between echelons and preparation that precedes execution are just as important
as plan development. Staff preparation includes assembling and continuously updating
estimates, (e.g., continuous JIPOE) with the goal of providing accurate situational updates for
commanders. Whether incorporated into a formal process or not, the staff’s preparatory
activities such as JIPOE, targeting, fire plan refinement, etc., continue throughout preparation
and execution.
Preparation includes concept of employment (COE) briefs, COE mission rehearsals, OPORDs,
backbriefs, equipment and communications checks, SOP reviews, load plan verification, pre-
combat checks/pre-combat inspections, and weapons test-fire.
4.1 REHEARSALS
The rehearsal is one of the most overlooked aspects of maneuver and fire support planning.
It provides attendees the opportunity to visualize the battle, ensure total comprehension of the
plan, promote responsiveness, and identify areas of confusion, friction or conflict that may have
been overlooked. This visual impression helps orient individuals to both the environment and
other units during the execution of the operation. Moreover, the repetition of combat tasks
during the rehearsal leaves a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the
operation. The extent of the rehearsal is limited by imagination, the tactical situation, time, and
resources available. The types of rehearsals include combined arms rehearsal and fire support
rehearsal.
Local SOPs should identify appropriate rehearsal types and techniques as well as standards
for their execution. This section focuses on the key areas that CAS participants should focus
on, be prepared to discuss/cover in the rehearsal, and leave the rehearsal understanding.
4.1.1 Combined Arms Rehearsal.
The combined arms/maneuver rehearsal is normally conducted by a maneuver unit HQ and

performed after subordinate units have issued their OPORD. The following CAS related areas
should (at a minimum) be covered and/or rehearsed during the combined arms rehearsal.
a. The Ground Force Commander’s (GFC) Intent for Fires and CAS. The
GFC’s intent for fires should include intent for CAS. During the planning phase,
the ALO should advise the GFC with respect to threat, aircraft availability, and
potential weapons loads to ensure a viable, obtainable intent is developed.
Requests for CAS should clearly describe the desired effects to meet the GFC’s
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intent. AOC planners should then tailor aircraft and weapons loads to create the
desired effects. Often, there is no separate “intent for CAS” defined; however,
the GFC’s intent for fires is inclusive for all fires of which CAS is an integral part.
b. Priority of CAS Fires. POF for each phase of an operation must be

identified. For CAS sorties, a projection of “who” will get CAS, “when” it’s
expected, “what” the commander’s desired end state is, and “where” the primary
and alternate observers are located needs to be understood. Additionally, at the
conclusion of the rehearsal, participants should have a thorough understanding
of the following:
(1) Verification of grid coordinates/locations for critical targets, primary and

alternate observers, unit locations (defense), FPFs, and projected movements
(by phase) for offensive operations.
(2) Triggers for targets and target engagement criteria.
(3) FSCMs/ACMs and how they Facilitate fire and maneuver.
(4) Verify SEAD plan.
(5) Communications connectivity.
(6) Verify CAS target marks, and if necessary, friendly marking.
(7) Terminal attack control types to be utilized.
(8) Which JTAC/FAC(A) will provide terminal attack control of aircraft

conducting CAS.
(9) Availability of JTACs/FAC(A)s.
(10) Plan for effective use of excess CAS sorties (i.e., use of kill boxes/handoff
to another sector or /etc.).
(11) BDA/MISREP collection procedures.
After the rehearsal, the participants must be able to effectively communicate the
plan to subordinate personnel prior to the beginning of the operation. Specific ALO
responsibilities include providing key information concerning all aspects of air
support of the ground force commander. During the combined arms rehearsal, the
ALO or FSO will address the following:
(1) Confirm commander’s intent for CAS.
(2) Number of CAS sorties expected.
(3) Type aircraft.
(4) Weapons load information.
(5) CAS on-station times.

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(6) CPs and IPs.
(7) ACMs/FSCMs.
(8) SEAD plan.
(9) Target marks/LASER plan.
(10) Friendly marking procedures.
(11) TACP battlefield employment.
(12) TACP battlefield recovery.
(13) TACP communications plan.
(14) Approved/disapproved CAS requests.
(15) Terminal attack control types.
4.1.2 Fire Support Rehearsal.
Fire support rehearsals focus on the execution of the ground maneuver commander’s essential
fire support tasks, the effectiveness of FSCMs, and the timing and synchronization of all fire
support efforts with maneuver. Fire support rehearsals serve to refine the fire support plan,
ensure understanding by all personnel in the JFSE, and confirm the feasibility of the current
plan.
The fire support rehearsal is the most critical part of the preparation phase of an operation.
The ALO/JTAC is responsible for providing key information concerning all aspects of air in
support of the ground force commander. The following areas should be covered and/or
rehearsed during the fire support rehearsal:
a. Rehearse CAS execution with ground maneuver element, JFSE, and

JTAC.
b. Identify and confirm that FSCMs support the scheme of maneuver and fires.
c. Verify consolidated target list to include CAS targets.
d. Verify coordinate locations for critical targets using the proper map datum.
e. Verify that each CAS target has a clearly defined task, purpose, and effect
and that targeting priorities are clearly delineated.
f. Verify trigger points for each target and target engagement criteria.
g. Review ROE / PID requirements.
h. Rehearse actions when CAS triggers are met.
i. Rehearse primary / alternate observation points.

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(1) Identify observers -Primary/alternate observers: (JTAC,ISR, scouts).
(2) Identify force protection.
(3) Identify infiltration/exfiltration routes.
(4) Identify CAS triggers.
(5) Identify displacement criteria.
(6) Review weather considerations.
(7) Review night procedures.
(8) Review FSCM and attack guidance matrix for CAS targets.
(9) Confirm observation plans.
j. Identify closest friendly locations.
k. Verify friendly marking procedures.
l. Verify likely CAS attack tactics (high/medium altitude, low/very low altitude).
m. Rehearse engagement procedures for CAS targets.
n. Rehearse communications connectivity.
(1) Confirm call signs.
(2) Review primary/secondary JTAC/FAC(A) freqs.
(3) Confirm code words.
(4) Conduct radio checks –COF, TACP, company/battalion TAC, TAD, air
request net, and NSFS.
(5) Confirm cryptographic/communications security (COMSEC) requirements

and procedures.
(6) Review authentication procedures.
o. Verify attack guidance for each target (unit[s] to fire, shell fuse combination,
number of volleys, number and type of aircraft available, and standard
conventional loads [SCLs]).
p. Verify/deconflict the movement plan specifying when and where firing units
will move:
(1) Primary AOF.
(2) Positioning areas.

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q. Verify the method of engagement (at my command, TOT, or when ready).
r. FSCMs/ACMs:
(1) Schedule or on-order call to shift boundaries and FSCMs.
(2) Formal.
(3) Informal.
s. Identify CPs/IPs and general aircraft flow.
t. Rehearse SEAD plan procedures with firing unit FDC.
u. Rehearse CAS target marking procedures.
(1) Review the integration / deconfliction plan of air and surface fires.
(2) Review indirect fire assets available.
(3) Review marking, SEAD plan, and method of control.
(4) Review indirect fires asset positions.
(5) Review gun target lines for planned targets.
(6) Review minimum/maximum ordinate(s).
(7) Review shell/fuse combination.
v. TOT/TTT.
w. Review type of CAS control for CAS targets:
(1) Type 1, 2, or 3
(2) Identify observer and controller connectivity.
(3) Review clearance procedures for CAS targets.
(4) ALO/FSO recap critical fire support, CAS, and naval surface fire events.
(5) Make refinements as necessary.
(6) FSCMs discussed/understood.
(7) Discuss indirect fire system position areas. CAS changes or updates
made during combined arms or fire support rehearsals should be forwarded to
the AOCC as soon as possible in accordance with established ATO planning
cycle “timelines.” Changes or updates that cannot be included in the ATO must
be passed to the aircrews as soon as possible to increase the chances of
success.

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4.2 PRE-COMBAT PREPARATIONS
Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections allow personnel to prepare for a mission and
provide the leader/supervisor an opportunity to ensure the operational readiness of personnel
and equipment.
The following pre-combat checklists are a guide to help personnel to prepare for pre-combat
inspections. Pre-combat checks can be broken down into the following areas:
a. Mission Essential Knowledge. Ensure personnel in each subordinate

element understand the mission, end-state, scheme of maneuver, and fires.
b. Mission Essential Equipment. Ensure all required equipment is full

mission-capable and properly accounted for IAW supply procedures.
Recommended items for a JTAC include NVDs, an IR LASER pointer, LASER
rangefinder/designator, IR strobe light, chemical lights, GLINT tape, VS-17
panels, spotting scope, multi-band radio, radar beacon, pyrotechnics
(smoke/designation), access to an grenade launcher with designation and smoke
rounds, compass, mirror, common objective graphics, authentication/crypto
materials, and GPS. If any portable tactical targeting systems are to be used, the
terminal attack controller should ensure the imagery products associated with
these programs are up to-date. The JTAC/FAC(A) must plan for redundant
communication and marking tools.
c. Mission Essential Coordination. Ensure distribution of graphics and/or

overlays depicting:
(1) Scheme of maneuver.
(2) FSCMs.
(3) ACMs.
(4) NAIs and/or TAIs.
(5) Decision points and triggers.
(6) Aircraft CPs and IPs.
(7) Helicopter HAs, BPs and/or landing zones.
(8) Countermobility/obstacle plan.
(9) Friendly marking procedures:
(a) - Day.
(b) - Night.
(10) Target list, target overlays, and schedules of fire with:
(a) POF/priority of CAS.

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(b) Priority targets.
(c) SEAD targets.
(d) Preparatory fires.
(e) FPFs.
(f) Groups and series.
(g) Target blocks.
(h) LASER guided munitions/designator codes.
d. Preparation.
If an ALO or JTAC/FAC(A) is unable to participate in the planning process, it is the

responsibility of both the TACP and the FAC(A) to coordinate prior to mission
execution. Face-to-face briefs are ideal, but at a minimum the TACP should
exchange information electronically prior to mission execution. Transmission to the
JTAC of the required planning products and information will ensure that they at least
have a baseline of knowledge for execution of the mission. Regardless of the
selected liaison method, the attendees are provided the following information in
order to clarify the information contained within the OPLAN/OPORD/ATO and any
particular requirements of the supported ground unit. A prioritized list of essential
information to be passed between the TACP but is not limited to:
(1) The ground force commander’s intent.
(2) Ground force scheme of maneuver.
(a) Essential tasks that must occur to ensure mission success

(specified and implied).
(b) Expected friendly locations and marking (ID) plan.
(c) Essential friendly coordinating documents (GRG, etc.).
(3) Threat scheme of maneuver.
(a) Most likely enemy COA.
(b) Most dangerous enemy COA.
(c) Known or anticipated threat.
(4) Fire support/targeting plan.
(a) Target priorities/precedence.
(b) Established FSCMs.
(c) Expected target arrays.

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(5) Asset integration plan.
(6) Communications plan.
(a) Terminal control nets.
(b) Air request nets.
(c) TACP administrative nets.
(d) Ground force nets.
(e) Code words.
(7) Fire support assets.
(a) Established position areas of artillery (PAAs).
(8) Tasked ATO assets.
(a) FW/RW CAS/.
(b) UAS.
(c) Tanker assets.
(9) Airspace plan (established ACMs).
(a) Routing plan.
(b) Planned CPs/IPs/HAs/BPs/ROZs.
(10) Terminal control plan.
(a) Game plan.
(b) JTAC/FAC(A) responsibilities.
(c) Mission approval process.
(d) Marking / guidance plan.
1/ SEAD SOP.
2/ LASER plan.
(11) TACP capabilities.
(a) TACP equipment.
(b) TACP limitations.
(12) ISR plan.

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(13) Enemy order of battle and equipment.
(a) Enemy signature/recognition.
(14) UAS ROZs.
(15) ISR integration plan.
(16) Supporting documents/information.
(a) Map overlays/graphics.
(b) FARP locations.
(c) Fires SOP.
In turn, the appropriate agencies should provide the following information to the TACP:
(1) Time on station.
(2) ATO breakout; assets coming to the operational area as well as operating
nearby.
(3) Loiter time.
(4) Initial holding point desired.
(5) Weapons that will be carried.
(6) Communication plan recommendations.
(7) Limitations that would affect the pre-briefed game plan.
(8) System capabilities in the form of type of targeting pod/advanced targeting

pod.
(9) FMV capability.
(10) Coordinate generation capability (with associated TLE).
4.3 COMMUNICATIONS
During the preparation phase, and often in conjunction with the pre-combat inspections,
communication links are checked and verified. This ensures that primary and backup voice
and digital systems are checked, crypto material is current, time is synchronized, and code
words, brevity codes, authenticators, passwords, and call signs are available and current.
Ensure systems are fully operational and connectivity is established. Often unit SOPs will
delineate connectivity checks (e.g., “...each station will perform a communications check on
TAR/HR on the half hour reporting in precedence order”). Additionally, any extra measures
such as day/night friendly marking procedures and visual or sound signals are practiced.
Check and verify:

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a. Nets:
(1) Command Nets:
(a) Company.
(b) BN.
(c) Regiment/brigade.
(d) Division command.
(2) Fire Support Nets:
(a) COF.
(b) Mortar COF.
(c) JFSE nets.
(d) Air spot.
(3) Air Nets:
(a) TAR/HR.
(b) JARN.
(c) TAD.
(d) TACP local.
(e) Data links and networks.
b. Cryptographic keys/Call signs/Codewords/Prowords/Passwords/Brevity

Codes.
(1) Crypto verified and loaded.
(2) Time synchronized.
(3) Copies or excerpts of call signs available.
(4) Codewords and brevity codes for current plan reviewed.
(5) Prowords posted or noted for communicators.
c. Friendly day/night marking procedures. Equipment available and correctly

displayed/checked.
(1) IR pointer lights/pointers.
(2) Strobe lights (visual and/or IR).

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(3) Air panels.
(a) VS-17 panels.
(b) Thermal panels.
(4) Chemical lights.
(5) GLINT tape.
(6) LASER designators and their associated codes. Information for planning
and coordinating LASER designator use should include LASER designator
location (i.e. observation post location), LASER codes, and LASER-target line
at a minimum.
(7) Pyrotechnics.
(a) Smoke.
(b) Flares/star clusters.
(8) Radar beacons and codes.
(9) Tagging devices.
4.4 MOVEMENT AND POSITIONING.
Movement.
The ALO ensures TACP movement is in accordance with the maneuver unit’s observation
plan. Most TACP operations require movement to forward assembly areas, observation posts,
or BPs during the preparation phase of an operation. The maneuver unit OPORD will normally
specify formations and techniques of movement. This allows the commander to position
elements where they will optimize the unit’s operational area and Facilitate execution of the
scheme of maneuver.
Positioning. The ALO recommends initial observation positions of TACPs to the commander.
The ALO and the commander must consider three aspects in the TACP positioning decision:
security, observation, and communications.
a. Security. A TACP cannot provide its own security. The TACP is positioned
within the maneuver unit’s area where it can optimize its observation capability
yet maintain its survivability and communications capability. The maneuver unit
commander considers the Factors of METT-T when selecting a position.
b. Observation. The selection of an observation position is critical to the

ability of the TACP to effectively control CAS. The position permits observation
of targets. Landmarks and prominent terrain features should be avoided, as the
enemy probably targets them.

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c. Communications. TACP’s primary means of communication are tactical

radios. The TACP is positioned to allow communications with the commander,
HHQ (TACP), and the CAS aircraft.
d. Reconnaissance. If time and the tactical situation permit, take advantage

of the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance of the battlefield. Confirm when
observation positions offer visibility of engagement areas, enemy avenues of
approach, and dead space. Verify communications connectivity.

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CHAPTER 5 - EXECUTION
Introduction.
CAS execution begins with a target nomination from the supported commander and involves
two processes that are continuous and overlapping in nature: JTAC/operations center
coordination and CAS target engagement. This chapter discusses the considerations required
for the detailed integration of CAS with the fire and maneuver of the supported unit.
Section I. Introduction to Game plan and CAS Brief.

5.1 GAME PLAN
The Game plan is the concise means to inform all players of the flow of the upcoming attack.
Game plan is utilized for attacks involving single or multiple attack elements and third parties.
When conducting coordinated attacks or third-party lasing, coordinated attack instructions
should at first be briefed to all players, as an SA-enhancing way to frame a complicated
engagement followed by single element game plan as appropriate.
5.1.1 Coordinated Attack Instructions
If coordinating engagement that includes multiple players (such as JTAC, FAC (A), forward
observer, ISR assets used for marking targets, multiple flights of attacking aircraft etc.)
JTAC/FAC(A) should inform all the players about elements participating in the engagement
and the roles they will play in the planned course of action. It should be done in plain text.
It should also include information on type of coordinated attack, flow of attack and actions by
third parties.
Types of coordinated attack
a. Combined.
Aircraft will engage the same target. If combined, the order and separation that the
elements will use (e.g. visual, timing , altitude) should be stated.
b. Sectored.
Attack elements will engage different parts of target area. If sectored, which general
target area each element will be responsible for and what will be used to define the
sector (e.g. geographic reference, gridline)
c. Simultaneous.
All aircraft will deliver ordnance simultaneously. This method minimizes CAS aircraft
exposure to threats and minimizes the amount of time the enemy will have to react
to the attack. This is the optimum method of attacking multiple targets, especially
mobile targets that may flee once the attack commences. Primary limitation of this
method is the inability to correct or abort between impacts.

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d. Sequential
Aircraft will attack one at a time with a specific interval between each aircraft. The
interval between aircraft is based on several factors including: time to acquire the
subsequent aircraft and judge nose position, time of flight of the weapon, time to
clear obscurations from first impacts, and time needed to assess effects and decide
on subsequent attacks.
5.1.2 Third parties involvement.
Third parties contributing to attack with their ability to provide terminal guidance operations,
BDA, airspace management, marking etc include FAC(A), TAC(A), forvard observers and
spotters, UAS, and other aircraft. . Their contribution to attack should be specified in game
plan.
Third party lasing-When using an off-board element to host a LASER guided weapon, the
JTAC/FAC(A) shall include the lasing entities call sign and the LASER PRF codes for the
intended weapons in the game plan. Off-board platforms providing LASER to other elements
requires detailed coordination among all players. JTACs/FAC(A)s shall also ensure they
correlate with the lasing platform.
5.1.3 Individual game plan
Individual game plan must be given to each attack element. Minimum information in the single
element game plan shall include:
a. Type of Control (see Chapter 3 paragraph 3.10 Types of control)
b. Method of Attack (see Chapter 3 paragraph 3.9 Methods of Attack.
Additional information (if applicable) may include:
c. Ordnance requested/fusing/effect on target/commanders intent
d. Aircraft Interval
5.2 CAS BRIEF
The CAS brief is the standard for use with FW and RW aircraft. The brief is used for all threat
conditions and does not dictate the CAS aircraft’s tactics. It consist of 9-line, remarks and
restrictions.
5.2.1 9-line
a. Line 1 –Initial Point or Battle Position (IP or BP). The IP is the starting
point for the run-in to the target. For rotary wing aircraft, the BP is where attacks
on the target are commenced (for running and diving fire) or actual firing position
(for hovering fire). IPs and BPs are usually described by name, geographic
location and description of terrain feature (if it is used as an IP/BP).

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JTAC/FAC(A) may also assign RW aircraft to a hasty BP, if no preplanned BP is

available. The position of the BP will than be expressed as set of coordinates in this
line along with dimensions of the BP.
If Keyhole template is used, IP/BP can be expressed as cardinal direction and

distance from Echo Point (see Chapter 3, 3.13.1.1Keyhole template.)
Details of IPs and BPs (such as names, coordinates and descriptions) are usually
published in the SPINS.
b. Line 2 - Heading and Offset. The heading is course from the IP or center
of the BP to target.
Magnetic North is considered standard, however some aircraft use geographic

(True) north as their primary northing reference, therefore JTAC/FAC(A) should be
prepared to convert Magnetic North to True North, if necessary.
The offset is the side of the IP-to target line on which aircrews can maneuver for the
attack (LEFT or RIGHT).JTACs/FAC(A)s use an offset direction to ease fire support
coordination, align the aircraft for the attack or egress, or keep aircrews away from
known threats. An offset direction aids fire support coordination by restricting
aircrews from using airspace on the side of the IP-to target line where there might
be a conflict with other airspace user such as GTL. The offset direction regulates the
attack quadrant without assigning a specific attack heading unless it is assigned in
the Restrictions of the CAS Brief.
Heading is usually calculated by JTAC/FAC(A) using map and compass/protractor

or GPS. Offset is assigned by JTAC/FAC(A) based on current airspace restrictions.
c. Line 3 - Distance. The distance is given from the IP or center of the BP to

the target. (FW in NM with 0.1NM accuracy, RW in meters with 100m accuracy).
This figure is usually calculated by JTAC/FAC(A) using map, ruler or GPS.
d. Line 4 -Target Elevation. Target elevation is needed for cuing sensors and
for weapon/targeting solutions for CAS platforms which require it. The target
elevation is given in feet above mean sea level (MSL). Can be given in feet height
above ellipsoid (HAE), but this must be specifically stated. Elevation is the most
difficult aspect to judge accurately. Targeting software is the most accurate
method to derive elevation; however, terrain association can generally be
accurate enough except in very steep terrain and/or in urban environments.
e. Line 5 - Target Description. The target should be described in plain

language. When conducting BOC attack the description should be specific
enough for the aircrew to make recommendation for weapon and fusing selection.
For BOT attacks the description should allow the aircrew to recognize the target,
however too lengthy description should be avoided as target has to be correlated
during correlation phase.

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f. Line 6 –Target Location. WGS-84 map datum is considered standard. If

another datum is used it has to be specified in the Air Support Request. If an
aircrew is responding in an immediate CAS role, and the datum used is not
WGS-84, then the datum will be confirmed in the aircraft check in or situation
update (unless otherwise specified in SPINS). The JTAC/FAC(A) provides the
target location in 3 specific manners:
(1) MGRS Grid coordinates. If using grid coordinates, JTACs/FAC(A)s

should include the grid zone designator. 100,000 meter square identification
must be passed. The number of digits in a grid coordinate is the level of
precision of the grid, not a measurement of accuracy or TLE. JTAC/FAC(A)
should pass 6 to ten digit grid, depending on expected accuracy of location.
(2) Latitude and longitude (DMM, DMS) Care should be taken to clearly
communicate which specific format is being used as transposition errors or
misinterpretation can result in significant coordinate error and greatly increase
the risk of potential collateral damage.
(3) Offset from a known point. Direction and distance from a

geographical, man-made feature, navigational aid, or mark that is already
known to the aircrew. For an offset from a known point, the offset point should
be established by the controller and acquired by the aircrew prior to the CAS
Brief either visually or with a sensor.
Examples of lines 4 through 6 when using a GEOREF, TRP, GRG, navigational aid
or an offset:
“450 feet, personnel in square single-story building, Building 145 in sector Papa 8 of
macro GRG.”
“232 feet, tactical vehicle and personnel, 200 meters east of the intersection of Gas
Station and Baseline roads.”
“15 feet, enemy personnel in a ditch, 150 meters southeast of friendly position.”
There are rare times when a JTAC/FAC(A) is unable to provide a target elevation
and coordinate, making lines 4 and 6 a GEOREF, TRP, GRG or an offset from it. In
this case, there must be additional correlation between the attacking aircraft and
controller to confirm the actual target location. This may include verification through
Talk-On or use of VDL.
In this instance when tally/captured and if able to provide, aircrew will pass an
elevation and grid for the target. The JTAC/FAC(A) and the supporting fires approval
chain will utilize this grid for final fires integration, as a starting point for future
correlation if required, and for the BDA report. The grid passed from the aircraft to
the JTAC/FAC(A) during read backs does not require any further read back by the
JTAC/FAC(A). The JTAC/FAC(A) will respond with either “good read back” or
correlate further if there is concern over grid provided. The purpose of this TTP is to
confirm correlation of target location in an expeditious manner and ensure the
supported ground element has a record of final target location.
Example of lines 4 through 6 when correlation occurred prior to a CAS brief:

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JTAC: “Elevation, 450 feet, enemy personnel in defilade, north of road

intersection from your TALLY.”
Aircraft readback: “450 feet, I am captured personnel in defilade of a road

intersection. I have them at grid LS 1234 5678.”
JTAC: Good readback. (JTAC now plots the grid, verifies friendlies locations and
sends line 8: “Be advised Friendlies are North 900 meters”
Aircraft: “Friendlies N 900”.
WARNING. These techniques should be used with caution due to the potential for
confusion and they do not support the fires approval process, collateral damage
estimation, and friendly fire mitigation.
g. Line 7 - Mark Type/Terminal Guidance. The type of mark the

JTAC/FAC(A) will use (smoke, LASER, direct fire or IR). If using a LASER, line 7
will also state:
(1) Whether the LASER will be used for marking of for weapon designation.
(2) The call sign of the platform/ individual that will provide the LASER
mark/designation (normally should be on the same frequency to facilitate
LASER communications during execution.
(3) LASER code. (for designation of weapons the LASER code set on
weapons must be used. This information is received during Fighter Check In –
see 5.4.9 CAS Aircraft Check-in.)
h. Line 8 - Friendlies. Given in a cardinal/sub cardinal direction and distance

in meters from the target to the closest friendly position (e.g., “South-west 300”).
The observer or JTAC/FAC(A) may not be the closest friendly to the target. If
marking of friendly forces is used to enhance safety, JTAC/FAC(A) shall pass the
information about type of mark being used. If several friendly positions exist in
close proximity to target and may be affected by weapon’s effects all of these
positions must be briefed. It is JTACs/FAC(A)s responsibility to have SA about
position of friendly elements and to populate line 8. If in doubt, friendly positions
can be verified through battle staff and ground force commander.
i. Line 9 - Egress. These are the instructions the aircrews use to exit the
target area. Egress instructions can be given as a cardinal direction, by using
control points or, if the operational environment allows, by stating “Egress at
pilot’s discretion.” Under all circumstances JTAC/FAC(A) must maintain SA on
aircraft’s position and altitude after egress and be able to deconflict the aircraft
from other airspace users, if necessary. Consideration should be given to provide
egress altitude as well.

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5.2.2 Remarks
Remarks convey additional information important to the conduct of the CAS mission. The
following is a list of remarks that should be included in the CAS brief, if applicable. The order
of the remarks portion of the CAS brief is recommended for a standard, logical flow of
information. Only those elements that are applicable and have not previously been briefed (for
example during routing instructions, situation update or game plan) should be included.
Remarks are not required to be read back by the aircrew, unless requested by JTAC/FAC(A).
a. LASER-to-Target Line (LTL) shall be passed if using ground-based

LASER designators. When using infrared pointers, the pointer-to-target line
(PTL) may be passed as well. It is expressed in degrees magnetic from point of
origin to the target. It is usually provided by LASER operator with use of map and
protractor or compass.
b. Desired type/ number of ordnance or weapons effect. If this has not

been previously coordinated during Game Plan.
c. Surface-to-air threat (to be mentioned if it has not been briefed during

Routing/Safety of Flight or Situation Update.
(1) Type of threat.
(2) Position expressed in coordinates or direction and distance from line 6. If

position is unknown it must be stated.
(3) Type of suppression - Continuous, interrupted or non-standard. If non-

standard, state the duration of the suppression relative to the CAS TOT.
(4) Suppression gun target line in degrees magnetic.
This information usually comes from the intelligence officer or ISR assets.
Information about artillery fires can be obtained from JFSE.
d. Active GTLs. Gives aircrew SA to fires on the battle field. It must be briefed,
unless already briefed during routing/ safety of flight or situation update.
Information must include:
(1) GTL in degrees magnetic,
(2) Max Ord in feet MSL (if deconflicting the aircraft by altitude) and
(3) Time of Flight (if deconflicting aircraft by time).
(4) If position of the artillery is unknown to the aircraft, JTAC/FAC(A) shall

include information about position of the active artillery or location of the target
being engaged.
This information is usually provided by Joint Fire Support Element on

appropriate levels.

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e. Weather. If weather has significant impact on CAS mission it should be

briefed to enhance aircrew’s situational awareness, unless briefed during
Situation Update. This may include:
(1) Strong winds (expressed as cardinal direction and wind velocity in knots)
(2) Low Cloud base (in feet above ground level, if JTAC/FAC(A) is able to
estimate)
(3) Limited visibility (in kilometers). If visibility differs in different directions,

JTAC/FAC(A) should report the lowest figure.
This information usually comes from JTAC´s own observation or from weather
forecast briefed prior to the mission.
f. Hazards to Aviation. If any hazards to aviation exist (high ground,

powerlines, areas where birds gather- especially for low altitude missions), they
should be briefed, unless already briefed during Situation Update. Position is
usually expressed as grid or as direction and distance from line 6. JTAC/FAC(A)
must brief all hazards affecting safety of flight during holding, ingress and egress.
This information usually comes from intelligence preparation of the battle field.
g. Additional radio calls as requested.
(1) IP inbound.
(2) In with heading or cardinal direction.
(3) Time to roll-in / release.
NOTE: These calls are usually requested after correlation immediately prior to the attack run.
h. Additional remarks.
Depending on the tactical situation or theatre requirements, additional information

may need to be passed such as:
(1) Rules of engagement
(2) Additional target information including TLE category
(3) JTAC/FAC(A) additional/ missing capabilities (NVG capability, no VDL

receiver,…)
5.2.3 Restrictions
The following information is always a restriction and must be included if applicable. Additional
restrictions are at the discretion of the JTAC/FAC(A). All passed restrictions shall be read
back.

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a. Final Attack Headings.
JTACs/FAC(A)s assign attack headings for several reasons, such as:
(1) to increase ground troop safety,
(2) aid in aircraft acquisition by the JTAC/FAC(A),
(3) aid aircrews in target acquisition,
(4) mitigate collateral damage,
(5) meet LASER safety cone attack restrictions,
(6) facilitate fire support coordination.
Controllers may employ final attack headings/directions that allow aircrew to

maneuver on either side of the attack heading. This gives aircrew more flexibility in
prosecuting the target while maintaining the required degree of restriction on the
aircraft heading. Attack headings also allow aircraft to maneuver over terrain or
urban sprawl to enhance delivery while remaining survivable. Attack headings might
be particularly useful when the attack aircraft are using coordinate-dependent
weapons, as it is possible for the weapon’s final attack heading to differ significantly
from the aircraft’s heading. If the JTAC/FAC(A) requires a specific attack heading
for the weapon (but not the aircraft), that restriction must be stated clearly when the
final attack heading is passed. JTACs/FAC(A)s must weigh the advantages of
issuing an attack heading with the disadvantages of restricting aircraft tactics.
JTACs/FAC(A) should attempt to place as few restrictions as possible on attacking

aircraft. Unnecessary or overly restrictive run-in restrictions often increase the time
required to attack, decrease the flexibility and survivability of the flight, and increase
the likelihood of an aircraft not expending its ordnance because it was outside of
parameters. JTACs/FAC(A) should limit restrictions to the minimum required. Final
attack headings are expressed as three digit figures and magnetic north is
considered standard. The following are examples of briefed final attack geometry:
(1) Magnetic heading
“Final attack heading 230 degrees.”
(2) Magnetic headings with a cone
“Final attack heading 240 to 300 degrees”
“Final attack heading between 240 and 300 degrees”
“Final attack heading 300 plus or minus 10”
(3) Use of cardinal/sub-cardinal directions. A JTAC should be cautious

when using this method as no final attack magnetic headings are specified and
the attacking aircraft may not be on the exact heading or in the expected sector

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of airspace for CAS aircraft acquisition or deconfliction. If an exact heading or

cone is required, then use of one of the above techniques is recommended.
“Make your attack from northeast to southwest”
(4) Use of a geographical reference that are known to the aircrew
“Make attacks parallel to the road”
b. Danger close/Commanders initials
If any friendly forces are within Danger Close distance (see 3.25.7.2 Risk Estimate
Distance (RED) for ordnance to be used, mission is considered Danger Close.
Supported commander must accept responsibility for possible fratricide by passing
his initials to the aircrew.
c. Airspace Coordination Area.
If there is any limitation on use of the airspace that has not been briefed during
Routing/Safety of flight (see 5.4.8 Routing/Safety of Flight –) or during situation
update (see 5.4.10 Situation Update.), it must be briefed here. However
JTAC/FAC(A) may choose to repeat this information here to enhance safety of the
flight.
d. TOT/TTT (Time On Target/ Time To Target)
Assigning TOT/TTT has a synchronizing effect on the battlefield. TOT/TTT allow for
efficient fires approval, and effective integration with fire and movement.
JTAC/FAC(A) assigns TOT/TTT to precisely synchronize attacks of multiple aircraft
or to synchronize CAS with supporting fires. Great care must be taken to make sure
all participants are on the same timeline.
(1) TOT is exact time when ordnance is to impact on target. It is expressed in

minute/ second format. Hour is usually omitted as aircraft navigation kit may use
UTC time while JTAC on the ground usually works in local time. Baseline time
is always GPS time. JTAC/FAC(A) must conduct time check with all participants
to make sure all players are on the same timeline prior to coordinating TOTs.
When coordinating TOT with supporting fires (marking, SEAD), JTAC/FAC(A)
must consider time required for flow of information between JTAC/FAC(A), FDC
and actual IDF asset crews and duration of the fire mission to deliver required
effect on target.
(2) TTT is time elapsed from command “Hack” to impact of ordnance on

target. It is usually expressed in minutes and seconds.
e. Additional restrictions JTAC/FAC(A) may establish any additional

restrictions, if deemed necessary for safe conduct of CAS mission, however
restrictions must be limited to the minimum required.
JTAC: “ .................................. “ this is “..................................” advise when ready for Game Plan
(Aircraft Call Sign) (JTAC Call Sign)
Type of Control 1 2 3

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Method of Attack BOT BOC

Effects desired/Ordnance
Interval if appropriate
JTAC: “ .................................. “ this is “..................................” advise when ready for CAS Brief
(Aircraft Call Sign) (JTAC Call Sign)
1 IP / BP
2 HEADING ˚MAG Offset: Left Right
3 DISTANCE IP to Target NM
BP to Target m
4 Target ELEVATION ft MSL
5 TARGET Description
6 Target LOCATION Grid
Lat/Long
7 MARK Type Code:
8 Location of FRIENDLIES
9 EGRESS
Remarks
LTL / PTL
Effects desired/Ordnance
Surface to air threat/SEAD location and type
Gun to Target Line
Weather
Hazards
Other remarks
Restrictions
Final Attack Heading
Danger Close/Commanders Initials
ACAs
Post Launch Abort
TOT / TTT
Other
Section II Close Air Support Target Engagement.

This section will provide standard procedures for CAS execution. While theatres or specific
commands may have unique requirements, JTACs/FAC(A)s, CAS aircrews, and fire
supporters should be familiar with the standard formats used in passing key information
between CAS participants.
5.3 CAS TARGET NOMINATION.
After making a tactical risk assessment, commanders nominate CAS targets based on
previously planned target sets or from spot reports received during execution. The nomination
process can occur before or after aircraft arrive at the control point.
5.4 JTAC ACTIONS FOR DEVELOPING CAS BRIEF.
Once a ground force commander has nominated a CAS target, the JTAC/FAC(A) should
accomplish the following tasks to prepare for CAS engagement. These steps should begin
with the target and work backwards. This sequence allows the JTAC/FAC(A) to build a game

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plan, CAS brief, and remarks / restrictions in a logical order. Each step, however, will affect
the others and may result in an iterative process. For instance, SEAD requirements may
influence game plan development.
5.4.1 Development of Targeting Data.
Planning for a CAS attack should begin with the target and work backwards. There are five
main pieces of information a JTAC/FAC(A) needs to begin the CAS attack planning: target
elevation target description, target location, friendly location, and commander’s desired effects
on the target.
a. Target Description (line 5).
Line 5 should be a concise, accurate description of the target (e.g., “Five APCs in
the open”). Avoid using overly complicated descriptions or labels that will not be
understood by aircrew. However, JTACs/FAC(A)s should be specific with the actual
target. For example, if the commander’s intent is to kill a high value target that
happens to be inside a building at the time, line 5 should be “HVT in 2 story building”
vice “2-story building”. The target is the personnel, not the building itself.
b. Target Location (line 6).
JTACs/FAC(A)s must consider the accuracy of line 6 required to achieve ground

force commander’s intent versus the time required to generate a more accurate
coordinate. Some of the factors to consider when determining the level of target
coordinate accuracy required are the delivering platform system capabilities, the
proximity of friendly troops, the ordnance available, the need and difficulty of target
acquisition anticipated, collateral damage concerns, and method of engagement. A
Type 2 BOC with LGB ground-lase will require a much less accurate coordinate than
a Type 2 BOC JDAM mission where a direct hit will be necessary to meet ground
force commander’s intent. Methods to determine target location include:
(1) Terrain association with map –least accurate, but fast, efficient and
effective depending on the situation.
(2) LRF coupled with GPS and/or compass – more accurate than terrain
association, however still has limitations related to magnetic bearing. This
method can take longer than terrain association but may yield a more accurate
location. JTAC should plot the grid derived in his map and cross check the
expected location as poorly calibrated DMC may result in significant TLE.
(3) Targeting Software – most accurate method, dependent on updated and

accurate software to function properly.
(4) Aircraft or ISR asset-derived coordinates.
The following target location considerations should be used when developing line-6:
(1) For an area target, give the location of the target’s center or location of
the greatest concentration.

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(2) For a linear target, give the location of intended impact point, orientation,
and the distance to each end either in line 5 or the remarks section of the CAS
brief, if required. However ability to engage linear target with multiple weapons
in one pass is platform dependent and details must be discussed with the
aircrew prior to game plan, if JTAC/FAC(A) is not familiar with aircraft
capabilities.
(3) When the mission includes more than one target, read one standard CAS
brief with the nearest target to friendlies, then assign the additional target
locations to the other mission aircraft prior to remarks and restrictions. Make
sure to include changes in elevation (line 4) and locations (line 6) if required.
(4) For a moving target, if able and without losing SA, give a location along
the target’s route of travel along with a direction of movement and estimated
speed. Attack Aircraft and JTAC/FAC(A) must consider the direction of a
moving target (away/towards friendlies or collateral damage) when updating
lines 4, 6, 8, and restrictions. Additionally, consider any airspace/FSCM issues
that may arise, to include adjacent units/operations.
5.4.2 Determination of Commander’s Desired Effects.
Commander’s Desired Effects determined through dialogue with the ground force commander.
JTACs/FAC(A)s should provide the commander with a realistic expectation of ordnance effects
based on the likely aircraft loadout and professional expertise. For effect see paragraph 3.19
Effects. For weapons considerations see paragraph 3.25.7 Weapons .
5.4.3 Requesting Air Support.
Once a rough location for the target has been determined and commander’s desired effects
are known, JTACs/FAC(A)s should request air support at the earliest possible opportunity due
to the transit time required for CAS aircraft to arrive on station. Do not delay the request to
refine the coordinate at this time. Extreme caution should be taken when using “generic” or
previously generated coordinates for the Air Support Request ASR. Friendly Fire events have
occurred when JTACs/FAC(A)s utilized friendly locations in the air request as initial routing
points for CAS aircraft. Friendly locations must never be utilized as the target location in the
request.
Air Support Request (ASR)Accuracy. Ideally, the controlling agency (e.g., AOCC, AWACS),
briefs the aircrew before contact with the JTAC using the information from the ASR, Section 1,
Block 8 The brief must be accurate, concise, and executed quickly. If other than WGS-84, the
map datum must be considered when determining target grid coordinates.
For details see paragraph 3.15 Air Support requests.
5.4.4 Development of Game Plan.
If there are questions regarding aircraft capabilities, ordnance, tactics etc., these should be
cleared up during CAS check in using plain language prior to passing of the CAS briefing to
avoid issuing unsupportable instructions.

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a. Determine desired effects.
The first step in developing a game plan is to determine the ground force
commander’s desired effects and, if necessary, a proposed optimum combination of
ordnance and fusing to create those effects. This assessment should also factor in
the aircraft and SCLs that will likely show up in support. Factors to consider are:
(1) target composition (hard or soft target),
(2) target array (point target or dispersed),
(3) degree of protection (in the open or enclosed),
(4) collateral damage, and
(5) distance from friendlies.
Consideration should be given to the anticipated type of aircraft, aiming system,

delivery mode, threat, and required time to employ in order to select the most
appropriate weapon.
JTACs/FAC(A)s must have a working knowledge of ordnance effects as well as risk-

estimate distances (REDs) and the conditions under which those numbers were
derived. Consult appropriate REDs and determine if friendly troops are at risk. If
so, consult with the ground force commander and weigh the risks of all potential
courses of action before employing ordnance. After consideration of applicable
factors, JTACs/FAC(A)s should relay to aircraft the desired weapons effects and, if
necessary, a request for desired ordnance and fusing. Aircrew may suggest
alternate ordnance and fusing, based upon the ground force commander’s desired
effects.
b. Assess threat, determine SEAD requirements/ SEAD plan.
Plan for SEAD when attacking aircraft cannot avoid exposure to a threat based on
expected aircraft delivery profile and the threat‘s max effective range. Depending on
the threat system, SEAD planning may be extremely complicated and require
detailed integration with EW systems and fires agencies.
(1) IDF SEAD
When planning IDF SEAD, the SEAD timeline should be planned to suppress
the threat from the first aircraft‘s entry into the threat‘s max effective range until
after the last aircraft‘s exit from the threat‘s max effective range. If attack
geometry does not allow for this, interrupted suppression may be utilized.
Consideration must be given to the ability to deconflict through altitude

separation. If not feasible, an interrupted SEAD mission with a cessation of fires
in the middle may be required.
IDF SEAD and CAS may both prosecute the same threat, but consideration
must be given to obscuration caused by SEAD impacts. Effects of SEAD must
not prohibit successful CAS attacks.

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(2) EW SEAD – Modern radar guided threat systems may also require EW
support in order to effectively employ CAS, requiring detailed planning and
coordination.
(3) Threats may also be mitigated:
(a) Laterally - Use of standoff PGMs.
(b) Vertically - Aircraft maintain altitude sanctuary using over-flight

rules of thumb.
(c) Terrain masking.
(d) LOAL Hellfire.
(e) FW pop deliveries.
c. Select Method of Attack (BOT or BOC).
The optimum method of attack is chosen based on which method allows the quickest
and most effective target engagement and is dependent on: For basic
considerations on Methods of Attack see paragraph 3.9 Methods of Attack.
(1) the target type,
(2) tactical situation,
(3) JTACs ability to derive precise coordinates,
(4) combination of aircraft and ordnance available,
(5) weather.
Generally BOC method allows for shorter time to kill, as correlation is done through
readbacks.
d. Select Type of Terminal Attack Control (TAC).
For basic considerations on types of control see paragraph 3.10 Types of control
Type of TAC is based on several factors that include:
(1) JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s ability to observe either the aircraft or the target,
(2) best method to mitigate risk, and
(3) speed of target engagement.
Type of control must be consulted with and approved by supported commander.

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e. Plan aircraft interval.
JTACs/FAC(A)s can request specific impact intervals based on target, threat,

friendlies, artillery/SEAD/LASER deconfliction, ordnance, restrictions, weather, etc.
The aircrew, in coordination with the JTAC/FAC(A), is responsible for deriving their
own tactics in meeting the ground force commander’s intent.
f. Develop Sensor plan.
g. JTACs/FAC(A) should plan for allocation of the multiple sensors that may
be available for a CAS attack.
5.4.5 Development of correlation/marking plan.
JTAC/FAC(A) must plan for the most effective way of target correlation and marking to enable
the aircrew to engage the target. Available marking assets, third party contributors, method of
engagement and aircraft and ordnance capabilities must be considered. For marking and
correlation considerations see paragraphs 3.8 Correlation and Marking 5.4.15 Correlation.
a. BOC
No mark required for attacking aircraft. Line 7 is “Negative mark” or “No mark.”
If terminal guidance is used for LGWs, line 7 will state the LASER with the associated
PRF code (e.g., “Designation by Blackjack´s LASER, code 1688”).
b. BOT
Line 7 is the mark specific to the attacking aircraft
c. BOT and third party contributor correlation
Due to the expanding technological capabilities of manned and unmanned

platforms, weapons, and sensors, JTACs/FAC(A)s may employ a wide array of third
party contributors to aid in target location, precise coordinate generation, terminal
guidance, BDA and ISR collection. A third party contributor is any individual who is
integral to the success of the CAS attack based on the contributor’s ability to provide:
(1) target location,
(2) target marking,
(3) terminal guidance
(4) BDA.
Therefore, correlation is also required with third party contributors. A third party
contributor may be used to support either BOT or BOC attacks. Examples of third
party contributors are remote observers (scout, sniper, etc.), airborne platforms that
can provide terminal guidance (LASER equipped UAS, RW, and FW platforms), as
well as airborne platforms that can generate target location information or provide
target marking.

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5.4.6 Development of Attack Geometry.
JTACs/FAC(A)s must consider many factors when determining attack geometry and make an
educated compromise amongst these factors:
a. Safety of the aircraft:
(1) Safety from known threats
(2) Deconfliction from other fires – lateral or vertical deconfliction may be

necessary if de-confliction through time is not possible.
(3) Preplanned ACMs / FSCMs / other restrictions. Final attack headings

should not be planned over friendly positions, including occupied HAs, BPs, and
ACAs.
b. Target Acquisition/weapons employment/clearance requirements:
(1) Aircraft acquisition of the target / mark.
(2) JTAC/FAC(A) visual acquisition of aircraft.
(3) LASER geometry.
(4) LASER terminal guidance.
c. Safety of friendly forces.
(1) JTACs/FAC(A)s must be aware of the effects of short or long hits along
the bomb-fall line or weapon-to-target line. In general, FAHs should be planned
to be as close to parallel to the FLOT as possible.
d. Target disposition / orientation.
(1) For linear target sets, FAHs should generally be planned along the long
axis of the target set.
(2) Movement direction – attack along expected axis of target movement if

able.
(3) Urban canyon – optimally, plan to attack along urban canyons.
(4) Terrain – significant terrain, such as mountains, may influence FAHs due
to terrain masking targets or interfering with delivery profiles.
e. Weather
(1) Winds–crosswinds >30 knots may affect probability of LASER acquisition

for LGBs. Priority for LGB FAHs is tailwind, then headwind, then crosswind.

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(2) Sun / moon position and angle. FAHs that force an aircraft to attack into
the sun, or a bright moon that is low on the horizon, make it difficult for aircrew
to acquire targets. This is especially true for FW diving and RW attacks. FAHs
that allow aircraft to attack out of the sun may provide increased protection from
IR MANPADS.
(3) Cloud decks in the target area may affect FAHs.
f. JTACs/FAC(A)s should be aware of the off-axis capability of RW and UAS

platforms. This could mean that RW and UAS platforms are not pointed at the
target, but the munitions will follow the briefed geometry. In this case, it may be
more appropriate to brief an munitions attack azimuth rather than a final attack
heading.
g. Determine IP / BP and egress plan to support attack geometry (lines

1,2,3,9, FAH). JTACs should strive to use control points for ingress and egress
that do not force aircraft to make inordinately large turns to abide by FAHs.
Section III Close Air Support Execution Template.

By its very nature, the execution of CAS differs in every tactical situation. The following
considerations and recommendations are meant to be a guide for execution of CAS, so that
both CAS aircrew and JTAC/FAC(A)s have a standard, repeatable format to expect in the
highly dynamic CAS environment. The execution template is a technique used to organize the
flow of events from when an aircraft first checks in with a JTAC/FAC(A), through a CAS brief
and attack, to when the aircraft checks out:
(1) Routing/Safety of flight
(2) CAS Aircraft check-in
(3) Situation Update
(4) Game Plan
(5) CAS brief
(6) Remarks/Restrictions
(7) Readbacks
(8) Correlation
(9) Attack
(10) Assessment of effects
(11) BDA
(12) Routing/Safety of flight
Discipline on the radio.

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Military operations in coalition environment pose great challenge to language proficiency of all
players. CAS due to it’s inherent complexity brings together players from multiple nations that
must accomplish common task. Despite all the efforts to standardize the language proficiency,
problems with language barrier may arise. Poor communications caused by frequency
interference or enemy electronic warfare may also hamper communications necessary for
execution of CAS mission. For this reason all players are strongly encourage to:
a. Follow the templates set up in this allied standard to avoid confusion
b. Keep their transmissions short, clear and concise
c. Deliver messages at moderate speed
d. Avoid using slang on the radio
e. Hold on to procedures set forth in Allied Communication Publication ACP-

125 Communication Instructions Radiotelephone Procedures.
f. Use appropriate brevity terms in accordance with this publication and Allied
Standard APP-7 Joint Brevity Words whenever possible.
A brevity code is a single word or phrase that does not provide security but
shortens the message rather than concealing its content. Using brevity eases
coordination and improves understanding in tactical communications since
brevity codes have only one meaning. In periods of communications jamming,
brevity is required to “get the message across” since transmissions must be
minimized. CAS players should always use brevity for clearer and more concise
communications.
5.4.7 Battle staff coordination prior to aircraft check in.
Battle staff coordination is essential to ensure that CAS is integrated with surface fires and
maneuver forces to meet the commanders intent.
a. ALO should initiate the activity within TOC, verify deconfliction plan,
activate ACA and alert JTACs/FAC(A)s.
b. Intelligence officer should verify enemy size, activity, location, unit, time
equipment (SALUTE) and update supported commander/operations officer.
c. Supported commander/Operations officer should initiate tactical risk

assessment (verify positions of friendly forces, civilians and collateral damage
concerns). Update ALO and JTACs/FAC(A)s.
d. Fire Support Officer should provide information about current fires. Alert
units providing support (marking, SEAD) and observers. Coordinate ACA
deconfliction and TOT/TTT.
e. Air Defense Officer should inform AD assets of inbound friendly aircraft,

adjust Weapon Control Order, brief ALO on weapon control status (for weapon
control status see paragraph 3.2 COordination.).

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5.4.8 Routing/Safety of Flight –
Authentication. JTAC/FAC(A)and aircrew shall establish good two way communications.

When working on unsecure nets authentication shall not be omitted, unless stated otherwise
in the SPINS. Authentication must be conducted in accordance with established procedures.
Check in on secure nets is considered authentication, unless SPINS dictate otherwise.
Following authentication the aircrew should immediately inform JTAC/FAC(A) about his
position and altitude in order to facilitate deconfliction and routing instructions.
JTAC/FAC(A)must be prepared to deconflict assets (i.e., aircraft from aircraft, aircraft from
surface fires, and aircraft from known threats.) JTAC/FAC(A)must advise aircrew of available
airspace and desired IP/hold point locations for the attack. At initial aircraft check-in, ALO /
JTAC/FAC(A) shall respond with, in order:
a. Aircraft routing / holding instructions.
Upon initial contact each controller shall at least give “maintain” instructions in order
to establish control of aircraft:
“Razor 53, maintain Chevy-Dodge 14-15”
If unsure of aircraft‘s current position and altitude, JTAC/FAC(A) must request this
information prior to giving routing / safety of flight instructions in order to avoid
potential conflicts:
“Hawg 23 say current pos and altitude”
If using an unbriefed keyhole template for holding, the JTAC/FAC(A) must pass the
center of the keyhole to the aircraft prior to passing holding instructions.
“Latch 65, keyhole in effect, echo point is november uniform nine one eight three
five seven, proceed Alpha ten, angels 14-16”
b. Other aircraft on station.
If no other aircraft, that should be stated:
“Latch 65 proceed Chevy-Dodge hold 13-15, you are the only aircraft on station.”
c. Immediate threats:
“Deuce 21 proceed Emily to Adder maintain below 1500’ AGL, there is a ZSU23-4
vicinity of compound 34, you are the only aircraft on station.”
d. Any other info necessary for safety of flight.
e. Significant weather/terrain
“Razor 57 proceed Frog-Gambler angels twenty-five, at Frog-Gambler, descend and hold

sixteen block eighteen, report established; you have Latch 65 flight of 2 at Chevy-Dodge
thirteen block fifteen, Wildcard 73 in ACA Sony seven to 8k’, and Venom 15 in Betty 2k’ AGL
and below; hold your check-in, attack in progress”

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“Deuce 23 proceed HA Betty, stay below 2k’ MSL en route, gun position 12 is hot, gun target
line three four zero. You are the only air on station, send your check-in”
To maintain SA to where aircraft are during routing, JTACs/FAC(A) may request status calls
from aircrew. Some common calls used to maintain awareness are:
Example Routing Calls
“Proceed xxxx and report established” Call for aircrew to proceed to a

location/elevation and verbally report when
established
“Maintain xxxx” Directive call for aircrew to hold at the

specified location/altitude
“Report passing xxxx” Call for aircrew to verbally report passing the
specified altitude
NOTE: Bringing the aircraft immediately into the overhead is common trend in low threat
environment. Having aircraft in the overhead aids in target acquisition when using visual Talk-
On or IR pointers, however in current operations where aircraft are equipped with advanced
sensors, that enable target acquisition from distances exceeding 5 NM and with PGMs that
are generally released in distances exceeding 3 NM, holding aircraft in the overhead does not
provide any significant advantage. Tactical targets will be alerted by presence of the aircraft
and will react. Holding the aircraft with sensors and PGMs in such direction and distance that
allows for immediate start of the attack run as soon as correlation is completed significantly
shortens time to kill without hampering most correlation methods and helps to achieve surprise.
5.4.9 CAS Aircraft Check-in.
Aircraft check-in procedures are essential for establishing the required flow of information
between the CAS aircrews and control agencies. Controlling agencies should update all CAS
assets on the current situation en route to the target. Consequently, it is important for the
JTAC/FAC(A) to brief the current situation to the AOCC allowing CAS aircraft to arrive with the
most current information available.
JTACs/FAC(A)s should be directive about when they want the aircraft check-in.
Example: “Latch 65 send your check-in”
There may be a reason to delay taking or abbreviate the aircraft check-in: an attack in progress,
JTAC/FAC(A) not ready to copy, or JTAC/FAC(A) waiting for aircraft to contact a different
terminal controller prior to passing the check-in.
If aircraft are on the ATO and the JTAC/FAC(A) have a copy of the ATO, the CAS asset may
check-in “as fragged” and subsequent transmissions may be minimized.

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This brief may be abbreviated for brevity or security (“as fragged” or “with exception”).
Capabilities examples include, sensors, Link-16, and etc. JTACs/FAC(A)s and CAS aircrew
should strive to minimize multiple unnecessary check-ins. If the JTAC/FAC(A) is planning on
passing the aircraft to another controller, consideration should be given to waiting until talking
to the JTAC/FAC(A) that will be working with the aircraft to give the full CAS check-in.
Example: “Latch 65 hold your check-in, attack in progress”
Example: “Latch 65, Broadsword 11 will take your check-in once you contact him on Amber”
Depending on the situation, a JTAC/FAC(A) may ask for only those parts of the check-in he
currently needs.
Example: “Latch 65, hold your full check-in, say ordnance and play-time.”
Example: “Venom 15, do you have Papa Hellfire aboard?”
Close Air Support Check-In Briefing
(Aircraft transmits to controller)

Aircraft “___________,” this is “___________” (e.g., “Heartless 52, this is Rumble 31”)
(JTAC c/s) (Aircraft c/s)

1. Mission Number ____________. (e.g., “Mission number 1541”)
(ATO assigned MSN #)

2. Number and type of aircraft: _________. (e.g., “2 by F/A-18C”)
3. Position and altitude: ________. (e.g., “Currently 20 nm north of Ford, block 20-21”)
4. Ordnance: ______. (e.g., “500 rds of 20mm, 1 by GBU-12, 1 by GBU-38 each aircraft,
LASER
codes Rumble 31-1688, Rumble 32-1731, instantaneous and delayed fuzing for GBU-12s
and
GBU-38s”)
5. Playtime or Time on Station: _______. (e.g., “We have 25 minutes time on station”)
6. Capabilities: FAC(A), Type of Sensors, Link-16, VDL code, SITREPs on board, map
version or GRGs, UAS Lost Link Procedures/Route: (e.g., “Rumble 31 is FAC(A) capable.
Both aircraft are ATFLIR, and CAT II coordinate generation capable. Timber Sweet, Rumble
31 VDL code 4927. Rumble 32, VDL code 4977. We have SITREP C and micro-GRG 15-
17 onboard.”)
7. Abort code: ______. (e.g., “Abort code none, Ready to copy your updated SITREP.”)

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MNPOPCA–The abbreviation MNPOPCA is useful for remembering the order of the check-in.
a. Mission number. Alphanumeric code assigned to each mission in the

ATO. JTAC/FAC(A) should record the mission number for further reporting
(MISREP).
b. Number and type of aircraft.
c. Position and altitude. Aircrew should describe their position relative to

points JTAC/FAC(A) is familiar with in order to be able to safely deconflict the
aircraft such as:
(1) Control Points established in the SPINS (CPs, IPs)
“5NM west of IP Chevy”
(2) GARS/CGRS keypad
“Holding in 86CG9”
(3) JTAC position (if it is known to the aircrew)
“10NM north of your position”
FW Altitude is usually expressed in feet AMSL or flight level. RW altitude is usually

expressed in feet AGL. Aircrew may also state the altitude block that they have been
assigned by the airspace control authority.
d. Ordnance. Flight lead should state number and types of weapons per
aircraft. If aircraft are carrying different weapons load it must be clearly stated.
Information should include:
(1) Number of rounds for gun
(2) Number and type of bombs to include:
(a) Fuse settings/possibility to set fuses from the cockpit
(b) LASER code for LGBs
(3) Number of rockets. If aircraft is carrying rockets that can deliver other than
kinetic effects (illumination, smoke) it should be clearly stated.
(4) Number and type of missiles (with LASER code, if LASER guided)
e. Playtime / time on station.
f. Capabilities. If not stated by the aircraft, the following items may be asked
for by the JTAC/FAC(A).
(1) Sensor type and capability (type of targeting pod, NVG capability).

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(2) VDL capability and code(s).
(3) Current SITREPs identifier (see Sit Update add ref).
(4) Map / reference graphic version on board.
(5) Capability to generate precise coordinates.
(6) VMF / Link-16 (Timber).
g. Abort code. It is established in order to enable JTAC/FAC(A) to stop the

attack if tactical situation requires.
If communications are unsecure or need to be switched from secure to unsecure,

then an abort code should be passed based on SPINS/SOP for area (e.g., TRIAD
authentication matrix, Ramrod). The CAS abort procedure can use the
“challenge-reply” method to authenticate the abort command.
During the CAS check in briefing, the flight lead gives the JTAC/FAC(A) a
challenge code for use with the flight lead’s flight only. The JTAC/FAC(A) refers
to the authentication document, finds the reply, and notes but does not transmit
it. The reply ‘letter’ becomes the “abort code.” If no abort code was briefed, then
the CAS attack is aborted by simply transmitting: “ABORT, ABORT, ABORT”
The JTAC may elect to use a single abort code for all aircraft under his control in
situations where multiple flights of aircraft with multiple abort codes would be
problematic. In such cases the JTAC/FAC(A) needs to state this nonstandard
procedure during the situation update and establish the code.
Anytime an abort message is transmitted, a new abort code shall be established.
If abort code is passed using challenge/reply method, JTAC/FAC(A)must read

back the challenge to ensure accuracy.
h. Any non-standard requests by the aircrew (such as use of different map

datum than WGS-84, use of HAE for target elevation, use of Lat Long for line 6)
must be clearly stated during CAS check in.
If the JTAC/FAC(A) is unfamiliar with any of the aircraft’s capabilities, they should ask
questions in plain language at this time in order to avoid developing and issuing unsupportable
instructions.
Note: Abort Code (challenge) must be read back by JTAC/FAC(A) to the aircrew upon
completion of the check in.
Ground commander’s back brief
After aircraft check in is received JTAC/FAC(A) must brief supported commander on CAS
aircraft capabilities related to ground commander’s intent for CAS. This information may
include playtime, weapons available, sensors, capabilities and other information deemed
necessary for the supported commander to make decision how to use CAS most efficiently.

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5.4.10 Situation Update.
The situation update brief is a tool used to increase all players’ SA to the level required by the
tactical situation. The objective of the situation update is to build the oncoming aircrew’s SA
to the level necessary to conduct the expected mission. The brief must be missionized based
on the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s expectations of the use of the CAS asset. Two example techniques
for the situation update brief are below:
Situation Update Example 1
(TTFACOR)
Situation Close Air Support (CAS) Battlefield Handover (BHO)

Update Line Situation Update
Threat - General locations of surface-to-air - General locations of surface-to-air

threats not already covered threats not already covered
- Time of last observed surface-to- - Time of last observed surface to air

air fires may also be passed fires may also be passed
Targets - General enemy disposition - General enemy disposition. Include

GCE targeting priorities.
- Avoid giving a list of grids. Specific
- Include target location grids, may
targets and locations will be require breaking up the transmission
addressed in CAS briefs
- GCE Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM)
and Target Priority List (TPL)
Friendly - General friendly situation and scheme of maneuver
- Use georefs, phase lines, checkpoints, etc. Technique is to use general
terms: “all friendlies are east of the 94 easting”
- Friendly grids should not be passed if it can be avoided. If necessary, use

no more than 6 digits
- Should include all friendlies that may be a factor during TOS, not just joint
JTAC
*- Include all CAS assets, ordnance, and TOS remaining for BHO
Artillery - IDF assets that may be a factor - Firing unit location, call sign,
during TOS, may include general frequency, status
direction of fire
Clearance - May be omitted if the speaker has control

Authority
- If there may be confusion due to multiple voices on TAD, roles should be
clarified: “Savage 13 has control and is located in the COC, my JFO call
sign E4B is located with Charlie company, and is up this net”
- Define who has which elements of brief, stack, mark, and control

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*- If not already prebriefed, a game plan for the approval of fires should be
passed for BHO.
Ordnance - Expected ordnance required to achieve ground commander’s intent.
- Any restrictions to ordnance allowed such as no CBUs or low CD bombs

only
Remarks and - Additional radio calls that will be - Additional radio calls that will be
Restrictions included for the whole TOS included for the whole TOS
- JTAC capabilities (LASER, IR - Hazards (WX) or other remarks

sparkle, VDL, etc.)
- At the conclusion, a positive passing
- Intent for aircraft (CAS, MIR, etc.) of the appropriate elements of brief,
- Hazards (WX) or other remarks stack, mark, and control should occur
Example Situation Updates:
CAS: “Current surface-to-air threat is a SA-6 at KJ 123 456, just west of MSR Tampa; target
is light armored company attempting to flank us to the north and two companies dug in three
klicks to our west, break.”
“Friendlies are two companies in the vicinity of OP 2, one on the high ground and the other
in a blocking position to the east. I am with the company on the high ground. There is also
a Recon team at the northwest tip of Black Mountain, arty is firecapped at Firebase 5E, firing
generally west, break.”
“Savage 13 has control. Plan on using your GP bombs to disrupt the light armor. Winds on
the deck are 10-knots out of the west. Savage is LASER and IR capable, advise when ready
for gameplan.”
Situation Update Example 2

(TEFACHR)
Situation Close Air Support (CAS) Battlefield Handover (BHO)
Update Line Situation Update
Threat - General locations of surface-to- - General locations of surface-to-air

air threats not already covered. threats not already covered.
- Time of last observed surface-to- - Time of last observed surface to air

air fires may also be passed. fires may also be passed.
-Type of suppression, if applicable

(EW, artillery).

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Enemy - General enemy disposition. -General enemy disposition.

situation
- Avoid giving a list of grids. Include ground combat element
Specific targets and locations will (GCE) targeting priorities.
be addressed in CAS briefs.
- Include target location grids, may
require breaking up the transmission.
- GCE attack guidance matrix and

target priority list.
Friendly - General friendly situation and scheme of maneuver.
-Use geographic references, phase lines, checkpoints, etc. Technique is

to
use general terms: “all friendlies are east of the 94 easting.”
- Friendly grids should not be passed if it can be avoided. If necessary,

use no
more than 6 digits.
- Should include all friendlies that may be a factor during time on station
(TOS),
not just joint terminal attack controller (JTAC).
- Include all CAS assets, ordnance, and TOS remaining for BHO.
Artillery - Indirect fire assets that may be a - Firing unit location, call sign,
factor during TOS, frequency, status.
-Include location of firing units (if

unknown to the aircrew)
-Specify type of deconfliction, if

not already covered during routing
to include GTL, Max Ord etc.
-fires supporting CAS (marking,

SEAD)
Clearance - May be omitted if the speaker has control.
Authority - If there may be confusion due to multiple voices on tactical air direction,
roles should be clarified: “Savage 13 has control and is located in the

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COC, my FO call sign E4B is located with Charlie company, and is up this
net.”
- Define who has which elements of brief, stack, mark, and control.
- If not already prebriefed, a game plan for the approval of fires should be
passed for BHO.
Hazards -obstacles for low flying aviation (towers, masts, high voltage powerlines,
high ground, places where birds gather,…)
-significant weather (if factor- include information on winds, visibility,

precipitation etc.)
Remarks and -Additional radio calls that will be - Additional radio calls that will be
included for the whole TOS.
Restrictions included for the whole TOS.
- JTAC capabilities (LASER,
infrared sparkle, video downlink, - Hazards (weather) or other
etc.) remarks.
- Intent for aircraft (CAS, - At the conclusion, a positive

multisensory, imagery passing
reconnaissance, etc.).
of the appropriate elements of brief,
-Other remarks
stack, mark, and control should
occur.
-Other remarks
Example Situation Updates:
CAS:
“Current surface-to-air threat is a SA-8 at WQ 123 456, Break”
“Enemy is light armored company attempting to flank us to the north and two companies
dug in three klicks to our west, break.”
“Friendlies are two companies west of Phase Line Maple, I am with the southern element.
There is also a Forward Observer team, CS Steelrain 15 located 1km east of PL Maple on
high ground north of MSR ,break.”
“Artillery will provide SEAD and marking, expect separation by time. Arty position WQ 101
235, GTL 350°, Max Ord 5500ft AMSL, break.”

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“Savage 13 has control, expect type 2 and 3 controls. I am VDL, LASER and IR capable.
Steelrain 15 has eyes on target, is LASER and IR capable and will provide terminal
guidance, break”.
“ Winds on the deck are 10-knots out of the west, visibility 5+ expect light rain shower.
Advise when ready for game plan.”
The length and depth of the situation update must be balanced with the need to pass game
plans and CAS briefs in order to create timely and desired effects. Not all elements must be
passed to all aircraft. Situation updates that are read too quickly, are excessively long, or pass
unnecessary information waste time and decrease SA. JTACs/FAC(A)s should break up the
situation update into manageable transmissions. A situation update that is rattled off to
aircrews that are just arriving into a dynamic scenario will most likely not be copied. For
example, in a situation where the JTAC is in a ‘troops in contact’ situation, has requested air,
has done thorough coordination with the fires approval chain, and is simply waiting on aircraft
to check-in to execute a BOC attack, the situation update would be relatively short. On the
other hand a JTAC/FAC(A) giving a situation update to an aircrew who is preparing to conduct
urban overwatch of a friendly patrol may require a more detailed brief.
If time and tactical situation allows JTACs/FAC(A)s should pass their update to appropriate
C2 element (such as higher echelon TACP, AOCC) who will pass it to the attack aircraft to
alleviate the need for the JTAC/FAC(A) to pass a full situation update. Situation updates may
be given alphanumeric codes. Upon initial check-in with the JTAC/FAC(A), aircraft should state
the code for the situation update they have received. Changes to the situation update may be
passed by the TACP as aircraft check on station. If appropriate, JTACs/FAC(A)s may pass
specific AO situation updates as well.
The situation update is also a format recognized for battlefield handover between terminal
controllers (i.e., JTAC to JTAC or FAC(A)). The format should be adapted to the mission and
only those items required to accomplish the expected mission should be passed. Passing
redundant or nonessential information increases time-to-kill and should be avoided.
Situation Update is not required to be readback by the aircrew, unless requested by

JTAC/FAC(A).
5.4.11 Game Plan.
NOTE: If there are questions regarding aircraft capabilities, ordnance, tactics etc., these
should be cleared up using plain language prior to passing of the CAS briefing to avoid issuing
unsupportable instructions.
When conducting coordinated attacks or third-party lasing, the coordinated attack instructions
should at first be briefed to all players followed by single element game plan as appropriate.
Using the term “in order” establishes the order the aircrew should respond to the
JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s calls, establishing good communication cadence. This cadence order should
match the order the JTAC/FAC(A) is planning on executing the attack.
Example: “Latch 65 and Venom 11, in order, advise when ready for game plan”

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a. The coordinated attack instructions and flow of attack must be stated, if

applicable.
(1) Combined.
(2) Sectored.
(3) Simultaneous.
(4) Sequential
Example: “Razor 55 and Deuce 23, this will be a combined sequential

attack with Razor flight attacking first, followed by Deuce 23 two minutes
in trail of Razor 56’s impacts, Razor 55 advise when ready for game plan”
Example: “Latch 65 and Venom 11, this will be a sectored simultaneous

attack, Latch 65 to the east, Venom 11 to the west; Latch 65 advise when
ready for game plan”
b. Third party contributors to CAS mission, their roles, call signs and
frequencies.
This information should be stated in plain language so as all players understand

their roles and tasks. When using an off-board element to host a LASER guided
weapon, the JTAC/FAC(A) shall include the lasing entities call sign and frequency
in the game plan. Off-board platforms providing LASER to other elements
requires detailed coordination among all players. JTACs/FAC(A)s shall also
ensure they correlate with the lasing platform.
Example: “Razor 55 and Deuce 23, we have JFO call sign Steel 13, he is on
this net. He will provide Talk-OnTalk-ons and BDA. Razor 55 advise when
ready for game plan”
Example: “Latch 65 and Venom 11, we have MQ-1 on station at FL 120, call
sign Reaper 44, he has eyes on target and will provide LASER handoff.
Advise when ready for game plan”
c. Individual Game Plan.
Each attack element must be given a game plan. Minimum information in the
single element game plan shall include at minimum:
(1) Type of Control
(2) Method of Attack
Additional information may include:
(3) Ordnance requested/fusing/effect on target/ commanders intent
(4) Interval between attacks

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“Deuce 21, Type 1, guns only, advise when ready for CAS Brief”
“Latch 65, Type 2, bomb on coordinate, one GBU38 instantaneous fusing

from each aircraft, simultaneous impact, 8-digit grid to follow, advise when
ready for CAS Brief”
“Venom 15, Type 3, bomb on target, I need all BRDMs and enemy personnel in
the vicinity destroyed, advise when ready for CAS Brief”
NOTE: When requesting LGMs JTAC/FAC(A) should clearly state who will provide
designation to avoid confusion between possible LASER hand off and actual
designation:
“Silvo 21, Type 2, bomb on target, 1x GBU-12 self lased, advise when ready for
CAS Brief”
“Viper 55, Type 2, bomb on coordinates 1x GBU-12 on my LASER, advise when

ready for CAS Brief”
“Pluto 35, Type 2, bomb on coordinates, 1x GBU-12 on Blackjack 13´s LASER,

advise when ready for CAS Brief”
When briefing Game plan JTAC/FAC(A) should avoid repeating information that will be given
in other parts of the CAS brief.
The JTAC/FAC(A) should read the first element’s entire game plan, CAS brief, and remarks /
restrictions prior to the second element’s game plan, CAS brief and remarks/restrictions in
order to maintain good communication cadence.
By giving the coordinated attack instructions first, all aircrews should be paying attention to the
game plans and CAS briefs given to other elements. If all elements are attacking the same
target (combined attack), the JTAC/FAC(A) has the option of issuing a CAS brief to the first
element, and simply issuing changes to the CAS brief for the second element.
When briefing coordinated attacks, the JTAC/FAC(A) may state “Hold all readbacks” in the
remarks portion of each CAS brief so the JTAC/FAC(A) transmits briefs for all elements prior
to receiving readbacks. The JTAC/FAC(A) should then request readbacks when he is ready.
The JTAC/FAC(A) may also get readbacks immediately following the attack briefs to each
element if this better fits the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s habit pattern.
5.4.12 CAS Brief.
Elements of a CAS Brief will not be passed piecemeal over several minutes and out of
sequence. JTACs/FAC(A)s must read the CAS Brief at a moderate pace. Information that is
read too quickly increases confusion and delays time to kill when it is required to be said again.
The first 9 lines require the line header to be read before data for that line is passed. Units (if
applicable) may be included. These lines should be read at least in 3 transmissions of three
lines each.

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CAS brief should be prefaced by: “Aircraft call sign, advise when ready for CAS Brief”.
JTACs/FAC(A)s should ensure they are ready to pass the CAS brief prior to asking the aircraft.
Line 1 - IP or BP. Items for line 1 are:
a. 1.IP or BP by name “IP Mazda”
b. 2. Hasty BP “Hasty BP, center grid Papa Uniform One-two-three-four, 2x2”
Line 2 - Heading and Offset. The heading is expressed in three sequential digits in degrees
magnetic (unless requested differently by the aircrew).JTACs/FAC(A)s give an offset (offset
left/right) if a restriction exists.
“Heading Zero-Eight-Five, offset left”
Line 3 - Distance. For fixed wing aircraft, the distance is given in nautical miles and should be
accurate to a tenth of a nautical mile. For attack helicopters, the distance is given in meters
from the center of the BP and is accurate to the nearest 100 meters.
“Distance seven-decimal-one nautical miles”
“Distance five one zero zero meters”
NOTE: Lines 1-3 shall not be omitted („Lines 1-3 N/A“). Instead JTAC/FAC(A) shall state „Lines
1-3 from the overhead.“. If keyhole template is used, lines 1-3 may be expressed as „Lines 1-
3 AB@7”(Start the attack 7NM North East).
Line 4 - Target Elevation. The target elevation is given in feet MSL, unless requested
differently by the aircrew. It shall be read as sequential digits.
“Elevation one-six-five-zero feet.”
“Elevation three- six- five feet height above ellipsoid.”
Line 5 - Target Description. The target should be described accurately and concisely using
plain language. If target sorts are required, they should be given later as part of amplifying
information so as not to disrupt the flow of the CAS brief.
“Target is three tanks in revetment”
“Target is machine gun position in treeline”
“Target is enemy personnel in building”
Line 6 - Target Location. The JTAC/FAC(A) provides the target location in 3 specific manners:
a. Grid coordinates. If using grid coordinates, JTACs/FAC(A)s should

include the grid zone designator and must include the 100,000 meter square
identification. JTAC/FAC(A) may also include number of digits to be stated in
line 6. Significant pause should be made between easting and northing. Using
“Break” between easting and northing should be avoided as it can be easily
confused with figure eight.

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“Location-six digit grid to follow: Three-three Uniform, Victor Quebec, one- two-three
(pause), four-five-six.
b. Latitude and longitude. Care should be taken to clearly communicate

which specific format (DMM/DMS). Units (degrees, minutes, decimal
minutes/seconds) should be specified. Easting/Westing degrees should be
expressed as 3-digit number.
“Location North four niner degrees, one five, decimal one one two minutes, East
zero one six degrees, four five decimal eight one one minutes.”
“Location North four niner degrees, one five minutes, three five seconds, East zero
one eight degrees, four five minutes, one five seconds.”
c. Offset from a known point. Direction and distance from a geographical,

man-made feature, navigational aid, or mark that the aircrew is familiar with.
“Building 145 in sector Papa 8 of macro GRG.”
“200 meters east of the intersection of Gas Station and Baseline roads.”
“150 meters southeast of friendly position.”
When describing position of a moving target, JTAC/FAC(A) should include:
a. Geographic location where the aircrew can start looking for target in MGRS,
L/L coordinates or known point (TRP, GRG reference point)
b. Route and direction of travel
c. Estimated speed
“Heartless 21, Punisher 99, the target is a single tactical vehicle in the vicinity of Papa Uniform
123 … 456, traveling Northeast along route Michigan at approximately 50 kilometers per hour.”
Note: Lines 4 through 6 will not be combined into one statement such as “Lines 4
through 6, from your system” or “Lines 4 through 6, from the talk-on.”
Line 7-Mark Type/Terminal Guidance. Specify what type of mark JTAC will use
(smoke, LASER, or IR). If using a LASER, the JTAC/FAC(A) will also pass the LASER
code that will be used. If LASER code on weapons is not selectable from the cockpit,
JTAC/FAC(A) or third party contributor providing designation must set the LASER code
that was reported during CAS check in. If third party (such as UAV, Forward Observer,
another aircraft) will provide target marking or designation, call sign of the third party
must be provided (unless already provided in the game plan).It must be clearly stated
if LASER will be used for marking or also for target designation.
“Mark None”
“Mark White Phosphorus”

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“Mark IR Pointer”
“Mark by Blackjack´s LASER, Code 1688”
“Designation by my LASER, Code 1688”
Line 8 -Friendlies. Cardinal/subcardinal direction from the target (N, NE, E, SE, S,
SW, W, or NW) and distance of the closest friendly position from the target in meters
“ Friendlies South 300 meters”.
Line 9-Egress. Egress instructions can be given as a cardinal direction, by using

control points or, if the operational environment allows, by stating “Egress at pilot’s
discretion.” If keyhole template is used, it can be used to give egress instructions as
well. Consideration should be given to provide egress altitude.
Examples:
“Egress North”
“Egress back to IP Mazda, block 10-12ft AMSL”
“Egress AB@7” (7NM North East)
5.4.13 Remarks and Restrictions
Only those elements that are applicable and have not previously been briefed should be
included.
5.4.13.1 REMARKS:
a. LTL/PTL in degrees magnetic. It is to be expressed as sequential three

digits.
“LASER to Target Line one-eight-zero”
b. Desired type/number of ordnance or weapons effect
“One GBU-38, instantaneous fusing”
c. Surface-to-air threat (type, location, type of suppression, GTL for SEAD).
“Threat is SA-6 on grid WQ 123 456. It will be suppressed by arty, expect continuous
SEAD from TOT minus 2 till plus 2, GTL 158 degrees magnetic.”
“SA-13 600m NW from your target.”
“Expect small arms fire, MANDPADS reported by the intel, location unknown.”
d. Active GTLs/Additional fires.
“Artillery position Delta is active, GTL 225 degrees, Max Ord 9000ft MSL.

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e. Weather. To be briefed it has any impact on execution of CAS mission.
“Visibility 3km due to rain shower”
“Wind from the west at 30kts”
“Low cloud base, estimated 3000ft AGL”.
f. Hazards to aviation.
“High voltage powerlines 2km South of target”
g. Additional radio calls as requested. JTAC/FAC(A) may delay request for

additional required radio calls until correlation is completed.
IP inbound. “Report IP inbound”
In with heading or cardinal direction. “Call IN with heading”
Time to roll-in / release. “Push when ready”
h. Additional remarks. The following information may be included if

applicable (list not exhaustive):
Additional target information including TLE category. “Be advised CAT 5

coordinates”
JTAC/FAC(A) additional existing/missing capabilities
“I am NVG/IR pointer capable”
“VDL receiver is not operational”
Rules of engagement. “ROE XXX in effect”
Other
5.4.13.2 RESTRICTIONS.
The following information is always a restriction and must be included if applicable. Additional
restrictions are at the discretion of the JTAC/FAC(A). All passed restrictions shall be read
back.
a. Final Attack Headings
(1) Magnetic heading
“Final attack heading 230”
(2) Magnetic heading with cone
“Final attack heading 240-300”

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“Final attack heading 270 plus or minus 30”
(3) Use of cardinal/subcardinal directions
“Make your attack from northeast to the southwest”
(4) Use geographical references
“Make your attack parallel to the road”
b. Danger Close with commanders initials
“Danger close, commanders initials Juliet Sierra”
c. Airspace coordination area
d. PLA point or direction/distance, and circumstances for executing PLA

(if applicable).
e. TOT/TTT
While technically a timing ACA and a restriction, to indicate the end of the
restrictions/remarks portion, TOT/TTT should be last. If the TOT/TTT has not been
assigned yet, “Standby TOT/TTT,” or “TOT/TTT will be issued after correlation”
should be used.
Before assigning TOT to the aircrew JTAC/FAC(A) must conduct time check
to make sure all players are on the same timeline.
Example: JTAC: “Hawg 53, time check follows: minute 34, seconds 15,16,17,18”
Aircrew: “The same/ Good check”
NOTE: When using frequency agile or encrypted radios there is an inherent 1-2
second delay in transmissions, therefore tolerance of 2-3 seconds in time check is
generally considered a good check.
(1) BOC.TOT/TTT may be assigned as part of restrictions since BOC

correlation is complete with correct readbacks. JTACs/FAC(A)s should assign
TOT/TTTs that allow aircrew time to set up their systems, provide readbacks,
and ingress to the target area. TOT/TTTs must also take into account other fires
and movement integrated with the CAS attack.
(2) BOT JTAC/FAC(A) may choose to delay assigning TOT/TTT until

correlation is completed.
(3) TOT/TTT assigned after correlation - For a BOT attack that may require
lengthy correlation, JTACs should consider waiting until after correlation is
complete to assign the TOT. This alleviates multiple TOTs being passed due to
correlation taking longer than expected.

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(4) TOT/TTT assigned before correlation – When correlation is to occur as an

offset from a mark, TOTs may be established prior to correlation since
correlation requires the mark to be in place.
Examples:
“TOT minute 20 and 0 seconds”
“TTT 3 minutes and 0 seconds”
(5) “Push when ready” vs. “Immediate” – There may be times when issuing
a TOT is unnecessary and aircrews may proceed on a timeline of their
discretion. JTACs/FAC(A)s should use the terms “Push when ready” in this
case. The word “Immediate” in relation to TOT infers a level of urgency that
may result in task-shedding on the part of all players. “Immediate” TOTs should
be reserved for when that level of urgency truly exists.
If the aircrew are not be able to make the specified TOT/TTT, they must tell the
JTAC what TOT/TTT they can make, so the JTAC/FAC(A) can begin the
approval process for that TOT/TTT, vice the JTAC/FAC(A) making multiple
guesses as what TOT/TTT the aircrew will be able to make.
5.4.14 Readbacks.
The aircrew shall read back all mandatory readback items, ie:
a. Line 4 (Elevation)
b. Line 6 (Location)
c. Line 8 (Friendly position)
d. All applicable restrictions.
e. Any additional data requested by JTAC/FAC(A)
JTACs should respond to correct aircrew readbacks with
“Call sign readback correct” or “Call sign good readback.”
If the readback is not correct the JTAC/FAC(A)must restate the portion in question correctly
and request additional readback:
“Deuce 21 correction, final attack headings 1-8-0 through 2-1-0, read back!”
NOTE: For BOT attacks the flight lead will provide readbacks, unless directed otherwise
by JTAC/FAC(A).
For BOC attacks all aircraft delivering ordnance shall provide readbacks of lines 4 and
6 from aircraft navigation kit or from the weapon. The aircrew must state that they are
providing system read back from system or weapon.

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“From my system (weapon): elevation 1650 feet, position 33U, WQ 12345 67890, friendlies
West 500.”
If the JTAC/FAC(A) does not receive readbacks from all aircraft, but desires them, he should
continue to request those readbacks required to positively control the attack.
For BOT attacks where no grid was provided in line 6, if capable, the aircraft should include
the target location during the read back to provide situational awareness to other members of
the CAS stack, the fires clearance personnel and to aid the JTAC/FAC(A) in the BDA report.
5.4.15 Correlation.
The process by which the JTAC/FAC(A) coordinates and confirms that the attacking aircraft
and/or a third party contributor have acquired the correct target or mark. Correlation is required
on each and every CAS attack. For basic considerations see paragraph 3.8 Correlation and
Marking For considerations about use of LASER see Chapter 3, section XI LASER operations.
a. BOC. Correlation is complete when the attacking aircraft correctly read

back lines 4, 6 from their weapon system along with line 8 and other restrictions.
When using a third-party for terminal guidance for a BOC attack, it is still
necessary to conduct correlation with that third party.
b. BOT and/or third party contributor required correlation is mandatory with

the attacking aircraft or a third party contributor (if used). Third party correlation
may occur outside the normal timeline of the CAS attack. During correlation, the
JTAC/FAC(A) coordinates actions to mark the target and positions the aircraft to
acquire the mark and/or target. Depending on the tactical situation,
JTACs/FAC(A)s must determine whether the aircrew needs to acquire the target,
or if employing on an offset from a mark is sufficient to create the commander‘s
desired effects. Target composition, camouflage, and concealment may make it
difficult for aircrew to acquire the actual target. In addition, certain attack profiles,
such as fixed-wing aircraft rolling in on an IDF mark, may not allow time for
precise target acquisition. Throughout correlation, JTACs/FAC(A) shall confirm
that aircrews are looking at the same reference points as the JTAC/FAC(A) by
asking questions with unique and distinct answers that will indicate that
correlation is on track.
Once the JTAC/FAC(A) is comfortable the aircrew have acquired the correct target,
the JTAC/FAC(A)shall transmit “The xxxx is your target.” Aircrew shall respond with
“TALLY (target/object)” or “CAPTURED (target/object)”as appropriate.
JTACs/FAC(A)s should strive to include what the target is in this statement, such as
“The third vehicle is your target” or “The individual north of the road is your target.”
Simply saying “That‘s your target” is ambiguous and must be avoided. If the
JTAC/FAC(A) determines that there was significant potential for confusion during
correlation, he may ask the aircrew to provide an updated coordinate for the target
once it has been acquired. In order to avoid “ping-ponging” of coordinates the
JTAC/FAC(A) is not required to readback this updated coordinate. The
JTAC/FAC(A) should plot the updated target location given by the aircrew and
ensure that it satisfies required geometry. Requesting updated coordinates is not
required, and doing so must be weighed against delaying effects on target.

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Standard Marking Brevity Terms
No visual contact with FRIENDLY aircraft/ground position. Opposite of

BLIND
VISUAL.
VISUAL Sighting of a FRIENDLY aircraft or ground position. Opposite of BLIND.
Acknowledges sighting of a specified reference point (either visually or

CONTACT
via sensor).
(target/object)
Specified surface target or object has been acquired and is being tracked
with an onboard sensor.
CAPTURED
Aircrew does not have the ground object, reference point, or target in
LOOKING
sight. Opposite of CONTACT.
Sighting of a target, non-friendly aircraft, or enemy position. Opposite of

TALLY
NO JOY.
Aircrew does not have visual contact with the TARGET/BANDIT.

NO JOY
Opposite of TALLY.
The following paragraphs outline procedures for conducting correlation using different
correlation techniques and marking plans:
5.4.15.1 Talk-On.
The objective of a Talk-On is to correlate a specific target or target area between the
JTAC/FAC(A) and the CAS aircrew through verbal description to a level of fidelity such that
the terminal attack controller knows the CAS asset has acquired the target. The JTAC who
effectively executes Talk-On techniques while considering the CAS/FAC(A)s asset’s
visual/sensor perspective for a BOT will likely be able to successfully execute expeditious and
complete target correlation prior to the CAS attack. Exact brevity and language to conduct a
talk-on is dependent on the situation and perspective of the JTAC/FAC(A) and CAS aircrew
and targeting systems available to each. The JTAC/FAC(A) must consider the following basic
elements that will affect talk-on effectiveness:
a. Aircrew perspective. It is totally different from the controller’s perspective.

JTAC must use map or target imagery to translate his perspective to the aircrew´s
perspective.
b. Controller perspective. Usually it is limited (field of view obscured by natural

and manmade objects). Using maps and graphics helps controller to build SA
about terrain surrounding him and vicinity of target that he cannot see from his
vantage point.

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c. Environmental conditions. Poor visibility generally degrades aircrew´s

ability to acquire targets.
d. Target area relief. Vertically develop terrain creates lot of dead ground
hindering observation from ground position. Controllers must use graphics to
overcome this limitation.
e. Resolution and currency of reference graphics. Ordinary military maps do

(1:50k, 1: 25k) do not provide sufficient details. It is highly recommended to have
standard military map of larger target area and mission graphics of objectives
with greater scale/ resolution.
f. Ability to establish a unit of measure (UoMs). Controllers may establish

UoMs:
(1) Using maps and graphics
(2) Using LRFs or OF factor with reticles in binoculars
(3) Through estimation with naked eye- the least accurate method.
As the JTAC/FAC(A) considers the CAS asset’s perspective, also consider whether to use
large target area features to cue to smaller features or a more narrowly focused initial search
patterns to expedite target correlation. The decision as to which technique to use is dependent
on such Factors as:
a. Aircraft sensor capabilities (none, EO, IR, etc.).
b. Video downlink capability.
c. Aircraft INS.
d. GRGs/operational graphics.
e. Imagery products with associated elevation data.
Following figure articulates the elements of a target area which should be considered in
determining what visual aspects of a target would be most remarkable and effective. For
example, the vertical relief of a structure will be more apparent from the ground terminal
controller’s position than from an overhead FW aircraft. However, low flying RW aircraft are
more likely to perceive vertical relief. The following figure applies to general perspectives as
they relate to target descriptions during a talk-on. It is most useful when at least one of the
assets is not aided by a multispectral sensor or video downlink. JTACs should select the most
prominent structure/feature nearby for initial orientation between themselves and the aircrew.

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Ground Fixed-Wing Rotary-Wing Unmanned
Aircraft
System
Vertical Relief Good Poor Good Poor

(Note 3) (Notes 2,3)
Horizontal Relief Poor Good Poor (Note Good

3)
Color Distinction Good Poor* Good Good

(Note 2) (Notes 3,4) (Note 3) (Notes 1,2,3)
Communications Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant
Delay
This figure assumes the environment is sky clear, visibility unrestricted.

*Aircraft greater than 15, 000 feet slant range from target will likely be unable to discern
color with the naked eye. The use of binoculars or other sensors essentially
“decreases” slant range to a target to a distance at which the color may be determined.
NOTES:
(1) Sensor dependent
(2) Slant range dependent
(3) Altitude dependent
(4) Enhanced when aided (binoculars)
The JTAC/FAC(A) may elect to conduct a talk-on cued by larger features if CAS aircraft or
terminal controller sensors (optics, NVDs) or systems are either not available or degraded, and
precision targeting systems are unavailable. In all cases the starting point would be a feature
of the target’s surroundings, which based on perspective, is identifiable to both the
JTAC/FAC(A) and CAS aircrew. This is often referred to as an “Anchor Point”. From this
feature a gradually more detailed description would begin, ultimately resulting in proper
correlation to the intended target.
When coordinating a talk-on, the JTAC/FAC(A) should be specific about which type of talk-
on he will be using, i.e. visual, map, GRG, VDL, etc. The JTAC/FAC(A) should also be specific
about when he switches from one type of talk-on to another. For example, a JTAC/FAC(A)
may begin a talk-on using a GRG, but transition to a visual talk-on once a common frame of
reference has been established. When using GRGs, TRPs, geographic references etc., it is
essential that both the JTAC and aircrew have a common understanding of the product or
feature being used.
“Latch 65, advise when ready for a GRG talk-on using the version 4.8 GRG.”

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JTACs/FAC(A)s should consider the best way to begin the talk-on. Generally visual talk-ons
should be conducted “big-to-small.” Sensor talk-ons in an urban area may, on the other hand,
start by orienting the aircrew‘s sensor to a specific intersection or recognizable building in order
to ensure a common starting point.
Talk-on descriptions and directions should be simple and short, “driving” the aircrew‘s eyes
from one point to another. A technique for doing this is to give directions in the following format:
a. Visual Talk-On
When conducting visual Talk-On the aircrew must be in position to visually

observe target area. Generally most visual Talk-Ons are conducted with aircraft
in the overhead. Aircrew try to acquire target with Mk I eyeball, therefore using
colors aids in target acquisition.
(1) Establishing common anchor point.
When conducting visual Talk-On JTAC/FAC(A) must establish common anchor

point with the aircrew to start the Talk-On. Anchor point is a unique easily
identifiable manmade or natural feature that can be seen from the air.
JTAC/FAC(A) and the aircrew must be confident that they both are referencing
the same feature, therefore using of confirmers is highly recommended to avoid
possible confusion. JTAC may use terrain features that he does not see from
his position, but that he can describe using map or graphics and that he
assumes will be visible to the aircrew.
The aircrew may establish an anchor point when they are confident that they
are looking to the target area. When establishing an anchor point the aircrew
must choose feature that JTAC can identify using his mission graphics, if he
does not see it from his position.
(2) Establishing unit of measure.
When anchor point is established, JTAC/FAC(A) and aircrew will establish unit
of measure. Distances in meters are hard to estimate for the aircrew from higher
altitudes, therefore using meters as unit of measure for visual Talk-On is not
desirable and must be avoided. Unit of measure is usually established as
distance from an anchor point to another easily identifiable feature.
(3) FIDO
When anchor point and unit of measure are established, JTAC/FAC(A) can start
leading aircrew’s eyes using technique called FIDO:
(a) From an anchor point.
(b) In a direction (given as cardinal/sub-cardinal direction).
NOTE: When conducting visual talk-ons JTACs may use linear terrain
features to orient aircrew to cardinal directions. Even if those linear
features do not line up exactly with a cardinal direction, establishing them
as “north/south” or “east/west” may aid in the talk-on.

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(c) Distance to travel (number of established units of measure).
(d) Object seen (target or object the JTAC wants the aircrew to see).
When conducting visual Talk-On utilizing FIDO technique JTAC/FAC(A) should

follow these rules:
(a) When possible, JTAC/FAC(A) should lead pilot’s eyes along linear
terrain features (such as roads, railways, edges of wood, demarcation
lines between fields of different color etc.) rather than moving across
terrain.
(b) Use no more than 4 units of measure or no less than ¼ of unit of

measure at the time (hard to estimate for the aircrew)
(c) If moving at greater distances JTAC/FAC(A) should establish new

anchor points as he proceeds with Talk-On. In case the aircrew “gets lost”,
they may return to the last anchor point described, rather than restarting
the Talk-On from the very beginning.
(d) Unit of measure may be changed during Talk-On (when agreed with
the aircrew) when moving at greater distances.
Note: Use confirmers around target/object to ensure aircrew are in the correct
area.
JTAC: “Razor 53, from the Cubby-hole, proceed south across MSR Michigan to
the first building and call contact”
Attack Aircraft: “Razor 53 contact”
JTAC: “Razor 53, that building will be called the bank, from the bank go two
buildings east and call contact on a building with a courtyard in the middle”
Short, directive transmissions using “call contact” as an instruction are more

likely to result in a successful talk-on. If directions are too open-ended, there is
significant likelihood of a talk-off occurring.
Limiting the number of cardinal directions in a transmission to two helps to

reduce confusion.
Features such as buildings, roads, and intersections may be named throughout

the talk-on if they do not already have names assigned in mission graphics. This
allows all players to quickly reference them without having to resort to “this
road” and “that building.”
A 2 and 1 ratio should be used when conducting talk-ons, give two directive
statements, then ask a confirming question of the aircrew.
Attack Aircraft: “Razor 53 is contact the building with the courtyard”
JTAC: “Which side of the courtyard opens to the street?”

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JTACs/FAC(A)s should make aircrew aware of their avenue of observation to

the target, helping the aircrew to visualize what the JTAC/FAC(A) can and
cannot see.
When transitioning from a map or GRG talk-on to a visual talk-on, the JTAC
must be aware of the limitations of his perspective. The JTAC/FAC(A) should
not ask the aircrew to describe features that the JTAC/FAC(A) cannot visually
see.
If aircrew describes a feature that is not observable by the JTAC/FAC(A), the

JTAC/FAC(A) should inform the aircrew.
Once the JTAC/FAC(A) has talked the aircrew onto the correct target,
correlation should be completed by verifying the aircrew is looking at the correct
target. This should be done by asking specific questions about the target that
are unique and distinct. Examples include:
“Which direction is the lead vehicle facing?”
“How many individuals are on the north side of the lead vehicle?”
“What do you see directly south of the lead vehicle?”
b. EO/Thermal Sensor talk-on with or without VDL receiver.
When the JTAC/FAC(A) and aircrew are both VDL equipped, a sensor talk-on
provides good certainty as to what the aircraft is looking at.
For ease of JTAC/FAC(A) use, aircrew should strive, within a section, to select
downlink frequency with at least 30 megahertz separation. This will allow the
JTAC/FAC(A) to rapidly switch between aircraft downlinks within a section while
not dealing with bleed-over from the other aircraft.
Details about sensor Talk-On can be found in Annex F, chapter G.3 Execution.
Most aircraft downlink video feeds provide symbology, including sensor aim point
reticle, target location and elevation, and aircraft position and elevation.
JTACs/FAC(A)s should strive to be familiar with general symbology, but if they
are not, may query aircrew regarding the display. Some aircraft systems are also
capable of transmitting metadata that allows aircraft position and Sensor Point of
Interest (SPI) to be overlaid on the map feature of some VDL receiver systems.
When conducting VDL talk-ons, JTACs/FAC(A)s should use appropriate brevity

terms.
When using the term ”slew” to directively move a sensor, JTACs/FAC(A) should
use up, down, left, and right instead of cardinal directions to avoid confusion. VDL
Talk-On should drive the sensor directively from one point to another to avoid
excessive slewing.
JTACs/FAC(A) should keep aircrew informed of Handshake or Hollow status,

providing a common frame of reference to both parties.

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c. Talk-On in Urban Environment.
The use of TRPs or a GRG (an urban grid) requires some degree of
communication. If aircrews are operating without any of the above preplanned
control measures, then disciplined voice communications (cadence, clarity,
brevity) will be critical. Even with preplanned or unplanned control measure
graphics, JTACs/FAC(A)s should select the most prominent structure nearby for
initial orientation between themselves and the aircrew. The time to pass a brief
and then pass talk-on type remarks will decrease as the level of pre-mission
planning increases. Whereas it may take 5-10 minutes for a detailed talk-on
using only a 1:12,500 city map, it may only take 2-3 minutes given a photograph
or line-art urban grid.
Development and implementation of a GRG (urban grid) system will only be

effective if all players utilize it. If the supported unit uses one system and CAS
aircrew have their own, it will make coordination of CAS difficult. Whatever type
of grid system is chosen, it should be standardized so all units have the correct
information to include the following: C2 HQ, JFSE, reconnaissance and
surveillance teams, intelligence section, TACPs, and all assets, including
artillery, mortars, and RW and FW aircraft.
Describing the target location as it relates to surrounding structures is essential.

Plain language descriptions will greatly assist the CAS aircrew in locating the
target. Describing building color, type of roofing, window structure, and etc., as it
relates to surrounding structures, can greatly assist aircrew in locating the correct
target. However, do not proceed with a talk-on without establishing a common
reference point for both the JTAC/FAC(A) and aircrew. Adapt the talk-on for
nighttime or sensor use, as NVDs and IR systems can display shapes but not
colors. Items that provide contrast will allow for faster target acquisition.
d. RADAR Talk-On.
When talking-on an aircrew utilizing synthetic aperture radar (SAR) or similar

sensors, stick to the basics of standard visual Talk-On while allowing time
between establishing reference points for the aircrew to update their sensor
resolution.
Key to success is to work big-to-small from a known, easily identifiable tactical

reference point. Once contact is established, the aircrew will follow the
subsequent talk-on by increasing radar resolution by reducing field of view. It can
take few minutes, to build a map specific A/C TTPs should be applied. Be
methodical and ensure concurrence at each step. Employing units of measure
is valid; however, be aware that the established “measuring stick” may fall outside
of the radar field of view as the aircrew increases resolution—so choose
measurement TRPs as close to the target as possible.
When the talk-on is complete, the aircrew should derive target location from the
highest resolution radar scale possible to reduce scope-induced error.

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5.4.15.2 Enhanced Target Description (ETD).
An enhanced target description is typically used in non-permissive or low altitude scenarios to

assist the aircrew in finding the target when they will only have a few seconds to acquire the
target. Use of enhanced target description is not limited to low level attacks only, generally it
is used when the aircrew cannot observe the target area and correlate target (with naked eye
or with sensors) as it is being described prior to commencing attack run .
An enhanced target description “paints a picture” in the mind of the aircrew (some aircrews
actually make a sketch of target and it´s vicinity) as to what the target area will look like as they
ingress and describes where they will find the target. It must be tailored to match the viewpoint
and perspective of the attacking aircraft as they approach the target area on the final attack
heading (i.e. JTAC/FAC(A) must “rotate” the description so as it matches not his, but aircrew´s
view).
When conducting low level attacks, JTAC/FAC(A) should use for ETD vertically developed
features (such as masts, towers, tall buildings and trees etc.), because they will stand out
better than the horizontally developed ones (intersections, roads, bodies of water etc.). If
conducting attacks from higher altitudes, horizontally developed features may be used
effectively. Aircrews look for targets with their eyeballs and not with sensors, therefore use of
colors during ETD may aid in target acquisition.
The JTAC/FAC(A) will usually provide:
a. Detailed target description what target looks like
b. Immediate surroundings of the target (applicable if it aids in acquisition or

helps to avoid confusion)
c. Additional information that makes target unique in the area
d. Reference (clearly identifiable feature) or a mark that the pilot should see
near the target.
Frequently, an enhanced target description will begin with a map or GRG talk-on
and then provide amplifying information including features that are not on the chart.
Enhanced target description is usually transmitted by JTAC/FAC(A) after the CAS attack brief
has been read back and prior to the attack run. Because the JTAC is describing what the
aircrew will see and not what he is currently looking at, the aircrew shall not call “contact” as
the JTAC/FAC(A) is describing the area.
JTAC/FAC(A) should break down the ETD into multiple transmissions and deliver only one
information at the time in order to allow the aircrew to process the information gradually into a
mental picture. Pilot shall acknowledge every transmission with “Roger”. When JTAC/FAC(A)
transmits all elements of ETD, he shall state “ETD Complete”. Pilot shall respond with “Roger
ETD”. JTAC/FAC(A) may request the aircrew to repeat the information to be sure that it has
been received correctly.

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Example:
JTAC: “Hind 21, advise when ready for ETD”.
Aircrew: “Ready”.
JTAC: “Your target is 3 BMPs on paved road East- West oriented, spacing about 50 meters.
Aircrew: “Roger”
JTAC” That road the vehicles are sitting on is a demarcation line between green field North
and brown field South”.
Aircrew: “Roger”
JTAC: “During your attack run you will see a white water tower in western part of a village, it
looks like a ball on a stick, it will be reference point”
Aircrew: ” Roger”
JTAC ” From the water tower, NW direction, 800 meters, is your target- three tanks in the open.
End of ETD.”
Aircrew: “Roger ETD”.
JTAC: “Call leaving IP/ Report IP Inbound”.
Aircrew: “Wilco”
Note: Prior to commencing the attack run the aircrew must validate the information received
in ETD matches the expected target area details using their maps. If in any doubt, the aircrew
should pull from JTAC additional information in order to maximize the chance to hit the target
during first run as reattacking a target that has been alerted by an unsuccessful pass may
increase exposure of aircraft to enemy air defenses.
When the aircraft commences attack run JTAC/FAC(A) should communicate to the aircrew
details of the target area as they will appear on the ingress (big-medium-small) to help the
aircrew to acquire dominant terrain features and lead their eyes from the most dominant terrain
features(big) through smaller (medium) to target (small). When sighting the features being
described by JTAC/FAC(A), the aircrew will respond “Contact”. JTAC/FAC(A) will lead aircrews
eyes from objects that the aircrew sees using direction and distance.
JTAC/FAC(A) must be prepared to give direction and distance from objects not previously
described in ETD that aircrew reports they see in the target area during attack run, such as
marks of opportunity or other terrain features. For example if JTAC described the water tower
in the village as reference point and the aircrew during attack run instead reports “Contact
burning village”, JTAC/FAC(A) must have sufficient SA to provide direction and distance to
target/target area. “From there- North East, 2 kilometers is the village with white water tower
in western part, call contact”.

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If no specific Final Attack Heading was assigned, or if Final Attack Heading cone is wide open,
cardinal/subcardinal directions should be used when leading pilot’s eyes from one point to
another.
If FAH attack cone is narrow JTAC/FAC(A) can use clock code to drive pilot’s eyes from one
point to another. Aircrafts´ direction of travel/FAH is in this case considered 12 o´clock.
Distances are easier to estimate from lower altitudes, therefore distances should be expressed
in meters or kilometers, as there is no time to establish common unit of measure.
5.4.15.3 Correction from visually-significant marks.
IDF, direct fire, or aviation fires may be employed specifically as marks for CAS aircraft. Marks
of opportunity, such as battlefield fires or smoke not specifically employed for CAS may also
be used. Aircrew will generally use a combination of sensors and visual lookout to acquire
these marks.
Consider the timing of the mark. JTACs/FAC(A)s may coordinate a mark to arrive on deck 30-
45” prior to an assigned CAS TOT, or they may coordinate a mark earlier to take advantage of
aircraft sensors while the aircraft is holding at an IP or HA. This technique gives the aircrew
more time to discern hard to find targets before the attack run, but sacrifices surprise.
For BOT attacks using IDF, direct fire, or aviation fires as visual marks that are deliberately
synchronized to arrive 30-45 seconds prior to CAS TOTs, there is minimal time to conduct
correlation. For these types of attacks, correlation is satisfied by the JTAC/FAC(A)s providing
an accurate correction from the visual mark once observed, “Razor 53, from the mark, east
50.” Transmitting “mark is on the deck” is not required.
Aircrew shall call “contact the mark” to advise JTAC/FAC(A) they are meeting the requirements
of BOT and allow him to make correction from the mark.
When using direct fire weapons to mark, the JTAC/FAC(A) must consider when the mark will
be visible to attacking aircraft. FW aircraft will most likely only be able to acquire direct fire
impacts using their sensors from inside traditional IP distances. If the threat allows,
JTACs/FAC(A)s should coordinate moving them to the overhead to aid in visual acquisition.
JTACs/FAC(A)s must also be aware that the presence of multiple direct fire assets on a
battlefield could lead to confusion.
If the IDF, direct fire, or aviation fires mark falls out or is unusable, the JTAC/FAC(A) must
weigh the risk of continuing the attack. JTACs/FAC(A)s should have a plan to deal with a mark
fall-out. This may involve flexing to a back-up mark, using a mark of opportunity, or aborting
an aircraft or the entire attack. In addition, attacking aircrew may call contact of something
besides the intended mark. JTACs/FAC(A)s must be able to quickly weigh whether to use the
object the aircrew is contact as a new mark.
If something other than the mark referenced in Line 7 is being used for cueing, it should be not
be called ”the mark”, it should be called by a different label, i.e., “lead‘s hits,” “the black smoke,”
etc.

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5.4.15.4 IR Pointer Correlation
a. Ground IR sparkle only.
The JTAC must ensure that the aircraft is in a position to acquire the target end of
the IR sparkle. This may require bringing FW aircraft into the overhead, or pushing
RW aircraft forward from the HA. Depending on the target and the attacking aircraft
profile, this may require a target acquisition run or may be conducted on the attack
run.
Depending on target size and composition, JTACs may need to cease sparkle to
avoid the IR energy washing out the target. When attacking tactical size targets, the
attacking aircraft may be able to see the target end of the IR pointer, but unable to
acquire the target. In this case, aircraft should make a “contact sparkle” call
indicating they are able to discern the target end from the friendly end of the IR
sparkle, but unable to make out the exact target. Prior to receiving weapons release
authorization, aircrew must call “VISUAL” and either “TALLY” or “CONTACT
SPARKLE” when ground forces employ IR sparkle.
JTACs/FAC(A) must be aware that using their IR sparkle may expose them to NVG-
equipped enemies. Ground IR sparkle should not be left on for excessive amounts
of time.
b. Sparkle Walk-on.
When the tactical situation prevents the JTAC from using a ground based IR sparkle
(dead batteries, broken equipment, concealment from enemy observation,
excessive skip/overspill, etc.), a sparkle walk-on may be used to orient the aircraft’s
sensor to the target. The JTAC observes the aircraft’s IR sparkle and directs the
aircrew to move their IR sparkle using cardinal/sub-cardinal direction and distance
slew commands until the aircraft‘s IR sparkle overlays the target.
If holding at an IP, aircraft may need to proceed inbound in order to acquire the
target on their sensors.
JTAC begins sparkle walk-on with: “Aircraft call sign, sparkle.”
JTAC observes aircraft IR sparkle and gives verbal slew commands
Slew commands should be “Aircraft call sign, slew, cardinal / sub-cardinal

direction and distance in meters.”
Example: “Latch 65 slew north 150”
Slew commands may also include a limiting feature.
Example: “Razor 53 slew south 50 to the east-west road”
Do not use “left, right, up, down” when conducting a sparkle walk-on.
JTACs/FAC(A)s must be aware of the difficulties of estimating directions and

distances at night as well as the disparity of perspective between themselves and

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the aircrew. In addition, since aircrew are splitting time between looking outside and
their sensors, it is extremely difficult to precisely measure direction and distance
over the ground when slewing the IR sparkle. JTACs/FAC(A)s must be careful not
to give directions that cause the IR sparkle to continually bracket back and forth
across the target: “Latch 65 slew north 100” “Latch 65 slew south 100” “Latch 65
slew north 100”. If JTACs note this occurring they should reevaluate their direction
/ distance estimations and use limiting features.
When the aircraft‘s IR sparkle overlays the target the JTAC/FAC(A)s should direct
“Aircraft call sign, Steady.”
JTAC completes correlation by confirming what the aircrew sees where their IR
sparkle is.
Aircrew call ‘TALLY” or “(target/object) CAPTURE.”
JTACs/FAC(A)s may also request that aircrew sparkle the target as they ingress
during the attack run in order to provide additional confirmation.
c. Match Sparkle.
When matching IR sparkles, all players must be disciplined in call sign usage to
avoid confusion as to who is to “Sparkle on” or “Cease Sparkle.”
JTACs/FAC(A)s should ensure that prior to attempting to match sparkle, the aircraft
is in position to allow observation of the sparkle they are to match. This may require
pushing FW aircraft into the overhead, or allowing RW aircraft forward of the HA or
BP. JTAC/FAC(A) verifies own IR sparkle is pointed at the correct target.
JTAC: “Aircraft call sign, proceed into the overhead and advise when ready to
match sparkle”
Aircrew, initiates when in position: “JTAC call sign, Sparkle.”
Note: JTAC/FAC(A) should echo calls to his IR sparkle operator (if applicable) prior
to responding to the aircrew. The JTAC/FAC(A) may have to direct the sparkle
operator to shift to ensure the correct target is marked.
JTAC/FAC(A) may initiate match sparkle if required. When aircrew reports ready,
JTAC/FAC(A) turns on IR sparkle and transmits “Aircraft call sign, match
sparkle”.
JTACs/FAC(A) should be prepared to facilitate “Snake” and “Steady” calls by the

aircrew.
JTAC/FAC(A) should then observe the aircraft‘s IR sparkle move to overlay the
ground IR sparkle.
Once the aircrew’s pointer is on the correct point, the JTAC/FAC(A) confirms what
the aircrew sees there.

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Note: In some cases, the ground-based pointer can “wash-out” the aircraft‘s pointer.
In this case the JTAC should cease the ground-based IR sparkle in order to confirm
the aircraft’s sparkle is on the appropriate location. JTAC should transmit the
informative call “Broadsword 11 ceasing sparkle.”
Note: RW IR sparkle will often not be steady on the target due to vibration of the
aircraft.
Note: JTACs should be aware that since current aircraft thermal imagers are unable
to sense IR sparkle, aircrew must compare what they see outside the cockpit to what
their sensor is centered on during correlation.
If aircrew reports ”no joy” or indicates problems with skip / overspill that preclude
locating the target:
(1) JTAC/FAC(A) verifies IR sparkle pointed at correct target.
(2) Verify aircraft is NVG equipped.
(3) Verify aircraft in a position to acquire IR energy and is searching in the

correct area. Many Factors influence whether airborne platforms can see IR
sparkles (IR sparkle power out, ambient light levels (cultural lighting), distance
from target, cloud cover, NVG performance, etc.). Generally speaking, the
JTAC/FAC(A) should expect that aircrew will attempt to position themselves to
have unobstructed line of sight to the target area.
(4) Re-initiate match sparkle procedures. If unsuccessful and unable to

resolve, attempt sparkle walk-on, or choose a different type of mark.
NIGHT INFRARED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BREVITY TERMS
CALL MEANING
SPARKLE Mark/marking target by infrared (IR) pointer. (Joint terminal attack

controller [JTAC] marks the target with an IR pointer. Can be initiated by
JTAC or aircrew. Proper aircrew response is CONTACT SPARKLE or
NO JOY.)
SNAKE Oscillate an IR pointer in a figure eight about a target. (Call made by

exception for the JTAC to jiggle the IR beam on the target. This aids
indistinguishing the friendly position from the target, verifies that the
aircrew is looking at the proper IR pointer and can aid in the acquisition
of the IR energy. Proper aircrew response is CONTACT SPARKLE,
STEADY, or NO JOY.)

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PULSE Illuminate/illuminating a position with flashing IR energy. (JTAC uses

pulse mode available on some IR pointers. Can be initiated by JTAC or
aircrew. May be used by JTAC to emphasize that an enemy position is
being illuminated by flashing IR energy, which is often used to identify
friendly positions. Proper aircrew response is CONTACT SPARKLE,
STEADY, or NO JOY.)
STEADY Stop oscillation of IR pointer. (JTAC steadies the beam after a SNAKE
or PULSE call. This can aid in verifying that the aircrew is looking at the
proper IR pointer.)
CEASE Discontinue sparkle activity. (JTAC turns the beam off. This can aid in
SPARKLE verifying that the aircrew is looking at the proper IR pointer, especially if
followed with a SPARKLE call.)
ROPE Circling an IR pointer around an aircraft to help the aircraft identify the
friendly ground position. Caution: This technique may damage night
vision devices.
CONTACT Acknowledges sighting of sparkle. Call acknowledging the sighting of a

SPARKLE specified reference point (either visually or via sensor). After the
SPARKLE call is made, the close air support aircraft should respond
with NO JOY or SNAKE. Once the aircrew sees the IR energy and is
able to discern between the friendly and target end of the pointer, a
CONTACT SPARKLE call may be made.
MATCH Overlay requested target designator type. (Directive term for a second
SPARKLE party to overlay an IR mark on an existing mark.)
5.4.15.5 Aircraft Position Target Designation (APTD).
CAS aircraft that can transmit APTD allow the JTAC/FAC(A) to see where the aircraft is and
the aircraft’s designated sensor point of interest if the JTAC/FAC(A) is properly equipped.
5.4.15.6 Link-16 handoff.
If a target has been published as a Link-16 track file, aircraft sensors will be cued to the
approximate target location. A talk-on will still be required to correlate the exact target.
5.4.15.7 LASER hand-off.
Basics on LASER operations are discussed in Chapter 3, section XI LASER Operations.
LASER hand-offs may be conducted as part of a target acquisition run after readbacks, or as
the aircraft are ingressing on the attack run.

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JTACs/FAC(A)s must be directive in order to ensure proper LASER safety geometry is adhered
to when executing a LASER hand-off. This is especially crucial when aircraft are in the
overhead, since if aircraft are on the far side of the overhead from the designator, there is
potential for the LST to track the designator. Holding aircraft in the overhead for LASER handoff
should therefore be avoided. Inbound headings should be provided for LASER hand-off and
should be interpreted by the aircrew as mandatory to avoid false lock-on.
Instructions should be assigned for the LASER hand-off and may be passed as part of remarks
/ restrictions. The directions/headings that are used for the hand-off may be different than the
final attack headings. In this case, the headings used for the target acquisition pass should
not be called final attack headings.
Example: “Final attack headings 150-170, LASER target line 220, after readbacks expect
to proceed inbound heading 230-260 for the LASER hand-off, standby TOT”
After readbacks, JTAC/FAC(A) begins LASER hand-off with:
“Latch 65 proceed inbound heading 230 to 260, stare 1688 Papa Uniform 123 456”
Note: JTAC/FAC(A) may restate LASER target line as part of this transmission if comfort level
dictates.
Aircrew initiates LASER communication when in position: “10 seconds”…“Broadsword 11

LASER on.”JTAC should echo calls to the LASER operator (if applicable) prior to responding
to the aircrew.
Note:When JTACs use a dedicated co-located LASER operator, ensure the operator is trained
to respond to internal TACP communication brevity calls for LASER operations
LASER operator responds to JTAC: “Lasing, 1688.”
JTAC to aircraft: “Broadsword 11, lasing, 1688.”
The JTAC shall ensure continuous lasing until the aircrew directs “Aircraft call sign, spot,
cease LASER.”JTAC shall direct “Cease LASER” to the LASER operator.
Once the aircrew has called “Spot, cease LASER”, the JTAC shall confirm the aircraft‘s
sensor was cued to acquire the correct target.
JTAC: “Latch 65 what do you have under your crosshairs?”
Attack Aircraft: “Latch 65 has a single armored vehicle oriented north-south”
JTAC: “Latch 65 that armored vehicle is your target”
Attack Aircraft: “Latch 65 captured”
Note: The terms “spot” and “capture” are not synonymous. JTAC should not cease LASER
until directed by aircrew (common sense and judgment apply). In situations where it is
apparent that a “cease LASER” call was not made or missed, the JTAC should query the
aircrew with “Aircraft call sign, status”. Otherwise, the aircraft may lose the spot before setting
a designation. Due to designator jitter, LASER overspill, LASER underspill and battlefield

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obscuration, the LASER spot acquired by the aircraft may be slightly off the intended target.
Target verification through verbal confirmers is still required to confirm the correct hand off.
Note: After an LST handoff, JTACs/FAC(A)s should avoid going “back out” to use big to small
confirmers, as this will likely induce confusion and unnecessarily increase time to engage.
However, due to spot jitter, overspill and underspill, a JTAC should “back out” as much as
necessary to confirm the exact target acquired. In a congested target environment, it may be
necessary to “back out” some in order to confirm that the aircraft has acquired the exact
intended target and not a nearby similar target.
If aircrew reports “negative LASER” during the LASER hand-off:
a. JTAC/FAC(A) verifies proper LASER set-up and pointed at correct target.
b. JTAC/FAC(A) verifies location of spot on that side of the target which is

facing expected aircraft position. (podium effect, entrapment)
c. Verify aircraft and designator on correct code.
d. Verify aircraft in a position to receive reflected LASER energy.
Many factors influence whether airborne platforms are in a position to receive properly coded
LASER energy (angle of incidence, reflectivity, power out, environmentals, etc.).
Re-initiate LASER hand-off procedures. If unsuccessful and unable to resolve, choose another
mark.
LASER CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BREVITY TERMS
CALL MEANING
TEN SECONDS Standby for LASER ON call in approximately 10 seconds
LASER ON Start/ acknowledge LASER designation
SHIFT (direction/ TN) Shift LASER aimpoint. Note: Can be used to shift from offset
position onto the target. Also used during multi-aircraft attack
to shift LASER energy or target assignments
SPOT Acquisition of LASER designation
CEASE LASER Discontinue lasing
DEAD EYE LASER designator system inoperative
NEGATIVE LASER LASER energy has not been acquired
LASING The speaker is firing the LASER

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STARE (w/ LASER code Cue the LASER spot search/ tracker function on the specified
and reference point) LASER code in relation to the specified reference point.
Reference point may include the following: steeropint,
geographic reference, bearing and range, or data link point.
5.4.15.8 Aircraft LASER designation on target.
JTACs equipped with thermal LASER spot imager or see-spot devices may correlate by
directing the aircrew to lase the target with their LASER designator. On vertically developed
targets, the aircraft LASER must be on a surface that the JTAC can observe.
5.4.15.9 Additional Considerations.
After correlation is complete, and before the attack, any questions that remain must be
answered. If, during correlation, either the aircrew or JTAC/FAC(A) realize that an element of
the CAS brief should be changed in order to facilitate a successful attack, it should be
discussed. Additionally, other information necessary for the attack may not be decided until
correlation is complete and should be discussed in plain language between the JTAC/FAC(A)
and aircrew prior to beginning the attack. Examples of this include:
a. Delay versus continuous lase.
b. Section versus individual approval for RW attacks.
c. Ground force commander‘s intent for fires.
d. Does ordnance selection make sense based on aircrew‘s analysis of the

target?
e. Fusing.
JTACs/FAC(A)s must remember to issue the TOT/TTT if it has not already been issued and
confirm mission with their fires approval chain.
JTACs/FAC(A)s may also need aircrew to state the type of delivery profile they will execute in
order to allow the JTAC/FAC(A) to plan appropriately.
If JTAC/FAC(A) requires the aircrew to make additional radio calls prior to or during attack that
he did not mention in the Remarks section of the CAS brief, he may request them after
correlation prior to attack.
5.4.16 Attack.
Throughout a CAS attack, the JTAC/FAC(A) must maintain awareness to the aircraft position,
the friendly situation, and the objective area.
JTACs/FAC(A) should compare the distances required by attack geometry, from IP or BP to

target with the time it will take the CAS aircraft to transit that distance and relate this to the
TOT. By developing this timeline, and using aircraft calls to update it, JTACs can monitor the
CAS attack timeline in order to ensure effective integration with fire and movement.

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Changes to the friendly situation must be monitored to ensure their fire and movement will
remain integrated with the CAS attack timeline. If changes occur, JTACs/FAC(A)s must weigh
their ability to continue, shift, or abort the attack based on the attack timeline. For instance, if
SEAD is required, the JTAC/FAC(A) must know the SEAD timeline so that he can shift the
CAS TOT if the SEAD is late. The earlier these adjustments can be made, the greater the
chance of mission success.
The JTAC/FAC(A) must also maintain awareness to the objective area for the timely
recognition of changes, such as target movement and/or entrance of non-combatants and
civilians.
TAD discipline. The TAD net can become very congested very quickly. All players on a TAD
net must use “active listening” and appropriate communications discipline and cadence.
Ultimately, the TAD belongs to the JTAC/FAC(A), and the JTAC/FAC(A) must control it by
voice.
Once an aircraft calls “In” all other calls should be held until after the JTAC/FAC(A) has issued
weapons release authority or abort. An exception to this is that anyone can and should call an
abort at any time they deem necessary.
5.4.16.1 Clearance to Drop/Fire.
Once the clearance requirements for a particular type of control are met, it is important to pass
clearance in a timely manner to give aircrews time to prosecute the attack before release
parameters have expired. A wide variety of ordnance is available and suitable for CAS
missions. Mixed weapons loads on aircraft or between flight members will require the flight
lead and the JTAC/FAC(A) to coordinate different delivery patterns. When employing standoff
munitions or delivery methods, the JTAC/FAC(A) must provide a timely clearance appropriate
for the weapon being delivered. For example, medium-altitude attacks can result in weapon
releases more than four nautical miles from the target. Weapons release authority grants
JTACs/FAC(A)s the authority to provide the following to attacking aircraft:
a. “Abort” — Term used by a JTAC/FAC(A) during all types of control to

terminate the attack prior to weapons release. The JTAC/FAC(A) shall direct
CAS aircrews to abort if they are not aligned with the correct target, and must
abort them if it appears that friendly troops may be endangered, or for the safety
of the CAS aircrew.
b. “Cleared Hot” — Term used by a JTAC/FAC(A) when granting weapons

release clearance to an aircraft attacking a specific target. An exception to this
would be a JTAC/FAC(A) providing a specific “Cleared Hot” clearance for the
entire flight/section to attack. When providing clearance for an entire
flight/section to attack, the JTAC/FAC(A) should preface the clearance with the
term “flight” after the call sign. For example, JTAC – “Ragin’ 41 flight, cleared
hot.”
c. “Continue” — Term used by a JTAC/FAC(A) during all types of control to

authorize the aircraft to proceed with the attack profile, but weapons release is
not granted yet.

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d. “Cleared To Engage” — Term used by a JTAC/FAC(A) during Type 3

control, granting a weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a
target or targets which meet the prescribed restrictions set by the JTAC.
e. “Continue Dry” — Continue present maneuver, ordnance release is not

authorized. Term is used to provide approval to aircraft to continue the pass
without expending ordnance during Type 1, 2, or 3 controls. (JTAC must use –
“Type 3, Continue Dry” for dry Type 3 controls. Given in place of a “Cleared Hot”
when weapons release is not intended, such as in training or during a show of
force.
TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROLLER CLEARANCE CALLS
CALL MEANING
ABORT Cease action/attack/event/mission.
CLEARED HOT Type 1 and 2 close air support terminal attack control clearance to
release ordnance on this pass.
CONTINUE Continue present maneuver, does not imply a change in clearance

to engage or expend ordnance.
CONTINUE DRY Continue present maneuver, ordnance release not authorized. Used
to provide approval to aircraft to continue the pass without expending
ordnance during Type 1, 2, or 3 control. (Joint terminal attack
controller must use “Type 3, CONTINUE DRY” for dry Type 3
control.)
CLEARED TO Type 3 control clearance. Attack aircraft or flight may initiate attacks
within the parameters imposed by the JTAC/FAC(A). (Joint terminal
ENGAGE attack controller must use “Type 3, CONTINUE DRY” for dry Type 3
control.)
WARNING
The word CLEARED will only be used when ordnance is actually to be delivered. This will
minimize the chances of dropping ordnance on dry passes, further reducing the risk of
friendly fire incidents. Nonstandard calls must be avoided at all times.
5.4.16.2 Abort Procedures.
The JTAC/FAC(A) shall direct CAS aircrews to abort if they are not aligned with the correct
target, and must abort them if it appears that friendly troops may be endangered, or for the
safety of the CAS aircrew.

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5.4.16.3 Mutual Support.
During wartime, most CAS aircraft have been shot down by threats they were not aware of.
The JTAC/FAC(A) can contribute greatly to the mission’s success by suppressing threats,
briefing the CAS aircraft on the threats, and monitoring for threats during the attack. During
CAS mission execution, the JTAC/FAC(A) should endeavor to monitor the attacking aircraft to
the maximum extent possible. The JTAC/FAC(A) will be in an optimal position to observe
surface to air threat activity. A missile launch observed from the ground has high line of sight
and a smoke trail with a clear sky background. From the air, a missile tracking on the aircraft
will have very little line of sight and have a cluttered background. Because of this, the JTAC
should make every effort to observe the attacking aircraft and be ready to alert the pilot to
surface to air activity.
When targeted by a surface-to-air threat, the CAS aircraft will execute defensive maneuver s
to allow him to survive long enough to egress the threat envelope. The type of defensive
maneuver will depend on the type of threat.
a. Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs).
When a SAM is launched against a CAS aircraft, the pilot will execute a break turn
and dispense chaff and flare in an attempt to foul any radar and decoy if it is IR
guided. The maneuver is designed to force the missile to fly a longer flight path, thus
using up energy and ultimately causing it to overshoot and miss the aircraft. In the
case of a SAM launch the JTAC/FAC(A) should immediately transmit, “(Aircraft call
sign), SAM LAUNCH” followed by the launch location in relation to the aircraft or in
a direction from the target. Example: “Winder 61! SAM LAUNCH NORTH OF THE
TARGET AREA.” Do not delay the call since the time of flight of the missile may only
be several seconds and time is critical.
b. Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA).
When fired upon by AAA, the pilot will maneuver the aircraft, changing altitude and
heading in a 3-dimensional maneuver, called a “jink,” to defeat the bullets already
fired by the gunner and complicate further firing solutions. This also causes an
increasing slant range, which decreases the gun’s accuracy. The pilot may also
dispense chaff to decoy any radar that is providing aiming information to the gun. If
air defense artillery (ADA) is observed in or around the target area then transmit,
“JINK, TRIPLE A” followed by the firing location in relation to the aircraft or a direction
from the target area. If the JTAC/FAC(A) can observe the aircraft and the ADA and
believes the aircraft are in imminent danger, then transmit, “Winder 61, JINK,
TRIPLE A NORTH OF THE TARGET AREA.” JTACs/FAC(A)s should preface the
call with the aircraft’s call sign that is under attack. If the JTAC has the situational
awareness, the call should be directive and then descriptive. Tell the aircraft what
to do and then tell him why. JTACs/FAC(A)s should continue to update the aircraft
until the aircraft is out of danger. Once the aircraft is out of immediate danger, the
JTAC/FAC(A) should update the aircraft’s egress instructions. If the threat pops up
prior to weapons release and the tactical situation permits, the JTAC/FAC(A) should
abort the attack prior to issuing directive communications.
Examples of pop-up threat responses by JTACs:

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(1) Situation 1 - Type 1, low altitude, fixed-wing pop attack employing

unguided ordnance or strafe. During the attack, a previously unknown ZSU-23-
4 begins firing at the attacking aircraft from the aircraft’s right two o’clock. The
correct response for the JTAC in this scenario would be to have the attacking
aircraft jink away from the threat.
JTAC: "Winder 61,JINK, TRIPLE A NORTH OF THE TARGET!"
JTAC: "Winder 61, JINK, GUNS STILL TRACKING!"
JTAC: "Winder 61, you are clear of the guns, continue with your egress, back
to MAZDA, block 13-14."
(2) Situation 2 – Type 1, high altitude, fixed-wing, roll-in delivery employing

unguided ordnance. As the second aircraft is coming off target, the JTAC spots
a smoke trail from a man-portable air defense system tracking on the aircraft
from the aircraft’s left nine o’clock. The correct response for the JTAC in this
scenario is to direct the aircraft to deploy reactive flares and break into the
missile.
JTAC: “WINDER 62, FLARES, BREAK LEFT!” JTAC: “MISSILE TRACKING!”

JTAC: “Winder 62, missile missed aft, continue with your egress, back to
MAZDA, block 13-14.”
5.4.17 Assessment of effectiveness of the attack.
Once ordnance impacts the target, the JTAC/FAC(A) must assess whether the commander‘s
desired effects were created. This assessment will determine whether to continue the attack,
abort sequential attacks, or set up a re-attack. Obscuration may preclude effect assessment
for several minutes. JTACs should weigh the need for follow-on attacks with the need to
preserve ordnance until an assessment can be made.
Execute re-attacks or issue new game plans/CAS briefs as necessary.
Re-attacks allow CAS aircraft to quickly reposition to attack the same target, and while
maneuvering, maintain compliance with any restrictions in force. A re-attack by CAS aircraft
under Type 1 and 2 control may be requested if additional fires are required on the target;
aircraft under Type 3 control are free to re-attack as long as their “Cleared to Engage” is in
effect. In a high-threat or non-permissive environment, aircraft may be unable to make multiple
passes due to enemy defenses. The JTAC/FAC(A) issues approval for immediate re-attack
and remains aware of any threats to the aircraft. As was required in the initial attack, clearance
to drop/fire on a re-attack must be issued by the JTAC/FAC(A) before ordnance release.
Corrections and new restrictions can be given to the aircrew during maneuvering. If ordnance
adjustments are required, they must be given in a timely manner. Corrections are given in
cardinal direction and distance in meters from the previous weapon impact point. In the
following example a correction is being given to the second attacking aircraft in the flight -
based on flight lead aircraft’s impacts (e.g., “Razor 02, from lead’s hits, north 100”).
If re-attacks are required, the JTAC/FAC(A) must determine if there is a need for a new game
plan and also determine whether a new CAS brief is required.

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If the re-attack is against the same target, the JTAC/FAC(A) should state “Call sign, continue
for a re-attack, restrictions remain the same”
If the re-attack target is in close proximity to the previous target, the JTAC/FAC(A) must ensure
the aircraft is correlated to the new target, but does not require a whole new CAS brief.
JTACs/FAC(A)s shall also ensure that previous restrictions are still applicable to re-attacks,
and change them if necessary.
5.4.18 Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
Accurate BDA is critical for determining if a target should be re-attacked. In a high-threat

environment, BDA may be difficult to judge. There is no simple answer as to who is in the best
position to determine BDA. Aircraft and JTACs/FAC(A)s have different capabilities based on
experience, weather, terrain, weapons employment techniques, and enemy actions when
assessing BDA. In some cases aircrew with various sensors may be better situated to aid the
JTAC in assessing hit results. Entity providing BDA must use their judgment and be precise
(“if you do not see it, do not report it”) in reporting BDA. If conditions preclude briefing BDA,
at a minimum pass “SUCCESSFUL,” “UNSUCCESSFUL,” or “UNKNOWN” assessment to the
aircraft and the controlling agency; this assessment reflects whether, in the JTAC’s/’s
judgment, the ground force commander’s intent was met.
BDA is crucial in determining mission effectiveness, enemy disposition, and re-attack

requirements. BDA will be difficult to ascertain in a high threat environment, but the difficulty
can be mitigated by integration of JIPOE early in the planning process. This assists in
developing an appropriate mix of ISR assets that maximizes collection and exploitation
potential. Determination of who reports or collects BDA within a given scenario is based upon
the objective, capabilities, experience, weather, terrain, employment techniques, and enemy
actions.
The BDA report should include:
a. Size - Number and type of equipment/personnel attacked.
b. Activity – Mechanism/degree of damage, activity after the attack.
c. Location. If the location was the same as in 9-line, it may be expressed as

“Location as per 9-line”. If the impact was observed elsewhere, accurate grid or
an offset from line 6 with direction and distance should be passed.
d. Time. Usually expressed as hour and minute when ordnance impacted on

target. If target is subject to multiple reattacks and engagement takes long, it can
be expressed as time when the mission ended.
e. Remarks. Munitions expended, observed damage (number of tanks

destroyed, number still active, and recommendation), mission number, and
mission accomplished.
Accurate and timely BDA leads to a more accurate operational picture of the current enemy
order of battle, which helps the C2 system correctly dictate asset flow and allocation

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JTACs/FAC(A)s must ensure that BDA is accurate, and should not overestimate BDA, or report
BDA that they cannot observe.
BDA reports may be passed throughout the time on station or prior to aircraft egressing, and
should be given for a flight, not individual aircraft.
5.4.18.1 JTAC/FAC(A) Responsibilities.
Whenever possible, the JTAC/FAC(A) provides attack flights with the BDA of their attack as
they egress. The JTAC/FAC(A) gives BDA for the flight, not for individual aircraft in the flight.
BDA must also be passed to intelligence and controlling agencies as soon as possible. The
JTAC/FAC(A) should not assume the target is completely destroyed because the enemy may
employ deception. The JTAC/FAC(A) should provide a “SALTR [size, activity, location, time,
remarks]” report to the appropriate C2 agency to determine if further assets are required.
Develop and maintain a log of all BDA. The log should contain the following elements:
a. mission number,
b. call sign,
c. target coordinates,
d. TOT, specific results (number of enemy killed by air, vehicles/structures

destroyed, unexploded ordnance),
e. whether the mission was successful,
f. targets remaining, and
g. recommendation.
5.4.18.2 Aircrew Responsibilities.
The INFLTREP can be used to report other tactical information of such importance and
urgency that if the aircrew were to wait for a normal post-flight debriefing the information might
no longer be useful. This might include the presence of SAMs, AAA, or radar warning receiver
indications or numbers of remaining targets. Send the INFLTREP directly to any ACS agency,
the supported unit, or via any available relay. Message recipients may add additional
information and forward via another INFLTREP. INFLTREP information is incorporated in all-
source intelligence reports.
5.4.19 Routing / Safety of Flight.
JTACs/FAC(A)s are responsible for providing routing and safety of flight instructions to aircraft
as they egress. This provides safe passage for exiting aircraft, and allows JTACs/FAC(A)s to
maintain a picture of their CAS stack and positions of assets. Routing should include a point
and an altitude block that provides deconfliction from other aircraft and fires.

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Battle staff coordination after aircraft check out.

Following aircraft departure battle staff should perform following activities:
a. ALO/JTAC/FAC(A) should collect and disseminate BDA
b. Supported Commander/ Operations officer should assess mission

effectiveness and decide on next course of action
c. Intelligence officer should collect and process BDA
d. Fire Support Officer should deactivate ACAs, terminate fire missions in

support of CAS
e. Air Defense Officer should inform friendly AD that air is off station and
adjust weapons control order.
Section IV - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance into Close Air

Support.
When aircraft are tasked to conduct ISR, and there is not an immediate need to conduct CAS
attacks, the following caveat to the execution template may be used.
a. Routing/safety of flight.
b. CAS aircraft check-in.
c. Situation update/reconnaissance/surveillance briefing. JTACs/FAC(A)

should develop and brief a comprehensive sensor allocation plan that provides
tasking for all available sensors. Redundancy should be minimized. Figure V-15
provides terms for tasking aircraft sensors providing overwatch for patrols and
convoys.
ISR While ISR is being conducted, JTACs/FAC(A) should remain engaged with
aircrew and update tasking and sensor allocation as the tactical situation develop.
Labeling–Specific labels may be assigned to individuals, vehicles, etc. that aircrew

acquire while conducting ISR. This enables JTACs and aircrew to quickly refer to
these items of interest using the unique label assigned. These labels should be
distinctive and unique to each item to reduce confusion, such as “Bongo truck 1” or
“Person 2.” brevity terms that can be used with these labels to provide quick,
directive tasking.
This step may continue into correlation if the aircrew discovers a target.
When it appears likely that a CAS attack will be required, JTACs/FAC(A)s should be
proactive in executing the steps discussed in section a “JTAC Actions for Developing
CAS Brief” to develop targeting data, game plan, CAS brief, and restrictions.
Developing this information early will allow JTACs/FAC(A)s to issue a preemptive
CAS brief, remarks, minimizing time to kill once the attack has been approved.

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If aircrews are the first to gain SA to a target, the JTAC should request target
coordinate and elevation from the aircrew. Depending on the type of attack planned,
the coordinate and elevation passed from the aircrew does not need to be derived
through a dedicated coordinate generation pass. For BOT employments, the
coordinate and elevation are used by the JTAC/FAC(A) for target location
verification and clearance of fires. However, if the attack is planned as a ROC for
the original aircraft or other CAS assets, the coordinate and elevation must be as
precise as necessary to meet ground force commander’s intent. If in doubt, the
aircrew should query the JTAC/FAC(A) as to the level of precision required.
d. Game plan.
e. CAS brief. If the aircrew were the first to gain SA to the target, the lines 4
and 6 passed should be the same as provided by the aircrew during ISR.
f. Remarks / restrictions.
g. Readbacks. If the aircrew were the first to gain SA to the target, readbacks
will be in accordance with Appendix E, “Example of Close Air Support Missions,”
Example 13. An aircrew can acquire a target and derive targetable data (lines 4,
5, and 6) for JTAC/FAC(A) while conducting CAS, ISR, escort, and other
missions. After verifying the target data provided by the aircrew, the
JTAC/FAC(A) will provide the same aircrew with a CAS briefing using the target
data provided by the aircrew. The transmission of the target data by the
JTAC/FAC(A) is considered the mandatory readback and is the responsibility of
the aircrew to confirm readback was correct.
Note: This situation only applies if the aircrew that provides the target data is the
same aircrew that is provided the CAS briefing by the JTAC/FAC(A).
h. Attack
i. Assess effects and repeat 4-9 as necessary.
j. BDA.
k. Routing / Safety of flight.
Section V - Emergency Close Air Support.

Note: Emergency CAS is not to be a pre-planned condition. Failure to conduct proper planning
and utilization of a JTAC/FAC(A) while planning to execute CAS during a mission is ill advised.
It is imperative to include a JTAC/FAC(A) in the mission when any reasonable use of CAS is
envisioned.
In emergency circumstances, the ground force commander might require air support when a
JTAC/FAC(A) is not available or is no longer able to provide assistance, but detailed integration
with friendly forces fire and movement is still required. Aircrew executing CAS under these
circumstances bear increased responsibility for the detailed integration required to minimize
friendly fire and collateral damage, tasks normally done by a JTAC/FAC(A). In these

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circumstances, CAS aircrew shall assist non-JTAC-qualified personnel/units to the greatest

extent possible in order to bring fires to bear.
Due to the complexity of air support, the aircrew and supported commander must consider the
increased risk of friendly fire and civilian casualties when using personnel who are not
JTAC/FAC(A) qualified. The requester must notify/alert his command element when a
JTAC/FAC(A) is unavailable to conduct terminal attack control and/or assume control of
supporting CAS assets. If the maneuver commander accepts the risk, the request is
forwarded to the CAS controlling agency (AOCC, JFACC). This information will alert the CAS
controlling agency that aircrew will be working with non-JTAC/FAC(A) personnel.
Execution.
Ground personnel requiring air support will normally be able to provide much of the information
needed to complete the CAS brief. CAS aircrew shall draw the following information from the
ground personnel:
a. Target elevation.
b. Target location (grid, lat/long, direction and distance from reference point,
etc.).
c. Target description (sufficient to provide positive identification).
d. Any target marks that the ground personnel are able to provide (smoke,
direct fire, LASER, IR pointer, etc.).
e. Nearest friendly location (sub-cardinal direction and distance from target,

possibility to mark their position with assets available).
f. Any restrictions that the ground force commander feels are necessary or
situational awareness the aircrew needs to prosecute the target safely (presence
of civilians or other friendly troops, etc.). Aircrew should be prepared to develop
their own restrictions they believe are necessary for the safe prosecution of the
target to include final attack headings in order to ensure the friendlies and civilians
are safe from the effects of all fires.
Aircrew shall achieve positive target correlation through a sufficient dialogue or question and
answer method with the ground personnel while understanding that the ground personnel are
not specifically trained in target correlation methods.
Aircrew should direct the ground personnel to use the brevity term “Abort” if any unsafe
situation develops during the attack. Aircrew in this situation will make a timely effort to involve
a JTAC/FAC(A) in the situation; be prepared to “pull” information from ground personnel to
complete the attack brief; and exercise vigilance with target identification, weapons effects,
friendly locations, and execution of the final attack/abort procedures.
Section VI - Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Integration

NOTE: There is no commons NATO standard for FAC(A) certification and qualification and
mission essential task list. Following section is an extract from the US JP 3-09.3 that has been
used in order to provide guidance and improve interoperability.

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5.4.20 FAC(A) Capabilities.
Whether operating as an extension of a TACP or as a separate TACP, FAC(A)s are terminal

attack controllers with a host of capabilities that vary based on platform. They can and should
be used to maximize and integrate fires on the battlefield and achieve the supported
commander’s intent while minimizing the risk of friendly fire. It is important that fire planners
understand the capabilities that a FAC(A) brings to an operational area. The following list
highlights these capabilities:
a. TAC (Type 1, 2, and 3)
(1) Provide final attack clearance in accordance with Type 1, 2, and 3 control.
(2) Coordinate and control SOF gunship fire missions.
(3) Be a reactive CAS asset, available to the JTAC.
(4) Provide a final quality control check to prevent friendly fire.
b. Radio Relay
(1) Provide a communication link due to LOS for the JTAC and supported
unit.
(2) Provide a communication link between the supported unit and aviation
C2system.
(3) Provide a communication link between the JTAC and RW CAS assets.
(4) Perform OSC duties in the event of a combat search-and-rescue event

where there is no ground commander or TACP/JTAC on scene.
c. Reconnaissance
(1) Perform multispectral imagery function in an attempt to fulfill CCIRs.
(2) Provide target analysis and weaponeering recommendations.
(3) Provide perspective from air, same perspective of CAS assets.
d. Indirect Fires Calls for Fire. Perform as an artillery spotter/perform calls

forfire.
e. Asset Coordination/Deconfliction
(1) Provide deconfliction of aircraft and surface fires.
(2) Pass situation updates.
(3) Put targeting information into CAS brief format, tactical situation
dependent.

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(4) Pass targeting information (CAS brief, SOF gunship call for fire, SPINS
specified formats).
f. BDA. Develop and pass BDA.
g. Target Marking/Designation/Coordinate Generation
(1) Provide Talk-Ons.
(2) Provide marks.
(3) Provide terminal guidance for LGWs.
(4) Generate target coordinates for weapons employment.
h. SEAD Coordination Efforts
5.4.21 FAC(A) Duties and Responsibilities.
It is important for the FSE, JTAC and FAC(A) to rapidly determine responsibilities for execution
and expedite CAS procedures in a tactically safe manner. The three objectives of the FAC(A)
are:
a. to achieve the ground commander’s intent,
b. maximize and integrate fires on the battlefield, and
c. mitigate friendly fire.
The FAC(A) must understand the tasking and duties set forth by the JFSE and JTAC in order
to accomplish them autonomously and reduce the work load required of the JTAC. Absence,
or misidentification, of the tasks and duties for the FAC(A) during planning and/or execution
will likely result in delayed CAS operations. It is important to note that these duties can change
at any time during the time on station for the supporting FAC(A), at the discretion oft he TACP.
Should TAC duties be divided between the JTAC and FAC(A), the element who has the
authority to provide final weapons release permission must be clearly stated. This will alleviate
any confusion during the critical phase of employment. JTACs and FAC(A)s should use the
following brevity terms to quickly communicate duties, and shall positively echo any
responsibilities passed:
a. BRIEF.
The FAC(A) will automatically pass information such as operational area updates,
available CAS briefs, BDA, etc. to CAS assets within the operational area, as well
as copy CAS asset check-in information. The FAC(A) will keep the JTAC updated
on the situation, but will allow them to focus on other duties. It is not uncommon for
some aspects of the brief to be passed, while the JTAC retains other aspects, e.g.,
a JTAC could task the FAC(A) to check aircraft into the operating area and then
pass a current situation update, while retaining the attack brief or CAS brief. The
JTAC will be as specific as necessary, using plain language, to clearly identify the
JTAC’s desires to the FAC(A).

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b. STACK.
The FAC(A) will deconflict all CAS assets from surface fires within the operational
area, as well as provide deconfliction for assets upon check-in. Deconfliction will
include HAs, ingress and egress routings, and target areas. The FAC(A) will keep
the JTAC updated of the situation as required, allowing the JTAC to focus on other
duties. The JTAC must keep the FAC(A) updated on any changes with FSCMs/IDF
operations. Further coordination should take place between the JTAC and FAC(A)
if any specific axis or holding points are desired for following missions that the JTAC
wishes to undertake.
c. MARK.
The FAC(A) will provide target marks for CAS attacks. It is critical that the FAC(A)
and JTAC coordinate whether or not the JTAC will issue a clearance via Type 1, 2
or 3 for the FAC(A) to release a mark. A CAS brief is not required to be provided for
a FAC(A) mark, as it could significantly increase time to kill, however care should be
undertaken to achieve proper target confirmation prior to issuing release authority.
If the FAC(A) is provided the authorization to release airborne marks autonomously
by the JTAC, at a minimum the FAC(A) shall still telegraph intentions by
communicating an IN for the MARK call prior to releasing ordnance, allowing the
JTAC to abort the autonomous mark if tactically necessary. Talk-Ons are considered
a mark for this tasking. The FAC(A) will bring aircraft forward with deconfliction
established and threat permitting, in order to provide Talk--Ons to targets associated
with passed CAS briefs/areas of interest.
d. CONTROL.
The FAC(A) will provide final release authority to attacking aircraft if delegated this
authority by the JTAC. As always, the JTAC retains abort authority. There is no need
to use the term “Joint Control,” as it is ambiguous. The JTAC should always back up
the FAC(A) if tactically feasible, and be ready to assume control if the FAC(A) is
unable to obtain the proper position for a Type I control, given a dynamic tactical
scenario requiring significant aircraft maneuvering. In this case, the FAC(A) should
clearly communicate intentions to the JTAC as soon as possible, to allow the JTAC
the ability to assume terminal control. In the case of a FAC(A) receiving control
authority, similar to autonomous marking, the FAC(A) can release ordnance by
effectively controlling him/herself, if prior coordination takes place with the JTAC.
However, in this scenario the FAC(A) should exercise utmost care to perform all
necessary measures to mitigate risk of friendly fire and, at a minimum, the FAC(A)
shall telegraph intentions by communicating an IN call prior to releasing ordnance,
allowing the JTAC to abort the FAC(A) if tactically necessary.
5.4.22 FAC(A) Integration
a. Integration with TACP
The FAC(A) is an extension of the TACP, and should communicate “FAC(A)

capable/qualified” at check-in, providing the JTAC knowledge of the capability
resident within the asset. If the JTAC intends to utilize the FAC(A) capability in these
situations, the situation update should be much more in depth than that of a normal
CAS asset, therefore, the JTAC should consider using an enhanced version of the

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common situation update. If a FAC(A)-capable asset is going to be used ad hoc,

then JTACs should be aware that the usual degree of detailed integration may not
have taken place during mission planning. More time may be required to allow the
asset to develop the necessary SA(i.e., active PAAs, friendly battle tracking) in order
to successfully perform FAC(A) duties.
With this enhanced knowledge of the overall game plan, the FAC(A) will be better
prepared and able to support the ground commander. Other information to be
passed to FAC(A) should be any present or developing target areas. If the JTAC
has CAS briefs available, complete or incomplete, they should pass as much to the
FAC(A) as the tactical situation allows. Routine “nice to know” information for a CAS
asset should be considered and passed as “need to know” information for a FAC(A),
as it may become critical for effective execution as the tactical situation changes.
b. FAC(A) integration in the absence of an on-scene TACP.
As per the definition, a FAC(A) is normally an extension of the TACP. However, as

the demand for qualified controllers increases, it is important to highlight
considerations for employing a FAC(A) either as a separate terminal attack controller
working directly for the ground commander, or as an extension of a TACP not
physically located with the supported unit commander.
(1) Coordination. When operating as a separate TACP or without a JTAC

on scene, the FAC(A) must maintain the communication links to the ground
commander and receive authorization (either in planning or real-time) for
coordination and delivery of aviation fires. The close and continuous
coordination with the supported ground commander will foster understanding
about the FAC(A) platform’s capabilities and when to leverage them. The
supported commander is responsible for all fires, both aviation and surface-
based, that are delivered in the assigned operational area. A FAC(A) conducting
CAS operations as a separate TACP must be aware that the fires in the support
of the ground commander are occurring in a unit’s operational area. All FAC(A)
fire missions (aviation or surface-to-surface) must still be approved by the
supported ground maneuver fire support element. This may require the
FAC(A) to conduct detailed, real-time coordination on the supported unit’s fire
support coordination net. Additionally, the FAC(A) must understand that the unit
in need of FAC(A) support may not be the one that owns the operational area.
In recent counterinsurgency operations, FAC(A)s have been employed
supporting convoys and mounted patrols from one unit, while those elements
are transiting another unit’s operational area. Often in these situations, the on-
scene unit leader did not have the same SA with regard to nearby friendly force
disposition or fire missions as the unit that was responsible for the operational
area. In many of these situations, CAS engagements resulting in friendly fire
were avoided due to a FAC(A)’s ability to conduct coordination, understand
through whom fires approval must be requested, and build each unit’s SA
quickly as a radio-relay between agencies. The FAC(A) must understand that
complex operations, as discussed, will require potentially greater and more
detailed real-time integration with adjacent and HHQ.

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(2) Commanders guidance. Ground commanders should provide the

FAC(A)s the same direction with respect to the fire support plan and execution
as would be provided to the TACP/JTAC, and expect the FAC(A) to perform the
tasking. The FAC(A) can and will likely be the terminal controller who will retain
the employment authority of FAC(A) and CAS element ordnance.
While the emphasis is usually placed on the “control” in FAC(A), recent combat experience
has shown that the most important utility in having a FAC(A) overhead may lie with the mission-
essential tasks, other than terminal control, that the FAC(A) can provide to the supported
commanders. The FAC(A) may be given TAC or, by focusing on the other mission essential
tasks (radio relay, reconnaissance, calls for fire, asset coordination/deconfliction, BDA, target
marking, designation, coordinate generation, and SEAD), may become the critical link that
allows a JTAC to provide weapons release approval. In recent counterinsurgency operations,
TAC has been a low-percentage task for the FAC(A)s, whereas the requirement for the
coordination aspects of the FAC(A) mission have increased. The requirement for the FAC(A)
to seamlessly assume control and coordinate with the ground commander for fires approval
and weapons release authority during terminal attack operations has not diminished. The
increased role of the FAC(A) executing the coordination missions allows the FAC(A) to act as
a facilitator between agencies maintaining and expediting the kill chain. As the TACPs and
JTACs operate at greater distances from the supported ground maneuver units, the
requirement for aircrew to be well versed in the finer details of CAS has increased. Whether
delivering sophisticated ordnance in close proximity to friendly troops, dropping new classes
of weapons through increasingly complex airspace, or operating as part of the air-ground team
against an enemy mindful of collateral damage and political impact, the FAC(A)s must bring to
bear all of the knowledge and equipment necessary to best contribute to the commander’s
success on the battlefield.
5.4.23 Execution with FAC(A)
The responsibilities of the JTAC and the FAC(A)s must be determined prior to the attack.
These responsibilities may include coordination with maneuver elements, attack aircraft
briefing, target marking, airspace deconfliction, SEAD execution, and who provides final attack
clearance.
a. Communication Techniques.
Communication often becomes complex, with a FAC(A) and numerous CAS assets
on station simultaneously. Several options and techniques are available to maximize
the use of verbal communication, while preserving radio time for critical weapons
release authority, mission approval, and passing information.
Establish two or three separate frequencies for CAS coordination and execution.
One will serve as the primary AO/ALO frequency on which all CAS target-attack
missions may be passed and coordinated, and final weapons release permission
may be passed. All players including the JTAC, FAC(A), and CAS aircraft should be
on the frequency. This frequency will normally be the TAD net assigned to the JTAC.
The auxiliary frequency(UHF or VHF) can be used as a coordination frequency
between the AO/ALO, JTAC, and the FAC(A) to pass administrative details, situation
updates, new targets, coordination for SEAD, coordination for marks, and CAS
mission approval. In a Marine operation, this is often the TACP (local) net. A third
frequency could be established if numerous aircraft are anticipated within an

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operational area, as terminal control communication can quickly become intensive

and diminish the ability to deconflict aircraft. On this additional frequency,
communications such as check-in, updates, and asset deconfliction can be passed
by the FAC(A) and/or JTAC. This prevents these vital but lower-priority
communications from interfering with target Talk-Ons, coordination between the
FAC(A) and JTAC, or terminal attack communications. If such a frequency plan is
established, the FAC(A) must understand that coordination should occur on this
frequency but that all TAC is to occur on the primary net in order to ensure that the
JTAC has SA and is able to abort attacks if necessary.
Another technique when utilizing a FAC(A) and/or several CAS assets

simultaneously is to ensure that when information is passed, it is passed to as many
assets as possible. When passing a CAS brief to a FAC(A) or CAS asset, preface it
with a HEADSUP call to all players, alerting them to copy the information. This will
potentially prevent the same information from being passed several times on the
same frequency.
A final communications technique is to inform all players that communications are

becoming intensive and to limit all calls to 10-seconds or less, as well as for attacking
aircraft to provide a THIRTY SECONDS call. This will allow information to continue
being passed in short segments to all players within the operational area, as well as
provide attacking aircraft with breaks in communications, in which to inform the
JTAC and/or FAC(A) that they will be making an IN call soon, and will need final
attack clearance. When the THIRTY SECONDS call is made, the FAC(A) should
inform the aircrew that information is being passed to standby, monitor the attack,
and provide weapon release permission (clearance); or to abort and then resume
passing pertinent information to the respective aircraft.
b. Holding.
The FAC(A)’s holding pattern will vary greatly throughout the time on station in order
to accommodate such tasks as target identification, coordinate generation, or visual
acquisition of CAS assets. If the threat and weather allows, the FAC(A) may wish to
orbit over or near the target. This will allow the FAC(A) to be in a position to mark,
accomplish talk-ons, provide final clearance, and conduct other tasks previously
listed. The JTAC should provide the FAC(A) with as much airspace as possible, both
laterally and vertically, consistent with existing limitations, to allow the FAC(A) to
manage the airspace deconfliction between him/herself and the other CAS aircraft.
This flexibility is necessary for the CAS assets and the FAC(A) to effectively employ
ordnance consistent with existing tactics and threat considerations.
c. Marks.
The requirement for JTAC clearance for FAC(A) marks must be clearly stated real-
time. Consideration should be given to providing blanket approval for FAC(A) target
marking. If the TACP determines that they will provide clearance in the form of a
Type 1, 2, or 3 control for FAC(A) marks, the FAC(A) should request blanket
approval for the use of nonlethal marks (e.g., IR pointers/markers). Ultimately, the
decision will rest with the ground commander, and as such, the TACP must provide
guidance that will allow an informed decision.

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d. Attacks
During medium altitude operations, with JTAC approval, the FAC(A) can execute all
tasks listed above, including briefing the CAS aircraft, bringing them into the target
area, providing the talk-on, marking, and providing final clearance. The JTAC must
continually monitor the mission, provide necessary corrections, retain abort
authority, monitor artillery and RW activities, and work with the ground commander
and representatives to further refine target priorities in support of the commander’s
objectives.
During low-altitude or RW operations, with TACP approval, the FAC(A) will normally
remain at the BP/IP, brief the CAS aircraft, provide them holding instructions for
deconfliction, confirm a common time hack, and possibly provide target marks.
In a time-sensitive situation, such as a troops in contact, an on-station FAC(A)

working with ground forces may have greater SA than CAS fighters checking in, and
may also be able to provide support most rapidly through the employment of own-
ship munitions. As stated previously, this ordnance release must be coordinated with
the JTAC and be either under a blanket approval to mark and suppress targets (“your
mark and control”), or via a terminal attack-control clearance.
A FAC(A) can use several techniques to aid the JTAC with flexible and lethal aviation
fires. One such technique is to initiate a CAS attack window with a visual mark
followed by either a Type 1 or 2 control for the first weapon to be employed to ensure
that all members of the attacking flight have the target TALLY/CAPTURED. Once
the attacking aircraft are TALLY/CAPTURED, the FAC(A) may then request a
transition to Type 3 on the specified target set, allowing the FAC(A) to continue
monitoring the engagement while assisting the JTAC with any of the other FAC(A)
capabilities or tasks listed earlier.
e. Post Attack.
If the FAC(A) is providing deconfliction at the IP and/or in the target area, they will
continue to do so for the CAS aircraft egressing the area. Whoever has the best
observation of the attack and weapons effects should provide the CAS aircraft with
BDA. If communications are interrupted by terrain, the JTAC should plan to relay
BDA through the FAC(A) to the CAS asset.
f. Battle Handover.
Prior to the FAC(A) checking out with the JTAC, a handover brief shall be conducted
with the JTAC or oncoming FAC(A). Information should include, but is not limited to:
(1) Assets On Station.
(a) Location.
(b) Ordnance/time on station remaining.
(c) Established deconfliction plan for assets within the operational area.
(2) Threat Updates.

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(3) Missions Conducted.
(a) Targets engaged/CAS briefs passed.
(b) Targets currently being engaged under Type 3.
(c) Targets remaining and priority.
(4) Communications Plan.
(5) Recommendations to JTAC or Oncoming FAC(A).
(6) Any other pertinent information
Section VII. Joint Fires Observer Integration

NOTE: JFO is not recognized NATO term. There is no common NATO standard for Joint Fires
Observers and nations develop capabilities of their observers independently. However multiple
NATO nations have signed up to the US JFO MOA and therefore this section is an extract from
the US JP 3-09.3 that is to facilitate interoperability during coalition operations. Only personnel
certified and qualified in accordance with the US JFO MOA can be considered JFOs and
authorized to perform duties as outlined in the JFO MOA. When working with observers from
other nations, extreme caution must be applied due to this lack of standardization.
5.4.24 JFO Actions.
a. Target Nomination.
Targets may be nominated for attack by unit leaders (e.g., platoon commanders,
squad leaders) via maneuver frequencies or by JFO via TACP frequencies or
surface fires frequencies. It is imperative that the communications plan is understood
by all.
b. Initial contact.
Once established in the assigned location/area, the JFO will contact the
JTAC/FAC(A) on the briefed communications net. Upon initial contact, the JFO
should communicate the situation to the JTAC/FAC(A) using the observer lineup
brief. The JFO should periodically update the JTAC/FAC(A) as the battlefield
situation changes.
c. Situation Update.
Depending on the tactical situation, the JFO situation update brief should use the
same format as the CAS situation update brief, only including those items that are
applicable. JFOs may pass the situation update directly to the JTAC/FAC(A) or may
require the CAS aircraft to relay. Clearance authority is not briefed by the JFO. JFOs
should break the situation update into manageable transmissions using the brevity
term BREAK when passing to their JTAC/FAC(A).

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Observer Lineup
“__________, this is _____________with observer lineup. Over”
(JTAC C/S) (JFO C/S)
Only to JTAC: “My position is _____________________”
(i.e., grid and/ or reference point)
“I am in ________________________, located ___________________from target area,
(Overwatch, Convoy, Defensive, etc.) (direction and distance m/km)
marked by________________________. I have________________________ targets for

CAS.
(Friendly mark type) (Number of)
My specialized equipment is________________________. Over.”
(PSS-SOF, LTD w/JFO PRF code, LRF, GPS, IR Pointer, etc.)
Notes:
1. The JFO should be prepared to describe how the target coordinates were derived for each
CAS brief. For example: LRF coupled with a GPS, or map and compass. This information
provides the JTAC and supporting aircrew situational awareness regarding the accuracy of
the target coordinates provided.
2. Friendly grid coordinates should not be passed on an unsecure net.
d. JFO Target Brief.
When the decision has been made to attack the target using CAS, the JFO shall
contact the JTAC/FAC(A) and provide targeting information. A target brief should be
prefaced by “advise when ready for JFO target brief.” JFOs should ensure that they
are ready to pass the entire target brief prior to transmission. The target brief should
be prefaced by stating the first line number, “Line 4:” Additional line numbers are not
transmitted unless there is an omission. After Line 8 is read, the JFO will state
“Advise when ready for remarks.” At a minimum, JFOs should recommend final
attack restrictions.

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Joint Fires Observer Target Brief
Line 4: Target Elevation (ft MSL) "Line 4 ________________________"
Line 5: Target Description " ________________________"
Line 6: Target Location " ________________________"
Line 7: Target Mark " ________________________"
Line 8: Friendlies " ________________________"
"Advise ready for remarks"
FAH
LTL/PTL
Threat Direction/Distance
SEAD Int/Cont/Non-Stan
GTL/LOF Max Ord
Restrictions
TOT Readback
(1) If any lines between 4 and 8 are omitted from the brief, the line must be
prefaced with the line title to identify the location of the information within the
attack brief, followed by either “None” or “Unknown.” Lines 4 and 8 shall not be
omitted. Line 7 of the target brief should specify which type of correlation the
JFO will be using, i.e., map, GRG, visual talk-on.
(2) JFOs shall ensure that Line 8 references the closest friendlies to the
target, which may or may not be their position. It is incumbent on the
JTAC/FAC(A) to verify the direction and distance by all available battle-tracking
methods.
(3) Remarks may include, but are not limited to, LTLs, IR pointer-target lines,
threats to aviation, recommended/requested attack geometry (e.g., FAHs),
ordnance, etc.

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(4) Readbacks. During the JFO target brief, the JFO will receive readbacks
of all mandatory readback items from the TAC. The JFO should respond to
correct readbacks with “Chief 21, readback correct,” or “Chief 21, good
readback.” If the readback is not correct, the JFO should restate the portion in
question correctly, using voice inflection to draw attention to the portion that had
been read incorrectly, e.g., “Chief 21, correction, FAHs 1-8-0 through 2-1-0.”
5.4.25 JTAC/FAC(A) mission preparation.
The JTAC/FAC(A) shall verify the target location, friendly location and attack geometry.
After the JFO target brief, the JTAC will pass instructions and the intended plan of action.
a. Consider requesting an “IN with direction” or “heading” radio call from the
aircrew. This can increase the JFO’s SA of the attack and allows timely aborts
from the JFO if required. (See Figure V-17).
b. The JTAC to JFO instructions identify actions required by the JFO to

support the JTAC’s intended plan of action.
c. The intended plan of action communicates the details of the CAS attack so
that the JFO can brief the supported unit leader.
d. The JTAC will direct the JFO to switch to the TAD frequency to monitor the
CAS brief. During the execution of the CAS attack, the JFO will provide TGO,
correlation, or target/situation updates, as required for mission success.
5.4.26 Execution template.
JTAC conducts the CAS mission using the execution template. Execution template
considerations specific to JFO integration are:
a. Routing/Safety of Flight. The JTAC or higher TACP provide aircraft

routing, but the JFO may be required to pass safety of flight information as the
battlefield situation changes or during CAS execution with non-JTAC personnel.
b. CAS Aircraft Check-In. The JFO should be on TAD and monitoring the
communications between the TAC and the CAS aircrew. This will enable the JFO
to brief the ground commander on CAS mission status. JFOs must take care to
copy the check-inaccurately the first time it is passed, whether from their JTAC
or from monitoring transmission to the JTAC from the aircrew.
c. Situation Update. The JTAC’s SITREP should include JFO information if

applicable (general location, equipment/capabilities, and duties with regard to the
CAS mission).
d. Game Plan. The JFO monitors the game plan to provide the ground
commander with pertinent information.
e. CAS Brief. The JFO monitors the CAS brief to validate accuracy.

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f. Remarks/Restrictions. The JFO monitors the remarks/restrictions to

identify attack geometry, TGO requirements, and TOT.
(1) JFO confirms the ability to provide required TGO, correlation, or

observation of the target.
(2) JFO and ground commander should be involved in establishment of TOT.
g. Readbacks. The JFO monitors to validate accuracy.
h. Correlation. See paragraph, “Target Correlation.”
i. Attack. See paragraph “Mission Execution.”
j. Assess Effects. JFO provides assessment of weapon(s) effects and

updated commander‘s intent. Conferring with the on-scene maneuver
commander and JTAC, JFOs shall ensure that previous restrictions are still
applicable to reattacks, and recommend changes to them if necessary.
k. BDA. JTACs working with a JFO in a Type 2 control scenario will generally
have the JFO pass BDA directly to the attacking section of aircraft over TAD while
monitoring for accuracy. In some cases, aircrew with various sensors may be
better situated to aid the JFO in assessing hit results. JFO monitors and updates
ground commander on CAS mission status.
l. Routing/Safety of Flight. N/A.
5.4.27 Target Correlation.
Correlation may be required to refine target location to a high enough fidelity for mission
approval. Target correlation can occur either between the JFO and the JTAC or between the
JFO and the CAS aircrew. Some correlation considerations follow:
a. JFO to JTAC Correlation
(1) Correlation should occur prior to aircraft check-in, if possible. With

systems available in the COC, this could enable the JTAC to conduct a BOC
attack, minimizing time to first effects, vice a BOT attack.
(2) The JTAC should verify the coordinate source (i.e., PSS-SOF, Vector 21,
GRG) during BOC employment if the JFO is the sole source of targeting
information. The JTAC should cross-check the intended aim point against the
coordinates provided.
(3) JFO can continue to search for additional targets once target correlation
occurs.
(4) While not required, it is recommended that the JFO utilize the TAD
frequency.

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b. JFO to Aircrew Correlation
It is required for BOT attacks when JFO is the individual that is tally and when visual
marking is the means to affect target correlation (e.g., IR sparkle, smoke, direct fire).
(1) Communications. JFO must be on TAD frequency.
(2) Talk-On. When aircraft are already on-station and in a position to

participate in a target talk-on. JFOs should confirm that the aircrew is looking at
the same reference points as they are, by asking questions with unique and
distinct answers that will indicate that correlation is on track.
(3) LASER Target Designator. If the JFO is employing a GLTD for

correlation or terminal guidance of a LGW, the JFO will confirm the LASER is
on the correct code and use appropriate LASER brevity terms. When the JFO
is providing TGO with a LTD, the JTAC should ensure that all LASER
communications occur between the JFO and attacking aircraft. This
communication will occur on TAD, and a communication check between the
JFO and the aircrew should be accomplished.
(4) IR Pointer. The JFO will use appropriate IR and VDL brevity terms in
response to aircrew or the JTAC. When the JFO is using an IR sparkle to mark
a target, the JTAC must ensure that all proper IR terminology is utilized. IR TGO
communication should occur on TAD between the aircraft and JFO.
5.4.28 Mission Execution.
The JFO should be kept informed as the mission progresses. The JFO must know CAS mission
specifics that may include when aircraft are prosecuting attacks, how many aircraft are
attacking the target, when they release ordnance, and approximate time of weapons impact.
While the JFO will not issue weapons release authority (i.e., CLEARED HOT), informing him
of weapons release from the aircraft allows the JFO time to notify ground forces to seek cover
if required. Due to extended time of fall associated with PGM employment, the JTAC should
notify the JFO of weapons release and time of fall if the JFO is unable to monitor TAD. This
will give the JFO SA and allow him time to notify others in the target area of pending weapons
impact.
a. Situation updates during mission execution.
The JFO will pass pertinent information to the JTAC, while maintaining
communications with the on-scene maneuver commander. This includes, but is not
limited to:
(1) Target updates, target location refinement, target movement, and change
in target priority.
(2) Troops in contact.
(3) Friendly location updates and maneuver plan after the attack.
(4) Collateral damage considerations and updates.

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(5) Weapons impact correction and/or new desired aim point. The JTAC
should be proactive and ensure the JFO provides timely corrections.
(6) Emerging threats to aircraft (MANPADS, small arms, AAA equipment).
(7) Inputs to BDA.
b. Aborting.
The JFO should use active listening and take care to practice TAD discipline during
the terminal phase of a CAS attack and be prepared to provide an ABORT call to
prevent friendly fire, ensure safety of flight, or satisfy commander’s intent. While not
certified to assess aircraft attack geometry, the JFO should monitor the aircraft’s
employment profile if the situation dictates.
5.4.29 CAS Execution with Non-JTAC Qualified Personnel.
In instances where a JFO facilitates CAS without a terminal attack controller present, the JFO
will inform the aircrew they are a JFO upon aircraft check-in, ensure aircraft safety of flight,
and adhere to procedures outlined in Chapter V, Section V - Emergency Close Air Support.

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PART II – AIR INTERDICTION
X Edition D Version 1
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CHAPTER 6 - INTRODUCTION AND FUNDAMENTALS

6.1 INTRODUCTION
This part provides AI tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the conduct of air
interdiction against targets developed from both deliberate and dynamic targeting processes.
For the purposes of this publication, all AI missions (AI, GAI, XAI, and SCAR) will be referred
to as AI. Exceptions to this rule will occur only as specifically required for proper understanding
of a specific mission type. This publication serves as a reference for planners and a checklist
for planners and aircrew to execute AI missions. Specific focus areas include command and
control (C2), planning, and execution with best practices for engaging air interdiction targets.
This AI part is not designed for targets in close proximity to ground forces, where detailed
integration is required for fire and maneuver. The portion of PART I of this publication (to
include introduction to fire support, legal considerations, etc.) should also be applied to AI
operations as appropriate.
6.2 DEFINITIONS
a. COM JFAC is, normally, the supported commander for the joint force
commander’s (JFC’s) overall AI effort. When designated as the supported
commander, COM JFAC will conduct theater-wide or joint operations area (JOA) wide
AI to support the JFC’s overall objectives. With the preponderance of air assets and
the ability to plan, task, and control joint air operations, COM JFAC can best plan and
execute AI. COM JFAC recommends theater and/or JOA-wide targeting priorities and,
in coordination with other component commanders, forwards the air apportionment
recommendation to the JFC. COM JFAC plans and executes the interdiction effort in
accordance with the JFC’s guidance.
b. AI missions result from the normal targeting cycle against targets in the
approved Prioritized Target List (PTL) and also from preplanned requests during the
normal air tasking order (ATO) cycle and allow for detailed coordination between the
tactical air and ground units involved. Additionally, preplanned requests may result in
AI sorties in an on-call status (either airborne or ground alert) to cover periods of
expected enemy action, respond to immediate requests, or attack dynamic targets. AI
missions use detailed intelligence to attack known or anticipated targets in an
operational area to generate effects that achieve JFC objectives. Dynamic targeting
(DT) provides a responsive use of on-call or dynamically re-tasked AI missions to
exploit enemy vulnerability that may be of limited duration. However, dynamic
targeting may lead to an overall reduction in the probability of success because of
reduced time for mission preparation and target study.
c. The following are air interdiction missions that can be found in the ATO:
(1) AI is a mission scheduled to strike particular targets in response to JFC
or component target nominations.
(2) GAI is the AI term used to identify an on-call mission placed on ground
alert to provide responsive AI throughout the theater in response to emerging
targets
(3) XAI is the AI term used to identify a scheduled mission that provides
airpower to a designated area versus a preplanned target and is flown when
targets are not known or briefed in advance (also referred to as armed
reconnaissance). During these missions the aircrew finds and attacks targets of
opportunity (i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, and facilities) in assigned areas.
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(4) SCAR (Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance) missions are flown to

detect targets so coordinated attacks or reconnaissance can be performed on
those targets. SCAR missions operate in specific geographic areas as an
element of the C2 interface to coordinate multiple flights, detect and attack
targets, neutralize enemy air defenses, and provide BDAs. The specific
geographic area may be defined by an Airspace Control Means (ACM) or fire
support coordination measure (FSCM) where potential targets are known, or
suspect, to exist. Typical SCAR tasks include sequencing and deconflicting
multiple attacking flights while providing target guidance and enemy air defense
updates to maximize the effect of each sortie.
(a) The SCAR. The SCAR is an asset responsible for performing
specific SCAR functions. These are described in paragraph 6.5.b.The
SCAR is the primary link between AI assets and C2.
d. Targets fall into two general classes: deliberate and dynamic:
(1) Deliberate. Deliberate targets are those known to exist in an operational
area with actions scheduled. Examples range from targets on the joint prioritized
target list (JPTL) in the applicable campaign plan, to targets detected in
sufficient time that can be listed in the ATO, mission-type orders, or fire support
plans.
(2) Dynamic. Dynamic targets are those that have been identified too late, or
not selected for action in time to be included in the normal targeting cycle, and
therefore have not been scheduled. Dynamic targets have two sub-
classifications: anticipated and unanticipated. An additional type of dynamic
target is a time sensitive target (TST). TSTs are those targets requiring
immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly
forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. The COM JTF
provides specific guidance and prioritization for TSTs within the campaign.
6.3 AI MISSIONS
The commander may designate AI to fly anywhere in the JOA. AI missions may occur on either
side of the fire support coordination line (FSCL). The JFC or supported commander establishes
target priorities. As there may be multiple supported commanders within a JOA, there may be
more than one AI target priority. In addition, these AI target priorities can change rapidly as the
JFC transitions from one phase to the next (e.g., deter, seize the initiative, dominate, and/or
stabilize). Target priorities established by the JFC or supported commander are defined in the
air operations directive (AOD), special instructions (SPINS), interdiction ROE, and appropriate
operation orders.
6.4 AI AUTHORITIES
a. The authority to conduct AI missions comes from the JFC. Within the land,
maritime, or special operations AO, the authority for interdiction is delegated to the
supported commander. Outside those AOs, the JFC normally designates the COM
JFAC as the supported commander for AI within the JOA.
b. Once an aircrew receives the task to conduct AI, by the ATO or a C2 agency,
no further authorization is required to deliver or direct delivery of ordnance on
appropriate targets. A SCAR has the authority to direct aircraft to proceed against
appropriate targets using search, investigate, target, strike or smack tasking’s. While

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smack tasking authority is inherent in the SCAR mission and can enhance mission
effectiveness, smack or other authorities may be restricted by the supported
commander within the JOA/AO, or by the COM JFAC for theater-wide AI operations,
based on force capabilities and/or operational requirements. Any restrictions should
be promulgated via ATO, ROE, SPINS, or in real-time via C2 agencies.
c. It is important to note joint interdiction can be conducted inside an AO in direct
response to a JFC tasking which may not be in support of the AO commander. The
JFC may, for example, designate certain high priority targets located inside an AO
that are not of immediate interest to the AO commander. Any commander executing
such a mission within a land or maritime AO must coordinate the operation to avoid
adverse effects and fratricide. SCAR aircrew need to be aware that an interdiction
tasking may require airspace and target area deconfliction in real time.
6.5 FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
a. AI assets are responsible for adherence to the applicable considerations within

their designated ACM/FSCM/geographic area. Other platforms/agencies can be used
to increase SA (e.g., confirming a FSCM is active in an affected kill box). These
considerations include:
(1) SPINS.
(2) ROE.
(3) FSCM or other restrictions.
(4) ACM.
(5) Target priority.
(6) Appropriate ordnance.
(7) Positive Identification (PID).
(8) CDE.
b. Additionally, the SCAR functions and responsibilities can be performed by any
aircraft that has the ability to find targets, communicate target location and description
to other AI assets or C2 agencies, and is trained to and capable of leading a SCAR
mission. These functions and responsibilities can be defined as follows:
(1) Primary
(a) Deconflict all assets in the designated area (airspace, aircraft, and
weapons).
(b) Integrate supporting assets by coordinating aircraft flow and
aircraft attack.
(c) Perform reconnaissance and/or direct assets to locate and PID
targets.
(d) Verify planned target locations, if required.
(e) Prioritize targets as per targeting guidance.
(f) Pass target description, location, and elevation to strike assets and
coordinate those engagements as necessary.
(g) Perform threat-level assessment.

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(2) Secondary.
(a) Monitor target areas of interest and named areas of interest(NAIs)
to provide timely warning of enemy location and intentions.
(b) Serve as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
collection platform.
(c) Attack targets, as required.
(d) Match appropriate ordnance to targets.
(e) Provide target marks (i.e., infrared (IR) pointer, LASER, or
rockets).
(f) Provide terminal guidance for LASER-guided munitions.
(g) Assist with BDA.
(h) Maintain a running tally of targets prosecuted and request
additional assets, as required.
(i) Provide a battlefield handover briefing to the follow-on SCAR.
(j) Provide reports to higher and supported agencies.
6.6 CONSIDERATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE AI
The following is a list of considerations for accomplishing an effective AI:
a. Defined geographic areas; ACM and FSCM.

b. Timely and accurate intelligence.
c. Local air superiority, as required.
d. Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
e. Effective communications and early warning.
f. Favorable weather.
g. Capable AI/SCAR assets.
h. Playtime.
i. Sensors.
j. Ordnance.
k. Aircrew training and proficiency.
l. Streamlined and flexible procedures.
m. Clear understanding of friendly ground scheme of maneuver and mission (e.g.
SOF operations).
6.7 SCAR IDENTIFICATION
a. The ATO or a C2 agency should identify the SCAR.
b. In the absence of a dedicated SCAR, the first AI asset on station capable of

performing the SCAR functions, outlined in paragraph 6.5.b, should be prepared to
perform the role of the SCAR. SCAR responsibilities may be transferred to any SCAR
capable asset that can provide better:
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(1) Situational awareness (SA).

(2) Sensors.
(3) Playtime.
(4) Communication.

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CHAPTER 7 - COMMAND AND CONTROL

7.1 OPERATIONAL C2
a. During the JFAC’s planning process, initial developments of AI mission tasks

will be reflected on the ATO. Regardless of mission location, critical situation updates
and mission results (i.e., inflight reports) must be reported via tactical C2 agencies to
the appropriate operational C2 for inclusion in the supported commander’s dynamic
or deliberate targeting processes.
b. If the AI mission requires a change, several factors must be taken into

consideration before making adjustments to its operational area or target priority.
Among these factors are the number of targets that meet ROE and the commander’s
intent inside the area assigned. Mission changes or deviations will require
coordination between operational and tactical C2. Mission updates should be
forwarded to the AI assets from operational C2, via tactical C2. As an example:
amplifying information on unidentified or defended targets and fratricide prevention
information from the special operations liaison element (SOLE) about special
operations forces(SOF) teams’ locations.
7.2 TACTICAL C2
a. When conducting an AI mission, aircrew shall check-in with the appropriate

C2 agency as prescribed within the theater airspace control plan (ACP) and SPINS.
C2 agencies shall provide an appropriate situation update to the AI assets upon check
in. When available, the C2 agency should provide sensor data or tracks of interest
applicable to the AI asset’s assigned area. This will allow the AI assets to combine
real time intelligence from outside agencies with onboard sensors.
b. Tactical C2 Systems/Agencies.
(1) Air surveillance and controls provided by airborne early warning (AEW)
aircraft equipped with search and height finding radar. AEW aircraft, (e.g. the
E-3), provide all-weather surveillance, C2, airborne battle management, and
communications needed by NATO commanders and allied air forces.
(2) Control and Reporting Center (CRC). Air Force CRCs are ground-based
airspace control/air defense, air battle management centers that provide
decentralized C2 execution capability. Critical core competencies of the CRC
include air battle execution, surveillance, combat identification, data link
management, cyberspace security, and theater air defense. The CRC provides
a robust systems and communications hub capability that connects upper,
lateral and subordinate C2 nodes.
(3) Air Operations Coordination Center (AOCC)4. The AOCC is an air control
agency responsible for the direction and control of air operations (if delegated
by COM JFAC) directly supporting ground combat forces. It processes and
coordinates requests for immediate air support and coordinates air missions
requiring integration with other supporting arms and ground forces.
4 For a more detailed discussion on AOCCs, see ACO Directive (AD) 080-065 “Concept of operations
for Air Coordination Centers Land and Maritime in allied command operations”
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(4) Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)5. When deemed appropriate by

the COMJFAC, an ASOC can be created. In such a case, the ASOC is the
principal air control agency responsible for controlling joint air operations that
directly support the land component. The ASOC is an extension of the JFAC
HQ to which it is directly subordinated. Within the air volume assigned by the
COMJFAC, the ASOC is responsible for coordination with land component (and
potentially other components) of air component missions which require
integration with other supporting arms and ground forces. The ASOC processes
include the following: handling immediate air support requests, coordinating the
execution of scheduled and on-call CAS sorties, and coordinating manned/UA
transiting through ASOC assigned airspace over the ground force commander’s
operational area. When delegated the authority, the ASOC retargets/re-
roles/redirects airborne assets, provides target updates, and launches ground
alert aircraft on call for the ground maneuver commander, as required. The
ASOC’s configuration is flexible and can be task-organized to support a variety
of tactical control requirements. For CAS missions, ASOC directs attack aircraft
to JTACs and performs other functions to facilitate air-surface operations. Within
its volume of assigned airspace, the ASOC coordinates other mission areas: AI,
ISR, SEAD, and personnel recovery. The ASOC, as a tactical level element,
normally collocates with the Army’s senior tactical GFC as required.
Coordination and synchronization among the ASOC and the land component is
vital to effective air-surface integration. Some of the roles and responsibilities of
the AOCC may appear similar to those of the ASOC. However, unlike the
AOCC, whose primary function is liaison and coordination, the ASOC’s primary
function is Airspace Control and fires deconfliction.
(5) Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) aircraft, (e.g. JSTARS, Sentinel),
provide ground and air commanders with situation development, attack
planning, targeting, and limited post-attack assessment information. GMTI
aircraft can provide ground surveillance SA and targeting information directly to
the AI assets or it can be relayed through a C2 agency.
c. SCAR. Tactical C2 provides a means for the SCAR to request additional assets,
both air or surface fires, and conduct additional airspace coordination when required
(e.g., when employing stand-off weapons or long range artillery). Depending on
system/agency capabilities and authorities, tactical C2 will coordinate with operational
C2, or fire support agencies to facilitate these requirements.
7.3 AIRSPACE
The use of ACMs and FSCMs is to facilitate efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions,
expedite target attacks and, simultaneously, provide safeguards for friendly forces. More
specific details of ACM and FSCM can be found in AJP-3.3.5 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace
Control” and ATP-3.3.5.1 “Joint Airspace Control, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures”.
a. ACMs increase AI effectiveness by ensuring the safe, efficient, and flexible use
of airspace. ACMs can assist planners in designating AI working areas. These areas
may be formal [established in the airspace control order (ACO)]or informal
(established by tactical C2 during execution). The SCAR may establish additional
5 At the moment, the ASOC concept is not part of the allied doctrine. However, several nations apply
this concept and may offer it for an operation. In such a case, if an ASOC is established, an AOCC will
not.
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ACMs within the assigned area to facilitate target engagement. Airspace changes or
additions shall be coordinated with tactical C2.
b. FSCMs also increase AI effectiveness, particularly when operating inside a land
component AO. They can reduce and expedite coordination requirements and provide
approval of fires for AI aircraft. When established by the commander of an AO, kill
boxes are the preferred FSCM for AI missions because they are a three-dimensional
measure that accounts for airspace and surface engagement area. Detailed
discussion of kill box use can be found in the Annex A – Killbox.
c. AI aircrews must understand which ACMs and FSCMs are being utilized to
prevent conflicts and potential fratricide between friendly aircraft and indirect fires.

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CHAPTER 8 - PLANNING
8.1 OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
8.1.1 Conditions for AI missions
a. Defined Geographic Areas. These are determined using ACMs and FSCMs.
b. Accurate and Timely Intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence is critical to

any AI mission to maximize the use of on station time and minimize time to kill. When
executing AI missions, target location (either general or specific) can minimize an
aircrew’s exposure to potential threats. Accurate and timely intelligence of adversary
air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities are essential in planning appropriate support
assets to protect AI assets and employ appropriate tactics. Sharing detection
information is critical. Disseminate threat systems detection to AI assets as
expeditiously as possible.
c. Local control of the air. Theater-wide control of the air is not required to conduct
AI operations. However, AI assets must be free from prohibitive threats when
operating in the target area. The desired level of control of the air should be provided
by additional aircraft tasked to counter air-to-air and/or surface-to-air threats. Based
on allowable risk, AI aircraft with an air-to-air capability may be used to respond to an
unplanned air threat.
d. Effective Communications.
(1) AI missions require dedicated communication networks between C2 and

the AI assets. AI assets must consider potential communication limitations such
as the effects of terrain on line of sight (LOS) communications and cyberspace
threats and plan appropriately to maintain communication between AI assets
and C2 agencies. C2 agencies are still responsible to contact AI assets with
urgent threat warnings. Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) data link frequencies
should be sanitized to ensure no electromagnetic fratricide.
(2) Due to high level of information exchange required for SCAR, the SCAR
must closely coordinate radio frequency allocation with C2. Associated
networks could include threat warning, SCAR primary and kill box (KB)
frequencies. SPINS will dictate what radio networks will be employed for SCAR
missions. Ideally there will be a frequency associated with each SCAR mission
that enables AI assets to have a common frequency for coordination. The SCAR
should consider potential data link capabilities of strike and reconnaissance
assets. Changes to the friendly scheme of maneuver should be communicated
to the SCAR as expeditiously as possible.
e. Favorable weather. Weather conditions will dictate the level of AI mission

effectiveness, dependent on aircraft platform and weapons system capabilities. Poor
weather conditions decrease the target search / identification (ID) ability for AI aircraft.
To effectively search, PID and determine CDE, AI aircraft should have room to
operate below the weather. Planners and operators also should consider the impact
weather conditions will have on AI missions when combined with the following:
(1) Terrain elevation.

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(2) Maximum altitude for the bulk of threat systems (risk management).
(3) Altitude requirement for effective threat reactions and mission

performance.
(4) Airspace requirements based on the number of AI assets in the AO or KB

and awareness of all established FSCMs and ACMs.
(5) Weapon / sensor capability. Specific aircraft capabilities may allow assets
to operate in and above negative weather conditions.
f. Capabilities of AI assets.
(1) To effectively execute all aspects of AI missions, the assets should be

capable of locating and identifying targets, communicating timely and accurate
details on the targets and destroying them, if required.
(2) Ideally, the SCAR should be equipped with advanced targeting capability,
communication suites and mixed weapon loads (including the ability to mark
targets and engage mobile targets). Planners also should consider aircraft loiter
times when selecting the SCAR.
8.1.2 AI mission design
a. An AI mission consists of strike and support (mission enablers, such as, SEAD).
b. SCAR mission design. In addition to the above, a SCAR mission consists of: C2
(beyond ‘normal’ command and control, refers to the C2 of other AI assets inside the
designated area by the SCAR); reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RSTA).
c. When planning AI missions, consider each element in context of the mission

and resources available to best meet the commander’s intent. Depending upon the
situation, not every element may be necessary for mission accomplishment.
(1) Strike. Consider varying weapon / fuses, aircraft types, and the
capabilities listed in paragraph 2.1.1g, aircraft configuration, to increase
flexibility.
(2) Support. Flexibility to maintain a high operations tempo should be

designed into the plan by having on-call assets or air-to-air refueling capability
available to extend operations.
(3) C2. Determine if an airborne C2 platform is necessary to enable

communications with the coordinating agency for the AI mission.
(4) RSTA. Identify available assets to search for surface targets.
8.1.3 Airspace Control
In addition to a geographic area in which to focus their reconnaissance effort and prosecute
targets, the AI assets must be delegated enough airspace to allow for them to hold, maneuver
and deliver ordnance. The use of a KB, because it is three-dimensional, is one method to
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achieve this, but is not exclusively required. Regardless of the method to delegate airspace,
the measure should be activated, or in effect, during the entire AI mission and methods of entry
and exit should be defined in the ACO or SPINS.
8.2 TACTICAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
8.2.1 Aircrew Skill Set Requirements.
AI missions are generally complex and aircrew proficiency will have a major impact on mission
success. Units conducting AI missions should consider the following skill sets when selecting
aircrew for the mission:
a. AI skills and experience.
b. In-theater expertise.
c. Situational awareness of restricted and no-strike targets in the AO.
d. The ability to create and execute a complex deconfliction plan between AI,
SEAD players and unmanned aircraft (UA).
e. Experience with other platforms, weapons, sensors and capabilities.
f. Detailed knowledge of enemy forces, locations, dispositions and formations

and also known friendly locations.
8.2.2 Aircraft Configuration
AI capable units (both manned and unmanned aircraft) should request the most suitable
loadout for AI missions. AI mission tasks include finding and identifying targets. Additionally,
SCAR missions add the handing targets off to other AI assets, striking a variety of tactical and
potentially mobile targets, and performing BDA. Ideally, aircraft should be configured with the
following capabilities:
a. Advanced Targeting or Reconnaissance Pods.
b. Aircraft sensors. Examples include; synthetic aperture radar (SAR)

mapping capability, full motion video (FMV) and moving target indicator (MTI).
c. Data link. Examples include Link 16 or situational awareness data link,

improved data modem, digital communications suite, remote viewing terminal
and secure communication suites.
d. Target Designation and Marking. Examples include rockets, bombs, guns,

LASER designator spot tracker and IR pointers.
e. Appropriate Weapons Loads. Examples include precision guided munitions

and area munitions.
f. Multiple Secure Radios (Voice).

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8.2.3 Mission Planning
a. AI mission planning involves determining the supported commander’s

intent/desired effects, coordinating strikes (lethal and nonlethal) to maximize
effects on the enemy, and reviewing engagement criteria. AI mission planning is
normally based on the following factors (also known as the 4 T’s):
(1) Task
(2) Target
(3) Threat
(4) Tactics
b. Planning guide. Annex B shows an example of a planning guide to facilitate

AI/SCAR mission preparation. Refer to current SPINS for AOR-specific briefing
considerations and include DT/SCAR information in aircrew smart packs in case
missions are re-tasked while airborne. In addition, the SCAR should carry a
coordination card to effectively manage assets, allocate targets and record BDA.
8.2.3.1 SCAR-specific mission planning
SCAR mission planning includes deconfliction / integration of assets, and locating and
identifying targets, considered in the following paragraphs:
a. Locating and Identifying the Targets. Several planning considerations

assist with locating and identifying a target. AI assets should gather information
on the types and locations of targets through intelligence briefs, develop different
search strategies and understand the target prioritization for the AO.
(1) Target types. Basic target types for AI are fixed and mobile. Target folders
should be available for fixed targets, but may not be available for mobile targets.
AI assets should analyze the AO to develop specific points of interest (POI) lists
that will facilitate effective searching for mobile targets once airborne.
(2) Imagery. The imagery of specific waypoints or POI can be printed and
carried in flight to help verify search areas. In addition, an AI target folder with
photos of enemy order of battle/visual ID packet may be helpful to achieve PID.
(3) Communication. While the AI assets are on station, other assets such as
JSTARS or SOF may find potential targets and pass the information to the
aircraft. This information may be passed via voice or data link normally using an
attack brief; but as a minimum, should include a target location and a brief
description.
b. Deconfliction / integration of assets. Within a geographic area, a

deconfliction plan must be applied to enable AI assets to arrive/depart and
operate within the designated AI working area. Deconfliction can be
accomplished using altitude, lateral or time separation or any combination of the
three. The following considerations should be taken into account:
(1) Details of any planned air interdiction strikes that affect the AI mission(s).
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(2) ACMs and FSCMs to support AI missions already established.
(3) Location of holding patterns.
(4) Location and deconfliction of friendly assets.
(5) Assigned airspace based on aircraft capabilities and the priority of those
capabilities to create desired effects.
(6) Entry and exit of the SCAR working area without interfering with other
SCAR/AI assets.
(7) Use of safety margins between assigned airspace.
(8) Likely enemy locations.
(9) Attack profiles and weapons flight paths.
(10) Communications plan.
(11) Entry and exit of the SCAR working area without interfering with AI assets.
c. Holding / Deconfliction Planning Considerations. During AI mission

planning, the planners/aircrew should examine available airspace and ATO
tasked AI assets to formulate a holding/deconfliction plan.
8.2.4 SEAD Considerations
a. SEAD operations in support of AI are based on the AI asset’s

suppression needs, target priorities and availability of SEAD assets. With valid
surface-to-air threat, SEAD must be an integral part of AI planning and
operations; however, SEAD requirements may vary according to mission
objectives, system capabilities and threat complexity.
b. Threat assessments and levels of allowable risk will determine

appropriation of SEAD assets to support AI. Service components with dedicated,
specialized SEAD aircraft will be able to provide special detectors, jammers and
electronic warfare equipment, anti-radiation missiles (ARMs), and precision-
guided munitions. If SEAD assets are not tasked to support AI, other fighter-
attack and multi-role fighter crews may be utilized to support the SEAD mission.
Also, SEAD assets may be re-tasked from the AOR-JOA SEAD support by the
appropriate echelon’s C2 agency. Tactical SEAD planning in support of AI will
require a detailed understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the
supporting SEAD assets.
c. Air defense threats can include many national or multinational systems

normally integrated into an IADS. An adversary’s IADS need to be analyzed in
depth, focusing on potential strengths and weaknesses. The goal is to identify
command structure, air defense doctrine, early warning and tracking capabilities,
C2 reliability/redundancy and defensive weapons systems.

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d. In most cases, SEAD support to AI will fall under the reactive SEAD
category whereby suppression is unplanned and includes aircrew self-defense
and attack against surface-to-air defense targets of opportunity. An aircraft
commander has the inherent authority and is obligated to use all necessary
means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the aircraft
and other forces in the vicinity, consistent with the ROE and LOAC. SEAD targets
of opportunity are those enemy air defense systems detected by surface or
airborne sensors or observers within range of available weapons and not yet
targeted.
(1) The JFC will establish ROE for reactive SEAD because SEAD operations
require correct ID of enemy systems to prevent fratricide, especially when
launching ARM’s against sources of unknown, spurious electronic signals. If
able, the SCAR should immediately coordinate an attack (versus a surface-to-
air threat) using an AI asset with the highest SA supported by SEAD, if available.
8.2.5 Acceptable Level of Risk (ALR)
The JFC, or his delegated authority, sets the ALR for all AI missions. During AI planning, it is
important to understand the ALR, the commander’s intent/desired effects, and the expected
threat levels based on intelligence reports. Additionally, the ALR may impact tactics based on
a requirement to maintain sanctuary from threats. Based on the JFC guidance and battlefield
developments, the ALR may change during AI missions.
8.2.6 Coordinating Strikes to Maximize Effects on the Targets
a. AI assets should turn their attention toward coordinating strikes against

their assigned targets. For dynamic targets, from a planning perspective, the first
step is to understand the assigned target priorities given in the ATO.
b. Timely BDA is required after each AI mission and enables COM JFAC to
optimize asset allocation. This is an essential part of the process to be completed
while the AI pilots are in the cockpit. It allows for recording prosecuted and
allocated targets to ensure accurate reporting. Through coordination with the
JFAC, the AI asset’s BDA will assist the JFAC in planning future mission taskings.
c. SCAR considerations.
(1) The SCAR should be familiar with the general capabilities and limitations
for strike assets. This includes standard weapons load out, data link capabilities,
sensor capabilities and loiter potential. Time permitting the SCAR can directly
contact assigned assets for an expanded capabilities brief specific to the ATO
tasked mission.
(2) The SCAR should maximize all available capabilities to perform accurate
and timely BDA. This includes all available sensors within their formation as well
as UAS, reconnaissance aircraft, SOF and electronic intelligence to confirm the
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8.2.7 Contingencies
a. Adverse weather. Weather can severely affect the AI mission process

including deconfliction, target location and employment / coordination. In the
planning stages, AI assets should determine the weather minimums (ceiling and
visibility) in which the AI mission can be conducted based on threat, terrain,
regulations, aircraft / equipment limitations and aircrew experience. AI assets
should consider available options if faced with conditions worse than projected.
Some aircraft may provide an all-weather search and target capability (i.e., SAR
map capable aircraft) while other aircraft may be significantly hampered by bad
weather.
b. Unanticipated enemy activity. Based on ALR, AI assets should plan for

potential “pop-up threats” on the battlefield. Based on the threat, the AI assets
may have to suppress the threat, reestablish sanctuary by altitude or lateral
separation, or terminate the mission. SPINS will address the authority for granting
an increased ALR.
c. Contested/Degraded Operations. The AI assets should expect and have

contingencies for communications degradation, Global Positioning System
jamming/unavailability, and data link denial. Some options include active and
networks, chatter mark game plan, and adjusting weapons load out and
employment.
d. Fallout. Coordination and dissemination of the AI plan prior to execution will

reduce the chances for a single point of failure.
(1) Primary asset fallout.
(a) AI assets fallout. Identify specific capabilities required to accomplish

the mission and identify back-up assets to create the desired effect.
(b) SCAR assets fallout. Identify the best qualified asset to assume the
SCAR responsibilities in case of ATO designated SCAR falls out.
(2) Capability fallout. Partial degradation of asset capability, of either primary

or supporting assets, which may result in planning modifications/restrictions.
(3) Supporting asset fallout. Identify specific capabilities required to

accomplish the mission. (e.g. tanker fallout)
e. Non PID / CDE capable aircraft. In some cases, SCAR aircraft may need
to find targets for other ATO-assigned aircraft that can strike a target but cannot
conduct PID or CDE due to system limitations, degraded systems or
environmental factors. The SCAR will have to complete all of the requirements
for PID and/or CDE to allow non PID / CDE capable assets to engage their
designated targets. In these cases, the SCAR will have to use smack authority.
If smack authority has been restricted by ROE or a C2 agency, it must be
requested.

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8.2.8 SCAR Coordinating Instructions / Mission Brief.
a. The SCAR mission coordinating instructions (CI) are used to convey the
SCAR’s plan to all assets. The SCAR should attempt to provide a face-to-face
mission brief (MB) (to include video teleconferences or phone conversations)
which will allow for questions and discussion among all assets. Often, it will not
be feasible for the SCAR to conduct face–to-face briefings, so the SCAR shall
issue CI digitally to ensure widest dissemination. Timely issuance of CI is a key
factor for success and will allow assets to incorporate the CI into mission
planning. Attempt to disseminate the CI/MB as early as possible prior to execution
to ensure it reaches all assets prior to their mission planning cycle. This would
include UAS, bombers and C2 assets with long transit and on-station times who
may be unavailable just prior to the mission, for example.
b. The CI/MB should begin with an overview of the ATO mission, objectives,
package composition and load out, and administrative procedures (i.e., routing,
holding, and communications). The overview should include the commander’s
intent and will aid in the smooth transition between SCARs during the mission.
Refer to the SCAR/AI Mission Briefing Guide (Annex B) for specifics to include in
CI/MB. The SCAR should focus on tactical execution and ensure assets are
provided fire support plans to integrate fires.
c. The CI/MB should cover an overall plan but must remain simple to increase
tempo on the battlefield. A complex CI may result in confusion during the
execution of SCAR. The SCAR should realize that some assets will check into
the AO without having received the CI/MB; that information will have to be passed
real time on the battlefield.

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CHAPTER 9 - EXECUTION
9.1 AI MISSION EXECUTION
AI mission is normally executed according to plan were all mission aspects should have been
taken into account. Often is also platform-specific. Refer to AOO- / platform specific
documentation for AI mission execution particularities.
9.2 SCAR MISSION EXECUTION
As the SCAR is required to perform a set of specific functions and have specific responsibilities,
the following paragraphs are dedicated to the SCAR-specific mission execution.
9.2.1 SCAR Communication
9.2.1.1 SCAR Check-in
The initial situation update from the C2 agency to the SCAR should be as thorough as possible
to increase the SCAR’s SA. The C2 agency should pass any applicable updates. Close
coordination between the SCAR and C2 agency will help to reduce the SCAR’s workload.
9.2.1.2 En route
The SCAR should attempt to gain as much information as possible from the current or outgoing
SCAR and C2 assets. Additionally, the SCAR should check own aircraft situation displays,
when available, for data link information on flights working in the AO. SCARs should ensure
they receive a battlefield handover using the situation update format from the departing SCAR.
9.2.1.3 AI Asset Check-in
a. En route the AI asset will check-in with C2 agencies in accordance with the
appropriate SPINS. Before entering the SCAR working area, flights must check
in with the SCAR to receive routing and safety of flight. An example of the check-
in brief can be found in table 6-1. Entry into the SCAR working area without
routing is prohibited.
AI asset check-in brief (example)

Authenticate
Callsign / Mission number
Number / type of aircraft
Position / Altitude
Ordnance (to include fusing and LASER code)
Playtime (minutes to bingo fuel)
Abort code (if applicable)
Table 9-1: Example AI asset check-in brief
b. When requested, the AI asset will check in with the SCAR using a pre-
defined format given in the SPINS. It is important that the SCAR evaluate
information such as playtime and ordnance to maximize the efficiency of
assigning aircraft capabilities toward desired target effects. The intent is to
generate and sustain as high a tempo as practical against the enemy. This high

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tempo degrades the enemy’s ability to displace or maneuver against friendly

forces.
c. Following check-in, the SCAR will pass a situation update to the AI asset
as required. The SCAR should pass this situation update and only pass
appropriate information to keep the tempo high.
d. When working with UAS, the SCAR should expect the UAS to pass a lost
link plan in the remarks section at check-in. The lost link plan may change
throughout the mission; the more complex the ACMs and deconfliction, the more
complicated the lost link routing may become. This information may be passed
over voice or data link. In the event of an actual lost link situation, the UAS may
be unable to pass the status of the aircraft to the SCAR via voice. In these
situations this information may be routed through a C2 agency.
9.2.1.4 SCAR Battlefield Handover
a. The outgoing SCAR will execute a battlefield handover with the incoming
SCAR when relinquishing the SCAR role. Considerations for selecting a
replacement SCAR should include SA, TOS, and available
sensors/communications. If a replacement SCAR is not available, the SCAR will
execute a battlefield handover with C2. If possible, handovers should be
accomplished on lower density communications networks that do not detract from
ongoing operations.
b. The outgoing SCAR should tailor the battlefield handover to the situation. If
passing SCAR responsibilities to an aircrew that have been on station for a
significant period of time, with sufficient SA, the battlefield handover should be
brief. However, if the handover is passed to an inbound SCAR or aircrew that has
yet to build sufficient SA, the battlefield handover should be more robust.
9.2.2 Holding/Deconfliction
a. The SCAR holding plan should avoid leaving AI assets idle. The SCAR
should utilize the available AI assets’ sensor/weapon capabilities while holding
and during execution. When required, the SCAR has numerous techniques for
de-conflicting aircraft including altitude, lateral, timing, or a combination of the
three. There are advantages and disadvantages to each depending on the
situation.
b. The SCAR holding and deconfliction plan should take into consideration
enemy capabilities, target orientation, weather, threats, and AI asset capabilities.
The following is a list of techniques available to the SCAR for holding and de-
conflicting AI assets:
(1) Sectored. Sectored deconfliction can facilitate lateral separation of AI

assets using GARS, common geographic reference system, or other commonly
understood sectors defined in the ACO/SPINS. An example is:
“Monster 11 (SCAR) established block 21-23 quadrants 1 through 4, Stork 21

(AI) currently working targets in quadrant 1 surface to 15, Tiger 01 (AI) working
quadrant 2 at 16-17”.

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(2) Timing. If the SCAR wants multiple AI assets to attack the same target
array/area, the SCAR should assign a time on target (TOT) to each AI asset.
Assigning a TOT will ensure a time separation of each aircraft conducting
attacks. The SCAR should assign a TOT window to each AI asset that supports
the type and number of attacks required. Assigning separate AI asset TOT
windows will require a one minute minimum separation. If de-conflicting AI
assets with significantly different ground speeds, more separation may be
required. This technique serves to prevent timing mistakes and target
obscuration from reducing the AI asset’s effectiveness. If slower tempos are
acceptable, the SCAR may decide to employ AI assets one at a time with each
element working until they report “Winchester”. If the SCAR determines an AI
asset requires more time to execute attacks than planned, the SCAR should
direct that AI to egress. The coordination to direct an egress will enable a more
capable asset to engage the target array.
(3) Altitude. If the target array requires operations in a small area, it may be
necessary to stack multiple elements in the same airspace and deconflict them
by altitude. The SCAR should stack all aircraft to optimize sensor performance,
expedite deconfliction of fires, and mitigate the threat. An example is:
“Arrow 31 (AI), Killer 11 (SCAR), maintain current altitude, proceed into hot open
blue kill box 006AB quadrant 4, once established, descent and maintain block
18-20”.
(a) SCAR stacked low. This technique is used when stacking at the top
of the block would prohibit the SCAR from locating targets. The SCAR can
conduct immediate attacks on targets without further weapons
deconfliction. The SCAR is required to deconflict from fires falling through
the SCAR altitude.
(b) SCAR stacked high. This technique is used when stacking at the
bottom of the block is not required for finding targets. Stacking high
provides the SCAR the autonomy to move within the SCAR working area
without further deconfliction. However, the SCAR must deconflict his
weapons if conducting strikes through elements holding at lower altitudes.
c. Additional instructions.
(1) The SCAR should be prepared to provide immediate deconfliction of

assets and fires from any neutral/friendly air or surface contacts that enter the
SCAR’s geographic area. This is interloper deconfliction.
(2) Surface-to-surface (S/S) and long range, air-to-surface (A/S) fires can be
deconflicted through lateral, altitude and timing techniques.
(3) See Annex D for more holding / deconfliction planning considerations.
9.2.3 SCAR Mission Working Area Execution
Dynamic targeting (DT) F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess) is a process
which facilitates tactical SCAR mission execution. During SCAR mission execution, this
process may be abbreviated and should occur rapidly to increase the battlefield tempo.
Specific platforms may be better suited to execute the six steps of the DT process. This
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process involves targeting, from search through BDA. The following paragraphs will explain
the different steps in DT as they apply to SCAR/AI assets and provide amplifying
data/considerations for the joint targeting process.
a. Target Detection (Find, Fix).
(1) Use off-board sensors, such as JSTARS, SOF reconnaissance teams and
UAs, to acquire targets. Additionally, use on-board sensors including targeting
pods, A/S radars, binoculars, night vision devices, and unaided visual searches
to acquire/refine targets. The effective use of all platforms to include wingman
and AI assets is important to maximize search potential and find targets. Use
off-board sensors and targeting information to increase SCAR working area
tempo and eliminate the requirement for strike capable assets to search for
targets.
(2) The SCAR should focus on areas where the enemy may choose to
conceal or fortify his position due to doctrinal or physical constraints.
Identification of the focal points can be found during mission planning and
updates to the intelligence estimate. In the absence of known target locations,
the SCAR should use all available assets to maximize sensor coverage. The
SCAR should assign search responsibilities to assets through sensor POI,
quadrants, keypads, geographic features, or LOCs.
(a) The task to SEARCH may be given to aircraft to search for potential
targets or points of interest within a killbox, named area of interest (NAI),
geographic area, or set of coordinates. A SEARCH tasking does NOT
imply clearance to engage.
(b) SEARCH tasking example:
1/ Warrior 31, SEARCH 391LE, report any military activity on

ASR Bronze.
2/ Aircraft will report back when potential targets are located

(with PID, ROE, and CDE status if able) or points of interest are
identified.
(3) Once a target is found, the focus shifts to fixing, which consists of
identification and prioritization. This is the bookkeeping portion of the mission;
and organization is crucial. As targets are found, they need to be identified,
plotted, annotated, and compared to where they fit in the priority list. The SCAR
should balance target engagement with target priorities, asset and ordnance
availability, and remaining TOS. For example, a prioritized list may contain
artillery, tanks, and infantry. If these targets are all located in the assigned
geographic area, the SCAR should focus the search to locate the highest priority
targets. If those searches fail to acquire artillery targets, the SCAR may begin
engaging located lower priority targets. If off-board target cueing is provided for
lower priority targets, the SCAR should not reorder their search priorities or
deviate from the target list to engage those targets. If there is a question
regarding target priority, the SCAR will need to contact C2 for clarification, which
will lengthen the DT process. A well planned cockpit organization flow will
significantly reduce the workload while increasing efficiency and SA.

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(4) PID is normally a requirement of the theater ROE. PID helps to determine
where a target ranks on the priority list. There are many techniques to
accomplish a PID, often requiring maximum sensor availability.
(5) The next consideration is to refine target location to the accuracy required
for strike coordination. Using sensors, avionics or map plots can facilitate target
location refinement. For visual or sensor Talk-On, rough coordinates may
suffice and, if necessary, the SCAR can communicate the location via C2 asset.
If an area of uncertainty exists for the target location, then this information
should be communicated to C2.
b. Decision to Engage (Track, Target).
(1) Track. The SCAR uses available sensors to continuously track the target.
Reasons to delay engagement and continue tracking include the need to
gather/exploit more information, observe enemy activity, delay for guidance, or
prosecute higher priority targets. The SCAR maintains SA by recording the
target location for later revisits, assigning an AI asset to monitor, or handing the
track off to a C2 agency. Evaluation of the target’s window of vulnerability is a
requirement throughout the tracking process. Mobile targets may require
immediate engagement. Destruction of all targets may not necessarily be
required. However, timely and accurate reporting of all targets will help build SA
and provide intelligence for further exploitation. As a minimum, the SCAR must
be able to report suitable detail for every target found. Collecting and sharing of
information while tracking targets may provide important intelligence on enemy
activity or intentions. This intelligence can assist the supported commander in
making decisions about enemy courses of action.
(2) Asset-to-Target Pairing. The SCAR should decide the best way to engage
the target with available assets by determining which combination of AI assets
and weapons will provide the highest probability of success. The final decision
making should be based on an understanding of specific asset/weapon
capabilities and limitations along with the desired weapons effects for the target.
Other considerations include:
(a) AI asset SA and location.
(b) FSCMs/ACMs.
(c) Playtime.
(d) The target’s window of vulnerability.
(e) Collateral damage.
(f) Assets’ and fires deconfliction in the target area.
(g) Required coordinate accuracy.
(3) Threat Considerations. The SCAR’s SA of threats will affect how AI assets
are tasked or packaged to create desired effects.

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(a) Threat relay. Threat information will be passed to the SCAR via the
SPINS designated frequency. In the event of a pop-up threat within the
assigned geographic area, the SCAR should retrograde all AI assets
away from the threat. Once sanctuary is reestablished, it is the SCAR’s
responsibility to determine if operations can continue. The following are
threat considerations:
1/ Determine the extent of the threat’s effect on the SCAR

working area.
2/ Determine whether the threat can be isolated either by altitude

or laterally so the SCAR mission may continue.
3/ Identify integrated fires that can be employed against the

target.
4/ Prohibitive interference in the area. This will ensure that the

information is provided to incoming AI assets and other assets in
the operational environment that could potentially assist the SCAR.
(4) SEAD Execution. The SCAR should coordinate with C2 for SEAD assets.
If a SEAD asset is available, the SCAR should coordinate reactive SEAD.
Ultimately, the SCAR will need to determine if the SCAR mission should be
continued or aborted. If the threat is affecting the mission to the point that more
time is spent dealing with the threat than the SCAR mission, the SCAR should
consider neutralizing the threat prior to continuing with SCAR. The SCAR
should retain the flexibility to prioritize and target emerging threats. However,
the PTL should be followed to the maximum extent possible to mirror the ground
commander’s intent.
c. Attack (Engage).
(1) Target Engagement. There are four types of tasking the SCAR should use
to facilitate rapid engagement of targets. The SCAR may pass attack authority
at any time. INVESTIGATE, TARGET and SMACK are three brevity words
associated with the tasking.
(a) INVESTIGATE. Verify specified element(s) of ROE, PID, CDE, and

coordination of forces on the referenced target/track.
(b) TARGET. ROE, PID, coordination of forces, and commander’s

intent requirements on the referenced target/track have been satisfied by
the engagement authority. Target/track correlation and CDE must be
accomplished prior to employing ordnance/fires.
(c) SMACK [Bomb on Coordinate (BOC)]. Clearance to employ

ordnance/fires on surface target coordinates/track. ROE, PID, CDE,
coordination of forces, and commander’s intent requirements on the
referenced target/track have been satisfied and coordinate accuracy is
sufficient for GPS-guided weapon employment.

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(2) Attack Briefs. The SCAR may be the best asset for conducting an attack.
When circumstances indicate the SCAR is not the best asset, a target hand off
to an AI asset could be the best option. Techniques for passing target location
include data link, NAI, geographic reference, or passing coordinates. In all
cases, the SCAR will communicate his intent to the AI asset via an attack brief.
The remarks portion of the attack brief should include coordinating instructions
identifying deconfliction measures, ordnance, final attack heading, and TOT
windows. Non-applicable items can be omitted. The 9-Line Attack Brief is used
as the standard format. An example of this brief can be found in table 6-2. Other
formats may applicable to a specific theatre or operation. Those should be
included in the relevant SPINS. Aircrews must check what is applicable to their
operating area.
(a) While all the lines of the 9-line attack brief may be necessary to
successfully conduct an attack, it is important to note that only the
necessary information should be passed. For example, only lines 4-6 may
be required. The SCAR should keep the attack brief as permissive as
possible but as restrictive as required to allow AI asset flexibility and
increased tempo.
(b) Other attack brief formats may be used that effectively pass the
required information. The transmission of these briefs can be by voice,
digital or both.
SCAR 9-line Attack Brief
“(Fighter C/S), (SCAR C/S), this is an (Investigate / Target / Strike / Smack) tasking (track
number________)
1. IP / Bullseye
2. Heading
3. Distance
4. Elevation
5. Target description
6. Coordinates
7. Marks
8. Friendlies
9. Egress
Remarks / Restrictions
Coordinate category
CDE
Other amplifying information
Table 9-2: SCAR 9-line attack brief
(3) SCAR Tasking Examples. The following examples illustrate the different
methods of tasking and various attack briefs.
(a) INVESTIGATE:
1/ Arrow 51 (F-16), investigate tasking to follow: “Investigate

Track 12345 in vicinity of alternate supply route (ASR) Atlantic,
suspected enemy armored column moving north to south.”
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(Engagement authority is not inherent in INVESTIGATE tasking.

This implies the AI asset will conduct a detailed route search and
then report back.)
2/ Ghost 41 (F/A-18), investigate tasking to follow: Investigate

ASR Pacific for armored personnel carriers (APCs) and main battle
tanks (MBTs). If MBTs are found, you are approved to target, make
all attacks east to west.” (In this example the SCAR has granted
engagement authority, provided MBTs are found, PID/ROE
established, and target correlation/CDE have been satisfied to
decrease time to kill. The SCAR has not granted engagement
authority for APCs because, for this example, MBTs are of higher
priority.)
(b) TARGET:
1/ Viking 11 (AV-8) target tasking to follow: “elevation 150 feet

MSL, two MBTs, single APC, Keypad 1 in vicinity of (IVO) MSR
Evergreen/ASR Atlantic intersection, grid 11S QR 123 456. Remain
within quadrant 1. Engagement authority has been granted. (No
further coordination is required once target correlation and CDE
have been satisfied. In this scenario the SCAR has issued only
those restrictions necessary to make the attacks successful.)
2/ Single Target Set, Multiple Strike Assets:
a/ Tiger 61 (F-16), Stalker 11 (AH-1) target tasking to

follow: Target set is four APCs, two MBTs, one ZSU 23-4
traveling west to east on MSR Evergreen, three miles east of
the Evergreen-Pacific intersection.”
b/ Tiger 61 and Stalker 11 standby for attack brief. Tiger

61: Lines 1-3 Bravo8; 1305 feet; ZSU 23-4; 11S QR 456 789;
negative mark; South 7400; egress to Delta 8; make attack
east to west, stay above 8,000 feet MSL, TOT 48.”Stalker 11:
Lines 1-3 Charlie 4; 1305 feet; multiple APCs and MBTs; 11S
QR 456 789; Tiger 61 impacts; egress Charlie 4; make all
attacks south to north, remain Charlie 4 and south until Tiger
61’s attacks are complete, TOT window 50 until attacks
complete.”(Engagement authority has been granted, once
target correlation and CDE have been satisfied. Stalker 11 is
a RW aircraft and is the closest friendly asset; therefore his
position is given in line 8. Due to the ZSU 23-4 threat, the
SCAR issued complete attack briefs to integrate fires in the
most expeditious manner).
(c) STRIKE:
Note: Example that follows assume the SCAR has been granted strike engagement authority
within a specified JOA/AO via ATO, SPINS, ROE; or in real-time via C2 agencies.

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1/ Thunder 71 (F-16), strike tasking to follow: Elevation 330 feet,

single MBT, 3456.78N 01234.56E.” (In this example the SCAR has
already established PID, CDE, and ROE. Engagement authority has
been granted once target correlation has been satisfied. The SCAR
chose to use a modified 9 line by only passing lines 4-6. If the AI
asset has more than one type of munition, strike tasking should also
specify a weapon in remarks to ensure CDE has been met).
(d) SMACK:
Note: Examples that follow assume the SCAR has been granted smack engagement authority
within a specified JOA/AO via ATO, SPINS, ROE; or in real-time via C2 agencies.
1/ Ghost 62 (F/A-18), smack tasking to follow: Elevation 1310

feet, single piece of artillery, 10-digit grid to follow: 11S QR 12345
67890.” (In this example the SCAR has already established PID,
CDE, ROE, and no further target correlation is required.
Engagement authority has been granted, no further communication
is required between AI asset and the SCAR. The SCAR chose to
use a modified 9 line by only passing lines 4-6. If the AI asset has
more than one type of munition, smack tasking should also specify
a weapon in remarks to ensure CDE has been met).
2/ AI asset requires support: Star 31 (F/A-18), single APC

traveling north to south on ASR Atlantic, request 1XGBU-12, my
LASER, smack tasking to follow: Lines 1-3 Alpha 8; 1,350 feet;
single APC; 11S QR 123 456; LASER 1688; egress Delta 8, block
15-18K. Final attack heading 170-190, LASER–to-target line (LTL)
150, request IP inbound, TOT 34.” (In this example, the SCAR has
determined it is not necessary for the AI asset to accomplish target
correlation. The SCAR has completed all requirements to employ
ordnance/fires for the target set including, passing a LTL and final
attack headings to ensure deconfliction.
(4) Target/Track Correlation. There are varying levels of target/track

correlation depending on the environment. This can be as simple as identifying
a valid target within a specified geographic area or as complex as a visual and/or
sensor Talk-On with the SCAR. The most expeditious way to begin the visual
and/or sensor Talk-On is to provide a mark or common reference point. Some
examples include LASER handoff, lethal strike, GEOREF, and IR marker.
(a) Using Marks to Achieve Target/Track Correlation. Marks can be

provided by target designators/markers or A/S fires. There is no need to
mark a target if AI asset target correlation is complete or not required.
Marks should be planned to include sufficient time before weapons
employment to ensure target acquisition and correlation by the attacking
aircraft.
1/ Marking with LASER designators. For LASER spot tracker

equipped aircraft, designating/marking targets by LASER is very
effective and can increase tempo on the battlefield. When using a
LASER to designate/mark a target, include the four digit LASER

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code in coordination. For low-altitude designators (RW LASER

target designators), a LTL should be passed in degrees magnetic to
ensure attacking aircraft do not confuse the LASER source with the
intended target.
2/ Marking with IR markers. The SCAR may use IR markers to

mark targets at night for night vision device (NVD) equipped AI
assets. When marking targets with IR markers, use standard brevity
terms. Battlefield illumination and cultural lighting may reduce IR
marker effectiveness. Also, consider enemy NVD capability.
3/ Marking with A/S fires. The SCAR may choose to mark a

target with onboard ordnance. Marking targets with high explosive
(HE) ordnance will allow AI assets to rapidly cue sensors to the
target or into the target area. However, the use of HE ordnance to
mark targets may lead to undesired target obscuration. Marking with
ordnance will also allow the SCAR to attack a target, while
simultaneously achieving AI asset target correlation. When marking
with A/S fires, use the standard marking brevity terms.
(5) Guided Munitions Considerations. The final measure the SCAR must
consider during the targeting step is the level of support the AI asset requires.
The SCAR may hand off the target, set up deconfliction, and then clear out of
or remain outside the target area to allow the AI asset to engage the target.
Another option is that the SCAR may integrate into the attack. The more
involved the SCAR becomes in AI asset attacks, the more the overall SA in the
SCAR working area may be degraded. However, some circumstances may
arise when employing IAMs or LGWs, which may require the SCAR to integrate
into the AI asset’s attack.
(a) IAMs. Based on the platform and ordnance, the SCAR may be the
most suitable platform to generate coordinates. This process should be
completed for as many targets as time allows. Based on the desired effect,
a varying level of coordinate accuracy may be required. If the AI assets
can self-target with IAMs, the SCAR may be able to bind a large target set
with one or two target coordinates and a description of the target set. If
the AI assets cannot self-target, the SCAR may be required to provide
coordinates for each desired point of impact in the target set.
(b) LGWs. Conditions may require the SCAR to buddy lase for the AI
asset. In the event this occurs, the SCAR should be aware of factors
involved in such attacks (i.e., proper geometry required, timing,
communication, LASER codes and deconfliction).
d. Assess. Assessing begins when the weapon impacts the target. The
assessment is situation dependent and may be conducted by the SCAR, an AI
asset or a reconnaissance asset. SCAR mission feedback is essential to optimize
subsequent tasking and update intelligence. Unlike a normal mission flow, SCAR
mission feedback needs to be dynamic and continuous to ensure continued
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(1) AI Asset Responsibilities. Once an AI asset engages the target, he will

conduct battle damage assessment (BDA) and determine if additional attacks
are required to create desired effects, per the attack brief. The AI asset will
report the results to the SCAR when complete. After checking out with the
SCAR, the AI asset should provide an inflight report (INFLTREP) to C2 agencies
IAW SPINS. There are three phases of BDA. Post SCAR mission, assets will
typically report phase 1 BDA to C2 agencies; they should not assume the target
is destroyed. The aircrew must use judgment and precision when reporting
BDA.
(2) SCAR Responsibilities. The SCAR will determine if additional attacks are
necessary based on SCAR/AI BDA. If additional attacks are required, the SCAR
will update tasking to on-station AI assets or request additional AI assets or
capabilities from C2. The SCAR is responsible for informing C2 of remaining
targets in the SCAR working area.
(3) Periodic Situation Reports (SITREPs). The SCAR is responsible for

keeping C2 informed of the SCAR working area status. This can be
accomplished by providing periodic SITREPs. The SITREP can be passed via
plain language or by using a labeled Situation Update found in table 3. These
SITREPs should only include critical information that may arise during the
SCAR mission e.g., surface-to-air threat, mission prohibitive weather, or
location of large elements of enemy forces). A technique to pass SITREPs is to
use a wingman or an AI asset to record the information and pass it to C2 while
the SCAR continues to search or coordinate with AI assets.
(4) SCAR/AI assets should have a plan to capture footage on engaged and
remaining targets. It is often more important to report priority targets remaining
(combined with a threat and weather update) since remaining priority targets
will likely be the deciding factors for C2 to re-task aircraft into the assigned
geographic area. AI assets are required to provide information on the number
of targets prosecuted and the remaining targets to the SCAR upon checkout.
Individual assets are responsible for conveying their detailed INFLTREP to C2
agencies (See table 5 Inflight Report.)
(5) C2 Responsibilities. C2 is the primary link between the SCAR/AI

INFLTREP and the JAOC. In the event of a gap in SCAR coverage, airborne
C2 can accept a battlefield handover from the outgoing SCAR and provide a
situation update to the incoming SCAR upon check in. This facilitates increased
SA on the battlefield and reduces redundant targeting.

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KILL BOX
A.1. GENERAL
A.1.1. Description
A killbox (KB) is a three-dimensional fire support coordination measure (FSCM) with an

associated airspace coordinating measure (ACM) used to facilitate the integration of joint fires
and the coordination of the airspace within. A killbox is a measure, not a mission.
A.1.2. Purpose
a. Killboxes are established to support AI efforts as part of the Joint Force

Commander’s (JFC’s) joint targeting process. Killboxes allow lethal attack against
surface targets without further coordination with the establishing commander and
without the requirement for terminal attack control. When used to integrate air-to-
surface and subsurface / surface-to-surface indirect fires, the kill box will have
appropriate restrictions. These restrictions provide a three-dimensional block of
airspace in which participating aircraft are de-conflicted from friendly surface fires.
The restrictive measures also prevent non-participating aircraft and maneuver forces
from entering the kill box. The goal is to reduce the coordination required to fulfill
support requirements with maximum flexibility (permissive attributes) while preventing
fratricide (restrictive attributes).
b. All aircrews executing missions within the confines of a kill box will execute in
accordance with ROEs, the Law of Armed Conflict, and SPINS applicable to their
assigned mission. Specific missions found in an air tasking order (ATO) applicable to
this publication are air interdiction (AI) and strike coordination and reconnaissance
(SCAR).
c. A kill box is established and adjusted by supported component commanders in

consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. It is
an extension of an existing support relationship established by the JFC. Requirements
for kill boxes and other control measures are determined using normal component
targeting and planning processes and are established and approved by commanders
or their designated staff. Information about the type, effective time, duration, and other
attributes will be published and disseminated using existing voice and digital
command and control (C2) systems.
A.2. KILLBOX SPECIFICS
A.2.1. Terminology
a. Killbox Types
Note: The killbox color definitions below are ordnance centric.
(1) Blue kill box (BKB). The primary purpose of a BKB is to facilitate the attack
of surface targets with air-to-surface munitions without further coordination with
the establishing headquarters.
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(2) Purple kill box (PKB). The primary purpose of a PKB is to facilitate the
attack of surface targets with subsurface-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and air-
to-surface munitions without further coordination with the establishing
headquarters.
b. Established. The killbox is planned, approved with an effective time, and

disseminated.
c. Effective Time. The killbox effective time begins when the killbox status is
scheduled to become hot and ends when the killbox is canceled.
d. On-Order. An on-order killbox is a planned coordinating measure to support

ongoing and future operations. The term does not describe a killbox status and it is
not published in the airspace control order (ACO). Additional information and
coordination is required to establish the killbox. Typically, on-order killboxes are event
triggered (e.g., target time of appearance in the operational area is unknown during
planning).
e. Canceled. The killbox is no longer established.
f. Status. Killbox status is described in two parts: Permitted fires and effects and
airspace status. The fires status addresses fires and effects on the killbox’s target
area. The airspace status addresses the availability and airspace restrictions in the
killbox. See table A-1 for a killbox status cross reference.
AIRSPACE STATUS
OPEN
CLOSED
Aircraft permitted
Aircraft Prohibited
(with coordination)
HOT
Fires permitted Fires permitted
Fires and effects require no
Aircraft permitted Aircraft prohibited
further coordination
FIRES
STATUS COLD Fires require Fires require
coordination coordination
Fires and effects require
coordination Aircraft permitted Aircraft prohibited
Note: This cross reference assumes no other fire support or airspace coordinating measures are
present in the kill box. Restrictive coordinating measures will always have priority when established
in a kill box.
Table 9-3: Killbox Cross Reference
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(1) Fires and effects. A killbox fires status can either be HOT or COLD.
(a) HOT. Describes a killbox or a portion of a killbox where fires or

effects of fires are allowed without further coordination or de-confliction.
See figure A-1 for an example.
Figure A-1: Hot killboxes
(b) COLD. Describes a killbox or portion(s) of a killbox where fires or

effects of fires are not allowed without further coordination. A cold killbox
does not restrict the airspace associated with the killbox. See figure A-2
for an example.
Figure A-2: Cold killboxes
(2) Airspace status. Within a killbox, the airspace will be designated as either
OPEN or CLOSED.
(a) OPEN. Manned and unmanned aircraft are cleared to operate inside
the killbox ACM or designated segments. See figure A-3 below for an
example.
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Figure A-3: Open killboxes
(b) Closed. Aircraft are restricted from operating inside the killbox or
designated segments of it [to include unmanned aircraft system (UAS)
unless otherwise authorized]. See figure A-4 below for an example of
closed killboxes.
Figure A-4: Closed killboxes
A.2.2. Characteristics
a. Target area. The target area is the killbox surface area declared hot for joint
fires. The dimensions of a killbox target area are defined using an area reference
system (i.e., GARS). The standard killbox dimensions using GARS is a single cell [30
minute (min) by 30 min (approximately 44 kilometer (km) by 44 km) area]. The use of
quadrants [15 min by 15 min (approximately 22 km by 22 km) area] and keypads [5
min by 5 min (approximately 7.5 km by 7.5 km) area] inside the killbox facilitate
airspace and fires deconfliction and C2.
b. Airspace. The restricted airspace block above the killbox target area extending
from the surface up to a ceiling. The airspace control authority (ACA) will establish
the ceiling height and ACM parameters through coordination with fire support and
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airspace organizations. Once established, the ACA will publish the parameters in the
airspace control plan (ACP), ACO, or SPINS to permit standardized planning for other
airspace uses.
Note: All airspace parameters must be consistently and unambiguously expressed in altitudes
referenced to Mean Sea Level or Flight Levels, as appropriate.
A.2.3. Employment
a. Killboxes are normally used when a support relationship exists between two or
more functional or Service components and a theater-specific concept of operations
(CONOPS) has been established for the integration and de-confliction of fires and
airspace. The goal is to reduce the coordination required to fulfill support requirements
with maximum flexibility while preventing fratricide.
b. Killboxes support the commander’s objectives and CONOPS. As such, all target
engagements within a Killbox must adhere to the establishing commander’s scheme
of maneuver and designated target priorities, effects, and timing of fires.
c. A killbox will not be established for close air support (CAS) missions. If a CAS
mission is required within an established killbox, the responsible C2 element should
change the fires status to cold for the portion of the killbox requiring detailed
integration.
d. Killboxes do not replace existing CAS procedures or preplanned air interdiction

against fixed targets.
e. C2 updates on killboxes (e.g., altitude restrictions, frequency use, and control

measures within the killbox) are accomplished via appropriate C2 systems and
published procedures.
f. The establishment of a killbox is usually in support of a targeting decision. The

killbox assists target engagement by identifying the area where effects are desired.
Killboxes can complement other FSCMs, such as fire support coordination lines
(FSCLs), coordinated fire lines, and battlefield coordination lines (BCLs). They also
help the commander focus the effort of air interdiction and indirect fire assets.
A.2.4. Considerations
a. The JFC or establishing authority makes the decision to use a killbox and
determines size, location, and timing based on careful consideration of the situation
and CONOPS. Other factors for the establishing authority to consider are: disposition
of enemy and friendly forces, anticipated rates of movement, surface-to-surface
indirect weapons capabilities, concept and tempo of the operation.
b. FSCMs are not mutually exclusive so a killbox could contain other measures
within its boundaries to include: no fire areas (NFAs), restricted operations zone
(ROZ), or airspace coordination areas. Restrictive FSCMs and ACMs will always have
priority when established in a killbox.
c. Friendly surface forces and non-participating aircraft should not enter or

maneuver in an established killbox without coordination. If the mission requires a
surface force presence (e.g., long-range reconnaissance patrols, special operations
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forces (SOF) teams) and the killbox must remain hot, then establish a restrictive
FSCM (restrictive fire area or NFA) to protect those forces. If a FSCM cannot be
emplaced to protect the ground forces, then the establishing authority must change
the affected quadrants or keypads to cold status or cancel the killbox. The establishing
authority must maintain awareness of maneuvering surface forces in and around
established killboxes to prevent fratricide.
Note: There is currently no digital system available to automatically track surface forces and
manage killboxes. This level of situational awareness requires active monitoring by current
operations personnel and functioning C2 cells.
d. Kill box Coordinator (KBC). When assigning aircraft missions in a killbox, specify
which aircraft is the KBC. The KBC will deconflict aircraft, manage and direct effective
target engagement, and provide bomb hit assessment. When possible, assign KBC
duties to a SCAR capable or forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)) qualified
aircrew.
e. Authority to engage is not automatically granted by the establishment of a

killbox; the killbox reduces coordination with ground forces because all requirements
for targeting guidance, clearance of fires, and deconfliction with other assets are
accomplished in the process of establishing the killbox. Engagement authority is
granted through standard mission orders or the ATO, but does not relieve aircrews of
the responsibility for complying with mission requirements such as designated target
priority, positive identification, effects, timing of fires; compliance with the Law of
Armed Conflict; and satisfying existing ROE.
f. Surface-to-surface direct fires are not restricted by the establishment of a

killbox.
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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX A – KILLBOX COMMAND AND CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES
A-I.1. General
a. Killboxes are established to support the JFC’s CONOPS. The authority

for C2 of Killboxes, when delegated from the JFC, rests at the highest tactical
echelon level of command. Information exchange requirements and procedures
for killbox execution should be written into applicable orders i.e., ACP, ACO, air
operations directive (AOD), SPINS, operation order (OPORD), fragmentary order
(FRAGO), etc., during campaign planning to ensure timely dissemination of
killbox status. The JFC should also:
(1) Require killbox FSCMs are published in the ACO.
(2) Identify killbox supporting ACMs and make them restrictive to surface-to-
surface indirect fires.
(3) Require Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System users to pull ACMs
into their system via the ACO.
(4) Optionally define exemptions for UAS employment within closed blue and
below the floor of purple killboxes.
b. Prior to planning for killbox employment, the JFC’s component

commanders must have a common understanding of the JFC’s theater and joint
operations area (JOA)-wide FSCM and ACM procedures including the use of long
range fires, air interdiction, and the location and phasing of current and future
joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and joint force maritime
component commander (JFMCC) area of operations (AO). Component
commanders must integrate killbox employment with the JFC’s theater and JOA-
wide campaign plan.
c. Effective killbox employment requires all participants to use standard

procedures across the JOA. Joint interoperability issues must be taken into
account when planning killbox employment. Commanders should limit
coordination and communication requirements and use simple consistent
procedures across the JOA.
A-I.2. Joint Force Commander
a. Duties. Killbox employment will affect both the execution of fires and
airspace control throughout the JOA to include the AO of the JFLCC and JFMCC.
The JFC develops guidance for killbox employment within the JOA. The JFC will
direct the use of an area reference system (e.g., GARS) to facilitate airspace
coordinating measures associated with killbox planning and employment. Once
defined, killbox procedures within the JOA must be distributed by means of the
JFC’s ACP; the joint force air component’s (JFAC’s) ACO, ATO, SPINS, and
component commanders’ OPORDs; and other releasable documents. These
relationships tie directly to killbox establishing authority through each phase.
Commanders and designated supported commanders with jurisdiction over the
operational area where killboxes are located have the authority and responsibility
to establish killboxes within their assigned areas. Once establishing authority is
given to component commanders, the JFC maintains visibility on all killboxes
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within the JOA and adjudicates cross-component coordination and establishment

issues.
b. Establishing Commander. The JFC normally delegates the

component commanders as the establishing authority for all killboxes within their
AO. The establishing authority is responsible for coordinating with the ACA and
notifying all affected commanders and forces. Component Relationships. The
JFC designates command relationships among the components in the
operational environment. Within their AO, land and maritime commanders are
designated the supported commander for the integration and synchronization of
maneuver, fires, and interdiction. Accordingly, land and maritime commanders
designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within
their AO. Outside of those AOs, the JFC normally designates COM JFAC as the
supported commander for AI within the JOA. A component supporting another
with fires must de-conflict and integrate those fires with the supported component.
It is important that aircrews clearly understand who is the supported commander
and the target priorities in the affected killbox.
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APPENDIX II TO ANNEX A – KILLBOX PLANNING
A-II.1. General
a. The JFC establishes detailed procedures and CONOPS for successful

killbox employment within the JOA by promulgating guidance and priorities.
Additionally, the JFC normally delegates authority to component commanders for
establishing killboxes in accordance with published guidance. Component
commanders may further delegate that authority. The establishing commander is
responsible for coordinating and notifying all affected forces.
b. GARS and killboxes are related topics but not the same. The GARS is a
reference system, not a FSCM or ACM, GARS or a local area reference system
facilitates the structure and coordination requirements for employing killboxes.
c. Killboxes are not ideal for every situation. Through the targeting process,
planners should evaluate the mission, enemy, terrain, weather, troops and
support available, time available, civil considerations, and terminal attack control
requirements to determine the most effective procedures. Killboxes can either be
planned or immediate in support of dynamic targeting. Immediate killboxes are
discussed in paragraph A-II.3.c.
d. All aircraft, ground forces, and fires not assigned to an open killbox are
restricted from entering unless coordinated with the KBC or appropriate C2
nodes.
e. Engagements within killboxes must adhere to Law of Armed Conflict and

must satisfy existing ROE.
A-II.2. Planning Considerations
a. Killboxes can be used in conjunction with other existing FSCMs and can be
established anywhere in the JOA where expeditious target engagement is
required, to include rear areas. Also consider using killboxes in areas where a
traditional FSCM (e.g., the FSCL) is not defined or has not been established.
b. Killboxes are not required for all AI missions. They are only used to reduce
coordination requirements between forces and facilitate the attack of targets.
Killboxes are particularly useful in the following situations:
(1) Facilitating air interdiction of mobile targets.
(2) Facilitating engagement of targets in areas where target locations are

imprecise or unknown.
(3) Focusing joint fires in areas not requiring detailed integration of fires and
maneuver.
(4) Facilitating engagement of targets in areas short of the FSCL, including

planned joint integrated prioritized target list AI targets.
(5) Facilitating execution for the suppression of enemy air defenses.
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c. Establishing a killbox requires careful planning and coordination. Some of

the considerations for successful planning are:
(1) Determine the applicability of killboxes in support of the CONOPS and

scheme of maneuver. Killboxes are intended to facilitate engagement of targets
in conjunction with the commander’s concept of operations.
(2) Determine the establishing authority. This is normally a straight forward

task when the killbox falls within a single operational area. The establishing
authority is either the JFC or JFC designated component commander of the
operational area. For killboxes that straddle component boundaries, the affected
commanders must coordinate to determine who will take responsibility for
establishing the killbox. The killbox establishment does not alter any portion of
either commander’s operational area. Cross-boundary coordination simply
identifies the establishing commander.
(3) Determine airspace requirements based on weapons flight paths,

maneuvering capability, delivery systems capabilities and limitations, terrain,
and the enemy. These considerations may be applied to any aircraft delivering
precision munitions. Additional airspace de-confliction and special
considerations may be required for certain stand-off weapons, such as
Tomahawk land attack missiles, Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS),
conventional air-launched cruise missiles, and high altitude precision bombing
with respect to flight path de-confliction.
(4) Determine the effective time required for the killbox to accomplish the
commander’s objectives.
(5) Determine friendly locations and capabilities. This determination includes

SOF, other government agency personnel, and alliance forces. This process
can be difficult and will require prior establishment of coordination procedures
outside military only channels.
(6) Determine location of other FSCMs and ACMs.
(7) Develop a communications plan. Killbox frequencies must be considered

in the development of the communications plan, including communication nets
between C2 and fire assets. Ideally, each killbox will be assigned a unique
frequency.
(8) Adhere to theater ROE. Target engagement within an established killbox

must adhere to applicable elements of theater ROE (e.g., ROE for AI). Planners
at the joint and component level should assess the current ROE for appropriate
or unduly restrictive target engagement criteria within killboxes and request
appropriate ROE adjustments, as required.
(9) Give careful considerations to the following characteristics of airborne

platforms: type of aircraft, required or optimal sensor operating altitudes, orbit
requirements, mission set, onboard payloads (sensors and ordnance), and
communication capabilities. Also consider UAS altitude separation with other
fixed and rotary wing aircraft.
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(10) Consider the subsurface- / surface-to-surface indirect fires target sets,

weapon systems, planned max ordnance altitude, munitions flight path and
firing unit locations (range-to-target). During deliberate planning the maximum
ordinate altitude may not be known; however, this altitude will be planned based
on best available data. Planners can adjust this altitude as necessary prior to
establishing the killbox but should avoid altitude changes after the killbox is
established and the measure is disseminated.
(11) Develop a contingency plan to minimize the impact of established

killboxes on surface-to-surface indirect fires. The established killbox may
prevent attack of targets beyond the measure (due to trajectory restrictions).
Ground force planners should consider planning for air support in those areas
if fires are required. As an example, planning killboxes (especially blue
killboxes) short of the FSCL may limit surface-to-surface indirect fires between
the killbox and the FSCL as shown in the following figure.
Figure A-II-1: Restrictive killboxes
A-II.3 Killbox Planning Process
a. Killbox planning falls under the purview of the joint targeting cycle. Planned
killboxes are established to support JFC or component commander CONOPS,
schemes of maneuver, and corresponding targeting efforts.
b. Planned killboxes. The requesting commander begins development of

killboxes to support operations following the joint targeting coordination board
(JTCB). If a killbox is within the requesting commander’s AO, then that
commander is both the establishing commander and the supported commander.
If a commander nominates a killbox in another commander’s AO, the commander
assigned the AO or JOA has the authority to approve or reject the request as the
establishing authority. Cross-boundary establishment of killboxes requires
coordination using similar procedures as for cross-boundary fires.
(1) Development. Once a determination is made that a killbox is required, the

establishing authority must coordinate with the affected components and
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airspace controlling agencies based on the initial FSCM attributes (priority,

location, airspace, and time). Coordination includes determination of target and
effect priorities, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance priorities,
availability of assets, assignment of tactical C2, and integration into the ACA’s
airspace plan. The establishing authority coordinates establishment with all
appropriate commands and C2 agencies. Cross-component coordination and
de-confliction of nominated killboxes should be accomplished using the JFC-
designated joint fires and airspace C2 systems; procedures for each theater
may vary. See table A-II-1 for information required to nominate a killbox.
Killbox Nomination Information
Target set/air support request number/target numbers.

Geographic limits, proposed ceiling, killbox location.
Effective times. Identify the date-time group (DTG) the killbox is established.
Identify the DTG or the event that will cancel the killbox.
Killbox type: (and requested floor for purple killbox).
Establishing command.
Establishing commander’s targeting guidance:
Priorities (list the targets).
Effects (identify the desired effects).
Restrictions.
Existing fire support coordination measures.
Remarks: (give any additional information: e.g., no fire area, no strike, etc.).
Table A-II-1: Kill box Nomination Information
(a) COM JFAC. Killbox development begins when the approved PTL
arrives in the plans division. There, air planners or component liaisons
match PTL targets to available assets and required killboxes become
geographically apparent. Killbox locations developed to support the PTL
prosecution are then passed to combat plans airspace planners to
determine conflicts. Any conflicts are worked out between the identified
organizations.
(b) JFLCC, JFMCC, or JFSOCC. Simultaneously, the component fires

support coordination agencies determine killbox requirements and
coordinate killboxes with the scheme of maneuver, other FSCMs,
airspace considerations, air defense plans and friendly force locations.
(2) Approval, Distribution, and Establishment. Following coordination and de-

confliction, the establishing authority approves the killbox. To complete the
killbox planning process, the killbox attributes must be distributed to all affected
commands. The planned killbox attributes and information are passed to all
affected commanders’ C2 agencies via the designated joint fires C2 systems for
integration into the ACO, OPORDs, SPINS, and etc.
c. Immediate killboxes. As targets of opportunity are identified which require

air interdiction, air and fire support elements determine if killboxes will facilitate
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operations. An immediate killbox is one identified too late, or not requested in

time, to be included during deliberate targeting. Immediate killboxes are normally
requested and approved using established dynamic targeting procedures when
air interdiction missions are needed. Immediate killboxes require the same
coordination and de-confliction as detailed in the planned killbox development
paragraph above.
Note: The term immediate does not imply commanders may dynamically create killboxes, only
that the planning cycle and time available to coordinate and approve the killbox is reduced.
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APPENDIX III TO ANNEX A - KILL BOX EXECUTION
A-III.1. Entry Procedures
a. Prior to operations in a killbox, the C2 agency must change the killbox fires
status from cold to hot. The C2 agency must first verify the killbox is either clear
of friendly air and ground forces or protected by FSCMs or ACMs prior to
changing the killbox status to hot. Exceptions may apply for UAS or remotely-
piloted aircraft (RPA); see paragraph A-III.2.c.(7).
b. Prior to entry into an open killbox, contact the C2 agency [e.g., AWACS, E-
2 Hawkeye, air operations center (AOC)] specified in the ATO or ACO or
published instructions. Expect the C2 agency to push tasked aircraft to either the
SCAR or KBC on station or to be designated as the KBC for that killbox. Use the
killbox check-in brief in table A-III-1 when contacting the SCAR or KBC. This
briefing may be abbreviated for brevity or security (e.g., “as fragged” or “with
exceptions”).
Killbox Check-In Briefing

(Passed to KBC Before Entering)
Mission Number:“_____________”
Number and Type of Aircraft: “_____________”
Position and Altitude: “_____________”
Ordnance: “_____________” (LASER codes as applicable)
Time on Station: “_____________”
Additional Aircraft/Aircrew Capabilities: “_____________”
Remarks: “_____________” (include assigned target from the ATO or C2 if applicable,
including target location and TOT)
Example:
“Tiger 11(KBC), Star 21(flight)-mission #2301, 4 F-16s entering 134LV from the south,
Angels 15, 4 X GBU 12 ea plus 20 mm, LASER code 1114 in sequence, 35 minutes
time on station, SADL/Litening Pod.”
ATO–air tasking order SADL–situational awareness data link
KBC–Kill box coordinator
Table A-III-1:Killbox Check-in Briefing
A-III.2. Coordination Procedures and Target Engagement
a. Coordination is required with the establishing authority and ACA for any
fires originating outside and penetrating a kill box that will require a change in kill
box, or portion of a kill box status to enable those fires (e.g., change in kill box
status from open to closed). See figures A-III-1 and 2 for a graphic portrayal of
this concept. Coordination for fires originating from and remaining inside the kill
box are discussed below in paragraph 2.c. Example fires requiring additional
coordination include:
(1) Trajectories of subsurface- / surface-to-surface indirect fires (e.g.,

Tomahawk land attack missiles, ATACMS, guided multiple launch rocket
system, or conventional air-launched cruise missiles) originating outside and
penetrating the kill box. (Coordination is affected through the appropriate FC
and C2 agency.)
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(2) Trajectories of air-to-surface fires (e.g., Joint Direct Attack Munition

delivery from high altitude bombers) originating outside and penetrating the kill
box (from non-participating aircraft).
Figure A-III-1.Open kill box restricting exterior fires
Figure A-III-2:Open kill box with coordinated fires
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b. At times the establishing authority or ACA will deconflict killbox airspace

and fires to accommodate other missions resulting in open cold portions of the
affected kill box for established time periods. See figure A-III-3 for an example.
The cold fires status permits coordinated fires and the open airspace status
allows participating aircraft to operate in the kill box. Example missions include:
(1) Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel missions, combat search and
rescue, or isolated personnel recovery.
(2) Medical and casualty evacuation missions.
(3) Emergency extraction of forces operating in security zones or deep

battlespace.
Figure A-III-3:Example kill box supporting other operations
c. Air-to-Surface fires.
(1) Planned missions into a kill box should expect minimal C2

communications and coordination assuming no ATO, threat, or targeting priority
changes. As time and conditions permit, amplifying information may be passed.
Immediate tasking may include some or all of the information in table A-III-2. At
a minimum, C2 will pass kill box assignment, status, targeting priorities, and
working frequency.
(2) All aircraft not assigned to an established kill box are restricted from flying
through or delivering air-to-surface munitions into that kill box unless
coordinated with the owning C2 agency.
(3) Aircraft operating within a kill box will be on an assigned kill box frequency
or have a previously coordinated de-confliction plan.
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C2 Agency Briefing
(Information Passed from C2 Agency to Aircraft)
Kill box name and status: “_____________”
Kill box floor: “_____________”(not required for blue kill box)
Targets: “_____________” (priorities, targets being worked, etc.)
Threats: “_____________”
Restrictions: “_____________”(Air and ground friendlies/FSCMs/ACMs/Ordnance)
Coordinator: “_____________” (call sign and net)
Remarks: “_____________” (Restricted targets, hazards munitions, UAS operations, etc.)
Example—Planned AI mission assigned to a hot kill box:
First aircraft assigned to a hot kill box:
“Star 21, cleared to hot open blue kill box 132LN, working frequency TAD 15.”
Follow-on aircraft assigned to a hot kill box:
[Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)] “Arrow 22, contact Elvis for re-
tasking.”
[Elvis (AOC)] “Arrow 22, proceed into hot open blue kill box 132LN. Target priorities are
tanks, self-propelled, and towed artillery. Possible SA-8 in quadrant 2. NFA keypad 132LN
14. Contact kill box coordinator, Star 21 on TAD 15.”
ACM–airspace coordinating measure NFA–no fire area
AOC–air operations center UAS–unmanned aircraft system
FSCM–fire support coordination measure
Table A-III-2:C2 Agency briefing
(4) When multiple flights or formations are conducting operations within the
same kill box, de-confliction of attacks and airspace is required. Aircrew
employing weapons within a kill box should ensure that the entire trajectory of
the munition and its effects remain within the lateral and vertical limits of the kill
box unless previously coordinated.
(5) C2 nodes must coordinate for additional airspace if required when

weapons employment occurs outside the assigned airspace (e.g., an aircraft
delivering a standoff munition outside the lateral or vertical limits of a kill box for
impact within the kill box).
(6) Manned Aircraft
(a) Ideally, the C2 agency will assign a SCAR to a kill box to de-conflict
attacks and airspace within the kill box. In support of kill boxes, the SCAR
is able to perform the following tasks.
1/ Facilitate the expeditious flow of air interdiction aircraft into

and out of the target area.
2/ Prevent redundant strikes against previously attacked targets.
3/ Provide targeting information and location.
4/ Provide target marks.
5/ Support LASER-guided weapons.
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6/ Confirm, locate, suppress, or destroy surface-to-air threats.
7/ Provide bomb hit assessment.
8/ Prioritize and engage targets.
9/ Provide positive identification (PID).
(b) When a SCAR is unavailable, the first flight to enter a given kill box
is designated the KBC. Any manned combat aircraft and some UAS or
RPA crews can perform the basic duties of the KBC. The primary
responsibility of the KBC is to de-conflict attacks and airspace within the
kill box. When possible, this includes all duties listed above except,
prioritizing and engaging targets and PID. As the complexity of operations
within a kill box increases, C2 nodes should make every effort to assign
SCARs to the kill box. KBCs (manned or unmanned) should relinquish
control to SCARs checking into the kill box.
(c) The SCAR or KBC will relay specific kill box and target information
to strike aircraft using table A-III-3, the kill box attack briefing. The de-
confliction portion of the attack brief, including general attack flow from
SCAR or KBC to striker aircraft, is directive. Strike aircraft must comply
with de-confliction instructions or coordinate otherwise.
Kill box Attack Briefing

(SCAR or KBC to Strike Aircraft)
De-confliction Instructions: “_____________” (Block altitude, keypads or quadrants,
geographic reference, flow, timing)
Target Description: “_____________”
Target Location: “_____________” (Coordinates, geographic references, etc.)
Target Elevation: “_____________”
Remarks: “_____________” (Buddy-lase plan, mark, TOT, threats, UAS, etc.)
Example: “Python 21, Magic 11, remain in Quadrant 4, Angels 15. Your target: column
of 4 armored personnel carriers oriented north to south with dismounted infantry,
location N3701.034/W07601.089, elevation 69 feet.”
KBC–Kill box coordinator TOT–time-on-target
SCAR–strike coordination and reconnaissance UAS–unmanned aircraft system
Table A-III-3:Kill Box Attack Briefing
(d) If a strike aircraft enters a kill box with a previously assigned target,
the SCAR or KBC is only responsible for providing airspace de-confliction.
Under the ATO, SPINS, and interdiction ROE, strikers are responsible for
meeting their own target engagement requirements.
(e) Although specifically intended for CAS missions, FAC(A) training

and qualifications make FAC(A)s well-suited for performing the SCAR
mission. To ensure clarity, FAC(A)s operating as SCARs should be listed
in the ATO as SCAR, not as FAC(A).
(f) When checking out of a kill box, the departing SCAR or KBC will
execute a positive handoff to the appropriate flight, if applicable, and notify
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C2. If no flights are available, the SCAR or KBC will complete an in-flight
report with C2 in accordance with established procedures.
(7) Unmanned Aircraft
(a) The KBC must have direct voice communications with all
participating aircraft, manned and unmanned, in the kill box to deconflict
airspace. UASs or RPAs not equipped with voice communication should
not operate within the confines of a hot or open kill box without the further
use of an ACM such as a ROZ to de-conflict their flight path and a FSCM
such as a NFA to protect the UAS or RPA from friendly fires.
(b) Not all UAS and RPA crews can perform SCAR or KBC duties due
to equipment limitations and crew qualifications. RPA pilots will notify C2
on initial check-in if they are unable to perform SCAR or KBC duties.
(c) UAS kill box integration of any size UAS or RPA is no different than
integration in other forms of airspace. UASs and RPAs equipped with
radios will use the same procedural deconfliction methods as manned
aircraft and receive deconfliction instructions from the KBC.
1/ If provided by SPINS and approved by the responsible

commander, UAS aircraft can operate in a closed blue or below the
floor of a purple kill box. Operating UASs or RPAs within closed kill
boxes without coordination of subsurface- and surface-to-surface
fires could potentially cause the loss of the aircraft. Operating UASs
or RPAs within closed kill boxes and requiring coordination of
subsurface- and surface-to-surface fires increases fires
coordination time and is inconsistent with the kill box’s intended
purpose.
Note: UAS or RPA crews should not assume they have blanket approval to enter a closed kill
box without the responsible commander’s approval. This commander should weigh the tactical
situation against the operational risk to the asset.
2/ As a technique, planners can assign altitude blocks for UAS

or RPA operations above or below manned aircraft. This provides
vertical separation between aircraft. Additionally, the KBC can
provide lateral de-confliction by assigning the UAS or RPA specific
quadrants or keypads to provide fires de-confliction.
3/ The KBC or SCAR will pass deconfliction and targeting

information to UAS or RPA in accordance with paragraph A-
III.2.6.(c).
(8) Subsurface- and Surface-Surface fires.
(a) Purple kill boxes are intended to integrate subsurface- and surface-
to-surface fires into the kill box using altitude de-confliction with
participating aircraft operating inside the kill box. Coordination of all
subsurface- and surface-to-surface fires from the point of origin to the kill
box (blue or purple) is accomplished in accordance with published theater
clearance of fires procedures.
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(b) Although blue kill boxes are not intended to incorporate pre-planned
subsurface- and surface-to-surface fires, it is possible to employ
immediate subsurface- and surface-to-surface fires, provided the fires
request is coordinated through the appropriate FC and C2 agency. This
may occur when the SCAR or KBC identifies more targets in the kill box
than the available aircraft can engage.
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APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX A - KILLBOX TERMINOLOGY QUICK REFERENCE
This appendix contains quick reference kill box terminology and briefings for airborne use;
figures A-IV-1 through 6. The pages are sized to fit in a standard flight crew check list.
Terminology
Blue kill box–The airspace included by a blue kill box extends from the
surface up to the limit established by the airspace control authority.
BLUE
Purple kill box–A purple kill box permits the integration of subsurface-
/surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface fires in the kill box using altitude
de-confliction (kill box floor).
PURPLE
Cell–30 minute (min) by 30 min [approximately 44 kilometer (km) by

44 km] area. Each cell contains four quadrants.
Effective Time– The kill box effective time begins when the kill box
status is scheduled to become hot and ends when the kill box is
canceled.
Established–The kill box is planned, approved with an effective time,
and disseminated.
Figure A-IV-1: Kill box Terminology
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Establishing Authority–The kill box establishing authority is the

component commander, acting on joint force commander authority,
responsible for their area of operations.
Floor–The de-confliction altitude between aircraft and subsurface-
/surface-to-surface fires in a purple kill box; typically set 1,000 feet
above the maximum ordinate altitude.
Keypad–5 min by 5 min [approximately 7.5 km by 7.5 km] area.
Kill box Coordinator–Responsible for deconfliction and managing
effective target engagement in a kill box.
Quadrant–15 min by 15 min [approximately 22 km by 22 km] area.
Each quadrant contains nine keypads.
The SCAR–The asset responsible for coordinating multiple flights,
detecting and attacking targets, neutralizing enemy air defenses and
providing battle damage assessments within a specific geographic area.
Fires and Airspace kill box Terms
Kill box Cross Reference
Airspace Status
OPEN CLOSED
Aircraft permitted Aircraft Prohibited
with coordination
HOT
Fires and Fires permitted Fires permitted
effects Aircraft permitted Aircraft prohibited
Fires Status
permitted
COLD
Fires and Fires require Fires require
effects coordination coordination
require Aircraft permitted Aircraft prohibited
coordination
Figure A-IV-2:Kill box Terminology (cont.)

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Kill box Fires and Effects Status

HOT–Term used to describe a kill box or a portion of a kill box where
fires are permitted without further coordination or de-confliction.
BLUE
COLD–Term used to describe a kill box or portion(s) of a kill box

where fires or effects of fires are not allowed without further
coordination. A cold kill box does not restrict the airspace associated
with the kill box.
BLUE
Figure A-IV-3:Kill box Fires Status

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Kill box Airspace Status

OPEN–A kill box with aircraft cleared to enter or with aircraft
operating inside the kill box.
BLUE
CLOSED–Aircraft are restricted from operating inside the kill box

airspace coordinating measure (ACM) or designated segments (to
include unmanned aircraft system (UAS) unless otherwise authorized).
BLUE
Figure A-IV-4:Kill box Airspace Status (cont.)

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Kill box Check-In Briefing

Mission Number:“_____________”
Number and Type of Aircraft: “_____________”
Position and Altitude: “_____________”
Ordnance: “_____________”
(LASER codes as applicable)
Time on Station: “_____________”
Additional Aircraft/Aircrew Capabilities: “__________”
Remarks:“_____________”
(Include assigned target from air tasking order (ATO) or command and
control (C2) if applicable, including target location and time-on-target
(TOT))
Kill boxC2Agency Briefing

Kill box name and status: “_____________”
Kill box floor:“_____________”
(Not required for blue kill box)
Targets: “_____________”
(Priorities, targets being worked, etc.)
Threats: “_____________”
Restrictions: “_____________”
(Air and ground friendlies, fire support coordination measures
(FSCMs), airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), Ordnance)
Coordinator: “_____________”
(Call sign and net)
Remarks: “_____________”
(Restricted targets, hazards munitions, UAS operations, etc.)
Figure A-IV-5:Kill box Briefing

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Kill box Attack Briefing

De-confliction Instructions: “_____________”
(Block altitude, keypads or quadrants, geographic reference, flow,
timing)
Target Description: “_____________”
Target Location: “_____________”
(Coordinates, geographic references, etc.)
Target Elevation: “_____________”
Remarks: “_____________”
(Buddy-lase plan, mark, time-on-target (TOT), threats, unmanned
aircraft system (UAS), etc.)
Figure A-IV-6: Kill box Briefing (cont.)

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AI / SCAR MISSION PLANNING GUIDE

The following are guides that can be used when planning from AI / SCAR missions. These are
meant to be as broadly applicable as possible; however there are not to be considered as all-
inclusive. Other mission planning guides (for example, national or platform specific) may be
more applicable.
B.1. AI PLANNING GUIDE
a. Overview.
(1) Review Commander’s intent and acceptable level of risk (ALR).
(2) Review rules of engagement (ROE)/ special instructions (SPINS)/ air

operations directive (AOD) / prioritized target list (PTL).
b. Air Tasking Order (ATO) breakdown. Scrub the ATO for mission pertinent
data to include determining:
(1) Tasking, targets, coordinates, munitions/payloads.
(2) Other strike assets.
(3) Determine MC tasking (if applicable).
(4) Offensive counterair (OCA)/defensive counterair (DCA) assets.
(5) Electronic warfare (EW) assets.
(6) Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) assets.
(7) Refueling assets.
(8) Command and Control (C2) assets.
c. Mission planning. Consider the following as a minimum:
(1) Target type/vulnerability/Desired Point of Impact (DPI) priority.
(2) Individual aimpoints / reattacks / deconfliction / desired effects.
(3) Target acquisition.
(4) Factor threats.
(5) Environmental factors (Wx, terrain, etc.).
(6) Route:
(a) Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) crossing
1/ Location
2/ Formation
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3/ Tactics
(b) Initial Point (IP)-to-target
(c) Egress
d. Target attackplanningspecifics.
(1) Target weaponeering
(2) Munition type/number/fusing etc.
(3) Impact angle / bomb spacing
(4) Attack axis
(5) Fragmentation clearance
(6) Weapon(s) delivery parameters
(7) Delivery mode(s) – Backup delivery mode(s)
(8) Threat assessment, countertactics, reactions.
(9) Exposure time
(10) Attack parameters
(a) Formation
(b) Altitude
(c) Sequence
(d) Airspeed
(11) Individual aimpoints
(12) Recovery from delivery
(13) Regaining mutual support after delivery
(a) Formation
(b) Altitude
(c) Sequence
(d) Airspeed
(14) Reattack considerations
(15) Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE)

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B.2. SCAR PLANNING GUIDE
a. Overview.
(1) Review Commander’s intent and acceptable level of risk (ALR).
(2) Review rules of engagement (ROE)/ special instructions (SPINS)/ air

operations directive (AOD) / prioritized target list (PTL).
b. Friendly Situation.
(1) ATO breakdown. Review the air tasking order (ATO) for mission pertinent
data to include determining:
(a) SCAR’s working area.
(b) AR/AI assets.
(c) Reconnaissance assets.
(d) Offensive counterair (OCA)/defensive counterair (DCA) assets.
(e) Electronic warfare (EW) assets.
(f) Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) assets.
(g) Refueling assets.
(2) Contact the ground liaison officer (GLO) for the following information:
(a) Current friendly disposition.
(b) ACMs / FSCMs
(c) Ground scheme of maneuver.
(d) Indirect fire assets.
(3) Determine command and control communication requirements.
c. Communications.
(1) Check in and out and inflight report procedures (i.e., agency, frequency).
(2) SCAR working frequencies.
(3) Data link considerations.
d. Intelligence Update.
(1) Review suspected enemy locations and identify points of interest.
(2) Review recce guides for enemy order of battle.

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(3) Assess enemy’s air and missile orders of battle.
(4) Review the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action.
e. Weaponeering.
(1) Review desired weapons effects to meet the commander’s intent.
(2) Identify potential targets and appropriate weapon selection.
(3) Develop a load plan or select a standard conventional load (SCL).
(4) Review collateral damage estimate (CDE) considerations for onboard

ordnance and listing of assets on ATO.
(5) Plan valid deliveries for ordnance.
f. Reconnaissance. Develop a search profile considering the following:
(1) Target priorities.
(2) Expected target locations.
(3) Threat.
(4) Predicted sensor detection ranges.
g. Target Area Tactics.
(1) Study target area imagery.
(2) Assess the impact of the following on target area tactics.
(a) Sensor capabilities/limitations.
(b) Threat.
(c) Weather.
(d) Terrain.
(3) Develop a holding/deconfliction game plan based on ATO assigned

airspace and assets.
(4) Consider optimum attack axis based on target orientation and

environmental influences on target acquisition.
(5) Prepare attack brief templates for all AR/AI assets.
(6) Develop a fires integration game plan.
h. Navigation Plan.

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(1) Waypoints.
(a) Ingress/egress routing.
(b) Sensor points of interest named area of interest (NAI)/target area of

interest (TAI).
(c) BULLSEYE.
(d) Initial points (IPs).
(e) Holding Points.
(2) Overlays.
(3) Communicate routing requirements/plan to fuels planner.
i. Go/No Go Criteria.
(1) Aircraft system requirements.
(2) Weather.
(3) Supporting assets.

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NATO ASR TEMPLATE
C-1 Edition D Version 1

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C-2 Edition D Version 1

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SCAR MISSION BRIEFING GUIDE

a. Mission Objectives.
(1) Commander’s intent/desired effects in SCAR working area.
(2) Responsibilities.
(a) Navigation.
(b) Deconfliction.
(c) Check-in briefs.
(d) Stack management.
(3) Systems/Sensors.
(a) Visual lookout.
(b) Targeting pod.
(c) Radar.
b. Threat Counter-tactics.
(1) Surface-to-air.
(a) Surface-to-air missile (SAM).
(b) Air defense artillery.
(2) Air-to-air.
c. Air tasking order (ATO)/Schedule overview.
(1) Armed Reconnaissance (AR)/Air Interdiction (AI) assets.
(a) Event/mission number.
(b) Call sign.
(c) Load out.
(d) Time on station.
(e) Capabilities/limitations.
(2) Indirect Fire Assets.
(a) Unit.
(b) Location.
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(c) Communication plan.
(d) Capabilities.
(3) Command, Control, and Communications Specifics.
(a) Requirements.
(b) Controlling agencies.
(c) SCAR common.
(d) Primary/alternate frequencies.
d. Operating Area/Map/Imagery study.
(1) Global area reference system (GARS)/ common grid reference

system(CGRS).
(2) SCAR Working area/named area of interest (NAI)/target area of

interest(TAI).
(3) FSCMs /ACMs.
(4) Datum shifts.
e. Cockpit Management.
(1) Maps/smart packs.
(2) Personal equipment/night vision devices (NVDs)/binoculars.
(3) Storage/accessibility plan.
f. Ingress Routing.
(1) Route.
(2) Formation/altitude/airspeed.
(3) Aircraft lighting.
(4) Timing.
(5) Fuel.
(6) Sensor/navigation update plan.
(7) Command, control, and communication requirements.
(8) Threat updates.
(9) Coordination.

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(10) Deconfliction.
(11) Reactions to threats.
(12) Emissions control (EMCON).
g. SCAR Game Plan.
(1) Overview.
(a) Assigned SCAR working area.
(b) Geographic orientation.
(c) Target priorities.
(d) Expected target locations.
(e) Commanders critical information requirements (CCIRs).
(2) Reconnaissance profile.
(a) System preparation.
1/ Waypoints.
2/ Sensors.
(b) Sanitation pass.
(c) Search.
1/ Formation/altitude/airspeed.
2/ Aircraft lighting.
3/ Lead/wingman contracts.
4/ Visual/NVDs/binoculars.
5/ Sensor game plan.
6/ Sensor predictions.
(3) Targeting.
(4) Rules of engagement (ROE)/ positive identification (PID).
(5) Passing/entering coordinates.
(6) Sorting.
(7) Talk-on/marks (LASER codes).

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h. SCAR Coordination.
(1) SCAR asset check-in.
(a) Call sign.
(b) Mission number.
(c) Number/type.
(d) Position.
(e) Ordnance (LASER code).
(f) Time on station (TOS).
(g) Type sensors.
(h) Abort.
(2) Situation update brief.
(a) Threat.
(b) Enemy situation.
(c) Friendly situation.
(d) Artillery.
(e) Coordination.
(f) Hazards.
(g) Remarks/Restrictions.
(3) Reconnaissance.
(a) Geographic area allocation.
1/ Deconfliction.
2/ Lateral/geographic.
3/ Altitude.
4/ Timing.
(b) Priority targets.
1/ Expected target locations.
(c) CCIRs.

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(4) Target engagement,
(a) Holding.
1/ Location.
2/ Orientation.
3/ Altitude.
(b) Deconfliction.
1/ Lateral/geographic.
2/ Altitude.
3/ Timing.
(c) Targeting game plan.
(d) Marks/LASER codes.
i. SCAR asset tasking.
(1) Target attack brief.
(2) Attack geometry.
(3) Attack/weapons selection.
(a) Weapon-to-target match.
(b) Reactive weaponeering.
(4) Weapons check.
(5) Formation/altitude/airspeed.
(6) Sensor game plan.
(a) Visual/NVDs.
(b) LASER spot tracker.
(c) Electro-optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensor.
(d) Radar.
(7) Delivery mode (primary/alternate).
(8) Moving target considerations.
(9) Expendable use.

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(10) Communication cadence.
(11) Reaction to threats.
(12) Abort criteria.
(a) ROE/PID/collateral damage estimate (CDE).
(b) Capture/spot.
(c) Expendables BINGO.
(13) Off-target.
(a) Geometry and flow.
(b) Expendable use.
(c) Communication cadence.
(d) Deconfliction.
(e) Shooter-cover role-swap.
(f) Sensor game plan.
(g) Visual/NVDs.
(14) Re-attack criteria/game plan.
(15) Battle damage assessment (BDA).
j. Battlefield Handover.
(1) Threat.
(2) Enemy situation.
(3) Friendly situation.
(4) Artillery.
(5) Coordination.
(6) Hazards.
(7) Remarks/restrictions.
k. Egress.
(1) Flow/rejoin.
(2) Route/deconfliction.

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(3) Formation/altitude/airspeed
(4) Aircraft lighting.
(5) Timing.
(6) Fuel.
(7) Command, control, and communication requirements.
(8) Inflight report.
(9) Coordination.
(10) Reaction to threats.
(11) Emissions control.
l. Contingencies.
(1) DEADEYE.
(2) Tanker/EW/SEAD/C2/fighter fallout.
(3) Separated wingman.
(4) Weather.
(5) Battle damage.
(6) Hung ordnance
(7) On-scene commander.

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SCAR HOLDING / DECONFLICTION PLAN

E.1. SCAR HOLDING / DECONFLICTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.
a. During mission planning, the SCAR should examine available airspace and
ATO tasked AI assets to formulate a holding/deconfliction plan. This plan should
be as permissive as possible and as restrictive as necessary. As an example,
see figure D-1, which depicts a sectored deconfliction with Global Area Reference
System (GARS), where each 30- by 30-minute area defines one KB. The KB is
then subdivided into quadrants. If attacking a target in quadrant 1, quadrants 2,
3, and 4may be assigned to specific flights for deconfliction.
b. Fighters. Plan a minimum of a 2,000 ft holding and deconfliction block for

a two ship of fighters. For a four ship, 4,000 ft is desired. Desired altitude varies
based on threats, average terrain, and munitions, but typically is in the 15,000-
25,000 ft altitude block which is a good tradeoff between on-station time and
sensor capability. A 15 by 15 nm holding area (one GARS quadrant) is typical for
fighters, but may not provide enough area to maximize sensor search in holding.
c. Bombers. Bombers have a large turn radius. Plan a minimum holding area
of 30 by 15 nm (two GARS quadrants), depending on altitude. On station time is
typically longer for bomber aircraft.
d. Helicopters. Helicopters typically operate below 10,000 ft mean sea level

(MSL) and at a groundspeed of 70-150 knots (kts). A typical high threat altitude
profile is 50-200 feet above ground level (AGL) while a medium/low threat altitude
profile is 1,500-2,500 feet AGL. If limited to a holding area, consider sensor
capabilities, terrain, and threat. Helicopter holding areas are typically established
at such a distance from the target area as to provide adequate threat stand-off.
The SCAR should consider the fragmentation envelope and bomb fall line of
concurrent strike missions in relation to the helicopter holding position to prevent
fratricide.
e. UAS. UAS holding airspace will vary based on the group category of UA.
UAS typically lack the ability to see and avoid manned aircraft, but may contain
other onboard systems (i.e., radio; tactical data links; or identification, friend or
foe) which allow the SCAR to use standard deconfliction (i.e., altitude, lateral, or
timing) measures. UASs belonging to different groups have different operating
altitude and holding area dimensions requirements. Detailed mission planning
and coordination between the SCAR and the UAS’s aircrew is required to
determine proper holding airspace and optimal UAS operating altitudes. The Lost
Link Plan is a pre-programmed route the UAS will fly if it loses contact with its
control station. The UAS aircrew are responsible for coordinating with and de-
conflicting their lost link routing and altitude with the SCAR.
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Figure E-1: GARS enabled kill box holding / deconfliction

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Figure E-2: Altitude Holding / Deconfliction V-diagram
E.2. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SURFACE TO SURFACE FIRES.
The SCAR needs to be familiar with all weapon systems capable of reaching the SCAR
working area. With increased capabilities in long-range fire and ability to engage precision and
area targets, long-range artillery systems and naval surface fire support are available attack
options. The SCAR’s information regarding the capabilities of these assets comes from the
BCD, ground liaison detachment, or other liaison officers prior to the mission. The flight path
of each round must be included in the SCAR’s airspace deconfliction plan and will likely require
additional coordination with tactical air C2. Knowing the firing unit location and the range fan
in relation to the SCAR working area will aid in target prosecution and airspace de-conflicting.

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EXAMPLE DT 9-LINE CARD
DT CARD
Tasking: INV / TGT / STRIKE / SMACK INV / TGT / STRIKE / SMACK INV / TGT / STRIKE / SMACK
Track Number:
9-Line Attack Briefing
1. IP/Bullseye
2. Heading
3. Distance
4. Elevation
5. Tgt Descr.
6. Coordinates N/S
E/W
Grid.
7. Marks
8. Friendlies
9. Egress
Remarks
Desired effect / ordnance
CDE
Coord category
Cat 1 (0-20’’) / Cat 2 (21’-50’) / Cat 3 (51’-100’) / Cat 4 (101’-300’) / Cat 5 (301’-1000’)
Amplifying Information
Threats
Support assets
C2 / freq
Escort
SEAD/EA
Tanker
Other
Tgt description
Other
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FULL MOTION VIDEO CONSIDERATIONS

G.1. INTRODUCTION
FMV systems provide near real time video down link to the ground units for CAS execution. This
means that both air system operator and ground system operator are looking at the same live
image. In CAS, FMV used to build aircrew and JTAC SA (see beyond obstacles), provides precise
coordinates, target verification, friendly fire reduction, collateral damage mitigation, real time
BDAand reduces the engagement cycle time. However FMV provides a soda straw view of the
target area through the aircraft’s electro-optical/infra-red sensors. Both aircrew and JTACs still
need to conduct adequate target talk-on prior to weapon release. FMV systems enhance, but do
not change standard CAS procedures. FMV feeds should not be used as a single-source for target
identification.FMV equipment normally comprises a terminal that provides the capability to receive
real-time sensor-data (in the form of streaming video data) from suitably equipped airborne
platforms (TGP and VDL transmitter). However, to realise this capability, aircrew and ground
forces must operate as a cohesive team. The requirement of the aircrew to understand the ground
scheme of maneuver is essential to success. FMV feed can be provided by various air platforms:
CAS platforms (FW, RW) but also UAS (either in an ISR or strike role).
New developments and trends will make FMV evolutions soon:

a. Encryption : simple encryption embedded in most systems (AES, DES)
through complex and with limited (US type 1 i.e.) are more and more used.
b. Uplink : some targeting pods and aircraft systems can be equipped and set-
up for receiving data from the ground operator. Range of data goes from a still image
captured from downlinked feed or taken by ground party to a “flag”/geographic
point/ref indicating an SPI/potential target. This is rather emerging and not yet
mature in its technical aspect but also operational usage.
CAUTION
The JTAC must understand that FMV is an extra tool to enhance CAS operations; whilst it is
extremely beneficial, FMV use does not over-ride the need to prosecute an attack using standard
CAS procedures.
G.2. PREPARATION, PLANNING AND REQUESTING
Units planning to use Full Motion Video (FMV) need to ensure desired downlink frequencies are
on the joint restricted frequency list. When multiple FMV transmitters are operating within an area,
de-conflict frequencies between transmitters to reduce mutual interference. In multiple aircraft
flights, attempt to keep the FMV transmitter on and set to a constant frequency with the ground
station switching frequencies to view desired FMV from the FMV platform. This provides a quicker
handshake than turning the FMV transmitter on/off.
Air platforms have different capabilities in terms of:
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a. Frequency band. This must be identified beforehand in order to ensure an

efficient signal reception. Most encountered bands are C-band, L-band, S-band and
Ku-band.
b. Video type. The signal can be analog or digital, sometime in a specific mode
(linked to baud rate in aircraft, i.e. .466 rate), requiring specific set-up of the ground
system. Almost all platforms transmit video feed in black and white background.
c. Information displayed on FMV system screen. Some information are TGP or

aircraft generated. Following information are commonly displayed:
(1) Mark point coordinates (Lat/Long and/ or MGRS)
(2) Mark point altitude (in feet MSL/HAE and/or meters)
(3) North indicator
(4) Fragmentation circle
(5) Range sensor to mark point
(6) Crosshair/yardstick with yardstick value in meters
(7) Sensor type (IR(+ black/white hot)/TV)
(8) Sensor FOV
(9) FMV frequency
(10) Relative position of the sensor vs the markpoint
(11) LASER symbology
(12) Time counter
d. Coordinate accuracy. Coordinates displayed on the FMV will have varying

degrees of accuracy based on platform and sensor type, but also relative position of
the sensor to the mark point (slant range (less accurate) vs vertical range (best
accurate).
Operators should query aircrew for coordinate accuracy prior to using those
coordinates for targeting purposes.
e. Metadata. Some air and ground systems are able to send/receive metadata
through the FMV link. Some of those data can be graphically displayed on the digital
map of a compatible application as icons and/or as text in a table format. They
consist mostly in sensor/platform information (location, altitude, heading), sensor
FOV footprint, markpoint location.
Planned use of metadata must be coordinated as they are not automatically transmitted
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Aircraft holding pattern. Maximize visibility of the target area while minimizing LOS loss between
the FMV transmit antenna and the ground station. Minimizing aircraft maneuvering and
maximizing wings level time during the holding, will increase successful video reception. Consider
orienting the holding pattern so the sensor is viewing the target from the same axis as the
operator. This will enhance operator scene interpretation of the FMV and increase talk-on
effectiveness.
Not all aircraft are equipped with suitable sensors to downlink to an FMV receiving terminal;
therefore, if FMV is required to support an operation, this must be highlighted when bidding for air
support using the appropriate air request form, annotating details within the remarks section. The
following should be considered when requesting support:
a. Specify the required and potential elapsed time-on-task as this could influence
which sensor platform is allocated (loiter time of regular CAS FW/RW platform vs
bomber/UAS).
b. Identify whether the task is purely Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition

and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) or will require autonomous air-to-ground platform
capability. If the task is ISTAR only, this may increase the number of platform types
that could support the operation.
c. Highlight the need for surprise or covert manoeuvring if it is considered that

platform signature may affect the operation.
d. Receiver location relative to the target should be sent to enable aircrew to

ensure that a sensor-to-receiver link is maintained.
e. JTACs should assess the local operating environment as the range at which
sensor data can be received is dependent upon the aircraft aspect, output power of
its datalink, the FMV antenna type and the guarantee of LOS between the aircraft
and receiver terminal.
f. Also the technical limitations of the systems (both air and ground) need to be
reported with the initial request(ASR) / tasking (ATO).
FMV Limitations. FMV link loss has to be occasionally expected due to air platform and/or ground
platform maneuvers. Operators should anticipate a loss of reception during target attacks and
aircraft threat reactions. Ground operators must be able to identify when the feed is lost and
communicate that to the aircrew with the brevity term “HOLLOW.” In addition, both systems
operators should communicate when they anticipate the feed to be lost due to maneuvers with
the brevity term “EXPECT HOLLOW.” Operators can identify loss of FMV by:
a. observing complete loss of image (snow on screen).
b. monitoring the clock display on video feed. When the image freezes or the
clock stops, reception has been lost.

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G.3. EXECUTION
Depending on the ground tactical situation, FMV as an SA and target acquisition tool can slightly
modify the sequence of events. Indeed, like with a non-VDL capable TGP use, sequence may
start by providing an SPI to the air system operator in order to correlate the mark/target. CAS
briefing creation may start then after TGT confirmation (correlation prior to CAS Bfg (Briefing)
procedure).
a. Routing/safety of flight. Aircraft will proceed as fragged to planned location.

This is particularly relevant when this one has been coordinated for surprise/covert
effect.
b. Aircraft check-in. Aircrews identify themselves as FMV capable, confirm

downlink frequency/band/mode with the ground operator and switch VDL ON on
request.
c. Situation Update. Sensor use and capabilities should be

coordinated/confirmed at this stage (see situation update paragraph for more
details).
d. Game Plan. N/A
e. CAS Briefing. If JTAC has no eyes on target and proceed with correlation
prior to CAS Bfg, FMV information can be used to build this last. But caution is
required for the information accuracy and they must be correlated with other
means as much as possible. This is critical if BOC procedure will be applied.
f. Remarks/Restrictions. Any additional FMV information can, as required,

and not yet stated, be inserted in this section.
g. Read back. Even if JTAC has used the sensor/FMV information as source
to build his CAS brief and aircrew has maintained target observation, this will
never preclude the mandatory read-back process.
h. Correlation.
(1) Types of Control. FMV can be used to assist in all 3 types of CAS terminal
attack control. Under Type 1 control, the JTAC will be visual with both target and
aircraft, FMV will be used to verify target details and expedite the engagement
cycle. However, if FMV is the primary means of identifying and engaging a target,
then as a minimum, this should be treated as a Type 2 control.
(2) Talk-On. Talk-Ons to specific targets start with the aircrew slewing their
sensor to target coordinates passed by the ground operator. The talk-on should
begin and end with the sensors in a wide enough FOV to allow the confirmation of
the correct target area. Features directly surrounding the target must be confirmed
to ensure proper target correlation and to mitigate collateral damage and friendly
fire prevention. Operators should develop SA by initially viewing the target area
through the sensor in wide FOV, then through narrow FOV, following a “big to

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small” progression. Once the target is acquired and identified, the sensor may be
returned to a wider FOV as a confirmation method.
Operators may request aircrew to switch sensors or views through brevity terms.
Operators should understand that aircrew will provide the most appropriate video
available within the limits of their sensor.
Using wide Field of View (FOV) initially, refining down to narrow FOV (big to small)
enables better situational awareness. The ZOOM command can be used in all
FOVs.
Most sensors display a reference for North, but this reference should only be used
as an SA tool.
(3) Coordination Procedure. Use of FMV follows traditional CAS medium-level

“FIDO” Talk-On procedures (From a point, In a direction, for a Distance, to an
Object) but the following points should be considered by JTAC when utilising an
FMV terminal:
Possible techniques are:
(a) Technique 1, Battleship. The JTAC employs a series of left, right, and
up, down commands coupled with a unit of measure. Example, “slew left 2
up 1”.
(b) Technique 2, Clock/Unit. The FMV video is viewed with the top of the
screen representing 12 o’clock. A unit of measure needs to be established
with the aircrew prior to proceeding. The recommended unit of measure is
from the center of the crosshair to the outer edge of a horizontal leg. The
JTAC then directs the aircrew to move the cursors using the clock position
and a unit of measure. Example: “Slew 3 o’clock for 2 units.” When the
aircrew is complete with the movement, it will call “SET”. Another technique
is to direct the aircrew to a specific identifiable feature in the video. Example:
“The white hot, inverted L shaped object at 10 o’clock for 2 units is the target.”
(c) Technique, Roadway. This method can be useful in cultural and urban
developments as Lines of Communications (LOC) are prevalent. It
incorporates the basic principles from the clock/unit method. Simply put, the
aircrew uses the sensor to follow the roads that lead to the target. The JTAC
directs the aircrew using the clock method to follow the LOC until they get to
a specific object or point, usually either a road intersection or a building.
Direct the aircrew to call contact at each intersection or point. Continue to
direct the search utilizing the clock method and LOCs until the aircrew comes
to the target area. Then transition to clock/unit and pass a final description
of the target.
(4) Unit of measure. The operator or aircrew will establish a unit of measure for
the talk-on. Movement is based on Unit of measure with direction. Unit of measure
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(a) Yardstick (length from the center of the crosshairs to the outer edge
of a horizontal leg
(b) Distance between two points
(c) Any other symbols or lines displayed
(d) Screen (by size)
Avoid using the full screen width or length as a unit measure. Using one-
half screen measure allows viewing of previous references when the
sensor is slewed or the FOV is changed. Movement directions based on
Unit of measure with direction
(5) Target Confirmation. The JTAC should use IR and TV sensors to identify a
target, as each sensor yields different information to the observer. Once the aircrew
identifies the target they should slew the sensor to place the target directly under
the center of the crosshairs. Once complete, the aircrew will state “SET,
CAPTURED” with any additional confirmatory communications. Operator verifies
the correct target is under the crosshairs and responds with CAPTURE”. Invariably,
the target will be positively identified in narrow FOV but operators/JTACs should
request that, prior to final clearance, the FOV is temporarily changed to give greater
coverage of the target area and allow overall situational awareness to be
maintained.
(6) Situational Awareness. Experience has shown that FMV users have a
tendency to become fixated by the TV picture and can potentially lose their overall
SA.
If FMV fails, the JTAC should then transition to having the aircrew describe what
they see through the sensor. This should confirm to the JTAC that the sensor is
positioned on the DMPI or at least in the general target area. From there the JTAC
can utilize a traditional talk-on to guide the aircrew on to the correct DMPI. If the
sensor fails, the JTAC should be prepared to conduct a visual only talk-on.
i. Attack.
It is critical that air system operator maintains target tracking during the whole attack
phase in order to permanently assess the tactical situation in the vicinity of the DMPI.
This will permit final safety check (friendlies’, civilians’ presence) concluding to a
clearance or an abort call.
Forward Firing Weapons. Some platform sensors ‘park’ in order to protect from being
damaged whenever a forward firing weapon is used. While it is possible for the aircrew
to un-park the sensor head during such attacks, it is not recommended and the JTAC
should only request this when necessary.
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k. BDA. In order to conduct BDA, JTAC has to request to air system operator to
maintain sensor on the DMPI until the post effect assessment is completed. This will
lead to detailed BDA and needs in eventual re-attack.
Video Downlink Brevity Terms

Term Definition
CHECK CAPTURE Informative call from Ground System
operator to Air System operator that target
appears to be no longer tracked by Sensor
CHECK FOCUS Informative call from Ground System
operator to Air System operator that the
video image appears to be out of focus
DECLUTTER Directive call from Ground System
operator to Air System operator to
minimize on-screen graphics to prevent an
object of interest from being obscured.
For sensors with multi-level declutter
capability, indicate as Level 1, 2, 3, etc
EXPECT HOLLOW Informative call that a condition will likely
exist that limits FMV reception
(maneuvers, terrain, etc.)
HANDSHAKE Informative call by Ground System
Operator to Air System operator to indicate
receiving good FMV signal (and/or
Metadata)
HOLLOW (Metadata) Informative call by Ground System
Operator to Air System operator to indicate
loss or no full motion video signal (and/or
Metadata) received by Ground System.
SET Informative call from Air System operator
to Ground System Operator indicating no
longer slewing the sensor and waiting for
further updates
SHADOW Directive call from Ground System
operator to Air System operator to follow
indicated target.
SLEW (LEFT/RIGHT/UP/DOWN or Directive call from Ground System
CLOCK POSITION and DISTANCE ¼ operator to Air System operator to slew the
SCREEN, ½ SCREEN, FULL SCREEN) sensor a given direction and distance
STAKE A sensor mark has been set and is used
as an anchor point.

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STARE Directive call to cue the targeting pod and

enable the LASER spot search function on
the specified LASER code in relation to the
specified reference point. Reference point
may include the following: inertial
navigation system steerpoint, geographic
reference, bearing and range, data link
point, or LASER mark.
SWITCH CAMERA Directive call from Ground System
operator to Air System operator to switch
to electro-optical (EO) or infrared (IR)
camera/sensor.
SWITCH POLARITY Directive call from Ground System
operator to Air System operator to switch
IR polarity to black hot or white hot
TELEMETRY (ON/OFF) Directive call from Ground System
operator to Air System operator to turn
telemetry data (Metadata) on/off.
ZOOM (IN/OUT) Directive call from Ground System
operator to Air System operator to change
field of view (FOV). Default is 1 level of
FOV in or out. The “Zoom” command can
also be given with a 2, 3, or 4 attached to
it. The 2, 3, or 4 indicate the number of
levels of FOVs that the JTAC wants to
change in or out at a time.
CAUTION
Use of brevity terms must be enforced for maximizing FMV use efficiency and not hampering its
advantages.

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DIGITALLY AIDED CAS (DACAS)

CONSIDERATIONS
H.1. INTRODUCTION, ORGANIZATION AND FUNDAMENTALS
Joint Terminal Attack Controller, due to his growing tasks and responsibilities, requires significant
and improved situation awareness and the ability to communicate rapidly and accurately in a
highly dynamic and potentially dangerous environment. Recent technologies have brought
innovative capabilities like high precision target acquisition systems, automated processing in
Geographic Information System (GIS) displaying all point of interests (target, friendly location,
IP/CP…) with their characteristics (coordinates, elevation, description…) and with ability to
transmit those data directly to the air platform system, through the standard JTAC radio.
Additionally, the emergence of network enabled warfare has enabled the JTAC to integrate into
a wider network of CAS participating units, from the AOCC to the weapons system. These
systems provide the ability to share targeting data, information and imagery along with near real
time assessment and direction at all levels of command.
These capabilities known collectively as Digitally Aided Close Air support (DaCAS) systems
provide the JTAC, the aircrew and the AOCC/chain of command/C² structure with the ability to
integrate CAS operations more rapidly and accurately over a wider area of operations.
It can also be particularly beneficial in situations involving high operational tempo, language
familiarity/issues, or communications jamming.
DaCAS systems display and manipulate targeting information on a digital GIS display enhancing
the JTAC’s situation awareness (SA) and battle space orientation. GIS information includes but
is not limited to airspace boundaries, restricted areas (e.g. ROZ, NFA), grid references (GRGs
with labels and grids), coordinates/elevation, LASER safety cones, gun/LASER to target lines,
graphical weapons effects(e.g. impact rings/areas), supporting collateral damage
estimation(CDE) and mitigation, while reducing the risk of fratricide.
Due to their nature, those systems also provide an interesting navigation tool (moving map) and
target correlation tool (aerial/Sat pictures).
DaCAS systems provide additional critical SA when conducting type 2 and/or type 3 controls
through the display and tracking of CAS aircraft positions, active kill box boundaries and changes
in the airspace control order (ACO).
DaCAS systems may further integrate NATO Friendly Force Information (NFFI) data from relevant
Combat Identification servers to increase situational awareness of the battle space, specifically
with regard to the location and status of friendly forces.
Finally, DaCAS systems may provide JTACs with options for the targeting of precision guided
munitions (e.g. JDAM) and emerging weapons systems such as the unmanned combat area
system (UCAS) and Network Enabled Weapons (NEW – for which JTACs will be able to update
directly target coordinates to the weapon after launch).
As a generic definition, DaCAS can be defined as a machine-to-machine exchange of required

close air support mission data (i.e. aircraft check-in, CAS briefing, BDA) between JTAC (or
FAC(A)) and CAS platform (or C²node). Airborne and ground based DaCAS systems provide
multiple benefits for the planning, conduct and assessment of CAS operations in a coalition battle
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space. These include but are not limited to increased accuracy in the dissemination of target
coordinates and C² direction; enhanced communications and collaboration between multiple
levels of command across a wider area of the battle space and in the reduction of collateral
damage and fratricide incidents by CAS weapons systems.
Currently, terminal control CAS operations still require voice communications and coordination
between the JTAC and the weapons system operator, principally in the critical phases that are
target correlation and attack execution.
But data exchange will definitely demonstrate its effectiveness for the “admin” portions of the
communications: aircraft check-in, CAS briefing, BDA mainly. Technically, the systems are
designed to maintain the voice communications prioritized over the data transfers, so any urgent
call can take precedence on a data message. The term “aided” highlights the notion that DaCAS
systems provide assistance for CAS operations and will not negate or supersede voice
communications. Indeed, CAS TTPs won’t be altered (12 steps template) but slightly tweaked as
required IAW what DaCAS system can additionally provide.
Obviously, not all situations will permit the use of such systems and its use may certainly not
hamper the successful execution of the mission.
Additionally, DaCAS is actually concentrating on the terminal control portion of CAS execution,
but is growing to cover other phases (requesting i.e. : submitting a digital CAS request to C²,
sending data beforehand to air asset while still transiting to AOR).
An important principle of DaCAS is that it has to provide to ground or air player a data that
is immediately exploited by the system and usable as such, e.g. a markpoint displayed on
navigation tool or sensor, and not receiving a text message that must still be understood
and handled prior to usage (cf idiom “Use a picture. It's worth a thousand words”).
DaCAS systems employ both LOS communication and beyond line of sight (BLOS)
communications. When combined, LOS and BLOS digital capabilities provide the higher level C²
element (e.g. AOCC), the JTAC and the weapons system operator greater situational awareness
potentially increasing the efficiency and accuracy of mission execution information being shared
between those entities. It also typically results in less time spent recording and entering mission
execution information into ground/aircraft systems and/or weapons.
Data exchange can occur as a point to point communication (JTAC sending directly to an air
asset) or network based with common data sharing (JTAC “publishing” an information accessible
to all network players).
Figure 1.Operational view of DaCAS operations

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In addition to FMV, DaCAS can create a quick and efficient process to detect, assess and
prosecute a target (D3A). Indeed, providing digital information automated in aircraft system,
slewing easily sensors (targeting pod, HMCS…) on that point of interest and sending back to the
ground the live feed permits a fast and accurate cycle. Some advanced systems permit interaction
between GIS and FMV feed: extraction of point of interest from the video feed and transformation
in a target/CAS Bfg message, display of targeting pod footprint on the digital map are some
examples.
Other systems have such capabilities but as stand-alone; i.e. data sent per air platform through
the FMV feed, known as metadata, can be displayed in GIS (aircraft position, targeting pod
footprint…).
More and more air platform types are entering the DaCAS arena : rotary wing, bombers,
UAS/RPAs in addition to traditional FW CAS platforms.
Actually, one of the most important limiting factors, affecting the use of DaCAS, is the actual
relatively limited standardization in protocol type/message formats across air and ground
platforms/systems.
That issue is tempered through a thorough process known as coordinated implementation (CI) of
standards, led by US JOINT STAFF – JOINT FIRES DIVISION, involving most of NATO partner
nations, and closely followed by NATO organization. The goal is synchronizing implementation
amongst players and information exchange about capabilities, present and future. Nations
considering DaCAS use and/or implementing DaCAS are therefore encouraged to join those
existing working groups and initiatives. The coordinated implementation across platforms and
nations is hampered by the asynchronous calendars, as those ones are linked to access to
technological evolution, platform update program and funding. In order to establishing robust and
common references, a NATO CONEMP has also been created by NATO Communication and

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Information Agency (NCI Agency).Nations are also bringing different national initiatives: USA
DaCAS TTPs, BEL Automated Target Hand-off System SOPs.
In order to reaching maximum efficiency and easiness for operators, critical factors conditioning
the use of DaCAS system, here are the required characteristics of the systems:
a. Pre-formatted messages with drop-down menus
b. Easy set-up of addressing parameters (per type of aircraft i.e.)/mission planner
c. Easy and timely software updates
d. Generation of text messages and geographic display of point of interests

based on a digital mapping system
e. Interaction back and forward between messages and geographical display

(extraction of information from the map into the message, and all POIs visible on
digital map)
f. Messages/datas processed in an automated manner to the maximum extent

in the systems (loaded in air platform system (no typing required anymore),
acknowledge of message receipt…)
Those new technologies definitely require effective and regular training, therefore easy access to
all training resources (hardware, bandwidth…).
This aspect is critical and cannot be neglected otherwise this could lead to misuse of equipment,
or no use at all.
On the other hand, JTACs must be ready to spread their attention between computer screen and
terrain (except if working in a TOC i.e.),”screen fascination” effect can create dangerous situation.
Table 1. Advantages of DaCAS
Advantages of DaCAS
Provides greater accuracy with reduced human error through computer-displayed and
computer-generated information, and spend less time developing CAS briefings
(automation)
Higher targeting efficiency when digital systems receive and display aircraft information
such as sensor point of interest (SPI), designated ground target, or aircraft position and
target designation
Potential to increase tempo, reduce time to kill, minimize human error in information
transfer, and reduce the risk of fratricide
Improves C² of CAS by providing machine-to-machine tasking and information exchange

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between joint fires support systems and JTACs/FAC(A)s
Provides line of sight (LOS) and beyond line of sight digital messaging capabilities. When
combined, they provide aircrew greater situation awareness and result in less time spent
recording and entering mission execution information into aircraft systems
Increased SA when friendly and opposing force information is displayed on user systems
Enhanced survivability: reduces the effectiveness of communications jamming (friendly and

threat) and JTAC vulnerability to threat direction finding capabilities
Table 2. Disadvantages of DaCAS
Disadvantages of DaCAS
Requires additional time to manage digital communications and interfaces required to enter
information, increasing workload for the operator.
Difficult to accomplish in unexpected time critical situations due to complexity and non-
standard implementation of DaCAS message sets and parameters (at this time)
May require “heads down” operation in a tactical environmentwhile having to maintain eyes
on sensors, targets, or ground threats
Requires high level of standardization between systems in order to ensure interoperability
Truncation and data input errors (addressing)
Requires permanent training for an effective use
Taking additional equipment required for DaCAS (LOS or BLOS) won’t be possible in all
operations.
H.2. COMMAND AND CONTROL
DaCAS systems are not designed to replace or supplant current processes within the C² chain of
command. DaCAS systems simply provide a more accurate and efficient method for the
coordination of CAS targeting operations.
Usual products/documents will contain critical information relative to DaCAS: JTAC and aircraft
capabilities, addressing details/set-up, will be found in ATO and SPINS.
Nevertheless, DaCAS planning documentation, specifically related to its data link messages is
resident in the Operational Tasking / Operational Tasking data link message
(OPTASK/OPTASKLINK). It contains the station assigned addresses and track block numbers
required for entering the network. Ideally, this electronic document is created in a format that can
be read/exploited by DaCAS air or ground system, loading all required information automatically

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in the mission planning systems (this is part of the additional goals of DaCAS standardization and
DaCAS implementation in other phases then just execution).
DaCAS, like CAS in general, is executed by the same C² elements and participants:
a. AOCC
b. Airborne C²elements (e.g. AWACS/J-STARS)Weapons System Operators
c. Tactical Aircrew
d. UAS pilots and operators
e. JFSE
f. JTAC
g. FAC(A)
Note: airborne digital targeting weapons systems (aircraft/UAS) and ground based DaCAS
systems generally don’t send the same type of messages (as per CAS procedures : aircrew sends
check-in brief while JTAC not but FAC(A), as dual role, will have a mix of those capabilities.
Additional participants are supporting DaCAS operations in that specific framework :
a. Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO). The senior multi-TDL interface control
officer in support of JTF operations. The JICO is responsible for planning and
management of the Joint TDL network within a theater of operations. He will typically
coordinate and issue the OPTASK(LINK).
b. Joint Interface Control cell (JICC). Led by JICO, this entity is responsible for
network architecture design, coordination, maintenance…
Standard DaCAS protocols include:
a. Air Force Applications Program Development (AFAPD) also known as IDM
b. Variable Message Format (VMF)
c. Link 16 (L-16) / Situation Awareness Data Link (SADL)
Additional protocols do exist (CoT, XML, MTS) aboard specific platforms (AC-130, B-1, AV-8).
Integrating these capabilities requires a DaCAS system with a wider range of protocols. JTACs
and weapons system operators should review the capabilities of their respective systems prior to
engaging in operations.
Currently, VMF and Link 16 are the primary standards being employed in the development of new
DaCAS systems. As a result, further discussions of DaCAS capabilities and employment will
focus on the two protocols. Note that :
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a. AFAPD, MTS, CoT and other protocols may still be found.

Employment of those systems may require additional planning on the part of the
JTAC and the weapons system operator.
b. AFAPD and MTS are designed for point to point communication
Figure 2. Operational view of DaCAS players and current protocols/data links
Some systems don’t require specific hardware/communications means, as they make use of the
standard radios used as voice carrier (AFAPD or VMF on VHF/UHF radio i.e.), but contradictorily,
some other systems do require specific additional equipment and dedicated architecture (unless
working through a gateway): L-16/SADL.
DaCAS system data exchange can be performed in secure and non-secure, frequency hopping
over variable carriers (UHF, VHF, SINCGARS, Have Quick, etc). Short data bursts in non-
permissive environment and when communication quality is poor is a possible technique for
suitably equipped systems.
The possibility exists to transfer data from a specific network into another one configured for
another protocol. This happens typically through a gateway.
This one is a generic term for a C², Communications, and ISR network node designed to provide
interoperability by interfacing between two (or more)
Systems or networks that use different protocols. This system translates in fact a protocol into
another one while being transparent for the user.
Select DaCAS systems further support related ground-ground/surface-surface fires (e.g. artillery,
naval gunfire, etc. These capabilities known as Digitally Aided Fires (DAFS) are nation/service
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specific and may not be available to the JTAC depending on the operation and its participants.
Other areas are also explored like Digitally Aided Personnel Recovery (DAPR) i.e.
This expends therefore the functionalities of those kits.
H.3. PLANNING AND REQUESTING
Planning process for DaCAS is not generally different from a standard CAS mission. The primary
exceptions being the need to coordinate the additional technology and communications issues.
For DaCAS equipped JTACs, the planning phase is even more critical and must encompass the
following considerations:
a. Are CAS participants DaCAS capable (e.g., trained JTAC& weapons system
personnel, compatible systems) ?
b. Is it possible to use DaCAS due to operation nature and environment (dynamic

Ops, dismounted Ops impacting on carried equipment, required accuracy)?
c. How can DaCAS be used and in the best possible manner (JTAC on front line
sending information back to a JTAC working from a TOC, preparing/processing the
digital messages i.e., and following better the ground/air situation thanks to his
systems) ?
d. Is the Comms plan robust ? All means must be available (hardware,

bandwidth, networks)
e. Are all required information timely distributed and up to date ? (addressing,

radio modem timing parameters, used framework…)
f. Are all agencies involved in the process and having DaCAS capabilities clearly
identified ?
g. Are all products available for supporting the mission through DaCAS means ?
(digital maps, elevation database, other digital products (overlays, FSCMs,…)
h. Is it necessary to prepare pre-planned targets, points of interest, planned

friendly positions, defined during the CAS planning phases ?
Mission preparation must also ensure that, as a bare minimum,
a. System has been reconfigured/cleaned as required since last use
b. Addressing table/mission planner has been cleaned/prepared
c. digital maps/elevation DB for the AOR have been loaded
It is also critical that operators have sufficient knowledge of the employed GIS.

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Requesting procedures should be supported by DaCAS system through standard methods:

submitting a digital ASR in either pre-planned or in immediate CAS can help out by speeding up
the process, if the system is user friendly.
As previously stated, data transmission can be done by using Line Of Sight (LOS) or Beyond Line
of Sight (BLOS) capabilities.
a. Line of Sight Capabilities.
Complemented by the global situation awareness of BLOS links/protocols, common

LOS digital messaging protocols are the following :
(1) VMF
(2) AFAPD
These LOS protocols permit JTACs and aircrew to digitally exchange messages, such
as check-in and CAS briefing. VMF provides the most extensive digital information
exchange between similarly capable platforms and ground based terminal attack
controller kits. VMF is the near-term, LOS DaCAS standard for the terminal attack
control phase of CAS missions. Those different protocols have different message sets,
VMF having the broadest one, going further than the minimum set required for CAS
execution.
LOS DaCAS capabilities have the advantage of increased bandwidth and low latency
for data being shared between the JTAC and the weapons system operator. The
primary disadvantage lies with the aircraft’s need to stay in LOS with the JTAC. In
areas where screening is an issue (e.g. mountainous terrain, urban environments)
maintaining LOS may become problematic. LOS communications are usually between
the JTAC and the weapons system operator (aircrew). The distance to the C² element
(e.g. AOCC) normally precludes this capability.
b. Beyond Line of Sight Capabilities.
Examples of common BLOS capabilities are networked Link 16 (L-16) and situation
awareness data link(s) (SADL). BLOS links can be non-nodal and provide many
network participants with situation awareness information simultaneously. JTACs with
access to Link 16 and SADL C² nodes are able to place land tracks reflecting hostile,
friendly, and other points of interest, send free text messages as well as mission
assignments, and receive target sorting messages on data links. Doing so allows link
capable C² elements and aircraft to view the information published and expedite the
target acquisition process. In some cases, this enables C² elements and JTACs with
data link access to provide SA information to CAS aircraft well before they establish
voice communications with the terminal attack controller. The main disadvantage of
BLOS is connection requirement to a gateway, mostly found at AOCC level. This will
impose specific set-up of DaCAS equipment and heavier resources. BLOS DaCAS
capabilities are substantially no different than LOS capabilities, except that the actual
message sets are not specifically designed for CAS operations. The primary difference
being the carrier on which the data is disseminated. BLOS capabilities have the
advantage of range over LOS capabilities and in some cases (e.g. TACSAT), may
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provide higher levels of bandwidth and throughout over LOS carriers. The primary
disadvantage lies with the needs for additional infrastructure such as antennas and
radios to contact and share data within the network. BLOS communications are usually
between the JTAC and the C² element (e.g. AOCC).
c. DaCAS protocols description
(1) Air Force Applications Program Development (AFAPD).

This protocol is used for digital LOS communications between ground DaCAS
systems, and selected weapons systems. At the publication of this document
AFAPD was mostly employed with Block 40/45 and selected EPAF F-16 fighter
aircraft, MIRAGE 2000 and some AH-64s equipped with the Improved Data
Modem (IDM). The AFAPD message format uses an X-series message based on
simple addressing principle in a point to point network. Each station is assigned a
two digits address.
(2) Variable Message Format (VMF).

This protocol is used for digital LOS and BLOS communications. VMF has
emerged as the DaCAS standard and is being integrated into most ground based
DaCAS systems and digital CAS capable aircraft, for which coordinated
implementation is established. The VMF messaging format is known as a K-series
message (e.g., K 2.33 Close Air Support Aircrew Briefing) and is standardized by
MIL-STD 6017Rev A, B and C. A VMF is message is composed of three layers:
(a) The message type, referred as MIL-STD-6017
(b) The header type, referred as MIL-STD-2045-47001
(c) The network protocol type, referred as MS-188-220
Each layer/”component” has its own version/revision. But the message type is the
common reference name when talking about VMF standard. So VMF will be found
as 6017 plus the version/revision. The current revision is revision B, then
commonly called MIL-STD 6017B.
To express the type of VMF, the denomination “stack” is also commonly

encountered and states the detailed version of each layer:

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Stack A/C/C refers to 6017A, along with 2045C and 188-220C
Stack B/Dc1/Dc1 refers to 6017B, along with 2045Dchange1 and

188-220Dchange1
Note that many DaCAS systems currently support MIL-STD 6017B with some
systems still on MIL-STD 6017A.
VMF protocol is made of a more complex addressing structure and can be used in
point to point or shared network architecture.
(3) L-16 / SADL
This protocol is typically used for dissemination of data link information within a
larger network of participants. DaCAS employed over Link 16 and SADL entails
the use of messages exchanged over various radio frequency (RF) and non-RF
systems. J-series messages are both fixed format (J3.5 Land Track/Point) and
non-fixed format (J28.2 Free Text). The range of information exchanged and the
greater distances at which data exchange may occur over a network makes J-
series messaging attractive for building situation awareness and providing
command and control.
JTAC planning for DaCAS with Link 16 should coordinate with the appropriate C²
element (AOCC) for assignment of JUs and track blocks. JTAC should be prepared
to reference published track numbers to supporting aircraft and other controllers,
i.e., FAC(A) and JFO.
A thorough study of data link standards found in SPINS is also required. A key item
to look for in the SPINS’s information highlighting the difference in J-series
message implementation between CAS platforms. Understanding the difference
between platforms’ J-series message implementation is important to the CAS
planner as it details what can and cannot be shared between the participants in
the network. For example the length of J28.2 free text messages will vary between
aircraft types.
The following paragraphs have general comments on network construction, mission number and
call signs. The section IV preparation contains the addressing considerations for each of the
DaCAS family of capabilities (VMF, Link 16/ SADL, AFAPD, and MTS) and a section on
considerations for gateways.
a. General comments. A data message can be either sent to ONE station,

referred as UNICAST, or to multiple stations, referred as MULTICAST, or to all
stations, referred as BROADCAST.
Each type has its advantages and disadvantages:
(1) UNICAST and MULTICAST sending methods will generate a message

acknowledge upon receipt by addressee, if requested by sender through his
system (optional). This ACK is either system or operator generated.

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(2) BROADCAST method can’t get an ACK but permits to perform the “auto-
learning”, that consists in the ability for the receiving station in reading the message
sender’s addressing details and set these up in own addressing table. This is
specific to broadcast only.
It does not mitigate confusion when two aircraft show up with the same Unit
Reference Number (URN) on the same frequency.
Weapons system operators and JTACs must use only assigned URNs as provided
by the joint interface control cell in the OPTASK Link or Combat Network Radio
(CNR) segment.
b. Network construction. During planning phases, ensure that BLOS and LOS
network architectures are properly constructed. Data links information should be
coordinated at the Joint-service level by the JICO with assistance from the AOCC.
VMF, Link 16 and SADL will have their own segments within the OPTASK document.
The role of developing and managing the “OPTASK LINK, CNR SEGMENT” for the
VMF network has been given to the JICO community; resourcing is still being
determined to provide this capability. The AOCC will need to participate with the
JICO in preparing these products. The JTAC is responsible for programming the
communications nets into his ground kit.
c. Gateway Construction. A gateway permits the translation and transfer of

data from one protocol to another on separate networks (e.g. sending a VMF
message to a participant in the L-16 network).This will be transparent to the
sender/recipient. The gateway should be reached via LOS or BLOS
communications. The planning phase will determine what gateway systems will
be set up and managed by the JICO or subordinate units (e.g. AOCC).
d. Mission Number and Call sign
(1) Mission Number: In theater, mission numbers will be assigned per the ATO.
(2) Call sign: Use the Link-16 Standard (First and last letter of the name
component of the call sign, then the call sign number). VMF messages allow for
more characters, but JMPS (aircrew data loading system) can only accommodate
six characters.
Example: Aircraft call sign from the ATO is “TIGER 21”, the digital network call sign is “TR21.”
H.4. PREPARATION
As with all CAS mission preparation, DACA Sand all JTAC related equipment configuration should
be carefully checked:
a. Radios ready for voice communication
b. Specific radio settings for data (as required) prepared

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c. DaCAS systems with up to date software applications (e.g. digital maps,

elevation database, geo-references [GRGs, FSCMs], and pre-planned POIs [CPs,
IPs])) should be confirmed
d. Data link addresses and crypto loaded and checked
e. Former data, no more required, deleted for confusion avoidance
f. Data transmission test performed
VMF and Link-16/SADL data links generally require more preparation for the mission planning
side in terms of addressing set-up. CAS weapons systems’ addressing information is obtained
during mission planning from the AOCC, through Ops products (ATO, SPINS, OPTASKLINK..),
a broadcast check-in from aircraft, or verbally from the pilot during check-in.
a. Addressing considerations for VMF. VMF uses K-series message sets. This
protocol is made of different components having their own role in the message
architecture. Those fields are transmitted in the message (like origin address in an
Email), this being part of the auto-learning process.
(a) Call sign.
(b) Mission number.
(c) Internet protocol address.
(d) Link address.
(e) Subnet mask.
(f) URN.
Note
Internet Protocol Assignment. Internet protocol is designed for large networks where a message
may pass through several routers before it arrives at its destination. That does not happen in VMF
DaCAS networks. The internet protocol address is for future growth only and serves no specific
purpose at this time. However, an incorrect internet protocol address setup can cause broadcast
and multicast communications to fail. (Broadcasting is the way stations auto-learn; internet
protocol address errors can defeat, and have defeated, auto-learning.) The current
recommendation is to assign a unique internet protocol to each aircraft. The internet protocol
address assignment scheme, in USA, is based on squadron number but NATO still has to define
a similar process. Possible solution based on USA is as follows :
1.1.YYY.XXX 2
YYY is squadron number and is limited to 0-254. If squadron number is higher than 254, divide
by two. VMFA 314 = 157. If squadron number is over 509, divide by three. The JICO may need
to resolve redundancy that may occur where the numbers of two squadrons yield a common
number.

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XXX is tactical call sign number
Example: 31Sqn, TIGER 21 = 1.1.031.21
(1) Link Addressing. Link address is the means by which radios uniquely
identify each other on a given channel. Link addresses should not be duplicated
simultaneously on a channel. The Link address is the ATO call sign numeric and
is valid for numbers 05-95, but numbers ending in 5 are reserved for JTACs and
numbers ending in 6 are reserved for FAC(A).
Example: Call sign TR21 would be Link 21.
(2) Subnet Mask Addressing. Recommendation is to use a subnet mask of

255.255.0.0 in order to allow DaCAS systems to use the last 6 digits (or 2 octets)
of the IP as a way to identify the desired recipient. With this address scheme and
the subnet mask above, aircraft will not ignore broadcast messages sent from other
units. (Bottom Line Note: Set 255.255.0.0 and leave alone.)
(3) URN Addressing. URNs have the least effect of the three address elements
within the VMF DaCAS domain but are important to friendly force tracker systems.
URNs range between 0 and 16777215 with 16777215 reserved as a broadcast
URN. Each Service has a block of URNs. However, VMF DaCAS specific URNs
are not finalized; thus some ad hoc assignments may be in use. When establishing
VMF digital communications DaCAS systems may automatically learn each other’s
URNs. As noted earlier, while auto learning is a benefit, it does not mitigate
confusion when two aircraft show up with the same URN on a channel.
WARNING
Data Transfer of Coordinates by VMF Messages. When using VMF for digital transfer of
coordinates, either MGRS or latitude/longitude, data is entered, then converted by the
sender’s system using computer language, and then re-constructed at the receiving end.
Because of limits involved with computer language (coordinate value falls between defined
values), coordinated data rounding errors exist and could result in an error of as much as 6
– 10 meters.
A slight roundup (third decimal in Lat/Long (DMT) could also be noticed in AFAPD protocol.
b. Addressing considerations for Link 16/SADL.
Employing J-series messages (Link 16 and SADL).Common amongst all Link 16

platforms are four variables.
(1) JTIDS [Joint Tactical Information Distribution System] Unit (JU) Number.
Also known as a source track number, this JU defines the platform. Like C²
systems, users will have a “track block” associated with the machine’s JU that
allows the placement of “points” on Link 16 that are identified by numbers within
the track block.

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(2) Main net channel, also known as mission channel.
(3) Fighter net channel.
(4) Call sign.
Each JTAC will need to know what platforms will be in the Link 16 segment of the
OPTASK Link in order to configure his system for Link 16 interoperability and know
what track block he has to work from.
Placing digital marks, i.e., friendly position, target, and planned routes of travel and/or
surveillance indicators in the objective area for ready reference during CAS talk-ons, is
a principal advantage of Link 16 and SADL. The effective use of J3.5 Land Tracks as
marks will also require disciplined track management and timely removal of non-
relevant tracks.
NOTE: As with other DaCAS tools, Link 16 use may result in significant “heads-down”
time spent composing free text messages and thus may dictate TAC suite employment
from tactical operation centers. Keep in mind; if a free text message takes a long time
to compose it will also take heads down time for the aircrew to read.
c. Addressing considerations for AFAPD.
Messaging format is using X-series messages. To establish a link, the JTAC must have
the AFAPD link address for the specific aircraft. The aircraft should use link address
XX where XX corresponds to ATO call sign number.
Example: Tiger 21 = Link/address 21.
The aircraft should ensure the link address used is known by the AOCC. The AOCC
should pass the flight’s AFAPD address to the JTAC/TACP to help expedite the
establishment of digital connectivity. Conversely, situation permitting the AOCC should
provide the JTAC/TACP’s AFAPD link address to CAS aircraft as part of the mission
tasking and Situation update.
In a similar fashion as link addresses for VMF, numbers ending in 5 are reserved for
JTACs.
Example: POPPY 25 = Link/address25
d. Considerations for gateways.
Note :Use of gateway and related TTPs is actually under development. The
following explanations reflects what is actually encountered and this example is
from USA.
Gateways allow the JTAC with UHF SATCOM or HF to communicate digitally BLOS
with link capable aircraft by transmitting a J-series message, such as a J3.5, over CNR
to the gateway. At the gateway, the JTAC’s targeting and situational awareness
information is broadcast to all aircraft in the Link 16/SADL networks. The USAF’s ASOC
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gateway provides TACPs with the capability to publish digital reference points and other
information onto the data link network for Link 16 and SADL capable aircraft. The ASOC
gateway includes a joint range extender (JRE) for interface to the Link 16 network and
the JRE JTEP [Transparent Multi-platform Gateway Equipment Package] for interface
to Link 16 and SADL networks. Most USAF CAS fighter platforms and most USN and
USMC fighters are Link 16 capable. All A-10Cs and ANG F-16C+s are SADL capable.
The gateway is capable of sending information from the Link 16/SADL networks back
to DaCAS-equipped JTACs.
Including a gateway in the DaCAS kill chain is extremely beneficial for situational
awareness of the maximum number of platforms in the AO. With this, they employ
BLOS connections that can have latency for real-time decisions. Planning for gateways
in the JCAS mission will require thought of what J-series messages can be published
before air players arrive on station. Coordinate with the ASOC/DASC early to publish
as many J3.5 land track/points and build your J28.2 free-text-messages to send before
this time. Also, it is imperative to understand that the incorporation of a gateway allows
for the gateway owner (ASOC/DASC) to help you publish tracks. A technique of using
the ASOC/DASC follows: During a target nomination, voice over radio to the ASOC to
publish the targets location and report back with the track number assigned to the point.
Once the track number is received, voice to the aircrew of the presence of the track
number, typically by line 5 or 6 of the CAS briefing.
Use of gateway must be supported by a robust management plan depicting which traffic
is allowed IOT avoiding saturation of the network.
H.4.1. DaCAS Setup.
DaCAS requires particular attention to the capabilities of digital systems. AOCCs and JTACs must
be aware of aircraft capabilities and their JTAC system’s communication prerequisites to enable
the timely and effective use of digital communications. Not all aircraft or JTAC systems have the
same setup requirements for digital communications.
A capability table/matrix will be issued separately and updated frequently as it evolves

quite rapidly and is also nation dependent. This kind of table should also be part of
capability briefs or other Ops issued document for a specific theatre.
Thus, it is important that air and ground system operators understand their digital communication
requirements and be prepared to provide that information to others. When practical, the AOCC
should include in the ASR approval the supporting CAS aircrafts’ parameters for digital
communication.
Table 3.Summary of main messages nomenclature
Protocol AFAPD (X serie) VMF (K serie) L-16(J serie) Remarks

Phase/usage
Routing & safety,

X204FT K01.1FT J28.2FT
Gameplan/ Sit
(unformatted) (unformatted) (unformatted)
update

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Fighter check-in
X204 K02.34 J28.2 FT
(aka “On-station
OSR(formatted) (formatted) (unformatted)
report”)
J3.5 Land track/point

X202 J12.0 mission
CAS Bfg K02.33
(formatted) assignment
J28.2 Free text
X202 retrans VMF/L-16 :

Read-back N/A as such N/A as such
possible see paraV
Talk-on N/A K2.57 APTD J12.6 TSM
K2.35 DPIP
Clearance
Attack N/A TBD standard
K2.58 CAC
by voice !!
(clearance)
X204FT J28.2
BDA K02.28
(unformatted) (unformatted)
FT : Free Text CAC : CAS Attack Control (clearance)

OSR : On-Station Report TSM : Target Sorting Message
APTD : Aircraft Position and Target TBD : To Be Determined
Designation
DPIP : Departing Initial Point
Digitally aided CAS systems are not yet fully mature and continue to evolve (i.e. free text used for
situation update could be formatted under the TTFACOR/TEFACHR). Some information used
typically in voice CAS briefing are not yet implemented (egress altitude, keyhole template…) but
current interoperability exercises (BOLD QUEST series i.e.) and tests sessions including thorough
coordination with industry are bringing the required corrections.
Messages are not implemented in the same manner in all air/ground platforms, some fields or
messages (BDA i.e.) are not supported by certain platforms. JTACs can there expect slight
differences and must be mentally be prepared to that required flexibility.
Some messages can’t also actually replace as such the voice equivalent message : best example
is OSR/fighter check-in. Indeed, while one voice message will provide full set of required
information, this is not always the case with a single digital OSR !
Tools like digital messaging, image exchange and FMV help increase participants’ SA but do not
replace the need for voice coordination that typically completes the tactical situation picture
developed by aircrew and JTACs. Where practical, CAS aircrews and JTACs should capitalize
on data link capabilities and the increased SA that their use may bring to a tactical situation. In
some situations, most often driven by gateway availability, the use of data link (Link 16/SADL)
land tracks as “electronic marks” may expedite the target acquisition process. The same “digital
mark” message is also actually under study for LOS.
When using land tracks, aircrew and JTACs must familiarize themselves with potential system
inaccuracies. CAS participants should also use established brevity terms to indicate the
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transmission and receipt of digital data. The proper use of brevity terms may reduce the incidence
of voice transmissions interfering with digital communications. Brevity terms are also useful when
working with a mixed force of digital and non-digital CAS aircraft. Using brevity terms clues non-
digital players on when to remain silent so as not to impede data transfer.
WARNING
Digitally aided close air support (DaCAS) has the potential to rely on the information for
traditional terminal control or precise locations. Two key warnings must be adhered to when
employing DaCAS. (1) Presence or lack of digital information does not substitute or constitute
clearance and (2) Digital track quality (the displayed value of the system’s confidence of the
quality of the track) does not necessarily indicate location error (e.g. target location error).
Table4. Common Data Link Terminology
DaCAS / Common Data Link Terms and Definition

Term Definition
AUTO LEARNING. Broadcast messages ONLY enable the receiving stations
to “auto learn” the sender’s address data.
BROADCAST A message addressed to all stations simultaneously. In
VMF DaCAS, broadcasts are not acknowledged by the
receiving station – no “link acks.”
CROSS-CHECK Confirmation via sensor point of interest (SPI) on correct
hostile location.
DATA A data link message. Some examples are a digital K2.33
CAS aircrew briefing, K02.28 Close Air Support Battle
Damage Assessment Report, or a K01.1/J28.2 Free Text
Message
DESIGNATED GROUND A location selected by an aircraft or system for weapons
TARGET (DGT) employment. DGTs are made up of the horizontal
coordinate and elevation, either calculated on-board the
system or relayed from off-board. Selection as a DGT does
not imply nor require that weapons release authority has
been given by the terminal attack controller.
DIGITAL READBACK The capability for a digital system to confirm that the
required elements transmitted by the terminal attack
controller have been accepted by the aircraft system or
munitions.If the technical possibility exists, it is not
used at this stage due to critical factors and technical
solution (verification that read-back coordinates are
the ones loaded in the system/weapon…)
DIGITAL TRP Digital Target Reference Point. Used to direct aircraft
sensors to a location, via Link 16 or situation awareness
data link (SADL), using J3.5 Land/Point tracks to mark a
target or location.
IP ADDRESS A discrete internet protocol four number group delimited by
periods used in communications to identify the sending and
receiving computer platform(s)

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JU The discrete number up to 5 digits assigned to each

platform or component participating in Link 16 activity
LINK ADDRESS Derived from the air tasking order (ATO)-assigned call sign,
the link address is the two digit number contained in the call
sign. Numbers ending in 5 are reserved for JTACs and
numbers ending in 6 are reserved for FAC(A).
MISSION NUMBER The mission number assigned per the ATO. Note: For
training missions not supported by an ATO mission number,
a training mission number should be designated and
entered into aircraft network.
MULTICAST A message addressed to more than one but not all stations
simultaneously. In VMF DaCAS, each receiving station that
receives and decodes a message multicast to it will issue a
“link ack” in an order determined by each station’s link
address.
ON STATION REPORT Digital aircraft check-in message
POINT Link point/track of interest that can be associated with

directive call. An SPI (J12.6) is commonly called a “point.”
SENSOR POINT OF The location (horizontal coordinate and elevation) that a

INTEREST (SPI) system calculates its sensor is pointed at and/or a particular
location/mark provided from FAC to aircrew as mark point
for slewing the sensor at.
TIMBER The Link 16 network.
TRACK NUMBER Data link information file number (commonly called “track”
or written as TN)
UNICAST A message addressed to one station. In VMF DaCAS, if the

receiving station receives and decodes a message unicast
to it, it will issue a “link ack/”
URN A discrete number assigned to each radio communicating

platform in the environment. Many assigned unit reference
numbers (URNs) can be found in the Joint Master Unit List.
Platforms without preexisting URNs are accounted for
during communications planning
Table 5. Common Data Link Brevity Words
DaCAS / Common Data Link Brevity Words

Term Definition
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CAPTURE The time at which aircrew has acquired and is able to track
a specified air-to-ground target with an onboard sensor.
CALL READY FOR DATA Aircrew or terminal attack controller is to check setup and
make sure his station is ready to receive data burst.
DATA STAND-BY Data transmission expected shortly.
DATA RECEIVED Data successfully received.
DATA HOLLOW Data link message not received.

DROP L-16 specific : directs removing a track from the Link
16/SADL network. This does not require users to remove
tracks from internal networks or displays; the track
originator normally accomplishes the task.
HOOK L-16 specific : directive call to cue sensors to air-to-ground
data link point (e.g., point of interest, surface-to-air missile,
track number).
INITIATE L-16 specific : the act of broadcasting (enabling) a track
onto the Link 16/SADL network.
PUBLISH L-16 specific : the directive term to broadcast a track onto

the Link 16/SADL network from the tactical network.
READ BACK Terminal attack controller to aircrew call. Aircrew is to read

back mandatory lines from close air support (CAS) brief.
Readback of target coordinates should only take place after
the coordinates have been entered into the aircraft system
and the read back is from the system, not what the FAC
sent as displayed for review in a an aircraft’s cockpit
READ BACK CORRECT Terminal attack controller to aircrew call. Aircrew has done
a correct read back of the CAS briefing.
READY FOR DATA Aircrew or terminal attack controller is ready to receive data
(CAS brief, check in brief, mark point, free text message).
TIMBER SOUR L-16 specific :Indicates there are potential problems with
net entry and initiates pre-mission link troubleshooting
(opposite of timber sweet).
TIMBER SWEET L-16 specific :Confirms receipt of data link information

(opposite of timber sour).
UPDATE L-16 specific :Term to direct the update of a previously

initiated Link 16 track. The track number should be
referenced.
ZAP Request for data link information, for example “Zap data or
Zap point”

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H.5. EXECUTION
In general, the DaCAS mission sequence of events remains the same as one conducted
exclusively by voice.
Due to the infancy status and use of L-16 in DaCAS Ops, TTP details will be intentionally
omitted in this paragraph, which will concentrate on VMF protocol.
When mature, this will be described in an annex.
a. Routing/safety of flight.
May be sent via preplanned free text if coordination is made such that routing and safety
of flight instructions are prepared prior to aircraft check-in and all aircraft on station are
a type, model, series (T/M/S) capable of receiving it. Due to the requirement to
expeditiously transmit routing and safety of flight instructions as soon as possible after
aircraft check-in, voice communication and not free text should be used if preplanned
free text was not made prior to aircraft check-in, if any changes to the preplanned free
text are required, or there are different T/M/S aircraft on station that will not receive the
free text message.
b. Aircraft Check-in. The JTAC will provide the weapons system operator with
addressing details if aircrew is not in possession of this already. This will permit
aircraft without auto-learn capability to enter JTAC address network page.
(1) The airborne weapons system operator will send an on station report (OSR)
to the JTAC to establish digital two way COMMS. The aircrew must be able to
expeditiously add the JTAC to the network, collect OSR data from the wingman,
and transmit the OSR back to the JTAC. The JTAC will utilize the OSR to create
an active flight within the kit, if it was not yet existing in the mission planner of the
kit.
NOTE: It should be SOP for the flight lead to collect wingman data as part of
TACADMIN [tactical admin] prior to checking in with the JTAC to expedite
the OSR.
(2) The aircrew will send an additional free text or voice message that contains
additional information that is not contained within the OSR, as applicable (e.g. full
motion video, helmet, LASER code)
c. Situation update.
Sent by free text. Should be brief and include only information that is relevant to the
mission. Most aircraft systems can accept no more than 200characters. Slashes “/”
separate individual portions of the message with a double slash to mark the end. The
following example is 155 characters.
Example: POS MANPADS/LIGHT ARMOR WITH INFANTRY/FRIENDLIES VICINITY OP

FEETS/81MM SW OF OP/MARK AND CONTROL PY10/IN WITH HEADING ALL
ATTACKS/WINDS FROM NORTH 10KTS//
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d. Game plan.
JTAC sends free text game plan “TYPE 2 / BOC / 1XGBU-38V4 EA / 2 MIN SPACING//”
NOTE: If the JTAC does not have a digital game plan ready? he should proceed with
voice instructions.
e. CAS Brief.
JTAC should utilize digital CAS briefing, but be prepared to revert to voice if the digital
briefing is not received by the aircraft
f. Read backs. The Aircrew will read back all required information verbally.
(1) Aircraft Position Target Designation (APTD) Information. With VMF, the
JTAC can request a single APTD from the aircraft in order to display a momentary
aircraft position and the designated ground target provided the ground kit displays
single APTD data. An APTD request may also be initiated by the ground station
resulting in continuous tracking of aircraft position and target designation with
updates provided every 5 seconds. The JTAC should disable the APTD once the
designation is verified.
(2) Some aircraft are unable to transmit an APTD. However, SADL and Link 16
only equipped aircraft (F-16C+ and F-15E) can provide similar attack position and
target designation information by publishing their sensor point of interest (J12.6
message) via Link 16.
(3) JTAC and aircrew should confirm format of Lat/Long in use if the transfer of
locations (e.g. Line 6) is grossly incorrect on the read back.
g. Correlation
(1) In a BOC scenario, correlation is complete after the read back requirement
has been met.
(2) In a BOT scenario, correlation should be conducted via voice.
(3) Once correlation is complete the AIRCRAFT can send an APTD to the JTAC.
This will show the updated target position on the JTAC’s map.
h. Conducting the attack
(1) IP INBOUND Call: The aircraft can send a departing IP (DPIP) message to
the JTAC in lieu of a voice “IP Inbound” call.
(2) IN Call: A voice “IN” call remains the primary method of transmission. If
briefed, “IN” can be indicated by a second DPIP following the initial DPIP (on
departing IP). Another option, if briefed, is an aircraft-initiated APTD following the
initial DPIP (on departing IP). This would be based on prior coordination between

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JTAC and aircrew. Another alternative is to transmit a preformatted “IN” free text
message.
(3) The JTAC can initiate a continuous APTD track to graphically display the
aircraft position and target designation. Due to this message reoccurring every 5
seconds, this functionality should be disabled after JTAC is satisfied that aircraft or
target designation location is confirmed depending on type of attack and method
of engagement. This will avoid impact on necessary voice communications.
(4) LASER brevity communication will only be conducted with voice.
(5) Corrections from visual mark will be conducted with voice.
(6) Continue dry / cleared hot / cleared to engage” and “abort” shall be sent via
voice communication as a primary method and may be sent via digital message as
a secondary method immediately after corresponding voice call is transmitted.
(7) JTAC should utilize a kit specific “End of Mission” function to administratively
remove mission graphics from display and send pre-formatted BDA free text to
aircraft.
i. Assessment and Re-attacks.
Assess and repeat game plan through conducting the attack as required. Re-attack
instructions maybe sent via free text message or voice depending on timing
requirements.
j. BDA.
Summary BDA may be sent via a VMF K02.28, via free text, or via voice if not already
sent at the end of each attack.
k. Routing and Safety of Flight. Sent via free text or voice.
H.5.1. Execution considerations Link-16 /SADL.
DaCAS conducted BLOS via networked links may require a JTAC to employ two radios or to
move between two radio nets; one to access the data link network and the other for strike primary.
Controllers employing Link 16 should have an appreciation of the time required to initiate and
publish to the link all relevant tracks for terminal attack control operations.
Generic CAS execution sequence using DaCAS messages is depicted but doesn’t detail all
regular voice actions. Typically, JTAC/aircrew should send a voice warning order prior to sending
a digital message, by requesting if ready to receive. This will ensure good receipt.

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Table 6. Example of communications/actions flow during DaCAS missions
Aircrew actions JTAC actions Typical voice calls

1. If able/as required :
sends ASR, tracks
(L-16), Sit update to
C² node beforehand
2. Aircrew checks-in by voice
3. Authenticate and if “Confirm ready for data

able : sends routing ?”– “Ready for data”-
and safety “data stand-by”
message6
4. Acknowledges and read back “Data received/hollow”

as required
5. Aircrew sends OSR7 “Confirm ready for data

?”– “Ready for data” -
“data in 5”
6. Acknowledges and “Data received/hollow”

reads-back abort
code
7. Sends Sit update “Confirm ready for data

?”– “Ready for data”-
“data stand-by”

as required
9. Sends gameplan “Confirm ready for data

“data stand-by”

as required
6
If no R&S message possible, following initial verbal contact, broadcast a free text (K01.1) containing a request for
OSR. Strike aircraft that are able can then “capture” (“auto learn”) the JTAC’s ground kit VMF addressing information
if those were unknown.
7
FACs can also capture flight lead’s digital address information from the on station report addressed to the FAC’s
ground kit.

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11. Sends CAS Bfg “Confirm ready for data

“data stand-by”
12. Aircrew reads-back mandatory “Data received/hollow”

items8 + WILCO/CANTCO9
Following actions are possible in VMF protocol only
13. Queries aircraft

position and target
designation per
voice or digitally10
14. Aircraft system generates Correlate target

“APTD”11 location
15. If able, JTAC sends

imagery
16. Queries aircraft

position (“request
for APTD”)single or
multiple12
17. Aircraft system generates

“APTD”
18. When ready for attack, transmit

“DPIP”
19. Provides attack

clearance per voice
as a minimum but
can be doubled by a
digital clearance
8Some VMF messages permit the JTAC to get some of the required read-back items : K2.57 APTD (Tgt
location) but not all (friendlies i.e.)
9 Aircraft system will generate after aircrew action will generate this message
10JTAC can send a K2.59 message that queries automatically the aircraft system which replies without
aircrew action.
11APTD (K2.57) will display A/C location, target location and LOS line between A/C and Tgt
12
At this point the mission would transition almost entirely to voice as corrections from the mark are passed
and acknowledged, or in the case of LASER weapons employment, the associated LASER
communications, and finally a voice cleared hot or abort, all concurrent with any aircraft status messages
that may be passed for FAC’s SA.
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20. Provides BDA13 “Confirm ready for data

“data stand-by”
Remark :A data hollow will trigger a new digital transmission afterwards. After some
unsuccessful trials, decision has to be made to switching back to voice
 The Comms flow and use of voice vs data is as follow :

Legend :
: air to ground
: ground to air
V : voice
D: data
D+ V
D+ V
D+ V
D+ V
D+ V
D+ V
D+ V
D+ V
D+ V
13
JTAC ensures APTD is terminated to stop tracking of aircraft. The APTD request should stop once the
JTAC is satisfied the aircraft designation point is correct per the mission. The risk with keeping this message
exchange (continuous APTD) until attack complete is the data bursts associated with the APTD message
exchanges. The data bursts on the TAD net are very disruptive to aircrew and may interfere with voice
communications.

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Remarks
Standard : by voice, but can be performed by data as well/in addition
1 As only one type of ordnance is Txed by data, rest of SCL must be passed by voice
2 Data if time permits and can be complemented by voice. Abbreviated, based on
TTFACOR/TEFACHR acronym, see § 3.2 for more details and example
3 Data if time permits and can be complemented by voice. See § 3.2 for more details and
example
4 Normally no voice Tx needed, all required information are possible in data
5 Data if time permits. Free text format. See § 3.3 for more details and example
6 Voice only
7 Voice only a priori
8 Voice only, clearance ALWAYS by voice
9 Voice only
10 Voice a priori, data possible if time permits
11 See 1 above

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AAA Antiaircraft Artillery
ACA Airspace Coordination Areas
ACCS Air Command and Control Systems
ACM Airspace Control Means
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACP Airspace Control Plan
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AGL Above Ground Level
AI Air Interdiction
ALO Air Liaison Officer
ALR Acceptable Level of Risk
AO Area of Operation
AOD Air Operations Directive
APCLO Air Power Contribution to Counter-Land Operations
APCMO Air Power Contribution to Counter-Maritime Operations
APTD Aircraft Position Target Designation
ARM Anti-Radiation Missiles
ASR Air Support Request
ATM Air Tasking Message
ATO Air Tasking Order
AOCC Air Operations Coordination Center
ASOC Air Support Operations Center
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
I-1 Edition D Version 1

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BP Battle Position
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
BG Battle Group
BLOS Beyond Line-of-Sight
BOC Bomb On Coordinate
BOT Bomb On Target
CAG Common-Air-to-Ground Net
CAS Close Air Support
CCA Close Combat Attack
CCIP Continuously Computed Impact Point
CDE Collateral Damage Estimation
CDEM Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology
CE Circular Error
CFL Coordinate Fire Line
CID Combat Identification
CIS Communications and Information Systems
CIVCAS Civilian Casualties
CL Coordination Level
COE Concept Of Employment
COM JFAC Joint Force Air Component
CONOPS Concept Of Operations
CP Contact Point
CRC Control and Reporting Center
C2 Command and Control
C4 Command, Control, Communications and Computers
DE Directed Energy

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D&G Direction and Guidance
DPI Desired Point of Impact
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EME Ellectro Magnetic Environment
EMCON Emission Control
EO Electro Optical
EPM Electronic Protective Measures
ESM EW Support Measures
ETD Enhanced Target Description
EW Electronic Warfare
EWO Electronic Warfare Officers
FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)
FAH Final Attack Heading
FARP Forward Arming and Refueling Point
FFA Free Fire Area
FLIR Forward Looking Infra Red
FMV Full Motion Video
FO Forward Observer
FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line
FSCM Fire Support Coordination Measures
FSO Fire Support Officer
FW Fixed Wing
GBAD Ground Based Air Defense
GCE Ground Combat Element
GCI Ground Control Intercept

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GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence
GFC Ground Force Commanders
GLE Ground Liaison Element
GLINT Gated LASER Intensifier
GMTI Ground Moving Target Indicator
GPS Global Positioning System
GRG Gridded Reference Graphic
GTL Gun-Target line
HA Holding Area
HIDACZ High Density Airspace Control Zone
HF High-Frequency
HMCS Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems
HUD Head Up Display
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IAM Inertially-Aided Munitions
ID Identification
IDF Indirect Fire
IFF Identification, Friend or Foe
INFLTREP Inflight Report
IP Initial Point
IR Infra Red
IRP IR Pointer
IRC Internet Relay Chat
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JACC Joint Airspace Control Center
JARN Joint Air Request Net

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
JF Joint Fires
JFAC Commander Joint Force Air Component
JFC Joint Force Commander
JFO Joint Forward Observer
JFS Joint Fire Support
JFSE Joint Fire Support Element
JIPOE Joint Intelligence Preparation of Operational Environment
JOA Joint Operations Area
JPTL joint prioritized target list
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller
LCC Land Component Command
LEGAD Legal Advisor
LGB LASER-Guided Bombs
LGM LASER-Guided Missiles
LLAD Low Level Air Defense
LLLTV Low Level Light Television
LO LASER Operator
LOAC Law Of Armed Conflict
LOS Line-Of-Sight
LRF LASER Range Finder
LST LASER Spot Tracker
LTD LASER Target Designator
LTL LASER-to-Target-Line
MANPADS Man Portable Air Defense Systems

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
MAXORD Maximum Ordinate
METL Mission Essential Task List
MFD Multi Function Displays
MISREP Mission Report
MRR Minimum-Risk Routes
MSL Mean Sea Level
NAC North Atlantic Council
NCS Net Control Station
NFA No-Fire Areas
NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support
NVD Night Vision Device
O&I Operations and Intelligence
OPORD Operation Order
OPTASK LINK Operational Tasking Data Link
PGM Precision Guided Munition
PID Positive Identification
PLA Post Launch Abort
PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency
PTL Pointer-to-Target Line
RED Risk Estimate Distance
RFL Restricted Fire Line
ROE Rules Of Engagement
ROZ Restricted Operations Zone
RW Rotary Wing
SA Situational Awareness
SAAFR Slow Aviation Assets Flight Routes

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
SADL Situation Awareness Data Link
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
SCAR Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance
SCL Standard Conventional Loads
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
SoF Show of Force
SOF Special Operation Forces
SPINS Special Instructions
SOLE Special Operations Liaison Element
TAC Terminal Attack Control
TAC(A) Tactical Air Coordinator-Airborne
TAD Tactical Air Direction
TACP Tactical Air Control Party
TERF Terrain Flight
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TAC Terminal Attack Control
TGO Terminal Guidance Operations
TLE Target Location Error
TOA Transfer Of Authority
TOC Tactical Operations Center
TOF Time Of Flight
TOS Time On Station
TOT Time On Target
TRP Target Reference Points
TST Time Sensitive Target

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
TTT Time To Target
UA Unmanned Aircraft
UAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UHF Ultra High Frequency
VHF Very High Frequency
VDL Video DownLink
WCS Weapon Control Status
WOC Wing Operations Center

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.3.2.1(D)(1)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION

RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

III Edition D Version 1

RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

PART I – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT .................................................................................................................XIII

CHAPTER 1 - Introduction, organization and fundamentals ........................................................................... 1-1

CHAPTER 2 - command and control ............................................................................................................... 2-1

CHAPTER 3 - Planning and requesting ........................................................................................................... 3-1

3.6 Collateral Damage. ............................................................................................................................ 3-5

3.14.2.2 Step 2: Mission Analysis. ............................................................................................... 3-50

3.25.9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets. ................................................. 3-104

CHAPTER 4 - preparation ............................................................................................................................... 4-1

CHAPTER 5 - Execution .................................................................................................................................. 5-1

Section III Close Air Support Execution Template. ........................................................................................ 5-17

PART II – AIR INTERDICTION ..................................................................................................................... X

CHAPTER 6 - INTRODUCTION AND FUNDAMENTALS ..................................................................................... 6-1

6.6 CONSIDERATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE AI ................................................................................................ 6-4

CHAPTER 7 - COMMAND AND CONTROL ....................................................................................................... 7-1

CHAPTER 8 - PLANNING ................................................................................................................................. 8-1

CHAPTER 9 - EXECUTION ............................................................................................................................... 9-1

AI / SCAR mission planning guide ................................................................................................. B-1

NATO ASR TEMPLATE ................................................................................................................... C-1

SCAR MISSION BRIEFING GUIDE ...................................................................................................D-1

SCAR HOLDING / DECONFLICTION PLAN ....................................................................................... E-1

EXAMPLE DT 9-LINE CARD ............................................................................................................ F-1

Full motion video considerations ................................................................................................ G-1

DIGITALLY AIDED CAS (DaCAS) CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................H-1

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................................................. I-1

XII Edition D Version 1

PART I – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

XIII Edition D Version 1

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION, ORGANIZATION AND

1.1.1 Fire Power

1.1.2 Joint Fires

1.1.3 Joint Fire Support and Close Air Support

1.2 INTRODUCTION TO AIR POWER ATTRIBUTES

1.2.1.1 Core Air Power Attributes.

1-2 Edition D Version 1

1.2.1.3 The Limitations of Air Power

1-3 Edition D Version 1

1.3 CAS FUNDAMENTALS.

1.3.1 Close Air Support (CAS).

1-4 Edition D Version 1

1.3.2 Terminal Attack Control (TAC)

1.3.3 Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO).

1.3.4 Use of Close Air Support

Commanders consider the following criteria in planning for CAS:

(1) Mission and CONOPS.

(2) Enemy disposition, composition, and strength.

(3) Capabilities and limitations of available aircraft and available ordnance

(4) Locations of communications, and special equipment available to JTACs

(5) Rules of engagement (ROE).

(6) Special instructions (SPINS).

(8) Location of friendly troops, requirements necessary to integrate CAS with

(9) JFC’s apportionment decision, the JFAC’s allocation and JFLC’s

(10) Location of civilians, collateral damage estimate.

Other considerations include attack geometry, proximity of friendly forces, potential

1.3.5 Conditions for Effective Close Air Support

a. Effective Training and Proficiency.

b. Planning and Integration.