SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 74433. September 14, 1987.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-

appellant.

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J  p:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the
accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the
approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death
sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he
wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement
informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows: LibLex
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca
of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with
an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds
which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused
gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different
parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have
caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the
acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado
and Arnold Amparado which prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
The Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had
illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in
Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their
residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
 On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the
morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to
fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He
went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had
engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then
proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived at his
residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in
the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife
pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above
the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house
of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not
able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was
the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at
Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina
Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing
mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24,
1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen
(pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized
and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see
also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit
by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, id.). Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly
P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for P1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He
spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent P1,000.00 for the same
purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, id.). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion
whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as
charged in the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal
Code which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby
sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of
P30,000, complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and
defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila; that the accused
had been deceived, betrayed. disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which
disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his
acts. Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco
Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not
a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
 xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD
OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder.
Article 247 reads in full: cdphil
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.
— Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the
daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter,
or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case.
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in
the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-
appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was
actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by
the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them
or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say
that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse,
and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of
the accused's rage. 
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an
offense. 5 In People v. Araquel, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the
above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a
 legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in
case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and
his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for
the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be
— is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a
case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. (People vs.
Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the
offender is exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the
exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance,
for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly
lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines
and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances which
practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense,
and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in
the information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a
mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of
the crime charged. Only "acts or omissions . . . constituting the offense" should be
pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal
liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the
offense charged — but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of
the court — need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo,
23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we
consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the
General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There
can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could not
have possibly provided for a instinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not
define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused
for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the
circumstances therein mentioned. . . . 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is
intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a
punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances. We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries
suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-
appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder
against the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is
where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple.
Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule
presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing
murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for
the injuries suffered by the Amparados. prLL
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the
victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the
deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution
to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his
part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less
serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold
Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to
Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for
only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is
sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he
has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered
to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expenses
and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 130634-35. March 12, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANOLITO OYANIB y

MENDOZA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PARDO,  J p:

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 02, Iligan City finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and parricide
and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty 2 of six (6) months one day (1) to six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum, 3 and to pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus Esquierdo,
and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T. Oyanib. 4
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Iligan City two (2) separate informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
with murder and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012
 "That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly
weapon to wit: a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting
upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstances (sic) of evident premeditation." 5
Criminal Case No. 6018
"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having conceived and
(sic) deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his
wife, as a result of said attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code." 6
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities 7 and was
immediately detained at the Iligan City Jail. 8
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by
reading the informations against him and translating them into the Visayan dialect. 9 He pleaded not
guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita)
were married on February 3, 1979 10 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They lived in
Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping
custody of their two (2) children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo
Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family were
watching TV at the sala located at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City,
they heard a commotion coming from the second floor rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise
lasted for quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs to check. 11
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw
Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latter's stomach. Jesus was
wearing a pair of long black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told
Edgardo not to interfere. 
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought
Tita to the hospital. She died on the way to the hospital. 12
 SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office, Iligan City Police
Command, Precinct I, Poblacion, Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of September 4,
1995, while he was on duty, he received an information regarding a stabbing incident at the Llagas
residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City. 13
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying face up with several stab
wounds in different parts of the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the crime scene,
he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy Hospital to check on Tita; he was informed that
she was dead. Manolito was the suspect in the killing of Jesus and Tita. 14 The incident was
recorded in the police blotter as Entry No. 137138. 15
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal Officer, Iligan City examined
the bodies of Jesus and Tita. 16 Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those inflicted in the right
and left chests and stomach were fatal. 17 The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and multiple stab wound chest and
abdomen." 18
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds inflicted in the left chest
and right side of the abdomen. The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock
and multiple stab wound." 19
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to
live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation,
Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn's house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas
residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor. 20 The rented
space consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner that if one
enters the main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and from the sala, directly to the
door of the adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards
reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito. 21 In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in
front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate
situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. 22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus
about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him;
they even threatened to kill him. 23
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a
letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two
(2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the
morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Tita's house to ask her to attend the
school meeting in his behalf. 24
Upon reaching Tita's rented place, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing) coming from the
inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having
sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus.
Though Jesus was 5'9" in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused
him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus
in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay
bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting "kill him Jake, kill him Jake." 25
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and
Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay
bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more
times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point
that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired
about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with
it.
 Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City
and stayed at the wake of his friend's neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife
and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway
to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that
there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities
in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City. 26
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife's place, Manolito said that
he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together. 27
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and pronouncements and
having carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby declares
accused MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim. Case No. II-6018) and
appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and
voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstances to consider, this Court
sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:
"1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE (1) DAY to
SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8)
YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.
2.) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to indemnify
heirs of his wife P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay the costs.
"It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject to the forty
(40) years limitation prescribed in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment.
"SO ORDERED.
"Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
"MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge" 28
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an appeal from the joint
decision of the trial court to the Supreme Court. 29
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly
committed by the trial court, which boiled down to the basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the
exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. 30 He questioned the trial court's
appreciation of the facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces of
physical evidence material to the defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body of
Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus' pants were wide open,
unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any underwear, lending credence to his
defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand,
the Solicitor General submitted that accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying
him the exempting privilege under the Article. 31
We find the appeal meritorious. CSIcHA
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is present
'where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed.'" 32
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a
legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that
he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. 33 Accused must prove these elements by clear and
convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The death caused must be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act
of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant
adultery." 34
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that
accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses,
we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 24 7 of
the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of
sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at
the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by
jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his
anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he
stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the
police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v.
Wagas: 35
"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an
unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise
her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that
it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in  flagrante delicto; and it
must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be
inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter."
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months of  destierro. 36 He shall not be
permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan city. 37
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 209464. July 1, 2015.]

DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., petitioners, vs.  PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES,  respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J  p:
The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries,
and perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-
Hazing Law of 1995.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision 1 and the October 8, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr.
(Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the
Information 4 against the petitioners before the RTC, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa
Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, during an initiation rite
and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not
yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use
personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical
harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information 5 which
reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa
Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-name accused, during
a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega
fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members
and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA
y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity,
thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause, 6 but it was
denied by the trial court because the ground cited therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence.
When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva
(Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal
Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the
emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat. Dr.
Masilungan tried to revive Villanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did not
respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion
hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He further
attested that Villanueva's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer running through his
body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on
both legs, which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion, or
back of the knees.
Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told
him that they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
City, and brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them
answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned them
on how they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men
just said that they were headed somewhere else. CAIHTE
Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report. 8 Due to the nature, extent and
location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing
injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also because of his
experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that
he performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed down his
findings in an autopsy report. 9 Upon examination of the body, he found various external injuries in
the head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external injuries, with various severity
and nature. He concluded that the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury
contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on the body, and his previous
examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were hazing-related. During
the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of Alpha Phi
Omega (APO)  Fraternity. 10
Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol,
Calamba City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13,
2006, at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a
jeepney with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the
person seated beside the driver of the jeepney. 11 She estimated the ages of these persons in the
group to be between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white
long-sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women shook hands and embraced each
other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.
Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked
like they were praying, and then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least
three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was shown
photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went to her
store. 12 It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the policemen visiting
the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva. aScITE
Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that
at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the
corner of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the resort
needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who needed a ride.
Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very weak, like a
vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being carried and sensed it was
cold.
Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much
to drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal
Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside the
emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go home.
Several days after, he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.
Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security
guards on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00
o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men, who
signed on the logbook 13 under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the lifeless
body of a person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the security guards
did not allow the two men to leave the hospital because they called the police station so that an
investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital. During his testimony,
Natividad identified Sibal and Dungo as the two persons who brought Villanueva to the hospital.
PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (PO2 Ignacio) testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30
o'clock in the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless
body of a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When PO2 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva's
corpse with contusions and bite marks all over his body. PO2 Ignacio and his policemen companions
then brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what happened, but they
invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they knocked on the door and the
caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.
The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los
Baños) students who rented the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and
added that about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be
renting the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following morning.
Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baños during the
academic year of 2005-2006 and a member of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in the UPLB
Biological Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away from her. She
identified the two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo. 14 They were wearing black shirts with the
logo of APO. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived and, with their heads
bowed, approached the three men. One of them was Villanueva, who was carrying a 5-gallon water
container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter did not report to him when he
was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just kept quiet with
his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.
Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were
roommates at the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali
Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva introduced
him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as his APO — Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also to undergo
final initiation rites on January 13, 2006.
Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and
Sibal were both members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for
initiation or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.
 McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a
B.S. Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los Baños, 15 as evidenced by his official transcript of
record. 16
Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of
the UP Los Baños, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006
against the APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of Villa
Novaliches Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses for the
complainant. 17
Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP-Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified
that he met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman to
convince her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her safety.
She said that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked and
vandalized.
Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her
son, her family incurred actual damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the
aggregate amount of P140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts. 18 Her husband also incurred
travel expenses in the amount of P7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his son's wake
and burial, as supported by a plane ticket. 19 She further attested that she experienced mental
anguish, sleepless nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family relationship as a result of her
son's death. HEITAD
Version of the Defense
The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their
testimonies are summarized as follow:
Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006,
around 4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School.
Dungo asked him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in the negative
because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cornelio again
met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine along Raymundo
Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked Dungo if he would
attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would not because he and his girlfriend had
something to do.
Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at
around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on
Raymundo Street. Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños
Graduate School and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed
there from 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo
Restaurant for dinner and left at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her
boarding house, they encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and
slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, they were
roused from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in Pansol, Calamba
City. Dungo then left the boarding house.
Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived
at the boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about the requirements for a
master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked about their
fraternity's final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo and Rivera then
reached the latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near Crossing Junction, Los Baños. They
ate and stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half hours. Then they walked back to the
boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met Cornelio again at the Burger Machine along
Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he would attend their fraternity's final initiation ceremony,
to which he replied in the negative, Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding house around 9:00
o'clock in the evening and they slept there.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his
sleep because Sibal was calling him on his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go
to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo's arrival at the resort, Sibal led him
inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and Villanueva, who
was unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to the hospital. They all agreed,
and Castillo called a tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself before the
security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his real name. aDSIHc
Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO — Theta
Chapter for years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at
the tambayan of their fraternity in UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated that
night. Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada, Los
Baños. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a bruise on
the left side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to the second floor of the
resort. He confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in
the evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and
accompany Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes, Gopez left the resort and
went back to UP Los Baños.
Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up
B.S. Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of the APO — Theta Chapter, and was in
charge of fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood
donations. On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the
fraternity's tambayan for the final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for the
initiation rites, Sibal, together with some neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños, where he
saw fellow fraternity brother Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised face.
Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba
City. Once inside the resort, he accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A few
minutes later, he went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's face. He was
angry and irritated with Castillo. He then stayed outside the resort until Gopez and the other
neophytes came out and told him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that they were
returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal wanted to go with them but he was ordered to stay with Villanueva
and Castillo.
After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping
on the second floor of the resort. Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1:00 o'clock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who looked
unconscious, seated in one of the benches on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about Villanueva's
condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the
resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name
to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
The RTC Ruling
On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section
4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial
court stated that the prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los
Baños Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of Sunga
and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day by the
testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the
prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a
UP Los Baños student, was a neophyte of the APO — Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and
Sibal were members of the said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal,
together with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported Villanueva
and two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the final
initiation rites; that the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover of
darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members and
the other two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and
brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to
bodily assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their
final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites, but
they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.
The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The
defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend Rivera
and his co-fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by the defense
were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of denial of Sibal
likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect because they
had so much at stake in the outcome of the criminal action.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio
Sibal GUILTY of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and order them to jointly and severally
pay the family/heirs of Deceased Marlon Villanueva the following sums of money:
1. P141,324.00 for and as actual damages;
2. P200,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. P100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
4. P50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.
SO ORDERED. 20 ETHIDa
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the
prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They
also assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere presence in the
hazing was  prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
The CA Ruling
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding
them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by
the prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to
convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on
the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak,
could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on their presence in
the venue of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the
final initiation rites.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C,
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is
hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
 SO ORDERED. 21
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the
assailed October 8, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA  A QUO  CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM
BECAUSE THE OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY
IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE
INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE OTHER. 22
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Villanueva y Mejilla." 23 Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No.
8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present" 24 during the initiation rites. The crime of
hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the
information. By reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them has been violated.
In its Comment, 25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserted
that Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and convicted
for such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty members and
officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the
hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite would not have been
accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the victim to be present thereat and
it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the others. 26
In their Reply 27 filed on September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a
variance between the offense charged of "actually participated in the infliction of physical harm," and
the offense "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat." 28 The prosecution, moreover, failed to establish conspiracy because no act or
circumstance was proved pointing to a joint purpose and design between and among the petitioners
and the other twenty accused.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Matter
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a
higher court authority. 29 The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due
process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. 30
Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court
when the penalty imposed is either  reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 31 According to the said
provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes  reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by  notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had
been imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a
matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties. 32 Section 13 (c), Rule 124 recognizes the
constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher. 33
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court
via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall
raise only questions of law. 34 Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons. 35 cSEDTC
In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an
accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13 (c), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a
matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and
raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the RTC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua upon the petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the
petitioners began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their reply, 36 which is a question of fact
that would require an examination of the evidence presented. In the interest of justice, however, and
due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for
review. 37
Substantive Matter
In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children
to college or university. News of deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due to
hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and pounded
arms and shoulders of young men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare undergo the
hazing rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the agony, cries and ordeal of
their families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter how modern and
sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric acts of initiation of fraternities, sororities and other
organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite grounds of the academe.
The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case
of Villareal v. People. 38 It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of
hazing were transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. 39 Thus, a study
of the laws and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current
predicament of violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.
United States Laws and
Jurisprudence on Hazing
There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states. 40 In the case
of People v. Lenti, 41 the defendant therein challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining
hazing on the ground of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it would have
been an impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically because
fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms of hazing.
Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally abusing
newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation. 42 AIDSTE
Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence,
acts of humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts. 43 The physical form of hazing may
include beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing
have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing. 44 Moreover, hazing does not only
result in physical injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and traumatic
stress. 45
Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat
hazing through the passage of state laws that prohibit such acts. 46 Forty-four states, with the
exception of Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-
hazing laws. 47 The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for up
to six years. 48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result
in death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a felony. 49
In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act, 50 a law named after a student who died in a hazing
incident, was enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person commits a third degree felony when
he or she intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily
injury or death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is
categorized as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in the Penal Law of
New York. 51
Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its
effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas,
the law imposes a duty on school personnel to report hazing. 52 In fact, in Alabama, no person is
allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the offense of hazing,
or willfully acquiesces in its commission. 53
Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are
guilty of hazing even if they have the consent of the victim. 54 In New Jersey, consent is not a
defense to a hazing charge, and its law permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable
criminal statutes. 55 By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these states
have removed the subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts
to effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases. 56
In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a
civil suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university or college concerned. 57 Hazing, which threatens
to needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means are possible. 58
In State v. Brown, 59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was
indicted for complicity to hazing. The group physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to
stand on their heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates in the face and
head. The Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In  Oja v.
Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity, Inc., 60 a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of
aspirating his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation ritual.
The defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to the victim.
The court denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively contributed to the death
of the victim as part of their hazing.
Even in high school, hazing could exist. In  Nice v. Centennial Area School District, 61 a
tenth-grade wrestler at William Tennet High School was subjected to various forms of hazing,
including a ritual where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face with his
buttocks exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to prevent the incident
despite its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement of the parties in the
amount of US$151,000.00.
More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College 62 involved the hazing of an 18-year old
freshman, who suffered physical and mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi Kappa
Psi fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a chokehold, until he
lost consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity because, even if the
student consented, the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its activities.
The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain
redress before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the
distinct dilemma of hazing.
Anti-Hazing Law in the
Philippines
 R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and
other forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to
the rising incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa. 63 Despite its passage, reports of deaths resulting from hazing continue to emerge. Recent
victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin Reglos of
the San Beda College — Manila, and Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the Philippines —
Diliman. With the continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for an answer:
is R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing? AaCTcI
To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its
effect, implication and application.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se;
and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts   mala
prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done.
The rule on the subject is that in acts  mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts  mala prohibita, the
only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial. 64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public
welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself. 65
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal
Code  (RPC), while all  mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however,
there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended. 66 Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation. 67
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and  mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself,
but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is  mala prohibita.
In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact
and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. 68
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations
would show that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be malum prohibitum, as follows:
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA.
 That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.
SENATOR LINA.
 That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA.
 That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or
acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA.
 That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the crime of
hazing?
SENATOR LINA.
 To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or
any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already
resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
 That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no
group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person
can become a member without being held criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not
seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is
seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, etcetera as a
result of hazing which are already covered crimes. EcTCAD
 The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive
hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or
offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.
 That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA.
xxx xxx xxx
 Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a
person or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining
entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or
is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one
files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the
act of hazing.
 To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities
or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing."
Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a
neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed
initially, Mr. President.
 So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there
is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity
o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay.
Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na
namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin
sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay
kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
 xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the
intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries,
that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have
to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the
crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the
special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic
elements of any crime. SDHTEC
 If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is
no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization,
the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se,
not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the result.
But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there
was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised
Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA.
 Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context
of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct
hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are
already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a
criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
 If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters
intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the
result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the
physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have
any intention to kill or maim."
 This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with
the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the prosecution will
have a difficulty proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR LINA. . . .
 I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or
whether it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if
that is the point that he wants to go to.
 If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on
hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code.
That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President. 69
[Emphases Supplied]
Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala
in se adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. 70 In Vedaña v.
Valencia, 71 the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had spoken, through
the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal. 72 The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same
to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is
immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its
prosecution. 73
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or
applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or
organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks
or activities or otherwise subjecting him to  physical or psychological suffering
or injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice
performed by the fraternities, sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the definition
of these groups to those formed within academic colleges and universities. 74 In fact, the second
paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Military Academy (PMA),
or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. Even the
president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a
requirement for employment are covered by the law. 75
R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological testing and training
procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of
prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary of National
Defense and the National Police Commission, duly recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP
and the Director General of the PNP, shall not be considered as hazing.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that
initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the following
requisites are met:
1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school
authorities or head of organization;
2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct
of such initiation;
3. That the written notice shall indicate: AScHCD
a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;
b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and
c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody
during such initiation rites.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the school or organization or
their representatives that they must assign at least two (2) representatives, as the case may be, to be
present during these valid initiations. The duty of such representative is to see to it that no physical
harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or
organizations that fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and
organization administrators do not have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.
 Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of
the law, which provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and
accomplices.
The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person
subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result
thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in
the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any person
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the commission
of the acts punishable herein. 76
The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the
victim. 77 The penalties appear to be similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less serious
physical injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC, 78 with the penalties for hazing
increased one degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which would aggravate
the imposable penalty. 79
Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving
physical or psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of
physical harm. At best, the only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the
victim. Conversely, even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate him,
there is still a prescribed penalty. 80
The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the
organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing. 81 Although these planners
were not present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as
principals. The provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the organization, such as
their former officers or alumni.
The third class of principals would be officers or members of an organization group, fraternity
or sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat. 82 These officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct participation in the
infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to
attend the hazing.
The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present
when the acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from
occurring. 83 The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but
also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity,
group, or organization. 84 The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members.
The parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to take
any action to avoid the same from occurring.
The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities,
including faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but
failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as
accomplices. 85 Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an
accomplice to the crime. 86 The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of
the hazing conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the same.
Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person
charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no
intention to commit so grave a wrong. 87 Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the
victim shall not be a defense in hazing. During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as
a punishable act under the law, the issue of consent was tackled:
SENATOR LINA. . . .
  But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act
may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of
pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that
does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte
accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
 If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he
allowed it upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that
sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we would not have
passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill, because
it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or
suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
 But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the
defense of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting
physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act.
The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is
not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act. AcICHD
 So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is
committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this
proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON.
 Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA.
 Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT.
 Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none;
the same is approved. 88
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek
different courses of action. It provides that the responsible officials of the school or of the police,
military or citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions
on the person or the persons charged under this provision even before their
conviction. 89 Necessarily, the offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal actions
against the offenders. 90
The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust
in penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made  malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and
disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the different participants and contributors
in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the penalties imposed therein
involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage would-be offenders. Indeed, the law
against hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law can be effectively implemented, the Court
begs to continue on the merits of the case.
The Information properly
charged the offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended information avers a criminal charge of hazing by
actual participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their
contention must fail. The Amended Information reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa
Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the
 jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, during
a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega
fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members
and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA
y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity,
thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 91
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the  Rules of
Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly. 92
The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information
included the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be
understood to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the
perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of the
roles of the petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal
not only induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. They
fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The
hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the
victim to be present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing. 93 To require
the prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of
the criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task, if
not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).
The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime
of hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity, which
has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently informed the
petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the planned initiation rite. TAIaHE
Conspiracy of the
offenders was duly
proven
The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy.
The Court disagrees.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common
design to commit a felony. 94 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. 95
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from
the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. 96 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined
to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. 97
The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the
conspiracy between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The
charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA.
 Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing . . .
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA.
 No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to
prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA.
 But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA.
 That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. 98
The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not
prove conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but
by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. 99
R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable
presumption of actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4,
paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima
facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable
acts. This provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the
offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent
the commission of the hazing.
The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before
the CA, but did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence . . . does not shatter the presumptive
innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still to
be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because precisely, it is
merely  prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce." 100
Penal laws which feature  prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the
offenders are not new, and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia
gives rise to  prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug; 101 (2) the dishonor of the check for
insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit; 102 and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing. 103 cDHAES
Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in
the crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts
that could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of
the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually
participate in the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing
because of their presence in the venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and
Sibal during the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She
testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store, to wit:
MR. DIMACULANGAN
Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?
WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.
Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3
people or this group of people coming from?
A: Inside the resort, sir.
Q: And around what time was this?
A: Around 9:00, sir.
Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?
A: They went to my store, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?
xxx xxx xxx
A: "Meron po".
Q: Who were these visitors?
A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.
Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this
Court.
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the
Pre-Trial, can you please look over this document carefully and see if any of
the persons whom you said visited your store is here? TCAScE
xxx xxx xxx
A: "Siya rin po."
COURT:
 Make it of record that the witness, pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left
picture on the first row.
xxx xxx xxx
 ATTY. PAMAOS:
 For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the
witness has been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted
by the defense as referring to Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case. . . 104
Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on
the night of the hazing, to wit:
COURT
Q: . . . Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures
then how would you know that these people are indeed those people you could
identify?
WITNESS
A: "Iyon pong. . . di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at
saka iyong nagyakapan po. . ."
Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to
say that you could identify those people?
A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may
tabi ng driver bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapos iyong mga
kasamahan nya sa likod nagbaba-an din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."
Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?
A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po
sa kabila iyon."
Q: And who was that person?
A: "Siya po, iyon po."
Q: Who are you pointing to?
A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na. . ." (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)
Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the
driver came out and subsequently embraced and shook hands with the other
people from the jeepney, is that your testimony?
A: Yes, your Honor. 105
The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great
weight because she was a disinterested and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably
established the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the  prima
facie evidence of their actual participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity
to rebut and overcome the  prima facie  evidence of the prosecution by proving that they prevented the
commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie  evidence against the petitioners, it was shown
that they performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they
induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it based on
the  prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. 106 Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the  prima facie  evidence due to their presence during the hazing,
unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
The guilt of the
petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the
hazing, the petitioners' guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely
based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on
the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 107 In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 108
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct
evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition  sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort
to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret
and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all
circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded
places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove. 109
Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities,
especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give
any information regarding initiation rites. 110 The silence is only broken after someone has been
injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the secret is revealed
and the activities become public. 111 Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and
proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it. cTDaEH
The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 112 To
justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as
to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence
requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to
one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of
the crime. 113
The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which
established the petitioners' guilt in the death of Villanueva as follows:
1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate Joey
Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at
their tambayan, talking to her organization mates. Three men were seated two
meters way from her. She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo,
while she did not know the third man. The three men were wearing black shirts with
the seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology wing
arrived and approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the
victim, Marlon Villanueva. One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to
the two fraternity neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na
kayo." He later took back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."
4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant Dungo,
stood up and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him why
 he did not report to him when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then continuously
punched the victim on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet
with his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later, the men left going towards the
Entomology wing. ITAaHc
5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the
evening of 13 January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the
initiation right [sic]. Marlon told Joey that it was his "finals" night.
6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio saw
more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a
jeepney. She estimated the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years old.
Three (3) persons riding a single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who looked
like they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to
her store to buy some items. She did not know their names but could
identity  [sic] their faces. After she was shown colored photographs, she pointed to
the man later identified as Herald Christopher Braseros. She also pointed out the
man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for
passengers at the corner of Villa Novaliches Resort when a man approached him
and told him that someone inside the resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the
resort and asked the two (2) men standing by the gate who will be riding his tricycle.
9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the body of
the man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a
vegetable.
10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal
Hospital and was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the
early morning of January 14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo
Natividad and hospital helper Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at
the emergency room containing four (4) passengers, excluding the driver. He was an
arm's length away from said tricycle. He identified two of the passengers thereof as
appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and Glindo helped the passengers
unload a body inside the tricycle and brought it to the emergency room.
11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two men for identification cards. The latter replied that they
did not bring with them any I.D. or wallet. Instead of giving their true names, the
appellants listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y
Lanzon and Jericho Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not
telling them that they secretly called the police to report the incident which was their
standard operating procedure when a dead body was brought to the hospital.
12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency room,
observed that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.
13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the latter did
not respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big
contusion hematoma on the left sides of the victim's face and several injuries on his
arms and legs. He further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.
14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on both legs
which extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or
the back of the knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that he
was a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having
 undergone hazing when he was a student and also because of his experience
treating victims of hazing incidents.
16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV, Camp
Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim on January 14, 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt
head trauma. From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination
of the two (2) persons whose deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2)
persons sustained multiple contusions and injuries on different parts of their body,
particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and lower extremities. Both persons died
of brain hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the injuries found on the victim's
body, Dr. Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva, sustained similar
injuries to those two (2) persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries and
contusions on his body, he opined that these injuries were hazing-
related. 114 CHTAIc
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi.
These defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi
are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate.  115 As properly
held by the RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the
petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses
also lacked credibility and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect
because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would stand
by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do not
hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case. Stated differently,
the petitioners did not present credible and disinterested witnesses to substantiate their defenses of
denial and alibi.
After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the guilt
of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by the CA
leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They took part in
the hazing and, together with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical injuries to
Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually took a toll
on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young life lost.
With the fact of hazing, the identity of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly
proven, the moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.
Final Note
Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions
and communities. News of young men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites
supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence,  R.A. No.
8049 was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were raised. The
Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in penalizing the
crime of hazing.
Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application
of R.A. No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the
court, it is not impossible for the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused to be
overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
must bear in mind the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of circumstantial
evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and substantiate the same through
credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties must also consider hazing as a malum
prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.
While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far
from perfect. In  Villareal v. People, 116 the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as
 aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the
discussion earlier, this Court suggests some further amendments to the law.  First, there should be a
penalty or liability for non-compliance with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and with
Section 3, or the representation requirement. Second, the penalties under Section 4 should also
consider the psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these additional inputs on R.A. No.
8049, the movement against hazing can be invigorated.
R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic response to the uproar against hazing. It demonstrates that
there must, and should, be another way of fostering brotherhood, other than through the culture of
violence and suffering. The senseless deaths of these young men shall never be forgotten, for justice
is the spark that lights the candles of their graves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as
guidance for the proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the penalty for noncompliance with its Section 2 and 3,
and the penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.
SO ORDERED. EATCcI

[G.R. No. 171222. February 18, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS,

LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P.
DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN,  respondents.

[G.R. No. 174786. February 18, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG.

KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, and the HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN,  respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J  p:

While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity members for
hazing, this case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school authorities
under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has been
characterized by law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and responsibility.  1 This
responsibility has been amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school
authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal
liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the
face of patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate
duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine
Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under
the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed 2 the Information against
them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to
include in the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan's quashal
of the Information.
THE CASE BACKGROUND
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. 3 In
order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory
"Indoctrination and Orientation Period," 4 which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. 5 Balidoy died on 3
May 2001. 6 TDEASC
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of
investigation, it forwarded its findings 7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary
investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of
the PMMA Class of 2005. 8 Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a
Resolution 9 finding probable cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin
Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius C. Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S.
Simpas (Simpas) — collectively, Alvarez, et al. A criminal case against Alvarez, et al. was then filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC-Zambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the
finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing: Rear
Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant Senior Grade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos
(Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer),
LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis
Velasco (Velasco), and ENS. Dominador Operio (Operio) — collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman
Investigator agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered
re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against respondents for
grave misconduct and abuse of authority. 10 The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the
Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of hazing. 11
Meanwhile, the RTC-Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against
the principal accused, Alvarez, et al. 12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos, et al.) filed a Motion to
Quash the Information. 13 They argued that the Information did not contain all the essential elements of
the offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that the purported act had been made a
prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially considering that the victim had already been accepted
in the academy. Moreover, they stressed that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA
was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also underscored was the absence in the Information of
any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental, and psychological testing and
training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness
of prospective regular members." Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation that they
were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the activity. SIDTCa
As a final point, Bayabos, et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already
been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have
cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.
The Special Prosecutor opposed 14 the motion of Bayabos, et al. He insisted that the Information
alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the
crime of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the
principals must be prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the accomplices. The
Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on the issue of whether the
Information contained an allegation that the supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission
to the PMMA, and whether the academy was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the  Anti-
Hazing Law.
Six days before Bayabos, et al. were set to be arraigned, 15 the Sandiganbayan issued the
assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against
them. According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez,  et al. was
dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices,
whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there can be an
accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal
design. In this case, as there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one
else with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the
dismissal of the case against the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos,  et al.
as accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the
allegations therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment that the
alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular
members" of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP),
pursuant to Section 1 of the law. 16 It must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make any
categorical determination that the PMMA was considered an "organization" within the meaning of
the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against
Bayabos, et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to Quash, 17 adopting
the grounds raised by that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August 2006. 18 However, on 3 August
2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB Resolution II) dismissing the case against him.
According to the court, since Velasco was similarly situated as Bayabos, et al., the Information against
him must likewise be quashed in light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution,
the Sandiganbayan ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively,
Velasco et al. ), explaining that they, too, had been charged under the same Information for the same
offense. 19 It is unclear from the records 20 whether the accused Aris and Mabborang surrendered or
were arrested, or whether the Order of Arrest 21 was recalled prior to the dismissal of the case.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this Court on
13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another Petition challenging
SB Resolution II.
THE ISSUES
The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough
evaluation of the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed by this Court
as follows:
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can
proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal
accused
II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material
averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under
the Anti-Hazing Law
OUR RULING
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it
dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported
principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as
accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of
the case against the latter; or even the latter's acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has
in fact been established. 22 In People v. Rafael, 23 the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: "The
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As
long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal." Accordingly,
so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to
determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal. 24 TAaEIc
We note in the present case that Bayabos, et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of
Judgment 25 dismissing the case against Alvarez, et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the
case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does
not cite the trial court's reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error
when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the
dismissal of the case against the purported principals.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against
respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional right, the Rules
of Court requires that the information charging persons with an offense be "sufficient." One of the key
components of a "sufficient information" is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense
charged, subject of the complaint. 26 The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and
concise enough to enable persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged against
them. 27 This approach is intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly
committed. 28 The information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied upon. 29
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the claim
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed
on that ground, the basic test 30 is to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the
essential elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is examined without consideration
of the truth or veracity of the claims therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the
trial. In the appraisal of the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as
a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority
or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and
cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The
physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police
Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered as
hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. . . . . .
 The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the
hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to
prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of
hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied) acHETI
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1)
a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological
suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person's admission or entry
into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against
persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or
psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter's admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the
act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the
above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they
consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered
an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes — but is not
limited to — groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions,
clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. 31 Attached
to the Department of Transportation and Communications, 32 the PMMA is a government-owned
educational institution 33 established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained
merchant marine officers. 34 Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was
warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to the
duly recommended and approved "testing and training procedure and practices" for prospective regular
members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element
of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not
by the prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the requirements thereof. 35 Thus, the
prosecution's failure to point out in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would not justify the
quashal of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find — albeit for a different reason — that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of  accomplice to
hazing. The Information charging respondents reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses [RADM] VIRGINIO R. ARIS, [LTSG.] DOMINADOR D.
BAYABOS, [LTJG.] MANNY G. FERRER, [LTJG.] RONALD G. MAGSINO, [LTJG.]
KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, [LTJG.] GERRY P. DOCTOR, [ENS.] DOMINADOR B.
OPERIO, JR., and [ENS.] DENNIS S. VELASCO, as accomplices for Violation of R.A.
8049 (Anti-Hazing Law), committed as follows:
That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001,
inside the campus of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the
Municipality of San Narciso, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, President of
PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS, Commandant
of the Cadets; (LTJG.) MANNY G. FERRER, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG. RONALD G.
MAGSINO, Security Officer; LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, 2nd Battalion
Officer; LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR, Batl. Mast.; ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR.,
1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, Mess Officer, all
public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, committing
the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their duties as such
public officers being the school authorities and/or faculty members did then and there
 willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual knowledge of the hazing
perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary
midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. during the school's Indoctrination and
Orientation; and, fail to take any action to prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the
infliction of psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR.
thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. 36 cCAIDS
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed
as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would
prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term 37 — in this case, hazing — is
insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere
conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must
include, inter alia, both "the designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense." The Special Prosecutor's belated argument 38 in his Petition
before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as
a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy — i.e., attainment of active midshipman status —
does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts
it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor's claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered
the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the
case outright. 39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the
prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the Special
Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash 40 that there was no defect in the
Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the
eventual dismissal of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash would not
bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action
or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.
Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues raised
by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and the
petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan
Resolutions dated 27 January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 193960. January 7, 2013.]

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO,  petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC, 1 respondents.
 DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J  p:

The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless
in the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated September
13, 2010 2 and October 5, 2010 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in
Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioner's Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5 (a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 59, in an Information which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the boyfriend of the complainant, . . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use personal violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching
complainant's back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the
complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a)
of the Republic Act 9262. 4
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently,
issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13,
2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to
the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent
to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for
spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing
the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC denied petitioner's motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties' dating
relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior
dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women
and their children as defined in Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262.
Issues
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over
the offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused; and 3)
whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be quashed.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not
covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims
that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3.  Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. . . .
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to
be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or
had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to
result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
her. 6
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying
the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then,
clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had
a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had
ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently,
the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the
act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity 7 because
there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical
harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 8 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient
justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely
impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom
they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting
the protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such
as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed
by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by  RA
9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:
SEC. 7. Venue. — The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
 children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense
was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
Finally, the Court finds the Order 9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days
to amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and
the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4.  Amendment of complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in
directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October
5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210
are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is
directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 223477. February 14, 2018.]

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J  p:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated August
28, 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR No. 02211, which affirmed the Judgment 4 dated September 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-87386 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L.
Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
9262, 5 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of
2004." CAIHTE
The Facts
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA 9262,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, having the means and capacity to give financial support, with deliberate
intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse against one [AAA,] 6 and
her minor son, [BBB] (12 years old), by depriving them of financial support, which
 caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her
son.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA
entered into a compromise agreement 8 on the civil aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of
the compromise agreement on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally
dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on June 24, 2011, the prosecution
moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that
Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of
his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC
revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence. 9
The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which
resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as
evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar
with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an affair with a
younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support,
prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar
still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal
case against Melgar. 10
To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of
P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and
his children are enrolled in _____. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at _____ and she
spends the amount of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar for P8,000.00 as
support. 11
For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence due to his
repeated failure to appear during trial. 12
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment 13 dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. 14
The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son, BBB,
when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was supposed to answer for
his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010. 15
Melgar moved for reconsideration, 16 which was, however, denied in an Order 17 dated May
9, 2013 of the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed 18 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 19 dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction. It held that
Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB. 20 As such, when he deliberately and with evident bad faith
deprived BBB of support, he committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. In this
regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal case was prompted by Melgar's
evident refusal to comply with the judgment based on compromise agreement, particularly, in
providing support to his son; and worse, in conveying to another person the parcel of land which was
supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son from 2001 to
2010. 21 Lastly, the CA ruled that Melgar's acts "has clearly caused mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her child[, BBB]." 22
Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration, 23 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution 24 dated February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue before the Court
 The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's
conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. DETACa
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e.,
husband, former husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom the woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse. 25 The
said law defines "economic abuse as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein
the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
xxx xxx xxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation of
support of a common child of the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is
legitimate or not. 26 This specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of
which read:
Section 5. Acts of Violence against Women and Their Children. — The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but
not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
 (3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a
legal right;
xxx xxx xxx
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an
act of violence against women and children. 27 Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying
support to a child is a continuing offense. 28
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e)
of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship,
resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed
to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and  (d) his intent of not supporting
BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to
answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In
fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties and, hence, due deference should be accorded to the same. 29
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, inter alia, that he was
charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that the acts complained of
"caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her son[, BBB]." As
such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. 30
Melgar's contention is untenable. aDSIHc
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, 31 punishes the act of "causing
mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including,
but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody
of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence
is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the
victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional
anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any
of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it
is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this
party." 32 Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's denial thereof — which
is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse — further caused mental or emotional anguish to the
woman-victim and/or to their common child.
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and
BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB
any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i)
of RA 9262. This notwithstanding — and taking into consideration the variance doctrine which allows
the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the
crime charged 33 — the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA
9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of
psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.
As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that
violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia, prision correccional. Notably, while such
crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v. People, 34 the Court succinctly
discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties found in special penal laws vis-à-vis  Act No.
4103, 35 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a
special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence
 shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had
clarified in the landmark ruling of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994,
239 SCRA 555)] that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in
a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in
the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties
native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law. 36
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under
the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those
crimes punishable under the RPC. 37
Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on Melgar the penalty
of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, Melgar is also ordered
to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, to undergo a mandatory psychological counselling or
psychiatric treatment, and report compliance to the court. 38
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 28, 2015 and
the Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211
finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e)
of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004," are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso M.F.L.
Melgar: (a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum; (b) to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to undergo a mandatory
psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 6.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 232678. July 3, 2019.]

ESTEBAN DONATO REYES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J  p:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Esteban Donato
Reyes (Reyes) seeking to reverse and set aside the June 23, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA)  in CA-G.R. CR No. 38609 which affirmed the March 3, 2016 Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. Q-06-143139, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262 (R.A. No.
9262), otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of
2004 (VAWC), committed against AAA. 3
The antecedent facts are as follows:
 An Information, dated June 5, 2006, was filed on September 26, 2006 before the RTC against
Reyes designating the crime as one for violation of Section 5 (e), paragraph 2 of R.A. No. 9262. On
March 12, 2007, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) was issued by the RTC directing Reyes to
resume the delivery of monthly financial support to private complainant, AAA, in the amount of
P20,000.00 to be deducted from his net monthly salary of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
(US$2,500.00), reckoned from the time it was withheld in July 2005. Upon motion of AAA, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, the RTC issued on August 30, 2007 a Hold Departure
Order 4 (HDO)  against Reyes. In the October 28, 2008 Order 5 of the RTC, the TPO issued on March
12, 2007 was made permanent.
On June 11, 2009, Reyes filed a Motion to Quash 6 the Information anchored on the ground
that the allegations set forth therein do not constitute the crime of violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2
of R.A. No. 9262. He contended that "abandoning without financial support," which is different from
deprivation or denial of financial support, is not criminalized under R.A. No. 9262. Reyes posited that
the June 5, 2006 Information should be quashed as it does not charge any offense, otherwise, his
constitutional right to due process and right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation
against him, would be infringed. By way of Comment/Opposition, 7 the prosecution maintained that
the totality of facts as alleged in the Information constitutes the crime of violation of Section 5 (e), par.
2 of R.A. No. 9262.
In its Order 8 dated November 24, 2009, the RTC ruled that on the basis of the allegations in
the Information, Reyes is being charged with violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 and not with
violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2. Consequently, the RTC directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to
amend the Information by designating the proper crime to which Reyes should be charged. The RTC
held that the amendment of the Information was proper, since Reyes has not been arraigned at that
time, and inclusion sought would not prejudice his rights being merely formal in nature. Reyes' Motion
to Quash was denied by the trial court. CAIHTE
Upon arraignment, Reyes pleaded not guilty to the crime of violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A.
No. 9262. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on merits ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution tends to show that AAA and Reyes were married on May 15,
1969. Four children were born out of this union, of whom only three are living, and who are all now of
legal ages. Reyes was seldom at home since he used to render military service as a Philippine Air
Force pilot, and later he worked as a commercial pilot for the Philippine Airlines. At the time the
complaint for violation of the VAWC was filed against him, Reyes was employed as a pilot based in
Angola, Africa tasked to deliver relief goods by air. Sometime in 2005, AAA learned that Reyes got
married to a certain Marilou Osias Ramboanga who had borne him four children and with whom he is
living with up to the present.
AAA claimed that Reyes used to give her and their children monthly financial support, ranging
from Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but he suddenly
ceased giving the same in July 2005. On top of this unpleasant situation, AAA got sick of various
illness such as hypertension, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes and osteoarthritis. Due to her
advancing age, AAA's health condition further deteriorated requiring her to take maintenance
medicines and to undergo regular consultation, monitoring and treatment to prevent organ damage,
stroke, renal failure and heart attack. According to AAA, what impelled her to file the complaint for
violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Reyes was due to the latter's failure to provide her with monthly
financial support. 9
The defense presented petitioner as its lone witness. Primarily, Reyes assailed the validity of
his marriage with AAA alleging that he never attended the marriage ceremony and that his supposed
signature appearing in the marriage certificate was forged. He also pointed out that his supposed age
of twenty-five years old as reflected in the marriage certificate was erroneous considering that he was
born on August 3, 1948. Petitioner alleged that he lived with AAA in a common-law relationship,
which produced three daughters and a son. He narrated that he met AAA when he went for a
vacation at her aunt's house in Bicol where AAA was a housemaid. He averred that he gave AAA
monthly financial support of P20,000.00. In addition, he also gave her Christmas bonuses,
shouldered the expenses for her cataract operation, her denture and vacation in Tagaytay, as well as
paid for the matriculation of her grandchildren and the materials of their second daughter. He
admitted that he no longer provides AAA with financial support since July 2006 because he was
disappointed with her for instituting a criminal case for Bigamy against him which he considered as an
act of ingratitude. In 2007, he stopped flying as a pilot after he was prevented from leaving the
Philippines by virtue of a Hold Departure Order issued against him at the instance of AAA.
The RTC Ruling
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated March 3, 2016 finding accused-petitioner
guilty as charged. The RTC disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Esteban
Donato Reyes GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] violating Section 5(i)
of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against Women and
their Children Act, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
THREE (3) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 10
The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses: AAA, her attending physician,
Dr. Rey Caesar R. Anunciacion and the victim's daughter, to be credible and sufficient. It ruled that
the evidence proffered by the prosecution has adequately established all the elements of violation of
Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262.
Not in conformity, Reyes appealed his conviction before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On June 23, 2017, the CA rendered its assailed Decision upholding the conviction of Reyes
for Violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, the fallo of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED FOR
LACK OF MERIT. The Decision dated March 3, 2016 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Criminal Case No. Q-06-143139 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 11
The CA echoed the conclusion reached by the RTC that Reyes committed psychological
violence against his wife AAA when he suddenly stopped giving her financial support and by reason
of which, she suffered emotional and mental anguish. According to the CA, Reyes has an obligation
to financially support his wife AAA and their marriage is valid until annulled by the court. It held that
Reyes could not escape liability by the mere expedient of claiming that his marriage with AAA is void
because violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 can be committed even against a woman with
whom the accused had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child. The CA
opined that Reyes can also be convicted for violation of Section 5 (e), assuming that he is indicted for
the said crime, because said provision criminalizes the mere act of depriving a woman of financial
support legally due her. DETACa
Maintaining his innocence of the crime charged, Reyes filed the present petition and posited
the following issues, to wit:
I.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT DIRECTING HEREIN PETITITONER TO RESUME GIVING
REGULAR MONTHLY FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO AAA IN THE AMOUNT OF
P20,000.00 TO BE DEDUCTED DIRECTLY FROM HIS NET MONTHLY
SALARY RECKONED FROM THE TIME IT WAS WITHHELD IN JULY 2005.
II.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING SECTION 5(i) OF REPUBLIC ACT
 NO. 9262 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER
AN INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF THREE (3) YEARS OF PRISION
CORRECCIONAL, AS MINIMUM, TO EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF PRISION MAYOR, AS MAXIMUM. 12
Petitioner insists that the Information, dated June 5, 2006, failed to allege any of the acts
punishable under either Section 5 (e), par. 2 or Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262. He contends that the
defective criminal Information should have been quashed at the first instance by the RTC because it
effectively deprived him of his right to due process.
The OSG counters that it is apparent from a perusal of the Information that Reyes is charged
under Section 5 (e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse against AAA when he abandoned
her and failed to give her financial support. The OSG submits that the CA is correct in not only
affirming the conviction of Reyes under Section 5 (i), but in finding that he can be also held criminally
liable under Section 5 (e), par. 2 because his purpose in depriving AAA with support is to cow her
from further filing cases against him or to withdraw those already filed. The OSG asserts that
petitioner's guilt for violation of the provisions of Section 5 (e), par. 2 and 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 has
been established by the prosecution beyond cavil of a doubt.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Reyes stands charged with violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262. By alleging that the
Information should have been quashed by the RTC for lack of the essential elements of the crime of
violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, Reyes is essentially averring that the recital of facts therein
do not constitute the offense charged.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. It is
imperative that an indictment fully states the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed. 13
The sufficiency of the allegations of facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the
crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the
State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.  14 Every element
constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information 15 since the prosecution has the duty to
prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for
the crime charged. Thus, the Information must correctly reflect the charge against the accused before
any conviction may be made.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or
information is whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of
the offense. 16 To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to refer to the law defining
the offense charged which, in this case, is Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 9262, in relation to Section 5 (i),
which provides as follows:
Section 3.  Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
C.  "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions,
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim
such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage
to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness
the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the
family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any
form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
 deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children. aDSIHc
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are
inflicted on victims who are women and children through the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(i)  Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody  of  minor children or access to the
woman's child/children. 17
In Dinamling v. People, 18 the Court had the occasion to enumerate the elements of violation
of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, to wit:
(1)  The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2)  The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman
with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or
children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
family abode;
(3)  The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4)  The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or access to the children or similar acts or omissions. 19
Were the elements of violation of Section 5 (i) sufficiently alleged in the June 5, 2006
Information? To answer this query and for easy reference, the accusatory portion of the Information is
hereto reproduced, as follows:
That on or about the month of July, 2005 and continuously up to the present,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit economic abuse upon his wife, AAA, by then and there
abandoning her without any financial support thereby depriving her of her basic
needs and inflicting upon her psychological and emotional suffering and/or injuries, to
the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 20
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110, the Court finds that the afore-quoted Information
contains the recital of facts necessary to constitute the crime charged. The June 5, 2006 Information
stated in no uncertain terms that: (1) the offended party, AAA, is the wife of the offender Reyes; (2)
AAA sustained mental and emotional anguish; and (3) such anguish is inflicted by offender Reyes
when he deliberately and unlawfully denied AAA with financial support.
Psychological violence is certainly an indispensable element of violation of Section 5 (i)
of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of the mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while
mental or emotional suffering is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. 21 To establish psychological violence, it is necessary to adduce proof of the commission of
any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar of such acts. We concur with the similar findings
of the courts a quo that the prosecution had duly proved, through the clear and convincing
testimonies of AAA and her daughter, that Reyes committed psychological violence against AAA
when he deprived her of financial support beginning July 2005 and onwards which caused her to
experience mental and emotional suffering to the point that even her health condition was adversely
affected.
 Reyes argues that he cannot be held liable for violation of R.A. No. 9262 because he has no
obligation to financially support AAA since he never contracted marriage with her. Petitioner is
mistaken.
We find that the National Statistics Office certified copy of a marriage certificate presented by
the prosecution serves as positive evidence of the existence of the marriage between Reyes and
AAA. The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, is
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a
marriage was celebrated between Reyes and AAA on May 15, 1969, and it should be accorded the
full faith and credence given to public documents. 22 As correctly pointed out by the CA, their
marriage is deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Hence, Reyes is obliged to
support his wife, AAA, the amount of which shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
said petitioner and to the needs of the latter. 23 ETHIDa
Reyes will not be exonerated even assuming that his marriage is declared void ab initio by
the court. R.A. No. 9262 defines and criminalizes violence against women and their children
perpetrated by the woman's husband, former husband or any person against whom the woman has
or had a sexual or dating relationship with, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or likely
to result in, inter alia, economic abuse or psychological harm or suffering. Thus, the offender need not
be related or connected to the victim by marriage or former marriage, as he could be someone who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship only or has a common child with the victim. In the case at
bench, it is undisputed that AAA had borne Reyes four children out of their relationship.
The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly indicted, Reyes can also be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse against AAA.
Section 5 (e), par. 2 identifies the act or acts that constitute the violence of economic abuse, the
pertinent portions of which states:
(e)  Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by
force or threat of force, physically or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)  Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
children of financial support legally due her or her family, x x x;
(3)  Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right;
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, criminal liability for violation of Section 5 (e) of R.A. No. 9262 attaches when the
accused deprives the woman of financial support which she is legally entitled to. Deprivation or denial
of support, by itself, is already specifically penalized therein. 24
Here, we note that Reyes, although gainfully employed after June 2005, deliberately refused
to provide financial support to AAA. According to Reyes, he stopped giving monetary support to AAA
because she filed a Bigamy case against him. The Court finds his excuse unacceptable and will not
at all exculpate him from criminal liability under the VAWC. It is noteworthy that AAA charged Reyes
with Bigamy not merely to torment or harass him but to enforce her right and protect her interest as
petitioner's legal wife considering that he contracted a second marriage with one Marilou Osias
Ramboanga during the subsistence of his marriage with AAA. Evidently, the denial of financial
support is designed to subjugate AAA's will and control her conduct, either to pressure her to
withdraw said criminal case for Bigamy or dissuade her from pursuing it, or at least, to discourage her
from filing additional cases against him.
There is nothing in the definition nor in the enumeration of the acts constituting psychological
violence and economic abuse that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse Reyes as what conducts
are penalized under the VAWC. They are worded with sufficient definiteness and clarity that persons
of ordinary intelligence can understand what act is prohibited, and need not guess as to its meaning
nor differ in its application. The express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature
for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true
intent, meaning and spirit — to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and children. 25
Lastly, the Court finds that Reyes should be compelled to comply with the directive under the
TPO pertaining to the resumption of providing monthly financial support to AAA. It bears stressing
that not an iota of evidence was adduced by him to show that he is no longer employed and/or he
failed to obtain another gainful employment and/or that he has no resources or means to provide the
same.
Having ascertain the guilt of Reyes for violation of Section 5 (i), We shall now proceed to
determine the appropriate penalty.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9262 provides:
Section 6.  Penalties. — The crime of violence against women and their
children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following
rules: cSEDTC
xxx xxx xxx
(f)  Acts failing under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be
punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed
in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of
penalty prescribed in this section. In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall
(a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000,00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b)
undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall
report compliance to the court.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, or anywhere from six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, while the maximum term shall be that which could be
properly imposed under the law, which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime. 26 This Court deems it proper to impose on petitioner Reyes the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
Also, petitioner Reyes is DIRECTED to PAY a fine in the sum of P200,000.00. He is also
required to submit himself to a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment, and to
report his compliance therewith to the court of origin.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 23,
2017 in CA-G.R. CR No. 38609 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
(1)  Petitioner Esteban Donato Reyes is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation
of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262 and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
 (2)  Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY a fine equivalent to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00); and
(3)  Further, petitioner is DIRECTED to UNDERGO a mandatory psychological counselling or
psychiatric treatment, and to report his compliance therewith to the court of origin within fifteen (15)
days after the completion of such counselling or treatment.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 182835. April 20, 2010.]

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA,  petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and IRISH SAGUD,  respondents.

DECISION

ABAD,  J p:

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a
former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora,
Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and
reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his
mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former
girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body
of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is
depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing
substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said
Irish Sagud. 1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused
Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they
became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with
him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to
elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the
proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish
changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text
messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301
and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her
alone. aCHcIE
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service
(MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish's face superimposed on the figure
(Exhibit A). 2 The sender's cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took
when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B). 3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that
it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread
the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text
messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa
lahat ng chatter." 4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under
police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the
picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy.
Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish
but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police
station, he shouted at Irish:  "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an
expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for
one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in
another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the
face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the
face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was
fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales
explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony
Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October
2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended,
Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that
time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess
Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police
officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the
police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her
identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender's number
and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the
obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it
was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a
woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7). 5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan's wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.
Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained
them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the
woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further,
the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the
woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
 After trial, the RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting
the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of
violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her
testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience." 6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the
violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan's appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a decision dated
January 31, 2008, 8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan's motion for reconsideration
in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on  certiorari. AHSaTI
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone
message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term
is defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this
case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in
violation of his constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case.
The Court's Rulings
Section 3 (a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a
person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include
any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman.
Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
 distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment are: 
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused
Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3 (e) provides that a "dating relationship"
includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a
business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the
offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He
cites Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or
informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb,  i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in
"He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that
implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman.
Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple's relationship,  i.e., "a love affair." 9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women . . . refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a woman . . . with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating
relationship. Indeed, Section 3 (e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3 (f) defines
"sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even
without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. AaSIET
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off"
variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a
continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from
October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust
and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their
taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up
during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times,
when she could not reply to Rustan's messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she
characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous. 10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be
considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a
very dangerous precedent. But Section 3 (a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that
constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today's women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that
her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or
psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that
she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not
impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is
doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan's wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except
Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2
to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not
have time to delete them. 11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the
memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have
been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no
reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see
anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan's
low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today's youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here,
the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and face, was clearly
an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is
not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture.
What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it
in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him
without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact
is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the
police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to
prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900
cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish's testimony that she
received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender's cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to
come to Lorentess Resort and he did. 12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the
confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages. TIaCcD
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. 13 His defense
was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish
and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the
cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same.
The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most
unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes
an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit
A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed
to have already waived such ground for objection. 14
 Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings. 15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMSthe decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 212448. January 11, 2018.]

AAA, * petitioner, vs. BBB, * respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM,  J p:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 1 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against Women and
their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship
occurred or is occurring outside the country? HTcADC
The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition 2 for the issuance of a
writ of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24,
2014 3 and May 2, 2014 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal
Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the Information 5 which
charged respondent BBB under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as follows:
On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [BBB], being then legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA]
mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with a certain Lisel Mok
as confirmed by his photograph with his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her
children and the e-mailed letter by his mother mentioning about the said relationship,
to the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the aforecited law.
Contrary to law.
We briefly recount the antecedents.
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union
produced two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009. 6
In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent
resident status in September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon
City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until
March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City. 7
AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial
support, and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional
jobs to augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse,
BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB
had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids. 8 As can be
gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the
investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional
anguish through his alleged marital infidelity. 9
The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also
able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest.
Consequently, the case was archived. 10
On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused with Omnibus
Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest 11 was
filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby
dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:
Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable
cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime charged,
considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts complained of him
had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since the Court enjoys no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is not convinced by the prosecution's argument that since [AAA]
has been suffering from mental and emotional anguish "wherever she goes,"
jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court notwithstanding that the acts
resulting in said suffering had happened outside of the Philippines. To the mind of the
Court, with it noting that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score considering
that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act itself which had caused a
woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred within the territorial
limits of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the
use of the emphatic word "causing" in the provisions of Section 5 (i), above, which
denotes the bringing about or into existence of something. Hence, the mental or
emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been brought about or into
existence by a criminal act which must logically have occurred within the territorial
limits of the Court for jurisdiction over the offense to attach to it. To rule otherwise
would violate or render nugatory one of the basic characteristics of our criminal laws
— territoriality.
In the listing provided in the law itself — "repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of (sic) access to
the woman's child/children" — it becomes clear that there must be an act which
causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation," and it is such
act which partakes of a criminal nature. Here, such act was the alleged maintenance
of "an illicit relationship with a certain Liesel Mok" — which has been conceded to
have been committed in Singapore. aScITE
Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written,
quashal of the Information must still be ordered following the underlying fundamental
principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of [BBB]. At best, the Court draws
 the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the
law. 12 (Emphasis in the original)
Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
case, AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA
posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless
law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women have been given
license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any consequence, as long as they are carried
out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the
offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in
Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides
can take cognizance of the case.
In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides:
Sec. 7. Venue. — The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women
and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis ours)
As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order, AAA directs us
to:
Section 4. Construction. — This Act shall be liberally construed to promote
the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
In his Comment 13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to
quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the
private offended party; and that this petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought
before this Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the
People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that the petition was belatedly filed.
We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should entertain the petition.
It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that the instant petition
was belatedly filed. The date erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for
Extension 14 was filed — June 2, 2014 — refers to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court
and not the date when the said motion was lodged before this Court. The motion was in fact filed on
May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the Rules of Court to file the intended
petition. Thus, considering the timeliness of the motion, this Court in a Resolution 15 dated June 9,
2014, granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014 to file a petition for
review.
In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG's
response to her Letter 16 dated May 26, 2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was
unresponsive to her plea for assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in
her own name before the lapse of the extension given her by this Court or on June 25, 2014.
We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by
entertaining the petition if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v.
People of the Philippines, et al., 17 where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a
question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG's participation, we
recalled the instances when the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the
intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest of substantial justice so requires. 18
Morillo, 19 also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a
reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that
 the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either
because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form
and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not
correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has
presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court
dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in
reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution
fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal,
inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before
the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the
defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of
competent jurisdiction. 20 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original) HEITAD
The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in
limited instances may only be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing
grave abuse of discretion lest the accused would be twice placed in jeopardy. 21
Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved." 22 "There is a question of law when the
issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth
or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter." 23
Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is a question of law. Thus, in Morillo, 24 the Court reiterated that:
[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or
Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its
commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed
therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court
under Rule 45. 25 (Citations omitted)
We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against
BBB, much less weigh the evidence, especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown
trial on the merits. The issue for resolution concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence
on a given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial
jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed
through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.
The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as
yet no jurisprudence on this score, prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its
earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in the case. 26 Calling the attention of
Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law, 27 the RTC furnished copies of the
assailed order to the House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate through the Committee on
Youth, Women and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and Human Rights. 28
The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present economic reality
that a great number of Filipino families have at least one parent working overseas. In April to
September 2016, the number of overseas Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2
million, 97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas contract workers or those with existing
work contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas without contract. 29 It is thus necessary to clarify
how R.A. No. 9262 should be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case of
psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is allegedly caused by marital infidelity
carried on abroad.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly
forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common." 30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9262 made it a point to encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that
may be committed against women and their children:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to: ATICcS
xxx xxx xxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which
the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or
to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No.
9262 is crucial. In Dinamling v. People, 31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the
elements of psychological violence under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:
 Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5 (i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No.
9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is
a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional
anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts
or omissions.
xxx xxx xxx
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of
psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children.
Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.
xxx xxx xxx
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like
the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence
is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish
is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show
proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such
acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. x x
x. 32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) TIADCc
Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital
infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.
Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence
may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of
reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the
wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense.
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Treñas v. People, 33 the Court explained
that:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
 rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 34 (Emphasis in the original)
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed
out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological violence as the means employed
by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the
element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or
emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for
estafa, viz.:
The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses
employed by the accused, as shown in the vouchers, might have been perpetrated in
Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong
where the damage was consummated. Deceit and damage are the basic elements of
estafa.
The estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or continuing
offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person
charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is
in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material
and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province
and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it
being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the
others x x x[.] 35
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts
of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes;
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in
one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the
crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where
the offense was in part committed. 36
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3 (a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is
filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present scenario,
the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of
2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband,
and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains
imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is simply whether
or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the
Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extramarital
affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does
not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine
courts. AIDSTE
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February
24, 2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No.
146468 are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is
ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 247429. September 8, 2020.]

JAIME ARAZA y JARUPAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, C.J  p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Jaime Araza y Jarupay (Araza),
praying for the reversal of the December 17, 2018 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 40718 and its May 10, 2019 Resolution, 2 which affirmed the October 30, 2017 Decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 15-1287, finding
petitioner guilty of violating Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004.
Antecedents
The Information filed against Araza reads:
That on or about the month of September 2007, prior and subsequent
thereto, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to humiliate and degrade his
lawful wife AAA, 4 did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts
of psychological abuse upon his wife by then and there committing acts of marital
infidelity by having an affair with his paramour Tessie Luy Fabillar and begetting three
illegitimate children with his paramour thus causing [his] wife emotional anguish and
mental suffering.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
When arraigned, Araza pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: 1) private complainant AAA; 2) Armando
Que (Que); and 3) Dr. Kristina Ruth Lindain (Dr. Lindain).
As culled from the records of the RTC, the prosecution elicited the following:
 [AAA] testified that she and [Araza] were married on October 5, 1989 at
Malate Catholic Church. Initially and at the onset of their marriage[,] her husband
[Araza] was hardworking, loving and faithful. She had no marital issues with [Araza]
until x x x [he] went to Zamboanga City in February 2007[,] for their networking
business. [Araza] was formerly working as an Overseas Filipino Worker but decided
to stop in 1993 to join [AAA] in her business.
It was at this point that she began to notice [Araza's] change in behavior.
Allegedly, he would act x x x depressed and would cry. He always appeared
absent[-]minded. She was concerned and would ask [him about it] but [he] would just
stay quiet, [and] x x x stare at her[,] full of anxiety.
One day, she received a text message from a certain Edna and Mary Ann
who told her that her husband x x x is having an affair with their best friend. At first,
she did not believe them. However, that information brought [AAA] to Zamboanga to
see for her herself whether [it] is true. Indeed[,] on September 3, 2007[,] she was able
to confirm that her husband was living with another woman[,] a certain Tessie Luy
Fabillar [Fabillar].
She instituted a complaint against [her husband Araza] x x x and his alleged
mistress, [for Concubinage,] at the Philippine National Police. The case was
subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed an Agreement whereby
[Araza] and [Fabillar] committed themselves never to see each other again.
After the case was settled x x x, [Araza again] lived with [AAA] x x x.
However, [it] x x x was only for a short time. Without saying a word, [Araza] left [AAA]
on November 22, 2007. She was looking for [Araza] and out of desperation[,] she
sought the help of the NBI to search for [him]. To her surprise, [Araza] had returned
to live with his mistress again.
In the days to come, she would receive text messages from her husband's
supposed mistress using various numbers. The messages would tell her that [Araza]
is sick and needed money for medicines. There was also another text message
threatening her that she will kill [AAA's] husband. Because of this, sometime in 2013,
she sought a law firm who issued a letter addressed to [Fabillar,] demanding for the
release of [Araza].
[AAA] was emotionally depressed and anxious of her husband's condition.
She believed that [Araza's] liberty was being restrained by [Fabillar]. She was
determined to bring her husband home. Thus, [i]n May 2014[,] she went to
Zamboanga to search for [Araza]. She looked for him from one [b]arangay to another;
she would ask help from [p]olice [s]tations giving out pictures of her husband. She
would promise a reward to those who are able to locate [Araza]. She was desperate
looking for [him] and she fell ill and [was] confined in a hospital.
Thereupon, thinking that [Fabillar] was restraining the liberty of [Araza], she
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the [CA,] Manila[,] on June 20, 2014. The
[CA] deputized a [National Bureau of Investigation] NBI agent to conduct a thorough
investigation on [Araza] and [Fabillar].
[Based on the investigation, Araza] left their conjugal abode on his own
volition and he has been living with his mistress[,] as husband and wife. As a matter
of fact, three children were born out of their cohabitation. Hence, the petition
for habeas corpus was dismissed.
The truth cause[d] AAA emotional and psychological suffering. She was
suffering from insomnia and asthma. Allegedly, she is still hurting and crying[.] [S]he
could not believe x x x what had happened in their marriage as they were living
harmoniously as husband and wife.
 At present[,] she is [taking] x x x anti-depressant and sleeping pills to cope
with her severe emotional and psychological turmoil brought about by [Araza's]
marital infidelity and having children with his mistress.
She claimed she had spent a large amount of money to search for her
husband[,] [which] includes the filing of several cases.
Armando Que, a friend of AAA and x x x [Araza], x x x testified that he is a
member of Boardwalk, a direct selling and networking business. Allegedly, he met
AAA and [Araza] for the first time in 2001 in this Boardwalk business. He alleged that
while he was recruiting and selling items of Boardwalk in Zamboanga, he frequently
saw [Araza] and [Fabillar] together[,] [and] holding hands.
Allegedly, he kept that information to himself because he knew once AAA
would know about it[,] there would be trouble in their relationship.
After the reception of prosecution evidence, they formally offered their
exhibits, which were all admitted by the court[,] but only as part of the testimonies of
witnesses who testified thereon. 6
xxx xxx xxx
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Dr. Lindain as expert witness, who testified:
[S]he met x x x AAA for the first time on September 9, 2016 when she was
referred to her by the Women's Desk of the PGH[,] in relation to her filing of
a VAWC complaint against her husband[,] [Araza].
Allegedly, she saw AAA on September 9, x x x 22, and x x x 29, 2016[,] on
an hour per session. Based on her assessment and expert opinion, the symptoms
AAA was having was like the depressed mood; her occasional difficulty in sleeping
are secondary to the relational distress with [Araza]. It was [her] wanting to be with
[her] husband that was causing those symptoms. However, [Dr. Lindain] clarified that
the manifestations exhibited by [AAA] are not sufficient to be considered as a
psychiatric disorder. She advised AAA to undergo counsel[l]ing or psychotherapy[,] in
order to help her accept [her] situation x x x. 7
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented Araza as it sole witness. According to Araza:
[H]e and AAA were married in 1989. He averred that he was a former taxi
driver and an [Overseas Filipino Worker] OFW for [two] years. When he stopped
being an OFW, he went back to being a taxi driver. [O]n the other hand[,] [AAA] was
into buy and sell of Boardwalk. In order to extend help to his wife AAA, he helped in
the recruitment of Boardwalk dealers to the extent of even going to various provinces.
He recalls that initially, their marriage was going smoothly[,] but when AAA
started earning money, her behavior changed. He revealed that he did not earn
anything from recruiting agents who worked under AAA. All the commissions went to
AAA['s] account.
He disclosed that when he was in Cagayan de Oro to recruit agents for their
business, AAA had told him that his sister had a stroke. He was allegedly dismayed
when his wife did not even offer any help as she claimed she has nothing to spare.
He felt hurt about it and sadly, his sister died.
He testified that since 2007[,] his relationship with his wife has gone sour.
Oftentimes, she would believe rumors and accuse him of being a womanizer.
He denied having an affair with x x x Fabillar[,] who was acting as his guide
in his recruiting activities in Zamboanga. He revealed that when AAA went to
Zamboanga, she filed a complaint against him at the Women's Desk. He was
 arrested as a consequence and was forced to sign an agreement. He returned to
Manila with his wife hoping that she would change her ways towards him[,] but she
[did not].
About a month, he sought a friend['s] help [for him to secure] a plane ticket
[bound] to Zamboanga. He left his wife because he could no longer stand [her]
attitude towards him. He also denied fathering children with x x x Fabillar. 9
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated October 30, 2017, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime of
violence against women under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 were satisfied. Araza and AAA were
married, as required by the first element. The prosecution was able to establish through testimonial
and documentary evidence that Araza was the perpetrator of the mental and emotional anguish
suffered by AAA. 10 Araza left their conjugal abode and chose to live with his mistress; and he
reneged his promise to stop seeing his mistress, contrary to the written agreement between him and
his mistress. AAA's psychological and emotional sufferings due to the said ordeals can also be
gleaned from Dr. Lindain's testimony, who was presented as an expert witness. 11
With regard to AAA's testimony, the RTC is convinced by her sincerity and candor. 12 Her
testimony was able to show that due to Araza's acts of infidelity, she suffered emotional and
psychological harm. 13 Since there are no facts and/or circumstances from which it could be
reasonably inferred that AAA falsely testified or was actuated by improper motives, her testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit. 14
On the other hand, Araza only offered the defense of denial, which cannot be given greater
weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this court finds accused JAIME
ARAZA y JARUPAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 5(i)
of Republic Act 9262 and hereby imposes an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
for SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as its
minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as its
maximum.
In addition to imprisonment[,] accused shall pay a FINE in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P100,000.00] and to indemnify the private
complainant moral damages in the amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
[P25,000.00].
The period during which accused has remained under detention shall be
credited to him in full[,] provided that[,] he complies with the terms and conditions of
the City Jail.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the prosecution, the private
complainant, the accused[,] as well as his counsel for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED. 15
Aggrieved, Araza appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA denied Araza's appeal, and motion for reconsideration, in toto. The appellate court
echoed the RTC's factual findings and conclusions. The CA found that the prosecution sufficiently
established the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262, and as alleged in
the Information filed against Araza. Psychological violence as an element of the crime, and the
mental and emotional anguish she suffered, were proven through the testimonies of AAA and Dr.
Lindain. The defense of denial of Araza, which were not supported by clear and convincing evidence,
cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim. 16
 The CA concluded that R.A. No. 9262 does not criminalize acts such as the marital
infidelity per se, but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. 17
Araza filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its May 10, 2019
Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming Araza's conviction for violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A.
No. 9262 although his conviction was based on facts not alleged in the Information.
2. Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Araza's conviction for violation of Section 5 (i)
of R.A. No. 9262 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the acts allegedly committed by Araza.
3. Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Araza's conviction for violation of Section 5 (i)
of R.A. No. 9262, considering that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that AAA suffered mental and emotional anguish and Araza's act was the
proximate cause thereof.
Our Ruling
The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
The elements of violation of
Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 were
sufficiently alleged in the
Information.
Araza argued that nothing in the Information mentioned his alleged abandonment of the
conjugal home, and his pretenses that he was forcefully detained, specifically caused AAA's
emotional anguish and mental suffering. For this reason, he cannot be convicted based on these
acts, which were not part of the charge against him. 18
In Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 19 an Information is sufficient if it accurately and clearly
alleges all the elements of the crime charged, to wit:
The issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in
order to meet the standard of sufficiency has long been settled. It is fundamental that
every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the information.
No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court requires, inter alia, that the information must state the acts or omissions
so complained of as constitutive of the offense. Recently, this Court emphasized
that the test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense
is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will
establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. In
this examination, matters aliunde are not considered. The law essentially requires
this to enable the accused suitably to prepare his defense, as he is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
This is in consonance with the fundamental right of an accused to be informed of the "nature
and cause of accusation." 21
In order to determine the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information, Section 5
(i) of R.A. No. 9262 must be referred to, being the law defining the offense charged in this case.
Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 9262, in relation to Section 5 (i), provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
 C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions, causing or likely to cause
mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or
visitation of common children.
On the other hand, Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 penalizes some forms of psychological
violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children through the following acts:
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman
or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's
child/children. (Emphasis supplied)
In Dinamling v. People, 22 the elements of violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 are
enumerated:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman
with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or
children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the children or similar acts or omissions.
To determine whether the elements of violation of Section 5 (i) were sufficiently alleged, the
accusatory portion of the Information is reproduced below:
That on or about the month of September 2007, prior and subsequent
thereto, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to humiliate and degrade his
lawful wife AAA, did then and there  willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of psychological abuse upon his wife by then and there committing acts
of marital infidelity  by having an affair with his paramour Tessie Luy Fabillar  and
begetting three illegitimate children with his paramour thus causing [his] wife
emotional anguish and mental suffering.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 23
Araza is correct that he cannot be convicted based on acts of abandonment of the conjugal
home, and pretenses that he was forcefully detained. These were not alleged in the Information.
However, there were other acts alleged in the Information that caused emotional anguish and mental
suffering on AAA.
In this case, the Court finds that the Information contains the recital of facts necessary to
constitute the crime charged. It clearly stated that: (1) The offended party AAA, is the wife of offender
Araza; (2) AAA sustained emotional anguish and mental suffering; and (3) such anguish and suffering
is inflicted by Araza when he had an extramarital affair with Fabillar and had three illegitimate children
with her.
The CA was correct in ruling that
Araza committed psychological
violence upon his wife AAA by
committing marital infidelity,
which caused AAA to suffer
emotional anguish and mental
suffering.
Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No.
9262. 24 Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are
personal to the complainant. 25 Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party. 26 The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the
psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and
mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only
requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to
this party. 27
In order to establish psychological violence, proof of the commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar of such acts, is necessary.
The prosecution has established Araza's guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he
committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA's testimony was
strong and credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another woman:
Q: You also mentioned in your complaint affidavit that in September 2007 there was
some sort of an agreement entered into by you[,] the complainant and your
complainant's alleged mistress, do you confirm that?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
Q: What was the agreement all about?
WITNESS
A: I went to Zamboanga when I learned that my husband has a live[-]in relationship
with one Tessie Fabillar. I went to the police station to ask for assistance. I had
them arrested and I had them sign a document saying that they will stay apart
from each other.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL MACASAET
Q: What happened to that agreement Madam Witness?
WITNESS
A: He stayed in my house for a short period only and then after November 22, 2007 he
fled without asking for my permission.
Q: Do you know where he went?
A: I'm aware that he went to his mistress.
Q: How did you know that he went to his mistress?
A: Because my colleagues in the office told me.
Q: Were you able to confirm that he went to his mistress?
A: Yes[,] sir, because I went to Zamboanga[,] I secured NBI assistance to
investigate on my husband and we discovered that he had a mistress.
Q: Who was that mistress as discovered by the National Bureau of Investigation?
A: Tessie Luy Fabillar, sir. 28
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When did you discover that indeed your husband is living with another
woman?
A: When I went back to Zamboanga last December and the police caught Jaime
Araza and Tessie Luy Fabillar living in one house.
Q: Were you able to see them living in that house?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: You were also saying that there was a policeman, what did the policeman do?
A: They just brought Tessie Luy Fabillar and Jaime Araza to the police and sign an
agreement that they be separated and no more relationship will be made.
Q: Were you able to confirm the relationship of your husband from himself?
A: Yes, Your Honor. 29
On the part of Araza, he admitted that he deserted AAA in order to live with Fabillar:
Q: Was there a time that you lived with Tessie Fabillar?
A: Yes[,] sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Nagsama kayo sa iisang bubong ni [Fabillar]?
A: Yes, I stayed in her place.
Q: In the house of [Fabillar]?
A: Yes[,] sir.
Q: You are in one room?
A: In one house, your [H]onor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: For how long did you stay with [Fabillar] and in her house?
A: Now, I'm staying with her, your [H]onor.
COURT
Continue.
FISCAL MACASAET
Q: When did you start living in the same house with [Fabillar]?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS
A: For 1 year only.
Q: Are you sure Mr. Witness for one year only?
A: Yes[,] sir.
FISCAL MACASAET
I have to warn you Mr. Witness if you are lying you can be . . .
COURT
 Naiintindihan po ba ninyo ang sabi ni Fiscal kung ikaw ay nagsisinungaling
mananagot ka sa batas.
Q: I'm giving you a chance, how long have you been living with [Fabillar] under
one roof.
A: Since 2008, sir. 30
Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA's
emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was adversely
affected.
The RTC ruled:
Logic and experience dictate that any woman who goes through that kind of
ordeal would suffer psychologically and emotionally as a consequence. The
prosecution was able to prove this in the case of AAA as can be gleaned from the
testimony of Dr. Kristina Ruth B. Lindain who was presented as an expert witness. 31
On the other hand, the CA held:
In addition to [Araza's] marital infidelity[,] [i]t was the thought that her
husband was being detained, sick and ailing, and in the danger of being killed if she
will not send money that caused [AAA's] emotional and psychological turmoil that
drove her to the brink of despair. [AAA] became so depressed that she had to be
hospitalized. 32
In the RTC Decision, and as affirmed by the CA, these acts were in accord with the
Information to have caused emotional and mental anguish on AAA:
No doubt that the prosecution has successfully established that [Araza]
left his wife AAA and decided to stay in Zamboanga City where he maintained
an illicit affair with x x x Fabillar during the subsistence of their marriage. The
record is brimming with evidence that [Araza] intentionally left AAA groping in the
dark. Without any explanation or mature conversation with his wife, x x x [Araza]
simply left his wife causing the latter emotional and psychological distress. 33
First, the prosecution was able to prove the case of AAA, as can be gleaned from the
testimony of Dr. Lindain, who was presented as an expert witness:
COURT
Q: In other words[,] doctor[,] it cannot be denied that the separation and the non-
providing of support from the accused has exposed the private complainant to
emotional suffering, is this correct?
WITNESS
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And you were saying that at that time when you conducted the psychiatric
evaluation of the patient, it is possible that in the past after the separation of
the private complainant with [Araza,] that was the time that she suffered the
most and the possibility that she had suffered the anxiety and depression, is
this correct?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So, just because she could not accept that the accused can no longer be with her
and stay with her she then suffered anxiety and insomnia?
A: It's part of it[,] but it's not solely.
 Q: What other factors could have triggered those manifestations of psychological or
psychiatric problem?
A: Well, separation po, even that they have been together from 1989 to 2007[,] it's been
a marriage wherein there's a commitment, the fact that he was not
there nawala siya counted as a loss so, the actual loss can actually perpetrate
symptoms of depression, anxiety so na-test yung reaction it's a contegration
but the actual loss of him not being there anymore can trigger the symptom. 34
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Just the sole act of leaving a spouse, can you already qualify that as psychological
or emotional abuse?
A: In my opinion, yes.
Q: Why so?
A: During the separation there was no understanding of what had actually happened
and from her story that per 2007 until 2013[,] she was making an effort to
actually find the husband and she was worried what was happening to the
husband, it is enough to be the cause of emotional and psychological
abuse. 35
Second, AAA narrated how she received several information about Araza's affair with
Fabillar; how she was able to confirm the affair herself which led to the filing of the complaint for
concubinage; and despite the complaint being settled and that both Araza and Fabillar agreed to stop
living together, Araza repeated his affair with Fabillar. 36
AAA's testimony that she suffered mental and emotional anguish due to Araza's acts, was
categorical and straightforward, to wit:
Q: In this letter Madam Witness, [Fabillar] was asked to release your husband from her
custody and to send your husband to you, what was the result of this letter, if
you know?
A: The case was not given due course because the truth is, my husband was living with
x x x Fabillar.
Q: Was your husband returned to you by x x x Fabillar?
A: No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was the effect of your husband's unfaithfulness to you?
A: I became so depressed until now, I was always hospitalized.
Q: What was your proof that you were hospitalized?
A: I have a medical certificate from Perpetual Help.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And if you see those medical records, will you be able to identify them?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I'm showing you [these] documents marked as Exhibits "E" up to "E-6", will you
please look at them and tell us if those are the medical records that you are
referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
FISCAL MACASAET
 Your Honor, just for the record the witness identified Exhibits "E" up to "E-6".
Q: Now in filing this complaint against your husband, what do you wish to attain?
WITNESS
A: He must be put in jail so that he knows that he is really, he had done something
wrong to me because I love him so much but then he has different attitudes
and he has a different answer against me. I want to put him in jail that's all.
FISCAL MACASAET
We want to make it on record Your Honor, that the witness is crying.
Q: What if he . . .
A: The main purpose of mine today is to put him in jail.
Q: That's all?
A: After the case I will also present the case against Tessie Luy Fabillar so that both of
them will be put in jail. 37
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And you said that your husband came back and live with you again as husband and
wife?
A: Only for two (2) months.
Q: And then after two (2) months?
A: He went back to x x x Fabillar.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And this time when your husband left you to live with her mistress once more, how
did you feel about this?
A: Until now I am depressed, I can't forget my husband.
Q: So, you want to impress upon this court that you still love your husband?
A: Yes of course, but then a punishment should be made.
Q: Have you forgiven your husband about this?
A: I'm still hurt. 38
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said in your affidavit in no. 28 of that document Madam Witness, Jaime is
engaging in conduct that causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to you, can you please tell us what do you mean by that?
A: First of all[,] when my husband left me[,] I didn't eat, I didn't sleep until 2013 when I
found out that he's still alive[,] then that's the time I changed my mind so I tried
my health to be better so that I can move to another case.
Q: Isn't it that the matter that you told us is just an effect of love being unreturned and
not because of what Jaime intentionally did to you?
A: No, it's not, ma'am.
Q: You considered those things as the effect of actions of Jaime, not loving you back?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And what you wanted now to do is that you filed this case so that he will love you
back?
 A: I think no more because until now I know he doesn't love me anymore because he
wants to stay with another woman so, I want him to be punished so that he will
know how it feels to be hurt, both of them. 39
Third, while Araza denied that he committed marital infidelity against AAA, he would later on
admit that that he left his wife AAA to live with Fabillar, and that he was fully aware that AAA suffered
emotionally and psychologically because of his decision:
[ATTY. SOMERA]
Q: After a month more or less[,] where did you go?
A: When I couldn't take her behavior anymore, I called my friend who's in Zamboanga,
ma'am.
Q: And what did you ask this friend[,] if there be any?
A: I asked the help of my friend for him to secure a plane ticket for me because I was
intending to go back and work in Zamboanga. 40
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You decided to finally leave your wife in 2007 because you cannot stand her
character anymore, is that correct?
A: Yes[,] sir.
Q: And you know very well that your separation from her is affecting her
emotionally and psychologically, is that correct? You know that?
COURT
Please answer the question.
A: Yes[,] sir.
Q: And despite knowing that your wife is suffering emotionally and
psychologically because of your decision to leave [her] you still choose
to stay [away] from her, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Was there a time that you lived with Tessie Fabillar?
A: Yes[,] sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
Q: I'm giving you a chance, how long have you been living with [Fabillar] under one
roof.
A: Since 2008, sir. 41
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And it is correct to say based on this document that you and [Fabillar] agreed not to
live [together] anymore, is that correct?
COURT
Please don't nod.
Q: What's the answer?
A: Yes, sir[.]
 Q: And yet after signing that agreement you and [Fabillar] lived together under one
roof, is that correct?
A: Yes[,] sir[.] 42
The RTC was convinced by the sincerity and truthfulness of AAA's testimony. AAA, who only
intended to bring justice to what happened to her, was able to testify and to show through her
testimony that due to Araza's act of infidelity and failure to stay true to his promise, she suffered
emotional and psychological harm.
This Court will not disturb the findings of the RTC and as affirmed by the CA, as regards
AAA's credibility as a witness. The RTC is in a better position to observe her candor and behavior on
the witness stand. Its assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 43
Araza can only offer the defense of denial. The defense of denial is inherently weak and
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the
accused committed the crime. 44 Denial, being a self-serving negative defense, cannot be given
greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 45
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that Araza committed the crime of
psychological violence, through his acts of marital infidelity, which caused mental or emotional
suffering on the part of AAA.
Having ascertained the guilt of Araza for violation of Section 5 (i), We shall now proceed to
determine the appropriate penalty.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9262 provides:
SECTION 6. Penalties. — The crime of violence against women and their
children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished
by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed
in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of
penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount
of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological
counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional, in any of its period
which is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, while the maximum term shall be which
could be properly imposed under the law, which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
the crime. 46 This Court deems it proper to impose on petitioner Araza, the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
Also, petitioner Araza is DIRECTED TO PAY a fine in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), and moral damages in the amount of TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of the petitioner to
show any reversible error in the assailed CA Decision. The assailed Decision dated December 17,
2018 and the Resolution dated May 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40718 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
 1. Petitioner Jaime Araza y Jarupay is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation
of Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262 and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum;
2. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY a fine equivalent to One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), and moral damages in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00); and
3. Further, petitioner is DIRECTED to UNDERGO a mandatory psychological counselling or
psychiatric treatment, and to REPORT his compliance therewith to the court of origin
within fifteen (15) days after the completion of such counselling or treatment.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 166441. October 8, 2014.]

NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,  respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J  p:

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape
and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of
lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the
female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without
proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.
The Case
This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004, 1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union (RTC), and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of  prision
mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay moral damages of P20,000.00 to AAA, 2 the victim.
Antecedents
The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving
different victims. At arraignment, he pleaded not guilty  to the respective informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 2388
Attempted Rape
 That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the
morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of
Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by
means of force and intimidation commenced the commission of rape directly by overt
acts, to wit: While private complainant AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15)
years old, was sleeping inside the tent along Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused
remove her panty and underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching
her vagina and breast with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force,
and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of
the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said
offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the
damage and prejudice of said offended party. ADSIaT
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Criminal Case No. 2389
Acts of Lasciviousness
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o'clock in the
morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of
Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously touch the vagina of [BBB] 4 against the latter's will and with
no other purpose but to satisfy his lascivious desire to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 DHSEcI
Version of the Prosecution
The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows: 6
. . . [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged
in the selling of plastic wares and glass wares in different municipalities around the
country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help
them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta.
From Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB
boarded a passenger jeepney owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied
by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the name of "Jess".
Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December
20, 1993, they parked in front of Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the goods
and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep.
Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning, AAA and BBB
went to sleep. Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that
somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her
private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally
naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she'll be killed. AAA tried to push
Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She
fought back and kicked Norberto twice. TCDHaE
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money
and told her not to tell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went
out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to wake him up.
 Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto
touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands were
shaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that
early morning. Later still, while they were on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB
asked the people around where they can find the municipal building. An old woman
pointed to them the place.
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the
municipal hall where they met a policeman by the name of "Sabas". They told Sabas
the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the police
station where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto's wife, Belinda,
arrived at the police station, an argument ensued between them.
On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o'clock in the morning, the police
investigator ordered the complainants to return at 6:00 o'clock in the morning. Norberto
and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and BBB home with them and worked for them
until December 30, 1994, after which they were sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their
respective sworn statements against Norberto.
Version of the Defense
The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the assailed
decision of the CA, 7 as follows:
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different
version of the story. The accused maintains that it was not possible for him to commit
the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the alleged incident, there were many
people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering the location of
the tents, which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do the
dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would
scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the
reason why the complainants filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose
of extorting money from him.
Judgment of the RTC
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and
acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 2389, 8 to wit:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment
declaring the accused NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as
defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code respectively.
With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences
the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS
PRISION MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law and to
pay the victim AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.
With regard to the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR
(4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory penalties
 provided for by law, and to pay the victim BBB the amount of P10,000.00 as moral
damages. cDCaHA
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two
cases is counted in his favor.
SO ORDERED. 9
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted
rape despite the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not
testify.
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness charged in
Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the insufficiency of the evidence, 10 holding thusly:
In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and
inconsequential as to dent, even slightly, the overall integrity and probative value of the
prosecution's evidence insofar as AAA is concerned.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted
felony is the "penalty lower by two (2) degrees" prescribed by law for the consummated
felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it had been consummated would have
been reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua is prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
shall be the medium period of  prision mayor in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed for the offense which in this case is  prision correccional in
any of its periods.
We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of P20,000.00
by way of moral damages against the accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral
damages may be awarded without the need of proof or pleading since it is assumed
that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so, when the victim is aged
13 to 19.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the
accused argues that there is not enough evidence to support such accusation. BBB did
not testify and neither her sworn statement was formally offered in evidence to support
the charge for acts of lasciviousness. cSaADC
In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to
substantiate the charge of acts of lasciviousness against the accused-appellant. The
basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the sworn statement of BBB to the
effect that the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her breast and
touching her private part. However, she was not presented to testify. While AAA claims
that she personally saw the accused touching the private parts of BBB, there was no
testimony to the effect that such lascivious acts were without the consent or against the
will of BBB. 11
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA's decision was not in accord with law or with
jurisprudence, particularly:
I.
 In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged
victim; and
II.
In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that
AAA still continued working for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted
rape in the early morning of December 21, 1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against her;
that he could not have undressed her without rousing her if she had gone to sleep only an hour before,
because her bra was locked at her back; that her testimony about his having been on top of her for nearly
an hour while they struggled was also inconceivable unless she either consented to his act and yielded to
his lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being the product only of her fertile imagination; that the
record does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised to penetrate her; and
that she and her mother demanded from him P80,000.00 as settlement, under threat that she would file a
case against him. 12
On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA
that cast doubt on her veracity.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious. AcDHCS
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, 13 the Court reviews only questions of law. No
review of the findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of this rule, the Court accords the
highest respect for the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from its factual findings, particularly
when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience has shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in the
best position to decide issues of credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the witnesses
and observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying under exacting
examination. As such, the contentions of the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a witness for the State
cannot be entertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that are outside the scope of this appeal.
Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the entire evidence
adduced by the Prosecution and the Defense.
Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of
whether or not the petitioner's climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they faced each other, with
him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape, the crime
for which the RTC and the CA convicted and punished him. Based on the information,  supra, he
committed such acts "with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the accused
did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his
voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of
said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party."
There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the  Revised Penal Code, when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance. In  People v. Lamahang, 14 the Court, speaking through the eminent Justice
Claro M. Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts would constitute an attempted felony, to wit:
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code
punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that,
which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator,
leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an
indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous,
is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. . . . But it is not sufficient,
for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute
 a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection,
like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which,
upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by
the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. . . . . aTEHIC
"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated,
as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot
exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts of
execution  (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their
very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons
performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without
any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of
double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an
innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by
themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts
submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce
must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is
necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to
directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This
must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to
exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts,
that is to say, that the acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit
an offense, they would be meaningless." 15
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to
determine the law on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he
was convicted of. That law was Article 335 of the  Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as
follows:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be
present. DaIAcC
xxx xxx xxx
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is
defined simply as "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,"  16 which explains
why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is
consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of
the female. 17 In  People v. Campuhan, 18 the Court has defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in
rape in the following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of
the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the  mons pubis, as in
this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their
 natural situs or location beneath the  mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch
them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface,
hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of
the  pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or  vulva  is the collective term for the female genital organs
that are visible in the perineal area, e.g.,  mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the
hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis  is the rounded eminence
that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next
layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer
convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered
with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not
have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora  is
the  labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora  must be entered for rape
to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. . . . Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching
the mons pubis  of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated
rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia  of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied] aITDAE
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita, 19 the Court clarified that the ruling in People v.
Eriñia 20 whereby the offender was declared guilty of frustrated rape  because of lack of conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, was a  stray decision for not having
been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its
frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony;  and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator's will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge
of his victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him. 21
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt
acts for purposes of the attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada: 22
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating
the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never
ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act
becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of
the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is . It is
necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step
in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended
crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense. (Bold emphasis supplied) HISAET
 In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform
all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission
of the felony  directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be
shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent
to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal
law, 23 that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held
liable for attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In
short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent
be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into
rape, 24 for, as succinctly put in  People v. Dominguez, Jr.: 25 "The gauge in determining whether the
crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse,
i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his
hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his
designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony
would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully
manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation," as Justice
Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the
intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he
been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple
seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) 26 could also be ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did
not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to
rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the
intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an
attempt to commit such felony. 27 His preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents,
with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing
his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no
direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal
Code for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no
one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator's intent really was. 28 HICSTa
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of
lasciviousness?
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
is the offender's intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this
element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. 29 Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the
"touching" of the vagina by the penis  is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is
manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the
external genitalia of the female. 30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
committed. 31
Based on Article 336 of the  Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
consummated when the following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or
lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived
of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age. 32 In that
regard,  lewd  is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that
has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. 33
The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top
of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being
competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of
lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not
directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the
position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her.
At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own
declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this
can be seen in  People v. Bugarin, 34 where the accused was charged with attempted rape through an
information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there
kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of
her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that
is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for acts of
lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the act described," and the intent
to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also
pointed out that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse." 35
Pursuant to Article 336 of the  Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of
lasciviousness, is punished with  prision correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prision
correccional  is imposed in its medium period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
penalty should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than  prision correccional which ranges
from one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3)
months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of  prision
correccional, as the maximum.
In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her
chastity by his lewdness. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission." 36 Indeed, Article 2219, (3), of the  Civil
Code  expressly recognizes the right of the victim in acts of lasciviousness to recover moral
damages. 37 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the record, decrees that P30,000.00 is
a reasonable award of moral damages. 38 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of
P20,000.00. 39 DAHaTc
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose interest
as a part of the damages in crimes and quasi-delicts. In that regard, the moral damages of P20,000.00
shall earn interest of 6% per annum  reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment. 40
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO
CRUZ  y  BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and, ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him
with the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the maximum; ORDERS him to pay moral
damages of P30,000.00 and civil indemnity of P20,000.00 to the complainant, with interest of 6%  per
annum on such awards reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 220143. June 7, 2017.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JONATHAN BAAY y

FALCO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

TIJAM,  J p:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated February 26, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
Eighteenth Division, Cebu City, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01590, which sustained accused-appellant's
conviction for the crime of Statutory Rape in a Decision 2 dated January 4, 2013 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mambusao, Capiz, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 09-0886-05.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
In an Information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz, accused-appellant was charged
with rape as follows:
That sometime in the month of July 2005 in Brgy. Bungsi, Mambusao, Capiz,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
lewd design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and have carnal knowledge of
one (AAA), a mentally (sic) retardate, against the will of the latter.
That the commission of the rape is aggravated by the fact that the private
offended party is a mentally (sic) retardate who though was then 22 years old at the
time of the incident, yet, considered and has mental faculties as that of a minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Upon arraignment on April 14, 2010, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge. 4 Trial on the merits then ensued.
The following are the events that led to the filing of the complaint and Information, as narrated
by the victim, AAA and her mother, BBB.
AAA testified that sometime in July 2005, she was drying palay when the accused-appellant
invited her to go to the forest. Upon arrival thereat, the accused-appellant pulled down her shorts and
underwear, then inserted his penis in her vagina and started a pumping motion. It lasted quite long,
after which, a white liquid came out of the penis of the accused-appellant. Thereafter, she went home.
After the incident, AAA got pregnant. 5
On cross-examination, she testified that she practiced and was coached by her mother on
what she had to say in court and to point to the accused-appellant as the one who had sex with her
but in fact, the accused-appellant did not have sex with her 6
The trial court, however, noted that as AAA's examination continued, AAA made conflicting
answers to the query as to whether or not accused-appellant had sex with her, which prompted the
court to reset the hearing to give the witness time to rest. The defense objected to the resetting,
arguing that it would give the prosecution the opportunity to coach AAA. 7
BBB testified that she came to know that her daughter was pregnant when she brought her to
Dr. Hector Flores for a medical check-up and therein, AAA told her about the rape incident in the
forest. BBB also brought AAA to Dra. Leah Florence Adicula-Sicad to assess AAA's
mental/psychological status and then to the police for the purpose of filing the complaint. On April 21,
2006, AAA delivered a baby. This is AAA's second child, the first was fathered by a certain DDD. 8
Dra. Adicula-Sicad testified that the mental faculties of AAA are severely deficient in areas
where the executive functioning judgment and other areas of intellect are concerned. According to
Dra. Adicula-Sicad's assessment, AAA's age is comparable to a child of around 4-5 years old as a
result of mental retardation, which is congenital in nature. It being congenital in nature, the victim
could not have consented or would not be in any position to give consent as to the consequences of a
certain act. 9
The defense presented the accused-appellant, Vicente Monajan, Remegios Llorico, and
accused-appellant's mother, Teresita Baay as witnesses.
Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. He testified that AAA's house is about
500 meters away from their house and that he knew that AAA is mentally retarded. He averred that
he could not have raped AAA in July 2005 because from May 15 to August 30, 2005, he was working
on the farm of a certain Motet Monajan which is about one kilometer away from the forested area
where the alleged crime took place. He stayed in a hut beside the said farm and bought his needs at
a store near the place. He further averred that AAA's family accused him of rape because of the trees
he planted beside the pigpen owned by AAA's family. 10
The other defense witnesses testified on the whereabouts of accused-appellant during the
month when the incident allegedly occurred to corroborate accused-appellant's testimony. In addition,
Teresita Baay testified that the conflict with AAA's family started in September 2005 when they
discovered that AAA was pregnant and the latter's family was ashamed that the child to be born had
no father. Also, AAA's family has issues with accused-appellant's family because the former claimed
ownership over the trees planted by the latter. 11
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated January 4, 2013, the RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove
that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with AAA, a mental retardate, sometime in July
2005. It found AAA's testimony credible despite the apparent inconsistencies, explaining that the
same was due to her mental condition. The RTC observed that AAA had the tendency to agree with
leading questions asked. However, despite some discrepancies, AAA was consistent and positive in
identifying accused-appellant as the person who raped her. 12 The trial court also noted that in the
case study dated January 4, 2006 conducted by Veronica Martinez, Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Officer of Mambusao, Capiz, AAA was consistent in pointing to the accused-appellant
as the person who abused her. The RTC also rejected accused-appellant's defenses of denial and
alibi to be unmeritorious. Accordingly, the RTC ruled:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused-appellant JONATHAN BAAY y
FALCO alias "Jun-Jun" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape which
is defined and punished under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) in relation to Article
266-B, paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.
If qualified under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
6127 and E.O. 214, the accused, if he has agreed in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rule imposed upon convicted prisoners, shall be credited with the full
duration of his preventive imprisonment, otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5
of the same.
SO ORDERED. 13
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified the damages awarded,
thus:
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 4, 2013
of the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz in
Criminal Case No. 09-0886-05 for Statutory Rape, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Jonathan Baay is found GUILTY
of the crime of statutory rape as defined and punished under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The civil
indemnity and damages shall earn interest at 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 14
Hence, this appeal.
Both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the People, and the accused-appellant
manifested that they will no longer file supplemental briefs. 15
The Issue
Whether or not the CA, in affirming the decision of the RTC, erred in convicting the accused-
appellant of Statutory Rape.
The Court's Ruling
We find the appeal unmeritorious albeit We modify the designation of the crime committed, as
well as the indemnities awarded.
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented. 16
Accused-appellant faults the RTC for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping
AAA. He insisted that he should be acquitted of the charge because doubts linger as to whether or
not he had sex with AAA or the rape incident happened, considering AAA's conflicting responses to
the queries regarding the same. The accused-appellant capitalizes on the fact that during AAA's
cross-examination, the latter candidly stated that accused-appellant did not have sex with her.
We sustain the conviction.
The fact of AAA's mental retardation is undisputed. Even the accused-appellant admitted that
he knew of AAA's mental condition. Essentially, thus, the appeal boils down to the credibility of AAA's
testimony as to the fact of sexual congress between the accused-appellant and AAA.
We stress, at the outset, that prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact of
the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon Us. 17 As a general rule, on the
question of whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court's
choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent
to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on
the witness stand as they gave their testimonies. 18 The trial court is in the best position to discern if
the witnesses were telling the truth. 19 Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact, or circumstances of weight and
substance, the rule should not be disturbed. 20
In the case at bar, even though AAA's testimony was not flawless in all particulars, We do not
find any justifiable reason to deviate from the findings and conclusion of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA.
The fact that AAA's testimony was practiced and instructed by her mother to impute such
serious charge against the accused-appellant does not sway this Court. Given the victim's mental
condition, being a 22-year old woman with a mental age of 4-5 years old, We find it highly improbable
that she had simply concocted or fabricated the rape charge against the accused-appellant. We
neither find it likely that she was merely coached into testifying against accused-appellant, precisely,
considering her limited intellect. 21 In her mental state, only a very startling event would leave a
lasting impression on her so that she would be able to recall it later when asked. 22
Likewise, the conflicting responses of AAA to the questions on whether the accused-appellant
had sex with her were succinctly explained by the trial court. According to the trial court's observation,
when AAA was asked leading questions, she has the tendency to merely agree with such leading
question asked. 23
The accused-appellant then used the said observation to argue that the reason why AAA
pointed to the accused-appellant as the perpetrator was because she was asked leading questions to
that effect. Upon the other hand, accused-appellant emphasized that AAA candidly admitted on
cross-examination that accused-appellant did not have sex with her. 24
We do not agree.
Notably, AAA's statements that accused-appellant indeed raped her or had sex with her were
not entirely solicited from leading questions in her direct testimony. During AAA's cross, re-direct, and
re-cross examinations, the trial court also propounded clarificatory questions in the following manner:
COURT: But truly the accused did not have sex with you, am I correct?
A: I was raped, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
  If according to you accused Jonathan Baay did not have sex with you, who had sex
with you?
A: Jonathan Baay, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Why he should (sic) be imprisoned?
A: Because he has done wrong, Your Honor, he raped me.
Q: It was a different man who had sex with you?
A: Jonathan Baay, sir. 25
Clearly, the foregoing are not leading questions. It is, thus, not merely leading questions
which brought about AAA's statement pointing to him as the person who had sex with her, contrary to
the accused-appellant's contention.
At any rate, the trial court correctly pointed out that what is significant, notwithstanding
discrepancies in AAA's testimony, was the positive identification of the accused-appellant as the
person who raped or had sex with her. We also could not disregard the study dated January 4, 2006
conducted by Veronica D. Martinez, Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer of
Mambusao, Capiz, that AAA was consistent in identifying accused-appellant as the person who
abused her. 26
We also find no reason to discredit AAA's testimony by the defense's imputation of ill-motive
against AAA and her family. The defense claims that the case was filed against accused-appellant
because AAA's family got angry with the accused-appellant's family because they claimed ownership
over the trees planted by the latter. It is also alleged that the conflict between the parties started when
the accused-appellant's family discovered that AAA was pregnant and her family was ashamed that
the child would be born without a father.
Again, these fail to persuade Us.
 We find such conflict as regards the "trees planted" too flimsy and insignificant for AAA or her
family to charge accused-appellant of such a serious crime and to make AAA publicly disclose that
she had been raped and undergo the concomitant humiliation, anxiety, and exposure to a public
trial. 27 Likewise, We find no reason nor wisdom in filing a criminal case against accused-appellant
by mere reason that AAA's family was ashamed that AAA bore a child without a father. Indeed, AAA's
family would be subject to the same, if not worse, situation in filing the case as such would inevitably
put AAA in public scrutiny.
Accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration. As can be
gleaned from the records, the testimonies of the defense witnesses which should supposedly support
accused-appellant's alibi did not clearly state that it was indeed impossible for the accused-appellant
to have raped AAA. At most, their testimonies merely proved that accused-appellant worked on a
farm from May to August 2005.
In all, We affirm the RTC and CA's finding that the accused-appellant indeed raped AAA.
We, however, find it erroneous for the RTC and the CA to convict accused-appellant of
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape under the said provision is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. 28 To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution
must prove: first, the age of the victim; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least,
the carnal knowledge between the accused and the victim. 29
In this case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 22 years old when she was
raped albeit she has a mental age of 4-5 years old.
It should, however, no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under
paragraph 1 (b), not Section 1 (d), of the said provision as the same, precisely, refers to a rape of a
female "deprived of reason." 30 This Court, in the case of People v. Dalan, 31 explained:
We are not unaware that there have been cases where the Court stated that
sexual intercourse with a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape. Nonetheless,
the Court in these cases, affirmed the accused's conviction for simple rape despite a
finding that the victim as a mental retardate with a mental age of a person less than
12 years old.
Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory rape should
only be confined to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12
years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b)
as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is
equivalent to that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental
retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to
statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), should still be designated
as simple rape under paragraph 1(b). 32 (emphasis supplied)
Considering the circumstances of this case, We find that accused-appellant should be held
liable for simple rape.
At any rate, We sustain the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by both the RTC and the
CA. Indeed, Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides that simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. The penalty is increased to death only
when the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by the accused of the mental disability of the victim,
among others, is alleged in the information. 33 In this case, while it was proven and admitted during
trial that accused-appellant knew of AAA's mental retardation, the same was not alleged in the
Information, hence, cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. 34
Anent the award of damages, the increase of the award of exemplary damages from
PhP30,000 to PhP75,000 is proper, in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter. 35 The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of PhP75,000 each are
maintained. 36
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in Cebu City dated February 26, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01590 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accused Jonathan Baay is found
GUILTY of the crime of simple rape as defined and punished under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(b) in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
and is thus sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
offended party AAA the sum of PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP75,000.00 as
moral damages and PhP75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The civil indemnity and
damages shall earn interest at 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 212201. June 28, 2017.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO DENIEGA y

ESPINOSA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, ** J  p:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Rodolfo Deniega y

Espinosa assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 27, 2013, in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05348, which affirmed in toto the November 15, 2011 Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 6185-SPL, finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordering him to pay the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The antecedents are as follows:
AAA 3 was a young lass suffering from mental retardation. Around 7 o'clock in the evening of
May 2, 2007, AAA who, was then sixteen years old 4 but with a mental capacity of a six (6)-year-old
child, went out of their house with some neighbors to watch a basketball game in a nearby basketball
court. Upon returning home at approximately 11 o'clock in the evening of the same date, BBB, AAA's
mother noticed that the latter's pants were wet. When BBB asked AAA what caused the wetting of her
pants, the latter simply dismissed her mother's query and said that it was nothing (wala lang).
Prompted by suspicion, BBB asked AAA to remove her pants, thereupon, she smelled her underwear
which emitted the scent of semen. When quizzed by her mother, AAA eventually admitted that herein
accused-appellant, whom she calls Dodong, and who was known to them as a delivery boy in their
neighborhood, invited her to go to another basketball court where they could talk with each other but,
instead, upon arriving at the said place, he undressed her and made her lie down. Upon acquiring
such information, BBB put AAA's underwear in a plastic bag and immediately reported the incident to
the barangay authorities. AAA later revealed that, at the said basketball court, accused-appellant
undressed her, made her lie down, removed his pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted
his penis in her vagina and made "up-and-down" movements." The barangay authorities, with the
help of some police officers, then proceeded to arrest accused-appellant who was then found in a
neighbor's house. At the time of his apprehension, accused-appellant was very drunk. Thus, the
authorities waited until the next morning for him to become sober before interrogating him. Upon
questioning by the authorities, accused-appellant admitted in front of his employer and BBB that he
had sex with AAA and that he loves AAA and he offered to marry her. He also requested BBB and
the barangay authorities not to file a case against him. BBB, however, refused accused-appellant's
offer and request. Instead, she brought AAA to a doctor in Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna for
medical examination. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for rape was filed against accused-
appellant. 5
In an Amended Information dated July 9, 2007, accused was charged with the crime of
statutory rape before the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna accuses Rodolfo
Deniega @ "DONG" of the crime of Statutory Rape in relation to Republic Act No.
7610, as follows: CAIHTE
That on or about May 2, 2007, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with a
minor (16 years old) [AAA], whose mental age is only six (6) years old. Said carnal
knowledge with the said [AAA] is detrimental to her normal growth and development.
That accused knew fully well that the said [AAA] is suffering from mental
disability and/or disorder.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
Accused-appellant was arraigned on August 14, 2007 where he pleaded not guilty. 7
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the prosecution and also raised
the defense of alibi. He contended that between the hours of 8 o'clock in the morning and 12 o'clock
midnight of May 2, 2007, he busied himself by painting the house of a neighbor, then he went to GMA
Cavite to have his electric fan repaired and, subsequently, had a drinking session with his friend at
the latter's house. He also admitted that he and the victim were residing at the same place and, at the
time of the incident, he has known the victim for one month.
Pre-trial was conducted on September 12, 2007. 8 Thereafter, trial ensued.
On November 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Rodolfo Deniega y Espinosa
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
The accused is ordered to pay the victim the following sums: P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damage.
SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish through clinical and testimonial
evidence that AAA is suffering from moderate mental retardation, with an IQ of 43 and with a mental
age of a six-year-old child. The trial court also noted that, as admitted by accused-appellant, he knew
of the condition of the victim. The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim. The RTC gave full
credence to the testimony of AAA holding that she testified on the rape that happened to her in a
straightforward and categorical manner. The trial court did not give weight to accused-appellant's
defense of alibi because the place where he claims to be at the time of the rape is just three streets
away from the scene of the crime, hence, it is not physically impossible for him to be at the said
scene at the time of the commission of the rape. The RTC also noted that accused-appellant failed to
account for his whereabouts between 8 o'clock and 10 o'clock in the evening of May 2, 2007, which is
the approximate time that AAA was raped. The RTC further held that AAA positively identified
accused-appellant as the one who raped her.
Accused-appellant appealed the RTC Decision with the CA. 10
On September 27, 2013, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision affirming the judgment of
the RTC in toto.
The CA held, among others, that: the observation of the trial judge, coupled with the evidence
of the prosecution, confirms the mental retardation of the victim; AAA's narration of the rape incident
is consistent; and accused-appellant's denial is unsubstantiated, thus, cannot overcome the
categorical testimony of the victim.
On October 10, 2013, accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal 11 manifesting his intention to appeal the CA Decision to this Court.
In its Resolution 12 dated October 30, 2013, the CA gave due course to accused-appellant's
Notice of Appeal and directed its Judicial Records Division to elevate the records of the case to this
Court.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In a Resolution 13 dated July 7, 2014, this Court, among others, notified the parties that they
may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire.
In its Manifestation and Motion 14 dated September 4, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) prayed that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief because it had already
adequately addressed in its brief filed before the CA all the issues and arguments raised by accused-
appellant in his brief.
In the same manner, accused-appellant filed a Manifestation 15 (in Lieu of Supplemental
Brief) dated September 10, 2014, indicating that he no longer intends to file a supplemental brief and
is adopting his brief, which was filed with the CA, as his supplemental brief had adequately discussed
all the matters pertinent to his defense.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contends that he was wrongly convicted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He questions the credibility of the
victim and insists that the trial court erred in not giving due consideration to his defense of alibi.
The appeal lacks merit. The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse accused-appellant's
conviction.
Accused-appellant was charged with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 16 (RA 8353), in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610 17 (RA 7610). DETACa
The pertinent provisions of Articles 266-A of the RPC, as amended, provide:
Art. 266-A Rape; When and How Rape is Committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
 xxx xxx xxx
Statutory rape is committed when: (1) the offended party is under twelve years of age; and (2)
the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done
through fraud or grave abuse of authority. 18 It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that
there was sexual intercourse. 19
This Court has consistently held that rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the  Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing
rape. 20 What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12)
years old. 21 Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations;
the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. 22 The
law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender
years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from
evil. 23
It is also a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a
mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. 24 In People v. Quintos, 25 this Court held
that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person whose mental age is less than 12 years is
raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d) and not paragraph 1 (b), Article 266-A
of the RPC. In holding as such, this Court differentiated the term "mentally-retarded" or "intellectually
disabled" from the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented" as used under Article 266-A,
paragraphs 1 (b) and 1 (d) of the RPC. The Court ruled that:
xxx xxx xxx
The term, "deprived of reason," is associated with insanity or madness. A
person deprived of reason has mental abnormalities that affect his or her reasoning
and perception of reality and, therefore, his or her capacity to resist, make decisions,
and give consent.
The term, "demented," refers to a person who suffers from a mental condition
called dementia. Dementia refers to the deterioration or loss of mental functions such
as memory, learning, speaking, and social condition, which impairs one's
independence in everyday activities.
We are aware that the terms, "mental retardation" or "intellectual disability,"
had been classified under "deprived of reason." The terms, "deprived of reason" and
"demented," however, should be differentiated from the term, "mentally retarded" or
"intellectually disabled." An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived
of reason or demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible
witnesses. However, his or her maturity is not there despite the physical age. He or
she is deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social,
and practical functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. Because of
such impairment, he or she does not meet the "socio-cultural standards of personal
independence and social responsibility."
Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age
is as capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a
chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of
giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached the
level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially
on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a
person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to
an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or
her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12)
years of age" under Article 266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in
accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not
 suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability
is established.
xxx xxx xxx 26
In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim, at the time of the commission of
the crime, was 16 years old but with a mental age of a 6-year-old child. The prosecution was able to
establish these facts through AAA's Birth Certificate, 27 Clinical Abstract prepared by a medical
doctor who is a psychiatrist from the National Center for Mental Health, 28 as well as the testimonies
of the said doctor 29 and the victim's mother, BBB. 30 aDSIHc
In the present appeal, accused-appellant's main line of argument is anchored on his attack on
the credibility of the victim, AAA. He posits that AAA's mental state profoundly affects her perception
of reality causing her to forget things or details. Accused-appellant also claims that AAA has a very
limited understanding of her choices and actions and their consequences and is prone to making up
and telling stories, thus, putting into question her credibility as a witness.
Both the RTC and the CA, however, found AAA's testimony, that accused-appellant had
sexual intercourse with her, to be steadfast, unwavering and consistent, and the Court finds no
reason to disturb this finding. Thus, in People v. Pareja, 31 this Court reiterated the established rule
that:
xxx xxx xxx
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we
follow certain guidelines that have over time been established in jurisprudence.
In People v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 197815, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 639, 643), we
enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of
the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in
directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the
reversal of the RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing
court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly
when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome
of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA
concurred with the RTC. (Citations omitted)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his
unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand;
a vantage point denied appellate courts — and when his findings have been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."
While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial
reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the
matter of AAA's credibility.
xxx xxx xxx 32
In the present case, it is true that based on the medical and psychiatric evaluation of AAA,
she has moderate mental retardation and that she has the mental age of a six-year-old child.
Accused-appellant makes much of this fact to discredit the testimony of AAA. This Court has,
nonetheless, held that competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses
have been upheld where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and
consistently. 33 Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it even lends
greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so
tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the
hands of the accused. 34 The basic rule is that when a victim's testimony is credible and sufficiently
establishes the elements of the crime, it may be enough basis to convict an accused of rape. 35
What makes the case stronger for the prosecution is that the testimony of AAA is
corroborated by the medical findings of the presence of a "deep healing laceration" in her hymen
which was caused by a blunt object. 36 Such medico-legal findings bolsters the prosecution's
testimonial evidence. Together, these pieces of evidence produce a moral certainty that accused-
appellant indeed raped the victim.
Accused-appellant also questions AAA's credibility by contending that it is very hard to
believe that no one could have seen or noticed him having sexual intercourse with AAA in the nearby
basketball court, considering that AAA herself testified that the said basketball court, was near the
one where people were watching the ongoing game.
The Court is not persuaded. There is no evidence to show that there were people present at
the basketball court where the crime was committed. Moreover, it is probable that people did not
notice accused-appellant having sexual intercourse with AAA because there was then an ongoing
basketball game at another court and the attention of the persons present were directed at the said
game. Besides, as testified by the victim, it only took a minute for accused-appellant to consummate
his carnal desire, after which they immediately went back. 37 In any case, as correctly cited by the
OSG, this Court has held that lust is no respecter of time and place and that rape can be committed
even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside
a house where there are other occupants and even in the same room where other members of the
family are also sleeping. 38 ETHIDa
Aside from interposing the defense of denial, accused-appellant also argues that the trial
court erred in giving scant consideration of his defense of alibi, especially of the fact that given the
state of intoxication that he was found in at the time of the said incident, it would be physically
impossible for him to have committed the crime charged. Countless times, this Court has declared
that alibi is an inherently weak defense. Unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot
prevail over the positive declaration of a victim who, in a natural and straightforward manner,
convincingly identifies the accused-appellant. 39 Positive identification, where consistent and without
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
denial. 40 On the other hand, denial — if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence — is
negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law. 41 In the present case, the OSG
correctly echoed the trial court's observation that accused appellant failed to account for his
whereabouts between 8 o'clock in the evening and 10 o'clock of the same night, which is the
approximate time that AAA was raped. Moreover, the place where the crime was committed was a
mere three streets away from where accused-appellant and his friend were having a drinking session.
This leads to the conclusion that it is not impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the
crime at the approximate time that it was committed, after which, he would still have enough time to
go back to their drinking session and get himself extremely drunk.
All told, the prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that accused-appellant
was guilty of raping AAA.
Statutory rape, penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC, as amended,
carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the same Code, unless attended by
qualifying circumstances defined therein, among which is "when the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime," in which case the death penalty shall be imposed.
In the instant case, as discussed above, the victim, AAA, is considered below twelve (12)
years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Moreover, it was alleged in the Information and
established by the prosecution that accused-appellant had knowledge of her mental disability. In fact,
accused-appellant never denied knowledge of such fact. Thus, because of the presence of this
qualifying circumstance, the imposable penalty is death. However, the passage of Republic Act No.
9346 42 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty without, nonetheless, declassifying the crime of
 qualified rape as heinous. Thus, the trial court correctly reduced the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Anent the award of damages, to conform to this Court's ruling in People v. Ireneo
Jugueta, 43 which is the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, the award of damages are modified
as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Moreover, also in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence, 44 the amount of
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until said amounts are fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The September 27, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05348 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Accused-appellant is ORDERED to PAY the increased amounts of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2) Accused-appellant is additionally ORDERED to PAY the victim, AAA, interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. Deniega y Espinosa, G.R. No. 212201, [June 28, 2017], 811 PHIL 712-728)

[G.R. No. 230975. December 4, 2017.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICO

NIEBRES y REGINALDO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J  p:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-appellant Rico Niebres y Reginaldo

(Niebres) assailing the Decision 2 dated August 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 06374, which affirmed with modification the Judgment 3 dated June 28, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. P-4532, and
found Niebres guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape, as defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

On June 24, 2011, an Information 4 was filed before the RTC charging Niebres of Rape, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That sometime in the month of August 2010 and the days thereafter at
Barangay Panoypoyan, Municipality of Bula Province of Camarines Sur, and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design,
 through force, intimidation and influence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly, undress and succeed in having carnal knowledge with [AAA], 5 a sixteen
(16) year-old lass, who is suffering from mild mental retardation which fact of
retardation is known to the accused and with a mental age of nine (9) year-old,
without her consent and against her will, an act by deed which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said victim as a human being, to her
damage and prejudice in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The prosecution alleged that sometime in October 2010, Niebres, together with his wife
(AAA's sister) and six (6) children, went to the house of his parents-in-law in La Victoria, Bula,
Camarines Sur (La Victoria) to participate in a traditional palay harvesting
called "basok/hasok." 7 When they arrived at the house of his parents-in-law at around eight (8)
o'clock in the morning, they momentarily took a rest. Thereafter, Niebres joined the other members of
the family on the fields and began the "basok/hasok," which lasted until 4:30 in the afternoon. After
dinner, Niebres went out to drink with his father-in-law and brother-in-law and came home at around
midnight. He directly went to the room where AAA and his family were sleeping and lied beside her to
sleep. 8 At about five (5) o'clock in the morning of the following day, AAA suddenly woke up and
noticed Niebres kissing her on the cheeks, neck, and down her body. Niebres then pulled down her
shorts, unzipped his pants, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. After repeatedly making
a push and pull motion on AAA, Niebres finally pulled out his penis and dismounted from her. AAA
claimed that the incident produced so much pain, and it caused her vagina to bleed profusely. This
notwithstanding, she could not tell anyone about it, as she was afraid of what Niebres and her parents
would do to her. According to AAA, this was not the first time Niebres sexually abused her, claiming
that Niebres also raped her several weeks before the said incident in his house at Panoypoyan, Bula,
Camarines Sur (Panoypoyan). 9
Subsequently, when AAA complained of abdominal pains, her mother, BBB, 10 brought her
to Naga Health Care Diagnostic Center on March 25, 2011. After conducting an ultrasound
examination on AAA, the doctors discovered that she was approximately five (5) to six (6) months
pregnant. When AAA finally admitted to BBB that Niebres raped her, they reported the matter to the
police and filed the instant Complaint. On February 7, 2012, AAA went to a psychiatrist named Dr.
Edessa Parde Laguidao (Dr. Laguidao), who revealed that she was suffering from a mild mental
retardation with an intelligence quotient (I.Q.) equivalent to a nine (9)-year old child. 11
For his part, while Niebres admitted that he and his family went to the house of his parents-in-
law in La Victoria sometime in October 2010, he verbally denied raping AAA therein. Niebres
maintained that at the time of the incident, he went out of the room of his parents-in-law's house,
drank coffee, and proceeded to continue harvesting palay without waiting for his other companions.
When Niebres was done harvesting, he and his family supposedly left La Victoria in the afternoon and
never came back. Moreover, Niebres averred that the only time AAA slept in their house in
Panoypoyan was when he was in Batangas from March to August 2010. Ultimately, Niebres insisted
that the filing of case against him was actuated by ill motive, considering that his parents-in-law were
angry at him when he demanded his share in the proceeds of the cow, which was purportedly sold to
cover the wedding expenses of his brother-in-law. 12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment 13 dated June 28, 2013, the RTC found Niebres guilty of the crime of Simple
Rape in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00
as exemplary damages. 14 It held that the prosecution was able to present testimonial and
documentary evidence to support AAA's claim of rape against Niebres. Meanwhile, Niebres's
unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi failed to create reasonable doubt in light of the positive
and categorical testimony and identification of AAA. 15
 Furthermore, the RTC did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of relationship by affinity
between Niebres and AAA even if it was proven in court, given that the same was not alleged in the
Information. 16
Aggrieved, Niebres appealed 17 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a the Decision 18 dated August 17, 2015, the CA upgraded Niebres's conviction to that of
Qualified Rape, finding Niebres not eligible for parole and ordering him to pay AAA the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from date
of finality of judgment until fully paid. 19
The CA upheld the RTC's finding of rape, further noting that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of AAA were too minor and inconsequential to acquit Niebres of the crime charged.
Further, it was highly improbable for AAA to fabricate the charges against Niebres, considering that a
traumatizing experience like rape would definitely leave a lasting impression on her given her mental
condition. 20 However, the CA ruled that Niebres should be convicted for Qualified Rape, considering
that: (a) the state of mental retardation of AAA was competently established on account of the
testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Laguidao on AAA; and (b) Niebres failed to dispute AAA's
mental retardation during trial. Accordingly, the CA deemed it proper to hold Niebres guilty of
Qualified Rape. 21
Unyielding, Niebres filed the present appeal. CAIHTE

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Niebres's conviction for the crime of
Rape should be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is denied.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that
the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 22
As will be explained hereunder, the Court deems it proper to modify Niebres's conviction for
the crime of Qualified Rape to Simple Rape.
Here, a plain reading of the Information reveals that Niebres was charged of the crime of
Qualified Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1), in relation to Article 266-B, of
the RPC, to wit:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
 b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. — . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A
(1) of the RPC, it is necessary that the elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable doubt, to
wit: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act through
force, threat or intimidation, when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, by
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is under 12 years of
age or is demented. 23 Moreover, case law states that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a
mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. 24 In People v.
Deniega, 25 the Court clarified that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person whose
mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d)
and not paragraph 1 (b), Article 266-A of the RPC. Thus, it ruled that:
Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age
is as capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a
chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of
giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached the
level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially
on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence,
person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to
an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or
her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12)
years of age" under Article 266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in
accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not
suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability
is established. 26 (Emphasis in the original)
In this instance, the prosecution competently established the elements of the crime of Rape,
as it was shown that: (a) AAA was suffering from mild mental retardation, which has an I.Q.
equivalent to a nine (9)-year old child; (b) Niebres successfully had carnal knowledge of AAA
sometime in October 2010; and (c) Niebres was able to accomplish the said act because AAA, being
a mental retardate, was deprived of reason at the time of the incident.
However, the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Niebres's knowledge of
AAA's mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime, there being no sufficient and
competent evidence to substantiate the same.
Notably, knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the
commission of the crime of rape is a special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by
death. 27 Such qualifying circumstance, however, must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and
proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. 28 It must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its
qualified form. 29
In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental
retardation was specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the
prosecution. The fact that Niebres did not dispute AAA's mental retardation during trial is insufficient
to qualify the crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral certainty that he knew of her
disability at the time of its commission. It is settled that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense. 30 On that score, the prosecution cannot simply profit from Niebres's omission, as it
must rely on its own evidence to prove his knowledge of AAA's mental disability beyond reasonable
doubt.
Additionally, mere relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA does not sufficiently
create moral certainty that the former knew of the latter's disability. In People v. Ramos, 31 the Court
ruled that "while private complainant was the niece of accused-appellant and they were neighbors
before and at the time of the commission of the crime[, the same] do not constitute conclusive proof
that accused-appellant had knowledge of the mental retardation of private complainant absent
evidence of external manifestations of her mental condition." 32 Here, the prosecution did not present
any evidence that AAA exhibited external manifestations of her mental condition. On the contrary,
records reveal that the mental retardation of AAA only became noticeable the moment Dr. Laguidao
conducted the requisite psychological test on her. When AAA engaged in other activities, she actually
performed and functioned like a normal person. Thus, Dr. Laguidao testified that:
[PROS. AGATON FAJARDO]:
Also in your assessment, you stated "mental retardation, mild," tell us Doctor what
method did you use or take that you were able to say the mental retardation of
patient is mild?
DR. LAGUIDAO:
The patient has to undergo psychological test to determine the IQ or intelligence
quotient of the patient.
Q: From the basis of the IQ you conducted you can now determine the mental
retardation of the patient?
A: The level of the retardation.
Q: And the level is mild?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is the mental retardation of the patient manifests (sic)?
A: It was seen during the psychological test however during the activities she was able
to function appropriately regarding her communication and self-care.
Q: So she performs normally?
A: Yes, your honor. 33 (Underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
[ATTY. ART TEOXON]:
Based on your examination this patient [AAA] is duly cognizant of whatever is
happening around her especially the time?
[DR. LAGUIDAO]:
 Yes, sir.
Q: She was certain based on your questioning her that is happened sometimes (sic) in
September 2010?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you examined the patient you did not observe any abnormality on her?
A: The way she answered it seems that there is something wrong with the intelligence
and the manner she presented. 34 (Underscoring supplied)
By and large, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Niebres was
aware of AAA's mental disability at the time he committed the crime and, thus, he should be convicted
of the crime of Simple Rape only.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds it necessary to modify the amount of
exemplary damages awarded to AAA in order to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence. 35 Accordingly, Niebres is ordered to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Meanwhile, the awards of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as
moral damages are affirmed. In addition, the Court imposes, on all monetary awards, interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 36
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 17, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06374 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Rico Niebres y Reginaldo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple
Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code and,
accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary
awards from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. DETACa
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. Niebres y Reginaldo, G.R. No. 230975, [December 4, 2017])

[G.R. No. 206878. August 22, 2016.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCELINO CAGA y

FABRE, accused-appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J  p:
This is an appeal from the February 14, 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04248. The CA Decision affirmed the November 13, 2009 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Criminal Case No. 06-246762, finding the
appellant Marcelino Caga y Fabre (Caga) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Factual Antecedents
 Caga was charged with the crime of rape for having carnal knowledge of "AAA" 3 after having
a drinking spree with her and her boyfriend, viz.:
That on or about September 17, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
commit sexual assault upon "AAA", by then and there, while sleeping, placing himself
on top of her ("pumatong") and inserting his penis into the vagina of said
complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having
carnal knowledge with the said "AAA," against her will and consent.
Contrary to law. 4
Arraigned thereon, Caga, assisted by counsel, entered a negative plea. After pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the rape victim herself, "AAA," Barangay
Kagawad Cresencio Aquino (Aquino), and the Women's Desk Officer, SPO1 Josette Saturnino
(SPO1 Saturnino). Their collective testimonies tended to establish the following facts:
On September 17, 2006, "AAA" and her boyfriend, Randy Bomita (Randy), went to Caga's
residence at No. 2027 Kahilum II, Pandacan, Manila for a drinking spree. Along with other guests,
Caga, Randy, and "AAA" started drinking from midnight of September 17, 2006 until the early hours
of the following day. After consuming about four bottles of Red Horse Grande, "AAA" and Randy
decided to spend the night at Caga's house since they were both very intoxicated. In fact "AAA"
vomited a couple of times due to her alcohol intake.
Caga was already asleep on a foam cushion on the floor when "AAA" and Randy slept beside
him. While still intoxicated and asleep, "AAA" felt someone kiss her vagina. At first, she thought it was
her boyfriend Randy who did it. She tried to push him away as she had menstruation at that time, but
failed to stop him as this person proceeded to kiss her on the lips and then went on to take undue
liberties with her person. Indeed, in no time at all Caga succeeded in mounting her and in penetrating
her private parts with his penis. All the while, "AAA" thought that it was her boyfriend Randy who was
having coitus with her.
When she ("AAA") slowly opened her eyes, a tiny glimmer of light coming from the window
revealed that it was Caga who had copulated with her while she was in a drunken stupor. "AAA" then
became hysterical. She started hitting and slapping Caga and accused him of violating her. She also
kicked Randy who was still asleep on the floor. She yelled at Randy exclaiming, "Bakit mo ako
pinabayaan?"
"AAA" immediately reported the incident at the Barangay Hall and the Police Station in
Pandacan, Manila; and thereafter submitted herself to a medical examination at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH).
During trial, "AAA" positively identified Caga in open court as the person who raped
her. CAIHTE
Barangay Kagawad Aquino testified that "AAA" appeared at the Barangay  Hall where she
declared that Caga had raped her. After this, he accompanied "AAA" to the Police Station in
Pandacan. Then he (Aquino) went to Caga's house and confronted him with "AAA's" accusation that
he (Caga) had raped her. According to Aquino Caga admitted that he did rape "AAA" — an admission
that Caga repeated at the Police Station.
SPO1 Saturnino testified that she received a complaint for rape lodged by "AAA" against
Caga; and that she conducted an investigation into the complaint for rape. She identified "AAA's"
sworn statement and the booking sheet she prepared relative to Caga's arrest and detention.
The prosecution concluded its case with the presentation of the PGH's medical examination
report which revealed that "AAA" did sustain physical injuries, and that this was indicative of a
possible sexual assault.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented Caga as its sole witness. His testimony tended to establish the
following:
On the night of September 17, 2006, he (Caga) was in his house having a drinking spree with
some friends, including his relative, Randy, and his girlfriend, "AAA." Because he was already drunk,
he (Caga) slept ahead of Randy and "AAA." He had no idea that Randy and "AAA" would spend the
night in his house and he was even surprised upon waking up that the two were sleeping beside him.
He tried to rouse them up so they could transfer to a bed. When "AAA" was awakened, she
immediately asked him if he did something wrong to her. He denied doing anything wrong to her.
"AAA" nevertheless became hysterical. He (Caga) then roused up Randy who tried to pacify "AAA."
When Randy and "AAA" left his house, he (Caga) cleaned up and ate breakfast outside his
house. He had another drinking spree at a friend's house nearby. Upon returning to his house at
around 10:00 a.m., he met Barangay Kagawad Aquino who invited him to the Barangay Hall. From
there, the two of them went to the Pandacan Police Station where he was informed that he was
accused of a crime. It was during the Inquest proceedings when he learned that he was accused of
raping "AAA."
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After due proceedings, the RTC of Manila, Branch 26, rendered judgment finding Caga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The dispositive part of the RTC Decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds accused MARCELINO
CAGA y FABRE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as charged in the Information. He is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, with all the accessory penalties provided
by law; and to indemnify private complainant "AAA" the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos by way of moral damages.
Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, he is hereby credited
with the full length of time he has been under detention.
Cost de Oficio.
SO ORDERED. 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Against this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA contending that the RTC gravely erred in
finding him guilty based only on the incredible, implausible and uncorroborated testimony of "AAA."
The CA however, rejected this posture.
Inevitably, on February 14, 2012, the CA disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision, dated November
13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 06-
246762, finding accused-appellant Marcelino Caga y Fabre, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 6
Caga filed a Motion for Reconsideration 7 of the CA's Decision, but this was denied in a
Resolution 8 dated August 23, 2012. Undeterred, Caga instituted the instant appeal before this Court.
Assignment of Error
In his Supplemental Brief, 9 Caga assigns the following error.
 I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF
RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO CONVINCINGLY PROVE HIS
GUILT. 10
Caga argues that while the Information alleged that force, violence, and intimidation were
employed to consummate the alleged rape, the prosecution's evidence failed to establish the
existence thereof. He claims that "AAA" did not offer any resistance against his sexual advances,
"because she thought that it was her boyfriend (Randy) who was then making love with her." 11
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal. We hold that the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Elements of Rape
Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force, threat, or intimidation;
2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
This Court finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with "AAA" when she was asleep and
still under the influence of alcohol. The case thus falls under the second paragraph of rape: "when the
offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious." It is altogether immaterial that the
prosecution's evidence failed to establish the presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation
because, as the evidence at bar shows, Caga raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated
woman — a fact that was duly alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution's
evidence during the trial. In the case at bench, physical force, threat or intimidation is not necessary,
for the simple reason that an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and
voluntarily give her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse.
In point are these succinct observations of the appellate court: DETACa
At the core of almost all rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is
crucial in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only the participants therein
can testify to its occurrence. In this regard, a restatement of a consistent ruling is in
order. The rule is that 'the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect.'
The complainant's testimonies and the pieces of evidence, taken together, all
point to the accused-appellant's complicity to the crime charged.
There is nothing in the records to render suspicious the evidence put forth by
the complainant. The accused-appellant is the uncle of her boyfriend. She has no
known ill-motive to impute such a grave crime to him and, like the trial court, [w]e did
not find any motive why she would fabricate a story that could, in fact, subject herself
to public ridicule and humiliation. As settled, no woman would want to go through the
process, the trouble and the humiliation of trial for such a debasing offense unless
she actually has been a victim of abuse and her motive is but a response to the
compelling need to seek and obtain justice.
 Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail.
For such an offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment
as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep
psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life
and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget.
Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and
that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
Besides, the records are reflective of the complainant's version that she was
initially sleeping at the time she was ravished right after a drinking spree of hard
liquor. There is even no dispute that complainant was at such intoxicated condition.
Interestingly, not even the accused-appellant has ever put in issue the [level] of
intoxication that the complainant might be at the time of the crime.
The complainant's credibility is further strengthened by the subsequent
events that transpired. That she immediately reported the matter to the authorities
and submitted herself readily to physical examination are indications of the truth of
her accusation.
Indeed, the complainant has consistently been resolute in her desire to seek
justice for what has been unlawfully done [to] her. This Court, therefore, has no
reason to depart from the findings and conclusion of the trial court when it declared
that: 'The fact that [the complainant] immediately reported the matter to the
authorities which led to the immediate arrest of the accused and the filing of the
instant case, sustained more than ever the credibility of the victim's testimony.'
Viewed under all of these premises, there is no iota of doubt in the mind of
this Court that accused-appellant undeniably committed the crime of rape against the
complainant.
In his attempt to exculpate himself from this serious charge, all that the
accused-appellant did was to proffer his denial which must fail.
It is a well-settled rule that positive identification of the accused, where
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. 12
Credibility of the Prosecution's Witnesses
Indeed, the CA's findings are in accord with the RTC's assessment that "AAA" is a credible
witness and her testimony deserves full faith and credit.
Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that, "[i]n rape cases, the accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing,
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things." 13 The credibility ascribed by the
trial judge to the victim and her testimony is an essential aspect of evidence which appellate courts
can rely on because of the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, attitude, and
conduct during their direct and cross-examination. Thus, the RTC pertinently observed:
During her testimony, the victim appeared to be straightforward, positive and
convincing in her testimony. Such personal demeanor of the victim truly persuaded
and satisfied this Court that the crime charged was indeed perpetrated by the
accused. The victim would not have allowed herself to undergo the ordeal of public
trial and expose herself to humiliation and embarrassment if her motive is not to bring
to justice the person who sexually abused her.
 The Court found no motive on the part of the victim to concoct such a false
charge. . . . From all indications, she does not appear to have any ill motive to falsely
testify against the accused.
The fact that she immediately reported the matter to the authorities, which
led to the immediate arrest of the accused and the filing of the instant case, sustained
more than ever the credibility of the victim's testimony. 14
We are shown no reason why this Court ought not to defer to the findings of facts of both the
RTC and the CA. Indeed, such findings of facts of both courts bear the hallmark of truth and have the
ring of candor and sincerity.
Finally, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, 15 this Court hereby modifies the award of moral
damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Civil indemnity and exemplary damages are further added
to the award of damages, both in the amount of P75,000.00. Also, interest at the rate of 6% per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04248, is AFFIRMED, subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that the appellant Marcelino Caga y Fabre is hereby ordered to pay "AAA" civil
indemnity and exemplary damages, both in the amount of P75,000.00, as well as the upgraded
amount of P75,000.00 by way of moral damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate
of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (People v. Caga y Fabre, G.R. No. 206878, [August 22, 2016])

[G.R. No. 187495. April 21, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN,  accused-

appellant.

DECISION

REYES,  J p:

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and
protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the
necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely.
He is bound to honor her . . . ; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but
also to protect her from oppression and wrong."  1
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit
within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly
legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review 2 of the Decision 3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment 4 dated April 1, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and
99-669 convicting Edgar Jumawan (accused-appellant) of two (2) counts of rape and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
 Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, 5 were married on October 18, 1975. They lived
together since then and raised their four (4) children 6 as they put up several businesses over the
years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, 7 alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa
Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed
her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution, 8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and
recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed
as Criminal Case No. 99-668 9 and Criminal Case No. 99-669. 10 The Information in Criminal Case
No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant,
her [sic]  wife, against the latter[']s will. IDAESH
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant,
her [sic]  wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999. 11 On August
18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, 12 which was denied by the trial
court in an Order 13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and
he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. 14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information 15 averring that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the original
informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated
November 15, 1999, 16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998
and October 17, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The
motion was granted on January 18, 2000. 17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means
of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means
 of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both
indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM
and OOO, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the
laborers. They got married after a year of courtship. 20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK
and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari  store. 21 Later on, they engaged in several other
businesses — trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill,
which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In
reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks
to haul goods. 22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's
dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents. 23 He would
drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses.  24 She
wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with
that objective. 25 TDCAIS
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. 26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the
accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the
two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her. 27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan
De Oro City most of the days of the week. 28 On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to
procure supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day. 29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-
appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course,
responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. 30 However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He
would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His
abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush
but he would threaten her into submission. 31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that
she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a
bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good
in bed (sic) . . . ." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the
children. 32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-
appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By
October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City. 33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their
nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was
taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to
pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room. 34 OOO and MMM
then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with
him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied. 35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did
not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her
reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c[o]t[?]", and to
instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."  36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain
due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose
from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK
stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. 37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well. 38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.  39 KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs. 40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, 41 stretched her legs apart and rested his
own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating
her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately
shouting: "[D]on't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."  42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the
spouses' bedroom, 43 KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay
awake. cIHSTC
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have
pity on me," 44  MMM woke up OOO who prodded her to go to their parents' room. 45 MMM hurriedly
climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it
that Mama is crying?" 46  The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly
opened the door and said: "[D]on't interfere because this is a family trouble,"  before closing it
again. 47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked
at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it. 48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider
and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family
trouble!"  Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room,
approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what
happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"  49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in
order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her torn underwear and covered herself
with a blanket. 50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving,
the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded
KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room,"  when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go
out."  He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned
against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out. 51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what
happened. 52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him
when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest." 53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store
on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join
them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK
and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the
night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-
appellant entered. "Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded
that she preferred to sleep with the children. 54 He then scoffed: "It's alright if you will not go with me,
anyway, there are women that could be paid [P]1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her
head away after retorting: "So be it."  After that, he left the room. 55
He returned 15 minutes later 56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became
infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he
exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Let's go to our bedroom."  When she defied him, he grabbed
her short pants causing them to tear apart. 57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to
Mama because we are in front of you."  58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who
yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic] because I'm the head of the
family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to
the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the
creaking bed. 59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled
KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on't do that to me, my body is
still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand
sex."  60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted
her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and
briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered:  "[I]t's nice, that is what
you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."  He then retreated to the masters' bedroom. 61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs
but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the
doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother
crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are
you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y]our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with
him even if I don't feel well." 62  IcSEAH
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to
that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When
they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary
graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life.
Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and
established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also
drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or corn. 63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that
on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling corn. On October 7, his truck met an
accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the
roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they
returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City
and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some corn. 64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the
above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of
the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998,
he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of corn into the truck.
They finished loading at 3:00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta  in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order
to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to
Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with corn.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and
hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in
Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3:00 a.m. of
October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the
damaged truck to Cugman. 65
 The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge
because he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of
their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to
account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the
balance of P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the
amount dwindled to a measly P9,894.88. 66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies
her rape allegations. 67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually
detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the
accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get
a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do
the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When
he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied
herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out. 68
Bebs, 69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant
several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK. 70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as:
Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police,
another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests. 71 Several
persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it
because he trusted her. 72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2,
1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a
television program, he asked OOO to turn down the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed,
unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head
bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter
took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-
appellant because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-
appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly. 73 cCaIET
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her
and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the
accused-appellant's parents intervened. 74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the
accused-appellant by initiating  Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action
dated February 18, 1999. 75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment 76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the
prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two
daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own
father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-
appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court
shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the
contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual
whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY"
beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant
[P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of
[P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
 SO ORDERED. 77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision 78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held
that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the
original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because
he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself
and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable
doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate
the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and
wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical
evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The
CA explained that physical showing of external injuries is not indispensable to prosecute and convict
a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the
accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only
reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her
husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she
stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it. HcaDTE
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it
was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was,
is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed  Judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution 80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified
the parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation
and Motion 81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant,
through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when
the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by:
(a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's
failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and (c) the absence of a medical
certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties. 82
Our Ruling
I.    Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture'
whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted
a woman and married her. 83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but
rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage  84 or to protect a man's
valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity. 85 If a man raped an unmarried
virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using
his property. 86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was
justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her
father until she marries to become the property of her husband. 87 If a man abducted an unmarried
woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were
synonymous. 88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the
law denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture. 89 A husband had
the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the
family. 90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon
marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue
another, own personal property or write a will. 91
II.    The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the
irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape.
He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife,
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in
this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract. 92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA)
and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which
would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife. 93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally
defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the
perpetrator." 94 cTECHI
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty  95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it
would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a
similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis. 96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was
endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. 97 The privilege was
personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable
when he aids or abets another person in raping her. 98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its
abolition for being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws. 99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application
of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by
its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of
separation. 100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals
of New York declared the same unconstitutional in  People v. Liberta  101 for lack of rational basis in
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's
irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape
and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of
the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property
 rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to
sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. .
. . Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not
simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading,
violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe,
long-lasting physical and psychic harm . . . . To ever imply consent to such an act is
irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never
been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand . . . .
Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to
forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her
own body as does an unmarried woman . . . . If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his
wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts
governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help . . . ."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-
law doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal
existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband . . . ." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State.
Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world — [or] in any modern society — is a
woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the
dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being . . . ." 102 (Citations
omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of
Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some
exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired,
unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent. 103
III.    Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It
appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's
irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino, 104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there
is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse. 105 caSEAH
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). 106 Hailed as the first
international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all
forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender
equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns. 107 The
country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and
agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination
against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a)   To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and
to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this
principle;
(b)   To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions
where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxx xxx xxx
 (f)   To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination
against women;
(g)   To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination
against women. 108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the
principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II
thereof, thus:
Sec. 11.   The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14.   The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of
international law such as the CEDAW and its allied issuances,  viz.:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In
1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. 109 The
law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against
chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive  proviso  is the
2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its
perpetration, viz.:
Article 266-C.    Effect of Pardon. — The subsequent valid marriage between
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining
rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal
relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A.   Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1)   By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a)   Through force, threat, or intimidation; aHcDEC
b)   When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c)   By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d)   When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
 The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of
the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of
qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage,
the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general
definition of 'rape,' viz.:
MR. DAMASING:
Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point of clarification in the House version on
Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under
Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender . . ." Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? . . . .
MR. LARA:
. . . [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private
practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at
stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a
husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't
have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why
even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now
being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here
for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of
the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital
rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction
there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put
second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. . . . , that if it
is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it
here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the cohesion
of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING:
Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265
our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital
sexual assault.
MR. LARA:
That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING:
But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor,
direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the
second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender,
this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA:
No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING:
So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call it?
MR. LARA:
Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING:
There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because
under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault.
That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual
assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under
this bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as rape
whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua  to death or whether the penalty
is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that
correct? HEacDA
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAMASING:
Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the
husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please
do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the
sanctity of marriage. . . . . 110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL:
In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO:
Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL:
No. No. No. Silent  lang 'yung  marital rape.
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO:
. . . [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly
contained in the second paragraph. . . . So marital rape actually was in the
House version . . . . But it was not another definition of rape. You will
notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband does not mean
that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife
until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean,
you just cannot raise the defense . . . [:] I am the husband. But where in the
marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means. That
is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy.
Because  parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex.
No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. . . . .
That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the]
husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape . . . .
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHANI:
All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO:
. . . [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you
can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by
depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how
that cannot apply.  Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the,  yun ang
sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is
all the same definition . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO:
What is 266-F? . . . . Now if we can retain 266-F . . . , we can say that this rule is
implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when
a husband can be charged [with] rape . . . .
HON. ROXAS:
Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO:
Otherwise, we are silent na. So  parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this
rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL:
We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape. DHcEAa
HON. ROCO:
No, yun ang, oo  we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on
page 8, the effect of pardon. . . . [I]t is inferred but we leave it because
after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that
a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ba? I think that should
be made clear. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO:
. . . [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're
[the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you
are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So,  ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I
mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it
is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA:
I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime
but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. . . . .
HON. ROCO:
Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is
husband is not, does not negate. 111
CHAIRMAN LARA:
. . . We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement
now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions
now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation
or any of the circumstances that would define rape . . . immaterial. The fact that
the husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even if
they are living under one roof . . . for as long as the attendant
circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape. 112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO:
Mr. Chairman, . . . [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the
meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether
 or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the wife . So
the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal
impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to change the concept
of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es]
not actually add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is
merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she
was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having
sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been
committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they
have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL:
Yes, I think, there is no change on this . . . . 113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No.
9262, 114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by
a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz.:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It
includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A.   "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical
harm; CcAHEI
B.   "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a)   rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman
or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing
her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the
same room with the abuser;
b)   acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any
sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm or coercion;
c)   prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-
personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence
among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by
their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence. 115
IV.    Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent
theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which
gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he
and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to
copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
 The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently
from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack
thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation
between husband and wife. 116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory
evolved have already been superseded by modern global principles on the equality of rights between
men and women and respect for human dignity established in various international conventions, such
as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the
traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve
full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.  117 One of such
measures is R.A. No. 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every
act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was promulgated 118 by the UN General Assembly
subsequent to the CEDAW. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual
violence, viz.:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against
women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether
occurring in public or in private life. HSATIC
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited
to, the following:
(a)   Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household,
dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other
traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence
related to exploitation; 119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual
violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying
Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has
sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with
a fellow human being with dignity equal 120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to
violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely,
the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities 121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code, 122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule
sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and
mutual 123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
 Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife
excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is
an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long
way in deepening marital relationship. 124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in
order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband
who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual
intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
an essential marital obligation. 125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her
coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection
clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws 126 ordains that similar subjects
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed,
by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape,
as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law
does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage.
Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other
man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape
victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by their
husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims. EAcCHI
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in  Liberta  in rejecting the
argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed
as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same
right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman. 128 She can give or withhold her
consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from
her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely
and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of
coercion, discrimination and violence. 129 Women do not divest themselves of such right by
contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable. 130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor
provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the
law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what
the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape
cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them
differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The
elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply
uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established
legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that
no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim.
Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended
party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining
witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony
is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent
with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof. 131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly
observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-
examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts
of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will
not be disturbed on appeal. 132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire
records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no
justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous.
Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements
vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward,
and candid during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to
convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense. HDCTAc
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her
refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by
violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed.
On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal
pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK
held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small
clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no
amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands,
mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued
pleading but he never desisted. 133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 17, 1998 is likewise
unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to
sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant
barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When
KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up.
MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the
head of the family he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch,
he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual
intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Don't do that to me,
my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex." 134  But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and
briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina.
After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled:  "It's nice, that is what you
deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."  135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must
be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress. 136 Under the law, consent
is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary
consent because he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is
under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her
through force and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the
prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz.:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q   So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you
remember what happened?
A   He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q   How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A   He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his
hand.
Q   Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A   Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or
knocking her lap which means that he wanted to have sex."
Q   So, what did you do after that?
A   I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture
the witness is sobbing)
Q   So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
A   He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic]  was torn.
Q   Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
A   I resisted and tried to hold my pantie  [sic] but I failed, because he is so
strong. DCISAE
xxx xxx xxx
Q   So, when your pantie  [sic] was torn by your husband, what else did he do?
A   He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q   So after that what else did he do?
A   He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how
I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
ATTY. LARGO:
(To the witness cont'ng.)
Q   So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode
on you and held your two hands?
A   I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
Q   How did you say that to your husband?
A   I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
Q   Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxx xxx xxx
A   I shouted when I uttered that words.
xxx xxx xxx
Q   Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxx xxx xxx
A   Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything. 137
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q   Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove
your panty?
A   Yes, Sir.
Q   It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according
to you he normally do that if he have sex with you?
A   Yes, Sir.
Q   And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A   Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't
want to have sex with him at that time.
Q   You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A   Yes, Sir.
Q   Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A   I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxx xxx xxx
Q   At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your
nightgown?
A   No, Sir.
Q   And he did pull out your duster  [sic] towards your face?
A   He raised my duster  [sic] up. EIASDT
Q   In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A   No, only on the breast level. 138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY LARGO
Q   So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
 A   He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie
forcible.
Q   So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A   I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I
cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."
Q   So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A   It was torn.
Q   And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A   He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me
and succeeded in having sex with me. 139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her
hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation
of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His
actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted
sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and
thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed,
when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over
her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on
October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse
that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep
in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture
there were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was
still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear
to the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given
is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this
case, that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and
blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him
to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the
law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance 140 much more requires her to
raise a specific kind thereof. ASHECD
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-
appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her
panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted
and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just
enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind 141 or is of such a degree as to
impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission. 142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or
the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the
victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape 143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is
dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. 144 These details do not pertain to the
elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is — sexual intercourse with a woman
against her will or without her consent. 145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in  People v. Godoy, 146 the evidentiary
circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the
testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the
prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on the
position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of
physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent. 147 Here, however, KKK's
testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of
credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value
as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially
committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact
of the forced sexual intercourse. 148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest
not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony
with KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape
incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard
KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me" 149 on the night of October
16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM
went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling.
Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-
appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion
from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her
torn panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were
finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her
daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not
feeling well."
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-
appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to
interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex
with his wife even in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed
by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the
accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-
appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal
knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and
physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on
the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the
accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two
bedroom episodes — all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her
will. TAcCDI
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
 The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed
to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges.
Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their
credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit
to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband
for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed
the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant. 151 It
must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing
marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as
opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique.
In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape
victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is
in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her
husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence
or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and
public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities
or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting
the subject rape incidents.
The victim's testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view
of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence
carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and
re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete
and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court. 152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is
riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to
establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from
the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31,
1996 in the amount of P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have
entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted
that approximately P3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence
effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money
deposited in the bank. 153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs
could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while
KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more
competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite
promise to do so, to present the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's
supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the
Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has
fooled around with 10 men — some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic
statements on the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it
reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate
himself out of this legal quandary. ASHICc
 At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded
suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility
and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that
KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the
accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two
criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any
discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his  alibi.
Alibi  is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but
also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely. 154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti  or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to
the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime
was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the
two places. 155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a  fiesta in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling corn with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the
same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the
time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five
hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the
accused appellant at any time. 156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs
criminis  at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi  and denial, and the positive identification and credible
testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in
the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently
overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate
occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her
will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's
narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence
of KKK's torn panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is
morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and
17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the
accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he
shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, n otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." 157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral
damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. 158 CSTcEI
 The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.
Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances
attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is P50,000.00 159 and not P75,000.00 as
awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic
violence, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative. 160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum  to
be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's
value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social
status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to
a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who
vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our
rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives.
A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest
herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt
to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal
to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can
seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes
psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological
communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and
as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing
personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that
safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital
rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made
answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole.
He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The
award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum  from the finality
of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 204061. February 5, 2018.]

EDMISAEL C. LUTAP, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

 DECISION

TIJAM,  J p:

Through this petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45, petitioner Edmisael C. Lutap
seeks the reversal of the Decision 2 dated July 10, 2012 and Resolution 3 dated October 25, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) 4 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33630 finding petitioner guilty of attempted rape. The
assailed CA Decision modified the Decision dated August 23, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) 5 of Quezon City, Branch 94 which, in turn, found petitioner guilty of rape by sexual assault as
charged. HTcADC

The Antecedents

Petitioner was charged in an Information the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 27th day of April 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault upon the person of
[AAA], 6 6 year[s] of age, a minor, by then and [there] inserting his finger into
complainant's genital organ against her will and without her consent, to the damage
and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
Upon petitioner's plea of not guilty, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. 8
The prosecution presented as witnesses private complainant AAA, her younger brother BBB,
her mother DDD and P/SUPT. Ruby Grace Sabino-Diangson. The evidence for the prosecution tends
to establish the following facts:
At the time of the incident, AAA was only six (6) years old having been born on September
11, 1997. 9 Petitioner, who was also known as "Egay," frequently visits the house of AAA's family,
being the best friend of AAA's father. Around 6:30 o'clock in the evening of April 27, 2004, AAA and
her younger siblings, BBB and CCC, were watching television in their sala, together with petitioner.
Meanwhile, their mother DDD was cooking dinner in the kitchen separated only by a concrete wall
from the sala. 10
AAA was then wearing short pants 11 and was sitting on the floor with her legs spread apart
while watching television and playing with "text cards." BBB, on the other hand, was seated on a chair
beside CCC, some five steps away from AAA. Petitioner was seated on the sofa which was one foot
away from AAA. 12
Petitioner then touched AAA's vagina. 13 AAA reacted by swaying off his hand. 14
BBB saw petitioner using his middle finger in touching AAA's vagina. 15 Upon seeing this,
BBB said "Kuya Egay, bad iyan, wag mong kinikiliti ang pepe ni Ate." 16 BBB then went to where
DDD was cooking and told her that petitioner is bad because he is tickling AAA's vagina. 17 DDD
then called AAA, brought her inside the room and asked her if it were true that petitioner tickled her
vagina. AAA answered, "but I swayed his hand, Mama." DDD again asked AAA how many times have
petitioner tickled her vagina and AAA answered, "many times in [petitioner's] house" and that he also
"let her go on the bed, remove her panty, open her legs and lick her vagina." 18
As such, DDD confronted petitioner and asked why he did that to AAA. Petitioner said that it
was because AAA's panty was wet and that he was sorry. 19
The next day, or on April 28, 2004, DDD brought AAA to Camp Crame for medical
examination but because the doctor was not available, AAA was examined only on April 30, 2004. 20
 In defense, petitioner denied the accusations against him. Petitioner testified that he merely
pacified AAA and BBB who were quarreling over the text cards. When petitioner separated the
children, BBB then said, "bad yan, bad." 21 After which, DDD talked to her two children in the kitchen
and when she came out, she asked petitioner if he touched AAA. Petitioner denied having touched
AAA and suggested that AAA be examined. 22
The testimony of Melba Garcia, a Purok Leader, was also presented to the effect that she
personally knows petitioner and that the latter enjoys a good reputation. DDD, on the other hand, was
the subject of several complaints from the neighbors. 23
The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The RTC gave full credit to AAA's and BBB's
candid testimonies that petitioner inserted his finger in the vagina of AAA. 24 The RTC emphasized
that BBB graphically demonstrated the act committed by petitioner by moving his middle finger
constantly. To prove its point, the RTC cited the following excerpt from BBB's testimony:
COURT:
   I want to clarify. What was the finger doing?
WITNESS:
   Pinaano po sa ano ni Ate.
COURT:
   Ideretso muna. Pinaano ang ano.
WITNESS:
   Inilulusot po niya.
COURT:
   Sa ano?
WITNESS:
   Dito po.
COURT:
   Ang ano?
WITNESS:
   Sa ano ni Ate, dito po.
ACP VILLALON:
   Ano tawag diyan?
COURT:
   Huwag kang mahiya, sabihin mo. aScITE
WITNESS:
   Pepets po. x x x 25
As such, the RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding accused EDMISAEL LUTAP y CUSPAO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A paragraph 2 in
relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, taking into consideration the
aggravating circumstance that the victim was only six (6) years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to TWELVE
 YEARS (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum
and to pay the cost.
Accused is further ordered to pay private complainant [AAA] civil indemnity of
P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 26
From this adverse decision, petitioner appealed.

The Ruling of the CA

Revisiting the testimonies of AAA and BBB, the CA found that there was no insertion of
petitioner's finger into AAA's vagina as it was merely slightly touched 27 or touched without too much
pressure by petitioner. 28 The CA went on to conclude that since petitioner's finger merely touched
AAA's vagina and that there was no penetration, petitioner can only be held liable for attempted rape.
The CA thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 23, 2010 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is hereby MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Edmisael Lutap y Cuspao is found GUILTY of Attempted Rape,
and is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
of prision correccional  medium, as maximum.
Also, the accused-appellant is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 29
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied by the CA. Hence, the instant
recourse.

The Issue

Petitioner questions the CA's finding that the crime of attempted rape was committed
considering that there is absolutely no showing in this case that petitioner's sexual organ had ever
touched the victim's vagina nor any part of her body. 30 Petitioner likewise argues that there is no
clear, competent, convincing and positive evidence that petitioner touched the vagina of the victim
with the intention of forcefully inserting his finger inside. Petitioner directs the Court's attention to the
fact that at the time of the alleged incident, AAA was well clothed, her vagina fully covered as she
was then wearing a panty and a short pants. 31
Thus, the core issue tendered in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in convicting
petitioner for the crime of attempted rape on the basis of the evidence thus presented.

Our Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

We agree with the CA's ruling that the fact of insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's sexual
organ was not established beyond reasonable doubt to support petitioner's conviction of rape by
sexual assault. We also agree with the CA that there was sexual molestation by petitioner's
established act of touching AAA's vagina. Be that as it may, the act of touching a female's sexual
organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape, not even an attempted one. 32 At most, therefore,
petitioner's act of touching AAA's sexual organ demonstrates his guilt for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, an offense subsumed in the charge of rape by sexual assault. 33
Rape, under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997" can be committed in two ways: Article 266-A paragraph
1 34 refers to rape through sexual intercourse, the central element of which is carnal knowledge
which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt; and Article 266-A paragraph 2 35 refers to rape by
sexual assault which must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d) of paragraph 1. 36
The direct examination of AAA and BBB, as well as the clarificatory questions interposed by
the RTC, while convincingly prove that there was malicious touching of AAA's sexual organ,
nevertheless invite doubts as to whether petitioner indeed inserted his finger inside AAA's vagina.
On point is the direct examination of AAA yielding the following:
Q: While you were playing text, what happened, if any?
A: Tito Egay touched my vagina.
Q: What were you wearing during that time?
A: Shorts, ma'am.
Q: Where did he touch you?
A: My vagina, ma'am.
Q: Did you say anything when your Tito Egay touched your vagina?
A: I swayed off his hands. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
That the act done by petitioner was mere "touching" of AAA's sexual organ was further
corroborated by BBB whose testimony is as follows:
Q  On that particular day, April 27, 2004, you saw the accused and your Ate AAA.
What did you see?
A  Ginaganyan po.
COURT
   The witness is demonstrating by moving his middle finger.
Q  According to you, you demonstrated by moving your middle finger constantly. Who
was the once [sic] doing that? HEITAD
A  Him, ma'am.
COURT INTERPRETER
   Witness pointing to the accused.
COURT
   I want to clarify. What was that finger doing?
WITNESS
   Pinaano po sa ano ni Ate.
COURT
   Ideretso muna [sic]. Pinaano ang ano.
WITNESS
   Inilulusot po niya.
COURT
   Sa ano?
WITNESS
   Dito po.
COURT
   Ang ano?
WITNESS
   Sa ano ni Ate, dito po.
ACP VILLALON
   Anong tawag diyan?
COURT
   Huwag kang mahiya, sabihin mo.
WITNESS
   Pepets po.
ACP VILLALON
   Pinapasok.
ATTY. TOPACIO
   He did not say pinapasok.
COURT
   Ginagalaw.
ACP VILLALON
   Ginaganun?
WITNESS
   Opo.
COURT
   Interpret the answer. Pepets is vagina.
ACP VILLALON
   Iyung ginaganun, your honor.
COURT
   Touching.
WITNESS (Court Interpreter's interpretation)
   The accused was touching by his middle finger the vagina of my sister.
xxx xxx xxx
   Okay, we will ask. Was the middle finger touching the pepets (vagina) of your sister?
WITNESS
   Not too much. (Hindi po masyado.)
COURT
    Hindi masyado. Pero umabot?
WITNESS
   Umabot po.
COURT
   So umabot. Touching. Umabot pero hindi masyado. Okay, I will. Supposed this
is the pepe (vagina) of your sister, hanggang saan umabot? You
demonstrate.
COURT INTERPRETER
   Hanggang saan diyan sa daliri ni Judge?
WITNESS
   Hanggang dito lang po.
COURT
   Sa baba. Hindi umabot dito?
WITNESS
   Hindi po.
COURT
   So below the pepe.
ATTY. TOPACIO
   No, your honor, he was only pointing to the thigh area.
COURT
   Sige ulitin natin ang tanong. Sa binti ba niya . . .
ATTY. TOPACIO
   Hita po.
COURT
   Sa hita ba niya hinawakan o sa pekpek niya?
WITNESS
   Sa pepe po.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
   Pero hindi masyadong idiniin?
WITNESS
   Hindi po masyado. 38 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, absent any showing that there was actual insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's
vagina, petitioner cannot be held liable for consummated rape by sexual assault. ATICcS
People v. Mendoza, 39 explains that for a charge of rape by sexual assault with the use of
one's fingers as the assaulting object, as in the instant case, to prosper, there should be evidence of
at least the slightest penetration of the sexual organ and not merely a brush or a graze of its surface,
being that rape by sexual assault requires that the assault be specifically done through the insertion
of the assault object into the genital or anal orifices of the victim. 40
 Applying by analogy the treatment of "touching" and "entering" in penile rape as explained
in People v. Campuhan, 41 Mendoza states:
The touching of a female's sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to
rape, not even an attempted one. With regard to penile rape, People v.
Campuhan explains:
x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply
mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight
brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's
vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient
and convincing proof that the penis
indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape. x x x
x x x Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must
be entered for rape to be consummated and not merely for the penis
to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the
surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. (Italics in the original.)
What was established beyond reasonable doubt in this case was that petitioner touched,
using his middle finger, AAA's sexual organ which was then fully covered by a panty and a short
pants. However, such is insufficient to hold petitioner liable for attempted rape by sexual assault. As
above intimated, the mere touching of a female's sexual organ, by itself, does not amount to rape nor
does it suffice to convict for rape at its attempted stage. 42
The Court's explanation of attempted penile rape in Cruz v. People 43 is instructive:
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender
does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted
stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the
felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be
shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act,
is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts
directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without
such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to
establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be
carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters,
would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge
in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the
commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the
vagina, before the interruption." (Italics and citations omitted.)
Applying by analogy the above pronouncements to attempted rape by sexual assault,
petitioner's direct overt act of touching AAA's vagina by constantly moving his middle finger cannot
convincingly be interpreted as demonstrating an intent to actually insert his finger inside AAA's sexual
organ which, to reiterate, was still then protectively covered, much less an intent to have carnal
knowledge with the victim. An inference of attempted rape by sexual intercourse or attempted rape by
sexual assault cannot therefore be successfully reached based on petitioner's act of touching AAA's
genitalia and upon ceasing from doing so when AAA swayed off his hand.
 Instead, petitioner's lewd act of fondling AAA's sexual organ consummates the felony of acts
of lasciviousness. The slightest penetration into one's sexual organ distinguishes an act of
lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v. Bonaagua 44 discussed this distinction:
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the
slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip
or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if
the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should
also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual
assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case,
such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the
victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not
insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to
various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the
vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt
of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot
be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual
assault. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
Since there was neither an insertion nor an attempt to insert petitioner's finger into AAA's
genitalia, petitioner can only be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness following the
variance doctrine enunciated under Section 4 46 in relation to Section 5 47 of Rule 120 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Acts of lasciviousness, the offense proved, is included in rape, the offense
charged. 48
Pursuant to Article 336 of the RPC, acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the
following essential elements are present: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is
committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason
or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age.  49 As thus
used, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that
has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. 50 All of these elements
are present in the instant case.
It is likewise undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was six
(6) years old which calls for the application of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 defining sexual
abuse of children and prescribing the penalty therefor, as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse. TIADCc
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
Apropos, Section 2 (h) of the rules implementing R.A. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
 object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person. (Emphasis supplied)
In Quimvel v. People, 51 the Court En Banc pronounced that Section 5 (b) covers not only a
situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation
or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Further, Quimvel instructs that the
term "coercion and influence" as appearing under the law is broad enough to cover "force and
intimidation."
In this case, the Information specifically stated that: (a) AAA was a 6-year old minor at the
time of the commission of the offense; (b) that petitioner inserted his finger into AAA's genitalia; and
(c) petitioner employed force, threats and intimidation. At the trial it was established that petitioner
committed a lewd act by fondling AAA's vagina who, at the time of the incident, was alleged and
proved to be only 6 years old. Here, it was also established that AAA, being of tender age, knew and
trusted petitioner who frequents their house being the best friend of her father, thus, satisfying the
element of "influence" exerted by an adult which led AAA to indulge in lascivious conduct. Petitioner's
defense of denial, apart from being inherently weak, 52 is demolished by AAA's and BBB's
testimonies which the RTC and the CA unanimously regarded as straightforward and credible.
Conclusively, the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and of
lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610 were established in the present case. Following People v.
Caoili, 53 petitioner should be convicted of the offense designated as acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of R.A. 7610 since the minor victim in this case is below
12 years old and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), and in the absence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next lower to reclusion
temporal medium, which is reclusion temporal minimum, which ranges from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. The maximum term shall be taken from the
medium period of the imposable penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal in its medium period, which ranges
from fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and
nine (9) days. 54
Accordingly, the prison term is modified to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
Further, in line with recent jurisprudence, petitioner is ordered to pay AAA moral damages,
exemplary damages and fine in the amount of PhP15,000.00 each and civil indemnity in the amount
of PhP20,000.00. 55
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2012 and
Resolution dated October 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33630 finding
petitioner Edmisael Lutap guilty of attempted rape is REVERSED. The Court finds herein petitioner
Edmisael Lutap GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of R.A. 7610 and hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of  reclusion
temporal in its medium period as maximum. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY private complainant
moral damages, exemplary damages and fine in the amount of PhP15,000.00 each and civil
indemnity in the amount of PhP20,000.00.
Petitioner is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the damages and civil indemnity. 56
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 211002. January 21, 2015.]

RICHARD RICALDE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J  p:

Even men can become victims of rape.

Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual assault committed against a 10-year-old boy.
Accused Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged with rape as described under the second paragraph of
Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, committed "[b]y any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person." 1
This is a Petition for Review 2 assailing the Court of Appeals' August 28, 2013
Decision 3 affirming Ricalde's conviction for rape through sexual assault and January 15, 2014
Resolution 4 denying reconsideration.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Biñan, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of rape through
sexual assault:
That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province
of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus of XXX who was then ten (10) years of
age against his will and consent, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002. 6 The prosecution
presented the victim (XXX), 7 his mother, and the medico-legal as witnesses, while the defense
presented Ricalde as its sole witness. 8
The facts as found by the lower courts follow.
On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald's Bel-Air, Sta.
Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. 9 Ricalde, then 31 years old, 10 is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10
years old. 11
After dinner, XXX's mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late.  12 He
slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. 13
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and
something inserted in his anus." 14 He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis." 15 When Ricalde returned to
the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother's room to tell her what happened. 16 He also told his mother that
Ricalde played with his sexual organ. 17 ITSCED
XXX's mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the
incident, but he remained silent. 18 She asked him to leave. 19
 XXX's mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the
incident to the Sta. Rosa police station. 20 The police referred them to the municipal health center for
medical examination. 21 Dr. Roy Camarillo examined 22 XXX and found no signs of recent trauma in his
anal orifice 23 that was also "NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa." 24
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa
police station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde. 25
Ricalde denied the accusations. 26 He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town fiesta of
Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXX's mother is the cousin of his cousin Arlan Ricalde. 27 He and
XXX became textmates, and XXX invited him to his house. 28 On January 30, 2002, XXX's mother picked
him up to sleep at their house. 29 He slept at 10:00 p.m. on the living room sofa while XXX slept on the
floor. 30 He denied the alleged rape through sexual assault. 31
The Regional Trial Court in its Decision 32 dated June 20, 2011 found Ricalde guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and, accordingly, sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay [XXX] the sums of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED. 33
The Court of Appeals in its Decision 34 dated August 28, 2013 affirmed the conviction with the
modification of lowering the amounts of damages awarded:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 of the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, in Crim. Case No. 11906-B, is AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant RICHARD
RICALDE is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages likewise in the amount of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos, both with interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 35
Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal. 36
Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal testified
that he found "no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma [in XXX's] anus,"  37 or any trace of
spermatozoa. 38 He contends that physical evidence "ranks high in [the court's] hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence." 39
Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he
saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice. 40 XXX was also able to immediately push
him away. 41 Thus, no push and pull movement happened that would explain XXX's alleged stomach
ache. 42 Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach ache was an attempt to aggravate the charge
against him. 43
Petitioner argues that XXX's inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt on his guilt. 44 XXX
claimed that he immediately pushed petitioner away, but in another instance, he testified as follows: "I felt
that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his penis. He was also
playing with my penis." 45 XXX also stated in his salaysay that "the penis reached only the periphery of
his anal orifice." 46
Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner was wearing
pants with the zipper open. 47 Petitioner submits that performing anal coitus while wearing pants with an
open zipper poses a challenge — the risk of injuring the sexual organ or having pubic hair entangled in
the zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that the court must consider every circumstance favoring the innocence
of an accused. 49
Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have applied the
"variance doctrine" in People v. Sumingwa, 50 and the court would have found him guilty for the lesser
offense of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. 51 The petition then
enumerated circumstances showing possible homosexual affections between petitioner and
XXX. 52 These include the fact that they were textmates and that petitioner played with XXX's penis. 53
Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX mistook as
penetration. 54 XXX could also have mistaken the "overreaching fingers as a male organ trying to enter
his [anus]." 55 Assuming these acts took place, these would only be considered as acts of
lasciviousness. 56
The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the crime charged.
The Comment 57 discussed that it is neither improbable nor contrary to human experience that
XXX's mother allowed her son to be left alone with a stranger. 58 Petitioner was not a complete stranger,
and she could not have foreseen such abuse since "rape by sexual assault or any form of sexual abuse
of a boy by a grown man is fairly uncommon in our culture." 59 ECDAcS
Petitioner's reliance on the medico-legal's findings deserves scant consideration. 60 The
Comment quoted People v. Penilla 61 in that "[a] medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in
a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the
accused of the crime." 62 In any case, the medico-legal testified on the sphincter's flexibility and how an
insertion into the anal orifice would not necessarily cause injury. 63
Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through sexual assault based on XXX's
clear and categorical testimony. 64 Petitioner's defense of mere denial cannot outweigh positive
testimony. 65 Consequently, petitioner's contention that the incident only amounts to acts of
lasciviousness lacks merit. 66
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
petitioner Richard Ricalde's guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault.
We affirm petitioner's conviction with modification on the penalty imposed.
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 67 classified rape as a crime against persons 68 and amended
the Revised Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is Committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2)  By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis
into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object
rape," 69 "gender-free rape," 70 or "homosexual rape." 71 The gravamen of rape through sexual assault
is "the insertion of the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person's genital or anal orifice." 72
Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect." 73
The trial court found that XXX's "straightforward, unequivocal and convincing
testimony" 74 sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis
into XXX's anal orifice. 75 There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse
petitioner. 76 The Court of Appeals accorded great weight to the trial court's findings and affirmed
petitioner's conviction. 77
No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts' findings.
First, petitioner's argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXX's testimony fails to
convince.
In a long line of cases, 78 this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child
victims. Their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."  79 XXX, then only 10
years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner. 80
This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially
when they are relating past incidents of abuse." 81
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal
orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.
This contradicts petitioner's earlier statement in his appellant's brief 82 that "[a]lthough it is true
that the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape in cases where the
victim remained physically intact at the time she or he was physically examined, still, it bears stressing
that in the instant case, the private complainant testified that the accused-appellant's penis fully
penetrated his anus." 83
The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXX's testimony in that he "felt something
was inserted in [his] anus." 84
Q: That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you were sleeping at your house, do
you recall any unusual incident that happened to you?
A: Yes sir, I felt something was inserted in my anus.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you said that you felt something was inserted in your anus, what did you do?
A: I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold
his penis. He was also playing with my penis.
Q: So when you said he was inserting his penis to your anus and he was even playing
with your private part, who is this person you are referring to as "he"?
A: Richard, sir. 85
In People v. Soria, 86 this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into
his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed:
We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the
particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and
relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA" to
identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to
the fundamental tenets of due process. 87
 Second, petitioner's reliance on the medico-legal's finding of no recent trauma in XXX's anal
orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX's anal orifice does
not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive
testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human nature. DIEcHa
This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the
possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim's credible lone testimony. 88
In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in the anal orifice does
not remove the possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility of the sphincter:
Q: Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and your findings
states [sic] that you did not find any congestion or abrasion, can you explain to
this court why you stated in your findings that you did not find any congestion
or abrasion?
A: Again, based on my examination[,] there were no external signs of recent trauma to
the anus. It should be realized that the sphincter, that is the particular portion of
the anus controlling the bowel movement, it exhibits a certain flexibility such
that it can resist any objected [sic] inserted and that area is very vascular,
meaning to say, it is rich in blood supply, such that any injuries would be
healed in 24 hours or less than 24 hours, sir? 89
Lastly, we address petitioner's invocation of the "variance doctrine" citing People v. Sumingwa. 90
Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
"variance doctrine":
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. —
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included
in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified rape
but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article
III, Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 91 since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert
[the accused's] penis into [the victim's] vagina." 92
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during
trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through
sexual assault.
XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus." 93 The slightest penetration
into one's sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v.
Bonaagua 94 discussed this distinction: EICSTa
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the
slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or
the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the
tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also
be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not
the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical
 interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that
Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her
vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it
cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in
conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime
of rape through sexual assault. 95 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman's private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy
when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim's anal orifice consummates the
crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim's dignity. The degree of penetration is not
important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity." 96
People v. Quintos 97 discussed how rape causes incalculable damage on a victim's dignity,
regardless of the manner of its commission:
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are
relevant only insofar as these define the manners of commission of rape. However, it
does not mean that one manner is less heinous or wrong than the other. Whether rape
is committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a woman or by insertion of the
penis into the mouth of another person, the damage to the victim's dignity is
incalculable. Child sexual abuse in general has been associated with negative
psychological impacts such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-destructive
behavior, emotional pain, impaired sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties. Hence,
one experience of sexual abuse should not be trivialized just because it was committed
in a relatively unusual manner.
"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order." Crimes are
punished as retribution so that society would understand that the act punished was
wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a
message that one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It
attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever
manner, is a desecration of a person's will and body. In terms of penalties, treating one
manner of committing rape as greater or less in heinousness than another may be of
doubtful constitutionality.
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result
was not raised in this case. Acknowledging that every presumption must be accorded
in favor of accused in criminal cases, we have no choice but to impose a lesser penalty
for rape committed by inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim. 98 (Citations
omitted)
We affirm petitioner's conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower court to the penalty
under Article III, Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act": 99
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.  — Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case maybe: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; (Emphasis
supplied) aHcACI
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines "lascivious conduct":
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person. 100
In People v. Chingh, 101 the accused was charged with rape "for inserting his fingers and
afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor victim[.]" 102 The Court of Appeals found the
accused guilty of two counts of rape: statutory rape and rape through sexual assault. 103 This court
modified the penalty imposed for rape through sexual assault to the penalty provided in Article III, Section
5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, discussing as follows:
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV
was ten (10) years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which
defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5(b),
Article III, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission
of the offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly
prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the
penalty prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12
years of age, and considering further that Armando's act of inserting his finger in VVV's
private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable
penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A.  No. 7610, which
is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts
of lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A.  No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which
is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child
victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A.  No. 8353 to have
disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children.
Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be
applied when the victims are children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of
age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition." 104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
 Thus, "for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, [the accused Chingh
was] sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one
(21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum." 105
The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5 (b) "for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period." This penalty
is higher than the imposable penalty of prision correccional for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty when the
victim is a child.
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth
certificate, and this was admitted by the defense. 106 His age of 10 years old was alleged in the
Information. 107 The higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v. Chingh,
applies in this case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act No.
7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for children. Justice
Velasco suggests that this is not so. He anchors his view on his interpretation that Republic Act No.
7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act on the 10-year-old, the child must
also be exploited by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate on grounds of verba
legis and ratione legis.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that "children
. . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." The label "children exploited in . . . other
sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject of coercion and sexual intercourse.
Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to be
imposed. The person who engages in sexual intercourse with a child already coerced is liable.
It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child abuse. The proposal of
Justice Velasco implies that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature other than the rape itself that will
characterize rape as child abuse. One count of rape is not enough. Child abuse, in his view, is not yet
present with one count of rape. SHECcT
This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If we
adopt his view, it would amount to our collective official sanction to the idea that a single act of rape is not
debilitating to a child. That a single act of rape is not a tormenting memory that will sear into a child's
memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her of the trust that will enable him or her to have
full and diverse meaningful interactions with other human beings. In my view, a single act of sexual abuse
to a child, by law, is already reprehensible. Our society has expressed that this is conduct which should
be punishable. The purpose and text of the law already punish that single act as child abuse.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.
Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of the accused will be violated
should we impose the penalty under Republic Act No. 7610. I disagree.
The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the offense. The facts constitutive of the
offense will suggest the crime punishable by law. The principle is that ignorantia legis non excusat. With
the facts clearly laid out in the Information, the law which punishes the offense should already be clear
and the accused put on notice of the charges against him.
Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not represented by counsel. Clear from
the records is the entry and active participation of his lawyer up to and including this appeal.
 On the award of damages, we maintain the amount of P30,000.00 in favor of XXX as a victim of
rape through sexual assault, consistent with jurisprudence. 108
This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the information that
the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape committed by means other than
penile insertion is P30,000." 109
This statement considered the prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where victims of rape are
all women. However, as in this case, men can also become victims of rape through sexual assault, and
this can involve penile insertion.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 34387 dated August 28, 2013
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph
2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the victim
civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the amount of P30,000.00,
both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 227363. March 12, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALVADOR

TULAGAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J  p:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 17, 2015 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, which affirmed the Joint Decision 2 dated February 10, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211,
finding accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan (Tulagan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of sexual assault and statutory rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraphs 2 and
1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in relation to Article 266-B.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows:
That sometime in the month of September 2011, at x x x, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
intimidation and with abuse of superior strength forcibly laid complainant AAA, 3 a 9-
year-old minor in a cemented pavement, and did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will
and consent.
Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A.
7610.
 In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, Tulagan was charged as follows:
That on or about October 8, 2011 at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with
abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor against her will
and consent to the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against her will and consent.
Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
R.A. 7610.
Upon arraignment, Tulagan pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
During the trial, BBB, aunt of the victim AAA, testified that around 10:30 a.m. of October 17,
2011, she noticed a man looking at AAA outside their house. When AAA asked her permission to go
to the bathroom located outside their house, the man suddenly went near AAA. Out of suspicion, BBB
walked to approach AAA. As BBB came close to AAA, the man left suddenly. After AAA returned from
the bathroom, BBB asked what the man was doing to her. AAA did not reply. She then told AAA to
get inside the house. She asked AAA to move her panties down, and examined her genitalia. She
noticed that her genitalia was swollen. AAA then confessed to her about the wrong done to her by
appellant whom AAA referred to as Badong or Salvador Tulagan. AAA cried hard and embraced BBB
tightly. AAA asked BBB for her help and even told her that she wanted Badong to be put in jail.
AAA, nine (9) years old, testified that sometime in September 2011 while she was peeling
corn with her cousin who lived adjacent to her grandmother's house, Tulagan approached her, spread
her legs, and inserted his finger into her private part. She said that it was painful, but Tulagan just
pretended as if he was just looking for something and went home. CAIHTE
AAA, likewise, testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8, 2011, while she was playing
with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house, he brought her to his house and told her to keep quiet. He
told her to lie down on the floor, and removed her short pants and panties. He also undressed
himself, kissed AAA's cheeks, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She claimed that it was painful
and that she cried because Tulagan held her hands and pinned them with his. She did not tell anyone
about the incident, until her aunt examined her private part.
Upon genital examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder on AAA, she found a healed laceration at
6 o'clock position in AAA's hymen, and a dilated or enlarged vaginal opening. She said that it is not
normal for a 9-year-old child to have a dilated vaginal opening and laceration in the hymen.
For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted that he lived
barely five (5) meters away from AAA's grandmother's house where she lived. He added that the
whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried banana leaves
to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the banana leaves he
gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to AAA's house and that he had not
seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011. Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the
alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding with AAA's grandmother, who later on
started spreading rumors that he raped her granddaughter.
After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in
two offenses of rape against AAA. It held that all the elements of sexual assault and statutory rape
was duly established. The trial court relied on the credible and positive declaration of the victim as
against the alibi and denial of Tulagan. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
victim in the amount of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00) pesos; moral damages in the
amount of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of the suit.
Likewise, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case No. SCC-6210 for the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
 paragraph 2 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of thirty thousand
(Php30,000.00) pesos; and moral damages in the amount of twenty thousand
(Php20,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual assault and
statutory rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated February 10, 2014 is AFFIRMED,
subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault),
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The award of moral damages is increased to
P30,000.00; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, are likewise
granted.
2. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 (Statutory Rape), the awards of
civil indemnity and moral damages are increased to P100,000.00
each. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, too, are
granted.
3. All damages awarded are subject to legal interest at the rate of
6% [per annum] from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED. 5 DETACa
Aggrieved, Tulagan invoked the same arguments he raised before the CA in assailing his
conviction. He alleged that the appellate court erred in giving weight and credence to the inconsistent
testimony of AAA, and in sustaining his conviction despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. To support his appeal, he argued that the testimony of AAA was fraught
with inconsistencies and lapses which affected her credibility.

Our Ruling

The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of the crime,
the penalty imposed, and the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault,
and a reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, are in
order.
Factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity
afforded them to observe the witnesses when placed on the stand. Consequently, appellate courts
will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. 6 Said rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA, as in the instant case:
Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of
the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great
weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said
findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect
the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to
ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual
observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in
 court. Trial judges enjoy the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and
manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" —
all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and
sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are telling the
truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain
facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, its assessment must be respected, for it had the opportunity to
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if
they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. 7
Here, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, both the RTC and the CA found
AAA's testimony to be credible, straightforward and unwavering when she testified that Tulagan
forcibly inserted his finger in her vagina. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, both the
RTC and the CA also found that the elements thereof were present, to wit: (1) accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim, and (2) said act was accomplished when the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age. Indubitably, the courts a quo found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt Tulagan's guilt for the crime of rape. We find no reason to deviate from said
findings and conclusions of the courts a quo.
Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or discrepancies
does not, by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance in minor
details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they
discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness'
consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same. 8
As correctly held by the CA, the fact that some of the details testified to by AAA did not
appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not mean that the sexual assault did not happen. AAA was
still able to narrate all the details of the sexual assault she suffered in Tulagan's hands. AAA's
account of her ordeal being straightforward and candid and corroborated by the medical findings of
the examining physician, as well as her positive identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the
crime, are, thus, sufficient to support a conviction of rape.
As for Tulagan's imputation of ill motive on the part of AAA's grandmother, absent any
concrete supporting evidence, said allegation will not convince us that the trial court's assessment of
the credibility of the victim and her supporting witness was tainted with arbitrariness or blindness to a
fact of consequence. We reiterate the principle that no young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a
sordid tale, on her own or through the influence of her grandmother as per Tulagan's intimation,
undergo an invasive medical examination then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a
public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice. In  People v. Garcia, 9 we
held: aDSIHc
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the
offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her
account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the
shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's
revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to
give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as
mere concoction. 10
We also reject Tulagan's defense of denial. Being a negative defense, the defense of denial,
if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in the instant case, deserves no weight in
law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses, like AAA,
who testified on affirmative matters. Since AAA testified in a categorical and consistent manner
without any ill motive, her positive identification of Tulagan as the sexual offender must prevail over
his defenses of denial and alibi.
Here, the courts a quo did not give credence to Tulagan's alibi considering that his house
was only 50 meters away from AAA's house, thus, he failed to establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis when the rape incidents took place. "Physical
impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of
the accused when the crime was committed. There must be a demonstration that they were so far
away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when
the crime was committed. In this regard, Tulagan failed to prove that there was physical impossibility
for him to be at the crime scene when the rape was committed. 11 Thus, his alibi must fail.
Further, although the rape incidents in the instant case were not immediately reported to the
police, such delay does not affect the truthfulness of the charge in the absence of other
circumstances that show the same to be a mere concoction or impelled by some ill motive. 12
For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, We take this opportunity to reconcile the
provisions on Acts of Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual Assault under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 vis-à-vis Sexual Intercourse and
Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, to fortify the earlier decisions of the Court
and doctrines laid down on similar issues, and to clarify the nomenclature and the imposable
penalties of said crimes, and damages in line with existing jurisprudence. 13
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 on October 22, 1997,
acts constituting sexual assault under paragraph 2, 14 Article 266-A of the RPC, were punished as
acts of lasciviousness under Article No. 336 15 of the RPC or Act No. 3815 which took effect on
December 8, 1930. For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the confluence of the
following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness
or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c)
when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age. 16 In Amployo v. People, 17 We
expounded on the broad definition of the term "lewd":
The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is
characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is
entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence
of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that
can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd
designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot
be pigeonholed into a precise definition. As early as U.S. v. Gomez, we had
already lamented that: ETHIDa
It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule
specifically establishing just what conduct makes one amenable to
the provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code. What constitutes
lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the
circumstances of each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a
particular case that certain acts are lewd and lascivious, and it may
be extremely difficult in another case to say just where the line of
demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances
of an ardent lover. 18
When R.A. No. 7610 or The Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act took effect on June 17, 1992 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations was
promulgated in October 1993, the term "lascivious conduct" was given a specific definition. The Rules
and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases states that "lascivious
conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person."
Upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353, specific forms of acts of lasciviousness were no longer
punished under Article 336 of the RPC, but were transferred as a separate crime of "sexual assault"
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. Committed by "inserting penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person"
against the victim's will, "sexual assault" has also been called "gender-free rape" or "object rape."
However, the term "rape by sexual assault" is a misnomer, as it goes against the traditional concept
of rape, which is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent or against her will. In contrast to
sexual assault which is a broader term that includes acts that gratify sexual desire (such as
cunnilingus, felatio, sodomy or even rape), the classic rape is particular and its commission involves
only the reproductive organs of a woman and a man. Compared to sexual assault, rape is severely
penalized because it may lead to unwanted procreation; or to paraphrase the words of the legislators,
it will put an outsider into the woman who would bear a child, or to the family, if she is married.  19 The
dichotomy between rape and sexual assault can be gathered from the deliberation of the House of
Representatives on the Bill entitled "An Act to Amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Sexual Assault":
INTERPELLATION OF MR. [ERASMO B.] DAMASING:
xxx xxx xxx
Pointing out his other concerns on the measure, specifically regarding the
proposed amendment to the Revised Penal Code making rape gender-free, Mr.
Damasing asked how carnal knowledge could be committed in case the sexual act
involved persons of the same sex or involves unconventional sexual acts.
Mr. [Sergio A. F.] Apostol replied that the Bill is divided into two
classifications: rape and sexual assault. The Committee, he explained, defines rape
as carnal knowledge by a person with the opposite sex, while sexual assault is
defined as gender-free, meaning it is immaterial whether the person committing the
sexual act is a man or a woman or of the same sex as the victim.
Subsequently, Mr. Damasing adverted to Section 1 which seeks to amend
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA No. 7659, which is
amended in the Bill as follows: "Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
person of the opposite sex under the following circumstances." He then inquired
whether it is the Committee's intent to make rape gender-free, either by a man
against a woman, by a woman against a man, by man against a man, or by a woman
against a woman. He then pointed out that the Committee's proposed amendment is
vague as presented in the Bill, unlike the Senate version which specifically defines in
what instances the crime of rape can be committed by a man or by the opposite sex.
Mr. Apostol replied that under the Bill "carnal knowledge" presupposes that
the offender is of the opposite sex as the victim. If they are of the same sex, as what
Mr. Damasing has specifically illustrated, such act cannot be considered rape — it is
sexual assault.
Mr. Damasing, at this point, explained that the Committee's definition of
carnal knowledge should be specific since the phrase "be a person of the opposite
sex" connotes that carnal knowledge can be committed by a person, who can be
either a man or a woman and hence not necessarily of the opposite sex but may be
of the same sex.
Mr. Apostol pointed out that the measure explicitly used the phrase "carnal
knowledge of a person of the opposite sex" to define that the abuser and the victim
are of the opposite sex; a man cannot commit rape against another man or a woman
 against another woman. He pointed out that the Senate version uses the phrase
carnal knowledge with a woman."
While he acknowledged Mr. Apostol's points, Mr. Damasing reiterated that
the specific provisions need to be clarified further to avoid confusion, since, earlier in
the interpellation Mr. Apostol admitted that being gender-free, rape can be committed
under four situations or by persons of the same sex. Whereupon, Mr. Damasing read
the specific provisions of the Senate version of the measure. cSEDTC
In his rejoinder, Mr. Apostol reiterated his previous contention that the Bill
has provided for specific and distinct definitions regarding rape and sexual assault to
differentiate that rape cannot be totally gender-free as it must be committed by a
person against someone of the opposite sex.
With regard to Mr. Damasing's query on criminal sexual acts involving
persons of the same sex, Mr. Apostol replied that Section 2, Article 266(b) of the
measure on sexual assault applies to this particular provision.
Mr. Damasing, at this point, inquired on the particular page where Section 2
is located.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
xxx xxx xxx
INTERPELLATION OF MR. DAMASING
(Continuation)
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Apostol further expounded on Sections 1
and 2 of the bill and differentiated rape from sexual assault. Mr. Apostol pointed out
that the main difference between the aforementioned sections is that carnal
knowledge or rape, under Section 1, is always with the opposite sex. Under Section
2, on sexual assault, he explained that such assault may be on the genitalia, the
mouth, or the anus; it can be done by a man against a woman, a man against a man,
a woman against a woman or a woman against a man. 20
Concededly, R.A. No. 8353 defined specific acts constituting acts of lasciviousness as a
distinct crime of "sexual assault," and increased the penalty thereof from prision
correccional to prision mayor. But it was never the intention of the legislature to redefine the
traditional concept of rape. The Congress merely upgraded the same from a "crime against chastity"
(a private crime) to a "crime against persons" (a public crime) as a matter of policy and public interest
in order to allow prosecution of such cases even without the complaint of the offended party, and to
prevent extinguishment of criminal liability in such cases through express pardon by the offended
party. Thus, other forms of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct committed against a child,
such as touching of other delicate parts other than the private organ or kissing a young girl with
malice, are still punished as acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to R.A.
No. 7610 or lascivious conduct under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.
Records of committee and plenary deliberations of the House of Representative and of the
deliberations of the Senate, as well as the records of bicameral conference committee meetings,
further reveal no legislative intent for R.A. No. 8353 to supersede Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The
only contentious provisions during the bicameral conference committee meetings to reconcile the bills
of the Senate and House of Representatives which led to the enactment of R.A. No. 8353, deal with
the nature of and distinction between rape by carnal knowledge and rape by sexual assault, the
threshold age to be considered in statutory rape [whether Twelve (12) or Fourteen (14)], the
provisions on marital rape and effect of pardon, and the presumptions of vitiation or lack of consent in
rape cases. While R.A. No. 8353 contains a generic repealing and amendatory clause, the records of
the deliberation of the legislature are silent with respect to sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
against children under R.A. No. 7610, particularly those who are 12 years old or below 18, or above
18 but are unable to fully take care or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
 In instances where the lascivious conduct committed against a child victim is covered by the
definition under R.A. No. 7610, and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under paragraph
2, 21 Article 266-A of the RPC, the offender should be held liable for violation of Section 5 (b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610. The ruling in Dimakuta v. People 22 is instructive:
Article 226-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person if the victim did not consent either it was done through force,
threat or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority as
sexual assault as a form of rape. However, in instances where the lascivious conduct
is covered by the definition under R.A. No 7610, where the penalty is reclusion
temporal medium, and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision mayor, the offender
should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the
law provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended
party is a child victim. But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the
offender should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No. 7610,
unless the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of
herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender
may still be held liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610. 23
There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act, taking into account the
constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being of the youth, as well as, in harmony with the
foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all actions concerning him or
her. This is equally consistent with the declared policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide
sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence
of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.
Besides, if it was the intention of the framers of the law to make child offenders liable
only of Article 266-A of the RPC, which provides for a lower penalty than R.A. No.
7610, the law could have expressly made such statements. 24
Meanwhile, if acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct are committed with a child who is
12 years old or less than 18 years old, the ruling in Dimakuta 25 is also on point: SDAaTC
Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is deemed subjected to
other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult. This statutory provision must be distinguished from Acts of
Lasciviousness under Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of
the RPC, Acts of Lasciviousness has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
 Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts of lasciviousness committed
with the consent of the offended party if done by the same persons and under the
same circumstances mentioned in Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC, to wit:
1. if committed against a virgin over twelve years and under
eighteen years of age by any person in public authority, priest,
home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in
any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman; or
2. if committed by means of deceit against a woman who is single or
a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years
of age.
Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12 years of
age and under eighteen (18) years of age, the accused shall be liable for:
1. Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC,
where the victim is a virgin and consents to the lascivious acts
through abuse of confidence or when the victim is single or a widow
of good reputation and consents to the lascivious acts through
deceit, or;
2. Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of
lasciviousness is not covered by lascivious conduct as defined in
R.A. No. 7610. In case the acts of lasciviousness [are] covered by
lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through
coercion or influence, which establishes absence or lack of consent,
then Art. 336 of the RPC is no longer applicable;
3. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was
no consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious conduct, which
was done through the employment of coercion or influence. The
offender may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No.
7610 if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to
fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition. 26
In People v. Caoili, 27 We prescribed the following guidelines in designating or charging the
proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in
determining the imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the
offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime
should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant to the
second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below
eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully
take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition,
the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. 28
 Based on the Caoili 29 guidelines, it is only when the victim of the lascivious conduct is 18
years old and above that such crime would be designated as "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision correccional. acEHCD
Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere "crime against
chastity" in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a "crime against persons" akin to rape, as well as the
rulings in Dimakuta and Caoili, We hold that if the acts constituting sexual assault are committed
against a victim under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now
be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5
(b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a form of acts of lasciviousness is no longer covered
by Article 336 but by Article 266-A (2) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. Nevertheless, the
imposable penalty is still reclusion temporal in its medium period, and not prision mayor.
Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above
under special circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua, 30 but it should not make any reference to the provisions of the RPC. It is only
when the victim of the sexual assault is 18 years old and above, and not demented, that the crime
should be called as "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC" with the imposable
penalty of prision mayor.
Sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years old or is demented
is statutory rape

Under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the proper penalty when sexual intercourse is
committed with a victim who is under 12 years of age or is demented is  reclusion perpetua, pursuant
to paragraph 1 (d), 31 Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, 32 which in turn amended Article 335 33 of the RPC. Thus:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape [sic] and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x. 34
In Quimvel v. People, 35 it was opined 36 that the two provisos under Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610 will apply only if the victim is under 12 years of age, but not to those 12 years old and below
18, for the following reason:
"while the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 is silent with
respect to the age of the victim, Section 3, Article I thereof defines "children" as those
below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability. Notably,
 two provisos succeeding the first clause of Section 5(b) explicitly state a qualification
that when the victim of lascivious conduct is under 12 years of age, the perpetrator
shall be (1) prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, and (2) the penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period. It is a basic rule in statutory
construction that the office of the proviso qualifies or modifies only the phrase
immediately preceding it or restrains of limits the generality of the clause that it
immediately follows. A proviso is to be construed with reference to the
immediately preceding part of the provisions, to which it is attached, and not to
the statute itself or the other sections thereof. 37 Accordingly, this case falls
under the qualifying provisos of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 because the
allegations in the information make out a case for acts of lasciviousness, as defined
under Article 336 of the RPC, and the victim is under 12 years of age x x
x." 38 SDHTEC
In view of the foregoing rule in statutory construction, it was proposed 39 in Quimvel that the
penalty for acts of lasciviousness committed against a child should depend on his/her age: if the
victim is under 12 years of age, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, and if the
victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances under Section 3
(a) 40 of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Applying by analogy the foregoing discussion in Quimvel to the act of sexual intercourse with
a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse, We rule that when the offended party
is under 12 years of age or is demented, only the first proviso of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610 will apply, to wit: "when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape x x x." The penalty for statutory rape under Article
335 is reclusion perpetua, which is still the same as in the current rape law, i.e., paragraph 1 (d),
Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, except in cases
where the victim is below 7 years of age where the imposable penalty is death. 41
Note that the second proviso of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 will not apply because it
clearly has nothing to do with sexual intercourse, and it only deals with " lascivious conduct when the
victim is under 12 years of age." While the terms "lascivious conduct" and "sexual intercourse" are
included in the definition of "sexual abuse" under Section 2 (g) 42 of the Rules and Regulations on
the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, note that the definition of "lascivious
conduct" 43 does not include sexual intercourse. Be it stressed that the purpose of indicating the
phrase "under twelve (12) years of age" is to provide for statutory lascivious conduct or statutory rape,
whereby evidence of force, threat or intimidation is immaterial because the offended party, who is
under 12 years old or is demented, is presumed incapable of giving rational consent.
Malto ruling clarified

An important distinction between violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 and rape under
the RPC was explained in Malto v. People. 44 We ruled in Malto 45 that one may be held liable for
violation of Sec. 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 despite a finding that the person did not commit
rape, because rape is a felony under the RPC, while sexual abuse against a child is punished by a
special law. Said crimes are separate and distinct, and they have different elements. Unlike in rape,
however, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610. The
mere fact of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited
in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense.
In Malto, 46 where the accused professor indulged several times in sexual intercourse with
the 17-year-old private complainant, We also stressed that since a child cannot give consent to a
contract under our civil laws because she can easily be a victim of fraud as she is not capable of full
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions, the harm which results from a child's
bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal.
Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual
behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual
activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to
afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. In sum, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious conduct or sexual
intercourse.
We take exception, however, to the sweeping conclusions in Malto (1) that "a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious conduct or sexual
intercourse" and (2) that "consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610" because they would virtually eradicate the concepts of statutory rape
and statutory acts of lasciviousness, and trample upon the express provision of the said law.
Recall that in statutory rape, the only subject of inquiry is whether the woman is below 12
years old or is demented and whether carnal knowledge took place; whereas force, intimidation and
physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations. With respect to acts of lasciviousness,
R.A. No. 8353 modified Article 336 of the RPC by retaining the circumstance that the offended party
is under 12 years old in order for acts of lasciviousness to be considered as statutory and by adding
the circumstance that the offended party is demented, thereby rendering the evidence of force or
intimidation immaterial. 47 This is because the law presumes that the victim who is under 12 years
old or is demented does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years or
dementia; thus, a child's or a demented person's consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern good from evil. 48
However, considering the definition under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 of the term
"children" which refers to persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, We find that the opinion
in Malto, that a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent, unduly extends
the concept of statutory rape or acts of lasciviousness to those victims who are within the range of 12
to 17 years old, and even those 18 years old and above under special circumstances who are still
considered as "children" under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610. While Malto is correct that consent is
immaterial in cases under R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of age, We
clarify that consent of the child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases involving
violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18,
or above 18 under special circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to prove that
the said victim engaged in sexual intercourse either "due to money, profit or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group." AScHCD
It bears emphasis that violation of the first clause of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
on sexual intercourse with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse, is
separate and distinct from statutory rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the RPC. Aside from
being dissimilar in the sense that the former is an offense under special law, while the latter is a
felony under the RPC, they also have different elements. 49 Nevertheless, sexual intercourse with a
victim who is under 12 years of age or is demented is always statutory rape, as Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610 expressly states that the perpetrator will be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 of
the RPC [now paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 8353].
Even if the girl who is below twelve (12) years old or is demented consents to the sexual
intercourse, it is always a crime of statutory rape under the RPC, and the offender should no longer
be held liable under R.A. No. 7610. For example, a nine (9)-year-old girl was sold by a pimp to a
customer, the crime committed by the latter if he commits sexual intercourse with the girl is still
statutory rape, because even if the girl consented or is demented, the law presumes that she is
incapable of giving a rational consent. The same reason holds true with respect to acts of
lasciviousness or lascivious conduct when the offended party is less than 12 years old or is
demented. Even if such party consents to the lascivious conduct, the crime is always statutory acts of
lasciviousness. The offender will be prosecuted under Article 336 50 of the RPC, but the penalty is
provided for under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. Therefore, there is no conflict between rape and
acts of lasciviousness under the RPC, and sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct under R.A. No.
7610.
 Meanwhile, if sexual intercourse is committed with a child under 12 years of age, who is
deemed to be "exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse," then those who engage in or
promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution under Section 5 (a) 51 of R.A. No. 7610 shall be liable
as principal by force or inducement under Article 17 52 of the RPC in the crime of statutory rape
under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC; whereas those who derive profit or advantage therefrom under
Section 5 (c) 53 of R.A. No. 7610 shall be liable as principal by indispensable cooperation under
Article 17 of the RPC. Bearing in mind the policy of R.A. No. 7610 of providing for stronger deterrence
and special protection against child abuse and exploitation, the following shall be the nomenclature of
the said statutory crimes and the imposable penalties for principals by force or inducement or by
indispensable cooperation:
1. Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (a) or (c), as
the case may be, of R.A. No. 7610, with the imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua;
2. Rape under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, in relation to Article 17 of the RPC and Section 5
(a) or (c), as the case may be, of R.A. No. 7610 with the imposable penalty
of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, except when the victim is
below 7 years old, in which case the crime is considered as Qualified Rape, for which
the death penalty shall be imposed; and
3. Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (a) or (c), as the
case may be, of R.A. No. 7610 with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua.
If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child "exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she agreed to indulge in sexual intercourse "for money,
profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," then
the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of
statutory rape, and there was consent. That is why the offender will now be penalized under Section 5
(b), R.A. No. 7610, and not under Article 335 54 of the RPC [now Article 266-A]. But if the said victim
does not give her consent to sexual intercourse in the sense that the sexual intercourse was
committed through force, threat or intimidation, the crime is rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of
the RPC. However, if the same victim gave her consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money,
profit, consideration, coercion or influence is involved, then there is no crime committed, except in
those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an element of rape is substituted by "moral
ascendancy or moral authority," 55 like in the cases of incestuous rape, and unless it is punished
under the RPC as qualified seduction under Article 337 56 or simple seduction under Article 338. 57
Rulings in Tubillo, Abay and Pangilinan clarified

At this point, it is not amiss to state that the rulings in People v. Tubillo, 58 People v.
Abay 59 and People v. Pangilinan 60 should be clarified, because there is no need to examine
whether the focus of the prosecution's evidence is "coercion and influence" or "force and intimidation"
for the purpose of determining which between R.A. No. 7610 or the RPC should the accused be
prosecuted under in cases of acts of lasciviousness or rape where the offended party is 12 years of
age or below 18.
To recap, We explained in Abay 61 that under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 in
relation to R.A. No. 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should
not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the
RPC, and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the
offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape
under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the RPC. However, the offender cannot be accused of
both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy might be prejudiced. Besides,
rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, because under Section
48 of the RPC (on complex crimes), a felony under the RPC (such as rape) cannot be complexed
with an offense penalized by a special law. AcICHD
 Considering that the victim in Abay was more than 12 years old when the crime was
committed against her, and the Information against appellant stated that the child was 13 years old at
the time of the incident, We held that appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the RPC. We observed that
while the Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecution's evidence only
established that appellant sexually violated the person of the child through force and intimidation by
threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Hence,
appellant was found guilty of rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC.
In Pangilinan, where We were faced with the same dilemma because all the elements of
paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 were present, it was ruled
that the accused can be charged with either rape or child abuse and be convicted therefor. However,
We observed that rape was established, since the prosecution's evidence proved that the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim through force and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai.
Citing the discussion in Abay, We ruled as follows:
As in the present case, appellant can indeed be charged with either Rape or
Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. The prosecution's evidence established that
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening
her with a samurai. Thus, rape was established. Considering that in the resolution of
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he resolved the filing of rape under Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code for which appellant was convicted by both the RTC and
the CA, therefore, we merely affirm the conviction. 62
In the recent case of Tubillo where We noted that the Information would show that the case
involves both the elements of paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610, We likewise examined the evidence of the prosecution, whether it focused on the specific force
or intimidation employed by the offender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have
carnal knowledge with the victim. In ruling that appellant should be convicted of rape under paragraph
1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC instead of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, We explained:
Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the force or
intimidation employed by Tubillo against HGE under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC.
The prosecution presented the testimony of HGE who narrated that Tubillo unlawfully
entered the house where she was sleeping by breaking the padlock. Once inside, he
forced himself upon her, pointed a knife at her neck, and inserted his penis in her
vagina. She could not resist the sexual attack against her because Tubillo poked a
bladed weapon at her neck. Verily, Tubillo employed brash force or intimidation to
carry out his dastardly deeds. 63
With this decision, We now clarify the principles laid down in Abay, Pangilinan and Tubillo to
the effect that there is a need to examine the evidence of the prosecution to determine whether the
person accused of rape should be prosecuted under the RPC or R.A. No. 7610 when the offended
party is 12 years old or below 18.
First, if sexual intercourse is committed with an offended party who is a child less than 12
years old or is demented, whether or not exploited in prostitution, it is always a crime of statutory
rape; more so when the child is below 7 years old, in which case the crime is always qualified rape.
Second, when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 and the charge against the
accused is carnal knowledge through "force, threat or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for
rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC. In contrast, in case of sexual intercourse with a child who
is 12 years old or below 18 and who is deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," the
crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory
rape, and the victim indulged in sexual intercourse either "for money, profit or any other consideration
or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," which deemed the child as one
"exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse."
To avoid further confusion, We dissect the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" as an
element of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5
of R.A. No. 7610 and having in mind that the term "lascivious conduct" 64 has a clear definition which
does not include "sexual intercourse," the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" contemplates four
(4) scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration,
indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration,
indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse.
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of
"child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2 (g) of
the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. 65 In the former
provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person
to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children.
In Quimvel, it was held that the term "coercion or influence" is broad enough to cover or even
synonymous with the term "force or intimidation." Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that
"coercion or influence" is used in Section 5 66 of R.A. No. 7610 to qualify or refer to the means
through which "any adult, syndicate or group" compels a child to indulge in sexual intercourse. On the
other hand, the use of "money, profit or any other consideration" is the other mode by which a child
indulges in sexual intercourse, without the participation of "any adult, syndicate or group." In other
words, "coercion or influence" of a child to indulge in sexual intercourse is clearly exerted NOT by the
offender whose liability is based on Section 5 (b) 67 of R.A. No. 7610 for committing sexual act with a
child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse. Rather, the "coercion or influence" is exerted
upon the child by "any adult, syndicate, or group" whose liability is found under Section 5 (a)  68 for
engaging in, promoting, facilitating or inducing child prostitution, whereby the sexual intercourse is the
necessary consequence of the prostitution. TAIaHE
For a clearer view, a comparison of the elements of rape under the RPC and sexual
intercourse with a child under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is between 12
years old and below 18, is in order.
 

Rape under Article 266-A (1) (a, b, c) Section 5 (1) of R.A. No. 7610
under the RPC

1. Offender is a man; 1. Offender is a man;

2. Carnal knowledge of a woman; 2. Indulges in sexual intercourse with a

female child exploited in prostitution
or other sexual abuse, who is 12
years old or below 18 or above 18
under special circumstances;

3. Through force, threat or intimidation; 3. Coercion or influence of any adult,

when the offended party is deprived of syndicate or group is employed
reason or otherwise unconscious; and against the child to become a
by means of fraudulent machination prostitute.
or grave abuse of authority.

 
As can be gleaned above, "force, threat or intimidation" is the element of rape under the
RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for
a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," which is the element of sexual
abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The "coercion or influence" is not the reason why the
child submitted herself to sexual intercourse, but it was utilized in order for the child to become a
prostitute. Considering that the child has become a prostitute, the sexual intercourse becomes
voluntary and consensual because that is the logical consequence of prostitution as defined under
Article 202 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10158 where the definition of "prostitute" was
retained by the new law: 69
Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. — For the purposes of this article, women who, for
money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be
punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of
recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
Therefore, there could be no instance that an Information may charge the same accused with
the crime of rape where "force, threat or intimidation" is the element of the crime under the RPC, and
at the same time violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 where the victim indulged in sexual
intercourse because she is exploited in prostitution either "for money, profit or any other
consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" — the phrase which
qualifies a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse" as an element of
violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
Third, if the charge against the accused where the victim is 12 years old or below 18 is sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, then it may happen that the elements thereof
are the same as that of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, because the term
"lascivious conduct" includes introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any
person. 70 In this regard, We held in Dimakuta that in instances where a "lascivious conduct"
committed against a child is covered by R.A. No. 7610 and the act is likewise covered by sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC [punishable by prision mayor], the offender
should be held liable for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 [punishable by reclusion temporal
medium], consistent with the declared policy of the State to provide special protection to children from
all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. But when the offended party is below 12 years of age or is demented, the accused
should be prosecuted and penalized under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, because the crime of sexual assault is considered statutory, whereby
the evidence of force or intimidation is immaterial.
Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information — e.g., carnal
knowledge or sexual intercourse was due to "force or intimidation" with the added phrase of "due to
coercion or influence," one of the elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610; or in many instances
wrongfully designate the crime in the Information as violation of "Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) in
relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," although this may be a ground for quashal of the
Information under Section 3 (f) 71 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court — and proven during the trial in a
case where the victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual intercourse, the
accused should still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the
more recent and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies
of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610 is a special law specifically enacted to provide special
protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and
other conditions prejudicial to their development, We hold that it is contrary to the legislative intent of
the same law if the lesser penalty (reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua) under Section 5
(b) thereof would be imposed against the perpetrator of sexual intercourse with a child 12 years of
age or below 18. cDHAES
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353, is not only the more recent law, but also deals more particularly with all rape cases, hence,
 its short title "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." R.A. No. 8353 upholds the policies and principles of R.A.
No. 7610, and provides a "stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse," as it
imposes a more severe penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC, or even the
death penalty if the victim is (1) under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim; or (2) when the victim is a child below 7 years old.
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the
later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. 72 Indeed, statutes
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence, and if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later
enactment, because the later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.  73 Hence, Article 266-
B of the RPC must prevail over Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
In sum, the following are the applicable laws and penalty for the crimes of acts of
lasciviousness or lascivious conduct and rape by carnal knowledge or sexual assault, depending on
the age of the victim, in view of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A and Article 336
of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610:
Designation of the Crime & Imposable Penalty
Crime Age of Under 12 years old or 12 years old or below 18, 18 years old and
Committed: Victim: demented or 18 under special above
circumstances 74

Acts of Lasciviousness Acts of Lasciviousness Lascivious Not applicable

committed against children
exploited in prostitution or
other sexual abuse
under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to Section 5
(b) of R.A. No.
7610: reclusion temporal in
its medium period
conduct 75 under Section 5
(b) of R.A. No.
7610: reclusion temporal in
its medium period
to reclusion perpetua

Sexual Assault committed
against children exploited in
prostitution or other sexual
abuse
Sexual Assault under
Article 266-A (2) of the
RPC in relation to Section 5
(b) of R.A. No.
7610: reclusion temporal in
its medium period
Lascivious Conduct under Not applicable
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610: reclusion temporal in
its medium period
to reclusion perpetua

Sexual Intercourse
committed against children
exploited in prostitution or
other sexual abuse
Rape under Article 266-A
(1) of the RPC: reclusion
perpetua, except when the
victim is below 7 years old
in which case death penalty
shall be imposed 76
Sexual Abuse 77 under Not applicable
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610: reclusion temporal in
its medium period
to reclusion perpetua

Rape by carnal knowledge
Rape under Article 266-A Rape under Article 266-A Rape under
(1) in relation to Art. 266-B (1) in relation to Art. 266-B Article 266-A (1)
of the RPC: reclusion of the RPC: reclusion of the
perpetua, except when the perpetua RPC: reclusion
victim is below 7 years old perpetua
in which case death penalty
shall be imposed

Rape by Sexual Assault Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct under Sexual Assault 
Article 266-A (2) of the Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. under Article
RPC in relation to Section 5 7610: reclusion temporal in 266-A (2) of the
(b) of R.A. No. its medium period RPC: prision
 7610: reclusion temporal in to reclusion perpetua mayor
its medium period

 
For the crime of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct, the nomenclature of the crime
and the imposable penalty are based on the guidelines laid down in Caoili. For the crimes of rape by
carnal knowledge and sexual assault under the RPC, as well as sexual intercourse committed against
children under R.A. No. 7610, the designation of the crime and the imposable penalty are based on
the discussions in Dimakuta, 78 Quimvel 79 and Caoili, in line with the policy of R.A. No. 7610 to
provide stronger deterrence and special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is not
amiss to stress that the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision
penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if
the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged, for what controls is not the title
of the information or the designation of the offense, but the actual facts recited in the
information. 80 Nevertheless, the designation in the information of the specific statute violated is
imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. 81
Justice Caguioa asks us to abandon our rulings in Dimakuta, Quimvel and Caoili, and to
consider anew the viewpoint in his Separate Dissenting Opinion in Quimvel that the provisions of R.A.
No. 7610 should be understood in its proper context, i.e., that it only applies in the specific and limited
instances where the victim is a child "subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse." He asserts that
if the intention of R.A. No. 7610 is to penalize all sexual abuses against children under its provisions
to the exclusion of the RPC, it would have expressly stated so and would have done away with the
qualification that the child be "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." He points
out that Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 is a provision of specific and limited application, and must be
applied as worded — a separate and distinct offense from the "common" or ordinary acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. In support of his argument that the main thrust of R.A.
No. 7610 is the protection of street children from exploitation, Justice Caguioa cites parts of the
sponsorship speech of Senators Santanina T. Rasul, Juan Ponce Enrile and Jose D. Lina, Jr.
We find no compelling reason to abandon our ruling in Dimakuta, Quimvel and Caoili.
In his Separate Concurring Opinion in Quimvel, the ponente aptly explained that if and when
there is an absurdity in the interpretation of the provisions of the law, the proper recourse is to refer to
the objectives or the declaration of state policy and principles under Section 2 of R.A. No. 7610, as
well as Section 3 (2), Article XV of the 1987 Constitution:
[R.A. No. 7610] Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. — It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide
sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence
of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
The State shall intervene on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or
person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child
against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against the child are
committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody
of the same.
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely
threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival
and normal development and over which they have no control. ASEcHI
The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all
actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent
 with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.
[Emphasis added]
[Article XV 1987 Constitution] Section 3. The State shall defend:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. 82
Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special type of
protection for children from all types of abuse. Hence, it can be rightly inferred that the title used in
Article III, Section 5, "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" does not mean that it is only
applicable to children used as prostitutes as the main offense and the other sexual abuses as
additional offenses, the absence of the former rendering inapplicable the imposition of the penalty
provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses committed by the offenders on the children
concerned.
Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is clear — it only
punishes those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak of that which
requires statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the law.
We would have agreed with Justice Caguioa if not for Section 5 itself which provides who are
considered as "children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." Section 5 states that
"[c]hildren, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." Contrary to the
view of Justice Caguioa, Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is not as clear as it appears to be;
thus, We painstakingly sifted through the records of the Congressional deliberations to discover the
legislative intent behind such provision.
Justice Caguioa then asks: (1) if the legislature intended for Section 5 (b), R.A. No. 7610 to
cover any and all types of sexual abuse committed against children, then why would it bother adding
language to the effect that the provision applies to "children exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse?" and (2) why would it also put Section 5 under Article III of the law, which is
entitled "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse?"
We go back to the record of the Senate deliberation to explain the history behind the phrase
"child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse."
Section 5 originally covers Child Prostitution only, and this can still be gleaned from Section 6
on Attempt to Commit Child Prostitution, despite the fact that both Sections fall under Article III
on Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Thus:
Section 6. Attempt to Commit Child Prostitution. — There is an attempt to
commit child prostitution under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person
who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room
or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar
establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or secluded area under
circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is
about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of
Section 5 hereof when any person is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor
or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower
by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5
 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the crime of
child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised Penal
Code. ITAaHc
Even Senator Lina, in his explanation of his vote, stated that Senate Bill 1209 also imposes
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua for those who commit the
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution. 83 Senator Lina
mentioned nothing about the phrases "subject to other sexual abuse" or "Other Sexual Abuse" under
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
However, to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into
lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, Senator Eduardo Angara proposed the
insertion of the phrase "WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE
TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP, INDULGE" in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. 84
Further amendment of then Article III of R.A. No. 7610 on Child Prostitution was also
proposed by then President Pro Tempore Sotero Laurel, to which Senator Angara agreed, in order to
cover the "expanded scope" of "child abuse." Thus, Article III was amended and entitled "Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse." 85 This is the proper context where the element that a child be
"exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" or EPSOSA, came to be, and should be viewed.
We hold that it is under President Pro Tempore Laurel's amendment on "expanded scope" of
"child abuse" under Section 5 (b) and the definition of "child abuse" under Section 3,  86 Article I of
R.A. No. 7610 that should be relied upon in construing the element of "exploited under prostitution
and other sexual abuse." In understanding the element of "exploited under prostitution and other
sexual abuse," We take into account two provisions of R.A. No. 7610, namely: (1) Section 5, Article
III, which states that "[c]hildren, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse";
and (2) Section 3, Article I, which states that "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child, which includes, sexual abuse.
To clarify, once and for all, the meaning of the element of "exploited in prostitution" under
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, 87 We rule that it contemplates 4 scenarios, namely: (a) a
child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious
conduct; (b) a child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; (c) a female child, who for money, profit or any
other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence
of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in sexual intercourse.
Note, however, that the element of "exploited in prostitution" does not cover a male child, who
for money, profit or any other consideration, or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or
group, indulges in sexual intercourse. This is because at the time R.A. No. 7610 was enacted in
1992, the prevailing law on rape was Article 335 of the RPC where rape can only be committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under specified circumstances. Even under R.A. No. 8353
which took effect in 1997, the concept of rape remains the same — it is committed by a man who
shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under specified circumstances. As can be gathered from the
Senate deliberation on Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, it is only when the victim or the child
who was abused is a male that the offender would be prosecuted thereunder because the crime of
rape does not cover child abuse of males. 88
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, should be construed in relation to the
definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, 89 Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under
Section 2 (g) 90 of the  Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases. 91 In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not,
of the child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse"
includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage
in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children. Thus, the term "other sexual abuse" is broad enough to include all
other acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution. Accordingly, a single act of lascivious conduct is
punished under Section 5 (b), Article III, when the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older
under special circumstances. In contrast, when the victim is under 12 years old, the proviso of
Section 5 (b) states that the perpetrator should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC for acts of
lasciviousness, whereby the lascivious conduct itself is the sole element of the said crime. This is
because in statutory acts of lasciviousness, as in statutory rape, the minor is presumed incapable of
giving consent; hence, the other circumstances pertaining to rape — force, threat, intimidation, etc. —
are immaterial. CHTAIc
Justice Caguioa also posits that the Senate deliberation on R.A. No. 7610 is replete with
similar disquisitions that all show the intent to make the law applicable to cases involving child
exploitation through prostitution, sexual abuse, child trafficking, pornography and other types of
abuses. He stresses that the passage of the laws was the Senate's act of heeding the call of the
Court to afford protection to a special class of children, and not to cover any and all crimes against
children that are already covered by other penal laws, such as the RPC and Presidential Decree No.
603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. He concludes that it is erroneous for us
to rule that R.A. No. 7610 applies in each and every case where the victim although he or she was
not proved, much less, alleged to be a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse." He invites us to go back to the ruling in Abello that "since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law
referring to a particular class in society, the prosecution must show that the victim truly belongs to this
particular class to warrant the application of the statute's provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must
resolve in favor of the accused."
Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe also disagrees that R.A. No. 7610 would be generally
applicable to all cases of sexual abuse involving minors, except those who are under 12 years of age.
Justice Perlas-Bernabe concurs with Justice Caguioa that Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
only applies in instances where the child-victim is "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse" (EPSOSA). She asserts that her limited view, as opposed to the ponencia's expansive view, is
not only supported by several textual indicators both in law and the deliberations, but also squares
with practical logic and reason. She also contends that R.A. No. 7610 was enacted to protect those
who, like the child-victim in People v. Ritter, willingly engaged in sexual acts, not out of desire to
satisfy their own sexual gratification, but because of their vulnerable pre-disposition as exploited
children. She submits that, as opposed to the RPC where sexual crimes are largely predicated on the
lack of consent, Section 5 (b) fills in the gaps of the RPC by introducing the EPSOSA element which
effectively dispenses with the need to prove the lack of consent at the time the act of sexual abuse is
committed. Thus, when it comes to a prosecution under Section 5 (b), consent at the time the sexual
act is consummated is, unlike in the RPC, not anymore a defense.
We are unconvinced that R.A. No. 7610 only protects a special class of children, i.e., those
who are "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse," and does not cover all crimes
against them that are already punished by existing laws. It is hard to understand why the legislature
would enact a penal law on child abuse that would create an unreasonable classification between
those who are considered as "exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" or EPSOSA and those
who are not. After all, the policy is to provide stronger deterrence and special protection to children
from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.
In the extended explanation of his vote on Senate Bill No. 1209, 92 Senator Lina emphasized
that the bill complements the efforts the Senate has initiated towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival and development of Filipino children, in keeping with the
Constitutional mandate that "[t]he State shall defend the right of children to assistance, including
proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development." 93 Senator Lina also stressed that the bill
supplies the inadequacies of the existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the
RPC and the Child and Youth Welfare Code, in the light of the present situation, i.e., current empirical
data on child abuse indicate that a stronger deterrence is imperative. 94
 In the same vein, Senator Rasul expressed in her Sponsorship Speech the same view that
R.A. No. 7610 intends to protect all children against all forms of abuse and exploitation, thus:
There are still a lot of abuses and injustices done to our children who suffer
not only from strangers, but sadly, also in the hands of their parents and relatives.
We know for a fact that the present law on the matter, the Child and Welfare Code
(PD No. 603) has very little to offer to abuse children. We are aware of the numerous
cases not reported in media.
In the Filipino Family structure, a child is powerless; he or she is not
supposed to be heard and seen. Usually, it is the father or the mother who has a say
in family matters, and children, owing to their limited capability, are not consulted in
most families. Many children may be suffering from emotional, physical and social
abuses in their homes, but they cannot come out in the open; besides, there is a very
thin line separating discipline from abuse. This becomes wider when the abuse
becomes grave and severe.
Perhaps, more lamentable than the continuing child abuses and exploitation
is the seeming unimportance or the lack of interest in the way we have dealt with the
said problem in the country. No less than the Supreme Court, in the recent case
of People v. Ritter, held that we lack criminal laws which will adequately protect street
children from exploitation of pedophiles. But as we know, we, at the Senate have not
been remiss in our bounden duty to sponsor bills which will ensure the protection of
street children from the tentacles of sexual exploitation. Mr. President, now is the
time to convert these bills into reality.
In our long quest for solutions to problems regarding children, which
problems are deeply rooted in poverty, I have felt this grave need to sponsor a
bill, together with Senators Lina and Mercado, which would ensure the
children's protection from all forms of abuse and exploitation, to provide stiffer
sanction for their commission and carry out programs for prevention and
deterrence to aid crisis intervention in situations of child abuse and
exploitation.
Senate Bill No. 1209 translates into reality the provision of our 1987
Constitution on "THE FAMILY," and I quote:
Sec. 3. The State shall defend: EATCcI
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
This is a specific provision peculiar to the Philippines. No other Constitution
in the whole world contains this mandate. Keeping true to this mandate, Mr.
President, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which has been drafted
in the largest global summit, of which we have acceded, we should waste no time in
passing this significant bill into law. This is a commitment; thus, we should not thrive
on mere promises. We, the legislature of this country, must have that political will to
transform this promise into a vibrant reality.
Children's normal growth and development, considering their young minds
and fragile bodies, must not be stunted. We legislators must pave the way for the
sustained progress of our children. Let not a child's opportunity for physical, spiritual,
moral, social and intellectual well-being be stunted by the creeping cruelty and
insanity that sometimes plague the minds of the adults in the society who, ironically,
are the persons most expected to be the guardians of their interest and welfare. 95
 Justice Caguioa further submits that Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 cannot be read in
isolation in the way that Dimakuta, Quimvel and Caoili do, but must be read in the whole context of
R.A. No. 7610 which revolves around (1) child prostitution, (2) other sexual abuse in relation to
prostitution and (3) the specific acts punished under R.A. No. 7610, namely, child trafficking under
Article IV, obscene publications and indecent shows under Article V, and sanctions for establishments
where these prohibited acts are promoted, facilitated or conducted under Article VII. He adds that
even an analysis of the structure of R.A. No. 7610 demonstrates its intended application to the said
cases of child exploitation involving children "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse." Citing the exchange between Senators Pimentel and Lina during the second reading of
Senate Bill No. 1209 with respect to the provision on attempt to commit child prostitution, Justice
Caguioa likewise posits that a person can only be convicted of violation of Article 336 in relation to
Section 5 (b), upon allegation and proof of the unique circumstances of the children "exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."
We disagree that the whole context in which Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 must be read
revolves only around child prostitution, other sexual abuse in relation to prostitution, and the specific
acts punished under R.A. No. 7610. In fact, the provisos of Section 5 (b) itself explicitly state that it
must also be read in light of the provisions of the RPC, thus: "Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period."
When the first proviso of Section 5 (b) states that "when the victim is under 12 years of age
shall be prosecuted under the RPC," it only means that the elements of rape under then Article 335,
paragraph 3 of the RPC [now Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d)], and of acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC, have to be considered, alongside the element of the child being "exploited in
prostitution and or other sexual abuse," in determining whether the perpetrator can be held liable
under R.A. No. 7610. The second proviso of Section 5 (b), on the other hand, merely increased the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under 12 years of age, from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal in its medium period, in recognition of the principle of statutory acts
of lasciviousness, where the consent of the minor is immaterial.
Significantly, what impels Us to reject Justice Caguioa's view that acts of lasciviousness
committed against children may be punished under either Article 336 of the RPC [with prision
correccional] or Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610 [with reclusion temporal medium]/Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610 [with reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua], is the provision under Section 10 of
R.A. No. 7610.
As pointed out by the ponente in Quimvel, where the victim of acts of lasciviousness is under
7 years old, Quimvel cannot be merely penalized with prisión correccional for acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC when the victim is a child because it is contrary to the letter and intent of
R.A. No. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. The legislative intent is expressed under Section 10, Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610 which, among others, increased by one degree the penalty for certain crimes when the
victim is a child under 12 years of age, to wit:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable
under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and
serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Articles 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
 the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of
lasciviousness with consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and
white slave trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that
imposed by law when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. 96 DHITCc
The ponente explained that to impose upon Quimvel an indeterminate sentence computed
from the penalty of prisión correccional under Article 336 of the RPC would defeat the purpose of
R.A. No. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. First, the imposition of such penalty would erase the substantial
distinction between acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 and acts of lasciviousness with consent
of the offended party under Article 339, 97 which used to be punishable by arresto mayor, and now
by prisión correccional  pursuant to Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. Second, it would
inordinately put on equal footing the acts of lasciviousness committed against a child and the same
crime committed against an adult, because the imposable penalty for both would still be prisión
correccional, save for the aggravating circumstance of minority that may be considered against the
perpetrator. Third, it would make acts of lasciviousness against a child a probationable offense,
pursuant to the Probation Law of 1976, 98 as amended by R.A. No. 10707. 99 Indeed, while the
foregoing implications are favorable to the accused, they are contrary to the State policy and
principles under R.A. No. 7610 and the Constitution on the special protection to children.
Justice Caguioa also faults that a logical leap was committed when the ponencia posited that
the Section 10, Article VI, R.A. No. 7610 amendment of the penalties under Articles 337, 339, 340
and 341 of the RPC, also affected Article 336 on acts of lasciviousness. He argues that given the
clear import of Section 10 to the effect that the legislature expressly named the provisions it sought to
amend through R.A. No. 7610, amendment by implication cannot be insisted on.
We disagree. Articles 337 (Qualified Seduction), 339 (Acts of Lasciviousness with the
Consent of the Offended Party), 340 (Corruption of Minor) and 341 (White Slave Trade) of the RPC,
as well as Article 336 (Acts of Lasciviousness) of the RPC, fall under Title Eleven of the RPC on
Crimes against Chastity. All these crimes can be committed against children. Given the policy of R.A.
No. 7610 to provide stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, We see no
reason why the penalty for acts of lasciviousness committed against children should remain to
be prision correccional when Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes those who commit
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse with a penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period when the victim is under 12 years of age.
Contrary to the view of Justice Caguioa, there is, likewise, no such thing as a recurrent
practice of relating the crime committed to R.A. No. 7610 in order to increase the penalty, which
violates the accused's constitutionally protected right to due process of law. In the interpretation of
penal statutes, the rule is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to
safeguard the rights of the accused, 100 and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the
legislature. 101 A strict construction of penal statutes should also not be permitted to defeat the
intent, policy and purpose of the legislature, or the object of the law sought to be attained. 102 When
confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, the courts should endeavor to harmonize and
reconcile them, instead of declaring the outright invalidity of one against the other, because they are
equally the handiwork of the same legislature. 103 In this case, We are trying to harmonize the
applicability of the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 vis-à-vis those of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, in order to carry out the legislative intent to provide stronger deterrence and special protection
against all forms of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
Pertinent parts of the deliberation in Senate Bill No. 1209 underscoring the legislative intent to
increase the penalties as a deterrent against all forms of child abuse, including those covered by the
RPC and the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as well as to give special protection to all children, read:
Senator Lina. x x x
For the information and guidance of our Colleagues, the phrase "child abuse"
here is more descriptive than a definition that specifies the particulars of the
acts of child abuse. As can be gleaned from the bill, Mr. President, there is a
 reference in Section 10 to the "Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development."
We refer, for example, to the Revised Penal Code. There are already acts
described and punished under the Revised Penal Code and the Child and
Youth Welfare Code. These are all enumerated already, Mr. President. There
are particular acts that are already being punished.
But we are providing stronger deterrence against child abuse and exploitation
by increasing the penalties when the victim is a child. That is number one. We
define a child as "one who is 15 years and below." [Later amended to those
below 18, including those above 18 under special circumstances]
The President Pro Tempore.
Would the Sponsor then say that this bill repeals, by implication or as a
consequence, the law he just cited for the protection of the child as
contained in that Code just mentioned, since this provides for stronger
deterrence against child abuse and we have now a Code for the
protection of the child?
Senator Lina.
We specified in the bill, Mr. President, increase in penalties. That is one.
But, of course, that is not everything included in the bill. There are other
aspects like making it easier to prosecute these cases of pedophilia in
our country. That is another aspect of this bill.
The other aspects of the bill include the increase in the penalties on acts
committed against children; and by definition, children are those below
15 years of age.
So, it is an amendment to the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Mr.
President. This is not an amendment by implication. We made direct
reference to the Articles in the Revised Penal Code and in the Articles in
the Child and Youth Welfare Code that are amended because of the
increase in the penalties.
The President Pro Tempore.
Would Senator Lina think then that, probably, it would be more advisable to
specify the amendments and amend the particular provision of the existing law
rather than put up a separate bill like this?
Senator Lina.
We did, Mr. President. In Section 10, we made reference to . . .
The President Pro Tempore.
The Chair is not proposing any particular amendment. This is just an inquiry for
the purpose of making some suggestions at this stage where we are now in the
period of amendments.
Senator Lina.
We deemed it proper to have a separate Act, Mr. President, that will include all
measures to provide stronger deterrence against child abuse and
exploitation. There are other aspects that are included here other than
increasing the penalties that are already provided for in the Revised
Penal Code and in the Child and Youth Welfare Code when the victims
are children. CADacT
 Aside from the penalties, there are other measures that are provided for
in this Act. Therefore, to be more systematic about it, instead of filing
several bills, we thought of having a separate Act that will address the
problems of children below 15 years of age. This is to emphasize the fact
that this is a special sector in our society that needs to be given special
protection. So this bill is now being presented for consideration by the
Chamber. 104
The aforequoted parts of the deliberation in Senate Bill No. 1209 likewise negate the
contention of Justice Perlas-Bernabe that "to suppose that R.A. No. 7610 would generally cover acts
already punished under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would defy the operational logic behind the
introduction of this special law." They also address the contention of Justice Caguioa that the
passage of the same law was the Senate's act of heeding the call of the Court to afford protection to a
special class of children, and not to cover any and all crimes against children that are already covered
by other penal laws, like the RPC and P.D. No. 603.
As pointed out by Senator Lina, the other aspect of S.B. No. 1209, is to increase penalties on
acts committed against children; thus, direct reference was made to the Articles in the RPC and in the
Articles in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that are amended because of the increase in the
penalties. The said legislative intent is consistent with the policy to provide stronger deterrence and
special protection of children against child abuse, and is now embodied under Section 10, Article VI
of R.A. No. 7610, viz.:
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable
under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other
intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion
perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the
commission of acts punishable under Articles 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of
lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white
slave trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law
when the victim is under twelve (12) years age. CTIEac
Justice Perlas-Bernabe and Justice Caguioa are both correct that R.A. No. 7610 was enacted
to fill the gaps in the law, as observed by the Court in People v. Ritter. However, they may have
overlooked that fact that the Congressional deliberations and the express provisions of R.A. No. 7610
all point to the intention and policy to systematically address the problems of children below 15 years
of age [later increased to below 18], which Senator Lina emphasized as a special sector in our
society that needs to be given special protection. 105
Justice Perlas-Bernabe also noted that a general view on the application of R.A. No. 7610
would also lead to an unnerving incongruence between the law's policy objective and certain
penalties imposed thereunder. She pointed out that under Article 335 of the RPC, prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 8353, the crime of rape committed against a minor who is not under 12 and
below 18, is punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, while under Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, the crime of sexual abuse against a child EPSOSA is punished only with a lower
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. She concluded that it would
not make sense for the Congress to pass a supposedly stronger law against child abuse if the same
carries a lower penalty for the same act of rape under the old RPC provision.
Justice Perlas-Bernabe's observation on incongruent penalties was similarly noted by
the ponente in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Quimvel, albeit with respect to the penalties for
acts of lasciviousness committed against a child, but he added that the proper remedy therefor is a
corrective legislation:
Curiously, despite the clear intent of R.A. 7610 to provide for stronger
deterrence and special protection against child abuse, the penalty [reclusion
temporal medium] when the victim is under 12 years old is lower compared to the
 penalty [reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] when the victim is 12
years old and below 18. The same holds true if the crime of acts of lasciviousness is
attended by an aggravating circumstance or committed by persons under Section
31, 106 Article XII of R.A. 7610, in which case, the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. In contrast, when no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the
crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when committed against a child
under 12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty when the child is 12 years old and
below 18. This is because, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term in the case of the younger victims shall be taken from reclusion
temporal minimum, whereas as the minimum term in the case of the older victims
shall be taken from prisión mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum. It is a
basic rule in statutory construction that what courts may correct to reflect the real and
apparent intention of the legislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors or
obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints, but not those due to oversight, as shown
by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is clear, and to correct it
would be to change the meaning of the law. To my mind, a corrective legislation is
the proper remedy to address the noted incongruent penalties for acts of
lasciviousness committed against a child. 107
To support his theory that the provisions of R.A. No. 7610 are intended only for those under
the unique circumstances of the children being "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse," Justice Caguioa quoted pertinent portions of the Senate deliberation on the provision on
"attempt to commit child prostitution," which concededly do not affect Article 336 of the RPC on acts
of lasciviousness. Senator Lina provided with a background, not of the provision of Section 5 (b), but
of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7610 on attempt to commit child prostitution, thus:
Senator Lina. x x x Mr. President, Article 336 of Act No. 3815 will remain
unaffected by this amendment we are introducing here. As a backgrounder, the
difficulty in the prosecution of so-called "pedophiles" can be traced to this problem of
having to catch the malefactor committing the sexual act on the victim. And those in
the law enforcement agencies and in the prosecution service of the Government
have found it difficult to prosecute. Because if an old person, especially foreigner, is
seen with a child with whom he has no relation — blood or otherwise — and they are
just seen in a room and there is no way to enter the room and to see them in
flagrante delicto, then it will be very difficult for the prosecution to charge or to hale to
court these pedophiles.
So we are introducing into this bill, Mr. President, an act that is already
considered an attempt to commit child prostitution. This, in no way, affects the
Revised Penal Code provisions on acts of lasciviousness or qualified seduction. 108
Justice Caguioa's reliance on the foregoing statements of Senator Lina is misplaced. While
Senator Lina was referring to the specific provision on attempt to commit child prostitution under
Section 6, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr.'s questions were directed more
on the general effect of Senate Bill No. 1209 on the existing provisions of the RPC on child sexual
abuse, which elicited from Senator Lina the intent to provide higher penalties for such crimes, to wit:
Senator Pimentel.
I understand the Gentleman's opinion on that particular point. But my question
really is much broader. I am sorry that it would seem as if I am trying to be very
meticulous about this.
Senator Lina.
It is all right.
Senator Pimentel.
But the point is, there are existing laws that cover the sexual abuse of
children already, particularly female children. What I am trying to say is,
 what effect will the distinguished Gentleman's bill have on these existing
laws, particularly provisions of the Revised Penal Code. That is why I
tried to cite the case of rape — having sexual intercourse with a child
below 12 years of age, seduction instances, qualified abduction, or acts
of lasciviousness, involving minors; meaning to say, female below 18
years of age. There are already existing laws on this particular point.
Senator Lina.
Mr. President, there will also be a difference in penalties when the person or
the victim is 12 years old or less. That is another effect. So, there is a
difference.
For example, in qualified seduction, the penalty present for all persons
between ages of 13 to 17 is prision correccional; for acts of lasciviousness
under the proposal, similar acts will be prision mayor if the child is 12 years or
less.
Under qualified seduction, the present penalty is prision correccional, minimum
and medium. Under the proposal, it will be prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum, and so on and so forth.
Even in facts of lasciviousness, with consent of the offended party, there is still
a higher penalty. In corruption of minors, there will be a higher penalty. When
murder is committed, and the victim is under 12 years or less, there will be a
higher penalty from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty when
the culprit is below 12 years or less will be reclusion perpetua. The intention is
really to provide a strong deterrence and special protection against child abuse
and exploitation.
Senator Pimentel.
So, the net effect of this amendment, therefore, is to amend the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as they relate to the
victims who are females below the age of 12.
Senator Lina.
That will be the net effect, Mr. President.
Senator Pimentel.
We probably just have to tighten up our provisions to make that very explicit.
Mr. President.
Senator Lina.
Yes. During the period of individual amendments, Mr. President, that can be
well taken care of. 109
Quoting the sponsorship speech of Senator Rasul and citing the case of People v.
Ritter, 110 Justice Caguioa asserts that the enactment of R.A. No. 7610 was a response of the
legislature to the observation of the Court that there was a gap in the law because of the lack of
criminal laws which adequately protect street children from exploitation of pedophiles.
Justice Caguioa is partly correct. Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 is separate and distinct from
common and ordinary acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. However, when the victim
of such acts of lasciviousness is a child, as defined by law, We hold that the penalty is that provided
for under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 — i.e., reclusion temporal medium in case the victim is under
12 years old, and reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua when the victim is between 12
years old or under 18 years old or above 18 under special circumstances — and not merely prision
correccional under Article 336 of the RPC. Our view is consistent with the legislative intent to provide
stronger deterrence against all forms of child abuse, and the evil sought to be avoided by the
enactment of R.A. No. 7610, which was exhaustively discussed during the committee deliberations of
the House of Representatives:
HON. [PABLO] P. GARCIA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This problem is also
bogging me for quite some time because there has been so much cry against this evil
in our society. But, then until now, neither the courts nor those in the medical world
have come up with the exact definition of pedophilia. I have two standard dictionaries
— Webster and another one an English dictionary, Random Dictionary and the term
"pedophilia" is not there. Although, we have read so much literature, articles about
pedophilia and it is commonly understood as we might say a special predilection for
children. "Pedo" coming from the Greek word "pedo." But whether this would apply to
children of either sex, say male or female is not also very clear. It is a sexual desire
for its very unusual out of the ordinary desire or predilection for children. Now, in our
country, this has gain[ed] notoriety because of activities of foreigners in Pagsanjan
and even in Cebu. But most of the victims I have yet to hear of another victim than
male. Of course, satisfaction of sexual desire on female, young female, we have
instances of adults who are especially attracted to the young female children, say
below the ages of 12 or 15 if you can still classify these young female children. So
our first problem is whether pedophilia would apply only to male victims or should it
also apply to female victims?
I am trying to make this distinction because we have already a law in our
jurisdiction. I refer to the Revised Penal Code where sexual intercourse with a child
below 12 automatically becomes statutory rape whether with or without consent. In
other words, force or intimidation is not a necessary element. If a person commits
sexual intercourse with a child below 12, then he automatically has committed
statutory rape and the penalty is stiff. Now, we have really to also think deeply about
our accepted definition of sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse is committed against
. . . or is committed by a man and a woman. There is no sexual intercourse between
persons of the same sex. The sexual intercourse, as defined in the standard
dictionaries and also as has been defined by our courts is always committed between
a man and a woman. And so if we pass here a law, which would define pedophilia
and include any sexual contact between persons of different or the same sexes, in
other words, homosexual or heterosexual, then, we will have to be overhauling our
existing laws and jurisprudence on sexual offenses.
For example, we have in our Revised Penal Code, qualified seduction, under
Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the seduction of a virgin
over 12 and under 18 committed by any person in public authority: priest, house
servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or person who in any capacity shall be
entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced, shall be punished by
etc. etc. Now, if we make a general definition of pedophilia then shall that offender,
who, under our present law, is guilty of pedophilia? I understand that the consensus
is to consider a woman or a boy below 15 as a child and therefore a potential victim
of pedophilia. And so, what will happen to our laws and jurisprudence on seduction?
The Chairman earlier mentioned that possible we might just amend our existing
provisions on crimes against chastity, so as to make it stiffer, if the victim or the
offended party is a minor below a certain age, then there is also seduction of a
woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over 12 but under 18. Seduction,
as understood in law, is committed against a woman, in other words, a man having
sexual intercourse with a woman. That is how the term is understood in our
jurisprudence. So I believe Mr. Chairman, that we should rather act with caution and
circumspection on this matter. Let us hear everybody because we are about to enact
a law which would have very drastic and transcendental effects on our existing laws.
In the first place, we are not yet very clear on what is pedophilia. We have already
existing laws, which would punish these offenses.
 As a matter of fact, for the information of this Committee, in Cebu, I think that
it is the first conviction for an offense which would in our understanding amounts to
pedophilia. A fourteen-year old boy was the victim of certain sexual acts committed
by a German national. The fiscal came up with an information for acts of
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code and that German national was
convicted for the offense charged. Now, the boy was kept in his rented house and
subjected to sexual practices very unusual, tantamount to perversion but under
present laws, these offenses such as . . . well, it's too, we might say, too obscene to
describe, cannot be categorized under our existing laws except acts of
lasciviousness because there is no sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse in our
jurisdiction is as I have stated earlier, committed by a man and a woman. And it is a
sexual contact of the organ of the man with the organ of the woman. But in the case
of this German national, if there was any sexual contact it was between persons of
the same sex. So, he was convicted. He's a detention prisoner and there is also
deportation proceeding against him. In fact, he has applied for voluntary deportation,
but he is to serve a penalty of prision correccional to prision mayor. So, that is the
situation I would say in which we find ourselves. I am loath to immediately act on this
agitation for a definition of a crime of pedophilia. There is no I think this Committee
should study further the laws in other countries. Whether there is a distinct crime
known as pedophilia and whether this can be committed against a person of the
same sex or of another sex, or whether this crime is separate and distinct from the
other crimes against honor or against chastity in their respective jurisdictions. This is
a social evil but it has to be addressed with the tools we have at hand. If we have to
forge another tool or instrument to find to fight this evil, then I think we should make
sure that we are not doing violence for destroying the other existing tools we have at
hand. And maybe there is a need to sharpen the tools we have at hand, rather than
to make a new tool to fight this evil. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 111
Moreover, contrary to the claim of Justice Caguioa, We note that the Information charging
Tulagan with rape by sexual assault in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 not only distinctly stated that the
same is "Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610," but it
also sufficiently alleged all the elements of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, in this
wise: cHECAS
 
Information in Criminal Case No. SCC-
Elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A.
6210
No. 7610
1. The accused commits the act of 1. That sometime in the month of
sexual intercourse or lascivious September 2011 x x x, the above-named
conduct. accused [Tulagan] x x x did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted
his finger into the vagina of said AAA,
against her will and consent.
2. The said act is performed with a 2. [T]he above-name accused, by means
child exploited in prostitution or other of force, intimidation and with abuse of
sexual abuse. Section 5 of R.A. No. superior strength forcibly laid complainant
7610 deems as "children exploited AAA, x x x in a cemented pavement, and x
in prostitution and other sexual x x inserted his finger into the vagina of said
abuse" those children, whether male AAA, against her will and consent.
or female, (1) who for money, profit
or any other consideration or (2) due
to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.
 3. The child, whether male or 3. AAA is a 9-year-old minor.
female, is below 18 years of age.
 
In Quimvel, We ruled that the Information in Olivarez v. Court of Appeals 112 is
conspicuously couched in a similar fashion as the Information in the case against Quimvel. We
explained that the absence of the phrase "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse" or
even a specific mention of "coercion" or "influence" was never a bar for us to uphold the finding of
guilt against an accused for violation of R.A. No. 7610. Just as We held that it was enough for the
Information in Olivarez to have alleged that the offense was committed by means of "force and
intimidation," We must also rule that the Information in the case at bench does not suffer from the
alleged infirmity.
We likewise held in Quimvel that the offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting
the designation of the offense as appearing in the Information. The designation of the offense is a
critical element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in apprising the
accused of the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise
on the accused and to afford him of opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. Its import is
underscored in this case where the preamble states that the crime charged is "Acts of Lasciviousness
in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610."
We held that for purposes of determining the proper charge, the term "coercion or influence"
as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation" as used in the Information;
in fact, as these terms are almost used synonymously, it is then "of no moment that the terminologies
employed by R.A. No. 7610 and by the Information are different." 113 We also ruled that a child is
considered one "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" when the child indulges
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct "under the coercion or influence of any adult." 114 Thus,
We rule that the above-quoted Information in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 sufficiently informs
Tulagan of the nature and cause of accusation against him, namely: rape by sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610.
We also take this opportunity to address the position of Justice Caguioa and Justice Perlas-
Bernabe, which is based on dissenting opinions 115 in Olivarez and Quimvel. Citing the Senate
deliberations, the dissenting opinions explained that the phrase "or any other consideration or due to
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, was
added to merely cover situations where a child is abused or misused for sexual purposes without any
monetary gain or profit. The dissenting opinions added that this was significant because profit or
monetary gain is essential in prostitution; thus, the lawmakers intended that in case all other elements
of prostitution are present, but the monetary gain or profit is missing, the sexually abused and
misused child would still be afforded the same protection of the law as if he or she were in the same
situation as a child exploited in prostitution. 116
We partly disagree with the foregoing view. The amendment introduced by Senator Eduardo
Angara not only covers cases wherein the child is misused for sexual purposes not because of
money or profit, and coercion or intimidation, but likewise expanded the scope of Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7610 to cover not just child prostitution but also "other sexual abuse" in the broader context of
"child abuse," thus:
Senator Angara.
I refer to line 9, "who for money or profit." I would like to amend this, Mr.
President, to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or
intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, so
that we can cover those situations and not leave a loophole in this section.
This proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR
ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR
INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore.
I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer
be child prostitution?
Senator Angara.
No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child
who is being misused for sexual purposes either for money or for
consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other consideration. Because,
here, it is limited only to the child being abused or misused for sexual
purposes, only for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child
may not have been used for profit or . . .
The President Pro Tempore.
So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara.
Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But,
still, the President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore.
What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the
amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara.
The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS,
WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT OR ANY
OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE
OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina.
It is accepted, Mr. President. AHDacC
The President Pro Tempore.
Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, "Child Prostitution," shall we change that too?
Senator Angara.
Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.
The President Pro Tempore.
Is that not what we would call probably "child abuse"?
Senator Angara.
Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore.
Is that not defined on line 2, page 6?
Senator Angara.
Yes, Mr. President. Child prostitution and other sexual abuse.
 The President Pro Tempore.
Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. Any other amendments? 117
Indeed, the Angara amendment explains not just the rationale of the body of Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610 to cover a loophole or situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated
to indulge in lascivious conduct. The amendment of President Pro Tempore Laurel, however, also
affects the title of Article III, Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610, i.e., "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse." It is settled that if a chapter and section heading has been inserted merely for convenience or
reference, and not as integral part of the statute, it should not be allowed to control
interpretation. 118 To our mind, however, the amendment highlights the intention to expand the
scope of Section 5 to incorporate the broader concept of "child abuse," which includes acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC committed against "children," as defined under Section 3
of R.A. No. 7610. Records of the Senate deliberation show that "child prostitution" was originally
defined as "minors, whether male or female, who, for money or profit, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct are deemed children exploited in prostitution." 119 With the late addition of the
phrase "or subject to other sexual abuse," which connotes "child abuse," and in line with the policy of
R.A. No. 7610 to provide stronger deterrence and special protection of children against child abuse,
We take it to mean that Section 5 (b) also intends to cover those crimes of child sexual abuse already
punished under the RPC, and not just those children exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, who are coerced or intimidated to indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
This is the reason why We disagree with the view of Justice Perlas-Bernabe that the first proviso
under Section 5 (b) — which provides that "when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under x x x the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be" — is a textual indicator that R.A. No. 7610 has a specific application only to
children who are pre-disposed to "consent" to a sexual act because they are "exploited in prostitution
or subject to other sexual abuse," thereby negating the ponente's theory of general applicability.
In People v. Larin, 120 We held that a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money,
profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group. Under R.A. No. 7610, children are "persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition." Noting that the law covers not
only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or
intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct, We ruled that Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610
penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual
abuse of children. We stressed that this is clear from the deliberations of the Senate, and that the law
does not confine its protective mantle only to children under twelve (12) years of age.
In Amployo v. People, 121 citing Larin, We observed that Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does
not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in
any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not
necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or
subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the case of young,
innocent and immature girls who could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with
nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the same circumstances or to
have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.
In Olivarez vs. Court of Appeals, 122 We held that a child is deemed subjected to other
sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult. We found that the 16-year old victim in that case was sexually abused because she was
coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. We stated that it is
inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once because, as expressly provided in Section
3 (b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. We also observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover
a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit, hence, the law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms
of sexual abuse. IDSEAH
In Garingarao v. People, 123 We ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse
when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will.
We further ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 occurred only once.
Section 3 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that
the offense occurred only once is enough to hold an accused liable for acts of lasciviousness under
R.A. No. 7610.
In Quimvel, 124 We stressed that Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes acts pertaining to
or connected with child prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to
other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse
against children. This is even made clearer by the deliberations of the Senate, as cited in the
landmark ruling of People v. Larin. We also added that the very definition of "child abuse" under
Section 3 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of
sexual abuse aside from the act complained of, for it refers to the maltreatment whether habitual or
not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 occurs even though the accused
committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual offense.
In Caoili, 125 We reiterated that R.A. No. 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse,
exploitation or discrimination are children or those "persons below 18 years of age or those over but
are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition." It has been
settled that Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is
different from what is complained of, or that a third person should act in concert with the accused.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but
also one in which a child is coerced to engage in lascivious conduct.
Meanwhile, Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen partly agrees with the ponencia that
insertion of a finger into a minor's vagina deserves a higher penalty than prision mayor under Article
266-A, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC. However, he asserts that non-consensual
insertion of a finger in another's genitals is rape by carnal knowledge under Article 266-A, paragraph
1 of the RPC. He also reiterates his view in People v. Quimvel that Article 336 of the RPC has already
been rendered ineffective with the passage of R.A. No. 8353.
We stand by our ruling in Caoili that the act of inserting a finger in another's genitals cannot
be considered rape by carnal knowledge, thus:
The language of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, provides the elements that substantially differentiate the
two forms of rape, i.e., rape by sexual intercourse and rape by sexual assault. It is
through legislative process that the dichotomy between these two modes of rape was
created. To broaden the scope of rape by sexual assault, by eliminating its legal
distinction from rape through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation which We
cannot traverse without violating the principle of separation of powers. The Court
remains steadfast in confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of applying
the law as enacted by the Legislature.
In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape
introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an
accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual
intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the
latter. 126
 We also maintain the majority ruling in Quimvel that Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 8353 did not expressly
repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it were the intent of Congress, it would have expressly done
so. Apropos is the following disquisition in Quimvel:
x x x Rather, the phrase in Sec. 4 states: "deemed amended, modified, or
repealed accordingly" qualifies "Article 335 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and all
laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and
regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of [RA 8353]." aCIHcD
As can be read, repeal is not the only fate that may befall statutory provisions
that are inconsistent with RA 8353. It may be that mere amendment or modification
would suffice to reconcile the inconsistencies resulting from the latter law's
enactment. In this case, Art. 335 of the RPC, which previously penalized rape
through carnal knowledge, has been replaced by Art. 266-A. Thus, the reference by
Art. 336 of the RPC to any of the circumstances mentioned on the erstwhile
preceding article on how the crime is perpetrated should now refer to the
circumstances covered by Art. 266-A as introduced by the Anti-Rape Law.
We are inclined to abide by the Court's long-standing policy to disfavor
repeals by implication for laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full
knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. The failure to particularly mention the
law allegedly repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal the said law, unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. Here, RA 8353 made no specific mention of any RPC provision other than Art.
335 as having been amended, modified, or repealed. And as demonstrated, the Anti-
Rape Law, on the one hand, and Art. 336 of the RPC, on the other, are not
irreconcilable. The only construction that can be given to the phrase "preceding
article" is that Art. 336 of the RPC now refers to Art. 266-A in the place of the
repealed Art. 335. It is, therefore, erroneous to claim that Acts of Lasciviousness can
no longer be prosecuted under the RPC.
It is likewise incorrect to claim that Art. 336 had been rendered inoperative by
the Anti-Rape Law and argue in the same breath the applicability of Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its alleged
incompleteness, then so too would Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be ineffective since it
defines and punishes the prohibited act by way of reference to the RPC provision.
The decriminalization of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, as per
Justice Leonen's theory, would not sufficiently be supplanted by RA 7610 and RA
9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Law
(Anti-VAWC Law). Under RA 7610, only minors can be considered victims of the
enumerated forms of abuses therein. Meanwhile, the Anti-VAWC law limits the
victims of sexual abuses covered by the RA to a wife, former wife, or any women with
whom the offender has had a dating or sexual relationship, or against her child.
Clearly, these laws do not provide ample protection against sexual offenders who do
not discriminate in selecting their victims. One does not have to be a child before he
or she can be victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one have to be a
woman with an existing or prior relationship with the offender to fall prey. Anyone can
be a victim of another's lewd design. And if the Court will subscribe to Justice
Leonen's position, it will render a large portion of our demographics (i.e., adult
females who had no prior relationship to the offender, and adult males) vulnerable to
sexual abuses. 127
To be sure, deliberation of Senate Bill No. 950 which became R.A. No. 8353 reveals the
legislative intent not to repeal acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC as a crime against
chastity, but only to reclassify rape as a crime against persons, thus:
 Senator Enrile: x x x
As I indicated last week, I will support this bill but I would like to clarify some
points just to set the matters into the Record.
Mr. President, the first thing I would like to find out is the status of this bill —
whether this is going to be a statutory crime or a part of the crimes defined in
the Revised Penal Code.
There is a big difference between these two concepts, Mr. President, because
all of us who have studied law know in our course in Criminal Law two of
crimes: Crimes which we call malum prohibitum which are statutory crimes
and mala in se or crimes that would require intent. That is why we always recite
the principle that actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Because in every
crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, we required what they call a mens
rea, meaning intent to commit a crime in almost all cases: attempted, frustrated
and consummated.
Now, am I now to understand, Madam Sponsor, that this type of crime will be
taken out of the Revised Penal Code and shall be covered by a special law
making it a statutory crime rather than a crime that is committed with the
accompaniment of intent.
Senator Shahani:
Mr. President, we will recall that this was the topic of prolonged interpellations
not only by Senator Enrile, but also by Senator Sotto. In consultation with
Senator Roco — we were not able to get in touch with Senator Santiago — we
felt that the purpose of this bill would be better served if we limited the bill to
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, at the same time expanding
the definition of rape, reclassifying the same as a crime against persons,
providing evidentiary requirements and procedures for the effective prosecution
of offenders, and institutionalizing measures for the protection and
rehabilitation of rape victims and for other purposes. In other words, it stays
within the Revised Penal Code, and rape is associated with criminal intent.
Having said this, it means that there will be a new chapter. They are proposing
a new chapter to be known as Chapter III on rape, under Title 8 of the Revised
Penal Code. There it remains as a crime against persons and no longer as a
crime against chastity, but the criminal intent is retained.
Senator Enrile.
So, the distinction between rape as a crime, although now converted
from a crime against chastity to a crime against persons, and seduction
and act of lasciviousness would be maintained. Am I correct in this, Mr.
President?
Senator Shahani.
That is correct, Mr. President. 128
In light of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that Tulagan was aptly prosecuted for sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 because it was
alleged and proven that AAA was nine (9) years old at the time he inserted his finger into her vagina.
Instead of applying the penalty under Article 266-B of the RPC, which is  prision mayor, the proper
penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is  reclusion
temporal in its medium period. This is because AAA was below twelve (12) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense, and that the act of inserting his finger in AAA's private part undeniably
amounted to "lascivious conduct." 129 Hence, the proper nomenclature of the offense should be
Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610. cHaCAS
 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty
shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is fifteen (15) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the minimum term shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence,
Tulagan should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, We affirm that Tulagan should suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A in relation to Article
266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.

Damages

For the sake of consistency and uniformity, We deem it proper to address the award of
damages in cases of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. Considering that the imposable penalties for the said two crimes are
within the range of reclusion temporal, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages should now
be fixed in the amount of P50,000.00 each. The said amount is based on People v.
Jugueta 130 which awards civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each in
cases of homicide where the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal. In case exemplary damages
are awarded due to the presence of any aggravating circumstance, to set a public example, or to
deter elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, then an equal amount of P50,000.00 should likewise
be awarded.
The said award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should be
distinguished from those awarded in cases of: (1) Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC where the imposable penalty is prision correccional, the amount of civil indemnity and moral
damages should now be fixed at P20,000.00 while exemplary damages, if warranted, should also be
P20,000.00; (2) Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC where the imposable
penalty is prision mayor, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages should be fixed at
P30,000.00 each, while the award of exemplary damages, if warranted, should also be P30,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence; 131 and (3) Lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610, when the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed, and the award of civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages is P75,000.00 each.
The justification for the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages was
discussed in People v. Combate, 132 as follows:
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal
law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy
and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC
which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution, reparation, and
indemnification. Restitution is defined as the compensation for loss; it is full or partial
compensation paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or
as a condition for probation. Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly
defined as the compensation for an injury, wrong, loss, or damage sustained. Clearly,
all of these correspond to actual or compensatory damages defined under the Civil
Code.
xxx xxx xxx
 The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which
are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals expounded on the
nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to
compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood
to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature,
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.
Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the
claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases
expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code x x x.
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as
"compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish
resulting from a wrong." They may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain
and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as
result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the
reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of
the victim, [and] mental distress."
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert
v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted."
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does
not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,
depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it
does not exceed the award of civil indemnity. DACcIH
xxx xxx xxx
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded,
not only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of
the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down
the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed
exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption,
perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married
woman. In People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v.
Pepito Neverio  and People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court
awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders
who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse. 133
In summary, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages in Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610, Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, and Sexual Assault in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610, are as follows:
 
 Crime Civil Indemnity Moral Damages Exemplary Damages 134
Acts of Lasciviousness P20,000.00 P20,000.00 P20,000.00
under Article 336 of the
RPC [Victim is of legal
age]
Acts of lasciviousness P50,000.00 P50,000.00 P50,000.00
in relation to Section 5
(b) of R.A. No. 7610
[Victim is a child under
12 years old or is
demented]
Sexual Abuse or P75,000.00 (If P75,000.00 (If P75,000.00 (If penalty
Lascivious Conduct penalty imposed penalty imposed imposed is reclusion
under Section 5 (b) of is reclusion is reclusion perpetua)
R.A. No. 7610 [Victim is perpetua) perpetua)
a child 12 years old and P50,000.00 (If P50,000.00 (If P50,000.00 (If penalty
below 18, or above 18 penalty imposed is penalty imposed is imposed is within the range
under special within the range within the range of reclusion temporal medium)
circumstances] of reclusion tempora of reclusion tempora
l medium) l medium)
Sexual Assault under P30,000.00 P30,000.00 P30,000.00
Article 266-A (2) of the
RPC [Victim is of legal
age]
Sexual Assault under P50,000.00 P50,000.00 P50,000.00
Article 266-A (2) of the
RPC in relation to
Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610 [Victim is a
child under 12 years old
or is demented]
 
It is settled that an award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact
of rape, and moral damages may be automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof of
mental and physical suffering. The award of exemplary damages is also called for to set a public
example and to protect the young from sexual abuse. As to the civil liability in Criminal Case No.
SCC-6210 for sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 7610, Tulagan should, therefore, pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Anent the award of damages in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, We modify
the same in line with the ruling in People v. Jugueta, 135 where We held that "when the
circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages." Also in consonance with
prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully paid.
Over and above the foregoing, We observe that despite the clear intent of R.A. No. 7610 to
provide for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, the penalty for violation of
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 [reclusion temporal medium] when the victim is under 12 years old is
lower compared to the penalty [reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] when the victim is
12 years old and below 18. The same holds true if the crime of acts of lasciviousness is attended by
an aggravating circumstance or committed by persons under Section 31, 136 Article XII of R.A. No.
7610, in which case, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In contrast, when no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attended the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when
committed against a child under 12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty when the child is 12
years old and below 18. This is because, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term in the case of the younger victims shall be taken from reclusion
temporal  minimum, 137 whereas as the minimum term in the case of the older victims shall be taken
from prisión mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum. 138 It is a basic rule in statutory
construction that what courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of the legislature
are only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints, 139 but
not those due to oversight, as shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is
clear, and to correct it would be to change the meaning of the law. 140 Thus, a corrective legislation
is the proper remedy to address the noted incongruent penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed
against a child.
We further note that R.A. No. 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC, as
amended. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8353 only states that Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, and all
laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions thereof are deemed
amended, modified or repealed, accordingly. There is nothing inconsistent between the provisions of
Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, and R.A. No. 8353, except in sexual assault as a form of rape.
To recall, R.A. No. 8353 only modified Article 336 of the RPC, as follows: (1) by carrying over to acts
of lasciviousness the additional circumstances 141 applicable to rape, viz.: threat and fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; (2) by retaining the circumstance that the offended party is
under 12 years old, and including dementia as another one, in order for acts of lasciviousness to be
considered as statutory, wherein evidence of force or intimidation is immaterial because the offended
party who is under 12 years old or demented, is presumed incapable of giving rational consent; and
(3) by removing from the scope of acts of lasciviousness and placing under the crime of rape by
sexual assault the specific lewd act of inserting the offender's penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Hence,
Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, is still a good law despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8353 for
there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between their provisions. When the lascivious act is not
covered by R.A. No. 8353, then Article 336 of the RPC is applicable, except when the lascivious
conduct is covered by R.A. No. 7610.
We are also not unmindful of the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period, than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual
Assault, which is merely punishable by prisión mayor. HSCATc
In People v. Chingh, 142 We noted that the said fact is undeniably unfair to the child victim,
and it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A.
No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. We held that despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353,
R.A. No. 7610 is still a good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those
"persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition." 143
In Dimakuta, We added that where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition under
R.A. No. 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium and the said act is, likewise, covered
by sexual assault under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by  prisión mayor,
the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law
provides the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child. But if the
victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of
the RPC and not R.A. No. 7610, unless the victim is at least 18 years old and she is unable to fully
take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender may still be held
liable of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610. The reason for the foregoing is that with respect to
lascivious conduct, R.A. No. 7610 affords special protection and stronger deterrence against child
abuse, as compared to R.A. No. 8353 which specifically amended the RPC provisions on rape.
 Finally, despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8353 more than 20 years ago in 1997, We had
been consistent in our rulings in Larin, Olivarez, and Garingarao, Quimvel and Caoili, all of which
uphold the intent of R.A. No. 7610 to provide special protection of children and stronger deterrence
against child abuse. Judicial stability compels to stand by, but not to abandon, our sound rulings: [1]
that Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of
which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse wherein a child engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct through coercion or influence; and [2] that it is inconsequential that the sexual
abuse occurred only once. Our rulings also find textual anchor on Section 5, Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which explicitly states that a child is deemed "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse," when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money, profit or
any other consideration, or under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, as well
as on Section 3 (b), Article I thereof, which clearly provides that the term "child abuse" refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse.
If the lawmakers disagreed with our interpretation, they could have easily amended the law,
just like what they did when they enacted R.A. No. 10591 144 [Amendment on the provision of use of
firearm in the commission of a crime], R.A. No. 10951 145 [Amendments to certain penalty and fines
under the Revised Penal Code] and R.A. No. 10707 146 [Amendments to the Probation Law] after
We rendered People v. Ladjaalam, 147 Corpuz v. People, 148 Colinares v. People and Dimakuta v.
People, respectively, and their silence could only be construed as acquiescence to our rulings.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated
February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. We find accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan:
1. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, in
Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) and
penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. SCC-
6211, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with modification
as to the award of damages. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Office of the Court Administrator, and the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, for
their guidance and information, as well as the House of Representatives and the Senate of the
Philippines, as reference for possible statutory amendments on the maximum penalty for lascivious
conduct under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the victim is under 12 years of
age [reclusion temporal medium], and when the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older
under special circumstances [reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] under Section 3 (a) of
R.A. No. 7610. IDTSEH
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 235610. September 16, 2020.]

RODAN A. BANGAYAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CARANDANG,  J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated June 28, 2017 of
the Court of Appeals finding Rodan Bangayan y Alcaide (Bangayan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7610, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
FOR THE STATED REASONS, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
award of damages is increased to Php75,000.00 each as civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 3
Antecedents
The Information 4 against Bangayan alleges:
That sometime in the month of January, [sic] 2012 at Brgy. San Ramos, Municipality
of Nagtipunan, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named Accused, with intent to abuse, harass and
degrade AAA, 5 a twelve (12) year old minor at that time, and gratify the sexual
desire of said accused, the latter did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, had sexual intercourse with said AAA, in her dwelling against her will and
consent. 6
During trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) PO2 Rosalita Manilao
(PO2 Manilao); (2) BBB; 7 and (3) Dr. Luis Villar (Dr. Villar). The following documents were likewise
submitted in evidence: (1) Malaya at Kusang Loob na Salaysay of AAA; 8 (2) Malaya at Kusang Loob
na Salaysay ni BBB; 9 (3) Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Villar; 10 and (4) Certificate of Live Birth
of AAA. 11
According to the prosecution's witnesses, on January 5, 2012, AAA's brother, BBB, upon
arriving home from the farm, saw Bangayan laying on top of AAA. Bangayan and AAA were both
naked from the waist down. 12 BBB shouted at Bangayan and told him that he would report what he
did to AAA but the latter allegedly threatened to kill him if he tries to tell anyone. 13 AAA was born on
December 14, 1999 and was more than 12 years old at the time of the incident. 14
On April 24, 2012, AAA, accompanied by her aunt, CCC, 15 reported the incident to the
police. 16 On the same date, Dr. Villar examined AAA. The pertinent portion of the Medico-Legal
Report 17 revealed the following:
Physical Examination Findings:
1. Formed and developed areolar complexes.
2. Developed labia majora.
 3. No recent hymenal injury but the edges are smooth and the opening approximates
the size of the index finger of the examiner. 18
When Dr. Villar testified, he confirmed that AAA admitted to him that she had sexual
intercourse with Bangayan on several occasions even prior to January 5, 2012. 19 He explained that
the "opening" noted during his examination, as stated in item no. 3 of the physical findings, is not a
normal occurrence. For a young patient like AAA, it should have been closed. He further testified that
AAA was already pregnant when she was examined because her fundus is 15 centimeters in height
and the presence of 151 beats per minute at the last lower quadrant of her abdomen was
observed. 20 These indicate that, at the time of the examination, she was two (2) to three (3) months
pregnant, which could be compatible with the claim that she had sexual intercourse with Bangayan in
January 2012, the date stated in the information, or even before said date. 21
On October 2, 2012, AAA gave birth to a baby boy. 22
Notably, during arraignment on September 4, 2014, the counsel of Bangayan manifested that
AAA, who was then 14 years old, executed an Affidavit of Desistance 23 stating that she has decided
not to continue the case against Bangayan because they "are living [together] as husband and wife
and was blessed with a healthy baby boy." 24 Thus, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered that the
Office of the Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer conduct a case study on AAA. 25
On May 4, 2015, their second child was born. 26
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC of Maddela, Quirino, Branch 38 rendered its Decision 27 dated April 11,
2016, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
RODAN BANGAYAN y ALCAIDE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act 7610 and sentences him to an imprisonment
of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. However, his preventive imprisonment shall be
fully credited to him in the service of sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the  Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Accused is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of 1] PHP50,000.00 as civil
indemnity with interest of 6% per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid.
With the category of the accused as a national prisoner, the Clerk of Court is
directed to prepare the corresponding mittimus or commitment order for his
immediate transfer to the Bureau of Corrections and Penology, Muntinlupa City,
pursuant to SC Circular No. 492-A dated April 20, 1992.
SO ORDERED. 28 (Emphasis in the original)
In convicting Bangayan, the RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the
elements of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610. Bangayan had sexual intercourse with AAA who
was born on December 14, 1999 and was 12 years, one (1) month, and 14 days old at the time of the
incident. 29 For the RTC, the moral ascendancy or influence of Bangayan over AAA is beyond
question due to their age gap of 15 years, and the fact that he is her brother-in-law, he being the
brother of the husband of her older sister. 30 The RTC ruled that it will not matter if AAA consented to
her defloration because as a rule, the submissiveness or consent of the child under the influence of
an adult is not a defense in sexual abuse. 31 The RTC also considered the Affidavit of Desistance
AAA executed as hearsay evidence because she did not testify regarding its execution. The RTC
added that an Affidavit of Resistance is like an Affidavit of Recantation which the court does not look
with favor. 32
On appeal, 33 Bangayan impugned the findings of the RTC and argued that the trial court
gravely erred in finding that the defense failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is
not criminally liable for the act complained of. 34 Bangayan argued that he had proven, by clear and
convincing evidence, that he is in a relationship with AAA and that the act complained of was
consensual. 35 Bangayan maintained that their persisting relationship should be taken into account
and be considered an absolutory cause. 36 He averred that this is similar to Article 266-C of R.A.
8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, on the effect of pardon where the subsequent valid marriage of
the offended party to the offender shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. While
there is no valid marriage to speak of yet, they were clearly living together as husband and wife as
evidenced by the birth of their second child. Bangayan asserted that it would be in the best interest of
their growing family to acquit him and allow him to help with rearing their children. 37
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision 38 dated June 28, 2017, the Court of Appeals denied Bangayan's appeal and
affirmed with modification his conviction. The award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages were each increased to P75,000.00. 39
In affirming Bangayan's conviction, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of sexual
abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 were established as follows: (1) BBB positively
identified Bangayan as the person who had sexual intercourse with his minor sister and AAA was
confirmed to be 2-3 months pregnant at the time of her medical examination; (2) AAA was subjected
to sexual abuse under the coercion and influence of Bangayan because he was already 27 years old
or 15 years her senior, thus making her vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults; and (3) It
was proven that, at the time of the incident, she was only 12 years and one (1) month old — a minor
not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. 40
The Court of Appeals emphasized that consent of the child is immaterial in cases involving
violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610. It was held that the Sweetheart Theory is a defense in
acts of lasciviousness and rape that are felonies against or without the consent of the victim. It
operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. However, for purposes of sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under R.A. 7610, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the Sweetheart Theory defense is unacceptable.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 41 was denied in a Resolution 42 dated October 24,
2017. Hence, this petition for review.
Bangayan filed the instant Petition for Review 43 on January 5, 2018, assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 2017 and its subsequent Resolution dated October 24, 2017.
He insists that he was able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he should not be held
criminally liable for the act complained of because they were in a relationship at the time of its
commission. 44 For Bangayan, the fact that they were allowed to be together after the alleged sexual
abuse and that AAA conceived their second child right after the complaint was filed in court negate
the claim that AAA was unwilling. 45 Bangayan posits that his continuing relationship with AAA
should be considered an absolutory cause. 46 Invoking the best interest of their family, Bangayan
prays that he be acquitted and be allowed to help raise their family.
Meanwhile, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
manifested that it is no longer filing a Comment and is merely adopting its Brief for the Plaintiff-
Appellee previously filed with the Court of Appeals. 47
Issue
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Bangayan may use as a defense the consent
of AAA and his on-going relationship with her which had already produced two children to exonerate
himself from the charge of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious. The records of this case show that the prosecution failed to
establish all the elements of sexual abuse contemplated under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A.
7610 48 which provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
 influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or
oral advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as
prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute;
or
(5) Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child
with intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be:
Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; 49
The following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct: (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or
female is below eighteen (18) years of age. 50 This paragraph "punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also
with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation
or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. 51
Pursuant to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610, "sexual abuse" includes
the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or
assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children. 52 The present case does not fall under any of the circumstances
enumerated. Therefore, not all the elements of the crime were present to justify Bangayan's
conviction.
In explicitly stating that children deemed to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse
under Section 5 of R.A. 7610, refer to those who engage in sexual intercourse with a child "for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group," 53 it is apparent that the intendment of the law is to consider the condition and capacity of the
child to give consent.
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 qualifies that when the victim of the sexual abuse is under 12
years of age, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. 54 This means that,
regardless of the presence of any of the circumstances enumerated and consent of victim under 12
years of age, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand,
the law is noticeably silent with respect to situations where a child is between 12 years old and below
18 years of age and engages in sexual intercourse not "for money, profit, or any other consideration
or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group." Had it been the intention of the
law to absolutely consider as sexual abuse and punish individuals who engage in sexual intercourse
with "children" or those under 18 years of age, the qualifying circumstances enumerated would not
have been included in Section 5 of R.A. 7610.
Taking into consideration the statutory construction rules that penal laws should be strictly
construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused, and that every law should be
construed in such a way that it will harmonize with existing laws on the same subject matter, We
reconcile the apparent gap in the law by concluding that the qualifying circumstance cited in Section 5
(b) of R.A. 7610, which "punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse," leave room for a child
between 12 and 17 years of age to give consent to the sexual act. An individual who engages in
sexual intercourse with a child, at least 12 and under 18 years of age, and not falling under any of
these circumstances, cannot be held liable under the provisions of R.A. 7610. The interpretation that
consent is material in cases where victim is between 12 years old and below 18 years of age is
favorable to Bangayan. It fills the gap in the law and is consistent with what We have explained in the
case of People v. Tulagan, 55 to wit:
However, considering the definition under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 of
the tern "children" which refers to persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition, We find that the opinion in Malto, that a child is presumed
by law to be incapable of giving rational consent, unduly extends the concept
of statutory rape or acts of lasciviousness to those victims who are within the
range of 12 to 17 years old, and even those 18 years old and above under
special circumstances who are still considered as "children" under Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 7610. While Malto is correct that consent is immaterial in cases
under R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of age, We
clarify that consent of the child is material and may even be a defense in
criminal cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of  R.A. No. 7610 when
the offended party is 12 years old or below 18, or above 18 under special
circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to prove that the said
victim engaged in sexual intercourse either "due to money, profit or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group."
xxx xxx xxx
If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child
"exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she agreed to indulge in
sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group," then the crime could not be rape under
the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and there
was consent. That is why the offender will now be penalized under Section 5(b), R.A.
No. 7610, and not under Article 335 of the RPC [now Article 266-A]. But if the said
victim does not give her consent to sexual intercourse in the sense that the sexual
intercourse was committed through force, threat or intimidation, the crime is rape
under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC. However, if the same victim gave her
consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money, profit, consideration,
coercion or influence is involved, then there is no crime committed, except in
those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an element of rape is substituted
by "moral ascendancy or moral authority," like in the cases of incestuous rape, and
unless it is punished under the RPC as qualified seduction under Article 337 or
simple seduction under Article 338. 56 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
We are not unmindful that in Tulagan, the accused inserted his finger into a nine-year-old
girl's vagina and had sexual intercourse with her. Nevertheless, the vital discussion made by the
Court with respect to the capacity of a victim aged between 12 years old and below 18 years of age to
give rational consent to engage in sexual activity (sexual consent) cannot simply be disregarded.
Though it may be considered obiter dictum, the principle laid down in the majority opinion, speaking
through the ponencia of then Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta, now Chief Justice, remains
relevant and crucial to the resolution of the present case because it clearly outlined the essential
elements of the offense. The discussion of the Court in Tulagan should serve as a guide in resolving
situations identified by the Court to be potential sources of conflicting interpretations. The fact
that Tulagan did not involve a victim between 12 years old and below 18 years old should not
dissuade the Court from applying a principle that aims to clarify and harmonize conflicting provisions
due to an apparent gap in the law.
Recently, in Monroy v. People, 57 We adopted the ruling in Tulagan, to wit:
x x x [I]t bears to point out that "consent of the child is material and may even be
a defense in criminal cases" involving the aforesaid violation when the
offended party is 12 years old or below 18 years old, as in AAA's case. The
concept of consent under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 peculiarly relates to the
second element of the crime — that is, the act of sexual intercourse is performed with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is
considered "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" when the
child is predisposed to indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct because of
money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion of any adult,
syndicate, or group.
xxx xxx xxx 58 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Therefore, it is now clear that consent is a material factor in determining the guilt of
Bangayan.
In Monroy, 59 then 28-year-old accused was charged with violation of Section 5 (b) Article III
of R.A. 7610 for inserting his penis into the vagina of a 14-year-old. The Court acquitted the accused
on reasonable doubt, finding that the sexual intercourse that transpired between the accused and the
14-year-old was consensual and that the case against the accused is based merely on trumped-up
allegations meant as retaliation. In Monroy, the accused was 14 years older or twice the age of the
alleged victim yet the Court found that she was not subjected to other sexual abuse due to the
coercion of an adult as they were in a relationship. Similarly, in the present case, Bangayan was more
or less 15 years older than AAA. While difference in age may be an indication of coercion and
intimidation and negates the presence of sexual consent, this should not be blindly applied to all
instances of alleged sexual abuse cases. Therefore, the Court must not be restricted in identifying the
presence of coercion and intimidation by a simple mathematical computation of the age difference.
The sweeping and confusing conclusions in the case of Malto v. People 60 and the
application of contract law in determining the relevance of consent in cases under R.A. 7610 is not
proper. We had the opportunity to shed light on this matter in People v. Tulagan 61 where We
observed that:
We take exception, however, to the sweeping conclusions in Malto (1) that "a
child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious
conduct or sexual intercourse" and (2) that "consent of the child is immaterial in
criminal cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610" because they
would virtually eradicate the concepts of statutory rape and statutory acts of
lasciviousness, and trample upon the express provisions of the said law. 62
Accordingly, the Court deems it prudent to rectify the difference between the concept of
consent under contract law and sexual consent in criminal law which determines the guilt of an
individual engaging in a sexual relationship with one who is between 12 years old or below 18 years
of age. These are concepts that are distinct from each other and have differing legal implications.
The law limits, to varying degrees, the capacity of an individual to give consent. While in
general, under the civil law concept of consent, in relation to capacity to act, all individuals under 18
years of age have no capacity to act, the same concept cannot be applied to consent within the
context of sexual predation. Under civil law, the concept of "capacity to act" or "the power to do acts
with legal effects" 63 limits the capacity to give a valid consent which generally refers to "the meeting
of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the case which are to constitute the
contract." 64 To apply consent as a concept in civil law to criminal cases is to digress from the
essence of sexual consent as contemplated by the Revised Penal Code and R.A. 7610. Capacity to
act under civil law cannot be equated to capacity to give sexual consent for individuals between 12
years old and below 18 years of age. Sexual consent does not involve any obligation within the
context of civil law and instead refers to a private act or sexual activity that may be covered by
the Revised Penal Code and R.A. 7610.
More importantly, Our earlier pronouncement regarding consent in Malto failed to reflect
teenage psychology and predisposition. We recognize that the sweeping conclusions of the Court
in Malto failed to consider a juvenile's maturity and to reflect teenagers' attitude towards sex in this
day and age. There is a need to distinguish the difference between a child under 12 years of age and
one who is between 12 years old and below 18 years of age due to the incongruent mental capacities
and emotional maturity of each age group. It is settled that a victim under 12 years old or is demented
"does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years or dementia; thus, a child
or a demented person's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good
from evil." 65 As such, regardless of the willingness of a victim under 12 years old to engage in any
sexual activity, the Revised Penal Code punishes statutory rape and statutory acts of lasciviousness.
On the other hand, considering teenage psychology and predisposition in this day and age, We
cannot completely rule out the capacity of a child between 12 years old and below 18 years of age to
give sexual consent.
Consequently, although We declared in Malto that the Sweetheart Theory is unacceptable in
violations of R.A. 7610 since "a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person," 66 We deem it judicious to
review the Decision of the court a quo and reiterate Our recent pronouncements
in Tulagan and Monroy and clarify the ambiguity created in the Malto  case in resolving the case at
bar.
Where the age of the child is close to the threshold age of 12 years old, as in the case of AAA
who was only 12 years and one month old at the time of the incident, evidence must be strictly
scrutinized to determine the presence of sexual consent. The emotional maturity and predisposition of
a juvenile, whose age is close to the threshold age of 12, may significantly differ from a child aged
between 15-18 who may be expected to be more mature and to act with consciousness of the
consequences of sexual intercourse.
In this case, there are special circumstances that reveal the presence consent of AAA. The
sexual congress between Bangayan and AAA was not limited to just one incident. They were in a
relationship even after the incident alleged in the Information and had even produced two (2) children.
To Our mind, these are not acts of a child who is unable to discern good from evil and did not give
consent to the sexual act.
We also note that the conclusion of the RTC that:
x x x [T]he moral ascendancy or influence of the accused over the victim is beyond
question because of their 15 year age gap, not to mention that the former is also her
brother-in-law, he being the brother of the husband of her older sister. 67
is erroneous. Contrary to the ruling of the RTC, it cannot be said that Bangayan exercised moral
ascendancy over AAA simply because of their 15-year age gap and the fact that he is her "brother-in-
law." Following the concept of brother-in-law in its ordinary sense, Bangayan is not AAA's brother-in-
law because a brother-in-law refers only to a wife's brother or a sister's husband. It does not include a
brother of the husband of AAA's older sister.
We must take into account Bangayan's defense that, at the time of the incident, he and AAA
were lovers. The conduct of Bangayan and AAA, which is the subject of the Information against him,
is not the sexual abuse punished by the law. While placed in an unusual predicament, We recognize
that Bangayan and AAA are in a relationship that had produced not just one (1) offspring but two (2).
While AAA was a child, as defined under R.A. 7610, being under 18 years of age at the time she and
Bangayan engaged in sexual intercourse, there was no coercion, intimidation or influence of an adult,
as contemplated by the law. AAA consented to the sexual act as reflected in her conduct at the time
of the commission of the act and her subsequent conduct shown in the records.
AAA did not testify during the trial. Had she testified, the trial court would have been able to
confirm the veracity of the allegations in the sworn statement 68 she executed and the statements
she allegedly made to Dr. Villar during her medical examination on April 24, 2012. We cannot simply
accept the statement of Dr. Villar that AAA admitted to him that she had sexual intercourse with
Bangayan even before 2012. 69 This statement is hearsay as he has no personal knowledge of it.
Moreover, this is not even alleged in the Information 70 filed against him.
Furthermore, Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules provides:
Section. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
In Gumabon v. Philippine National Bank, 71 the Court explained that formal offer "means that
the offeror shall inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence." In the
absence of a formal offer, courts cannot take notice of the evidence even if this has been previously
marked and identified. 72
The Social Case Study Report 73 reflecting the evaluation of Social Welfare Officer III
Theresa A. Mauricio (Mauricio) on AAA's social, emotional, and intellectual development cannot be
admitted nor be given any credence by the Court. Mauricio made the following recommendations in
her report:
Based on the above information, the client suffered multiple emotional crisis
that hampered her growth and development. She has the time, knowledge, potentials
and abilities that could enhance her total development. However, as early as 7 years
old, she had crisis due to role confusion.
Being abused, she was unable to develop her unique values or personality.
She was not allowed the opportunities to acquire friends, develop skills and
knowledge through formal education.
Living together with the perpetuator [sic] could support her longing for a
parental figure. He served as support for her existence but considering his
weaknesses such as from abusing her, the lack for sense of responsibility and
assertiveness as lack of resources should affect the future of the minor and son. He
could not provide the basic needs such as food, shelter and education with his
disposition in life.
The minor had the CHANCE to grab the opportunities of the PRESENT and
the FUTURE once she is AWAY with her perpetuator [sic]. Support from relatives is
highly recommended for direction.
The honored court is then requested for favorable action that will promote the
general welfare of the minor-[AAA] and her family. 74
A careful study of the records reveals that the RTC received the Social Case Study Report
dated September 25, 2014 on October 8, 2014. Although the testimony of the social worker was
included in the Pre-Trial Order, 75 the document was never properly identified, authenticated by the
social worker who prepared the report, and included in the formal offer of evidence. 76 The social
worker never testified in open court and the defense was never given an opportunity to test her
credibility and verify the correctness and accuracy of her findings. To Our mind, giving credence to
evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the other party of due process.
Thus, evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be excluded by the court.
Even assuming that the Social Case Study Report was properly presented and formally
offered, it cannot be made the basis for establishing the absence of AAA's sexual consent. The report
did not accurately reflect the living condition and the state of her relationship with Bangayan. It did not
negate the presence of AAA's sexual consent at the time the alleged offense was committed.
Noticeably, she was already pregnant with their second child when she was interviewed for the Social
Case Study Report and later gave birth while he was incarcerated. 77 The contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of AAA, which are more consistent with the claim of Bangayan that AAA consented
to the sexual encounter, outweigh the contents of the Social Case Study Report which are not yet
verified. It is worthy to note that even when Bangayan was presented in the witness stand, AAA was
present in court, 78 presumably to show support for him. AAA conceived a second child with
Bangayan despite the charge against him. Both children were conceived before he was
incarcerated. 79 She did not testify against Bangayan even if she was present during the hearings.
These acts of AAA, and the Affidavit of Desistance she executed, when taken as a whole, bolsters
the claim of Bangayan that they were in a relationship when the act complained of was committed
and even lived together without the benefit of marriage after the case against him was filed. Her acts
are consistent with the claim of Bangayan that their relationship existed at the time of commission of
the act complained, during trial, and even continued after he was convicted by the lower court. To Our
mind, these factors are clear manifestations that she was not subjected to any form of abuse, and
prove that she consented to the act complained of. Applying the ruling in Tulagan there is no crime
committed because AAA freely gave her consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money, profit,
consideration, coercion or influence is involved. Due to the prosecution's failure to establish and
prove beyond reasonable doubt the requisites for the charge of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610,
Bangayan must be acquitted.
Section 2 of R.A. 7610 states that:
x x x [T]he "best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all
actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent
with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations
Convention of the Rights of the Child.
In this exceptional situation, We are not prepared to punish two individuals and deprive their
children from having a normal family life simply because of the minority of AAA at the time she began
dating Bangayan. The benefits of living in a nuclear family to AAA and their two (2) children outweigh
any perceived dangers of the on-going romantic relationship Bangayan has with AAA who is 15 years
younger than him. This arrangement is more favorable to the welfare of both parties as they are
planning to get married. 80 We verified from the records that Bangayan was single at the time he
gave his personal circumstances when he testified in court. 81 This is more consistent with the
principle of upholding the best interests of children as it gives Bangayan an opportunity to perform his
essential parental obligations and be present for their two (2) children.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 11, 2016 of the Regional
Trial Court of Maddela, Quirino, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. 38-510 as well as the Decision
dated June 28, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38723 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodan A. Bangayan is ACQUITTED. He
is ORDERED to be IMMEDIATELY RELEASED unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful
cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to inform this Court of the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 227581. January 15, 2020.]

JOSEPH DELOS SANTOS y PADRINAO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
 DECISION

J.C. REYES, JR.,  J p:

The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the July 7,
2016 Decision 1 and the October 12, 2016 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 35865, which affirmed the June 28, 2013 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
172, Valenzuela City in Criminal Case No. 870-v-07, finding the petitioner Joseph Delos
Santos y Padrinao (Delos Santos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10 (a), Article
VI of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act.
The Facts
The Information 4 charged Delos Santos with slight physical injuries, in relation to R.A. No.
7610, as follows:
That on or about August 31, 2007, in Valenzuela City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with other
person whose name, identity, and present whereabout[s] still unknown, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously maul one AAA, 17 years old,
hitting the latter on the face and chest, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical
injuries which injuries required medical attendance for a period of less than (9) days
and incapacitated said victim from performing her habitual work for the same period
of time, thereby subjecting said minor to psychological and physical abuse, cruelty
and emotional maltreatment.
Delos Santos pleaded not guilty during arraignment. 5
During trial, the prosecution presented: (1) AAA, 6 the victim, and (2) Clemente Daluro, Jr.
(Daluro), the victim's companion, as witnesses. 7 The parties stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth
Lim, who was the records custodian of Valenzuela General Hospital. 8
AAA testified that at around 11:00 p.m. on August 31, 2007, she and Daluro were on their
way to her house along Padrinao Street, Karuhatan, Valenzuela when Delos Santos and his group
confronted them. Delos Santos' brother, Bob Delos Santos (Bob), said "nag-iinit na ako," as he
wanted to punch Daluro. Bob attempted to hit Daluro with a rock, but AAA apologized to prevent a
commotion. Bob remarked that he was not holding a rock. 9
Delos Santos attempted to punch Daluro, but he dodged it and AAA was hit on the right
cheek instead. Bob punched AAA on the chest causing her to hit a wall. AAA asked Delos Santos'
companions to call her mother for help, but Bob interrupted and said "tama lang yan sa inyo
pagtripan dahil dinemanda n'yo kami." Delos Santos hurled invectives at AAA, who was calling her
mother on her way to her house with Daluro. 10
AAA's mother, who had earlier filed a complaint against Delos Santos' group, heard the call
and turned on the terrace light. Delos Santos and his group fled. AAA told her mother what happened
and they reported the incident to the barangay. At the barangay, four of the six men apologized, but
Delos Santos and Bob did not. AAA was brought to the Valenzuela General Hospital for treatment.
She suffered a "contusion at the right supraorbital area, secondary to mauling." 11
Daluro corroborated AAA's testimonies that Delos Santos' group approached them and that
Bob uttered "nag-iinit na ako." Bob said he was holding a rock and threatened to hit him, but AAA got
in the way causing her to be hit instead. AAA asked them why they were "making fancy of them," to
which Bob replied, "Dapat lang sa inyo yan dinemanda kami ng nanay n'yo." AAA and Daluro went
away, but Delos Santos' group followed them to her house. When the terrace light was turned on,
Delos Santos' group ran away. 12
On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Delos Santos, and (2) Noel Magbanua
(Magbanua), as their witnesses. 13
Delos Santos denied the charge against him and testified that at around 11:30 p.m. of August
31, 2007, he was in his sister's store resting and smoking when a barangay official came to arrest him
because he allegedly hurt AAA. Delos Santos claimed that AAA's accusation was due to the
confrontation of their respective mothers at the barangay. 14
Magbanua testified that he was a purok leader of Purok 31 from 2006 to 2007. He kept a log
of incidents within his jurisdiction, and there was no incident recorded on August 31, 2007. 15
On June 28, 2013, the RTC convicted Delos Santos of the crime charged and imposed the
penalty of imprisonment of four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional as minimum to
six years and one day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay P10,000.00 as moral damages. 16
Delos Santos appealed to the CA, which the latter denied in its July 7, 2016
Decision. 17 Delos Santos moved for reconsideration, which the CA again denied in its October 12,
2016 Resolution. 18 Undeterred, Delos Santos filed this petition before the Court assailing the CA
Decision and Resolution.
The Issue
The sole issue presented before the Court is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
RTC Decision.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that only questions of law shall be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule has exceptions and Delos Santos raised two of them as
grounds to allow his petition: 1) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, and 2)
when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 19
The Court finds that none of the exceptions raised are applicable in this case. The CA was
correct to affirm the RTC's conviction of Delos Santos. The CA's ruling was based on facts, law, and
jurisprudence. The Court opines that the exceptions raised were intended to mask the factual nature
of the issue raised before the Court. Delos Santos alleges that "the [CA] gravely erred in convicting
[him] despite the prosecution's failure to establish that all the elements to constitute the crime of child
abuse under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 are present in this case." 20
To determine whether the prosecution established all the elements of the crime, the Court
has to read the transcript of stenographic notes and review the documentary evidence presented. In
short, the Court has to reevaluate the evidence on record. Evaluation of evidence is an indication that
the question or issue posed before the Court is a question of fact or a factual issue.
In Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas, 21 the Court differentiated between question of law and
question of fact, thus:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether
 the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Applying the test to this case, it is without doubt that the issue presented before the Court is
factual in nature, which is not a proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It has been repeatedly pronounced that the Court is not a trier of facts. Evaluation
of evidence is the function of the trial court.
The Court finds no error in the substance of the CA Decision.
Delos Santos was charged, tried, and found guilty of violating Section 10 (a), Article VI,
of R.A. No. 7610, which states:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial
to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of [prision
mayor] in its minimum period. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 (b) of the same law defined child abuse as:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being[.] (Emphases supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Debasement is defined as "the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something."
Degradation, on the other hand, means the "lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality." 22
Intent is a state of mind that accompanies the act. 23 Since intent is an internal state, the
same can only be verified through the external acts of the person. In this case, there are several
circumstances that reveal the intent of Delos Santos to debase or degrade the intrinsic worth of AAA.
First, AAA and Daluro testified that Delos Santos' group approached them and Bob
said "nag-iinit na ako." The initial move came from Delos Santos' group without provocation on the
part of AAA or Daluro. The act of approaching with the words "nag-iinit na ako" indicates that there
was intent to confront or to challenge AAA and Daluro to a fight. This is contrary to Delos Santos'
claim that the incident was accidental.
Second, Bob threatened to hit Daluro with a stone and Delos Santos attempted to punch him,
which unfortunately landed on AAA. Then Bob punched AAA on the chest causing her to hit a wall.
These acts are obviously aimed to hurt, harass, and to cause harm, either physically, mentally,
emotionally, or psychologically, on AAA and Daluro.
Third, Bob said "tama lang yon sa inyo pagtripan dahil dinemanda n'yo kami." Then Delos
Santos hurled invectives at AAA and Daluro. Their words reveal that they were motivated by revenge,
which is their justification for their actions. Hurling invectives on a person is debasing, degrading, and
demeaning as it reduces a person's worth.
 Fourth, Delos Santos' group followed AAA and Daluro home, which implies that they had no
intention to stop their misdeeds had it not been for the timely intervention of AAA's mother.
Lastly, Delos Santos and Bob did not apologize to AAA and to Daluro during the confrontation
at the barangay. If indeed the incident was unintentional, they could have explained so during the
confrontation. However, there was no trace of remorse from them.
Delos Santos and Bob's words and actions characterized physical and psychological child
abuse, and emotional maltreatment, all of which debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being.
The Court resolves to deny the petition after finding that the CA did not commit any reversible
error in the assailed decision and resolution. The CA had exhaustively explained the law and
jurisprudence, which were the bases of its decision and resolution. Both the trial court and the
appellate court are consistent in their findings of fact that Delos Santos is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of slight physical injuries in relation to R.A. No. 7610.
Delos Santos was mistaken when he cited the case of Bongalon v. People. 24 The factual
backdrop of that case is different from the instant case. In Bongalon, the accused was convicted of
the crime of slight physical injuries instead of violation of Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, because of
the absence of intent to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. The physical harm
committed against the minor was committed "at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters x
x x." 25
Here, the accosting and laying of hands are deliberately intended by Delos Santos and his
group. As interpreted by the CA, the word "pagtripan" signified an intention to debase or degrade that
did not result from an unexpected event. The acts of Delos Santos were offshoots of an intent to take
revenge arising from the conflict existing between his mother and AAA's mother. Delos Santos did not
lose his self-control and the acts were not done at the spur of the moment.
Delos Santos merely interposes an alibi that he was resting and smoking at his sister's store
at the time of the incident. It is a well-settled rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses
and they deserve scant regard when the prosecution has clearly established the identity of the
accused. 26
On the imposable penalty, the Court modifies the maximum indeterminate penalty.
Considering the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum indeterminate penalty must
be prision mayor in its medium period of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seven (7)
years and four (4) months. The Court sustains the minimum indeterminate penalty imposed by the
RTC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 7, 2016 Decision and the October 12, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35865 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION in that the moral damages imposed by the Regional Trial Court shall earn an interest
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The Court imposes the minimum indeterminate penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day and a maximum indeterminate penalty
of prision mayor, in its medium period of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Delos Santos y Padrinao v. People, G.R. No. 227581, [January 15, 2020])