Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe

Patterns of Local
Autonomy in Europe
Andreas Ladner · Nicolas Keuffer
Harald Baldersheim · Nikos Hlepas
Pawel Swianiewicz · Kristof Steyvers
Carmen Navarro
Governance and Public Management
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Andreas Ladner • Nicolas Keuffer
Harald Baldersheim • Nikos Hlepas
Pawel Swianiewicz • Kristof Steyvers
Carmen Navarro
Patterns of Local
Autonomy in Europe
Andreas Ladner Nicolas Keuffer
IDHEAP IDHEAP
University of Lausanne University of Lausanne
Lausanne, Switzerland Lausanne, Switzerland
Harald Baldersheim Nikos Hlepas
Department of Political Science National and Kapodistrian University
University of Oslo of Athens
Oslo, Norway Athens, Greece
Pawel Swianiewicz Kristof Steyvers
Department of Local Development Department of Political Science
and Policy, Faculty of Geography and Ghent University
Regional Studies, University of Warsaw Ghent, Belgium
Warszawa, Poland
Carmen Navarro
Department of Political Science
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Madrid, Spain
ISSN 2524-728X ISSN 2524-7298 (electronic)

Governance and Public Management
ISBN 978-3-319-95641-1 ISBN 978-3-319-95642-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8
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Contents
Part I Assessing and Measuring Local Autonomy 1
1 What Is Local Autonomy? 3
2 Measuring Local Autonomy 37
Part II Towards the Local Autonomy Index 75
3 Legal Foundations 77
4 Functional Responsibilities 103
5 Financial Control 125
6 Organisational Choice 151
7 Administrative Supervision 175
v
vi CONTENTS
8 Vertical Access 193
9 The Local Autonomy Index (LAI) 213
Part III The Local Autonomy Index as Tool for Comparative

Analysis 255
10 A New Typology of Local Government? Beyond

North-South and East-West 257
11 Who Governs? Patterns of Responsiveness and

Accountability 279
12 Roadmap to Local Autonomy? Drivers of Variation 303
13 Blessings of Local Autonomy? Does It Matter? For What?

How? 317
14 Conclusions: Local Autonomy—Patterns, Dynamics and

Ambiguities 333
I ndex 349
About the Authors
Andreas Ladner is Professor of Political Institutions and Public

Administration at the Institut de Hautes Études en Administration Publique
(IDHEAP) at the University of Lausanne. His research areas include the
quality of democracy, local government, institutional change, political par-
ties and voting advice applications.
Nicolas Keuffer is Research Assistant at the Institut de Hautes Études en
Administration Publique (IDHEAP) at the University of Lausanne. His
research areas include local autonomy, decentralisation, institutional and
administrative reforms, local governance and evaluation of public
policies.
Harald Baldersheim is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the
University of Oslo. His research areas include local and regional govern-
ment studies, public policy analysis and e-government.
Nikos Hlepas is Associate Professor of Local Self-Government and
Regional Administration at the Faculty of Political Science and Public
Administration at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. His
areas of research include local government, public sector reforms and
comparative public law.
Kristof Steyvers is Associate Professor at the Department of Political
Science of Ghent University. His research is conducted in the Centre for
Local Politics. It focuses on (comparative) local politics with a key interest
in local political leadership, parties and elections at the local level, local
vii
viii About the Authors
government reform, the democratic anchorage of local governance net-

works and urban politics.
Pawel Swianiewicz is Professor at the Department of Local Development
and Policy, Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of
Warsaw. His research concentrates on local government and politics in
Poland, comparative studies of decentralisation in Central and Eastern
Europe as well as processes and impacts of territorial reforms.
Carmen Navarro is Associate Professor at the Department of Political
Science, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Her research areas include
local government and public policy.
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Local autonomy’s approaches and constitutive aspects 25

Fig. 3.1 Institutional depth (ID)—overall trend 87
Fig. 3.2 Institutional depth (ID)—development in the different
countries89
Fig. 3.3 Effective political discretion (EPD)—overall trend 92
Fig. 3.4 Effective political discretion (EPD)—development in the
different countries 93
Fig. 3.5 Legal protection (LP)—overall trend 94
Fig. 3.6 Legal protection (LP)—development in the different countries 96
Fig. 3.7 Four legal elements of local autonomy—overall trend 97
Fig. 4.1 Policy autonomy—overall trend 111
Fig. 4.2 Policy autonomy—development in the different countries 112
Fig. 4.3 Policy scope (PS) and effective political discretion (EPD) by
country (2014) 113
Fig. 5.1 Financial autonomy index (FAI)—overall trend 135
Fig. 5.2 Trend in subindices of financial autonomy 136
Fig. 5.3 Financial autonomy—development in the different countries 137
Fig. 5.4 Financial autonomy index and municipal spending to GDP 141
Fig. 5.5 Changes of the financial autonomy in the countries with the
fastest drop of the index (drop by at least 2 points) 142
Fig. 5.6 Cyclical changes of the role of unconditional grants in the
overall intergovernmental transfer system 143
Fig. 6.1 Organisational autonomy—overall trend 164
Fig. 6.2 Organisational autonomy—development in the different
countries165
Fig. 7.1 Administrative supervision (AS)—overall trend 183
ix
x List of Figures
Fig. 7.2 Administrative supervision (AS)—development in the different

countries184
Fig. 8.1 Vertical access—overall trend 199
Fig. 8.2 Vertical access—development in the different countries 201
Fig. 9.1 The operationalisation of the different dimensions of local
autonomy in the light of the different theoretical approaches 222
Fig. 9.2 The triangle of local autonomy 224
Fig. 9.3 Changes of local autonomy on seven dimensions (five-year
periods), means and standard deviations 228
Fig. 9.4 Selected spider graphs (means 2010–2014) 234
Fig. 9.5 Local autonomy index (LAI), country ranking 2014 236
Fig. 9.6 Countries with high and low degrees of local autonomy (LAI
2014)237
Fig. 9.7 Degree and changes of local autonomy between 1990–1994
and 2010–2014 (mean values) 238
Fig. 9.8 Whisker plots of the LAI 239
Fig. 9.9 Patterns of local autonomy (2010–2014 means) 249
Fig. 10.1 Typology of local autonomy—2014 270
Fig. 10.2 Decentralisation and convergence of local government systems
in Europe (1990–2014) 273
Fig. 11.1 Responsiveness and accountability as determinants of
community type in local government 287
Fig. 11.2 Distribution of political community types (accountability and
responsiveness) among countries in 1990 290
Fig. 14.1 Dimensions of decentralisation: Interactive rule and local
political space by country (2014) 344
List of Tables
Table 1.1 State of countries’ ratification of the European Charter of

Local Self-Government 28
Table 2.1 Distribution of countries and selection of the units of
observation/aggregation and the units of analysis 39
Table 2.2 Number of municipalities (1990–2014) 57
Table 2.3 Average population size (1990–2014) 58
Table 2.4 OECD indicators of local autonomy (1995 and 2014) 59
Table 2.5 OECD indicators of local autonomy: tax autonomy and
non-earmarked transfers (1995 and most recent data) 60
Table 2.6 A summary of research on local autonomy in European
countries61
Table 2.7 Local autonomy coding scheme 64
Table 3.1 Institutional depth (ID)—operationalisation/coding 86
Table 3.2 Effective political discretion (EPD)—operationalisation/
coding91
Table 3.3 Legal protection (LP)—operationalisation/coding 95
Table 3.4 Institutional depth (ID) by country (mean, reference years
and changes) 98
Table 3.5 Effective political discretion (EPD) by country (mean,
reference years and changes) 99
Table 3.6 Legal protection (LP) by country (mean, reference years and
changes)100
Table 3.7 Pearson correlation indicators (mean 1990–2014) 101
Table 4.1 Municipal expenditures by function in Italy and Norway 107
Table 4.2 Policy scope (PS) and effective political discretion (EPD)—
operationalisation/coding109
Table 4.3 Policy autonomy scores 2014 by functions and countries 116
xi
xii List of Tables
Table 4.4 Policy scope (PS) by country (mean, reference years and
changes)121
Table 5.1 Declarations and reservations on not bounding items of
art. 9 of the European Charter of Local Government 128
Table 5.2 Financial autonomy (TA, FSR, FSR, BA):
operationalisation/coding131
Table 5.3 Countries with the highest differences in the rankings of FAI
and PS + EPD index (2014) 139
Table 5.4 Changes in the financial autonomy index in countries with
the fastest growth of the index (at least 4 points growth) 140
Table 5.5 Fiscal autonomy (FA) by country (mean, reference years and
changes)145
Table 5.6 Financial transfer system (FTS) by country (mean, reference
years and changes) 146
Table 5.7 Financial self-reliance (FSR) by country (mean, reference
Table 5.8 Borrowing autonomy (BA) by country (mean, reference
Table 6.1 Organisational autonomy (OA)—operationalisation/coding 163
Table 6.2 Organisational autonomy (OA) by country (mean, reference
Table 7.1 Administrative supervision (AS)—operationalisation/coding 182
Table 7.2 Evolution of countries in administrative supervision 183
Table 7.3 Countries in categories of administrative supervision (2014) 185
Table 7.4 Administrative supervision (AS) by country (mean, reference
Table 8.1 Vertical access (CRA)—operationalisation/coding 198
Table 8.2 Countries in (sub)categories of access with(out) change 201
Table 8.3 Central or regional access (CRA), a synthetic overview 208
Table 8.4 Organisational autonomy (OA) by country (mean, reference
Table 9.1 The 11 variables to measure local autonomy (2014)—
original and standardised scales 219
Table 9.2 The 11 variables measuring local autonomy (correlation
matrix)220
Table 9.3 Country ranking on the seven dimensions (means 2010–
2014)229
Table 9.4 LAI, five-year means and five country groups 240
Table 9.5 Correlations between the seven dimensions and the LAI and
other measures of decentralisation 245
Table 10.1 Breaking points for division of dimensions of typology into
classes267
List of Tables xiii
Table 10.2 Types of local autonomy 267

Table 10.3 Typology of local autonomy in 2014 268
Table 10.6 Characteristics of types in 2014 271
Table 10.7 Decentralisation and convergence of local government
systems in Europe (1990–2014) 273
Table 11.1 Accountability and responsiveness 1990–2005 to 2014/
change 1990–2014 294
Table 12.1 Accounting for local autonomy: correlates of local autonomy
(local autonomy scores 2014), Pearson’s correlation
coefficients308
Table 12.2 Local autonomy (2014): the significance of citizen trust,
state tradition, and regional authority; regression analysis,
beta coefficients 311
Table 13.1 Local autonomy (2014) and the quality of democracy
(2014) (Pearson corr) 323
Table 13.2 Local autonomy (LAI 2014) and the quality of democracy
(regression models, standardised beta-coefficients) 324
Table 13.3 Local autonomy (2014) and the quality of local democracy
(Pearson corr) 326
Table 13.4 Local autonomy (LAI 2014) and turnout, elections and trust
(regression models) 327
Table 13.5 Local autonomy (2014) and output-related aspect of a
political system (Pearson corr) 328
Table 13.6 Local autonomy (LAI 2014) and output-related aspect of a
political system (regression models) 329
Table 14.1 Modes of central-local coordination (2014) 341
Table 14.2 Decentralisation as observed in 39 European countries by
2014345
List of Boxes
Box 3.1 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 2,

Constitutional and Legal Foundation of Local Self-
Government83
Box 3.2 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 3, Concept
of Local Self-Government 85
Box 3.3 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 4, Scope of
Box 3.4 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 11, Legal
Protection of Local Self-Government 94
Box 5.1 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 9, Financial
Resources of Local Authorities 127
Box 5.2 Financial Autonomy as Defined by Martinez-Vazquez and
Timofeev (2011) 130
Conditions Under Which Responsibilities at Local Level Are
Exercised153
Appropriate Administrative Structures and Resources for the
Tasks of Local Authorities 154
Administrative Supervision of Local Authorities’ Activities 177
Box 8.1 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 4, Scope of
xv
xvi List of Boxes
Box 8.2 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 10, Local

Authorities’ Right to Associate 194
Box 9.1 The Calculation of the LAI 225
Box 11.1 Calculation of Accountability and Responsiveness on the Basis
of LAI Variables 287
PART I
Assessing and Measuring Local

Autonomy
CHAPTER 1
What Is Local Autonomy?
1.1 Introduction
The balance between local autonomy and central control is a perennial
issue in the territorial organisation of states. Central domination and local
submission have been defining features of some states while in others cities
and provinces enjoyed extensive freedom from central interference. The
history of nation-building in Europe since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648)
is largely a story of gradual integration of diverse cities and provinces into
larger territorial units (Rokkan and Urwin 1978). The process varied from
country to country with markedly different outcomes in terms of the
degree and characteristic patterns of local autonomy. The purpose of this
book is to chart this variation as it exists today and to assess its drivers and
consequences.
With the emergence of the modern nation state, the virtues and short-
comings of the competing ideals about how to organise the relations
between central power and territorial subunits became an intensively
debated topic. For some, a powerful nation state had to be “one and indi-
visible” (see Art. 1 of the French Constitution of 1791), and they favoured
a strong centre with subordinate state units, whereas others insisted on the
principle of power-sharing (see James Madison in the Federalist Papers
No. 51) between the different layers of the state as a safeguard to the
rights of the people. To this can be added the ideas of Plato (see The
Dialogues of Plato Vol. II: V, 738, 742; VI 771) and other political think-
© The Author(s) 2019 3

A. Ladner et al., Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe, Governance
and Public Management,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_1
4 A. LADNER ET AL.
ers who claim that democratic decision-making depends on citizens who

know and trust each other and that the creation of homogeneous subunits
is a means to contain conflicts in ethnically, linguistically or confessionally
divided societies.
Renowned writers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill or
Toulmin Smith presented autonomy as a highly valued feature of local
government. For them, autonomy provided the ground for genuine
democracy where decisions could meet the demands and needs of the citi-
zens. Based on these ideas, international and European organisations such
as the European Union (EU) (through the establishment of the Committee
of Regions in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and the Lisbon
Treaty of 2009), the World Bank (WB), the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the UN-Habitat support and foster decentralisation
reforms devolving political power and responsibilities towards lower levels
of government and closer to the citizens. In 1985, the Council of Europe
adopted “The European Charter of Local Self-Government” to maintain
and promote local autonomy in its member states. The European Charter
has become an important instrument for protecting and promoting local
self-government.
Despite the importance of the concept, there is little theoretical conver-
gence regarding the core elements of local autonomy. The reports on the
countries having signed the European Charter regarding its implementa-
tion provide helpful insight into the situation in these countries and issue
a large number of recommendations for improvement. They often fail to
produce comparable data. There is also a considerable amount of data on
decentralisation produced by the OECD and the WB. These sources,
however, mainly deal with local expenditures, tax-raising powers and
transfers and do not capture to what extent local authorities have a say in
how these funds are spent. And finally, there is a limited number of scien-
tific studies trying to measure local autonomy comparatively. All these
studies focus on some aspects of autonomy only or treat a rather limited
number of countries and subnational tiers (Vetter 2007; Sellers and
Lidström 2007; Wolman et al. 2010; Hooghe et al. 2016; Do Vale 2015;
Ivanyna and Shah 2014). What is lacking are comprehensive studies
addressing the different components of local autonomy across a large
number of countries and across time. This book attempts to fill this gap.
WHAT IS LOCAL AUTONOMY? 5
Our study proposes a theoretically rooted measure of local autonomy

drawing on different theoretical paradigms (institutional theories,
comparative local and multilevel governance, theories of decentralisation).
The measure is applied to 39 countries over a time period of 25 years
(1990–2014).1 The 39 countries covered include all 28 EU member states
together with Albania, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia,
Moldova, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland Turkey and Ukraine. The study
identifies the position of the respective countries on component dimen-
sions of local autonomy, including changes over time, develops an overall
measure of local autonomy and reveals different patterns of local auton-
omy. Furthermore, we have sought to supplement existing typologies of
local government (e.g. Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Kuhlmann and Wollmann
2014; Loughlin et al. 2011; Swianiewicz 2014; Goldsmith and Page
2010) by grouping countries according to how they score on the various
dimensions of our local autonomy index. And finally, we address possible
causes for varying degrees of autonomy, and, since local autonomy is not
an end in itself, we have also sought to identify consequences of local
autonomy for local democracy and service delivery.
Thus, the overarching research intentions and the main questions of
this volume are:
(a) How can local autonomy be measured taking a larger number of its
different aspects into account?
(b) Are there characteristic patterns of local autonomy, and how did
local autonomy change in the last quarter of a century?2
(c) What explains cross-country variations in local autonomy and what
are the effects of these differences?
In this first chapter, we start with the question why local autonomy
is considered to be important, followed by a theoretical section outlin-
ing the theoretical justifications of local autonomy and the ways the
concept is used. Then, we look at the different disciplinary approaches
1
The study was initiated by the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy of the
European Commission (Tender No 2014.CE.16.BAT.031: “Self-rule Index for Local
Authorities”).
2
The second part of this question appears particularly interesting in the age of globalisa-
tion and Europeanisation or with respect to the financial and economic crisis.
6 A. LADNER ET AL.
and suggest a theory-based multidimensional concept of local auton-

omy which sets the grounds for our measurement of local autonomy
presented in the second chapter.
1.2 Why Is Local Autonomy Important?

In the past few decades, local autonomy has become one of the key issues
of reforms of local government systems. Decentralisation reforms devolv-
ing political power and responsibilities towards levels of government closer
to the citizens have been sweeping the globe since the 1980s. Both local
autonomy and decentralisations3 have been advocated by many important
European and international institutions as a cornerstone of “good gover-
nance” guaranteeing and enhancing democracy (UN-Habitat 2009;
UCLG 2008; OECD 2004).4
From such a perspective, local autonomy is more than just a topic of
scientific interest. It has become something to be achieved, an aim respon-
sible political leaders should crave for. The justification of this point of
view is found in many of the prerequisites for well-functioning municipali-
ties. Most of them are positively related to local autonomy or—as it is
assumed—are direct products of local autonomy. It is argued that local
autonomy leads to more involvement of citizens in the political process, an
increase of accountability, more economic efficiency, healthy local compe-
tition, cross-functional coordination, policy experimentation, and the pro-
tection of macroeconomic and political stability (Hankla 2009; Treisman
2007; Andrews and De Vries 2007). To what extent these expectations are
justified will be addressed later in this book (see Chap. 13). At this stage,
it seems, however, important to mention that there may also be negative
impacts of decentralisation, such as decreasing stabilisation (Musgrave and
Musgrave 1976), inequality, corruption and pork-barrel policies
(Prud’homme 1994) or decreasing (resource allocation) economic effi-
ciency and growth (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2011).
3
Important to note: Decentralisation and local autonomy are not synonyms (Fleurke and
Willemse 2004). There can be a strong decentralisation without local autonomy. Only in the
case of political or real decentralisation the municipalities enjoy a high degree of autonomy.
This is not the case in when it comes to administrative decentralisation or to deconcentration
(see Kuhlmann and Bogumil 2010; Wollmann 2004).
4
Within the World Bank operational experience, over one-quarter of development policy
operations approved in fiscal years 1995–2005 listed at least one condition with a decentrali-
sation theme (Kaiser 2006).
The European Charter of Local Self-Government, adopted by the Council

of Europe in 1985, probably represents the most prominent contemporary
endeavour to promote decentralisation and local autonomy. Based in the
normative assumption that a territorial organisation with autonomous
municipalities is better than any unitary form of state with no real decentrali-
sation at all the European Charter of Local Self-Government is an interna-
tional legal instrument to ensure the protection, evaluation and promotion of
decentralisation and local autonomy in the member states of the Council of
Europe. It “entails the existence of local authorities endowed with demo-
cratically constituted decision-making bodies and possessing a wide degree of
autonomy with regard to their responsibilities, the ways and means by which
those responsibilities are exercised and the resources required for their fulfil-
ment” (Council of Europe 1985: preamble).
The European Charter of Local Self-Government lays out the condi-
tions necessary for the existence of local autonomy and the rights of local
authorities. The 18 articles set the standards for national legislation on
local government on issues such as the constitutional and legal founda-
tion for local self-government, the scope of local self-government,
changes of local authority boundaries, the appropriate administrative
structures and resources for the tasks of local authorities, the conditions
under which responsibilities at local level are exercised, administrative
supervision of local authorities’ activities, financial resources of local
authorities, local authorities’ right to associate and the legal protection of
local self-government.
By 2016, 47 member states of the Council of Europe have signed and
ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The countries
signing the Charter were, however, allowed to make some reservations on
some of the articles. Ratifying states had to consider themselves bound by
at least 20 paragraphs of Part I of the Charter, including at least 10 from
a more restrictive and demanding selection of 14 articles/paragraphs.
About half the countries signed the Charter without any reservations (see
Table 1.1 in the Appendix).
Subsequently, the European Charter has become the yardstick to assess
levels of local autonomy in European countries. Visits and reports by inde-
pendent experts are the key instruments to enforce the European Charter
of Local Self-Government. Since 1995, the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe monitors approximately
every five years the situation of local and regional democracy in its mem-
ber states. As a result, a large number of recommendations for a better
8 A. LADNER ET AL.
implementation of the European Charter have been issued. The explana-

tory reports provide helpful insight into the situation in these countries
and show which elements are only partly or not at all implemented.5
The European Charter has, furthermore, served as a model for the
development of a draft text of a World Charter for Local Self-Government
by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS Habitat)
and the World Associations of Cities and Local Authorities Coordination
(WACLAC). The United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) declared
in 2004 that the adoption of a World Charter for Local Self-Government
remains one of its key objectives. And the European Union recognised
local autonomy and local self-government legally through the Lisbon
Treaty of 2009 (cp. art. 5 § 2 TEU). Be it the Council of Europe, the
European Union or the United Nations local autonomy is seen as some-
thing positive, something countries should grant their municipalities.
Local autonomy is thus more than a mere analytical concept; it has become
a normative goal. Behind this lays the idea that local autonomy has posi-
tive societal effects, be it on democracy, political stability or economic
growth and development.
Doubtless, municipalities play an important role in many states and
societies. The roughly 91’000 municipalities in the European Union
make up for a significant portion of the GDP and the total public expen-
ditures. In 2011, these figures amounted to 12% of the GDP and 24.3%
of the expenditures in the EU-27 countries (CEMR 2012). Local action
has also gained a noteworthy place in the mainstream of policies: 40% of
EU funds are invested in local government and 60% of items on local
council agendas are affected by the EU. The outstanding role of munici-
palities is reinforced by the fact that the level of trust in local authorities is
higher than the trust in national governments or parliaments (see e.g. the
Eurobarometer 307).
5
It appears from the monitoring reports that out of the different parts of the European
Charter of Local Self-Government, the art. 9 on financial resources of local authorities is the
one facing most problems, the first two paragraphs being the least complied with. This is not
only due to the recent financial crisis affecting many European countries but also to the clear
principles and criteria these two paragraphs entail. The second most violated part of the
European Charter of Local Self-Government is the art. 4, which enshrined the scope of local
self-government, and especially the paragraph 6 about timely and appropriate consultation of
local authorities when planning and decision-making processes directly concerning them.
Finally, elements not implemented are also often related to the art. 3 par. 2 (democratic
principle), the art. 8 par. 1 (adequate legislative basis for supervision), and the art. 11 (legal
protection) (Council of Europe 2016).
The importance of autonomous local government is also underlined by

the policy of the European Union. Big parts of the public investment in
the EU, in the form of the cohesion policy funding (21% in 2010–2012),
aim at improving institutional capacity and public administration, particu-
larly on local level. Since the absorption rate of cohesion policy funding for
the 2007–2013 has shown to be very low in some cases (European
Commission 2014) and the expected goals could not be reached, it has
become a key objective for the period 2014–2020 to strengthen local
authorities. Strong and autonomous municipalities able to invest the
money to be received for the benefit to the citizens and the local economy
becomes thus a goal to be achieved and a prerequisite for further
support.
1.3 Conceptualising Local Autonomy

Theoretically
1.3.1 The Normative and Theoretical Justifications of Local
Autonomy and Local Government
There is a wide field of literature dedicated to highlight and justify the
importance of local autonomy. Some of the writings go back to the early
days of the modern nation states.
For Chandler (2008), the normative rationale of local government is
based on two different grounds, the classical liberal theory and the ideal of
individual freedom. He calls them ethics and expedience. According to the
first, it is a value in its own right, regardless of its value for higher levels of
government, and fulfils a morally desirable purpose in itself. According to
the second, it justifies local government to the extent that it serves the
purposes of higher levels of government.
Alexis de Tocqueville (1994 [1835]) argues that local government can
be seen as a means of guaranteeing collective freedom by enabling citizens
to determine freely what matches their own needs and that these diverse
demands can be reconciled and met by the government which stands clos-
est to them. This idea is also reflected in the European notion of
subsidiarity.
Toulmin Smith (1951), advocate of decentralisation in Britain, claims
that if every individual has the right and duty to manage his or her own
affairs, for which he or she knows best how to do it, this applies also to
10 A. LADNER ET AL.
associated groups of individuals as well as to the large panoply of issues

which concern them as individual groups. As a consequence, no individual
or group of individuals, be it near or far away, has the right to dictate any-
thing to the individual or the group since they are less able to discern what
is in their best interest. Related to local government, Smith views an inde-
pendent and strong community as a way to secure individual freedom in
putting restrictions upon the arbitrary intervention of higher levels of
government.
Smith’s thoughts on individual and community liberty are not substan-
tially different from those of John Stuart Mill (1975 [1859]) who argues
that the individual liberty to follow one’s own beliefs implies that com-
munities with self-regarding interests have to be free to make decisions
that affect the community in question, provided these do not harm others
outside: “the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the individual is
alone concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of indi-
viduals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly,
and regard no persons but themselves” (Mill 1975 [1859]: 125, cited in
Chandler 2008: 358).
The normative principles derived from the arguments outlined above
justify that local government has to be free to make regulatory decisions
and to provide common policies affecting its residents and those with a
substantial interest in its area. This implies firstly that local government
must adopt a democratic structure so that each individual has the possibil-
ity to determine the policies of the group, secondly that it must find the
resources to undertake any service collectively wished to be provided for
itself, and thirdly that it ought to represent the views of its inhabitants to
other agencies where its policies affect others, and finally that higher levels
of government must respect its integrity and morally legitimate activities
(Chandler 2010).
However, Chandler (2008) argues that the major theorists of liberal
democracy throughout the twentieth century justified local government
mostly on utilitarian rather than on ethical grounds. Local government has
to serve the state as a whole. The “traditional” normative values of local
government, however, focus on efficiency and the democratic advantages
compared to other levels of government. This brings us to the w ell-known
“efficiency-democracy dilemma” (Goldsmith and Newton 1983) between
the two central functions of local government (Sharpe 1970).
Economic efficiency is the dominant virtue of local government. Local
government becomes a functionally efficient service-delivery agency which
accurately translates public preferences into public policies. For econo-

mists from the “public choice” school, the role of local government is
legitimised by the solution it offers to provide local public goods:
For a public good-the consumption of which is defined over geographical

subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level
of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central or the
respective local government-it will always be more efficient (or at least as effi-
cient) for local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for
their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any
specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions. (Oates, 1972: 35)
Aside from normatively legitimising local government as an appropriate

services provider, able to promote innovative policy choices (Vetter 2007),
local government can also be justified as a democratic institution, since it
provides for a healthy territorial division of political power promoting sta-
bility. It enhances local participation, brings forward representative,
responsible and accountable local authorities, gives opportunities for
political skills to be developed, leads to a diffusion of power and promotes
inclusion within society (Mill 1975 [1859]; Tocqueville 1994 [1835];
King and Stoker 1996). Therefore, if local government enables adminis-
tratively efficient service provision for the nation state, acts as a counter-
vailing power against tyranny and assures democratic legitimacy for the
nation as a whole, then it is only legitimate for the central government to
control and arrange local government to serve most efficiently these expe-
diential goals (Chandler 2008).
Local autonomy, defined as a policy space for local democracy, can be
considered as a necessary prerequisite for a local government to cope with
competing values, preferences and priorities, to resolve conflicts within
local democratic institutions and to provide local public services that are
in line with the prevailing tastes and demands. As a consequence, local
autonomy, not being synonymous to either local democracy or local effi-
ciency, does not have to be apprehended as a positive notion in itself, not
as a “hurrah word” (Page 1982: 39) viewed “through romantic eyes” as it
has been to a great extent the case in the dedicated literature (King and
Stoker 1996: 24; Goldsmith 1990). There are also ways of reasoning
where local autonomy is not entirely seen as a positive feature within a
nation state. That some of the tasks cannot be fulfilled successfully by the
lowest units autonomously is rather trivial when we think of defence and
international relations. Doubtlessly, there are also “economies of scales”
12 A. LADNER ET AL.
which ask for a more centralised and uniform provision of services for the
sake of lower costs. One might also favour more centrally regulated tasks
and procedures for organisational reasons. It is, for example, difficult to
maintain that the school starts in spring in some municipalities and in
autumn in others. And claims for social justice and equality might prohibit
unlimited autonomy for subnational units. Following this line of thinking,
local autonomy, and the effectiveness of the opportunities it offers can
thus be theoretically and empirically questioned and tested (Pierre 1990).
Only on such grounds we will be able to tell, whether it represents a fea-
ture of modern states to be aspired to.
To sum it up, from normative points of view, autonomous municipali-
ties are justified as a value in itself with their own policy sphere but also as
appropriate units to fulfil tasks designed by higher levels because they are
closer to the needs and preferences of their inhabitants. They are meant to
do so efficiently and democratically. To what extent they actually do it suc-
cessfully, however, has to be tested.
1.3.2 Local Autonomy as the “Freedom from”, “Freedom to”

and “Reflection of Local Identity”
Developing a definition of local autonomy that it is distinct from the defi-
nition of local democracy, Pratchett (2004) points out three theoretical
perspectives. First, local autonomy is understood as a relative concept and
is defined as local government’s independence from constraints existing in
its environment (Wolman and Goldsmith 1990). Thus, the degree of
autonomy depends on the “freedom from” such constraints, which can be
vertical when it is a matter of intergovernmental relations and horizontal
when local factors are concerned.
To Pratchett (2004) the “freedom from” approaches to local auton-
omy based on a constitutional or legal understanding of central-local rela-
tions analyse to what extent higher levels of government delegate tasks
and concede competences without paying much attention to the capacities
of local government to act. They represent the classical political science
perspective best illustrated by Clark (1984). In a well-known article, he
puts local powers in relation to higher levels of government. Translating
the principles of legal power from Jeremy Bentham (1970) from individual
to institutional powers, he defines local autonomy through initiation and
immunity. Initiation is the competence of local authorities to carry out
tasks in their own interest. The power of immunity means the possibility
of a local authority to act without being under the control of higher tiers
of government. Successively, autonomy “defines the extent of local discre-
tion in terms of local government functions, actions, and legitimate behav-
ior. (…) Discretion, or the ability of local governments to carry out in
their own manner their own particular objectives in accordance with their
own standards of implementation, depends on the prior specification of
local autonomy” (Clark 1984: 198–199, emphasis added).
Clark’s approach consists of conditions that have to be fulfilled to reach
the highest degree of autonomy: the powers of initiation and the power of
immunity. The extent of the two respective powers indicates the configu-
ration of local autonomy. This determines local discretion, namely, the
freedom to decide about the range of functions to be responsible for and
the manner to do so effectively. With respect to the sources of initiation
and immunity, Clark remains explicitly unclear. He notes, however, that
there are crucial implications with respect to democracy:
• Initiation and immunity are high: Locality “is totally autonomous

from other local and higher tiers of the state (if they exist)” (Clark
1984: 200). The power of initiation and the power of immunity
draw their legitimacy directly from the citizens.
• Initiation is high, immunity is low: Even if the action of local govern-
ment can be constrained, its legitimacy is created bottom-up. It is
the local citizens that decide on the realm of local affairs, the agendas
and the functions according to their needs.
• Initiation is low, immunity is high: Local authorities have no fear of
the review of their decisions by higher tiers of government, but they
enjoy no power of local initiation. This model holds less autonomy
than the previous one since the initiation power is assigned by state
legislation. On the one hand, this means an intrusion of the central
state in the definition of tasks that have to be carried out by the local
government.
• Initiation and immunity are low: This configuration qualifies local
government being “creatures” of the state in the sense that they hold
no power of initiative and are subject to strict control.
This raises a number of questions: First, the source of legitimacy is not

necessarily granted “from above” but can be assigned by local citizens.
Even though Pratchett’s arguments on this issue need to be qualified, the
logic underlying the distinction between the various theoretical insights
14 A. LADNER ET AL.
into the concept of local autonomy remains useful. The argument of the
source of legitimacy for the action requires to be related to the long-term
state-development process. It marks the difference between states where
power has been decentralised towards local governments and states where
the local governments pre-existed central government (Elazar 1976).
Secondly, the responsibility for the action, which is not in the hand of the
bureaucratic apparatus in the configurations with low initiation, refers to
the difference between local administration and local autonomy men-
tioned above. Thirdly, Clark’s perspective is based on a constitutional
understanding of the vertical distribution of tasks and competences
between the central and local governments, and therefore it is about the
issue of sovereignty rather than about questioning the normative positive
value of local autonomy.
Attempting to integrate various theoretical perspectives (especially the
neo-Marxist analyses in the late 1970 and 1980s), Gurr and King (1987:
28) concentrated not only on the limits imposed by higher levels of gov-
ernment but also on a multitude of local factors: “the autonomy of the
local state (…) is a function first of its relationship with local economic and
social groups, and second of its relationship with the national or central
state” (1987: 56). It not only has a vertical (Type II autonomy) but also a
horizontal (Type I autonomy) dimension. Type I autonomy is more con-
cretely circumscribed by the extent of the effective revenues which can be
extracted from local economy, the capacity of economic actors to control
the local political agenda, and the presence of local political organisations
and social movements able to resist or reshape the local policies imple-
mented (Gurr and King 1987). Type II autonomy describes the extent to
which a local government can pursue its interests without being limited by
constitutionally specified constraints, strict objectives accompanying sub-
ventions, and national political pressures on policies (Gurr and King
1987). It thus partly matches Clark’s immunity power. King and Pierre
(1990: 3–10) take up this distinction by the use of the terms “local auton-
omy” with reference to Type I autonomy (local community, including
local government as a local organisation) and “local government auton-
omy” with reference to Type II autonomy (local authorities as regards to
other authorities of the state).
The second theoretical insight into the concept of local autonomy
identified by Pratchett (2004: 364 f.) is the so-called freedom to
approach and refers to the distinction also made by Wolman and
Goldsmith (1992: 45): “Conventionally, local autonomy is defined as
the discretion local governments possess to act, free from control by

higher levels of governments. The usage here is quite different. Local
autonomy is defined here as the ability of local governments to have an
independent impact on the well-being of their citizens”. The authors
also consider that local autonomy is a potential for local government,
constrained by a central set of laws and political factors as well as socio-
economic conditions. Nonetheless, they go a step further in analysing
how capable local government is with its residual ability to influence
central government in order to undertake particular activities in the
interests of the urban residents. Under this approach it is the actual con-
sequences and the underlying normative rationales of local autonomy
that are brought to the forefront of the analysis, not considering local
autonomy as a positive value in itself. Taking advantage of local auton-
omy as an analytical concept to compare local government in the United
States and the United Kingdom, the fundamental question they ask is:
“Do local governments in urban areas have autonomy in the sense that
their presence and activities have independent impacts on anything
important? Does urban politics matter?” (Wolman and Goldsmith 1990:
3). This perspective adds the capacity to do something and the social
relevance of local government activities to the formerly discussed more
formal aspect of initiation and immunity.
The third theoretical insight conceptualises local autonomy as a bot-
tom-up phenomenon in which local governments have more or less
“capacity to define and express local identity through political activity”
(Pratchett 2004: 366 f.). This sociological approach, based on the
ideas of Tocqueville, emphasises the values of participation, commit-
ment, independence and emotional attachment. It focuses on the activ-
ities local community is striving for, to control the social construction
of place and to define its own differences (Lake 1994). This happens
through the participation of the citizens in local politics. As a conse-
quence local autonomy can be seen as a subjective concept, being the
expression of local citizens’, elected representatives’ or top bureau-
crats’ perception (Denters et al. 2016). In any case, local autonomy is
to be understood from the viewpoint of the expression of power, con-
sidered rather as a complex relational construct than a substantial static
thing granted or possessed by a local government (DeFilippis 1999).
At the bottom-up side of power relations, the possibility of local auton-
omy is latent and materialises through the constant quest for local
strategies and tactics of resistance and contestation (Brown 1992).
16 A. LADNER ET AL.
The different theoretical insights mentioned so far remind us of the

complexity of the concept of local autonomy. It not only consists of formal
rules that define the opportunities for municipalities to become active and
the aspects of control from higher levels but also their capacities to provide
services and their general importance for their citizens which might also
want to influence local political decisions. In a next step, we will look how
the different disciplines use the concept of local autonomy (Keuffer 2016).
1.4 Disciplinary Approaches and the Different

Dimensions of Local Autonomy
1.4.1 The Legalistic Approach and the “Old” Institutionalism
This branch of the literature mostly focuses on general legal regulations,
typically defining local autonomy in a defensive mode.
Clark, for example, is concerned with the prior rights of local govern-
ment, such as the right of existence and the right to decide upon its terri-
torial boundaries (Clark 1984). In this respect, the European Charter
condemns enforced amalgamations if they lack a “prior consultation of the
local communities” (art. 5) and their consent. Whether the citizens or the
representative authorities have to be consulted and the means through
which this should be done is nevertheless evasive and left to national dis-
cretion. The prior rights are closely related to the legal position of local
governments within the national institutional structure, which may be for-
malised through constitutional statutes (European Charter, art. 2).
A second type of concern is the formal distribution of competences
between different levels of government. There are countries where local
governments have a “general competence” to undertake services and oth-
ers, where local authorities have to find some form of specific statutory basis
for their action. An example of the latter is the doctrine of “ultra vires” in
the United Kingdom until recently.6 Nevertheless, it can be questioned
whether “the principle of a general competence per se necessarily entails a
higher degree of autonomy” (Blair 1991: 51). The formal allocation of
competences is inextricably linked to the principle of subsidiarity, as a more
general organisational principle. The European Charter does not explicitly
refer to the principle of subsidiarity but art. 4 with the title “scope of local
6
In the United Kingdom, the ultra vires rule has been replaced by the Localism Act in
2011.
self-government” states: “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised,

in preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation
of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature
of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy” (art. 4 para. 3). In
addition to the political choice favouring the authorities which are closest to
their constituency, four criteria for dividing powers between authorities are
provided: the nature and the extent of the task (two objective criteria), as
well as the two more subjective notions of efficiency and economy (Council
of Europe 1994). Furthermore, the European Charter prescribes the obli-
gation of the higher authority to assist the lower authority in accomplishing
its tasks when it does not have the ability to accomplish them autonomously
(Council of Europe 1994). Finally, art. 4 para. 3 states that “local authorities
shall, within the limits of the law, have full discretion to exercise their initia-
tive with regard to any matter which is not excluded from their competence
or not assigned to any other authority”. Consequently, it assumes, on the
one hand, an inherent power of local authorities, which suggests that sub-
sidiarity is the underlying principle in states where local governments pre-
existed central government. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the
formal assignment of powers may be interfered with other legal measures,
which may imply either decision-making competences or controls for the
provision of a specific public function (Wolman 1990).
A third set of legal issues is concerned with the formal basis for central
supervision of local authorities. Is supervision limited to the legality of
local decisions, or is it extended to reviews of the merits of decisions?
Supervision per se is not necessarily seen as a limitation of local autonomy,
bearing in mind the European Charter of Local Self-Government’s stipu-
lation that local authorities shall have full discretion “within the limits of
the law”. However, supervision beyond legality (“the limits of the law”)
may be seen as a limitation of local autonomy (Marcou 1999).
Fourth, in turn, is the formal existence of constitutional or legal means to
protect local autonomy against the violation of the principles of the right of
existence, to decide upon the territorial boundaries, and to be competent
for the free exercise of their powers in the provision of public tasks.
1.4.2 The Functional Approach, Economic Theories

and Politikverflechtung
With respect to the vertical organisation of the public sector, the assign-
ment of functions and finances (financial resources and fiscal instruments)
18 A. LADNER ET AL.
to the appropriate levels of governments has been longstanding issues of

decentralisation theories (Oates 1990). Economists of the first generation
of fiscal decentralisation proposed a normative framework suggesting a
task allocation model based on a clear separation of tasks by level (dual
task model) and a far-reaching decentralisation in order to achieve system
efficiency (Buchanan 1950; Tiebout 1956; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972).
In this perspective, autonomous local government enhances the allocative
efficiency of services by responding to the particular preferences and cir-
cumstances of the citizens. Hence, since the scope of functions local gov-
ernment is responsible for is connected to the degree of political
decentralisation, it becomes an indicator of local autonomy.
There are, however, some points to be discussed in theory (Blair 1991).
First, the importance of a public task is not equal from one country to the
other. Second, the actual role of local governments may remain unclear in
“administrative integrated models” (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014: 23)
where many tasks are shared between interdependent levels. The theory of
the Politikverflechtung helps to understand possible implications, such as
“the joint-decision trap”, which may lead to a loss of accountability and
responsibility of the different levels of governments and to a political
blockage (Scharpf 1978). Third, even if competences have been assigned
de jure, it may be possible that the local government acts de facto on
behalf of higher tiers of the government (local administration), under
their supervision and without an own effective decision-making discretion
(“mandated” vs. “permitted” functions, e.g. Page 1991: 24 f). If the local
government becomes an executive agency, economic theories such as
principal-agent, contract or cost transactions, point out how the
principal(s)—one (or several) higher level(s) of government—structure
its/their relationship with the agency (the local government) to maximise
economic rationality and minimise transaction costs (Williamson 1975).
All these issues make, for example, local government’s expenditures a
rather insufficient measure for local autonomy.
The vertical structure of revenues, i.e. the transfers local government
receives, is of primary importance for local autonomy. It is assumed—
without taking into account the multidimensionality of financial auton-
omy—that the higher the proportion of local government revenue derived
from higher tiers of government is, the lower is the amount of local auton-
omy. Furthermore and in line with the criterion of ability of the European
Charter, economists and others emphasise the importance of (mainly
financial) resources (European Charter, art. 9) for local authorities to be

truly autonomous. Vetter (2007), for instance, defines local autonomy as
“the range of functions the local level performs within a country and the
freedom local authorities have in making decisions about how to deliver
their services – the scope of their discretion” (2007: 99). She constructs
an autonomy measure by combining expenditures and revenues. With
respect to the revenues, in most countries, the most important sources are
tax revenues and intergovernmental grants (Bergvall et al. 2006).
Local autonomy implies, first of all, that local government is able to
decide over its own tax and fees (Oates 2001). Regarding intergovernmen-
tal grants (transfers), their main functions are the internalisation of spill-
overs, the equalisation of fiscal imbalance and the improvement of the
overall tax system. Grants can be either unconditional (non-earmarked) to
be freely used or conditional (earmarked) if they are transferred to local
governments for specific programmes and are subject to strict supervision
(Blöchliger 2013). In consequence, grant funding from higher levels of the
government does not necessarily reduce local autonomy. However, it is cru-
cial, according to Oates (1990: 50), that local governments “raise a signifi-
cant portion of their own funds” in order to preserve their independence on
expenditure decisions and to take their local fiscal decisions carefully. Finally,
whether local government can freely borrow money also determines to a
certain extent local autonomy (Rodden 2002; Swianiewicz 2004).
1.4.3 The Organisational Approach, Democracy

and Governance
The organisational or politico-administrative approach focuses on the way
a local government organises itself to perform its functions. The key is
“local government capacity” which can be defined as “the ability of local
government to perform their functions in an effective and efficient way”,
that is, what it does and how it does it (Reddy et al. 2015: 161, original
emphasis). The authors, recognising an enormous variation in the litera-
ture, distinguish four conditions:
• First, “contextual conditions” referring to the general judicial, socio-

economic and historical determinants
• Second, “structural conditions” which have to do with the relative
position of local governments in terms of functional responsibilities
20 A. LADNER ET AL.
and financial autonomy. This factor overlaps with the idea of fiscal
decentralisation
• Third, “institutional conditions” related to the size of local govern-
ment, its internal organisation, financial budget and infrastructure
• Last, the “human resource conditions” which refer basically to per-
sonnel management considerations (Reddy et al. 2015: 162)
All of these conditions are related to “system capacity”, that is, the abil-
ity of a polity to respond to the collective preferences of citizens and to
some extent—especially when it comes to the size of municipalities and
key elements of their political system—to “citizen effectiveness” in influ-
encing and controlling the decisions of the polity (Dahl and Tufte 1973:
20).
In this sense, local autonomy can be considered as the constituent ele-
ment of the “two faces of democratic self-determination” (Scharpf 1970)
which guarantees political legitimacy. On the output-oriented side, it
legitimates political choices that effectively respond to citizens’ demands
and preferences (government for the people). On the input-oriented side,
it legitimates political decisions that have been determined through a
whole range of procedures, such as public debates, votes or elections (gov-
ernment by the people) (Scharpf 1999; Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016).
The democratic dimension is thus a necessary prerequisite for political
decentralisation as well as the very essence of local autonomy since it
implies the creation and maintenance of political arenas (Riker 1969).
This not only in relation with a joint local identity and the possibilities to
influence decisions on higher level but also through the possibility to
determine core elements of the political system (majoritarian or propor-
tional electoral system, number of seats, electoral districts, etc.) (Evans
2014).
The degree of local autonomy depends on the administrative ability of
a local government as an organisation supplying public services (Pollitt
2005) to fulfil (both own and delegated) functions. Additionally, local
autonomy can be considered as a necessary institutional resource for
local governments to be able to implement reforms (Keuffer 2018; Ladner
2017). Facing a growing complexity of tasks—sometimes coupled with a
decrease of resources—as well as the ongoing globalisation and increas-
ing citizens’ demands, many European local governments have launched
reforms since the 1980s (Kersting and Vetter 2003). These reforms have
been influenced by economic theories of organisation, managerialism
and neoliberalism (especially by what is known as new public manage-

ment) promising to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of public
services delivery. The reform movement has aimed at redefining of the
government’s role and action and strengthening market mechanisms.
In recent years, the reform debate questions municipalities in their
traditional territorial form as the only and best possible provider of
local services. Non-hierarchical coordination across several state levels,
blurring boundaries between the public and the private sector and
increasing cooperation, has led to a move from local government to
local governance (Denters and Rose 2005; Rhodes 1996). This denotes
a shift towards networks of “single-purpose organisations” (vs. multi-
function organisations) that typically operate outside the direct influ-
ence of local governments. Local government becomes “hollowed
out” according to governance theory (Loughlin 2009; Peters and
Pierre 1998). These reforms have aimed at restructuring the internal
organisation, management instruments and personnel profiles in order
to increase the “administrative capacity”, “reflected through adminis-
tering local infrastructure effectively and proven track record in terms
of provision of public goods and services locally” (Reddy et al. 2015:
165). The concept of governance blurs the ideal of local autonomy as
a concept attachable to municipalities with a hierarchical structure of
the state. How can we speak about local autonomy when policies are
designed in non-hierarchical, network-like structures, based on con-
sensus seeking and negotiations and including the private sector
(Kersbergen and Warden 2004)?
1.4.4 The Politics Approach of Intergovernmental Relations

and the Veto Players’ Theory
This approach focuses on the bilateral vertical relations that take part in
the framework of “politics, the actor- and process-related dimension of
political life” (Mueller 2011: 216). In an intergovernmental power game,
political parties, associations, pressure groups or social movements are
potential veto players in the course of the decision-making process
(Tsebelis 1995).
Hutchcroft (2001) attempts to bridge the administrative and politics
perspective of centralisation and decentralisation in order to describe how
political-administrative systems are territorially organised. He highlights
their distinct but complementary contributions: the political science’s
22 A. LADNER ET AL.
subfield of public administration has referred to “authority”, as “the for-

mal roles conferred upon individuals in their official capacities” (2001:
26) and its formal distribution through the different territorial levels of
government, whereas the political science’s subfield of politics has paid
“attention to both authority and power, as well as to the complex interac-
tions between the two” (2001: 27). In the top-down direction, the
expression of power is control (or supervision). In a broad perspective of
intergovernmental relations, central government control is understood by
Goldsmith (2002: 91) as “setting the rules of the intergovernmental
game”.
Indeed, formal control can be operated by the review of the legality of
local decisions with respect to the legal framework. Central control can be
equally exercised through various informal means (Goldsmith 2002).
First, the control of the local government’s financial autonomy, which
concerns the setting of tax rates, the discretion to make expenditures, the
access to borrowing and the financial transfer system. Concerning the lat-
ter, many authors have emphasised the fact that the establishment of a
granting system is irremediably linked to the increase of control
(Prud’homme 1994; Oates 1999). Then comes the control exercised
through administrative regulation of the functions to be provided.
Administrative supervision reviews in this case the expediency of local
decisions. Finally, the control exercised over the access permitted to local
governments may be executed by an appointed prefect, namely, “a central
state official whose duties include the supervision of local government
actions” (Page 1991: 28), as well as by the selection of the candidates
competing in local elections by central government party officials (Rodden
2004).
Yet prefects and politicians—among other local actors—may also play a
role in defence of local interests vis-a-vis higher levels of government.
Page (1991) calls this “political localism”. According to Page, both direct
and indirect channels of access to higher tiers of government exist and
offer opportunities for local authorities to shape public services. Indirect
representation can take place collectively through corporate lobbying.
The strength and weakness of local government in individual countries
depend on the existence of a local government association, its inclusive-
ness, its internal cohesion, its authority and its observed impact on national
politics (1991: 44 f.). Direct representation, which offers a greater scope
of influence, refers to various formal arenas of interaction like, for exam-

ple, the background of higher-level legislators and the accumulation of
mandates (cumul des mandats) (1991: 56 f.). Other indicators may be the
existence of a territorial second chamber of representation (Lijphart
1984), the obligation of consultation of local authorities in the planning
and decision-making processes; the existence of means of direct democ-
racy available to local governments such as initiative, plebiscite or referen-
dum, the possibility to choose the candidates and the features of electoral
systems (system of representation, number and size of constituencies) for
the election of local as well as higher tiers (prefectural, regional, national)
representatives (Deschouwer 2006; Riker 1975). In sum, the degree of
influence which a local government is able to directly and indirectly exert
over higher levels of government is also an important factor of local
autonomy since it may change the decision-making process for public
policies and the conditions of their provision.
The disciplinary approaches described above underlines the multidi-
mensionality of the concept of local autonomy. Legal, economic, func-
tional politics and policy-related aspects have to be taken into account for
an adequate measurement of local autonomy. The final section summarises
the different dimensions which will have to be considered.
1.5 A Theory-Based and Multidimensional

Concept of Local Autonomy
Any serious attempt to measure local autonomy has to meet two require-
ments. (a) It has to be theoretically grounded, taking the different dimen-
sions into account, and (b) it has to be empirically applicable, using
available information.
As for the theory, the sections above have shown a plethora of aspects
which are in one way or another related to local autonomy. But how to
select the appropriate aspects for a comprehensive measure of local
autonomy? Is it more important that municipalities fulfil a wide range of
tasks independently or is a constitutionally granted right of existence the
most important characteristic of local autonomy? The answer to this
question depends to some extent on the purpose of the measurement.
When it comes to amalgamation reforms, the right of existence may pre-
vent any amalgamation without the consent of the citizens and is thus of
24 A. LADNER ET AL.
crucial importance, whereas if we talk about the importance of munici-

palities for their citizens compared to other layers of the state, the task
they fulfil are more relevant. A composite measure of local autonomy
expressed through one single indicator or variable will have to tackle this
problem. We will give a special consideration to this matter later in this
book (see Chap. 9).
Not all characteristics of local autonomy are equally accessible empiri-
cally. Qualitative case studies of a few municipalities can include more ele-
ments of local autonomy than comprehensive, cross-national studies. The
concept of Type I autonomy by Gurr and King (1987), for example,
implies that the autonomy varies from one municipality to another within
a single country depending on local actors and the local economy. This
can hardly be taken into account in an empirical comparison analysing a
larger number of countries at different moments in time. For more details
about the measurement-related issues, see Chap. 2, in which we present
the way we gathered the data.
Considering the theoretical and conceptual grounds outlined at the
beginning of the chapter and drawing on the different theoretical
approaches, we shall analyse local autonomy—both as a right and an abil-
ity—as consisting of a series of sub-dimensions (see Fig. 1.1). The four
sub-dimensions are set out in Fig. 1.1 and include the following:
The legalist approach points out that local autonomy implies rights and
decision-making powers to manage public affairs included in a legal
framework that stipulates status and means of protection. It high-
lights the constitutional statutes of municipalities and their legal
protection.
Related to functional powers are the scope of services delivered and the
expenses (output). Yet to make local autonomy effective, a local govern-
ment must also have the capacities to carry them out. Therefore, local
autonomy is linked to the financial resources local governments dispose
of independently and their tax-raising possibilities (input).
Another important dimension is the municipalities’ possibilities to create,
organise and maintain their political arenas independently (self-
regulation). Do they organise their local administration themselves, do
they hire their staff and can they regulate features of the local political
system?
Finally, vertical relations, which exist in an intergovernmental power game,
are also related to local autonomy in the sense of control and access.
Constitutional status and general Specific decision-making

competences competences and functional
responsibilities
Legal framework Capacities
Legal protection Financial resources
Central or regional control Administrative apparatus
Vertical relations Self-regulation
Central or regional access Local political system
Fig. 1.1 Local autonomy’s approaches and constitutive aspects
How far does the supervision of higher state levels reach and can local
government influence political decision on higher levels?
The approach of our book has some features in common with Clark
(1984) but also covers other dimensions. We primarily consider local
autonomy as a relative concept which expresses the formal modes of
intergovernmental relationships—for example, the traditional sense of
local government autonomy—without considering the horizontal rela-
tions between local government and other local groups of interests,
such as social or economic ones.7 Our approach enables us to identify
7
Local autonomy is therefore to be understood in the sense of local government auton-
omy (freedom from higher levels of government). But we will use the former expression as
it has traditionally been used in the fields of local government and urban studies, even to refer
only to the governmental relations system. It should be noted that the approach considering
local autonomy as the reflection of the local identity is not followed in this study because it
would have required the realisation of surveys to capture the autonomy perceived
subjectively.
26 A. LADNER ET AL.
the different degree of local autonomy enjoyed in local government

systems. Then we try to explain the differences between the ideal types
and their properties on the one hand and in questioning the normative
value of local autonomy, in examining its effective consequences (free-
dom to) on the other hand. In this sense, our conceptualisation and
definition of local autonomy is very close to the European Charter,
which constitutes a pivotal change in this matter.8 From originally
defining it rather negatively/deductively as a right of democratically
elected local authorities to resist the constraints—from higher levels of
governments as well as other local actors—the sense of local autonomy
has been expanded over time to include the positive ability for the
realisation of local interests as well as a means to implement other val-
ues (Chapman 2003; Kjellberg 1995; Hansen and Klausen 2002).
Local autonomy thus integrates the notion of discretion (“the ability
of local governments to carry out in their own manner their own par-
ticular objectives”) that Clark (1984: 199) saw as a rather logical impli-
cation. In a wider sense, local autonomy implies the legal right to
manage public affairs within the limits of the law but also the necessary
political, administrative and financial resources that a local government
should freely dispose of to carry them out effectively. The double cri-
teria of right and ability and the great number of principles upon which
local autonomy should be based, the European Charter constitutes a
big step towards an objectively measureable concept of local auton-
omy. Nevertheless, the concept draws upon various approaches and
dimensions.
As an objective reflection of the intergovernmental (vertical) relations,
we argue that there is not one theory of local autonomy but rather various
debates and definitions surrounding the different facets of local autonomy.
These debates and definitions reflect the different disciplines involved.
Local autonomy is too diversified for only one theory to be valid (Kjellberg
1995; Mackenzie 1961) and for both, right and ability, public law, eco-
nomics, administrative, and political science theories all highlight different
specific dimensions (Schneider 2003).
8
The idea of “local self-government” as employed by the European Charter means “local
autonomy” since the French version of the treaty is called “Charte européenne de l’autonomie
locale”. For the text and the chart of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty, see http://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/122 (consulted in
2016).
1.6 The Next Steps and Outline of the Study

This first chapter started with an overview of the various theoretical and
conceptual considerations related to local autonomy and the different dis-
ciplinary approaches defined the theoretical framework for our study. The
second chapter outlines existing attempts to apply the concept of local
autonomy and the challenges existing studies are confronted with when
attempting to measure it comparatively. Then we present the methodology
adopted in our research—that is, choice of units of observation, aggrega-
tion rules, institutional asymmetries, expert survey, control phases—and
the codebook for the 11 variables used to map the autonomy of local gov-
ernment in the 39 countries.
The second thematic part of the book (Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9)
presents the empirical findings with regard to the different dimensions of
local autonomy: the legal, functional, financial, organisational, administra-
tive and vertical access aspects are addressed successively in separate chap-
ters. This part concludes with the construction of an overall local autonomy
index (Chap. 9). In the first step, we take up theoretical (main dimensions
highlighted in the literature) and empirical considerations (correlations).
Then, the constituent elements of the respective dimensions and the pos-
sible weighting procedures will be discussed. Finally, the local autonomy
index is validated in terms of content (theoretical legitimation) and con-
vergence (comparison with other measures of decentralisation and local
autonomy).
In the third part of the book, we use our data, the local autonomy
index and the different dimensions for further comparative analyses. In
Chaps. 10 and 11, we present different typologies. Subsequently, we dis-
cuss the causes and consequences of local autonomy. First, local autonomy
is considered as a dependent variable (between-countries variation), and
structural, sociocultural and decisional factors (size, history, political pref-
erences, etc.) are statistically tested in order to explain variations in local
autonomy (Chap. 12). Second, local autonomy is considered as an inde-
pendent variable that impacts on local democracy and local social and eco-
nomic efficiency (Chap. 13).
Finally, the book ends with a concluding part that summarises the find-
ings and analyses of the preceding chapters and presents a new perspective
on multilevel governance in European countries (Chap. 14).
Appendix
28
Table 1.1 State of countries’ ratification of the European Charter of Local Self-Government
Country EU member European Charter Ratification Entry into Non-ratified provisions (NR) and No of ratified
since Signature force conditional ratifications (CR) provisions
15 EU states (founding states and early members, Western Europe)

Austria 01/01/1995 15/10/1985 23/09/1987 01/09/1988 6 NR – 4.2; 4.3; 4.5;7.2; 8.2; 11 24
A. LADNER ET AL.
Belgium 01/01/1958 15/10/1985 25/08/2004 01/12/2004 5NR – 3.2; 8.2; 9.2; 9.6; 9.7 25
Denmarka 01/01/1973 15/10/1985 03/02/1988 01/09/1988 None 30
Finland 01/01/1995 14/06/1990 03/06/1991 01/10/1991 None 30
Francea 01/01/1958 15/10/1985 17/01/2007 01/05/2007 1 NR – 7.2; 1 CR – 3.2 28
Germanya 01/01/1958 15/10/1985 17/05/1988 01/09/1988 1 NR – 9.3 29
Greece 01/01/1981 15/10/1985 06/09/1989 01/01/1990 4 NR – 5; 7.2; 8.2; 10.2 26
Irelanda 01/01/1973 07/10/1997 14/05/2002 01/09/2002 None 30
Italy 01/01/1958 15/10/1985 11/05/1990 01/09/1990 None 30
Luxembourg 01/01/1958 15/10/1985 15/05/1987 01/09/1988 None 30
The 01/01/1958 07/01/1988 20/03/1991 01/07/1991 4 NR – 7.2; 8.2; 9.5; 11, 1 25
Netherlandsa CR – 6.2
Portugal 01/01/1986 15/10/1985 18/12/1990 01/04/1991 None 30
Spaina 01/01/1986 15/10/1985 08/11/1988 01/03/1989 1 NR – 3.2 29
Swedena 01/01/1995 04/10/1988 29/08/1989 01/12/1989 None 30
United 01/01/1973 03/06/1997 24/04/1998 01/08/1998 None 30
Kingdom
13 newer EU states (post 2004 members, 11 countries of Central and Eastern Europe + Cyprus, Malta)
Bulgaria 01/01/2007 03/10/1994 10/05/1995 01/09/1995 None 30
Croatia 01/07/2013 11/10/1997 11/10/1997 01/02/1998 None 30
Cyprus 01/05/2004 08/10/1986 16/05/1988 01/09/1988 1 NR – 4.5 29
Czech Republic 01/05/2004 28/05/1998 07/05/1999 01/09/1999 6 NR – 4.5; 6.2; 7.2; 9.2; 9.5; 9.6 24
Estonia 01/05/2004 04/11/1993 16/12/1994 01/04/1995 None 30
Hungary 01/05/2004 06/04/1992 21/03/1994 01/07/1994 None 30
(continued)
Table 1.1 (continued)
Latvia 01/05/2004 05/12/1996 05/12/1996 01/04/1997

1 NR – 9.8 29
Lithuania 01/05/2004 27/11/1996 22/06/1999 01/10/1999
None 30
Malta 01/05/2004 13/07/1993 06/09/1993 01/01/1994
1 NR – 9.2 29
Poland 01/05/2004 19/02/1993 22/11/1993 01/03/1994
None 30
Romania 01/01/2007 04/10/1994 28/01/1998 01/05/1998
1 NR – 7.2 2 CR – 4.4; 4.5 27
Slovakia 01/05/2004 23/02/1999 01/02/2000 01/06/2000
10 NR – 3.1; 4.3; 4.5; 6.1; 9.1; 20
Republic 9.5; 9.6; 9.7; 10.2; 10.3
Slovenia 01/05/2004 11/10/1994 15/11/1996 01/03/1997 None 30
4 candidate countries for EU accession
Albania 06/2014 27/05/1998 04/04/2000 01/08/2000 None 30
Macedonia 12/ 2005 14/06/1996 06/06/1997 01/10/1997 None 30
Serbia 06/2013 24/06/2005 06/09/2007 01/01/2008 6 NR – 4.3; 4.5; 6.1; 6.2; 7.2; 24
8.3
Turkey 12/1999 21/11/1988 09/12/1992 01/04/1993 10 NR – 4.6; 6.1; 7.3; 8.3; 9.4; 20
9.6; 9.7; 10.2; 10.3; 11
3 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries
Georgiab 29/05/2002 08/12/2004 01/04/2005 6 NR – 4.6; 5; 6.2; 9.6; 10.2; 24
10.3
Moldova 02/05/1996 02/10/1997 01/02/1998 None 30
Ukraine 06/11/1996 11/09/1997 01/01/1998 None 30
4 non-EU countries
Iceland 20/11/1985 25/03/1991 01/07/1991 None 30
Norway 26/05/1989 26/05/1989 01/09/1989 None 30
WHAT IS LOCAL AUTONOMY?
(continued)
29
30
Liechtenstein 15/10/1985 11/05/1988 01/09/1988 8 NR – 3.2; 6.2; 7.2; 9.2; 9.3; 22
9.8; 10.2; 10.3
Switzerland 21/01/2004 17/02/2005 01/06/2005 6 NR – 4.4; 6.2; 7.2; 8.2; 9.5; 9.7 24
a b
A. LADNER ET AL.
Notes: Reservation or irrespective declaration that affects the substantial or territorial scope of the commitments; Declaration linked to occupied territories;
eight countries which have ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government but have not been subject of study in this report: Andorra, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco, Montenegro, Russia, San Marino
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CHAPTER 2
Measuring Local Autonomy
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the scope and complexity of the con-
cept of local autonomy. The aim of this second chapter is to develop a
comprehensive and empirically applicable concept to measure local auton-
omy in 39 European countries. First, we discuss previous attempts to con-
ceptualise and to measure local autonomy, and then we present the way we
have chosen to tackle the problem.
The units of comparison are—in general—the systems of local govern-
ment in the respective countries, with a focus on relations between central
governments and municipalities. In countries with a two-tier system of
local government, such as, for example, the Scandinavian countries, the
focus is on the autonomy of the lowest level with respect to the national
level. In federalist countries, the autonomy of municipalities depends first
of all on the relation with the next higher level of government, the inter-
mediate tier and secondly on the relation with national government. One
of the questions to be addressed will be whether all municipalities within
a country enjoy the same degree of autonomy.
The results of comparisons are often formulated in terms of high and
low and more or less autonomy. This almost inevitably leads to a ranking
of the countries according to the degree of autonomy of local govern-
ment and, moreover, to a search for different patterns of autonomy

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_2
38 A. LADNER ET AL.
(typologies). Although such simplifications are not unproblematic, we

will dedicate some chapters of this book (Chaps. 9, 10, 11 and 12) to
such endeavours. Why countries differ in terms of local autonomy and
whether there are specific effects of local autonomy on other variables is
the topic of the last chapters of this volume.
2.2 The Autonomy of Municipalities as the Object

of Our Study
Our study concentrates on the autonomy of the lowest level of govern-

ment, the level which is supposed to be closest to the citizens. The
lowest administrative units of a country are usually referred to as
municipalities or communes. They are located below a province, a
region or a state (LAU level 2, formerly NUTS level 5, or in some cases
LAU level 1).1 A local administrative unit covers a territory and a set of
legislative and executive institutions, or according to the European
Charter of Local Self-Government’s preamble: “local authorities (are)
endowed with democratically constituted decision-making bodies and
possessing a wide degree of autonomy with regard to their responsibili-
ties, the ways and means by which those responsibilities are exercised
and the resources required for their fulfilment” (Council of Europe
1985). Table 2.1 shows in the very right columns the units we selected
for our study in the different countries. All together more than 100,000
municipalities were concerned.
Some countries have an enormous number of municipalities like
France with more than 35,000 or Germany and the Ukraine with more
than 10,000 (see also Table 2.2 in the Appendix). The majority of the
countries, however, have less than 1000 municipalities and about one
fifth of our almost 40 countries have less than 100 municipalities, with
Denmark and Ireland as very prominent examples. In some countries,
like, for example, Greece, Georgia, Latvia, Denmark, Iceland and
Ireland, there has been a reduction of the number of municipalities and
more than 60 or sometimes even more than 90% of the municipalities
disappeared, whereas in the Czech Republic, in Croatia, Slovenia and
Macedonia, there has been a very significant increase of the number of
municipalities over the last 25 years.
1
For the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics by Eurostat, see: http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/web/nuts/local-administrative-units (consulted in 2018).
MEASURING LOCAL AUTONOMY 39
Table 2.1 Distribution of countries and selection of the units of observation/

aggregation and the units of analysis
Regional area Country Units of analysis (2014)
5 Nordic countries 8. Denmark 98 municipalities (Kommuner)

10. Finland 320 municipalities (Kunta)
16. Iceland 74 municipalities (Sveitarfélag)
27. Norway 428 municipalities (Kommune)
35. Sweden 290 municipalities (Kommuner)
5 Southern countries 6. Cyprus 350 communities (Koinotites)
30 municipalities (Dimoi)
14. Greece 325 municipalities (Dimos)
23. Macedonia 80 municipalities (Opštini)
24. Malta 68 local councils (Kunsill Lokali)
37. Turkey 1381 municipalities (Belediye)
30 metropolitan municipalities (and
municipalities within metropolitan
municipalities)
4 Western countries 1 11. France 36681 municipalities (Communes)
(Mediterranean countries) Paris, Marseille, Lyon
18. Italy 8071 municipalities (Comuni)
29. Portugal 308 municipalities (Municípios)
34. Spain 7718 municipalities with less than
20,000 inhabitants
400 municipalities with more than
20,000 inhabitants (Municipios)
3 Western countries 2 3. Belgium 589 municipalities (Gemeenten or
(Benelux countries) Communes)
22. Luxembourg 106 municipalities
26. Netherlands 403 municipalities (Gemeenten)
4 Western countries 3 2. Austria 2353 municipalities (Gemeinden)
(German-speaking 13. Germany 11,040 municipalities (Gemeinden
mid-European countries) and Städte)
20. Liechtenstein 11 municipalities (Gemeinden)
36. Switzerland 2352 municipalities (Gemeinden,
Communes or Comune)
2 Western countries 4 17. Ireland 31 local authorities (Cities and
(British Isles) counties)
39. United 433 local authorities
Kingdom
(continued)
40 A. LADNER ET AL.
Regional area Country Units of analysis (2014)
3 Central and Eastern 9. Estonia 213 municipalities (Vald and Linn)

countries 1 (Baltic 19. Latvia 119 municipalities (Novadi and
countries) Pilēsta)
21. Lithuania 60 municipalities (Savivaldybé)
4 Central and Eastern 7. Czech Republic 6253 municipalities (Obec)
countries 2 28. Poland 2413 municipalities (Gminy), 66
Cities
32. Slovakia 2890 municipalities (Obec and
Mesto)
33. Slovenia 212 municipalities (Občin)
11 cities (Mestna obcina)
3 Central and Eastern 1. Albania 373 municipalities (Komuna and
countries 3 (Balkan Bashkia)
countries) 5. Croatia 428 municipalities (Općine)
128 cities (Grad)
31. Serbia 122 municipalities (Opstina)
22 cities (Grad)
Belgrade city
6 Central and Eastern 4. Bulgaria 264 municipalities (Obshtina)
countries 4 (Eastern 12. Georgia 71 municipalities (Minucipaliteti)
countries) 15. Hungary 3177 municipalities (Települések)
25. Moldova 898 municipalities (Raion)
30. Romania 3181 municipalities (Comune, Orase
and Municipii)
38. Ukraine 11,164 villages and settlements (Sela)
278 towns (Selyshcha)
182 cities (Mista)
11 39 ~106,500
With the number of municipalities and the surface area of the countries
in mind, there are also some very significant differences with respect to the
size of the municipalities in terms of population. In the United Kingdom
and Ireland, the average size of the municipalities reaches more than
100,000 inhabitants compared to Slovakia, France and the Czech Republic
with values of less than 2000 (see also Table 2.3 in the Appendix). It will
be interesting to ask whether number and size of the municipalities are in
some way related to their autonomy and whether changes in number and
size had an impact on changes in the degree of autonomy over time (see
Chap. 12).
In some countries there are only two important levels of government

with the national level and the municipalities on the local level. The overall
picture, however, is far more complicated. Quite often there are in fact
several levels/organisations of local government, there is a very strong
intermediate tier or there are some important territorial units of the
national government. Even more complex are countries with asymmetric
patterns of local autonomy. This is the case in federalist countries like
Switzerland where local autonomy varies from one canton to another, but
also in Germany, Austria, Belgium and the United Kingdom with its four
regions. There are also countries like France, where cities like Paris, Lyon
and Marseille enjoy a special status (UCLG 2008: 131–133) and have
more autonomy than the rest of the municipalities. There are similar
examples in Poland, Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia. And in some cases
(Turkey, Ukraine, Cyprus), there are different types of lowest-level units
or there is a formal difference in terms of autonomy depending on the size
of the municipality like in Spain.
2.3 Existing Empirical Studies on Local Autonomy

Local autonomy is one of the key topics of typologies or more compre-
hensive studies on local government. Quite a few studies also focus more
directly on local autonomy, often combining different aspects of the con-
cept. Studies under the heading of fiscal federalism and decentralisation
are prominent in this regard.
2.3.1 Studies Focusing on Local Government and Local

Autonomy
To a large extent, comparative studies assessing local government systems
also consider local autonomy, at least in its relative and vertical form.2
Empirically, these studies often analyse a selection of (blueprint) countries
which are meant to be particularly interesting or especially telling in order
to capture the diversity of local government.3 Quite a few studies bring
forward typologies consisting of different groups of countries with differ-
2
Horizontal aspects of local autonomy are much more difficult to grasp in comparative
studies since they imply non-governmental actors.
3
For a complete literature review of the studies comparing local government systems
between countries, see Wolman (2008), Vetter (2007) or Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014).
42 A. LADNER ET AL.
ent forms and degrees of local autonomy. It goes without saying that the
characteristics (variables) used to describe and distinguish the role local
governments play in a country are thereby of vital importance.
Among the studies focusing more directly on local autonomy, the func-
tional approach (tasks and financial resources) plays a major role, often
combined with legal aspects (constitutionally granted rights and compe-
tences) and elements of intergovernmental relations (access, influence,
supervision, control). The organisational approach seems to be of lesser
importance:
• Lane and Ersson (1999) start with the legal setting and the type of
government. They rank 16 in West European countries according to
what they call institutional autonomy. Their index and its five
modes—decentralisation, federalism, special territorial autonomy
(home rule) and functional autonomy—are ordinal measures stating
the amount of institutional autonomy. Even though legal criteria can
a priori be counterbalanced by functional and financial ones and uni-
tary countries can have greater institutional autonomy than federalist
countries, it appears that a federal constitution (as well as regional
autonomy) is quite important.
• Page and Goldsmith (1987, see also Goldsmith 1995; Goldsmith
and Page 2010a, b) take the perspective of intergovernmental rela-
tions and summarise the limits imposed on a local government by
higher levels of government under three headings: the range of func-
tions, the discretion to perform these functions and access to/influ-
ence on higher level of government. The way functions (local
government expenditures and local employment) and discretion
(legal framework, the nature of administrative oversight and the
financial competences granted to local authorities) are measured
(Page 1991) reveals, however, the use of a legal or a functional
approach at the same time.
• Vetter (2007: 98 f.) assumes that the political dimension of local
autonomy developed by Page and Goldsmith (1987), Goldsmith
and Page (2010a, b) and Page (1991) primarily covers clientelistic-
patronage features of local government which are not necessarily
linked to local autonomy. She concentrates instead on two aspects,
the range of functions (measured through local expenditures) and
the scope of discretion (measured through the structure of local
revenue).
• Denters and Rose (2005) go beyond the provision of services and

highlight the trends in the range of responsibilities, the adoption of
internal (NPM) and external management (collaborative relation-
ships) measures, the strengthening of the local political executive
and the trend in local democratic governance.
• The organisational approach can also be found in the work of
Verhoest et al. (2004). Organisational autonomy is characterised by
a certain degree of managerial and policy autonomy. Four kinds of
organisational autonomy are discerned: structural, financial, legal
and interventional autonomy. Being used to compare agencies
among countries, they can also be applied to local governments
(Verhoest et al. 2010).
• In Marcou’s (2010: 1) “new comparative approach to local authority
powers and functions”, local autonomy is defined as the freedom
with which a function (a specific public policy) is exercised and
depends foremost on powers intended to exercise it—which may be
a faculty (power) or an obligation (duty)—and the resources needed
to implement it. Other comparative legal studies have focused on the
constitutional status of local government, the legal competences of
local authorities or the nature of the higher-level authorities on
which they depend (Moreno 2012; Loughlin 2001; Norton 1991).
Because of the nature of law, these studies are almost necessarily
qualitative.
• Do Vale (2015) comparing subnational autonomy across three con-
tinents (Brazil, India and South Africa) assesses fiscal autonomy
through the traditional indicators of fiscal decentralisation (local
governments’ expenditures and revenues), administrative autonomy
with the share of public employees and institutional autonomy by
the frequency of meetings of the intergovernmental forums and the
number of subnational institutional veto players.
• Sellers and Lidström’s (2007) conceptualisation of the relationship
between the local and higher tiers of government covers both local
capacities and supervision of local actions. The comparison is built
on quantitative indicators and qualitative ones coded quantitatively.
Local capacities are measured in a functional and an organisational
perspective through two fiscal (share of expenditures and revenues)
and three politico-administrative indicators. The indicators for
supervision consider the importance of grants, tax autonomy and
supervision of local borrowing.
44 A. LADNER ET AL.
Indexes have been developed not only in a cross-country perspective

but also for a comparison between regions within a federalist country.
Comparing local autonomy across the US states, Wolman et al. (2010)
draw upon the one-dimensional centralisation index developed by
Stephens (1974) with three dimensions: the local government’s impor-
tance in the economy and the intergovernmental system, the local govern-
ment discretion in determining what they will do without undue constraint
from higher levels of government and the local government’s capacity to
do so.
2.3.2 Studies Drawing More Extensively on Fiscal

Decentralisation Data
Another group of studies takes a somehow different approach. The selec-
tion of countries does not take place on theoretical grounds but much
more pragmatically because they belonged to a specific part of the world
(Europe), to an internationally active organisation (Council of Europe,
OECD) or even more pragmatically because of the availability of the data.
Wolman (2008: 94) highlights the variety of measurement efforts
undertaken or sponsored by international organisations such as the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (see, e.g.
OECD 1997, Blöchliger and King 2006) or the World Bank (see, e.g.
Shah and Shah 2006). These studies specifically focus on elements like
intergovernmental relations, degrees of decentralisation or fiscal auton-
omy. Most of these studies admit that each dimension consists of a num-
ber of sub-dimensions but they usually abstain from efforts to create an
overall score for each dimension or across dimensions (Wolman 2008:
94). The reason for this, as we will see later on in this book (see Chap. 9),
is due to the conceptual complexity of such a task.
Probably the most straightforward financial indicator describing the
importance of local government is the percentage of the municipal expen-
ditures in relation to the expenditures of all the levels of government
together which is also used by many of the more comprehensive studies
mentioned above. Own statistics on the basis of the data provided by the
OECD show quite considerable differences among European countries
(see Table 2.4 in the Appendix). In some countries very important parts
of public expenditures are spent by municipalities whereas in other coun-
tries these parts are limited. In 2014, municipal expenditures amounted to
more than 60% in Denmark, almost 50% in Sweden, about 40% in Finland,
33% in Norway and about 30% in Iceland. The municipalities in the

Netherlands also scored relatively high with 30% and so did Poland (32%).
In Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Greece, the percentage is below 15%.
The reasons for these differences and the changes over time will be
explored in Chap. 5.
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, expenditures are just one
component of financial autonomy. Additional important questions are:
Where do the municipalities receive their money from, and how freely can
they allocate the money to the different services (Akai 2013)? Here the
concept of fiscal autonomy suggests a large number of indicators, the most
important ones being: To what extent are the municipalities able to gener-
ate their own resources, and how freely can they dispose of the transfers
they receive from higher levels of the state? Blöchliger and King (2006)
directly relate fiscal autonomy of subcentral governments to local govern-
ment’s taxing powers and to the intergovernmental grant system.
The income of local government should be closely linked to the expen-
ditures of local government meaning that in order to keep the budget
balanced income and expenditures should be more or less equal. More
decisive than the total revenue, however, is the percentage of self-generate
income and whether municipalities can or have to decide autonomously
on their sources and the amounts they yield (taxes, fees). The consolidated
total local tax revenue roughly consists of the total local government rev-
enue minus transfers.
The OECD figures reveal that high local expenditures are—as
expected—related to high revenues. There are, however, important differ-
ences with respect to the importance of transfers (see Appendix Table 2.5).
There are also more OECD indicators trying to cope with the question of
tax autonomy and transfers in more detail. The figures basically confirm
the high local autonomy in the Nordic countries and reveal the differences
between federalist and unitary countries. In the former the part of local
government’s tax income in relation to subnational governments’ tax
income is understandably lower.
With respect to the financial decentralisation data used in many studies,
several problems have been identified. First, they are not distinguishing
the subnational levels (e.g. Vetter 2007; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002). Second,
they are mainly dealing with financial aspects of local autonomy without
capturing the role and discretion of local government in an adequate man-
ner (Woller and Phillips 1998; Wolman 1990). Indeed, the most widely
46 A. LADNER ET AL.
used indicators in fiscal decentralisation and local government studies—

due to the lack of good general data (Van de Walle et al. 2009; Bell et al.
2006; Sharpe 1988)—are the share of subcentral government direct
expenditures in total expenditures and the share of subcentral government
revenues in total revenues (OECD and KIPF 2016; Blöchliger 2013; Kim
2013). They are arguably—as we have seen—not the most accurate mea-
sures of the local governments’ actual responsibilities.4
Hence, recent reports of the OECD finally have tried to precise the
various aspects of the local government’s taxing power (Blöchliger 2013;
Blöchliger and King 2006; OECD 1999), and a taxonomy of grants has
been developed (Bergvall et al. 2006; Blöchliger and King 2007; OECD
and KIPF 2016).5
2.3.3 Studies on Federalism, Regional Autonomy

and Decentralisation
Studies on federalism and regionalisation can also be a source of inspira-
tion since they treat a similar problem on a higher level by analysing the
distribution of authority between the regional and national tiers. Examining
variations among regional authorities across states, Hooghe et al. (2016)
distinguish between elements concerning the extent to which a regional
unit has authority (meaning formal autonomy) over those who live in its
territory—self-rule—and the influence of regional units to shape national
decision-making: shared rule. Each dimension is then divided into four
further sub-dimensions that allow to quantify regional authority across 81
countries between 1950 and 2010. In the convergent validation of the
RAI, Schakel (2008) compares the RAI with other indices measuring
institutional decentralisation/regionalisation, indices of fiscal decentralisa
tion/regionalisation or indices that combine institutional and fiscal com-
ponents (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005; Brancati 2006; Hooghe and
Marks 2001; Lane and Ersson 1999; Lijphart 1999; Treisman 2002;
Woldendorp et al. 2000): they are globally in great agreement.
4
The same pitfalls shall be pointed out regarding the proportion of public employees
employed by subnational units as a measure of (de)centralisation (Wolman 1990).
5
The most recent studies on fiscal decentralisation (see e.g. OECD and KIPF 2016) are
focusing on subnational government; no distinction is made between regional and local
governments.
In studies that aim to measure quantitatively the degree of decentralisa-

tion of a government, the distinction is often made between political,
administrative/policy and fiscal/economic dimensions of decentralisation
(Schneider 2003; Falleti 2005; Ivanyna and Shah 2014; Furniss 1974;
Rodden 2004; AER 2009; Dardanelli et al. 2016). Measuring in fine the
degree of closeness between the government and the people, Ivanyna and
Shah (2014) provide an advanced operationalisation, of which one of the
main innovations consists in the weighting of the scores at every stage.
Choices are deliberately made in order to give more weight to certain
aspects in particular, involving a penalty—or conversely an advantage—for
some countries, either in a first step for the creation of fiscal, political and
administrative decentralisation indexes, in a second step for the construc-
tion of the overall decentralisation index or finally for the development of
the final Government Closeness Index. The data used comes from differ-
ent databases on decentralisation.
2.3.4 Agreement and Disagreement with Respect

to the Municipalities’ Autonomy in the Different Countries
With respect to the results of the different studies in the field of decentrali-
sation and local autonomy, there is agreement on quite a few countries,
but there is also some disagreement depending on the indicators used (see
Appendix Table 2.6). Not all authors, of course, used the term local
autonomy explicitly and distinguished equally between countries with
high, rather high, medium, rather low or low degrees of autonomy. For
our purpose, however, we tried to make the studies as comparable as
possible.
As far as countries with a high degree of local autonomy are concerned,
there is quite some agreement: The Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark,
Iceland, Finland, Norway) together with the German-speaking countries
(Germany, Austria, Switzerland) quite constantly among the countries
with a high degree of autonomy. But even here, there are some studies
with deviating results like, for example, Lane and Ersson (1999) or Page
and Goldsmith (1987) ranking them among countries with a medium or
at least not the highest degree of local autonomy. Switzerland is almost
consistently, and Germany and Austria a bit less often, among the coun-
tries with high local autonomy. Quite diverging are finally the results for
the United Kingdom and France where the municipalities seem to enjoy—
depending on the studies—more or less autonomy.
48 A. LADNER ET AL.
These somehow puzzling results are at least partially a direct expression

of the different variables or aspects of local autonomy used to analyse the
different countries. It makes a difference whether we rely on the legal
status, local public expenditures, tax revenue or transfers to establish the
degree of local autonomy. And, of course, local autonomy can also change
over time. In France and Italy, for example, local autonomy seems to have
increased during past decades. To draw the most accurate picture of local
autonomy possible, we must therefore present the different aspects of
local autonomy and capture the development over the years.
2.3.5 Conclusions to Be Drawn for the Conceptualisation

and Measurement of Local Autonomy
There is a very rich literature with different ways to conceptualise local
autonomy, a considerable amount of data, which is, however, not focused
on the local level, and quite some disagreement on the autonomy of
municipalities in the different countries. The four approaches described in
the first chapter with their different aspects to concentrate on are well
represented but applied in various combinations.
The capacities of local government to fulfil their tasks and to offer ser-
vices to their citizens play a vital role in most of the studies reviewed not
only with respect to what local government does but also to what extent
it can decide whether it wants to do it and how to do it. Also important
are the resources local government dispose of, mainly measured in terms
of finances. Taking up the terminology of Fig. 1.1 (see Chap. 1), the func-
tional approach plays quite a dominant role. Of lesser importance, particu-
larly when it comes to measuring, is the legal framework. This might be
due to the fact that it is very difficult to address these questions in a com-
parative manner and to produce meaningful indicators. The politics
approach looking at intergovernmental relations is also quite popular, but
there seems to be more agreement in the importance of these aspects, than
in how to measure them and which data is reliable. Also the organisational
approach looking at the possibilities of self-regulation of local govern-
ment’s administration and political systems is addressed less frequently
and less convincingly applied in a comparative perspective.
The dominant role of the functional approach is also due to the fact
that it can be operationalised through local government’s financial
resources more easily than other aspects of local autonomy. Most of the
studies use data from many different sources and the variables taken into
consideration (too) often serve as mere proxies and represent the second
best choice at the best. A comprehensive approach to grasp and measure
local autonomy convincingly has thus to go beyond the financial data and
has to integrate data from all four approaches summarised in Fig. 1.1 (see
Chap. 1). Since there is no hard data available for all these aspects, it has
to produce a universally applicable scheme to measure them qualitatively.
The codebook presented in the next section is an attempt to develop an
encompassing qualitative methodology to grasp the phenomenon of local
autonomy comprehensively.
2.4 The Codebook

The coding scheme of local autonomy we developed attempts to cover
most of the aspects of local autonomy addressed by the different approaches
and the four theoretical perspectives (for the original of codebook, see
Table 2.7 in the Appendix).6
The legalist approach emphasises elements like a constitutional guaran-
tee of existence of municipalities but also the way tasks are assigned to the
municipalities. The former can be termed legal protection, whereas for the
latter we use the term institutional depth.
• To assess the legal protection, we asked whether there were constitu-

tional or legal means to assert local autonomy. This dimension is
typically related to the §§ 4.1 and 11 in the European Charter of
Local Self-Government. The four different categories to code the
countries were: (0) no legal remedy for the protection of local auton-
omy exists; (1) constitutional clauses or other statutory regulations
protect local self-government; (2) local authorities have recourse to
the judicial system to settle disputes with higher authorities (e.g.
through constitutional courts, administrative courts or tribunals or
ordinary courts); and (3) remedies of types 1 and 2 above, plus other
means that protect local autonomy such as, for example, the listing
6
While developing the codebook, we tried, at least to some extent, to follow the method-
ology of the Regional Authority Index (RAI) produced by Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and
Arjan H. Schakel (2016). Some adaptations, however, had to be made to capture the specific
characteristics of local government.
50 A. LADNER ET AL.
of all municipalities in the constitution or the impossibility to force

them to merge. The extent to which local government is formally
autonomous and can choose the tasks they want to perform.
• For institutional depth we wanted to know the extent to which local
government is formally autonomous and can choose the tasks they
want to perform. Four different answers were possible: (0) local
authorities can only perform mandated tasks; (1) local authorities
can choose from a very narrow, predefined scope of tasks; (2) local
authorities are explicitly autonomous and can choose from a wide
scope of predefined tasks; and (3) local authorities are free to take on
any new tasks (residual competencies) not assigned to other levels of
government.
Whether a municipality is responsible for the different tasks and/
or has the financial resources was not the question here. The coding
had to comply with the legal framework in the respective countries.
This means that the coding refers to the status of local government
according to the constitution and other relevant legislation; if there
are deeply contradictory regulations, this should be reflected in the
coding and also mentioned in the notes.
The functional approach insists on the tasks municipalities per-
form and their financial resources. For both elements there were
various aspects to be considered. For the tasks we were interested
whether they are responsible for a wide range of important tasks
(policy scope) and to what extent they have the possibility to decide
on service aspects of these tasks (effective political discretion).
• To measure policy scope, we asked for the range of functions (tasks)
where local government is effectively involved in the delivery of the
services (be it through their own financial resources and/or through
their own staff). In the first step, we wanted to know whether the
municipalities were involved in the provision of these tasks and ser-
vices. How much they could decide was part of the next question. In
order to do so, we did no rely on the share of local expenditures—
like it is often done—but we selected eight different functions (pri-
mary education, social assistance, primary health services, land use,
public transport, housing and town development, traffic and public
order police and kindergarten services and services for elderly and
handicapped people) municipalities are often responsible for.
More precisely we asked whether the municipalities were involved
in the construction and/or maintenance of school buildings, the
employment and payment of teachers, poverty relief, other social

security/protection services, construction and/or maintenance of
clinics or health centres, employment and payment of doctors, build-
ing permits, zoning, public transport services, housing and town
development, police and caring functions. One point had to be given
if they were fully involved and 0.5 points if local government was
only partly involved.
• Whereas for the effective political discretion, we additionally wanted
to know to what extent local government has real influence (can
decide on service aspects) over the eight different functions (primary
education, social assistance, primary health services, land use, public
transport, housing and town development, traffic and public order
police and kindergarten services and services for elderly and handi-
capped people).
The following precise aspects to decide upon were given: number
and location of schools, employment and payment of teachers,
whether an individual receives financial relief, the level of assistance a
person receives, the construction and/or maintenance of health cen-
tres, the organisation and functioning of specialised health centres,
building permits, zoning, housing and town development, public
order police services and traffic police services. Again, 0.5 points
instead of one could be given if local government only partly decides
on these aspects.
For the financial resources, we selected four different issues: fiscal
autonomy, the financial transfer system, financial self-reliance and bor-
rowing autonomy. All these aspects are related to the municipalities’
possibilities to raise the financial resources they need independently
and to decide to a certain degree on how they want to spend them.
• The extent to which local government can independently tax its pop-
ulation is called fiscal autonomy. Here, we distinguish the following
five possibilities: (0) local authorities do not set base and rate of any
tax; (1) local authorities set base or rate of minor taxes; (2) local
authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate,
value added, property or sales tax) under restrictions stipulated by
higher levels of government; (3) local authorities set rate of one
major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or
sales tax) with few or no restrictions; and (4) local authorities set base
and rate of more than one major tax (personal income, corporate,
value added, property or sales tax).
52 A. LADNER ET AL.
• Under the heading financial transfer system, we are interested in the

proportion of unconditional financial transfers in relation to the total
amount of transfers received by local government. The four different
possibilities were (0) conditional transfers are dominant (uncondi-
tional = 0–40% of total transfers), (1) there is largely a balance
between conditional and unconditional financial transfers (uncondi-
tional = 40–60%), (2) unconditional financial transfers are dominant
(unconditional = 60–80%) and (3) nearly all transfers are uncondi-
tional (unconditional = 80–100%).
• Financial self-reliance describes the proportion of local government
revenues derived from own/local sources (taxes, fees, charges).
Hereby, a shared tax collected by central government and over which
local government has no influence had to be regarded as financial
transfer. The following four answer categories were suggested: (0)
own sources yield less than 10% of total revenues, (1) own sources
yield 10–25%, (2) own sources yield 25–50% and (3) own sources
yield more than 50.
• The extent to which local government can borrow is termed borrow-
ing autonomy. The four possible settings are:
(0) Local authorities cannot borrow.

(1) Local authorities may borrow under prior authorisation by higher-
level governments and with one or more of the following restrictions:
(a) Golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits)

(b) No foreign borrowing or borrowing from the regional or central
bank only
(c) No borrowing above a ceiling, absolute level of subnational indebt-
edness, maximum debt-service ratio for new borrowing or debt
brake mechanism
(d) Borrowing is limited to specific purposes.
(2) Local authorities may borrow without prior authorisation and under
one or more of (a), (b), (c) or (d).
(3) Local authorities may borrow without restriction imposed by higher-
level authorities.
With respect to the organisational approach, we basically focused on

the municipalities’ possibilities to organise their political systems indepen-
dently and to decide themselves on administrational matters. We call this

kind of self-regulation organisational autonomy.
• The organisational autonomy is assessed through the extent to

which local government is free to decide about its own organisa-
tion and electoral system. For the local executive and election sys-
tem, we distinguish countries where (0) local executives are
appointed by higher-level authorities and local authorities cannot
determine core elements of their political systems (electoral dis-
tricts, number of seats, electoral system), (1) executives are elected
by the municipal council or directly by citizens and (2) executives
are elected by the citizens or the council and the municipality may
decide some elements of the electoral system. Whereas for staff
and local structures half a point is additionally given when local
authorities hire their own staff, fix the salary of their employees,
choose their organisational structure or establish legal entities
and municipal enterprises.
The politics approach of intergovernmental relations contains two
lines of arguments. One can be called administrative supervision and
the other one central or regional access. They look at the control
executed by higher levels and the possibilities local government has
to influence higher-level decisions:
• By administrative supervision of local government, we mean the
obtrusiveness of higher level. This dimension is related to the § 8 in
the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The relevant cat-
egories are (0) administrative supervision reviews legality as well as
merits/expediency of municipal decisions, (1) administrative super-
vision covers details of accounts and spending priorities, (2) admin-
istrative supervision only aims at ensuring compliance with law
(legality of local decisions) and (3) there is very limited administra-
tive supervision.
• Central or regional access finally describes the extent to which local
authorities are consulted to influence higher-level governments’
policy-making. Again we distinguish four different settings: (0) local
authorities are never consulted by higher-level governments and
there are no formal mechanisms of representation, (1) local authori-
ties are consulted and/or have access to higher-level decision-making
through formal representation but influence is limited, (2) local
authorities are regularly consulted through permanent consultation
54 A. LADNER ET AL.
channels and have substantial influence and (3) local authorities are
either consulted or have access to higher-level decision-making
through formal representation and substantial influence.
Taken all together, the codebook contains 11 variables to measure local

autonomy. Institutional depth, policy scope, effective political discretion
and organisational autonomy measure what can be called self-rule aspects
of local autonomy, whereas legal protection, administrative supervision
and central or regional access can be described as interactive rule. There
are, however, some additional challenges to keep in mind.
In our presentation, we suggested that the different variables can be
more or less directly derived from the four different approaches sum-
marised in Fig. 1.1 in the previous chapter. There are, however, cases
where the origin of the variables is less clear. Institutional depth, for exam-
ple, has both a legal and a functional component. On the one hand, it
clarifies the responsibilities and decisional competences legally, and on the
other hand it shows de facto what municipalities are responsible for. Or,
very similarly, conditional grants are directly related to the financial
resources of the municipalities and are therefore a topic of the functional
approach. At the same time, however, they are also a means to enhance
and control municipalities in the fulfilment of specific tasks and describe a
vertical element of local autonomy which is at the core of interest in inter-
governmental relations.
The values of the different variables add up to a total of 37 points
which is the absolute maximum the municipalities in a country can
reach. The self-rule index adds up to 28 points and the interactive rule
contributes 9 points. A closer look at the points given reveals that some
variables contribute only three and other variables four points.7 Finally,
and this is even more important, some approaches are more influential
in terms of their contribution to the overall value. Financial aspects, for
example, add up to 13 points, whereas organisational autonomy con-
tributes only 4 points at the very best. These distortions must be kept
in mind when we try to construct an overall indicator of local autonomy
(see Chap. 9).
7
The points to be given to policy scope and effective political discretion can add up to 12.
They were then divided by three to remain in the range of the other variables.
2.5 The Organisation of the Project

and the Coding
To code almost 40 countries over a time span of 25 years in such an

extensive manner cannot be done by a small group of researchers
because of the extreme diversity of the territorial models and of the
systems of local government. We therefore had to rely on an extensive
network of experts of local government covering all the countries.
Altogether, some 40 specialists of the field participated in the project
and contributed by applying the same codebook to the collection of
reliable and comparable data.8 For organisational purposes the coding
of countries were split into different groups of countries coordinated
by country group coordinators which were particularly familiar with
the countries in their group.9
Each expert coded his country for each of the 25 years, starting with
the most recent year (2014) and working backward (1990). The reforms
which resulted in new scores had to be highlighted, described and docu-
mented in a country profile.10 In order to avoid the reliability and validity
8
List of the country experts by country: (1) Albania, Alba Dakoli Wilson; (2) Austria, Franz
Fallend and Armin Mühlböck; (3) Belgium, Kristof Steyvers; (4) Bulgaria, Desislava Stoilova;
(5) Croatia, Dubravka Jurlina Alibegovic; (6) Cyprus, Nikos Hlepas; (7) Czech Republic,
Lucie Sedmihradska; (8) Denmark, Kurt Houlberg; (9) Estonia, Georg Sootla; (10) Finland,
Pekka Kettunen; (11) France, William Gilles; (12) Georgia, Natia Daghelishvili; (13) Germany,
Angelika Vetter; (14) Greece, Nikos Hlepas; (15) Hungary, Gábor Dobos; (16) Iceland, Eva
Hlynsdottir; (17) Ireland, Gerard Turley; (18) Italy, Annick Magnier; (19) Latvia, Inga Vika;
(20) Liechtenstein, Nicolas Keuffer; (21) Lithuania, Diana Saparniene; (22) Luxembourg,
Raphaël Kies; (23) Macedonia, Gordana Siljanovska Davkova and Renata Treneska-Deskoska;
(24) Malta, Ivan Mifsud; (25) Moldova, Alexandru Osadci; (26) Netherlands, Bas Denters;
(27) Norway, Harald Baldersheim; (28) Poland, Pawel Swianiewicz; (29) Portugal, Pedro
Costa Gonçalves; (30) Romania, Cristina Stanus; (31) Serbia, Dusan Vasiljevic; (32) Slovak
Republic, Jan Bucek; (33) Slovenia, Irena Baclija; (34) Spain, Carmen Navarro; (35) Sweden,
Anders Lidström; (36) Switzerland, Nicolas Keuffer and Andreas Ladner; (37) Turkey, Ali
Cenap Yologlu; (38) Ukraine, Katerina Maynzyuk; (39) United Kingdom, Michael Goldsmith.
9
The country group coordinators were Harald Baldersheim (Nordic countries), Nikos
Hlepas (Cyprus, Greece, Macedonia, Malta, Turkey), Carmen Navarro (France, Italy, Spain,
Portugal), Kristof Steyvers (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands), Andreas Ladner and
Nicolas Keuffer (Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Ireland, United Kingdom)
and Pawel Swianiewicz (Baltic, Central Eastern, Balkan, Eastern countries).
10
For the country profiles, see: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/
studies/pdf/lai_country_profiles.zip (consulted in 2018).
56 A. LADNER ET AL.
risks regarding expert judgments (e.g. Steenbergen and Marks 2007), sev-
eral meetings with the experts were organised to improve and to clarify the
wording of coding instructions and procedures and to discuss preliminary
results. The consistency of the coding was checked in a three-step proce-
dure: for each country whether the variables fit into the overall pattern of
the country, within groups of countries whether the countries fit into the
overall pattern of the country groups and for all countries for outliers on
each variable and for the total value. The final results were then reviewed
by two external experts.11 Furthermore, the results were tested with
respect to other measurements of decentralisation (see Ladner et al. 2016a,
b: 70ff.).12
For some countries the procedure was relatively straightforward, since
we could assume that all municipalities enjoyed the same degree of
autonomy. In other countries the situation was a bit more complicated.
Federalism can lead to different degrees of local autonomy in the differ-
ent federal subunits, like, for example, in Switzerland, or, there is a dif-
ference between rural municipalities and large cities (like e.g. in Croatia,
France or Turkey). Countries with such asymmetric systems (different
degrees of autonomy inside one country) were assigned a special treat-
ment, and we weighted the areas with different degrees of autonomy by
population (smaller regions with higher autonomy become less
important).
Following this procedure we were able to create a comprehensive
comparative database on local autonomy, operationalised through 11
variables13 measuring aspect of local autonomy, applied to 39 European
countries and taking into account the changes between 1990 and
2014.14
11
Prof. Sabine Kuhlmann, Chair of the COST action IS1207 “Local Public Sector Reforms:
An International Comparison” and Prof. Anders Lidström, convenor at the ECPR Standing
Group on Local Government and Politics and Editor of The Oxford Handbook of Local and
Regional Democracy in Europe, among other things. They approved in most cases the coding
of the experts. If there was any disagreement, we went back to the country experts.
12
All the data, the country profiles and the report submitted to the European Commission’s
Directorate for Urban and Regional Affairs can be found on website of our project (http://
local-autonomy.andreasladner.ch/).
13
The 22 variables for policy scope and effective political discretion stemming from the
different policies were combined into two variables, only.
14
The data of the original project is available under: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_pol-
icy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/lai_datasets.xlsx (consulted in 2018).
Appendix
Table 2.2 Number of municipalities (1990–2014)
Country High number of High number of Changes Country High number of High number of Changes
municipalities municipalities 1990–2014 municipalities municipalities 1990–2014
1990 2014 1990 2014
France 36,693 36,684 0 Finland 460 320 −30.4

Germany 15,978 11,040 −30.9 Norway 448 428 −4.5
Ukraine 10,572 11,624 10 Cyprus 380 380 0
Spain 8108 8118 0.1 Albania 374 373 −0.3
Italy 8094 8071 −0.3 Portugal 305 308 1
Greece 5923 325 −94.5 Sweden 284 290 2.1
Czech 4100 6253 52.5 Denmark 275 98 −64.4
Republic
Hungary 3089 3177 2.9 Bulgaria 274 264 −3.7
Switzerland 3021 2352 −22.1 Estonia 255 213 −16.5
Romania 2948 3181 7.9 Iceland 213 74 −65.3
Slovakia 2826 2890 2.3 Croatia 172 556 223.3
Poland 2383 2479 4 Serbia 145 145 0
Austria 2317 2353 1.6 Luxembourg 118 106 −10.2
Turkey 2061 1411 −31.5 Ireland 113 31 −72.6
Georgia 1004 71 −92.9 Malta 67 68 1.5
Moldova 959 898 −6.4 Slovenia 62 223 259.7
Netherlands 672 403 −40 Lithuania 58 60 3.5
Belgium 589 589 0 Macedonia 34 80 135.3
Latvia 573 119 −79.2 Liechtenstein 11 11 0
United 540 433 −19.8
MEASURING LOCAL AUTONOMY
Kingdom
Total 116,498 106,499 −8.6
57
Notes: Order of presentation, number of municipalities in 1990

Bold figures stand for a significant decrease and italic figures stand for a significant increase of the number of municipalities
Source: Own survey
58 A. LADNER ET AL.
Table 2.3 Average population size (1990–2014)

Country Mean Mean Change Country Mean Mean Change
1990 2014 1990–2014 1990 2014 1990–2014
United 106,014 149,222 1.4 Croatia 27,791 7623 0.3

Kingdom
Ireland 31,097 148,943 4.8 Italy 7008 7532 1.1
Denmark 18,694 57,586 3.1 Germany 4971 7335 1.5
Turkey 26,198 54,942 2.1 Malta 5286 6285 1.2
Georgia 4783 52,493 11 Romania 7870 6259 0.8
Serbia 52,317 49,176 0.9 Estonia 6154 6172 1
Lithuania 63,756 48,873 0.8 Spain 4792 5726 1.2
Netherlands 22,249 41,849 1.9 Luxembourg 3236 5248 1.6
Portugal 32,732 33,770 1 Iceland 1196 4424 3.7
Greece 1722 33,515 19.5 Moldova 3854 3960 1
Sweden 30,137 33,435 1.1 Ukraine 4908 3903 0.8
Bulgaria 31,819 27,363 0.9 Austria 3314 3630 1.1
Macedonia 58,713 25,945 0.4 Switzerland 2223 3482 1.6
Belgium 16,923 19,068 1.1 Liechtenstein 2613 3390 1.3
Finland 10,840 17,067 1.6 Hungary 3358 3106 0.9
Latvia 4648 16,754 3.6 Cyprus 2017 3036 1.5
Poland 15,993 15,333 1 Slovakia 1875 1875 1
Norway 9468 12,003 1.3 France 1595 1813 1.1
Slovenia 32,228 9247 0.3 Czech 2520 1683 0.7
Republic
Albania 8788 7758 0.9
Notes: Order of presentation, mean size in 1990

Source: Own survey
Table 2.4 OECD indicators of local autonomy (1995 and 2014)

OECD LG_ LG_ LG_ LG_ LG_ LG_
Dtot Dtot Rtot Rtot Rtranstot Rtranstot
2014 1995 2014 1995 2014 1995
Denmark 62.4 53.5 25.9 32.0 26.6 21.2

Sweden 48.6 36.7 34.8 32.3 13.1 7.8
Finland 40.3 30.0 29.6 25.4 11.0 11.0
Norway 33.1 35.6 14.7 20.8 10.7 11.3
Poland 31.6 18.0 14.0
Netherlands 29.8 39.6 9.4 12.4 17.7 25.8
Iceland 29.7 24.9 3.1
Italy 28.0 23.9 19.0 11.3 10.4 14.7
Czech Republic 27.4 20.3 19.7 15.7 8.7 13.8
United Kingdom 25.1 26.3 9.1 7.9 16.4 17.5
Estonia 24.0 24.8 4.7 3.0 15.9 17.4
France 20.1 17.2 15.6 13.7 5.6 5.0
Slovenia 19.6 14.5 12.7 10.2 8.3 7.0
Switzerland 19.4 21.7 18.5 20.4 2.1 2.2
Germany 17.1 14.0 11.2 11.0 5.7 5.5
Slovakia 16.1 13.0 5.6 6.1 10.3 0.8
Hungary 15.6 23.3 9.6 10.5 9.0 14.8
Austria 14.8 17.6 6.5 9.5 8.5 8.5
Belgium 13.4 12.3 7.4 7.6 5.2 5.0
Portugal 11.7 11.6 10.5 9.2 3.7 4.0
Spain 11.0 11.1 11.0 10.0 4.4 4.3
Luxembourg 10.8 13.3 5.4 8.7 6.1 5.6
Ireland 9.4 31.1 5.6 9.8 4.6 18.6
Greece 6.7 5.8 2.8 2.6 4.8 5.9
23.6 22.6 13.8 13.2 9.4 10.3
Low autonomy −15.0 −15.0 −8.0 −8.0 15+ 15+
Medium 15–25 15–25 8–20 8–20 5–15 5–15
autonomy
High autonomy 25+ 25+ 20+ 20+ −5 −5
Notes: Expenditures (LG_Dtot), consolidated tax revenues (LG_Rtot) and transfers (LG_Rtranstot)
Source: OECD fiscal decentralisation database, Tables 5, 7 and 13, own calculations
60 A. LADNER ET AL.
Table 2.5 OECD indicators of local autonomy: tax autonomy and non-
earmarked transfers (1995 and most recent data)
OECD LG_Ta LG_Ta LG_Ta LG_Ta LG_Ta LG_Ta NonEar NonEar
xAut1 xAut1 xAut2 xAut2 xAut3 xAut3 0 0
2014 1995 2011 1995 2011 1995 2010 2000
Austria 3.2 4.1 15.4 27.8 0.7 1.6 10.9
Belgium 4.6 4.8 48.6 58.8 5.0 3.9
Czech 1.2 0.9 100.0 100.0 1.2 0.9 0.0 0.0
Republic
Denmark 24.7 31.3 98.1 94.9 26.2 30.3 47.4 25.2
Estonia 13.4 13.1 10.3 1.4 71.4
Finland 23.5 22.3 91.4 89.8 21.2 20.0 92.9 86.6
France 13.1 11.0 63.2 8.3 75.0
Germany 7.0 7.4 16.0 13.4 4.7 3.9
Greece 3.8 0.9 75.8 2.8 23.0
Hungary 5.7 2.5 84.2 75.3 5.5 1.9 12.7 40.2
Iceland 24.9 20.8 99.3 100.0 26.4 20.8 54.2
Ireland 2.8 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3
Italy 15.8 5.4 59.4 9.4
Luxembourg 3.3 6.4 97.2 4.5 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 2.7 97.3 100.0 3.5 2.7 46.6
Norway 13.8 19.6 98.5 3.7 12.0 0.7 64.3 60.4
Poland 8.3 36.5 45.9 4.5 3.4 61.1
Portugal 7.2 5.4 72.9 42.0 4.8 1.8 83.5
Slovakia 2.8 1.3 100.0 2.9
Slovenia 10.6 6.3 14.1 1.5 0.0 0.0
Spain 9.8 8.5 23.9 53.4 7.8 7.1 41.1 67.3
Sweden 37.0 30.9 97.4 100.0 34.8 30.9 74.1 71.7
Switzerland 15.2 17.6 38.5 41.5 15.2 17.2 38.2 19.5
United 4.9 3.7 100.0 100.0 4.8 3.7
Kingdom
Mean 11.3 9.9 64.1 61.6 8.7 8.9 40.2 41.0
High +15 +15 +80 +80 +15 +15 +50 +50

autonomy
Source: OECD fiscal decentralisation database, Tables 2 and 9, own calculations; Countries with high
autonomy highlighted in grey; operationalisation: TaxAut1, local government’s tax revenue as percentage
of total general government tax revenue; TaxAut2, part of local government’s own tax in % of Subnational
Government Tax Income; TaxAut3, Part of local government’s own tax income in % of General
Government Tax Income; NonEar0, Unconditional grants revenue of local governments as a % of total
grants revenue of local governments
Table 2.6 A summary of research on local autonomy in European countries
Degree of local autonomy
Low Medium High
Lane and FRA, GBR, ITA, ESP,FIN, DEU CHE

Ersson IRL PRT BEL,
(1999) NLD,
GRC,
AUT,
NOR,
DNK,
SWE
Dreier (1994) ITA, GRC, GBR, IRL ESP, PRT FIN, NOR, DEU, AUT,
FRA DNK, SWE CHE
Hesse and Franco – Anglo – Middle/
Sharpe group group Northern
(1991) BEL, FRA, GBR, IRL European
ITA, ESP, group
PRT, GRC DEU, AUT,
CHE, NLD,
NOR, SWE,
DNK, FIN
Page and GBR, IRL Southern HUN, Northern Germanic
Goldsmith European CZE European group systems
(1987) group SWE, NOR, DEU, AUT,
Page (1991) FRA, DNK, NLD CHE
Goldsmith BEL, ITA,
(1995) ESP
Goldsmith
and Page
(2010a, b)
Kuhlmann Continental Anglo- – Central Eastern Scandinavian
and European Saxon European SWE, NOR,
Wollmann Napoleonic GBR, HUN, POL, CZE DNK, FIN
(2014) FRA, ITA, ENG Continental
Kuhlmann PRT, GRC, European
and ESP federal
Bouckaert South DEU, AUT,
(2016) Eastern CHE
European
BGR, ROM
(continued)
62 A. LADNER ET AL.
Low Medium High
Vetter GRC ITA, IRL, BEL, NOR, DNK,

(2007)a NLD, PRT, SWE, LUX,
Vetter et al. GBR AUT, FRA
(2016) ESP,
DEU,
FRA
Sellers and BEL, GRC, ESP, FRA, NLD, PRT; SWE, DNK,
Lidström IRL ITA, GBR DEU, AUT FIN, CHE,
(2007)b NOR
Ladner et al. British Isles
Eastern Benelux Mediterranean Nordic
(2016a, b) GBR, IRL countries countries countries countries
Southern BGR, LUX, FRA, IRA, PRT, FIN, SWE,
countries HUN, BEL, ESP ISL, SNK,
MKD, GRC, MDV, NLD NOR
MLT, ROM German-
CYP Central speaking
Black Seaneastern Mid-
countries countries European
UKR, TUR, POL, countries
GEO, CZE, CHE, DEU,
SVK, SVN LIE, AUT
Balkan
countries
SRB,
HRV,
ALB
Baltic
countries
LTU,
EST, LVA
Ivanyna and MDV, ROM, ALB, ITA, GEO, FRAU, CHE, DNK,
Shah (2014): HRV, TUR, SVK, BEL, DEU, CZE, LVA SWE, FIN,
Government IRL, GRC, PRT, ESP, UKR, NOR, ISL,
Closeness CYP, MKD, EST, NLD, AUT, HUN,
Indexa MLT BGR, SRB LTU, POL
SVN,
LUX,
GBR
(continued)
Low Medium High
Hooghe et al. LVA, LTU, TUR, HUN, FRA, NLD, SWE, DEU, ESP,
(2010): RAIa ALB, BGR, DNK, ROM, NOR, GBR, GRC BEL, ITA,
MKD, SVK FIN, SRB, HRV, CHE, AUT
PRT, IRL CZE,
POL,
SVK
Notes: Own classification, inspired by Vetter (2007: 97). Country abbreviationst: ALB=Albania,
AUT=Austria, BEL=Belgium, BGR=Bulgaria, HRV=Croatia, CYP=Cyprus, CZE=Czech Republic,
DNK=Denmark, EST=Estonia, FIN=Finland, FRA=France, GEO=Georgia, DEU=Germany,
GRC=Greece, HUN=Hungary, ISL=Iceland, IRL=Ireland, ITA=Italy, LVA=Latvia, LIE=Liechtenstein,
LTU=Lithuania, LUX=Luxembourg, MKD=Macedonia, MLT=Malta, MDV=Moldova,
NLD=Netherlands, NOR=Norway, POL=Poland, PRT=Portugal, ROM=Romania, SRB=Serbia,
SVK=Slovakia, SVN=Slovenia, ESP=Spain, SWE=Sweden, CHE=Switzerland, TUR=Turkey,
UKR=Ukraine, GBR=United Kingdom.
a
Own typology
b
Own calculation and typology
Table 2.7 Local autonomy coding scheme
Self-rule index
Variable Description Scale Operationalisation
Institutional The extent to which local government is formally 0–3 0 local authorities can only perform mandated tasks
depth autonomous and can choose the tasks they want to 1 local authorities can choose from a very narrow, predefined scope of
perform tasks
Additional coding instructions: Whether a municipality is 2 local authorities are explicitly autonomous and can choose from a wide
responsible for the different tasks and/or has the scope of predefined tasks
financial resources is not the question here. Indeed, the 3 local authorities are free to take on any new tasks (residual
coding has to comply with the legal framework in the competencies) not assigned to other levels of government
respective countries. This means that the coding refers to
the status of the local government according to the
constitution and other relevant legislation; if there are
deeply contradictory regulations, this should be reflected
in the coding and also mentioned in the notes.
Policy scopea Range of functions (tasks) where local government is 0–4 Not at all, partly, fully responsible:
effectively involved in the delivery of the services (be it Education (0–2) Social assistance (0–2) Health (0–2)
through their own financial resources and/or through Land use (0–2) Public transport (0–1) Housing (0–1)
their own staff) Police (0–1) Caring functions (0–1)
Additional coding instructions: Here we want to
know whether the municipalities are involved in the
provision of these tasks and services. How much they
can decide is part of the next question. Half points
(0.5) can be used if local government is only partly
involved (i.e. below).
No, some, or real authoritative decision-making in:
Effective The extent to which local government has real influence 0–4
Education (0–2) Social assistance (0–2) Health (0–2)
political (can decide on service aspects) over these functions
Land use (0–2) Public transport (0–1) Housing (0–1)
discretiona Additional coding instructions: half points (0.5) can be
Police (0–1) Caring functions (0–1)
used if local government can only partly decide (i.e.
below).
(continued)
Self-rule index
Fiscal The extent to which local government can independently 0–4 0 local authorities do not set base and rate of any tax
autonomy tax its population 1 local authorities set base or rate of minor taxes
Additional coding instructions: For this dimension the 2 local authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate,
level of contribution of the tax for local authorities value added, property or sales tax) under restrictions stipulated by higher
(how much the tax actually yields) has to be clarified levels of government
in the explanations. 3 local authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate,
value added, property or sales tax) with few or no restrictions
4 local authorities set base and rate of more than one major tax (personal
income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax)
Financial The proportion of unconditional financial transfers to 0–3 0 conditional transfers are dominant (unconditional = 0–40% of total
transfer system total financial transfers received by the local government transfers)
1 there is largely a balance between conditional and unconditional
financial transfers (unconditional = 40–60%)
2 unconditional financial transfers are dominant (unconditional = 60–80%)
3 nearly all transfers are unconditional (unconditional = 80–100%)
Financial The proportion of local government revenues derived 0–3 0 own sources yield less than 10% of total revenues
self-reliance from own/local sources (taxes, fees, charges) 1 own sources yield 10–25%
Additional coding instructions: A shared tax collected 2 own sources yield 25–50%
by central government and over which local 3 own sources yield more than 50%
government has no influence has to be regarded as
financial transfer. Please make a note in your country
report if this is the case.
(continued)
Self-rule index
Borrowing The extent to which local government can borrow 0–3 0 local authorities cannot borrow
autonomy 1 local authorities may borrow under prior authorisation by higher-level
governments and with one or more of the following restrictions:
a. Golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits)
b. No foreign borrowing or borrowing from the regional or central bank only
c. No borrowing above a ceiling, absolute level of subnational
indebtedness, maximum debt-service ratio for new borrowing or debt
brake mechanism
d. Borrowing is limited to specific purposes
2 local authorities may borrow without prior authorisation and under one
or more of (a), (b), (c) or (d)
3 local authorities may borrow without restriction imposed by higher-level
authorities
Organisational The extent to which local government is free to decide 0–4 Local executive and election system:
autonomy about its own organisation and electoral system 0 local executives are appointed by higher-level authorities and local
authorities cannot determine core elements of their political systems
(electoral districts, number of seats, electoral system)
1 executives are elected by the municipal council or directly by citizens
2 executives are elected by the citizens or the council and the municipality
may decide some elements of the electoral system
Staff and local structures:
Local authorities:
Hire their own staff (0–0.5) Fix the salary of their
employees (0–0.5)
Choose their organisational structure Establish legal entities and
(0–0.5) municipal enterprises (0–0.5)
Self-rule 0–28 The overall self-rule enjoyed by local government in X country (the sum
of all the indicators above)
(continued)
Interactive rule index
Legal protection Existence of constitutional or legal means 0–3 0 no legal remedy for the protection of local autonomy exists
to assert local autonomy 1 constitutional clauses or other statutory regulations protect local
This dimension is related to the § 4.1 self-government
and 11 in the European Charter of Local 2 local authorities have recourse to the judicial system to settle disputes with
Self-Government higher authorities (e.g. through constitutional courts, administrative courts
or tribunals or ordinary courts)
3 remedies of types 1 and 2 above, plus other means that protect local
autonomy such as, for example, listing of all municipalities in the
constitution or the impossibility to force them to merge
Administrative Unobtrusive administrative supervision of 0–3 0 administrative supervision reviews legality as well as merits/expediency of
supervision local government municipal decisions
This dimension is related to the § 8 in 1 administrative supervision covers details of accounts and spending priorities
the European Charter of Local 2 administrative supervision only aims at ensuring compliance with law
Self-Government (legality of local decisions)
3 there is very limited administrative supervision
Central or regional To what extent local authorities are 0–3 0 local authorities are never consulted by higher-level governments, and
access consulted to influence higher-level there are no formal mechanisms of representation
governments’ policy-making 1 local authorities are consulted and/or have access to higher-level
decision-making through formal representation but influence is limited
2 local authorities are regularly consulted through permanent consultation
channels and have substantial influence
3 local authorities are either consulted or have access to higher-level
decision-making through formal representation and substantial influence
Interactive rule 0–9 The overall interactive rule enjoyed by local government in X country (the
sum of all the three indicators above)
LA 0–37 The combined autonomy of local authorities (the sum of all indicators)
a
Note: See additional instructions
68 A. LADNER ET AL.
Additional Coding Instructions
Policy Scope (0–4)

Range of functions (tasks) where local government is effectively involved
in the delivery of the services (be it through their own financial resources
and/or through their own staff).
You can use half points (0.5) if local government is only partly involved;
this also applies for the different items in education, social assistance,
health and land use planning.
Education Refers to primary + 1 point if the local government is fully

(0–2) education responsible for the construction and/or the
maintenance of school buildings
+ 1 point if the local government is fully
responsible for teachers’ employment and
payment
Social Refers to economic and +1 point if the local government is fully
assistance other help to destitute responsible for providing poverty relief
(0–2) people (“poverty relief”); + 1 points if the local government is fully
social insurance (e.g. responsible for other social security/
unemployment benefits) protection services
is excluded
Health (0–2) Refers to primary health + 1 point if the local government is fully
services responsible for the construction and/or the
maintenance of clinics or health centres (not
hospitals or specialised health services)
responsible for doctors’ employment and
payment
Land use Refers to building + 1 point if the local government is fully
(0–2) permits and zoning responsible for administering building
permits
responsible for administering zoning
Public Refers to public transport 1 point if the local government is fully
transport services (not roads, responsible for public transport services
(0–1) streets, street lights, etc.) (0.5 point if the local government is partly
responsible for public transport services)
Housing Refers to housing and 1 point if the local government is fully
(0–1) town development responsible for housing and town
development
(0.5 point if the local government is partly
responsible for housing and town
development)
Police (0–1) Refers to traffic police 1 point if the local government is fully
and public order police responsible for police
(0.5 point if the local government is partly
responsible for police)
Caring Refers to kindergartens, 1 point if the local government is fully
functions services for the elderly or responsible for delivering caring functions
(0–1) handicapped people, etc. (0.5 point if the local government is partly
responsible for delivering caring functions)
Effective Political Discretion (0–4)

The extent to which local government has real influence (can decide on
service aspects) over these functions.
You can use half points (0.5) if local government can only partly decide,
this also applies for the different items in education, social assistance,
health and land use planning.
Education Refers to primary education + 1 point if the local government can

(0–2) decide on the number and location
of schools
+ 1 point if the local government can
decide on teachers’ employment
and payment
Social Refers to economic and other help + 1 point if the local government can
assistance to destitute people (“poverty decide on whether an individual
(0–2) relief”); social insurance (e.g. receives financial relief or not
unemployment benefits) is + 1 point if the local government can
excluded decide on the level of assistance a
person receives
Health (0–2) Refers to primary health services + 1 point if local government can
decide on the construction and/or
the maintenance of health centres
(not hospitals or specialised health
services)
+ 1 point if local government can
decide on the organisation and
functioning of specialised health
centres
Land use Refers to building permits and + 1 point if the local government can
(0–2) zoning decide on building permits
+ 1 point if the local government can
decide on zoning
70 A. LADNER ET AL.
Public Refers to public transport services 1 point if the local government can
transport (not roads, streets, street lights, fully decide on range and level of
(0–1) etc.) public transport services offered
(0.5 point if the local government
can partly decide on range and level
of public transport services
offered)
Housing Refers to housing and town 1 point if the local government can
(0–1) development fully decide on housing and town
development
can partly decide on housing and
town development)
Police (0–1) Refers to police traffic and public 1 point if the local government can
order police decide on public order police
services
can decide on traffic police services)
Caring Refers to kindergartens, services 0.5 point if the local government can
functions for the elderly or handicapped fully decide on the level of caring
(0–1) people and so on functions offered
can partly decide on the level of
caring functions offered)
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PART II
Towards the Local Autonomy Index

CHAPTER 3
Legal Foundations
3.1 Introduction: The Long Route of Local

Autonomy in the European Legal Discourse
Right from the beginning of modern nation states, questions about the
legal status of local autonomies emerged. While Sieyes pledged a radical
territorial reform with “grandes communes” (which later on were estab-
lished as 720 districts—subdivisions of departments, not as municipali-
ties), Thouret had already presented his idea of “pouvoir municipal” in
September 1789. The “communes” would be the first unity in the sequence
of representation that escalated up to the “legislature” and at the same
time the last unit in the sequence of executive power (Brunet 2004: 193).
Pretty soon, these views were abandoned and centralist approaches pre-
vailed, since the “one and indivisible” nation should have one unitary
executive machinery that included municipalities as local agents which
were considered to be creation of the state and were subjects of the strict
“tutelle” expedience supervision regime, just as minors were kept under
the tutelage of their father and “natives” under the tutelage of the colonial
administration.
A few years later in Prussia, the reforms of Freiherr v. Stein (1808)
focused on municipal “civicness” and on voluntary engagement of citizens
in municipal affairs (“bürgerschaftliche Selbstverwaltung”). Stein’s percep-
tion of local government placed the participation of citizens (from higher

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_3
78 A. LADNER ET AL.
classes) at the epicentre of modern local administration (Preuss 1906: 26,

35). After the restoration of Monarchy in France and elsewhere, ideas
favouring decentralisation and various concepts of “pouvoir municipal”
emerged once more, which was also promoted by Comte (1767–1830),
an exponent figure among intellectuals theorising constitutional Monarchy,
through his vision of a “new type of federalism” and decentralisation of
powers to elected municipal councils (Constant 1872).
In Southern Germany, liberal ideas prevailed and v. Rotteck (Aretin and
Rotteck 1828: 22, 36), for instance, rejected the idea that local govern-
ments would be “state institutions” (“Staatsanstalten”) and promoted the
concept of local community as a kind of “aggregate” or “cumulative”
personality (“Gesamtpersönlichkeit”) of its citizens that would at the same
time be the sum and an extension of individual personalities. Therefore,
local communities would not be parts of the executive state power, more-
over they should be legally protected against the state, enjoy rights and
bear obligations as a union of individual citizens. After the revolution of
1848, these ideas also prevailed in the liberal Frankfurt Constitution of St.
Paul’s Church of 28 March 1849, where paragraph 184 (Art. XI, as part
of the section VI “The fundamental rights of the German people”)
enshrined the “right” of the municipalities for “independent administra-
tion” of their home affairs.
The English model of “self-government” had influenced debates on
local autonomy in continental Europe. In Germany, v. Gneist (Gneist
1869), stressed the value of an honorary municipal office which should be
held by upper social strata (“obrigkeitliche Selbstverwaltung”), enjoying the
confidence of state power and acting on behalf of state administration. Even
though ideas about local governance through “notables” were quite wide-
spread in Europe, the rise of new social classes and trade unions moved the
legal discourse, once more, towards the fundamental questions about local
autonomy. Tönnies distinguished the community (Gemeinschaft) from the
association (Gesellschaft). Whilst the first is a natural entity (the family, the
neighbourhood, the village), the second (the company, the city, the state) is
an artificial creation serving specific and rational purposes, for example,
profit or security (Tönnies 1887). Von Gierke’s “Genossenschaftslehre”
(“doctrine of cooperatives”) perceived the municipalities as creatures of
social dynamics with their own original legal personality (Von Gierke 1873:
714, 759), but at the same time Von Gierke categorised local governments
as “territorial corporations” (“Gebietskörperschaften”) just as he did with
the state. In France, Duguit used the similar term “territorial community”
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 79
(“communauté territoriale”), but his notion did not refer primarily to legal
persons (as in the case by Von Gierke) but to territorially defined societies
(Duguit 1903). In Italy, the legal theorist Romano saw in the social body
(corpo sociale) the sociological substratum of an institution, that is, of a
legal order, including subnational authorities. But at the same time,
Romano perceived the municipalities as rudimentary territorial entities (“enti
ausiliarii”) articulating a kind of indirect state administration and follow-
ing targets which constituted parts of major state targets (Romano 1908).
In the late decades of the nineteenth century, many cities in different
parts of Europe were increasingly interventionist in developing technical
and social infrastructures, while the ideas of “fabian” and municipal
“socialism” became popular in several countries (Mc Briar 1966). Later
on, Hugo Preuss elaborated a “scaled” system of territorial corporations
beginning with the municipalities, then with the counties, the Lander and,
finally the German Reich. His ideal was the “people’s state” (“Volksstaat”),
where the democratic principle would be combined with the principle of
self-government at more levels, thus creating not only a mechanism of
“multiple legitimacy” for democratic power but also a system of vertical
checks and balances (Schefold 1993: 419).
After World War I, the victory of constitutionalism in Europe did not
necessarily strengthen the position of local self-government, even though
in several European countries the new constitutions included provisions
that were supposed to protect local autonomies. In the Weimar Republic,
for instance, the theory about the constitutional norms with a guideline
character emerged (Anschütz 1921: 269, 301), including norms and prin-
ciples about the organisation of public administration. Organisational and
functional aspects of public administration would, therefore, be at the dis-
position of parliamentary legislators who enjoy “a very wide discretion”
when they regulate such matters. This doctrine paved the way for national
state interventionism at the cost of local autonomies, while in some
authoritarian regimes, municipalities were downgraded to “service provid-
ers” whose main task would be to ensure the well-functioning of modern
infrastructure and elementary services that were necessary for the well-
being of the population (“Daseinsvorsorge”: Forsthoff 1938).
Opposite to the “guidelines” doctrine was the theory about the institu-
tional guarantees of the constitution that was first presented by Carl
Schmitt (Schmitt 1928) and then further elaborated and adopted by the
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany after the war. According to this
theory, institutions of fundamental importance are actively protected by
80 A. LADNER ET AL.
the constitution, and the state legislation is not allowed to alter their
essential characteristics and infringe their core. Any legal restriction that
would not touch the core of this institution should nevertheless respect
the proportionality principle, which means that adopted measures should
be necessary, adequate and not exceed the measure of their target.1 The
institutional guarantee for local self-government in Art. 28 of the
Fundamental Law would be twofold: First an existential “subjective”
guarantee for the institutional type of municipality (but not for every sin-
gle municipality) and, second, an “objective” institutional guarantee that
would include the principle of “universal” competence for home affairs of
the local community (a kind of “general competence”), the principle of
own responsibility and the guarantee of legal position (or legal protection)
that is also realised through a special constitutional remedy (“kommunale
Verfassungsbeschwerde”).
In France, the Constitutional Council adopted the organisational
notion of territorial decentralisation, which meant that a local society,
recognised as such by the state, would be organised as a legal person and
integrated into the administrative machinery, while it would be governed
by assemblies elected by universal suffrage. A distinct principle would be
that of “free administration” which means that the territorial community
or collectivity must have an elected body which concentrates “substan-
tial” competence and responsibility. The doctrine of “local liberties” is
obviously defensive towards the state, and the French municipal law
adopted the principle of “general competence” in favour of local govern-
ment. According to the French legal doctrine, the principle of free admin-
istration (“libre administration”), as mentioned in Arts. 34 and 72 of the
constitution, is the key constitutional concept of local autonomy. This
concept has allowed the Constitutional Council to produce a creative
case law, since procedures adopted in 2009 allow a litigant in any ordi-
nary suit to claim that a law violates the constitution and should therefore
be examined for conformity by the Constitutional Court (the “constitu-
tionality question”). This has been used by many local governments,
often with success, to contest laws that had been in force for a long time
(Faure 2014).
This (selective) review of the evolution of legal theory on local auton-
omy in Europe shows that many constitutive elements of the legal
framework enshrined in the European Charter of Local Self-Government
1
BVerfGE 23, 353.
have been the subject of legal discourse for many decades. In fact, they are
parts of the so-called common European “legal culture” which was gradu-
ally elaborated and promoted in large part through the European consti-
tutionalist movements and sometimes through the “unspoken dialogue”
between the high courts of different European countries. This common
legacy is reflected in the provisions of the European Charter, which was
gradually adopted by all member states of the Council of Europe (47
countries) and offers a common base and a point of reference for any kind
of comparative effort on the topic of local autonomy. The different vari-
ables used in the codebook of local autonomy correspond to a great extent
with provisions of the European Charter. Therefore, this chapter will also
take advantage of selected findings from monitoring reports conducted by
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (CLRA) on the imple-
mentation of the European Charter in different European states (Council
of Europe 2017), in order to cross-check the findings of the local auton-
omy experts’ assessment. Since the aforementioned monitoring reports
have located European Charter of Local Self-Government violations
mostly in countries with rule of law deficits and/or centralist inertia
(Council of Europe 2017), it is expected that inconsistencies between reg-
istered local autonomy’s scores and the corresponding results of CLRA
reports will be mostly found in such cases (first hypothesis: H.1).
Scores of the following “legalist” variables of local autonomy reflect
different choices of the national legal frameworks for the corresponding
legal aspects of local autonomy. Since the European Charter sets mini-
mum standards for local government status, it is expected that cross-
country deviation of these legalist variables will not be particularly strong
(H.2), compared for instance with variables reflecting financial aspects
who account for the most important cross-country contrasts (Ladner et al.
2016: 347). In older democracies, where the legal status of local govern-
ment has been consolidated since several years, it is not expected to find
major changes in legalist variables over time, with the exception of vari-
ables affected by decentralisation and constitutional reforms (H.3). On
the contrary, countries that have undergone democratic transition are
expected to show remarkable changes over time, especially in the early
democratisation period and the years prior to EU accession/association
(H.4). Considerable changes are also expected in countries particularly
affected by the economic crisis (H.5).
The following parts, this chapter will look at the legal elements of local
autonomy in the light of the corresponding findings and the CLRA
82 A. LADNER ET AL.
reports. In the final part, eventual correlations among these elements will
be checked, before conclusions are drawn.
3.2 Legal Elements of Local Autonomy

In the introductory chapter of this book, following Clark (1984), some
legal elements of local autonomy were identified: Firstly the right of exis-
tence and the right to decide upon territorial boundaries, secondly the
formal distribution of competence, thirdly the range of formal supervision
and fourthly the formal existence of constitutional or legal means to pro-
tect local autonomy. Following, in principle, this approach, this chapter
will focus on the right of existence and on measures included in the legalist
approach and the legal framework dimension (see Chap. 1): These are the
institutional depth (ID), the effective policy discretion (EPD), the admin-
istrative supervision (AS—shortly analysed here, since there is a special
chapter on administrative supervision) and the legal protection (LP).
These four measures reflect defensive legal safeguards and active legal pos-
sibilities offered by the legal framework to local government, while they
seem to outline local autonomy as it is legally defined.
3.2.1 The Existence of Local Government and the Protection

of Territorial Boundaries
The right of existence for local governments can be enshrined in the legisla-
tion and/or in the constitution. According to art. 2 of the European Charter,
written national law should ensure that “the principle of local self-govern-
ment shall be recognised in domestic legislation; and where practicable in
the constitution” (see Box 3.1). This provision of the European Charter of
Local Self-Government means that it is desirable to include the principle of
local self-government in the fundamental text governing the organisation of
the state, the constitution. In some cases, however, recognition of this prin-
ciple in “ordinary” domestic legislation would be sufficient, since a constitu-
tional amendment follows complicated procedures, while elsewhere there is
no written constitution. Finally, in some federal countries, local government
is regulated by the federal states, and the European Charter of Local Self-
Government should not affect this division of powers.
In most member states of the Council of Europe, the principle of local
self-government is enshrined in the constitution. In recent years, important
constitutional changes strengthening local government were introduced in
Box 3.1: European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 2,

Constitutional and Legal Foundation of Local Self-Government
The principle of local self-government shall be recognised in domes-
tic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution.
several countries like Armenia (2005), France (2003, 2008), Greece

(2001), Italy (2001), Sweden (2011), Georgia (2010, 2018) and elsewhere
(Council of Europe 2017).2
In some countries, compulsory mergers are not allowed (see the part on
“legal protection” in this chapter). In general, however, constitutional and
legal safeguards for the existence of local government do not necessarily
entail a guarantee for the existence of each and every single local govern-
ment. Even if local government is primarily perceived as a collective free-
dom of citizens according to liberal legal doctrines (see above for the
Frankfurt constitution of 1848), most states claim for themselves the power
to decide upon administrative borders and territories of local governments.
Therefore, the European Charter of Local Self-Government does not rule
out compulsive amalgamations, but it demands “prior consultation with
the local communities concerned” (Council of Europe 1985: art. 5).
3.2.2 The Formal Distribution of Competence and Discretion

in Decision-Making
The legal principle of local government does entail, of course, competence for
a “substantial share of public affairs” (Council of Europe 1985: art. 3, §1). In
several national constitutions, competence of local authorities is defined as
primary responsibility for “local”, “home”, or “own” affairs (Council of
Europe 2017). These are, however, vague and flexible notions which are dif-
ficult to interpret, while relevant legal views differ, often following distinct
2
It is worth mentioning that the “no” vote in the Italian constitutional referendum of
December 2016 also blocked amendments on regional autonomy and on the abolition of
provinces. In 2012 abolition of provinces had been approved by referendum in Sardinia, but
finally in January 2014 the Sardinian Regional Administrative Court had declared “unconsti-
tutional” the abolition of eight provinces in Sardinia.
84 A. LADNER ET AL.
national traditions. But even the very content, the procedures and the instru-
ments of certain tasks can strongly deviate alongside national contexts and
different sectors, as well as understandings about their relative importance.
Each policy area has its own institutional substrate, its own meaning system,
paths and networks. Therefore, devolution has essentially an asymmetrical
character (Palermo and Kössler 2017: 57). Finally, there is the fact that in
reality most affairs have both local and national implications and responsibility
may be shared between different levels of government and vary over time:
Indeed, a neat compartmentalisation of authority is a model that barely exists
in reality, while reform experience in various countries has shown that decen-
tralisation usually entails a move from complete central dominance to joint
involvement and shared rule (Rodden 2004: 486, 494). Moreover, decen-
tralisation has proven to be an unstable and sometimes reversible process
(Palermo and Kössler 2017: 56).
Therefore, the measure of policy scope (PS) is not reliable as a legal
determinant of local autonomy. After all, PS refers to the “range of func-
tions (tasks) where local government is effectively involved”, and involve-
ment in task fulfilment does not necessarily include autonomy in
decision-making. On the contrary, the measure of institutional depth
(ID) does make a statement about the legal foundation of local govern-
ment competence since it catches the extent to which local governments
are legally entitled to choose the tasks they want to perform. These pos-
sibilities for local choices can better match territorially varied preferences
of citizens, turn them into local policies and make a democratically more
efficient use of public resources at the local level (Oates 1972; Dahl and
Tufte 1973; Rodden 2004). Local governments should be able to
respond to distinct community priorities, including the opportunity to
take on new tasks (or even leave some obsolete ones) in response to local
specificities and to the evolution of local needs and citizens’ preferences
over time.
Actually, local authorities that “can only perform mandated tasks” (zero
score of the ID variable, see Table 3.1) would not be considered as self-
government entities, according to the European Charter of Local Self-
Government: Apart from art. 2 of the European Charter on the legal
foundation of the principle of local government, a legal system where local
authorities are mere agents of execution on behalf of the state would also
violate art. 4 par. 2 and par. 3 of the European Charter (see Box 3.2).
Concerning the legal right of local authorities to take initiative on mat-
ters not excluded from their competence, national legal traditions range

Concept of Local Self-Government
§2. Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local
authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage
a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibil-
ity and in the interests of the local population.
from the “ultra vires” principle (or Dillon’s Rule) that demands a statu-
tory basis for any action of local government3 to the “general compe-
tence” clause4 for municipalities in France and elsewhere or the
“Aufgabenerfindungsrecht” in Germanic legal systems. In fact, many
countries have adopted the so-called clause of general competence for
local authorities which can also be combined with the subsidiarity princi-
ple described in the next paragraph (4.3) of the European Charter.
According to the findings of the CLRA monitoring reports, seven coun-
tries were found violating art. 4.2, while the same was found in six coun-
tries (Council of Europe 2017) for art. 4.3 (Greece, Ireland, Latvia,
Lithuania being among them for both norms).
3
The Supreme Court of the United States adopted Dillon’s emphasis on state power over
municipalities in Hunter v. Pittsburgh, (207 U.S. 161/1907) which upheld the power of
Pennsylvania to consolidate the city of Allegheny into the city of Pittsburgh, despite the
objections of a majority of Allegheny’s residents. The Court’s ruling that states could alter or
abolish at will the charters of municipal corporations without infringing upon contract rights
relied upon Dillon’s distinction between public, municipal corporations and private ones.
4
Contrary to Dillon’s Rule was the Cooley Doctrine in the United States, or the doctrine
of home rule, which expressed the liberal theory of an inherent right to local self-determina-
tion. Michigan Supreme Court Judge Thomas M. Cooley in 1871 stated, in a concurring
opinion that “local government is a matter of absolute right; and the state cannot take it
away” (People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich 44, 95; 1871). Dillon’s work Municipal Corporations
was published just one year later (1872). Dillon argued that in contrast to the powers of
states, which are unlimited except in the case of explicit restrictions under the state or federal
constitution, municipalities only have the powers that are expressly granted to them by the
state legislature, those that are necessarily implied from that grant of power and those that
are essential and indispensable to the municipality’s existence and functioning. Any eventual
ambiguities in the legislative grant of power should be resolved against the municipality so
that its powers are narrowly construed. Only when the state has not specifically directed the
method by which the municipality may implement its granted power, the municipality has
the discretion to choose the method so long as its choice is reasonable.
86 A. LADNER ET AL.
Table 3.1 Institutional depth (ID)—operationalisation/coding

Institutional The extent to which local government is 0–3 0 local authorities can
depth formally autonomous and can choose the only perform
tasks they want to perform mandated tasks
Additional coding instructions: 1 local authorities can
Whether a municipality is responsible choose from a very
for the different tasks and/or has the narrow, predefined
financial resources is not the question scope of tasks
here. Indeed, the coding has to comply 2 local authorities are
with the legal framework in the explicitly autonomous
respective countries. This means that and can choose from a
the coding refers to the status of local wide scope of
government according to the predefined tasks
constitution and other relevant 3 local authorities are
legislation; if there are deeply free to take on any
contradictory regulations, this should new tasks (residual
be reflected in the coding and also competencies) not
mentioned in the notes. assigned to other
levels of government
3.2.2.1 Institutional Depth (ID)

The institutional depth (ID) variable ranges between “local authorities
can only perform mandated tasks” and “local authorities with residual
competences” (see Table 3.1), which means that they are free to take on
any new tasks not assigned to higher levels. This indicator thus contrasts
municipalities which are mere agents of execution and municipalities with
residual competences.
Taken altogether, the ID value is quite high with an overall mean of
2.27 on a scale from 0 to 3. Since 1990, it has increased from 2 to 2.5 in
2014. The strongest increase took place between 1999 and 2003 (see
Fig. 3.1), a period where several Central and Eastern (CE) European
countries were preparing to join the EU and most ex-communist coun-
tries ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government.5
5
Albania ratified it on 4 April 2000, with entry into force on 1 August 2000; Armenia
ratified it on 25 January 2002 and the European Charter of Local Self-Government entered
into force on 1 May 2002; Azerbaijan ratified it on 15 April 2002. The European Charter
of Local Self-Government entered into force with respect to Azerbaijan on 1 August 2002;
Bosnia and Herzegovina ratified the European Charter on 12 July, and the instrument
came into force on 1 November 2002; Bulgaria ratified it on 10 May 1995, it came into
force with respect to Bulgaria on 1 September 1995; Croatia ratified and it entered into
force on 19 September 1997; The Czech Republic ratified it on 7 May 1999 with entry into
force on 1 September 1999; Estonia ratified it on 16 December 1994, it came into force
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Fig. 3.1 Institutional depth (ID)—overall trend. (Note: For Albania, Latvia,
Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990; the first years of measure-
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively)
In 22 countries the ID value did not change at all, while in seven coun-
tries there were only minor changes since 1990 (Ladner et al. 2016a).
These findings mostly refer to Western European countries where the ID
value remained stable, even though their local government systems had
with respect to Estonia on 1 April 1995; Georgia ratified it on 8 December 2004 with entry
into force on 1 April 2005; Hungary ratified the European Charter on 21 March 1994,
which came into force on 1 July 1994; Latvia ratified the European Charter on 5 December
1996, and it came into force on 1 April 1997; Lithuania ratified it on 22 June 1999, with
entry into force on 1 October 1999; Moldova ratified it on 2 October 1997, and it entered
into force on 1 February 1998; the FY Republic of Macedonia ratified it on 6 June 1997,
and it entered into force on 1 October 1997; Montenegro ratified it on 12 September
2008; Poland ratified it on 22 November 1993, and it entered into force on 1 March 1994;
Romania ratified European Charter on 28 January 1998, which came into force on 1 May
1998; the Russian Federation ratified European Charter which came into force for Russia
on 1 September 1998; Serbia ratified it on 6 September 2007, and it came into force on 1
January 2008; Slovakia signed the European Charter on 23 February 1999 and ratified it
on 1 February 2000; Slovenia signed the European Charter on 11 October 1994 and rati-
fied it on 15 November 1996; Ukraine signed the European Charter on 6 November 1996
and ratified it on 11 September 1997, with entry into force on 1 January 1998 (Council of
Europe 2017: Appendix 3).
88 A. LADNER ET AL.
undergone several reforms and changes within the same time frame
(Kersting and Vetter 2003; Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016). Italy was an
exception, due to the constitutional amendment of 2001 that launched
the new title V, introducing a general competence and the subsidiarity
principle (especially art. 114, 117 and 118).6 Spectacular increase of the
ID value was mainly found in Eastern European countries, more specifi-
cally in Slovenia, Bulgaria and Albania, while Macedonia (after the Ohrid
agreement in 2001)7 and Georgia (after the constitutional amendment of
2010) also experienced a considerable increase (Ladner et al. 2016a). On
the contrary, Spain was the only case of a considerable decrease, due to
re-centralisation tendencies after the crisis (see Fig. 3.2).8
In 2014, no less than 23 countries had reached the highest score of the ID
variable (see Table 3.4 in the Appendix). It seems that the common standards
of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (art. 4.2 “general com-
petence”) and of the EU led to a remarkable level of legal harmonisation. It
is worth mentioning that Austria reaches the highest ID score even though it
had declared not to be bound by art. 4.2 of the Chapter, while Latvia and
Lithuania, also reaching the highest ID score, were found not to comply with
art. 4. 2 according to the CLRA monitoring reports. These findings were
due to state practices of overriding local decisions and to national overregula-
tion. Also in Sweden, these reports found that the significantly increased
6
These principles were further specified, among alia, in Legge Cost. 3/2001 and Legge
131/2003. Before the reforms of 2001 (which were implemented for a large part in 2003),
the functions of municipalities were defined by national laws on the basis of the principles of
the 1947 Constitution.
7
In Georgia, considerable progress has been made through the Constitutional amend-
ments adopted in October 2010. The new Chapter 7(1), significantly strengthens and pro-
vides, inter alia, independence and autonomy of local self-government, stipulating the types
of local government competences (introducing a distinction between own and delegated
powers) and the execution of these competences. Furthermore, in 2014 a new organic law
for local government was issued. Finally, in March 2018, a new amendment introduced a
new Chapter 9 including three new articles on local self-government. Inter alia, the new
provisions introduced more detailed regulations on local elections, furthermore a general
obligation of state authorities to make decisions on issues related to local government in
consultation to self-governing units.
8
Law 27/2103 on the rationalisation and the sustainability of local administration had
reduced the list of compulsory services municipalities had to provide and eliminated the
previous residual clause that granted local governments a general capacity to act. This law
was challenged as anti-constitutional, and finally, the Constitutional Court of Spain (Tribunal
Constitucional. Sentencia 09-06-2016) declared some provisions of this law to be anti-con-
stitutional. The court ruled, inter alia, that the state can allocate competence when it has the
constitutional power to regulate the corresponding sector. If this power belongs to the
autonomous communities (regions) then a state law cannot interfere and define territorial
responsibilities (in this case it was social and health assistance).
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Turkey
Romania*
Serbia
Hungary
France
Belgium
Luxembourg
Italy
Austria
Denmark
Iceland
Norway
Albania*
Finland
Germany
Latvia*
Netherlands
Malta*
Greece
Slovakia
Moldova
Georgia
Spain
Poland
Macedonia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Liechtenstein
Ukraine*
Ireland
Sweden
Switzerland
Croatia
Estonia
Lithuania
Portugal
Cyprus
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
-0.5
-1.0
mean value (1990-2014) changes 1990-2014
Fig. 3.2 Institutional depth (ID)—development in the different countries.

(Note: *For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for
1990; the first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991,
respectively)
amount of detailed state regulations for local-level activities may carry the risk
of infringement on local affairs (Council of Europe 2017). In this way, it has
been made clear that even in countries with high ID scores, state practices of
overregulation can undermine local autonomy. This danger is, of course,
much bigger in countries where municipalities can only choose among a very
limited range of activities. This is especially the case with some states follow-
ing English law traditions (like the United Kingdom, Ireland and Cyprus)
where local governments’ rights were formally restricted by the “ultra vires”
principle, which meant that they could execute only functions allocated to
them directly by the law.9
9
In the United Kingdom, under the Local Government Act 2000, councils have a general
power to “promote economic, social and environmental well-being” of their area. However,
like all public bodies, they were limited by the doctrine of ultra vires and could only do things
that common law or an Act of Parliament specifically or generally allowed for. Councils could
promote Local Acts of Parliament to grant them special powers. Nevertheless, the Local
Government Act of 2000 altered a key sanction against ultra vires actions: The provision that
enabled councillors to be punished personally for having supported a decision classified as
ultra vires and liable to refund money spent illegally has been abolished. Later on, Localism
Act 2011 introduced a new “general power of competence” for local authorities, extending
90 A. LADNER ET AL.
3.2.2.2 Effective Political Discretion (EPD)

Independent local decision-making on various aspects of local govern-
ment tasks is definitely one of the core elements of local autonomy.
Democratically elected local governments take political responsibility for
decisions they can be held accountable for. Extensive regulation by higher
levels of governance often imposes restrictions on discretionary powers of
local authorities. Moreover, effective deciding on aspects of the services
delivered by local government is not only a matter of legal authority but a
complex function including the available financial and human resources,
leadership and managerial skills and other capacities. Legal authority for
independent local decision-making is, however, the keystone for effective
political discretion. Therefore, the aspects of discretion and local respon-
sibility in decision-making are mentioned in several paragraphs of the
European Charter (see Box 3.2).
The hydra of overlapping responsibilities is the subject of paragraph 4 of
art. 4: Powers of local authorities should normally be full and exclusive
(see Box 3.3). This is also a prerequisite for effective policy discretion.
Decrease of local autonomy could also stem from obligatory, multipurpose
inter-municipal cooperation that restricts political discretion of member
Box 3.3: European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 4, Scope

of Local Self-Government
§4. Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full and

exclusive. They may not be undermined or limited by another,
central or regional, authority except as provided for by the law.
§5. Where powers are delegated to them by a central or regional
authority, local authorities shall, insofar as possible, be allowed
discretion in adapting their exercise to local conditions.
the “well-being” power with the power to “do anything that individuals generally may do”.
This means, in effect, that nothing otherwise lawful that a local authority may wish to do can
be ultra vires. As of 2013 this general power of competence is available to all principal local
authorities and some parish councils. However, it has not been extensively used. The same
applies for Cyprus, where the ultra vires principle had already been abolished by law in 1985
for municipalities and in 1999 for rural communities, but local government restrained from
taking full advantage of it.
municipalities.10 Complementary action by other levels of authority should

not undermine local discretion (see art. 5, §5 in Box 3.3). According to
pertinent monitoring reports and recommendations of CLRA, however,
this is one of the most frequently violated paragraphs of the European
Charter of Local Self-Government (Council of Europe 2017), confirming
previous empirical findings about the prevalence of shared authority
(Rodden 2004: 486).
Within the framework of this project, the composite variable of EPD has
been used in order to measure whether local government has real influence
and can decide on service aspects of seven different functions (see Table 3.2).
The mean value for EPD was found to be 1.93 on a scale from 0 to 4,
which is definitely lower than the mean value for the precedent legal mea-
sure of local autonomy, namely, ID that reached a mean of 2.27 on a scale
from 0 to 3 (see Fig. 3.3).
Table 3.2 Effective political discretion (EPD)—operationalisation/coding

Effective The extent to 0–4 No, some, or real authoritative decision-making in:
political which local Education (0–2) Social (0–2) Health (0–2)
discretion government assistance
has real Land use (0–2) Public (0–1) Housing (0–1)
influence (can transport
decide on Police (0–1) Caring (0–1)
service aspects) functions
over these
functions
Additional
coding
instructions:
half points
(0.5) can be
used if local
government
can only partly
decide
10
Apparently, this is also a reason why the French Republic declared that, in accordance
with Art. 13, the authorities to which the European Charter of Local Self-Government
applies are the territorial authorities which are named in Arts. 72, 73, 74 and in Chapter XIII
of the French Constitution or which are created on those bases. The French Republic there-
fore considers that the public establishments of inter-municipal cooperation, which are not
territorial authorities, are excluded from the scope of application of the European Charter of
Local Self-Government.
92 A. LADNER ET AL.
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Fig. 3.3 Effective political discretion (EPD)—overall trend. (Note: For Albania,
Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990; the first years of
measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively)
Among the different countries, variation of EPD scores is much higher

in comparison to the previous ID scores, which is not surprising since
EPD is a composite variable (see Chap. 4). Moreover, EPD would accu-
rately reflect national peculiarities in the corresponding policy fields, while
ID is a proxy for widely accepted legal standards. Compared to ID scores,
EPD scores were less stable over the time period 1990–2014 (only in
eight countries there was no change, compared to 22 in EPD), since there
were various decentralisation reforms and quite a few cases of re-
centralisation (nine cases of EPD decrease). The most remarkable changes
occurred, once again, in former communist countries, especially in the
Czech Republic where EPD spectacularly increased after the velvet revolu-
tion, but also in Romania, the Slovak Republic, Albania and Poland. There
was also considerable increase in Iceland and Greece where major local
government reforms were implemented (Ladner et al. 2016a). Decreasing
scores were registered in Italy where EPD was affected by reforms in
important policy fields (in health in 1993 and in education and public
transport in 1999), and also in Slovenia in the early 1990s since the previ-
ous self-management regime was abandoned (see Fig. 3.4 and Table 3.5
in the Appendix).
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
Romania*
Turkey
Serbia
France
Hungary
Luxembourg
Greece
Iceland
Slovakia
Ireland
Finland
Latvia*
Macedonia
Austria
Georgia
Albania*
Malta*
Poland
Denmark
Italy
Netherlands
Ukraine*
Moldova
Estonia
Germany
Spain
Sweden
Slovenia
Norway
Bulgaria
Croatia
Belgium
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Portugal
Switzerland
Cyprus
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
-1.00
-2.00
mean value(1990-2014) changes 1990-2014
Fig. 3.4 Effective political discretion (EPD)—development in the different

countries. (Note: *For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no
data for 1990; the first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and
1991, respectively)
3.2.3 Administrative Supervision of Local Authorities’

Activities
The extent to which municipalities are subject to administrative supervision
(AS) also affects the autonomy of local government. Art. 8 of the European
Charter expects supervision normally to be concerned with the legality of
local decisions (their compliance with legal regulations). Supervision beyond
the legality of decisions (expediency) is a strong restriction of local auton-
omy; therefore it should be an exception. In any case, supervision should
respect the principle of proportionality, as a measure.
Within the framework of this study, the average value for all countries
is 1.79 (in a scale from 0 to 3) which is close to a form of supervision lim-
ited to ensuring compliance with the law. Most countries (25 cases) belong
to a type of “moderate” supervision. Moreover, the AS value has been
stable in most cases, since no (or extremely minimal) change was found in
28 countries (see Chap. 7). According to the CLRA monitoring reports,
most cases of infringement or partial compliance referred to expediency
controls or/and violations of the proportionality principle. Usually this
was found in former communist countries, even in some cases reaching
high AS scores like Estonia, for instance (Council of Europe 2017).
94 A. LADNER ET AL.
3.2.4 Formal Existence of Constitutional or Legal Means

to Protect Local Autonomy
Legal protection (LP) of local self-government is also the subject of a spe-
cial European Charter norm which focuses on judicial remedies, including
even extraordinary ones, such as applications for reopening of proceedings
(see Box 3.4). Recourse to a judicial remedy means access to a properly
constituted court of law or an equivalent, independent statutory body
having the power to rule and advise on the ruling, respectively, as to
whether any action, omission, decision or other administrative act is in
accordance with the law (see Fig. 3.5).
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
1995
1996
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Fig. 3.5 Legal protection (LP)—overall trend. (Note: For Albania, Latvia,
Box 3.4: European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 11, Legal

Protection of Local Self-Government
Local authorities shall have the right of recourse to a judicial remedy
in order to secure free exercise of their powers and respect for such
principles of local self-government as are enshrined in the constitu-
tion or domestic legislation.
As a measure of the local autonomy, LP steps beyond this article, since

it also includes additional legal safeguards, such as the listing of all local
governments in the constitution or the impossibility to force local authori-
ties to merge (individual right of existence) (see Table 3.3). However,
there are very few cases reaching this maximum level of legal protection,
and most of them are former communist countries (see Fig. 3.6).
Strengthening legal protection has been an important issue for the young
democracies: An impressive increase was recorded in Bulgaria after the 1991
Constitution and later on in Georgia after the 2010 Constitution (providing
direct recourse to the Constitutional court in Art. 89). Constitutional
reforms considerably increased LP scores also in W. Europe and more specifi-
cally in Spain since 1999 and in France since 2010, giving municipalities the
possibility to directly raise the constitutionality issue before the Tribunal
Constitucional and the Conseil Constitutionnel, respectively. The level of
legal protection, however, has been stable in the vast majority of countries,
since in 26 cases, no change was found in the time period under examination
(Ladner et al. 2016a). Cross-checking of the LP scores with the findings of
CLRA monitoring reports has shown, once more, important inconsistencies,
mostly in some ex-communist countries (including Bulgaria), where rule of
law deficits and state practices were violating art. 11 of the European Charter,
while in some countries with low LP score (e.g. in Sweden, Denmark), no
such infringement was found (Council of Europe 2017, see also Table 3.6 in
the Appendix).
Table 3.3 Legal protection (LP)—operationalisation/coding

Legal protection Existence of 0–3 0 no legal remedy for the
constitutional or legal protection of local autonomy exists
means to assert local 1 constitutional clauses or other
autonomy statutory regulations protect local
This dimension is self-government
related to the art. 4§1 2 local authorities have recourse to
and 11 in the the judicial system to settle disputes
European Charter of with higher authorities (e.g.
Local Self-Government through constitutional courts,
administrative courts or tribunals,
or ordinary courts)
3 remedies of types 1 and 2 above,
plus other means that protect local
autonomy such as e.g. listing of all
municipalities in the constitution or
the impossibility to force them to
merge
96 A. LADNER ET AL.
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Turkey
Serbia
Ireland
Hungary
France
Belgium
Iceland
Romania*
Greece
Luxembourg
Austria
Slovakia
Latvia*
Albania*
Georgia
Denmark
Bulgaria
Croatia
Moldova
Norway
Slovenia
Poland
Finland
Italy
Macedonia
Malta*
Netherlands
Liechtenstein
Spain
Estonia
Switzerland
Germany
United Kingdom
Ukraine*
Lithuania
Sweden
Portugal
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Fig. 3.6 Legal protection (LP)—development in the different countries. (Note:

*For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990; the
first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively)
3.3 Results and Conclusions

Legal elements of local autonomy became stronger, during the investigated
time period of 25 years (1990–2014). Among the four different legal ele-
ments of the codebook of local autonomy that were examined in this chap-
ter, cross-country variation has not been particularly strong for institutional
depth (ID), administrative supervision (AS) and legal protection (LP), but
it was considerable for effective political discretion (EPD), which was a
composite variable and sensitive to decentralisation reforms. Therefore, the
second hypothesis has partly been confirmed, since cross-country variation
was not particularly strong in three out of the four legalist variables.
Between 1990 and 2014, ID had the most considerable change (increase
of 0.5 points), while LP increased 0.37 points, EPD by 0.22 points and AS
had just a minimal 0.03 increase (see Chap. 7). All four variables experi-
enced significant growth during the 1990s (democratisation and pre-EU-
accession period for CE Europe) and stabilised, more or less, soon after EU
enlargement (see Fig. 3.7). This was particularly strong in young democra-
cies, confirming the third hypothesis. In older democracies, ID, LP and AS
variables hardly experienced change during the investigated time period,
since these countries were mature democracies with well-established insti-
tutions. Only the EPD variable stood out, once more, showing consider-
able changes also in older democracies, since it reflected decentralisation
reforms. Therefore, the third hypothesis has been confirmed. Contrary
tendencies towards re-centralisation emerged in some single cases, but the

recent crisis has not affected this variable as hardly as expected, since aus-
terity policies have primarily focused on financial issues (Hlepas 2016).
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis has not been confirmed.
This parallel, to some extent, development of these variables shown in
the previous graph (see Fig. 3.7) raised the question whether there is some
statistically significant correlation among them (or some of them) and
whether legally configured patterns of local autonomy would then emerge.
For example, it was questioned whether legal protection is correlated to
administrative supervision or whether institutional depth is related to
effective political discretion. The different tests that were conducted (see
Table 3.7 in the Appendix) have shown that, among these four variables, a
strong positive correlation exists only between ID and EPD (0.51) as well
as a statistical significance. The mix of the aforementioned legal elements
seems to deviate across countries without following clear patterns. Distinct
national contexts and path dependencies seem to configure this “legal
mix”, and clear-cut patterns do not emerge: For instance, even the “Nordic
group”, which is the most consistent one in all country groupings (Ladner
et al. 2016: 338), is falling apart when it comes to these legal aspects.
Comparing scores of legal aspects of local autonomy to the findings of
CLRA monitoring reports has shown that there are considerable inconsis-
tencies, mostly in countries with rule of law deficits and/or centralist iner-
tia. Therefore, the first hypothesis has been confirmed. Future research
should, therefore, further investigate the relation between the rule of law
and the level of local autonomy.
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1995
1996
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
ID EPD AS LP
Fig. 3.7 Four legal elements of local autonomy—overall trend. (Note: For
Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990; the first
years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively)
98 A. LADNER ET AL.
3.4 Appendix
Table 3.4 Institutional depth (ID) by country (mean, reference years and changes)
Mean
value Changes
(1990– 1990–
2014) 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2014
Austria 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Switzerla
nd 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.98 2.98 0.01
Poland 2.88 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Lithuania 2.56 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Iceland 2.48 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Maltaa 2.27 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Slovakia 2.16 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
Denmark 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Finland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
France 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Germany 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Netherla
nds 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Sweden 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Latviaa 1.71 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Slovenia 1.68 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.00
Portugal 1.64 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Italy 1.56 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Norway 1.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Estonia 1.52 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 –1.00
Hungary 1.36 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 –2.00
Bulgaria 1.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Belgium 1.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.58 1.58 1.57 0.57
United
Kingdom 1.22 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.21 –0.02
Cyprus 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Georgia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Greece 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Ireland 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Liechten
stein 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Luxemb
ourg 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Spain 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Turkey 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Croatia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Serbia 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Ukrainea 0.73 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00
Czech
Republic 0.68 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Albaniaa 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Romaniaa 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macedo
nia 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Moldova 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: Changes highlighted

a
For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990. The first years of measure-
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
Table 3.5 Effective political discretion (EPD) by country (mean, reference years
and changes)
Mean Changes
value(19 1990–
90–2014) 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2014
Finland 2.98 2.50 2.50 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 0.67
Latviaa 2.90 3.17 3.00 2.83 2.83 2.83 2.83 –0.33
Estonia 2.68 2.83 2.83 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.50 –0.33
Iceland 2.67 1.83 2.17 2.83 2.83 2.83 3.00 1.17
Germany 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 0.00
Sweden 2.65 2.50 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 0.17
Luxemb
ourg 2.57 2.83 2.83 2.83 2.50 2.50 2.17 –0.67
Czech
Republic 2.53 0.00 2.83 2.83 2.83 2.83 2.83 2.83
Slovenia 2.50 3.67 2.30 2.28 2.28 2.28 2.28 –1.39
Lithuania 2.48 1.83 2.17 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.83 1.00
Poland 2.45 2.00 2.31 2.58 2.56 2.55 2.55 0.55
Denmark 2.39 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.50 2.50 0.17
Norway 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 0.00
France 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.32 0.00
Italy 2.32 4.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 –2.00
Serbia 2.24 2.33 2.33 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.44 0.10
Hungary 2.19 2.33 2.33 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.00 –0.33
Bulgaria 2.13 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.17 2.17 2.33 0.33
Croatia 2.12 1.83 1.83 1.83 2.18 2.41 2.42 0.59
Netherla
nds 2.12 1.67 1.83 2.00 2.33 2.33 2.17 0.50
Romaniaa 2.07 0.67 0.67 1.83 2.33 2.50 2.83 2.17
Ukrainea 2.01 1.81 1.82 1.82 2.15 2.15 2.15 0.34
Portugal 1.99 1.67 1.67 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 0.50
Macedo
nia 1.93 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.33 2.33 2.33 0.83
Belgium 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 0.00
Liechten
stein 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 0.00
Austria 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 0.00
Moldova 1.56 1.33 1.33 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 0.33
Georgia 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.00
United
Kingdom 1.43 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.32 –0.14
Switzerla
nd 1.41 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.50 1.49 1.54 0.22
Spain 1.32 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.11 –0.22
Slovakia 1.15 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.50 2.00 2.00 1.50
Albaniaa 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
Greece 0.87 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.83 0.83 1.50 1.00
Turkey 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.79 –0.06
Ireland 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.00
Cyprus 0.80 0.61 0.63 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.27
Maltaa 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00
a
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
100 A. LADNER ET AL.
Table 3.6 Legal protection (LP) by country (mean, reference years and changes)
Mean
value Changes
(1990– 1990–
2014) 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2014
Czech
Republic 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Liechten
stein 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Romaniaa 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Bulgaria 2.92 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
Estonia 2.88 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Switzerla
nd 2.81 2.82 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 –0.01
France 2.48 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Slovenia 2.32 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Poland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Austria 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Belgium 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Cyprus 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Finland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Germany 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Greece 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Hungary 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Italy 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Luxemb
ourg 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Macedo
nia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Maltaa 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Netherla
nds 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Portugal 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Serbia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Slovakia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
United
Kingdom 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97 0.00
Latviaa 1.88 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Ukrainea 1.79 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Albaniaa 1.78 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Lithuania 1.64 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Spain 1.64 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Georgia 1.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Denmark 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Iceland 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Sweden 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Turkey 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Croatia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Moldova 0.72 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ireland 0.64 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

a
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
Table 3.7 Pearson correlation indicators (mean 1990–2014)

AS LP FA BA PS ID EPD
(mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean) (mean)
AS 1 0.233 0.102 0.211 0.211 0.218 0.175

(mean)
LP 0.233 1 0.028 0.224 0.015 0.055 0.116
(mean)
FA 0.102 0.028 1 0.318a 0.451b 0.230 0.207
(mean)
BA 0.211 0.224 0.318a 1 0.288 0.433b 0.266
(mean)
PS 0.211 0.015 0.451b 0.288 1 0.568b 0.780b
(mean)
ID 0.218 0.055 0.230 0.433b 0.568b 1 0.510b
(mean)
EPD 0.175 0.116 0.207 0.266 0.780b 0.510b 1
(mean)
Notes: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
(2-tailed); N = 39; FA=Fiscal autonomy, BA=Borrowing autonomy and PS=Policy scope
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CHAPTER 4
Functional Responsibilities
4.1 Points of Departure

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse variations in local policy auton-
omy across countries and over time. Why is this interesting? Local authori-
ties do lots of different things. A local authority typically carries out a
bundle of tasks for the population of a particular territory. The content of
that bundle varies from country to country (and may indeed vary across
municipalities inside countries, but the internal variation will be disre-
garded here). The variation in task bundles means that the local govern-
ment that citizens actually meet in their localities can be quite different
from country to country, and therefore the very meaning of local govern-
ment may differ accordingly to people in different countries. This varia-
tion in meaning has not been sufficiently appreciated by local government
analysts. In some countries, for example, local government is comprehen-
sively responsible for education, in other countries only in a very limited
sense. In some countries, local government performs certain police func-
tions, in other countries law and order is not a local responsibility at all and
so on. Local government is a very concrete phenomenon—it is what it
does. To understand what local government represents in the eyes of citi-
zens, one must investigate what bundles of tasks it takes care of for the
citizens and the amount of discretion it enjoys in carrying out those tasks.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_4
The issue of policy autonomy is at the core of the concept of local self-
government as expressed by the European Charter of Local
Self-Government, which defines the concept in the following way in its
art. 3 (see Box 4.1).
We assume that the more “public affairs” local government is respon-
sible for, and the more say it has over those affairs, the more autonomy it

a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility
and in the interests of the local population.
enjoys. Local democracy is not only about free and fair elections, it is also
about enabling elected councillors to set priorities among tasks in its bun-
dle of responsibilities according to the needs of the community, as the
councillors see them. If local councillors are not responsible for (a number
of) important tasks and/or cannot decide on priorities between them,
then local democracy is hollowed out: there will not be room for council-
lors and parties with different agendas and, for citizens, no real choice
between different agendas. And if there is no choice, elections are mean-
ingless and accountability an empty word.
This point of departure served to frame an extensive agenda of research
and triggered a prolonged scholarly debate in the political science com-
munity from the 1960s and well into this millennium. The research agenda
turned on the question “Does politics matter?” as researchers tried to
determine the relative weight of legal and institutional requirements and
socio-economic constraints against those of political parties and ideologies
in shaping local policy decisions. The first set of findings was rather disap-
pointing for those who hoped that there would be room for parties and
political ideas to shape local political outcomes (Dawson and Robson
1963; Dye 1966). Later research and theoretical development demon-
strated more impact from political variables, however (Boyne 1985, 1996).
In this chapter, this issue is followed up by investigating cross-country
variations with regard to how much freedom there is for local policy-makers
and, consequently, how much room there actually is for local politics to
unfold.
FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 105
Research took a new direction or was rather stood on its head with
Theodore Lowi’s proclamation that “Policies determine politics!” mean-
ing that the respective policy fields are surrounded with specific sets of
actors such as interest groups, professionals and politicians (Lowi 1972).
The policy elements—what is at stake for whom—were hypothesised to
structure the pattern of politics and shape the patterns of conflicts and
cleavages. Lowi introduced a policy typology (distributional, redistribu-
tional and regulatory policies) which he claimed could help systematise
the politics triggered by policy decisions. We do not need to dwell on the
virtues and problems of this specific typology, but Lowi’s statement
reminds us that variations in local politics may be fundamentally shaped by
variations in the local policy bundles. This issue will be investigated below
by analysing variations in policy autonomy by policy fields.
4.2 Good Local Governance: How Much Policy

Autonomy Is Needed?
But exactly how much decentralisation is required by ideals of good gov-
ernance, and what functions can be expected to be allocated to local gov-
ernment in response to such ideals? Unfortunately, neither normative
democratic theory nor analytical approaches to public administration give
precise answers to these questions. John Stuart Mill, for example, praised
local government as school in democracy but did not say what kinds of
local responsibilities would serve such a purpose best, except gave to
understand that local government had something to do with the manage-
ment of such tasks in the citizens’ proximity that they could easily under-
stand (Mill 1946).
Scholars associated with the school of thought known as fiscal federal-
ism have sought to demonstrate that decentralisation would lead to more
efficient use of public resources when preferences for public goods vary
across the state’s territory. Decentralised decision-making would then
allocate resources more efficiently (meaning more in accordance with
local preferences) than centralised decision-making would do, as sug-
gested by the so-called decentralisation theorem of Oates (1972). But
again, the theory leaves open which functions could most profitably be
decentralised. Later scholars have indicated that the theorem most likely
is applicable to purely local goods, which means that it would lead to a
rather limited scope of local functions (Söderström 1998).
The principle of fiscal equivalence might suggest that local govern-

ment would be structured around functions for which local citizens
would be willing to pay (Olson 1969) and, furthermore, that citizens
would vote with their feet to find jurisdictions with a balance of taxes
and services to their tastes (Tiebout 1956). If such processes of search
and adaption go on over time, all local authorities would, over time,
achieve such a balance, and the total national system would be in a
state of equilibrium. However, this approach overlooks the extensive
programmes of redistribution undertaken by most European national
governments and which often involve roles also for local government.
This again means that the functions of local government only partly
reflect what the average local voter actually demands; what national
governments expects local government to do must also be taken into
account.
Instead, a number of analysts have relied on an inductive approach to
cross-country analyses of local government functions, pointing to varia-
tions in political history and administrative traditions that allocate vary-
ing roles to local government. Such variations have been the starting
point of typologies of local government. Several typologies make a dis-
tinction, for example, between North and South European types (Heinelt
and Hlepas 2006). In the North European type, local authorities are
assigned a larger range of tasks than in the South European type. In the
typology of Loughlin et al. (2011) the Nordic countries appear as a sepa-
rate category characterised as decentralised welfare states with reference
to their extensive role in the provision of welfare services—and, by impli-
cation, in the implementation of national redistributive policies. After
the fall of the Wall, a post-communist type of local government was
tentatively introduced into the debate on typologies (Hesse and Sharpe
1991). The post-communist type was characterised by few local func-
tions and intrusive national tutelage.1 The merits of these typologies are
discussed further in Chap. 10.
The illustration in Table 4.1 brings out quite clearly the functional con-
trasts between two sets of local authorities, those of Norway and Italy,
exemplifying the Nordic and South European type respectively. In Italy,
1
Perhaps a somewhat simplistic characterisation in light of later differentiation in the
group of post-communist democracies (Swianiewicz 2014). The discussion is continued in
Chap. 10.
Table 4.1 Municipal expenditures by function in Italy and Norway

Italy Norway
(2003) (2007)
General administration 32 7
Territory and environmental protection (in Norway technical 20 8
services, e.g. water)
Social protection (in Norway health and social services) 14 39
Education (in Norway incl. kindergartens) 10 36
Transportation 9 None
Local police 6 None
Culture, sport, tourism 6 5
Ancillary 3 5
100 100
Note: Per cent

Source: Loughlin et al. (2011: 289 and 346)
the largest budget item of municipalities is general administration, which

only takes up a small share of the budgets of the Norwegian counterparts.
This is, of course, because other items are so much larger than in Italy: the
Norwegian municipal budgets are dominated by spending on education
(primary schools for the 6–15 years old plus kindergartens) and health and
social services, of which the caring services for the elderly and handicapped
people are the most important. Taken together the two items swallow up
75% of the total municipal budgets in Norway. In other words, Norwegian
and Italian citizens face rather different municipalities—in the former case
an educational and social/welfare profile, in the latter case an authority
with an administrative, law and order and technical profile.
Of the three approaches outlined—democratic-normative, fiscal feder-
alist and historical-institutional—only the latter leads to a hypothesis of
some precision regarding cross-country variations in policy autonomy.
Based on the typologies mentioned, the Nordic countries could be
expected to have the most extensive range of local government functions
although the level of local discretion may be questionable. The relative
position of South European and post-communist countries, respectively, is
harder to hypothesise, but on the whole, a centralistic tradition seems to
linger in post-communist countries, braking attempts at decentralisation
(Illner 2010). Consequently, post-communist countries are expected to
exhibit low scores on policy autonomy.
4.3 How Is Policy Autonomy Measured?

The concept of policy autonomy is composed of two variables, policy scope
and effective political discretion, introduced in Chap. 3. The first variable
measures the range of local functions and the second the extent of local
control over the respective functions. Furthermore, since we are interested
in ascertaining variations in bundles of local functions, we had to find a
way of characterising such bundles. To analyse the whole range of tasks in
all its variety performed by every municipalities in 39 countries would
have been a daunting undertaking, however. There is not only, as already
stated, variation across countries but presumably also variation inside
countries, as result of local choices. So a decision was made to select a
number of tasks that could be expected to differentiate between countries
in the sense that these tasks are performed by local government in some
countries but not in all countries. A series of tasks that was known to be
local government functions in almost all of the countries was disregarded.
These are the elementary local functions such as the maintenance of roads
and streets, provision of water and sewerage, collection and treatment of
waste or parks and other outdoor recreation amenities (Marcou 2010).
The functions included in the analysis were primary education, social
assistance, health services, land use/zoning, police, caring functions,
housing and public transport (see Table 4.2). These functions were
selected so as not to favour any particular country in advance. Caring
functions, for example, are more of a local government responsibility in
North European countries than in the southern part of the continent
while police functions are more usual in Southern Europe. Some involve-
ment in land use planning is quite common but in different ways in differ-
ent countries.
For some policy fields coding further distinguished between differ-
ent types of responsibilities. For education, a distinction was made
between responsibilities for school buildings and/or their maintenance
on the one hand and the responsibility for the pay and employment of
teachers on the other hand. The latter task is taken to indicate a deeper
responsibility for educational management and performance, not just
the physical framework of education. A parallel distinction is made for
primary health services: the construction and/or maintenance of health
centres versus the organisation and management of such centres.
Responsibility for social assistance may be limited to helping people in
immediate financial distress (“poverty relief”) or may extend to provid-
ing further social security and protection services (and with regard to
Table 4.2 Policy scope (PS) and effective political discretion (EPD)—operationalisation/coding
Policy scope Range of functions (tasks) where local government 0–4 Not at all; partly; fully responsible:
is effectively involved in the delivery of the services
(be it through their own financial resources and/or
through their own staff)
Additional coding instructions: Here we want to
know whether the municipalities are involved in
Education (0–2) Social (0–2) Health (0–2)
the provision of these tasks and services. How
assistance
much they can decide is part of the next
question. Half points (0.5) can be used if local
government is only partly involved Land use (0–2) Public (0–1) Housing (0–1)
transport
Effective The extent to which local government has real 0–4 Police (0–1) Caring (0–1)
political influence (can decide on service aspects) over these functions
discretion functions No, some or real authoritative decision-making in:
Additional coding instructions: half points (0.5) Education (0–2) Social (0–2) Health (0–2)
can be used if local government can only partly assistance
decide. Land use (0–2) Public (0–1) Housing (0–1)
transport
Police (0–1) Caring (0–1)
functions
Note: See Chap. 2 for further details of the coding and calculation of the scores
FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
109
EPD, discretion may be limited to deciding on a person’s eligibility for

assistance or may also encompass the level of assistance a person
receives). The coding of land use planning, furthermore, distinguishes
between responsibility for zoning and issuing of building permits. In
all, the coding of policy autonomy resulted in 24 variables: 12 variables
covering policy scope and 12 correspondingly for effective political dis-
cretion. The scores for policy autonomy are the country sums for these
24 variables.
4.4 Development of Local Policy Autonomy

over Time
How has policy autonomy developed over time? One could expect local
policy autonomy to decline as well as to increase over time. Reasons for
decline of autonomy could be growing technical demands of service provi-
sion inherent in general modernisation of society or more demanding citi-
zens, which again could drive more central government control. More
stringent environmental standards are imposed upon technical services,
such as water supply or sewerage, for example, or higher professional stan-
dards are expected of teachers, nurses or doctors. Digitalisation of society
transforms all sectors of municipal operations, from transport to education
and caring services, experimentally brought together under the concept of
“smart cities”. In some countries, the emergence of more demanding and
self-confident citizens has triggered legislative initiatives that have given citi-
zens entitlements to services and in consequence reduced local discretion.
However, local service autonomy could also be expected to rise, for
example, as consequence of waves of political-administrative decentralisa-
tion in a number of European countries. The “free commune experi-
ments” in the Nordic countries in the 1980s and 1990s come to mind
(Baldersheim and Ståhlberg 1994), or the decentralisation measures initi-
ated in France under the Mitterand presidency and pushed further under
Prime Minister Raffarin and President Chirac in the 2000s. The fall of
communist regimes, furthermore, in the Eastern parts of the continent
was accompanied by swift establishment of local democracy (Baldersheim
et al. 2003). Since the 2008 financial crisis, many national governments
have felt economically overburdened and could have been tempted to hive
off tasks to local government, resulting in seemingly more local autonomy.
So what were the actual developments from the early 1990s on?
Figure 4.1 shows, first, that there has been some increase in policy auton-
omy overall in all European countries combined. The increase took place
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
2006
2007
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
PS EPD
Fig. 4.1 Policy autonomy—overall trend. (Note: For Albania, Latvia, Malta,
Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990; the first years of measurement are
1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively)
mostly between 1993–1994 and 2001–2002. Second, the two sub-dimensions

of policy autonomy, PS and EPD, have followed very much the same trajec-
tory—the two curves shadow each other. This is confirmed by correlation
analysis of PS and EPD for 1995 and 2014. The correlation coefficient
(Pearson’s r) for 1995 is 802 (p<0.01) and for 2014, 824 (p<0.01). In other
words, in the overall picture there is not a tendency to burden local govern-
ment with functions without also augmenting the decision-making powers of
local authorities. Whether the decision-making powers are enhanced propor-
tionately to match increased functional responsibilities, is a different matter,
which cannot be determined accurately with the available material.
4.5 Policy Autonomy by Country

How does policy autonomy vary from country to country? This is shown
in Fig. 4.2 where an overall indicator of policy autonomy has been calcu-
lated by adding the scores for PS and EPD (and dividing by 2). The figure
outlines the situation as of the year 2014. The six countries with the high-
est overall scores are Finland, Germany, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and
Poland. The countries in this group have scores between 3.2 and 2.9,
which suggest they have a substantial share of all the responsibilities and
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
Romania*
Albania*
Turkey
Serbia
Hungary
Moldova
France
Belgium
Iceland
Luxembourg
Slovakia
Greece
Latvia*
Denmark
Macedonia
Austria
Georgia
Finland
Ukraine*
Spain
Ireland
Cyprus
Malta*
Estonia
Norway
Italy
Bulgaria
Netherlands
Germany
Slovenia
Poland
Liechtenstein
Sweden
Switzerland
Lithuania
Croatia
Portugal
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
-1.00
-2.00
Fig. 4.2 Policy autonomy—development in the different countries. (Notes:

first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively.
Policy autonomy = (policy scope + effective political discretion)/2))
powers covered by the scoring system. The lower end of the ranking
includes (read from bottom) a selection of Black Sea and East Mediterranean
cases such as Malta, Turkey, Cyprus, plus Ireland and the United Kingdom.
Among the mid-ranking countries, a selection of Central European and
Mediterranean states are found.
The ranking confirms the hypothesis that the Nordic countries would
be found among the top-scoring states. The other half of the hypothesis is
only partly confirmed, however: A number of post-communist countries
have much higher scores than expected, for example, Poland and Lithuania.
Furthermore, the ranking does not correspond particularly well to well-
known local government typologies: Ireland and the United Kingdom are
found in company with a number of Black Sea countries that are normally
thought to belong to quite different state traditions, such as, for example,
Turkey. In other words, high levels of local policy autonomy do not seem
to be a necessary feature of liberal democracies.
Figure 4.2 also shows where there has been an increase and a decrease,
respectively, in autonomy 1990–2014. The countries with the sharpest
increase are the Czech Republic, Romania, Albania, Slovakia and Greece.
Countries that have back-stepped with regard to policy autonomy include
Italy, Luxemburg, Hungary, Spain and Estonia. There has also been
minor back-stepping in Turkey. In some countries, the reduction of
autonomy can be attributed to reactions to the financial crisis of 2008
whereas reduction in the Italian case is related to transfer of functions to

other levels of government.
Do wide policy scope and broad policy discretion go hand in hand also at
the level of individual countries, as it seems to do when analysed at aggre-
gate level as in Fig. 4.1? Or is there some truth in the claim often heard from
local authorities that national governments shower them with responsibili-
ties without giving them adequate powers of decision-making so that they
are held responsible, in the eyes of the citizens, for services over which they
have little influence? Is this true at least for some countries?
This issue is addressed in Fig. 4.3, which presents separate scores for the
two components of policy autonomy, PS and EPD (see also Tables 4.4 and
3.5 in the Appendix).
Albania
United Kingdom Austria
Ukraine 4.00 Belgium
Turkey Bulgaria
3.50
Switzerland Croatia
Sweden 3.00 Cyprus
Spain 2.50 Czech Republic

2.00
Slovenia Denmark
1.50
Slovakia Estonia
1.00
Serbia 0.50 Finland
0.00
Romania France
Portugal Georgia
Poland Germany
Norway Greece
Netherlands Hungary
Moldova Iceland
Malta Ireland
Macedonia Italy
Luxembourg Latvia
Lithuania Liechtenstein
PS_2014 EPD_2014
Fig. 4.3 Policy scope (PS) and effective political discretion (EPD) by country
(2014)
The general trend in this regard is that PS and EPD tend to go together
also at the level of individual countries. In other words, countries with few
responsibilities also have little power of decision-making.
There are some interesting anomalies, however. Norway, for example,
has given local government responsibility for a large number of functions
but has not been quite so generous when it comes to influence over
decision-making. The reason for lower scores in this regard in Norway is
increasingly intrusive central government control in many areas of local
service provision. There are similar discrepancies in Germany, Poland
and Switzerland but not quite as glaring as in the Norwegian case. There
are also some cases where the level of political discretion is higher rela-
tive to policy scope, as in Slovenia, Romania, Moldova, Latvia and the
Czech Republic. In these countries, it seems that local government has
few functions but much freedom of decision-making concerning those
functions.
4.6 Does Policy Autonomy Vary Across Policy

Fields?
As mentioned above, the assessment of local policy autonomy has pro-
ceeded by detailed coding of a series of policy fields: Education, social
assistance, health, land use planning, public transport, housing, police and
caring functions. The purpose of this section is to analyse policy autonomy
across policy fields.
In the field of education, for example, responsibility and discretion are
assessed according to the responsibility for and influence over the number
of schools and their location on the one hand and teachers’ pay on the
other hand, and in the case of health according to responsibility for and
influence of the management of health centres and/or doctors’ pay. Local
control over land use is measured in terms of responsibility for overall land
use planning (zoning) and building permits. For the fields of public trans-
port, housing, police and caring functions, only one indicator for each is
applied. The scoring has been standardised so that scores as presented here
are comparable across policy fields.
Presumably, the level of autonomy may vary from policy area to policy
area. There may, of course, be many reasons for such variations. Some
variation may spring from reasons inherent to the respective policy fields;
other reasons may be more country-specific. The analysis here is limited to
the exploration of inherent features of the respective policy fields. The

policy fields can be grouped into three broad categories: Regulatory, enti-
tlement and allocative policies, with some resemblance to Lowi’s classifica-
tion mentioned in the introductory section (regulatory, distributional and
redistributive policies).
Regulatory policies give municipalities the authority to influence the
conduct or property of individuals through binding decisions (police, land
use).
Entitlement policies through national legislation give rights to indi-
viduals regarding eligibility for services and also to minimum levels of local
service and impose corresponding obligations on municipalities; however,
local authorities may be free to provide services at levels beyond the mini-
mum (education is a typical example of an entitlement policy).
In allocative policies, municipalities stipulate the eligibility rules as well
as levels of service (health, social assistance, caring and utilities such as
housing and transport).
In practice, of course, policies as they are encountered at the local level
may combine elements of the respective types.
The main hypothesis is that the level of autonomy is highest for alloca-
tive policies and lowest for regulatory policies, with entitlement policies
in-between. Allocative policies allow municipalities to set their own rules
regarding eligibility for the respective services (e.g. regarding admission
into homes for the elderly or municipal housing) as well as the level of
services allocated to individuals (e.g. how many hours of weekly help an
elderly person may receive). There may, of course, be national regulations
circumscribing local decisions to some extent, but in principle, municipali-
ties may set the parameters of service provision locally. Entitlement poli-
cies let municipalities decide on levels of service beyond nationally
prescribed minima but cannot decide on eligibility. Since regulatory poli-
cies may authorise municipalities to decide on far-reaching local develop-
ment issues (zoning), intervene in details of property utilisation (building
permits) as well as take actions against individual conduct (as the police
may), such powers are strictly circumscribed by national legislation and
subject to the norms of rule of law.
Table 4.3 presents the results for policy autonomy according to policy
fields or functions. By looking at the mean figures for each function in
the bottom line, the table demonstrates, first of all, that levels of auton-
omy do vary across policy fields. One field in particular stands out in
terms of policy autonomy—the regulation of land use through zoning
Table 4.3 Policy autonomy scores 2014 by functions and countries
Social
assistance Social
116
Teachers' economic assistance Health Doctors' Building Public

Country Schools pay relief general centres pay permits Zoning transport Housing Police Caring Mean
Albania 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.46
Austria 0.75 0.00 0.35 0.60 0.25 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.54
Belgium 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Bulgaria 0.75 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.69
Croatia 0.35 0.00 0.68 0.75 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.59
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22
Czech Republic 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.58
Denmark 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.75
A. LADNER ET AL.
Estonia 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.63
Finland 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.79
France 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.71
Georgia 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42
Germany 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.77
Greece 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38
Hungary 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.60
Iceland 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.75
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.21
Italy 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.56
Latvia 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 1.00 0.67
Liechtenstein 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.46
Lithuania 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.71
Luxembourg 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.52
Macedonia 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.58
Malta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.08
Moldova 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.38
Netherlands 0.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.58
Norway 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.75
Poland 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.49 0.08 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.58 0.71
Portugal 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.54
Romania 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.69
Serbia 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.31 1.00 0.65
Slovakia 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50
Slovenia 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.59 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.54
Spain 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.25 0.50 0.08 0.38
Sweden 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.71
Switzerland 0.61 0.46 0.61 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.63 0.73 0.45 0.63 0.38 0.69 0.54
Turkey 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20
Ukraine 0.50 0.50 0.12 0.12 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 0.56
United Kingdom 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.97 0.49 0.49 0.00 0.49 0.33
Mean 0.69 0.27 0.56 0.44 0.41 0.20 0.85 0.79 0.64 0.71 0.26 0.71
Notes: Mean values (scale 0–1); cells with values > 0.5 are shaded in grey
and building permits. This is a core local government function—the

physical control over the use of the territory; in this field local authorities
in most countries seem to enjoy a high level of autonomy both as regards
the extent of responsibility and freedom of decision-making. Housing
and caring functions are also fields with considerable local freedom.
Health and police represent contrasts with low levels of local involvement
and local freedom. Education is an interesting case; here, local authori-
ties in most countries have responsibilities and influence regarding school
buildings but have little control over what goes on in those buildings, as
indicated by low scores regarding teachers’ pay. Presumably, this is a
nationally salient function that national governments want to keep a
watchful eye on. This may not be so surprising, since in most countries
education and schools have been important instruments for nation-
building and national identity since the early nineteenth century. Today,
the quality of the educational system is regarded as a primary instrument
for national competiveness in a globalised world (OECD 2013).
How did the hypothesis about variation in autonomy according to pol-
icy type fare? Policy autonomy does not vary strictly as suggested by the
hypothesis above. The regulatory function of policing is low on auton-
omy, as expected, but land use is high. Education, furthermore, is mid-
level in terms of autonomy, as suggested—fairly high for school buildings
but low for teachers’ pay. Caring, housing and public transport are high,
as expected, but health should have been higher according to the
hypothesis.
4.7 The Variation of Policy Responsibilities

Across Countries
How do responsibilities for and discretion over the respective functions
vary across countries? Also this issue can be addressed through Table 4.2.
Analysing the table horizontally across functions shows the extent to
which specific countries have allocated powers over the respective func-
tions to local government.
Again taking education as an example of an entitlement function, the
table shows, first, that responsibility for school buildings is quite common
and more widespread than responsibility for teachers’ pay. Second, the
Nordic countries stand out with extensive responsibilities in the field of
education, with top scores in both functional areas. Switzerland is close to
the Nordic position whereas municipalities in Turkey, Ireland or Georgia

have no tasks in education.
As already pointed out, responsibilities for the regulatory functions of
zoning and building permits are the most common and widespread of
municipal functions. Municipalities have extensive powers in these fields in
most countries. In a few countries, municipalities are only involved in issu-
ing building permits but not zoning, such as in Cyprus, Greece and
Moldova. In two countries, it is the other way round—only zoning, not
building permits (the Czech Republic and Slovenia).
As regards police functions, only 18 out of 39 countries have given
municipalities responsibility for police. Bulgaria, France and Lichtenstein
are the countries with the most extensive municipal responsibility in this
regard, whereas none of the Nordic countries has entrusted local govern-
ment with such tasks. In Central European and Mediterranean countries,
however, this is a task in which municipalities are engaged in some minor
ways.
Municipal responsibility for the allocative function of caring, such as
care for elderly or handicapped people, is also quite widespread, although
the precise content of those functions may vary. However, municipalities
in Spain have very limited responsibilities in this field, and those in Turkey,
Moldova, Ireland and Cyprus are not active in the field at all.
4.8 Policy Bundles: A Shifting Mosaic of Tasks

Are there characteristic bundles of functions—functions that tend to occur
together? And can countries be grouped according to characteristic bun-
dles of functions allocated to local authorities? These questions have been
tentatively explored through correlation analysis and factor analysis.
Correlation analysis demonstrated surprisingly low associations between
the respective items (the full table of coefficients is not included); the
highest coefficients were found between responsibilities for housing and
school buildings (0.65), general social assistance and caring functions
(0.59) and the two health service items (0.54). Interestingly, the connec-
tion between responsibilities for school buildings and teachers’ pay is very
weak, so this appears to be an unusual combination found in few coun-
tries. And similarly, extensive responsibility for zoning is not necessarily
combined with corresponding responsibility for building permits, which
can also be seen from Table 4.2. The allocation of functions to local gov-
ernment seems to follow national logics, not functional logics.
Factor analysis indicated that European countries allocate responsibili-

ties to local government in ways that yield surprising and perhaps
idiosyncratic combinations of functional responsibilities.2 Factor 1 com-
bines housing and zoning most clearly with some association with social
assistance and responsibility for school buildings. Factor 2 is strong on
health-related responsibilities, while factor 3 is strong on building permits
and social assistance in the sense of help to destitute people. The fourth
factor combines extensive educational responsibilities and transport. The
scores of the respective countries tend to shift from factor to factor, which
suggests a varying mosaic of local functions from country to country.
The details of the bundles of function found in the respective countries
can be further inspected in Table 4.2. For ease of comparison across coun-
tries, the cells containing scores above the value of 0.50 have been shaded
in grey in order to highlight the most important local government func-
tions in a given country. It is hard to find two countries with exactly the
same pattern of functions; the Nordics may come close at the top end of
the scoring table, but even they are not perfect quintuplets. At the lower
end, there is even less commonality, with Malta having just two types of
functions (caring and health centres), and then Turkey, Ireland and Cyprus
with three functions each, but in different fields.
The conclusion to be drawn from these patterns is that the allocation of
functions to local government varies a lot from country to country; although
there are some recurrent core functions the full palette of functions in the
respective countries seems to be shaped largely by uniquely national factors.
4.9 Conclusion
The overarching issue in this chapter is determining how much policy
freedom local government enjoys in European countries. The motivation
for the analysis is the assumption that policy freedom is an essential pre-
2
Factor analysis of 12 PS sub-dimensions with eigenvalue set at 1.0 yields four factors.
Factor 1: HOUSING+: PS_Housing01_2014, PS_Landuse_Zoning01_2014 PS_
Socialassistance_Othersocialsecurity01_2014, PS_Education_Buildings01_2014
Factor 2: HEALTH: PS_Health_Healthcenters01_2014, PS_Health_Doctorspayments01_
2014
Factor 3: BUILDING PERMITS +: PS_Landuse_Buildingpermits01_2014, PS_Socialassis
tance_Povertyrelief01_2014
Factor 4: EDUCATION +: PS_Education_Teachers01_2014, PS_Publictransport01_2014
(and strong negative association with police: - .773)
requisite for meaningful local democracy. Without freedom in this sense,

there can be no meaningful political alternatives and no meaningful elec-
tions. And, at the end of the day, no one to hold politically accountable.
Local policy autonomy consists of two components: Policy scope and
effective political discretion. The former denotes the range of functions
for which local government is responsible, and the latter points to the
amount of decision-making competences that local councils has over those
functions. Analysis of policy autonomy proceeded by looking at the spe-
cific tasks for which local authorities may be responsible, such as educa-
tion, transport, zoning and so on, and the type of decisions they may make
regarding these tasks.
The main finding in this chapter is that there is substantial variation
across European countries regarding policy autonomy. The Nordic coun-
tries along with some Central and East-Central European states (Germany,
Poland) are the leaders in terms of local policy autonomy. Some Black Sea
countries and the United Kingdom and Ireland are at the bottom of the
league. In other words, the space for local politics and local policy agendas
varies substantially across European states. This chapter has not sought to
account for this variation or to assess its consequences; these are themes
that will be picked up in later chapters.
Policy autonomy also varies across policy fields such as education, land
use, housing, health and so on. Policy autonomy is most extensive in the
fields of land use (zoning, building permits) and responsibility for school
buildings, housing, caring functions and public transport. These are func-
tions that municipalities have responsibility for in many European coun-
tries. Having responsibility for police or what actually goes on in school
buildings (educational programmes and hiring and paying teachers) is
more unusual. So is responsibility for health services.
The bundle of functions that makes up local government is a mosaic
that varies a lot from country to country. The bundles are shaped by
unique national factors to the extent that there are hardly two countries
that have allocated exactly the same set of responsibilities to local gov-
ernment. If Lowi’s dictum is correct, that “policy shapes politics”, then
local politics can be expected to vary a lot from country to country. One
may indeed wonder whether patterns of local politics can be compared
across countries. At the very least, political analysts must be aware of
how the variation in policy autonomy shapes political behaviour at the
local level.
Appendix
Table 4.4 Policy scope (PS) by country (mean, reference years and changes)
Mean value 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Changes
(1990–2014) 1990–2014
Norway 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 3.67 0.00

Germany 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 0.00
Denmark 3.39 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.50 3.50 0.17
France 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 0.00
Hungary 3.29 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 2.83 −0.50
Finland 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.17 0.00
Poland 3.05 2.50 2.91 3.20 3.17 3.17 3.16 0.66
Sweden 2.99 2.83 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.17
Switzerland 2.92 2.90 2.98 3.04 2.99 2.72 2.80 −0.10
Bulgaria 2.82 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.83 2.83 3.17 0.50
Iceland 2.67 1.83 2.17 2.83 2.83 2.83 3.00 1.17
Austria 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 0.00
Latvia 2.63 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.50 2.50 −0.17
Italy 2.59 3.00 2.67 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 −0.50
Estonia 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.00
Lithuania 2.48 1.83 2.17 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.83 1.00
Serbia 2.47 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.67 2.77 0.44
Luxembourg 2.40 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.33 2.33 2.00 −0.67
Ukraine 2.38 2.63 2.63 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.31 −0.32
Netherlands 2.35 2.17 2.00 2.33 2.50 2.50 2.50 0.33
Spain 2.31 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.33 2.34 1.95 −0.37
Belgium 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 0.00
Romania 1.97 0.67 0.67 1.67 2.33 2.67 2.67 2.00
Macedonia 1.93 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.33 2.33 2.33 0.83
Portugal 1.93 1.50 1.50 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 0.67
Georgia 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 0.00
Liechtenstein 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 0.00
Croatia 1.82 1.33 1.33 1.33 2.03 2.26 2.28 0.94
Slovenia 1.73 0.00 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Czech Republic 1.67 0.17 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.67
United Kingdom 1.43 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.32 −0.14
Slovakia 1.32 0.67 0.83 0.83 1.67 2.00 2.00 1.33
Moldova 1.31 1.00 1.00 1.67 1.33 1.33 1.33 0.33
Albania 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17
Greece 0.97 0.67 0.67 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.83
Turkey 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.79 −0.06
Ireland 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.00
Cyprus 0.80 0.61 0.63 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.27
Malta 0.26 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.50 0.50 0.33
Note: For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990; the first years of mea-
surement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively
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CHAPTER 5
Financial Control
5.1 Introduction
The main theoretical framework available to analyse financial autonomy of
subnational jurisdictions is offered by fiscal federalism concept, developed
in the realm of the United States but widely referred to across Europe.
The model in its classis shape (Tiebout 1956; Musgrave 1959; Oates
1972; King 1984) is based on four major assumptions:
• Local governments concentrate on provision of typical public goods,

while merit and private goods related to redistributive functions stay
in hands of central government.
• The major part of local budgets originates from local taxes (with a
high discretion of local authorities to implement their own tax poli-
cies). Consequently those who contribute to the budget (local tax-
payers) are also beneficiaries of the local budget spending.
• There is a high spatial mobility of citizens (taxpayers) enabling com-
petition among local governments.
• Catchment area of services delivered by local governments is more or
less identical with administrative boundaries of local jurisdictions.
This brief reminder helps us to realise that although reality reflects

those theoretical assumptions relatively well in the United States or some
other non-European federal countries, there are significant deviations

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_5
from that model in the local government systems of most of European

countries. First of all, most of the European countries have allocated a
significant role to local governments in the provision of redistributive
functions related to social services such as social protection, health care
or education. That local involvement in redistributive social services is
perhaps the widest in Scandinavian countries, but visible also in other
parts of the continent. Second, only in minority of European states, local
taxes provide major part of local budgets. It is so in Nordic countries
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, to somehow smaller extent also in
Norway) and in Switzerland, but not in most of the other countries.
Third, mobility of residents in Europe is usually lower than in the United
States. Finally, the match of service catchment areas and administrative
boundaries is sometimes doubtful as well, so it is easy to indicate exam-
ples of overbound and under-bound jurisdictions in service delivery
(Bennett 1980).
Nevertheless fiscal federalism remains the main available theoretical
frame for analysis of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Rattsø (2005)—
referring to Scandinavian countries, where scope of locally delivered ser-
vices is the widest—uses the term administrative federalism, as more
adequate.
Regardless those deviations from the ideal model, the European Charter
of Local Government clearly refers to the ideas of fiscal federalism theory.
The whole art. 9 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government is
focused on the financial issues (see Box 5.1). It stresses:
• the importance of own tax base and tax policy discretion of local
governments (art. 9.1 and 9.3)
• power to decide upon rates of local taxes (art. 9.3)
• preference for general purpose rather than specific purpose transfers
(art. 9.1 and 9.7)
• access of local governments to borrowing and capital markets which
are seen as important preconditions for local capital investment strat-
egies (art. 9.8)
Implicit reference to fiscal federalism is seen also in practical advice

offered by technical assistance programmes of the Council of Europe and
other international organisations to countries reforming their local gov-
ernment systems.
FINANCIAL CONTROL 127

Financial Resources of Local Authorities
§1. Local authorities shall be entitled, within national economic

policy, to adequate financial resources of their own, of which
they may dispose freely within the framework of their powers.
§2. Local authorities’ financial resources shall be commensurate
with the responsibilities provided for by the constitution and the
law.
§3. Part at least of the financial resources of local authorities shall
derive from local taxes and charges of which, within the limits of
statute, they have the power to determine the rate.
§4. The financial systems on which resources available to local
authorities are based shall be of a sufficiently diversified and buoy-
ant nature to enable them to keep pace as far as practically possi-
ble with the real evolution of the cost of carrying out their tasks.
§5. The protection of financially weaker local authorities calls for the
institution of financial equalisation procedures or equivalent
measures which are designed to correct the effects of the unequal
distribution of potential sources of finance and of the financial
burden they must support. Such procedures or measures shall
not diminish the discretion local authorities may exercise within
their own sphere of responsibility.
§6. Local authorities shall be consulted, in an appropriate manner,
on the way in which redistributed resources are to be allocated
to them.
§7. As far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be ear-
marked for the financing of specific projects. The provision of
grants shall not remove the basic freedom of local authorities to
exercise policy discretion within their own jurisdiction.
For the purpose of borrowing for capital investment, local authorities

shall have access to the national capital market within the limits of the law.
All countries analysed in this volume have ratified the European Charter
of Local Governments, although some of them declared exemptions from
individual items of the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Those
Table 5.1 Declarations and reservations on not bounding items of art. 9 of the
European Charter of Local Government
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8
Belgium X X X
Czech Republic X X X
Georgia X
Germany X
Latvia X
Liechtenstein X X X
Netherlands X
Malta X
Slovakia X X X X
Switzerland X X
Turkey X X X
Note: Countries not mentioned in the table did not declare exemption from any of the items of the art. 9
reservations have been changing over time, but the Table 5.1 summarises
current declarations concerning art. 9, which refers to financial issues.
There is no doubt that financial autonomy is a necessary condition for
allowing potential benefits of decentralisation to materialise. But several
authors (e.g. Bahl 2007) discuss not only gains but also limitations (costs)
of local financial autonomy. In addition to well-known values of financial
decentralisation, Bahl (2007) indicates that more local financial autonomy
means more difficult control of macroeconomic indicators (such as infla-
tion or level of public debt) by central governments.1 Financial autonomy
makes also more difficult ensuring similar standards of local public services
across the country. In case of local borrowing, several authors claim (e.g.
Dafflon 2002) that no central regulation and leaving borrowing decisions
entirely in hands of local governments and market regulation would lead
to unwanted negative consequences for the economy related to market
failures. Therefore the system of intergovernmental financial relations has
to rely on proper balance of local financial autonomy and central control.
In the following section of this chapter, we discuss the measure of the
financial autonomy adopted in our research. In next section we turn to the
1
It explains why several central governments re-centralise their financial systems in periods
of economic slowdown or recession (even if such a policy is not always rational). We will get
back to that issue discussing changes in financial autonomy index in Europe after 2008 eco-
nomic crisis.
discussion of results. We start from general overall trend of changes of the

financial autonomy. Next we focus on the variation among 39 countries,
looking both at their current situation and diversified trends of changes in
the past. Finally, an interesting empirical question which is addressed in
this chapter is about the relationship between financial autonomy and
other aspects of the local autonomy. Is it so that local governments operat-
ing in more decentralised systems in general are also (and always) more
autonomous from the point of view of the conduct of their financial busi-
ness? In particular: are local governments in countries with more functions
allocated to municipal level enjoying also more local autonomy or opposite:
wider policy scope offered at the price of the more tight financial control?
The question is not trivial, since one may expect relationships going in
different directions. On the one hand, more financially autonomous coun-
tries are often more decentralised in general; their local governments are
responsible for the wider scope of services, so the relationship should be
positive. But on the other hand, it happens that more functional decen-
tralisation implies stricter control over local governments finance—larger
proportion of local revenues originate from transfers, often conditional,
also stricter control over local borrowing, since debt of (functionally)
larger local entities may have more serious macroeconomic implications.
Blöchliger and King (2007) call this phenomenon a decentralisation para-
dox—more (functional) decentralisation may go hand in hand with more
dependency in central government resources.
5.2 Measuring Financial Autonomy

The issue of financial decentralisation is very complex, and there is no
common agreement how to measure it. Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev
(2011) suggest to distinguish among at least three dimensions:
• Revenue decentralisation—the larger share of public revenues is allo-

cated to the local level and the higher the discretion in revenue
decision-making, the more fiscally decentralised is the system.
• Expenditure decentralisation—decentralisation here means widen-
ing the scope of public services allocated as local government tasks.
• Regulative decentralisation—local government are more autono-
mous if they are less bound by national norms and standards (or
administrative decisions made on upper tiers) so they may decide
upon management of their tasks more freely.
Box 5.2: Financial Autonomy as Defined by Martinez-Vazquez and

Timofeev (2011)
Own revenues of local governments / (total public expenditures –
(transfers to local governments + own revenues of local
governments))
In our study talking about financial autonomy, we concentrate first of

all on the first of those items (revenue decentralisation), while expenditure
and regulative aspects are covered by other variables, related to policy
scope and effective policy discretion (see Chap. 4).
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2011) reviewed several alternative
measures used to measure financial autonomy in various studies. They
came to the conclusion that the most common measures so far have been
the share of local in total public spending and the share of revenues from
own sources in total local government budgets. They test also several
alternative measures and come to the conclusion that the most valuable is
their own synthetic index of fiscal decentralisation (see Box 5.2).
More complex typology of fiscal autonomy of local governments is
offered by OECD materials distinguishing between 13 steps of autonomy,
grouped into 6 wider categories (see Blöchliger 2013) and the fiscal fed-
eralism network by the OECD.2
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2011) indicate positive correla-
tion between their index and various measures of social and economic
development of countries. Countries with more decentralised public
financial systems may be characterised by higher life expectancy, GDP
per capita and values of Human Development Index. However each of
single indices has simplifying character, and several authors (e.g. Spahn
2013) neglect comparative analysis based just on single measures. Our
index built on four different variables (see below) goes in the same
direction.
In our measurement of local financial autonomy, we decided to use
four variables described in the Table 5.2. They do not refer to the val-
ues of economic indicators directly. Instead, country experts were
asked—following the coding instructions—to ascertain the score
2
See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/federalism (consulted in 2018).
Table 5.2 Financial autonomy (TA, FSR, FSR, BA): operationalisation/coding
Tax (fiscal) The extent to which local 0–4 0 local authorities do not set base and
autonomy government can independently rate of any tax
tax its population 1 local authorities set base or rate of
Additional coding minor taxes
instructions: For this 2 local authorities set rate of one
dimension the level of major tax (personal income, corporate,
contribution of the tax for value added, property or sales tax)
local authorities (how much under restrictions stipulated by higher
the tax actually yields) has to levels of government
be clarified in the 3 local authorities set rate of one
explanations major tax (personal income, corporate,
value added, property or sales tax)
with few or no restrictions
4 local authorities set base and rate of
more than one major tax (personal
income, corporate, value added,
property or sales tax)
Financial The proportion of 0–3 0 conditional transfers are dominant
transfer unconditional financial (unconditional = 0–40% of total
system transfers to total financial transfers)
transfers received by the local 1 there is largely a balance between
government conditional and unconditional financial
transfers (unconditional = 40–60%)
2 unconditional financial transfers are
dominant (unconditional = 60–80%)
3 nearly all transfers are unconditional
(unconditional = 80–100%)
Financial The proportion of local 0–3 0 own sources yield less than 10% of
self-reliance government revenues derived total revenues
from own/local sources (taxes, 1 own sources yield 10–25%
fees, charges) 2 own sources yield 25–50%
Additional coding 3 own sources yield more than 50%
instructions: A shared tax
collected by central
government and over which
local government has no
influence has to be regarded
as financial transfer. Please
make a note in your country
report if this is the case
(continued)
Borrowing The extent to which local 0–3 0 local authorities cannot borrow
autonomy government can borrow 1 local authorities may borrow under
prior authorisation by higher-level
governments and with one or more of
the following restrictions:
(a) Golden rule (e. g. No borrowing
to cover current account deficits)
(b) No foreign borrowing or
borrowing from the regional or
central bank only
(c) No borrowing above a ceiling,
absolute level of subnational
indebtedness, maximum debt-
service ratio for new borrowing or
debt brake mechanism
(d) Borrowing is limited to specific
purposes
2 local authorities may borrow without
prior authorisation and under one or
more of (a), (b), (c) or (d)
3 local authorities may borrow without
restriction imposed by higher-level
authorities
between 0 and 3 (in case of one variable between 0 and 4). It means
that, arithmetically speaking, the summary score of financial autonomy
may vary between 0 (no or minimal financial autonomy) and 13 (almost
unlimited financial autonomy).
Individual variables refer to fiscal federalism assumptions and to the
spirit of the art. 9 of the European Charter of Local Government. So we
assume that autonomous local financial system is the one in which:
• Local governments have considerable discretion in setting own poli-

cies considering major (bringing significant yields) taxes.
• High proportion of total local budgets comes from own revenues,
which are controlled by local governments.
• Transfers received by local governments are general rather than spe-
cific purpose (conditional) nature.
• Local governments can relatively freely borrow money on capital
markets for their investment projects.
Even if our measures are relatively simple and well defined, we cannot
totally avoid terminological controversies which lead to difficult choices of
the particular scores. The reason is that several intergovernmental finance
instruments are not very easy to be grasped by simple definitions.
Financial transfer system variable refers to the distinction between
conditional and unconditional transfer systems. However—as demon-
strated in relevant literature—in practice such a distinction is not always
very clear. Boerboom and Huigsloot (2010), discussing the Dutch
financial system, talk in this context about general earmarked and ear-
marked general grants which fall between those categories and cannot
be classified in a simple way. Consequently some authors build much
more complex typology of transfers, for example, Bahl (2010) classifi-
cation includes ten different types, which cannot be simply reduced to
conditional-unconditional dichotomy. Also other authors (Lotz 2011,
2013; Spahn 2013) indicate “new categories of transfers” such as per-
formance grants arising from new public management ideas or com-
petitive grants (including those coming from EU structural funds)
which classification and impact on actual local financial autonomy is
more complex than it is in the traditional general-specific purpose dis-
tinction. All of these complications are important, although in most
typical cases the distinction between conditional and unconditional
grants, which we use in our variable, is still valid and straightforward.
However, we need to be aware that in some cases the scores are based
on unavoidable simplifications.
Another difficulty is related to the financial self-reliance variable.
Definition of revenues from own/local sources is not very sharp either.
The main complication is related to the broad category of shared rev-
enues which in several countries are officially classified as part of reve-
nues from own sources. And as Blöchliger and Petzold (2009)
demonstrate, the single “shared taxes” term is often misleading, since
in practice it is used to describe very wide range of situations—some of
them being much closer to intergovernmental transfers, but in some
being not really different from local taxes. Blöchliger and Petzold
identify several clusters of tax sharing (e.g. strict tax sharing, tax shar-
ing, transfer type tax sharing). In our measurement we usually did not
include tax sharing to the “own source revenue” category, but also in
that case we could not avoid simplifying, arbitrary decision. The most
important example of such a difficulty is perhaps related to Germany,
where tax shares has been treated as part of own revenues, which might
be considered a controversial choice, since the discretion of local
authorities over those revenues is next to non-existent.
It is important to stress that our financial self-reliance variable refers to
the proportion of own revenues in the total budget. It offers only partial
information on revenue and expenditure decentralisation, since it ignores
how large is the overall size of local spending. One may argue that control-
ling half or revenues of very tiny overall budget is not the same, in terms
of financial autonomy, as controlling half of revenues of the budget which
is a big part of overall public finance in the country. Not surprisingly, in
some cases local governments with wide scope of functional responsibili-
ties are not able to self-finance their spending by own revenues to that
extent as countries with very narrow set of functions. But our variable
measures how close is the financial system in the country to one of the
ideal assumptions of the fiscal federalism model.
Having in mind all of those complications, we cannot claim that our
measure of financial autonomy is a perfect one. Nevertheless it provides a
step in the direction of better understanding the variety of solutions
adopted in European countries.
In the next sections, an index of financial autonomy (FAI) is defined as
a sum of scores of the four variables listed in Table 5.2 (i.e. tax (fiscal)
autonomy, financial transfer system, financial self-reliance and borrowing
autonomy).
5.3 Results
5.3.1 General Trends
If we look at overall evolution of the mean of the financial autonomy index
in the researched period (see Fig. 5.1), we can see the trend towards more
decentralisation. The fast increase of an index’s values is clear especially in
the decade of the 1990s. But the more moderate growth can be noticed
until 2008, after which we see a slight decrease. The financial re-
centralisation trend seen in the 2008–2014 (and especially in 2008–2012)
period can be related to the financial and economic crisis. In several coun-
tries austerity measures adopted by central governments led to tighter
control over local budgets. Similarly, the drop of an index in 2001–2002
(after the local peak in 2000) corresponds with the slowdown of European
2007
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Fig. 5.1 Financial autonomy index (FAI)—overall trend. (Note: For Albania,
economy, noticeable in the whole Europe, but especially strong in the

Eastern part of the continent (and indeed, the decreasing value of financial
autonomy index in 2001–2002 period may be found in 7 countries; 5 of
them in Central and Eastern Europe).
But observations of the trend of individual variables are even more tell-
ing (see Fig. 5.2). In case of two variables—fiscal autonomy (measured by
local discretion over tax policies) and financial self-reliance (measured by
proportion of revenues from own sources in the total budget revenues)—
the slow upward slope of the trend is more or less stable throughout the
whole 1990–2014 period. In both cases the mean score of the beginning
was around 1.5, and it grew up to almost 1.9 in 2014 (see also Tables 5.5
and 5.7 in the Appendix).
The curve illustrating changes in the intergovernmental transfer systems
is more complicated. Looking at European average, we see the increasing
role of unconditional transfers in the 1990–1999 period, then the return of
control through specific purpose grants in 2000–2005 period, again slow
increase of the mean score in 2005–2012 and once again more tight control
through the grant system after 2012 (see also Table 5.6 in the Appendix).
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
1995
1996
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
TA FTS FSR BA
Fig. 5.2 Trend in subindices of financial autonomy. (Note: For Albania, Latvia,
This evolution reflects the typical cyclical waves of transfer policies—peri-

odic reforms consolidating fragmented-specific grant systems into one block
grant and revival of the conditional grants being the result of the political
games between central bureaucracies and local governments. The mecha-
nism of such cycles has been described, for example, by Borge and
Lilleschulstad (2010).
In case of the last of our variables—borrowing autonomy—a very
slow increase of the mean score could be observed from 1990 to 2003
(see also Table 5.8 in the Appendix). After it we could see no change of
the value, and then the drop of the mean scores, especially sharp after
2008. It is clear that limitation of the local borrowing autonomy was the
most frequent institutional austerity measure related to local govern-
ment finance and applied by many governments. Various ways of capping
local debt has been seen as a method to keep macroeconomic indicators
under control.
The connection between tightening local borrowing regulations
and economic crisis is even more visible when we look at countries in
which the value of the variable has changed after 2008. In our set of 39
countries, there are 7 in which the value of borrowing autonomy index
has decreased after 2008 (Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Slovenia and Spain). Comparison of that set with average annual GDP
change in 2008–2012 is very telling. Six of them (except of Georgia)
had negative mean GDP change in the referred period. Altogether, the
drop of GDP in that period was noted in 17 out of 39 European coun-
tries. Tightening of local borrowing regulations took place in over 35%
of them (6 out of 17). At the same time, lowering of the borrowing
autonomy index has been noted in less than 5% (1 out of 22) of coun-
tries experiencing mostly positive GDP trend in 2008–2012.
5.3.2 Variation by Countries
So far we looked at mean scores for all 39 European states, but situation is
of course very much diversified among individual countries. And the last
paragraph of the previous section suggests that looking at individual cases
may widen our knowledge in a considerable way. This variation is pre-
sented in Fig. 5.3. There is no country in which the value of an index
13.00
11.00
9.00
7.00
5.00
3.00
1.00
-1.00
Turkey
Serbia
Germany
Hungary
France
Poland
Belgium
Ireland
Georgia
Albania*
Luxembourg
Greece
Slovakia
Iceland
Norway
Austria
Malta*
Romania*
Latvia*
Moldova
Macedonia
Finland
Denmark
Italy
Netherlands
Bulgaria
Spain
Ukraine*
Liechtenstein
Sweden
Lithuania
Estonia
Slovenia
Switzerland
Portugal
Croatia
Cyprus
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
-3.00
Fig. 5.3 Financial autonomy—development in the different countries. (Note:

first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively)
would reach maximum possible score of 13. If we look at 2014 scores,

there are 4 countries with a score above 10 (Sweden, Finland, Liechtenstein
and Switzerland). If we add to this list Iceland, Denmark and Norway
which are close to this group, we have a confirmation of the fact that
Nordic countries form a European region with the highest financial auton-
omy. The main elements of that score are high level of financial self-reliance
(high proportion of revenues from local taxes—mainly local personal
income tax) and high fiscal autonomy (except of Norway where there is a
considerable discretion in setting local Personal Income Tax (PIT) rate).
If we look at the opposite end of the ranking, we find Slovenia, Ukraine
and Moldova with scores not exceeding 3. But it is even more striking that
all countries with score not higher than 5 (12 countries altogether) belong
to the post-communist Eastern Europe. From among the Eastern part of
the continent, only Serbia (score 9) and Poland (score 8) are in the upper
half of the European ranking of local financial autonomy. The general
picture noted in this paragraph reflects the tradition of the extremely cen-
tralised (financial) system under the communist regime and reluctance of
several central governments to decentralise public finance in parallel with
difficult transition of the national economies.
5.3.3 Financial Autonomy Index and Functional

Decentralisation
Are groups of countries with the highest financial autonomy and countries
with the widest scope of service function the same? Or is there an opposite
relationship that countries with the responsibility for the widest range of ser-
vices are at the same time the most thoroughly controlled in conduct of their
financial businesses? To answer these questions, we compare index of finan-
cial autonomy (FAI) with the sum of policy scope (PS) and effective policy
discretion (EPD) indices, which have been already defined in Chap. 4.
The first general observation is that there is a positive correlation
between both indices (FAI with PS+EPD index), which suggests that
those two aspects of local autonomy are interlinked. In other words, coun-
tries which are more functionally decentralised (their local governments
are responsible for the wide range of functions) are usually also more
financially decentralised. And more functionally centralised are also finan-
cially controlled by central governments. But the correlation is not very
Table 5.3 Countries with the highest differences in the rankings of FAI and
PS + EPD index (2014)
Countries with ranking of FAI significantly Countries with ranking of FAI significantly
lower than the ranking of PS + EPD higher than the ranking of PS + EPD
(difference between both rankings) (difference between both rankings)
Hungary 21 Liechtenstein 28
Latvia 21 Spain 24
Lithuania 20 Switzerland 20
Estonia 19 Turkey 20
Bulgaria 18 Luxembourg 18
Romania 18 Greece 15
Slovenia 17 Malta 15
Ukraine 17 Portugal 15
strong, and it is gradually weakening. For 1990 data the correlation was
+0.31, but later it was gradually dropping to +0.26 for 2014 data. The low
level of correlation indicates that there are several exceptions to the rule of
the close link between two aspects of local autonomy.
Indeed, we may find countries which are both functionally and financially
decentralised. This is true for Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden), Germany or France. We can also indicate countries on
the opposite side of the local autonomy spectrum, that is, both functionally
and financially centralised. This group include Albania, Georgia, Moldova,
Ireland or United Kingdom. But there is also considerable group of coun-
tries which position on both scales is very different (see Table 5.3).
Interestingly, the group of countries which are much more function-
ally than financially autonomous (left column of Table 5.3) includes
exclusively countries of Eastern Europe and especially all three Baltic
States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia). It confirms the claim that in fast
decentralising countries of Eastern Europe the reform of the financial
systems has been often lagging behind other aspects of the increasing
local autonomy. The countries in which fiscal autonomy is much higher
than the level of the functional decentralisation (right column of
Table 5.4) may be found mostly in the Southern (Mediterranean)
Europe—Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg being the only
exceptions to that rule.
We check also which of the individual components of the financial
autonomy index correlate with functional aspects (PS + EPD index):
Table 5.4 Changes in the financial autonomy index in countries with the fastest
growth of the index (at least 4 points growth)
Albania Bulgaria Italy Macedonia Romania Serbia
1990 0 0 4 0 0 5
1991 0 1 5 0 0 5
1992 0 1 5 0 1 5
1993 0 2 5 0 2 5
1994 0 2 6 0 4 5
1995 0 2 6 0 4 5
1996 0 3 6 0 4 5
1997 0 5 6 0 4 5
1998 0 5 6 0 4 5
1999 0 5 6 0 9 5
2000 0 5 6 0 9 5
2001 1 5 6 0 6 5
2002 5 5 7 0 6 5
2003 6 3 7 0 6 5
2004 6 4 7 0 6 5
2005 6 3 7 5 4 6
2006 5 3 7 5 5 7
2007 5 3 7 5 5 9
2008 5 5 7 5 5 9
2009 5 5 7 5 5 9
2010 5 5 7 5 5 9
2011 6 5 8 5 5 9
2012 5 5 7 5 5 9
2013 5 5 8 5 5 9
2014 5 5 8 5 5 9
Note: For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990; the first years of mea-
surement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively
• There is no correlation with financial self-reliance (+0.01), which

means that proportion of local government finance coming from
own sources is not related to the scope of functions local govern-
ments are responsible for.
• There is extremely weak relationship (+0.14) between functional
decentralisation and proportion of general purpose transfers in over-
all structure of grants for local governments.
• But there is stronger relationship that more functionally decentral-
ised countries offer to their local governments more discretion over
tax policies (+0.31) and more borrowing autonomy (+0.37).
35 [PLAGECELL]
30
25
[PLAGECELL]
20
15 [PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
10 [PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL][PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL]
5 [PLAGECELL] [PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
[PLAGECELL]
0
2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00
Fig. 5.4 Financial autonomy index and municipal spending to GDP. (Notes:
Financial autonomy index for 2014 (0X); municipal spending to GDP for 2014
(0Y) (POLLEADER project: Heinelt et al. 2018))
Another illustration of the relationship between financial autonomy

and scope of functions local governments are responsible for is correlation
with the share of municipal government spending to GDP (which might
be used as a simple proxy of functional decentralisation). Also in this case
we find relatively weak positive correlation (+0.36 for 2014 data). The
relationship is illustrated in Fig. 5.4.
Although there is general positive relationship, in some countries
(Moldova, Latvia) the level of financial autonomy is strikingly low if we
take into account relatively wide scope of functions of their municipalities.
In all five Nordic/Scandinavian countries, there is both high level of func-
tional decentralisation and financial autonomy, but the former measure is
“disproportionally” higher from the latter. On the other side of the regres-
sion trend, in Switzerland, France, Luxembourg and Spain the level of
financial autonomy is high in spite of relatively narrower scope of their
responsibilities. In Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Albania, the level of finan-
cial autonomy is lower, but still high comparing to the narrow set of func-
tions delivered by their municipalities.
In general, countries which are more decentralised are more decentral-

ised in both aspects (functional and financial), although the relationship is
not very strong.
5.3.4 Time Trends by Countries

At the same time, the group of East European countries (plus Malta) are
those in which the index of financial autonomy was growing the most
during the whole 1990–2014 period. The list of countries with the fast-
est positive change of an index include Malta, Albania, Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Serbia, Romania and Italy—being the only “old EU mem-
ber state” on the list.
Altogether in 16 countries, the score in 2014 was by at least 1 point
higher than in 1990, in following 17 countries there was no or minimal
change and only in 6 of them the overall score decreased. The sharpest
drop of financial autonomy was identified in Hungary (−3 points) and was
related to very recent re-centralisation reform. Also in other cases (Iceland,
Denmark, Liechtenstein, Estonia, Greece), the retreat of financial auton-
omy took a place during last decade and was often related to the policies
introduced as a response to the financial crisis. The change of the index in
the selected countries is illustrated in Fig. 5.5 and Table 5.4.
As it was mentioned above, changes in the financial transfer systems
often have cyclical character—periods of the consolidation into one
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Estonia Hungary Iceland
Fig. 5.5 Changes of the financial autonomy in the countries with the fastest drop
of the index (drop by at least 2 points)
general purpose grant are interlaced with periods of fragmentation into

more specific/conditional transfers. Our data indicate such cyclical
changes in several countries, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Netherlands, Romania, Switzerland and Ukraine. The time
horizon of those changes is different in individual countries, and it is
very difficult to find common pattern. That cyclical character in the
selected countries is presented in Fig. 5.6.
There are also countries in which general purpose grants have domi-
nated the structure of the transfers system throughout the whole anal-
ysed period. Those countries fall into two categories: first, strongly
decentralised with a wide scope of local functions, but also high finan-
cial autonomy (Denmark, Norway and Sweden); second, countries in
which the overall size of local budgets is low, local governments being
not responsible for vital social services, so the “temptation” to control
them tightly through conditional grants is not very strong (Malta,
Portugal, Turkey). France falls between the two categories. On the
other extreme, there is a group of countries in which conditional grants
were never an important part of the transfer system (Albania, Georgia,
Ireland, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovakia and Slovenia).
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
2001
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Netherlands Ukraine
Fig. 5.6 Cyclical changes of the role of unconditional grants in the overall inter-
governmental transfer system. (Note: 0, domination of conditional; 3, domination
of unconditional grants)
5.4 Conclusion
To analyse the financial dimension of municipal autonomy, we use four
measures (variables) which reflect the spirit of the art. 9 of the European
Charter of Local Government and the main assumptions of fiscal federal-
ism theory. Those variables concern structure of local budget revenues,
local discretion over main taxes, structure of the system of transfers to
municipal budgets and borrowing autonomy.
The main finding is that there has been a huge variation in the financial
autonomy, both across time and among studied countries. For the most of
the 1990–2014 period, the dominant trend has been an increase in the
financial autonomy. This has been especially true for the post-communist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which had a very low level of
financial autonomy at the beginning of the studied period, which have
been gradually increasing throughout the last decade of twentieth and first
few years of twenty-first century. But the increasing trend of financial
autonomy could be noted also in some countries from other parts of the
continent (e.g. Italy).
In some cases the reversal of the increasing autonomy trend might be
noticed as a reaction to the economic crisis which begun in 2008. In that
case the decrease of the financial autonomy has been the most visible in
changes related to borrowing regulations and have occurred more often in
countries which were the most hit by the crisis (as measured by the GDP
change).
In case of the transfers’ structure, the characteristic phenomenon have
been cyclical waves—periodic reforms consolidating fragmented-specific
grant systems into one block grant followed by the revival of the condi-
tional grants being the result of the political games between central
bureaucracies and local governments.
The chapter tries to check the relationship between financial and func-
tional decentralisation of European municipal governments. According to
some claims, the wider scope of functions allocated to local governments
generates demand to tighten control over municipal finance (Blöchliger
and King 2007). But our empirical data does not support such a claim.
There is a weak, but opposite relationship—especially tax and borrowing
autonomy are often higher in countries with more functional decentralisa-
tion. It seems that countries which opt for more decentralisation are usu-
ally ready for offering local autonomy related to various dimensions of the
term, in particular both functional and financial.
Appendix
Table 5.5 Fiscal autonomy (FA) by country (mean, reference years and changes)
Mean
value Changes
(1990– 1990–
2014) 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2014
Germany 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00
Liechten
stein 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00
Switzerla
nd 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.00
Denmark 3.44 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 -1.00
Austria 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Finland 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Luxemb
ourg 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Sweden 2.88 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Poland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Belgium 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
France 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Iceland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Ireland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Netherla
nds 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Norway 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Spain 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
United
Kingdom 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Italy 1.96 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Romaniaa 1.83 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Cyprus 1.74 1.22 1.27 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.78
Portugal 1.48 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Slovakia 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Serbia 1.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Georgia 1.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Czech
Republic 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Estonia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Greece 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Lithuania 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Turkey 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Ukrainea 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Croatia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Hungary 0.96 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Moldova 0.92 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macedo
nia 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Albaniaa 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Slovenia 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Bulgaria 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Latviaa 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Maltaa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

a
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
Table 5.6 Financial transfer system (FTS) by country (mean, reference years and
changes)
Mean
value Changes
(1990– 1990–
2014) 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2014
Denmark 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
France 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Luxemb
ourg 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Maltaa 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Norway 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Portugal 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Sweden 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Turkey 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Iceland 2.88 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 –1.00
Finland 2.80 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Serbia 2.32 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Poland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Austria 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Greece 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Liechten
stein 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Spain 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Germany 1.90 1.80 1.81 1.91 1.89 1.99 1.98 0.18
United
Kingdom 1.89 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.89 1.89 1.89 0.01
Hungary 1.84 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 –2.00
Latviaa 1.83 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Czech
Republic 1.68 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.00
Cyprus 1.30 1.22 1.27 1.32 1.33 1.32 1.31 0.09
Italy 1.16 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Belgium 1.13 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.22 1.22 0.22
Romaniaa 1.09 0.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Croatia 1.07 1.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 1.70 1.71 0.71
Lithuania 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Estonia 0.96 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.00
Netherla
nds 0.92 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Ireland 0.84 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Bulgaria 0.64 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Albaniaa 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ukrainea 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.91 0.46 0.46
Georgia 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Switzerla
nd 0.29 0.20 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.59 0.72 0.52
Macedo
nia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Moldova 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Slovakia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

a
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
Table 5.7 Financial self-reliance (FSR) by country (mean, reference years and
changes)
Mean value (1990– 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Changes 1990–
2014) 2014
Belgium 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Finland 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
France 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Iceland 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Ireland 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Norway 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Spain 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Sweden 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Switzerland 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Liechtenstein 2.88 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 –1.00
Cyprus 2.65 2.61 2.63 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.65 0.04
Croatia 2.39 2.00 2.00 2.66 2.69 2.29 2.29 0.29
Poland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Denmark 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Greece 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Luxembourg 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Portugal 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Slovakia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Turkey 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Italy 1.88 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00
Germany 1.78 1.80 1.86 1.89 1.78 1.54 1.85 0.05
Maltaa 1.73 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Austria 1.49 1.53 1.27 1.27 1.52 1.76 1.94 0.41
Georgia 1.48 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Czech
Republic 1.32 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Serbia 1.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Albaniaa 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Romaniaa 1.09 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Bulgaria 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Estonia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Hungary 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Lithuania 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Netherlands 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
United
Kingdom 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Macedonia 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Moldova 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Latviaa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ukrainea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
Table 5.8 Borrowing autonomy (BA) by country (mean, reference years and changes)
Mean
value Changes
(1990– 1990–
2014) 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2014
Liechten
stein 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Sweden 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Czech
Republic 2.92 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Iceland 2.88 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 –1.00
Greece 2.80 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 –1.00
Hungary 2.76 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 –2.00
Slovakia 2.60 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 –1.00
Switzerla
nd 2.53 2.50 2.50 2.55 2.54 2.53 2.52 0.03
Poland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Belgium 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Estonia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Finland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
France 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Germany 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Lithuania 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Netherla
nds 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Portugal 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Croatia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.99 2.00 0.00
Austria 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.88 0.01
Spain 1.76 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Bulgaria 1.64 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Norway 1.48 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Georgia 1.44 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Italy 1.44 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.00
Serbia 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Slovenia 1.40 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cyprus 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Denmark 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Ireland 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Latviaa 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Luxemb
ourg 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Maltaa 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Moldova 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Turkey 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
United
Kingdom 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Romaniaa 0.96 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ukrainea 0.95 1.32 1.33 1.34 0.68 0.68 0.69 –0.63
Albaniaa 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macedo
nia 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
a
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
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CHAPTER 6
Organisational Choice
6.1 Introduction
Another important aspect of local autonomy turns around the municipali-
ties’ and their citizens’ possibilities to organise their politico-administrative
system. Is everything fixed by national laws or do municipalities have the
possibility to adapt their political institutions and their local administra-
tion according to their specific needs and preferences?
Each part of the politico-administrative system, the local administration
and the political system (see also Nemec and de Vries 2015: 254), consists
of a larger number of aspects which can fill volumes of comparative
research since for each part we find a considerable amount of diversity in
the countries under scrutiny. In this book, however, we are only to a lim-
ited extent interested in the different organisational configurations and try
to avoid discussing their shortcomings and advantages. Our concern
focuses on the amount of discretion municipalities dispose of when it
comes to organising themselves.
For a better understanding of the decisions at stake, nevertheless, it is
useful to know more about the different existing models. This helps to
understand the choices municipalities can or cannot make according to
the degree of their autonomy. Once more, it will come out clearly that
there is a considerable diversity among the countries and sometimes even
within the countries. As a point of reference, we turn again our attention

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_6
to the European Charter of Local Self-Government which points out the

importance of the municipalities’ role when deciding on their political
system and their administration.
Art. 3 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government empha-
sises the right and ability of local authorities to manage public affairs
and insists that the members of the political councils or assemblies (the
legislative branch of local government) are democratically elected (see
Box 6.1). The executive branch of local government has to be account-
able to the legislative branch. It can be elected directly by the citizens
or elected/appointed by the council. The European Charter of Local
Self-Government therefore acknowledges the differences between
what is sometimes called parliamentary or presidential systems of gov-
ernment without favouring of either of them. More direct forms of
citizens’ participation, like, for example, referendums, are possible but
neither necessary nor requested, which would upset a considerable
number of countries.

a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibil-
ity and in the interests of the local population.
§2. This right shall be exercised by councils or assemblies composed
of members freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct,
equal, universal suffrage, and which may possess executive organs
responsible to them. This provision shall in no way affect recourse
to assemblies of citizens, referendums or any other form of direct
citizen participation where it is permitted by statute.
Interesting to add here is the claim of art. 7, paragraph 2 which insists

on appropriate financial compensation for expenses and loss of remunera-
tion and corresponding social welfare protection (see Box 6.2). Not all
countries seem to agree with this article, either because they do not have
the resources to do so, or because they do not think that politicians
ORGANISATIONAL CHOICE 153
should be remunerated like professionals. Switzerland, for example,

declares itself not bound to the second paragraph of this article since it
offsets the widespread militia system (“Milizsystem”).1 More than ten
other countries also declared themselves not bound to art. 7, paragraph
2, among them Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Greece
and the Netherlands (see Table 1.1 in Chap. 1).2

Conditions Under Which Responsibilities at Local Level Are
Exercised
§1. The conditions of office of local elected representatives shall

provide for free exercise of their functions.
§2. They shall allow for appropriate financial compensation for
expenses incurred in the exercise of the office in question as well
as, where appropriate, compensation for loss of earnings or
remuneration for work done and corresponding social welfare
protection.
§3. Any functions and activities which are deemed incompatible
with the holding of local elective office shall be determined by
statute or fundamental legal principles.
The relevant article concerning the local administration (art. 6) is

more prescriptive. Local authorities shall be able to determine their own
administrative structures, which shall allow for the recruitment of highly
qualified and adequately remunerated staff, selected on the principles of
merit and competence. The article insists on the training of local civil
servants and rules out a spoils system based on party membership or
kinship. Insisting on professional skills and adequate payment can bring
1
Message of the Swiss Federal Government on the signature of the European Charter of
Local Self-Government: https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2004/79.pdf,
p. 94 (consulted in 2018).
2
For the list of reservations and declarations, see: http://www.coe.int/en/web/conven-
tions/full-list/−/conventions/treaty/122/declarations?p_auth=RjzJKse3 (consulted in
2018).
smaller municipalities, where most of the work is done on a voluntary

and party-time basis, into difficulties, since they do not need and do not
have the resources for a professional administration. Switzerland, with
its numerous small municipalities, declares itself once more not bound
to art. 6.2 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (see Box
6.3).3 The cantons asked the national government not to accept this
article since they consider it in opposition to the militia system of Swiss
local governments.4 Other countries not considering themselves bound
to art. 6, paragraph 2 are the Czech Republic, Georgia, Liechtenstein,
Montenegro and Serbia (see Table 1.1 in Chap. 1).5

Appropriate Administrative Structures and Resources for the Tasks of
Local Authorities
§1. Without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local

authorities shall be able to determine their own internal admin-
istrative structures in order to adapt them to local needs and
ensure effective management.
§2. The conditions of service of local government employees shall
be such as to permit the recruitment of high-quality staff on the
basis of merit and competence; to this end adequate training
opportunities, remuneration and career prospects shall be
provided.
The articles in the European Charter of Local Self-Government—by

the way—reveal also nicely the challenges and the limits of such interna-
tional legally binding instruments. In order to achieve their goals, they
3
For the text ratified by Switzerland, for example, see: https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/
classified-compilation/20032500/index.html (consulted in 2018); not bound are as well
the Czech Republic, Georgia, Liechtenstein and Montenegro, for example, see the list of
reservations and declarations (op. cit.).
4
See, for example, the Message of the Swiss Federal Government on the signature of the
European Charter of Local Self-Government (op. cit.).
5
See the list of reservations and declarations (op. cit.).
have to be sufficiently clear and demanding. At the same time, they have
to appeal to a sufficient number of countries and have to take care of exist-
ing diversities. With respect to the political systems, there are some clear
hints to promote local democracy without being too explicit as far as the
democratic institutions are concerned. With respect to the administration,
municipalities enjoy quite some discretion to choose the form of manage-
ment for the public service, but there are exceptions (Marcou 2010: 3).
6.2 Issues at Stake

The way we use organisational autonomy in this book describes the
municipalities’ autonomy to decide on the different elements of their
politico-administrative system. These aspects are—at least partially—
sometimes addressed by the political profile or the structure of local
democracy (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014: 22). The way munici-
palities are organised is not only a technical matter but it is also related
to the concept of “good local governance” (see Reddy et al. 2015: 167).
This is particularly the case when it touches upon the different goals to
be achieved, such as transparency, accountability, rule of law, responsive-
ness, inclusiveness and equitability, effectiveness and efficiency or partici-
pation. It would be interesting and rewarding to compare the different
countries’ performance along these normative claims. This, however, is
not the goal of this book. We are interested in existing differences and
more particularly in the municipalities’ possibilities to decide on their
organisation.
The politico-administrative system consists—as the name suggests—of
two distinct parts: the political system and the administration (see also
Nemec and de Vries 2015: 254). Although the distinction between the
two parts, between political system and administration, between politi-
cians and civil servants, seems to be obvious at first sight, there is room for
overlapping, especially in the case of the executive function and top-ranked
civil servants. Occasionally, the political branch might take over adminis-
trative tasks, and sometimes the administrative branch becomes politically
powerful. Nevertheless, we believe that it makes sense to distinguish the
two parts. The political system is more about what has to be done, whereas
the administration is about executing these decisions.
6.2.1 Political System
The conditions under which local representatives obtain and carry out
their mandates are governed by domestic laws. The degree of autonomy
enjoyed by local authorities in adapting these provisions to local condi-
tions and preferences is generally limited (Council of European
Municipalities and Regions 2010: 5). If there are differences within the
countries, they quite often depend on the size of the municipalities
(Council of European Municipalities and Regions 2010: 6f.). Key ele-
ments of local political systems are the political institutions municipalities
dispose of (structure of local government), the way political office holders
are elected (electoral districts, electoral system) and the way they fulfil
their duties (competences, length of mandate, remuneration).
The main institutional pillars of local democracy are the local assembly
and the local executive to use the common terms of the Council of Europe.
In a more generic way and with a hint to the separation of powers, we
distinguish between the legislative and executive branches of local govern-
ment. By doing so, we must be aware that these terms are somehow mis-
leading. The assembly does not decide on laws but rather on rules and
regulations and finds it sometimes difficult to control the local govern-
ment in an adequate manner, and the executive or the mayor cover a
broad spectrum ranging from a more honorary or representative role to
professional political leadership. Important is the fact that assembly and
executive are political and not administrative bodies.
The common distinction between presidential and parliamentary sys-
tems—to some extent—also applies to local political systems. The purest
form of direct democracy, a meeting of the citizens to manage local affairs,
is hardly found among the countries of the Council of Europe (Council of
Europe 2002: 10). An outstanding exception in this respect is Switzerland,
where 80% of the municipalities take their decisions at such meetings.
These decisions are binding and cover all important issues of local politics
(Ladner 2016).
According to the Council of Europe (2002), local political systems best
described as parliamentary democracies be found in the majority of coun-
tries.6 At the time of the study, only a few countries came close to a
6
Parliamentary systems existed in Albania, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland,
Spain, Sweden and France (Council of Europe 2002). Some of these countries (Albania,
Croatia and Poland), however, moved towards a presidential system with the introduction of
directly elected mayors.
presidential system.7 In recent years the presidential system has become

more frequent, especially in Eastern Europe.
The local parliament or the local assembly (local council) is the main
actor in the local decision-making process. The assembly is democratically
elected by the citizens. It is the representative body of the citizens (Council
of Europe 2002: 11) and deals within the reach of local autonomy with
the most important matters of local politics such as the setting of political
goals, voting of the local budget and taxes, planning, approval of local
policies, approval of the annual account presented by the local executive.
The local assembly is accountable to the citizens.
The local executive is—in a parliamentary setting—accountable to the
local assembly. The idea that the executive is simply executing the deci-
sions of the local assembly, however, does not meet reality. Being in most
cases more professional and being able to take advantage of their closeness
to the administration, the executive body is generally much more involved
in shaping local policies than the local council. This might be even more
the case when the executive body (executive board or the major) is directly
elected and therefore also legitimised by the citizens.
The executive functions (meant as the role of the political body) is
either in the hands of the mayor or in the hand of a collegial body.8 In the
case of the latter, the size of the body and the way it is composed remains
to be decided. The way the local executive or the mayor is installed, leaves
also room for flexibility. There are basically three different ways to design
the local executive (Council of Europe 2002: 25):
1. The mayor/executive can be elected or appointed by the local

assembly (council). This comes close to a parliamentary system. An
additional question to ask here is whether the assembly can dismiss
the local executive?9
7
Hungary, Italy (since the 1993 reform), Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, Portugal, Romania
and Switzerland had local democracies of the presidential type. France and Spain can also be
counted as countries with a presidential system, because they have no tradition of the assem-
bly supervising the executive or because of the close electoral list in the case of Spain (Council
of Europe 2002: 34).
8
Executive power in the hands of the mayor: Albania, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Spain, Turkey and Ireland, where it is rather a man-
ager. Executive power in the hands of a collegial body: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden
and Switzerland (Council of Europe 2002: 53).
9
Countries with a council-elected mayor are Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, United
Kingdom, Estonia, France, Portugal, Malta, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain (except very
small municipalities) (Loughlin et al. 2010: 736; Council of Europe 2002: 55). In Finland,
Norway and Sweden, the mayor is neither council-elected nor directly elected. Here, all deci-
2. The executive/mayor can be directly elected by the local popula-

tion. In this case, the local system comes closer to a presidential
system.10
3. In some countries the executive respectively the head of the execu-
tive is appointed by national or regional authorities.11
With the higher number of parliamentary systems, the election through

parliament used to be more widespread, but in recent times some coun-
tries (e.g. Italy, Ireland, Belgium, Lithuania and Germany) turned towards
a more presidential type of systems with direct elections of the executive
(Council of Europe 2002: 32). An interesting case is the United Kingdom
where the direct election of the mayor is a recurrent debate. There is also
a group of countries (e.g. Denmark, Sweden) where the assembly elects
the executive but not in the form of a majority government. The composi-
tion of the executive here reflects the strength of the different parties.12
Switzerland also has such multiparty executives, but there the members
are directly elected.
Direct election of the executive or of the mayor has an impact on the
balance of power between the two branches of local government. The
direct election of the executive or parts of the executive increases its legiti-
macy. This, in general, favours political leadership but raises questions of
political control.
There are also room for diversity with respect to the legislative’s direct
access to the administration and whether their members have to pass
through the executive to receive information or services, whether members
of the executive still remain members of the parliament which upsets
sions are formally taken in the board or council, although there are examples of a powerful
municipal chairman (Loughlin et al. 2010: 736).
10
The countries concerned are Albania, Austria (6 Länder since 1994), Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Germany (in most Länder), Greece, Hungary, Italy (since 1993), Macedonia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom (in 12 municipali-
ties) (Loughlin et al. 2010: 736; Council of Europe 2002: 56; Nemec and de Vries 2015:
254). Also in Switzerland, the direct election of mayor and local executive is also common
practice, and so is in Poland and Croatia.
11
This applies to the Netherlands, parts of Belgium (Nemec and de Vries 2015: 254) and
Luxembourg.
12
Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014: 26) refer to countries like the United Kingdom,
Sweden and Denmark as monistic systems in which all decision-making power, including the
“executive” direction and control of local administration are in the control of the elected
local council.
the principle of a clear separation of powers or whether the mayor chairs

the local assembly. And the same holds for the frequency of meetings and
whether meetings are public or take place behind closed doors.
In the case of direct elections, there is the question of the electoral sys-
tem to be solved. This problem is especially salient when citizens elect an
executive body consisting of several members. Here, majority systems are
opposed to proportional (PR) systems, with the former definitely being
more widespread. In the case of the assembly (council), on the contrary,
about three quarters of the member states of the council of Europe use a
PR system (Council of Europe 2002: 16).13 Nevertheless, there are varying
degrees of proportionality achieved depending on the method of PR used.
And finally, political systems differ according to the possibilities they
offer their citizens to participate in the political policy making process.14
Without being exhaustive these possibilities range from participatory plan-
ning and participative budgeting to binding initiatives and referendums
on local issues. The latter forms, however, are particularly seldom with
Switzerland being the noteworthy exception. There is nevertheless a ten-
dency to integrate citizens more into local decision-making, and there are
calls for more direct democracy, like, for example, in the German Länder
and to some extent also in Austria. Quite often, however, these attempts
are government-initiated like, for example, in the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Hungary,
Czech Republic and Slovenia (Loughlin et al. 2010: 734).
There are—as we have seen—a large variety of possibilities to organise
local political systems and doubtlessly the reason for this diversity are his-
torical, cultural and related to the political system on national level. The
configurations itself are not directly linked to the degree of political auton-
omy; the question much more is to what extent are municipalities able to
decide on the different elements of their political system? Is it all set up by
national legislation or do they have the possibility to adapt their systems to
their specific needs or preferences?
13
France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Poland, Ukraine,
Greece, Italy (Council of Europe 2002: 16) and Switzerland use majority systems or mixed
systems, particularly in smaller municipalities.
14
Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014: 26) distinguish between traditionally representative
democracy-based institutions (United Kingdom, Sweden since 1974, Germany until 1990
and France) and local government systems with strong direct democracy-based systems
(Switzerland, Germany since 1990, Hungary, Italy, Sweden until 1974, Austria, Finland and
Czech Republic).
A large number of countries opt for uniformity and nationwide rules to

organise the municipalities’ political systems. Considering the diversity of
organisational settings described above, there are various competing solu-
tions to organise a municipality which are most probably functionally
equivalent. A high degree of organisational autonomy means that the
municipalities enjoy a high degree of discretion when it comes to defining
the key elements of their political system.
The Swiss case is a good example for how far organisational autonomy
can go. The federalist structure and the separation of task and compe-
tences make a nationwide regulation of the local political systems impos-
sible and leave this—like in many other federalist countries—to the
intermediate tier, the cantons. Within the 26 cantons, there is, however, a
large diversity concerning the organisational autonomy given to the
municipalities. In some cantons, mainly in the French-speaking part of the
country, most of the crucial characteristics concerning the local political
systems of their municipalities are defined by cantonal legislation and
sometimes depend on the size of the municipalities. In some of the
German-speaking cantons, legislation leaves much more leeway to the
municipalities, and they decide freely on the way they organise their politi-
cal systems. Such decisions concern the existence of a local parliament
(assembly) instead of a “town hall meeting” of all citizens entitled to vote,
the size of their executive, the way it is elected and the electoral systems
used and the means and the reach of direct democracy.
6.2.2 Local Administration
There is also a remarkable heterogeneity as far as the scope and role of the
local administration is concerned (Le Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et
régionaux 2009: 10). It can vary between the role of the secretary of the
local assembly and a very active manager or CEO of the local administra-
tion. In a large majority of the countries, however, it is national or regional
legislation that rules the status of the local administration and the recruit-
ment of the civil servants (Le Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux
2009: 9), and there is a limited amount of liberty left to the municipalities
to organise themselves according to their preferences.
The main parameters of the local administrations concern, first of all,
their internal organisation and processes which are, of course, related to
the scope and size of the administration, respectively, to the task the local
administration has to fulfil. To this has to be added the relation to the
political players of the local politico-administrative system. To what extent

does the administration depend on an elected politician, and how does the
local assembly steer and control the administration?
Whether municipalities fulfil their tasks themselves or whether they rely
to some extent on the private sector through outsourcing or public-private
partnership is a second distinct characteristic of administrative systems.
The relationship between state/public administration and civil society has
also constantly been one of the key issues of administrative reforms
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014: 172).
A third characteristic concerns the local civil servants and their status.
The nomination of the civil servants is in many countries in the hands of
the mayor or the executive (Le Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux
2009: 9). Are civils simply directly selected by the municipalities on the
basis of their qualifications and skills (employment system), or do they first
have to obtain specific qualifications (career system) which is more com-
mon in the countries under scrutiny (Le Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et
régionaux 2009: 8)? Is the career of top-ranked civil servants linked to the
politicians in office and they risk losing their jobs when a new party comes
into power (see the spoils system in the United States) or is the administra-
tion organised more independently?
When discussing the local administrative system, we must not forget
the NPM (new public management) reforms that started in the early
1980s. These reforms suggested new forms of organising the local admin-
istration by borrowing organisational and procedural models from the
business sector. They proposed to reconsider the civil service through
downsizing, normalising labour/employment, testing new personnel
selection procedures, decentralising personnel-related power/responsi-
bilities and developing performance-related pay schemes (Kuhlmann and
Wollmann 2014: 240 f.). And finally, they wanted to restrict local govern-
ment administration to “core tasks” and to halt the expansion of public
tasks and expenditures through privatisation, outsourcing and delegation
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014: 172).
In some countries—like, for example, in France with the “loi organique
sur les lois de finances (LOLF)”—NPM reforms were implemented top-
down and included the totality of municipalities. In other countries the
decision to undertake such reforms was in the hands of the municipalities.
The crucial question here remains the same. To what extent do municipali-
ties have the possibility to choose between different organisational forms?
But here, local autonomy becomes overshadowed by the municipalities’
possibilities and willingness to undertake such reforms. The reforms,

although oriented in a predefined direction (NPM), give them some addi-
tional options.
6.3 Measuring Organisation Autonomy

Not all of the above-mentioned elements of the politico-administrative
system are of equal importance for the measurement of local autonomy.
Whether local government tends towards a parliamentary or a presidential
system is related to institutional preferences for either of the forms of
electing the executive. Neither does the prevailing electoral system increase
or decrease the degree of local autonomy. It can, however, be important
that local government can decide about the main components of their
political system and that they have the possibility to decide who governs
them. It is also important that they can decide about their administration.
In this respect, the question rises whether the fact that the mayor is
appointed by higher levels of government like it is occasionally the case,
for example, in the Netherlands, Belgium or Luxembourg, is detrimental
to local autonomy. In a similar vein, it can be argued that a career system
with guaranteed employment for civil servants gives the municipalities less
marge de manoeuvre than a system where they simply employ their civil
servants according to their specific needs.
The most important questions to ask in terms of local autonomy, how-
ever, turn around the extent to which municipalities are free to organise
their politico-administrative system or whether they simply have to execute
nationwide regulations. Nationwide regulations sometimes distinguish
between smaller and larger municipalities or make the autonomy depen-
dent on a specific status of the city or the municipality. As for the degree of
freedom municipalities dispose of, a distinction can be made between the
number of elements that can be altered, the extent to which these elements
can be altered and whether these elements are more or less important.
Considering the large number of components and the existing diversity
among the countries a comprehensive evaluation of the municipalities’
autonomy would be a research project on its own right. We therefore s uggest
to use an overall measurement of organisational autonomy and to concen-
trate on some core elements of the politico-administrative system, that is,
whether municipalities can elect their authorities and decide on some ele-
ments of the electoral system and whether they can hire their civil servants,
fix their salaries, decide on the organisational structure and have the possibil-
ity to create legal entities and municipal enterprises (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Organisational autonomy (OA)—operationalisation/coding
Organisational The extent to 0–4 Local executive and election system:

autonomy which local 0 local executives are appointed by
government is free higher-level authorities and local authorities
to decide about its cannot determine core elements of their
own organisation political systems (electoral districts, number
and electoral of seats, electoral system)
system 1 executives are elected by the municipal
council or directly by citizens
2 executives are elected by the citizens or the
council and the municipality may decide
some elements of the electoral system
Staff and local structures:
Local authorities:
Hire their own staff (0–0.5) Fix the salary
of their
employees
(0–0.5)
Choose their organisational Establish legal
structure (0–0.5) entities and
municipal
enterprises
(0–0.5)
6.4 Results
According to the judgements of the experts involved in this study, the
average score for organisational autonomy across all years and all countries
amounts to 2.7 (N = 39). This is the highest value on the harmonised
scales. The standard deviation for organisational autonomy is also high
(0.9) meaning that there is a considerable diversity among the different
countries (see Chap. 9). To reach this value, the municipalities must have
at least the possibility to elect the local executive, either directly or through
the local assembly (council) and have also some autonomy to organise
their local administration (see previous section).
The development across time is not particularly spectacular (see
Fig. 6.1). If there have been changes in the degree of organisational
autonomy, they took place in the early 1990s. In many countries, particu-
larly in those of Eastern and Central Europe, this was a period of consoli-
dation of active democratic reforms and transformation of political culture.
In the middle of the 1990s, the degree of organisational autonomy almost
reached its actual level. Since then, there has only been a very small overall
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
2005
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Fig. 6.1 Organisational autonomy—overall trend. (Note: For Albania, Latvia,
increase. After 2009, the score slightly dropped. Although it increased

again, it has not reached the overall peak, yet.
Eight out of 39 countries reach the highest score of 4 in 2014 com-
pared to 7 in 1990 (see Fig. 6.2). Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland score the maximum value
throughout the whole period under observation. These countries have
been joined by Norway in the mid-1990s. Five countries only attain a
score of 1 in 2014 compared to 7 in 1995 which did not exceed the value
of 1. France, Ireland, Malta, Luxembourg and Georgia constantly score
the lowest values with Georgia attaining a minimum degree of autonomy
in this respect only very recently.
Nine countries (Finland, Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands, Serbia,
Slovak Republic, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) constantly
score a value of 3. Bulgaria, Belgium, Italy, Slovenia and Croatia joined
this group during the period under observation. Countries like Romania,
Albania, Hungary, Germany, Cyprus, Portugal, Turkey and Moldova
score below the overall average without falling into the group with the
lowest organisational autonomy.
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Netherlands
Romania*
Turkey
Hungary
Serbia
France
Belgium
Luxembourg
Albania*
Austria
Greece
Norway
Moldova
Malta*
Iceland
Finland
Latvia*
Macedonia
Italy
Spain
Germany
Croatia
Ireland
Denmark
Ukraine*
Bulgaria
Slovenia
Georgia
Poland
Sweden
Liechtenstein
Portugal
Switzerland
Lithuania
Slovakia
Estonia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
-0.5
-1.0
Fig. 6.2 Organisational autonomy—development in the different countries.

(Note: *For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for
1990; the first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991,
respectively)
The ways the different countries achieve their scores, however, can vary
considerably. In the Czech Republic, the municipal council can decide,
within a given bracket, the size of the council, that is, the number of the
council members. The council can also decide if the municipality is com-
posed of one or more electoral districts. In Norway the municipality may
decide on certain elements of the electoral system (e.g. whether to have
elections over one or two days or the number of council seats within cer-
tain limits). In Poland local governments decide upon the shape and size
of electoral districts. In Serbia local governments can decide on the num-
ber of members of the municipal/city councils. In Slovenia the municipal-
ity may decide on the territorial definition of electoral districts. In Sweden
as well the municipality may decide elements of the electoral system (e.g.
the number of council seats within certain limits and the division into
constituents). Swiss municipalities enjoy quite remarkable freedom with
regard to their political organisation. There are some cantons, especially in
the French-speaking part of the country, where subnational legislation
limits their leeway, but in the majority of the cantons the core decisions
concerning the political system (assembly or council, size of the executive,

electoral system, electoral districts and position of the mayor) is left to the
municipalities (Ladner 1991, 2008).
In a significant number of countries, all electoral elements regarding
the formation of local authorities are decided by the central government.
In Austria, for example, it is predetermined by the federal Constitution if
mayors are to be elected by the municipal council or directly by the citi-
zens, with no autonomy for the local communities to deviate from this
rule.
With respect to their administration, municipalities generally have the
possibility to hire their own staff, fix their salary (sometimes within limits
set by the central government), choose their organisational structure and
establish legal entities and municipal enterprises. In a larger number of
countries, there are different types of restrictions.
In Bulgaria municipal councils may decide on the structure of the local
administration and the number of administrative staff, but the central gov-
ernment is authorised to determine the maximum number of administra-
tive positions and the funds for salaries, provided by the state budget,
according to the municipality size (number of inhabitants). In Serbia sala-
ries of municipal employees are to a large extent determined by the central
government.
In the Czech Republic, the appointment of the municipal manager
requires the consent of the regional manager. The salary of employees is
regulated. There are two parts of the remuneration: fixed and variable.
Municipalities have some discretion regarding the variable part.
In Cyprus municipalities and communities hire their own staff but are
not free to fix the salary of their employees; they are also not free to estab-
lish legal entities and municipal enterprises since special schemes for differ-
ent services are regulated by national legislation and state authorities often
set up semi-governmental agencies for special tasks. In Greece municipalities
do not have the power to hire their own staff (few exemptions exist), and
they cannot fix the salary of their employees. In Malta the local councils
hire their own staff but are bound by national civil service rules when it
comes to setting salaries, performance bonuses and so on. Nor do local
councils choose their organisational structure or establish legal entities
and municipal enterprises.
If we have a closer look at the changes over time, the data for the dif-
ferent countries confirms a relative stability in the evolution of political
and organisational autonomy of local government. There are, however,

some noteworthy changes (see Table 6.2 in the Appendix). In eight coun-
tries (Norway, Italy, Bulgaria, Belgium, Slovenia, Moldova, Croatia,
Georgia), the organisational autonomy increased remarkably in the last
25 years. In Romania there has been an increase followed by a decrease,
and in the two countries Spain and Latvia, the autonomy decreased.
For Belgium the 1990s were a decade of hesitant administrative mod-
ernisation of local government. They translated into more autonomy in
terms or hiring staff, fixing their salary (although only for non-statutory
employees), choosing the organisational structure, establishing legal enti-
ties and municipal enterprises, establishing arms-length agencies and sys-
tems of budgeting and accounting. These ideas and tendencies have
continued after regionalisation. The Flemish region has been most enthu-
siastic about adopting organisational modernisation practices diffused
under the banner of new public management. In Wallonia and Brussels,
change has been much more modest.
In Bulgaria several legislative developments in the 1990s led to an
increase of organisational autonomy; the Local Self-Government and
Local Administration Act, promulgated in 1991 and subsequently
amended several times, lays out the foundations for organisational auton-
omy of local self-government, municipal structure, hiring of municipal
staff and so on, and a clear mechanism for the establishment and protec-
tion of municipal ownership right was put in place in 1996, with the intro-
duction of the State Property Act and the Municipal Property Act.
Croatia marks an important increase in 2009. The introduction of the
direct election of the mayor indirectly also changed the organisational
autonomy and the local government system introduced in 1992–1993.
The system from the outset met with significant challenges in municipali-
ties with divided power, where the mayor and the local council majority
represented different political forces. The cohabitation problem resulted
in particularly serious political tensions in the capital city of Zagreb. In
2012, the Croatian government introduced legislative changes regulating
elections and the relationship between the representative and executive
bodies in the local government system; one of the changes introduced was
that “Mayors were explicitly given the right to elect and revoke the repre-
sentatives of units of local and regional self-government in local institu-
tions and companies”.
Georgia adopted its new Local Self-Government Code in 2014, which

brings about important changes in the existing local self-government sys-
tem: that is, direct election of the mayor, declaration of a non-confidence
vote to a directly elected mayor by the municipal council or voters, the
mayor becoming the supreme self-government official (replacing in this
role the head of the municipal council). The Local Self-Government Code
states that the number of civil servants in self-government bodies will be
not less than 30 regular staff units. Remuneration costs of civil servants of
a city hall and municipal council should not exceed 25% of the costs pro-
jected in a municipality’s budget. Until 2007, property in the ownership
of the Ministry of Economy or of the former farming economies will be
transferred into the ownership of the relevant municipality if they are nec-
essary for the exercise of self-government.
In Italy the adoption of Law entitled “Regulations of Local
Autonomies” in 1990 was a landmark development for local government
bodies; it consolidated the statutory autonomy of Italian municipalities
and provinces, granted a significant number of new powers to local
authorities amongst which the right to establish their own constitu-
tions—“statutes”. Local authorities can hire their own staff, choose their
organisational structure and establish legal entities and municipal enter-
prises. Until 1990s, local authority staff in Italy formed one component
of the national public service, whereas provincial and municipal secretar-
ies were officials of the Ministry of Interior. Secretaries are now employ-
ees of an autonomous agency although they are answerable to the mayor/
president. There is also a power to appoint (confined, since 2011, to
cities of over 250,000) “city managers”—an option taken up by the
larger municipalities.
In Moldova the adoption of two key laws in 1998 marked a crucial stage
for consolidation of local democracy and increase of organisational
autonomy of local authorities, the Law on Territorial-Administrative

Organisation and the Law on Local Public Administration. The latter aimed
to enforce principles and techniques that would ensure an effective delimi-
tation of power among various levels of public administration. It confers to
the local council the right to approve statutes and other regulatory
acts necessary for the functioning of local government. This procedure is
usually initiated by the mayor, and the modes of implementation depend
upon the particular administrative structure adopted, based upon
forms and models approved by the government, including staff organisa-

tion of the mayoralty and other autonomous executive structures or public
services supervised by the local council. The personnel of local self-
government bodies form two distinct categories: (1) public officials, who
fall under the civil service, and (2) technical personnel, the relations with
which are regulated by labour legislation. The central government estab-
lished and recommended to the local councils a staffing scheme that is not
compulsory but defines the maximum number of technical staff of com-
munes and cities. The monitoring report of the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities on Moldova of 2005 states that local authorities have
very limited freedom to organise themselves, in particular because of the
obligation of recruiting a given number of civil servants to be affected to
precise tasks.15
In Norway organisational autonomy was substantially augmented with
the revision of local government legislation of 1992 and during the fol-
lowing years. Municipalities hire their own staff, decide organisational
structure, fix salaries and may establish legal entities/enterprises.
In Slovenia the consolidation of the principles of local democracy
started with the adoption of the Local Self-Government Act of 1993,
leading to a relatively high level of organisational autonomy. Local author-
ities hire their own staff, choose organisation structure of municipal
administration and establish legal entities and municipal enterprises.
Latvia and Spain are the two countries which have a marked decrease of
organisational autonomy; in both cases this decrease is directly linked to
the consequences of the global financial crisis and measures put in place by
central authorities.
In Latvia for a long time the salaries of the chair, deputies, as well as the
staff of local government units were determined by the local council. As a
result of the crisis, a stricter financial discipline in the public sector was
introduced and since 2010 the State’s and Local Governments’ Officials’
and Employees’ Remuneration Law is in force. According to this
legislation, the central government determines the ceilings for salaries of
public staff (state and local level) in different categories.
In Spain, the 2013 Local Act Reform has imposed some restrictions
over local governments to freely decide on their staff and local structures.
15
For the monitoring report of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities on
Moldova of 2005, see https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=1919577&Site=Congress
&direct=true (consulted in 2018).
The restrictions refer to the autonomy to fix salaries (both for public
employees and for councillors and mayors) and to decide on the size of the
staff as it has limited the possibility to hire new employees (this applies to
all administrations).
The level of organisational autonomy in Romania has been varying
in the last two decades, showing both increase and decrease. Local
governments in Romania employ two types of personnel: civil servants
and staff falling under special statutes and contractual personnel. The
central government sets the base wage of all subnational government
employees (both civil servants and contractual personnel). Until 2011
a system of bonuses and allowances, which could be granted at local
discretion, existed. The first cases of such bonuses and allowances were
introduced in 1993, their number has gradually increased over the
years, and by 2004 they produced significant effects in terms of differ-
ences in salaries and overall increases in personnel spending. Since
2009, as part of a set of measures aimed to reduce personnel spending
in local government, absolute ceilings of staffing levels and ceilings on
personnel spending were introduced for the first and second tiers of
local government units.
6.5 Concluding Remarks

Organisational autonomy defined as the possibilities municipalities have to
decide on their political institutions and their local administration is—
when looking at our measurements—a rather high scoring characteristics
of local autonomy meaning that municipalities have at least the possibility
to elect their local executive directly and have also some leeway when it
comes to organising their local administration. However, there is a consid-
erable amount of diversity among the different countries. Only in some
countries municipalities can decide on elements of their electoral system
like, for example, on the number and size of their electoral districts, on
whether they prefer majority elections or proportional representation
(PR) or on the form and the size of their local executive. In most countries
these parameters are set by national legislation. As for the local administra-
tion, most countries have the freedom to hire their own staff, fix the sala-
ries of their employees, choose their organisational structure and establish
legal entities and municipal enterprises. There are, however, also
countries where the local administration is more directly organised and

administered by the central state.
The development across time is not particularly spectacular. If there
have been changes in the degree of organisational autonomy, most of
them took place in the 1990s. For many countries, particularly for those
of Eastern and Central Europe, this was a period of consolidation of active
democratic reforms and transformation of political culture. Nevertheless,
there are a considerable number of countries, in which reforms specifically
aimed at increasing organisational autonomy.
Organisational autonomy, the way it is conceptualised here, is an inter-
esting but somehow also a peculiar aspect of local autonomy. Political
institutions doubtlessly play a crucial role in any democratic system. They
regulate the access to powerful positions and shape political decisions. If
institutional settings are broadly accepted, political decisions usually enjoy
a high degree of legitimacy. Institutions jointly agreed upon are com-
monly more accepted than imposed institutions and foster legitimacy.
There are, of course, also arguments imposing institutional configurations
on municipalities, especially if there are reasons to believe that otherwise
they will be tailored to serve specific interests only. To grant municipalities
the autonomy to decide on their political systems depends thus on the
trust that can be given to the municipalities and their citizens to decide on
these issues democratically.
As for the administration, it could be argued in a similar vein that
national solutions when it comes to civil servants can be seen as a guar-
antee for the necessary skills and training and comparable salaries, but
national solutions also contain an element of central control. To give
the municipalities the autonomy to organise their administration in
accordance with their needs and preferences means at the same time
that they can be trusted to do so in the best and most appropriate
manner.
Organisational autonomy is an important element of local autonomy
which contributes to a higher legitimacy of local policies and local polit-
ical decisions. It can easily be granted to the municipalities without any
specific costs provided that they meet the prerequisites of well-function-
ing local democracies. If a national model to organise the municipalities’
political systems is broadly accepted, more autonomy is not necessarily
needed.
Appendix
Table 6.2 Organisational autonomy (OA) by country (mean, reference years

and changes)
Mean 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Changes
value 1990–
(1990– 2014
2014)
Poland 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0
Czech Republic 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0
Denmark 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0
Estonia 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0
Iceland 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0
Liechtenstein 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0
Switzerland 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0
Norway 3.8 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 1.0
Finland 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
Lithuania 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
Macedonia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
Netherlands 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
Serbia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
Slovakia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
Sweden 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
Ukrainea 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
United Kingdom 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0
Italy 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0
Spain 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 –1.0
Latviaa 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 –1.0
Bulgaria 2.7 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0
Romaniaa 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 0.0
Belgium 2.6 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0
Slovenia 2.5 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Albaniaa 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.0
Germany 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.0
Hungary 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.0
Austria 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.0
Cyprus 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0
Greece 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0
Portugal 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0
Turkey 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0
Moldova 1.6 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0
Croatia 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 2.0
France 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Ireland 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Luxembourg 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Maltaa 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
a
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
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CHAPTER 7
Administrative Supervision
7.1 Introduction
Paradoxical as it may initially sound when we are talking about local
autonomy, the idea of supervision of local authorities’ actions by upper
levels of government is inherent to the definition of the concept. It
could not be otherwise, since local autonomy occurs only because a
national or regional legal framework grants it. Autonomy is not sover-
eignty. To the extent that it is developed within a legal framework, it is
subject to the limits that this framework sets. In other words, the defini-
tion of autonomy does not cover the defence of local governments of
which the actions do not conform to the legal framework. From this
assumption, there is compatibility between local autonomy and admin-
istrative supervision.
The European Charter of Local Self-Government reaffirms this, empha-
sising—in defining self-government—that local authorities have to act in
accordance with the law: “local self-government denotes the right and the
ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and man-
age a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and
in the interests of the local population” (Council of Europe 1985: art. 3).
All European regional or national authorities exercise a certain type
of administrative control over the activities of local governments.
However, there is diversity among systems both in the scope of supervi-

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_7
sion and in the tools that they use for this control. One of the key
points for grading the intensity of control is to assess whether it is based
exclusively on legality or also on the merits or opportunity of local
authorities’ decisions. Variation can also be found in matters of process,
such as in the supervisory authority’s capacities in questioning the local
action or in the execution and enforcement of the corresponding mea-
sures. In some countries, the challenged measure can be suspended
immediately, while, in others, the supervisory authority has to appeal in
court and provide evidence before the suspension is eventually declared.
This chapter analyses all these elements and their variations across sys-
tems and time throughout Europe. It first explores the concept of admin-
istrative supervision theoretically, reflecting on aspects regarding its scope,
its nature and the mechanisms to implement it. It then examines the
European trend, its evolution over the years, a comparison among coun-
tries, and some specific traits of the national systems.
7.2 Scope and Nature of Administrative

Supervision (Theoretical Considerations)
Each level of government-granted autonomy is part of a larger political sys-
tem. Therefore, the principle of autonomy has to be reconciled with the
principle of unity. This principle of unity, together with the goal of efficacy
of all administrations’ action, justifies (or even compels) the establishment of
channels of vertical coordination and, among them, the existence of supervi-
sion. They are indispensable in the exercise of governments’ responsibilities
and for the management of collective interests. Systems of control prevent
an administration from surpassing its limits and guarantee “the preservation
of the balance between the public interest, the community interest and indi-
vidual rights” (Council of Europe 1999). At the same time, any supervision
that is not necessary for this goal could threaten local autonomy.
The absence of any type of coordination and control mechanisms would
only be possible in an unreal context of strict separation of competences,
tasks, and actions among administrations and if no overlapping, ambigui-
ties, or even contradictions existed in the daily work of governments.
However, actual governing is characterised by mutual interdependence,
which demands coordinated action and the necessary accordance of munic-
ipal action to the superior legal framework and to the general interest.
Complexity arises when we have to draw the line that differentiates rea-
sonable control to meet the requirements of the rule of law from interference
in self-government. Supervision has to be organised in such a way that leaves
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION 177
discretion to local governments in decisions and in implementation. If

administrative control over local authorities is extensive and reaches the point
of being an intrusion into local action, it would be inevitable to consider that
it is in contradiction to the general principle of local autonomy. In such cir-
cumstances, the other dimensions of autonomy (policy, fiscal, etc.) would
seriously suffer. If the financial, organisational or policy measures adopted by
municipalities can easily be questioned and, eventually, suspended, self-gov-
ernment is at risk. It is from this perspective that some authors refer to this
dimension as the “backbone” of local autonomy (Moreno 2012).
Article 8 of the European Charter serves as a way to set the standard
for this delicate but indispensable conciliation between local autonomy
and the need for coordination in scenarios of multilevel governance (see
Box 7.1). It sheds some light when it establishes that administrative
supervision of local government acts has to be (a) clearly defined, (b)
focused mainly on legality (not on expediency), and (c) proportional to
the importance of the interests protected. The European Charter also
points to differentiated scopes of supervision between the decisions
made by local governments in the exercise of autonomous competences
and the tasks that they execute by delegation from upper levels of gov-
ernment. When local authorities are developing regional or national
governments’ tasks, administrative supervision’s scope widens.

Administrative Supervision of Local Authorities’ Activities
§1. Any administrative supervision of local authorities may only be

exercised according to such procedures and in such cases as are
provided for by the constitution or by statute.
§2. Any administrative supervision of the activities of the local
authorities shall normally aim only at ensuring compliance with
the law and with constitutional principles. Administrative super-
vision may however be exercised with regard to expediency by
higher-level authorities in respect of tasks the execution of which
is delegated to local authorities.
§3. Administrative supervision of local authorities shall be exercised
in such a way as to ensure that the intervention of the control-
ling authority is kept in proportion to the importance of the
interests which it is intended to protect.
Some countries have expressed reservations regarding art. 8. More spe-

cifically, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Montenegro, the Netherlands and
Switzerland have declared themselves not to be bound by the obligation
of limiting supervision to questions of legality (art. 8.2), while Montenegro
and Serbia have formulated a reservation in the matter of the proportion-
ality of supervision (art. 8.3). As we will see later in the chapter, these
reservations are justified in some cases, since the national legal systems
apply strict controls of local action (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands),
while, in others, limited supervision exists despite reservations (e.g. Austria
and Switzerland).
The content and scope of the measures that each country applies are
determined by statutory provisions or even included in the Constitution.
Legal systems define the limits to municipalities’ actions and the ways
to enforce control over them. Control is accepted in all systems, even
in countries with maximum levels of local autonomy. However, if local
autonomy is preserved, this control cannot place municipal authorities
in a subordinate position of hierarchical dependence. In this case, more
than political decentralisation to local governments, we would be con-
fronted with other types of decentralisation (i.e. administrative decen-
tralisation, vertical deconcentration, etc.; Kuhlmann and Wayenberg
2016).
The specific implementation of administrative supervision adopts
multiple forms, which range from mechanisms that impose on munici-
palities the duty to inform to the possibility for upper levels of govern-
ment to withhold decisions and agreements with suspensive effects,
the substitutive execution of policies, or the set-up of commissions
granted inspectorate functions. The challenge then is to make supervi-
sion work favourably in local self-government without endangering its
effectiveness. But the experience of many countries shows that the rec-
onciliation of these two principles is possible (Council of Europe
1999).
There are four questions worth asking if we want to examine the
concept of administrative supervision. What is subject to control? In
which phase of the local decision-making process can supervisory
authorities react? Which measures can be employed to exercise control?
Is there anything special about the supervision of local financial man-
agement? Each of them points to a different perspective of analysis.
The most relevant is the one that confronts control of legality with
control of opportunity. It is precisely this that inspires our choice of
measurement for this variable. Other elements are also important, such
as whether supervision can be exerted before the local decision has
been adopted (a priori) or only afterwards (a posteriori) and what types
of strategies are developed (e.g. information, coordination, suspen-
sion, dissolution of local organs, etc.). In addition, the particular case
of supervision of local financial management has acquired greater rel-
evance in recent times. All these elements are developed in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
7.2.1 Scope: Legality and Expediency

The most basic distinction in this topic differentiates between administra-
tive supervision of the lawfulness of decisions and supervision of their
expediency or merit.
Supervision of the lawfulness of decisions aims to verify the compliance
of the local action with the framework of laws that defines the limits of
local self-government. It is the way in which political systems guarantee
that local authorities do not exceed their powers. It is justified on the prin-
ciple of the rule of law and ensures that local action observes it. Local
authorities have to accommodate their work to the Constitution, primary
legislation and secondary legislation that set the legal framework for the
local government functioning.
This type of supervision is expressly covered by art. 8.2 of the European
Charter, which provides that administrative supervision “shall normally
aim only at ensuring compliance with the law and with constitutional prin-
ciples”. It has its basis in the principle of the rule of law, a principle that
local authorities must observe in their relations with other public authori-
ties and citizens.
Supervision of the expediency of decisions refers to examining the
merits of the act. It means that the supervisory authority can assess not
only conformity to the law but also appropriateness. This implies exam-
ining aspects such as the content of the act and its financing, timing, or
the population affected and decide on its appropriateness.
This type of control is restricted in most states that have signed the
European Charter. It limits the supervision of expediency to tasks del-
egated from upper levels of government. However, there are some
exceptions of countries that have not renounced the possibility of main-
taining the right to decide on the correctness of local authorities’
actions.
7.2.2
Phase: A Priori and a Posteriori Supervision
The stage in the local decision-making process when control is exercised
distinguishes between a priori and a posteriori supervision. A priori con-
trol works in a phase when municipal acts have not yet acquired legal
force, while a posteriori control is carried out once the decision has come
into force.
A priori or preventive control of the municipal act normally occurs
when the local decision needs the prior authorisation of an upper-level
authority to deploy its effects. In this case, local authorities cannot adopt
a decision until permission is given. In Europe, it tends to be an exception
to the general rule in the legal system, but this type of supervision is com-
mon in particular areas, such as in financial decisions of local borrowing,
the issuing of bonds (Ladner et al. 2016), or when general interests are
involved in local decisions, such as those in town planning or environmen-
tal matters. The obligation that municipalities have in many countries to
notify an upper-level authority of the decisions that they adopt cannot be
considered as preventive supervision.
A posteriori control operates after the enactment of the local decision
based on the violation of the law or the public interest. In these cases, the
supervisory authority has the power to suspend or annul the decision
questioned on its own or just to take it to the courts to have it examined.
This procedure can be initiated automatically, ex officio by central or
regional authorities, or at the request of a third party.
In comparison, a priori supervision implies a higher degree of interfer-
ence with local autonomy, although it can be justified on the grounds of
the interests at stake. Control can also refer to non-compliance with
municipal duties. In this case, supervision would target the inaction of
local governments. When local authorities neglect their obligations, other
administrations can be allowed to take alternative measures to guarantee
the services and rights to which citizens are entitled. In this case, it would
be a substitution—instead of an annulment—of local action.
7.2.3 Growing Supervision of Local Financial Management

Some classifications of supervision consider the financial control and audit-
ing of local accounts as a separate category (Council of Europe 1999). In
effect, local governments have obligations regarding financial and accoun-
tancy issues that are of a specific nature. They are mainly based on the
national rules of public accountancy and aim to ensure that accounts are
properly kept. In principle, this type of control could be considered super-
vision of the legality of local action to the extent that it refers to the condi-
tions that municipalities have to meet, which are established in the law.
However, the nature of the requirements regarding financial manage-
ment can be particularly diverse. Sometimes they refer to unambiguous
concepts, in which legality can easily be checked, like the budgetary bal-
ance, transparency, the obligation to provide information, and so on. They
aim to enforce compliance with general accountancy principles, like pre-
venting financial imbalances, fostering accountability of local governments
towards citizens, or monitoring the financial situation of local authorities
facing financial difficulties. On other occasions, the obligations are more
interventionist and open the door to actual control of opportunity. The
obligation, for instance, of observing the principles of efficiency or cost-
effectiveness in local public policy financing is one of the problematic
cases. Supervising whether a municipality has been efficient in its perfor-
mance gives enormous room for the evaluation of the merits of financial
management.
To fight the economic crisis and keep budgets balanced, central gov-
ernments in some countries have increased their monitoring of local
accounts (see the country cases below). This is an expected response of
central governments when they are faced with a fiscal crisis (Peters 2011).
Furthermore, in countries in which the core policies of the welfare state
are provided by municipalities, national governments tend to exert detailed
control over local decisions, and this has reportedly increased over the last
years. In sum, disguised as the control of legality, this type of control
seems to have acquired more relevance in recent times and on occasions
has reached the point at which it may also involve a critical assessment of
the authorities’ financial decisions. Therefore, their effects cannot be mini-
mised, as they can bring into question the expediency of choices made by
local elected representatives.
7.3 Measuring Administrative Supervision

Inspired by art. 8 of the European Charter, our codebook defines this
dimension of local autonomy as non-obtrusive administrative supervision
of local government (see Table 7.1).
The rationale for capturing the different degrees of administrative
supervision is based on the distinction between control of expediency and
Table 7.1 Administrative supervision (AS)—operationalisation/coding

Administrative Unobtrusive administrative 0–3 0 administrative supervision
supervision supervision of local reviews legality as well as
government merits/expediency of municipal
This dimension is related to decisions
the art. 8 in the European 1 administrative supervision
Charter of Local covers details of accounts and
Self-Government spending priorities
2 administrative supervision only
aims at ensuring compliance with
law (legality of decisions)
3 there is very limited
administrative supervision
control of legality. It unfolds on a scale from 0 to 3 in which situations of

lower autonomy correspond to control of expediency by upper levels of
government (positions 0 and 1) whereas higher autonomy would be found
in systems in which control is restricted to matters of legality (positions 2
and 3). More specifically, no autonomy (0) is attributed to cases in which
supervision is exerted on the grounds of both legality and expediency of
municipal decisions. Value (1) captures situations of slighter but still strict
supervision that extends to details of accounts and spending priorities. A
much more moderate degree of control is found when supervision only
aims to ensure compliance with the law (2). Cases with very limited
administrative supervision are coded with the highest degree of autonomy
in this dimension (3).
7.4 Results
7.4.1 Evolution Over Time: A Stable and Shared Pattern

Figure 7.1 presents data on administrative supervision as the aggregate
evolution of all the countries (39) considered in our study over the 25 years
included in the analysis.
This information, combined with the data included in Table 7.2,
describes a panorama of extraordinary stability and high concentration of
countries in value 2, that is, supervision of legality. Of all the variables of
local autonomy, this is the one that has remained more constant—practi-
cally unchanged—throughout the two and a half decades that cover the
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
1995
1996
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Fig. 7.1 Administrative supervision (AS)—overall trend. (Note: For Albania,
Table 7.2 Evolution of countries in administrative supervision
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014

N countries 34a 39 39 39 39 39
0: administrative supervision reviews legality as 6 4 4 4 4 3
well as merits/expediency of municipal
decisions
1: administrative supervision covers details of 5 6 5 4 4 6
accounts and spending priorities
2: administrative supervision only aims at 19 25 26 27 27 26
ensuring compliance with the law (legality of
local decisions)
3: there is very limited administrative 4 4 4 4 4 4
supervision
For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990
a
study, with variation from 1.6 as the average in 1990 to 1.8 in 2014. Only
minor adjustments have occurred in a very few countries: 7 out of 39
countries have improved throughout the period (Bulgaria, Estonia,
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Netherlands
Serbia
Turkey
Hungary
France
Ireland
Norway
Albania*
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Romania*
Georgia
Moldova
Austria
Greece
Iceland
Latvia*
Belgium
Spain
Italy
Denmark
Finland
Malta*
Croatia
Poland
Germany
Macedonia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Ukraine*
Estonia
Liechtenstein
Portugal
Sweden
Lithuania
Slovakia
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
-0.50
-1.00
Fig. 7.2 Administrative supervision (AS)—development in the different coun-

tries. (Note: *For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data
for 1990; the first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991,
respectively)
Georgia, Italy, Lithuania, Norway and Serbia), while three (Hungary,

Luxembourg and Slovakia) have experienced changes towards stricter
measures of control (see Fig. 7.2).
One plausible explanation for this persistent stability could be that local
supervision is part of each country’s inter-administrative relations system,
embedded in its main traits and principles. These principles are rooted in
a broader conception of a public administration and have a strong compo-
nent of path dependency. From this perspective, the non-variability
detected is an expression of the remarkable persistence shown by national
administrative systems and traditions (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014).
The rules and logics governing these relations are a legacy inherited from
the past and show strong endurance (e.g. the concept of “tutelle” in some
countries). Historical institutionalism is an adequate approach explaining
this pattern of (no) change.
The other striking feature, specifically the remarkable convergence of
European systems in value 2 (two-thirds of the countries analysed) can
have two explanations. Either countries have tended to accommodate
their legal frameworks to the mandate of the European Charter or control
of legality (only) has become commonly accepted as an inherent trait of

the very existence of local government. Whatever the justification, from
1995 onwards, two-thirds of countries have granted unobtrusive supervi-
sion of local government. This points to generalised achievement of
autonomy in this dimension. Only a minority of countries (fewer than
10%) declare a type of control that extends beyond the line of legality, but
even in some of these cases this is compensated by actual implementation
that relaxes strict control.
7.4.2 Comparing Countries: Limited, Moderate and Extensive

Administrative Supervision
The lines below discuss the specific cases with information from the coun-
try reports (Ladner et al. 2016) and additional works (Moreno 2012;
Loughlin et al. 2011). In Table 7.3 we have grouped them into three
categories, based on their current score, as having limited (3 or less but
more than 2), moderate (2) and extensive (0 and 1) administrative super-
vision. For an individual presentation by countries, see Table 7.4 in the
Appendix.
7.4.2.1 Limited Supervision

Of the 39 countries, 5 depict a situation of low control by regional and
national authorities. Supervision in them is based only on legal grounds
and, additionally, the experts coding these national situations report that
it is rather limited. The group comprises countries in different geographic
Table 7.3 Countries in categories of administrative supervision (2014)

Category Countries
Limited Estonia, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and Switzerland

supervision
N = 5;
score > 2
Moderate Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
supervision France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
N = 25; Luxemburg, Macedonia, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Serbia,
score = 2 Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey and Ukraine
Extensive (1)
supervision Georgia, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland and Romania
N = 9; (0)
score < 2 Belgium, Netherlands and Moldova
areas and with different legal traditions. Some of them started the period
under study with lower levels of autonomy and reached the maximum
grade over the years, like Estonia and Italy, while others present stable
situations over time (Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
Italy shows the highest progression of all the cases under study. Before
the 2001 constitutional reform, control of municipalities’ decisions was per-
formed by regional authorities, which had the power to annul illegal deci-
sions. The new constitution brought an abrogation of most of the
administrative controls. According to the interpretation of the Constitutional
Court, administrative substitution, as an extraordinary device in the hands
of the central government, can only be used in cases of “serious institutional
emergencies that affect the basic interests of the Republic” (Vandelli 2012).
Supervision in Switzerland varies by canton and sector of activity but on
average is relatively low. Questioned about the extent to which cantonal
authorities control municipalities’ fulfilment of their activities in accor-
dance with the democratic-legal-administrative minimum standards,
municipal civil servants report a limited level of supervision.
Due to its specific legal system of common law, the United Kingdom
has no equivalent to the system of administrative supervision as it is known
in continental Europe. Nevertheless, the notion of governmental control
is expressed by other means. Local authorities, for instance, are financially
controlled by auditors reporting to central government departments of
finance to maintain appropriateness in the accounting processes and to
report on the achievement of best-value objectives by local authorities
(Himsworth 2012).
In the case of Spain, the arrival of democracy in local governments in
the early 1980s meant total easing of the tight administrative control that
had been exercised by the central government during the authoritarian
rule (Velasco 2009), probably as a pendulum movement reaction to the
legacy of the past. Administrative supervision is therefore rather low.
Nevertheless, in recent years, with the financial crisis, certain national laws
have established criteria regarding local budgeting that, depending on
their implementation in the near future, could represent a shift of model.
7.4.2.2 Moderate Supervision

This category contains the largest number of countries. Two-thirds (25
countries) of all cases are recognised to have moderate supervision, only
aiming to ensure compliance with the law. The countries in this sizable
group share the element of limiting supervision to compliance with the
law but vary in some other aspects. It is interesting to observe that in sev-
eral cases the control becomes more intense when it comes to financial and
budgeting issues. Some of their specificities are described in the lines
below.
In Austria, the supervisory bodies exert the right to control whether
the local communities respect the economic principles of efficiency and
effectiveness in financial management. In Latvia, too, supervision formally
aims to control only legality but in practice the State Audit Office appeals
more and more to the court on the grounds of effectiveness and efficiency.
In addition, in Macedonia supervision of the performance of delegated
competences includes an efficiency control.
In France, where administrative supervision is a responsibility of the
prefect, there is a special focus on financial control as well. If the municipal
budget implementation ends with a deficit exceeding a certain ratio, the
responsible local administration has to pass through a process of special
supervision by the court and the prefect (Hertzog 2012).
Greece has experienced recent changes in this matter to improve the
effectiveness of control. The traditional scheme of central supervision,
which had become inefficient (and party-politicised), has been replaced by
a “special supervision service” set in the Kallikrates to ensure a high level
of legal control.
The regional governor exercises administrative control in Bulgaria over
the legality of acts. He or she has veto power over the decisions of local
government and may annul acts of mayors or block the execution of acts
of municipal councils by appealing them to the regional courts. A similar
situation occurs in the Czech Republic, where the Ministry of Interior has
the capacity to suspend the effect of a local regulation before submitting a
proposal for annulling it to the constitutional court.
Since 1990 the legislation has prohibited intervention in local spending
choices in Ukraine. However, the spending of local service providers (e.g.
schools and hospitals), including those owned partly by municipalities and
funded from municipal budgets, is controlled by the respective line
ministries.
The case of Nordic countries is puzzling, reporting in most cases that
the concept of legality has been stretched and supervision has become
more extensive over the last decade. That seems to be the case in Denmark
and Norway and, to a certain extent, in Sweden. The high values that these
countries score on the rest of the dimensions of local autonomy are not
mirrored in this one, with all the implications that this might represent.
Norway reports that supervision aims to control only the legality of

municipal decisions and service provision, but in practice it has become
extremely detailed and extensive over the last decade. The situation is simi-
lar in Denmark. Supervision starts with a statement by the regional/state
authority, and municipalities often comply with it to avoid sanctions and as
a result of an administrative tradition in which authorities generally accept
the supervision authorities (Greve 2012). If a statement is not sufficient,
the supervisory administration can suspend or annul an illegal decision
without the need for approval from the courts. It can also bring declara-
tory proceedings in the event of an illegal act or omission by a council.
In Sweden supervision also aims to control the actual content of provi-
sion within the welfare sector. Various authorities perform supervision,
particularly in the sectors of health and education. Central agencies (the
National Agency of Education or Board of Health) work actively for the
achievement of the national goals, supervising, steering, supporting and
evaluating the work of municipalities and schools with the purpose of
improving quality and ensuring equal access of citizens.
In sum, the fact that municipalities in Nordic countries have the respon-
sibility to implement the welfare system attracts the attention of central
governments, focused on guaranteeing the quality of services and the
rights of citizens.
7.4.2.3 Extensive Supervision

At the bottom of the table, which orders countries from more to less
autonomy (see Table 7.4 in the Appendix), we find cases in which, regard-
less of the exigencies of the European Charter, the control of local action
by upper levels of governments is strict and extends to aspects of opportu-
nity. This group comprises two subcategories. The first one, coded with
the value 1, is characterised by rigorous supervision, which is particularly
focused on detailed control over accounts and spending priorities (Albania,
Cyprus, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland and Romania). The second subgroup,
coded with the value 0, covers political systems that explicitly allow the
supervision of opportunity by national and/or regional governments
(Moldova, Belgium and the Netherlands). However, under this common
pattern of low autonomy, diverse national realities emerge, in particular
concerning the actual implementation of measures of supervision.
In Cyprus, control over local actions is strict. Municipal budgets and
other local decisions require prior authorisation by the Council of Ministers
or the Minister of Interior. In Romania, although the legal system enables
an assessment of the opportunity of a decision, in practice there are situa-
tions of control of opportunity implemented either by the county prefect

or by the Court of Accounts, which actually assess the subjective quality of
the economic and financial management.
Hungary is one of the few countries (together with only Luxembourg
and Slovakia) that have strengthened their administrative control over
local authorities. In Romania, where the central government supervises
municipalities’ action through the county-level government office, that is,
the prefect, a reform in 2011 put a more powerful tool of control in their
hands. In addition, the supervision that the State Audit Commission
exerts over local management and spending is reported to cover “not only
the lawfulness of expenditure but also the efficacy of its financial manage-
ment” (Scente 2012).
The countries with the lowest score for autonomy (0) are Moldova,
Belgium and the Netherlands. A closer look at them is worthwhile to
assess the conditions in which this control is exercised and the way in
which autonomy is affected by this tutelage.
Moldova illustrates an extreme case of strict supervision. In this coun-
try controls check legality and expediency and seem to be excessive, fre-
quent and politically biased. In general, there is strong administrative
pressure on local government, and the alleged contradictions in legislation
pave the way for the abuse of supervision.
Belgium and the Netherlands score 0 as well, but they present a com-
pletely different case from the one just described. The persisting presence
of the institution of “tutelle” in these systems (a typical trait of the Franco
model) implies the existence of extensive administrative supervision. Even
though the extreme versions of it have been modified, the principle of
central oversight over the local level has survived the processes of decen-
tralisation in these two countries.
In the Belgian case, this tutelage aims to ensure that the activity of
local authorities is in conformity not only with the law but also with the
general interest. This is a basic principle enshrined in the Constitution
and led Belgium to formulate a reservation to art. 8.2 of the European
Chapter. The supervision of expediency is largely accepted in the insti-
tutional culture of the country. However, the procedures for carrying
out these supervisory powers have been adapted to allow greater respect
for autonomy, with some differences by region. While this traditional
principle has largely sustained in the Walloon and Brussels areas, it has
become less strict in Flanders, leading to actual deregulation of
supervision.
In the Netherlands supervision refers to legality as well as to expedi-

ency and can be preventive, repressive or directed to replace local action
in situations of neglect or non-compliance. Preventive control applies to
delegated tasks and implies their prior approval by the supervisory
authority. Local regulations are also overseen once they have been
adopted (repressive control) and can be suspended or annulled. In the
case of neglect or non-compliance with municipal duties, other govern-
ments can step in and guarantee the execution of the delegated tasks or
provide the service.

Political systems put in place a variety of tools to guarantee that local
action conforms to the legal framework. Administrative supervision is one
of them and refers to the control exercised by the central or regional gov-
ernmental bodies. Other instruments exist, like the one exercised in courts,
the work carried out by ombudsmen in charge of examining citizens’ com-
plaints, or even the possibility of dissolution of the local council as the
result of disciplinary supervision when local responsibilities have been seri-
ously neglected.
Diversity among national systems in administrative supervision can
refer to both the scope of control and the tools and processes that they use
to monitor local action. However, the fundamental element for grading
this control is to assess whether it is based exclusively on legality or also on
the merits or opportunity of local authorities’ decisions.
In most European countries—in accordance with the European
Charter—administrative supervision is limited to controlling the legality
of municipal acts, and this pattern has remained stable over the last 25
years. Only in a few cases does supervision extend to the opportunity of
local decisions or cover details of accounts or spending priorities. This
could be interpreted as an achievement of local autonomy in this
dimension.
However, behind this static map of apparent convergence, a subtle
trend towards more control emerges. On the one hand, many countries
report an increasing number of controls, either focussing on financial
matters as a way to discipline local budgets and fight the fiscal crisis or just
as a means of steering municipal policies. These trends can result in con-
trol of the expediency of choices made in municipalities. In sum, the opti-
mism of the generalised support for non-intromission in the opportunity
of local decisions nowadays has to be moderated.
Appendix
Table 7.4 Administrative supervision (AS) by country (mean, reference years
and changes)
Mean
value Changes
(1990– 1990–
2014) 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2014
Spain 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Estonia 2.88 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
United
Kingdom 2.67 2.66 2.67 2.67 2.68 2.68 2.68 0.01
Slovakia 2.60 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 –1.00
Italy 2.52 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
Switzerla
nd 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.15 2.15 –0.01
Luxemb
ourg 2.08 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 –1.00
Poland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Austria 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Czech
Republic 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Denmark 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Finland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
France 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Germany 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Greece 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Iceland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Latviaa 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Liechten
stein 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Macedo
nia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Maltaa 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Portugal 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Sweden 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Turkey 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Ukrainea 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Slovenia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Croatia 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.99 2.00 0.00
Bulgaria 1.92 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Hungary 1.88 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 –1.00
Norway 1.84 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Serbia 1.52 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Lithuania 1.40 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Albaniaa 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Cyprus 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Ireland 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Romaniaa 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Georgia 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Moldova 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherla
nds 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

a
For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990. The
first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
References
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Montreal/Kingston: MacGill-Queen’s University Press.
CHAPTER 8
Vertical Access
8.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the central or regional access of local government
as a major aspect and dimension of local autonomy (Ladner et al. 2016).
Situated in the politics approach of intergovernmental relations, it is often
considered as the complement of the various modes of vertical control
exercised by the centre. It galvanises around attempts of the local level to
influence pertinent national policy. Thereto, place-bound decision-makers
use their political authority as democratically elected representatives of
their locality. Access is thus a key feature in the bottom-up perspective on
interactive rule (see Chap. 1).
The chapter aims to describe and explain similarities and differences in
access between (and when apt also within) the countries included in this
book and to scrutinise the associated trends over time since the beginning
of the 1990s. Before turning to the empirical analysis at the hearth of this
chapter, access is discussed against the relevant literature on central-local
relations. As will be explained in the theory section, most contributions
distinguish different forms of linkage between both levels often seeing one
predominating over the other and subsequently characterising the type of
relationship emerging. In our chapter, emphasis lays on one expression of

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_8
the corporate variant of access: the extent to which local authorities are
consulted by or dispose of formal mechanisms of representation within
their central counterpart and the amount of influence either or both are
perceived to garner.
This conception of access aligns with the indirect and institutionalised
variant discussed below. It also reflects what the concomitant European
Charter (Council of Europe 1985) designates as within the essential scope
of Local Self-Government (see Box 8.1). Thereto, local authorities have
the right to associate (see Box 8.2).
Box 8.1: European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 4, Scope

of Local Self-Government
§6. Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due

time and in an appropriate way in the planning and decision-
making processes for all matters which concern them directly.
Box 8.2: European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 10, Local

Authorities’ Right to Associate
§1. Local authorities shall be entitled, in exercising their powers, to

cooperate and, within the framework of the law, to form consor-
tia with other local authorities in order to carry out tasks of
common interest.
The underlying assumption of the European Charter of Local Self-

Government is that when these authorities are consulted and/or able to
associate, local autonomy enhances. This is also the undercurrent of the
empirical part of our chapter. It starts however by situating the various
modes of access identified in the literature in two parallel rationales found
therein also captured in the title of our contribution: compensation for a
lack of functions and discretion or a confirmation thereof.
VERTICAL ACCESS 195
8.2 Reviewing Access: Between Individual

and Institutional
Ever since the appearance of the seminal volume by Page and Goldsmith
(1987a) about 30 years ago, access is identified as a key dimension in the
comparative study of central-local relations. Conjointly with the functions
and discretion of local government, the mechanisms of entrance to its
central counterpart were discerned as a major component therein. In par-
ticular, access referred to how local governments “…dealt with higher
levels of government and the extent to which they could penetrate such
levels”. The legitimacy of this praxis largely draws on the place-bound
authority of local politicians and their alleged claims to represent commu-
nity interest. Distinguishing between direct and indirect variants the
authors emphasised the importance of the frequency and the balance of
both types of contacts and the extent to which specific local decision-
makers have a privileged access to supralocal authorities. Access thus per-
tained to either institutional or individual linkage with central government
(Goldsmith and Page 2010: 7).
The latter pattern particularly prevailed in the Southern European tra-
dition. Here, direct and individual contacts dominated rooted in the prac-
tice of dual mandate-holding by local politicians and/or their fulfilment of
substantial roles in national political parties (with central government net-
works entailed). In this vein, political careers often have local roots or
sustain ditto anchorage. It is argued that this type of access is a compensa-
tion for the comparatively lower functional reach and more extensive
administrative regulation limiting local authority. The more institution-
alised form of linkage is reflected in the Northern European tradition
where indirect and organised access predominates. Here, nationwide peak
associations of local government conduct routinised (i.e. regular and stan-
dardised) negotiations with central government referring to their com-
mon interests. Individual contacts are much less frequent or dominant
(Page and Goldsmith 1987b). In their earlier work, Page and Goldsmith
were thus mainly concerned with identifying access as a prime component
of central-local relations and describing and explaining the main patterns
therein (i.e. access as a dependent variable).
Later on, the authors also highlighted the implications thereof (i.e. access
as an independent variable) for “…the way in which local governments per-
formed their tasks” (Goldsmith and Page 2010: 7). Access then was identi-
fied as immanent to the political scale of local government (as a complement
to its legal counterpart) and categorised in line with the original typology.
In cases of political localism, for example, place-bound politicians tend to
override the administration in decision-making. However, their success is
often measured by the extent to which they are able to generate benefits for
their own local community through frequent and direct access to the central
level. This mould is associated with an underlying governmental ethos of
clientelism and patronage wherein local interest representation vis-à-vis the
legally principal national layer is prioritised. The legal scale alternatively
refers to the policy space of local government (including functions and dis-
cretion). Hence, legal localism is often identified with political centralism.
Therein, the local administration is extensive and professionalised with poli-
ticians seen as elected public managers. Formalism and procedures deter-
mine decision-making, and local government is at the core of a place-bound
welfare state. This mode is associated with indirect access with corporate
representation. Here, organised interest mediation is functional for both
levels given the extensive role of local government in place-bound public
services and provisions (Page 1991; Goldsmith 1992).
The juxtaposition of the two main modes of access mentioned and their
rooting in a political versus more functional role of local government has
figured in most of the subsequent typologies of central-local relations.
This pertains even if these timely variants identified different dimensions
for classification (i.e. constitutional status, discretion and role, see Hesse
and Sharpe 1991) or clustered a wider range of countries into a broader
array of categories revolving around the issue of how to further differenti-
ate within the geographical North (Loughlin et al. 2011).1 With regard to
this area where indirect access dominated, it was also emphasised that
institutionalised vertical integration varied on a sectorial basis (i.e. to the
extent that local government took up tasks, exercised functions and/or
disposed of competencies in designated policy domains).
Meanwhile, others have engaged with the shift from local state to
self-government in Central and Eastern Europe including its implica-
tions for access. Comparative assessments of the area argue that this
shows more similarities with the tradition identified with the South as
dual mandate-holding is no exception in most systems and members of
parliament are expected to lobby for individual decisions concerning
1
Whereas Hesse and Sharpe subdivided Northern Europe into an Anglo and North and
Middle European Group, Loughlin and colleagues further distinguished a Scandinavian core
and a Germanic periphery in the latter.
VERTICAL ACCESS 197
their local constituencies (Swianiewicz 2005). Whereas organised nego-

tiation via local government associations or through joint conferences is
an acknowledged form of access to central policy-making, the direct and
informal variant tends to be more representative of the local political
culture of the area (Coulson and Campbell 2008).
Over time, qualitative and categorical approaches have given way to
quantitative and discrete counterparts refining and objectifying typologies
of central-local relations. In most, also associated differences in access are
expressed in numerical and scalar measures. For Sellers and Lidström
(2007), corporate representation through associations is one indicator of
the political-administrative capacities of local government. The authors
subsequently developed an index cumulatively grasping both the influence
(insignificant, limited or strong) as well as an institutionalised representa-
tive role of these corporations (as provided in constitutions or laws). The
latter appeared most consistently in the social-democratic welfare states of
the Nordic countries. In contrast, influence was deemed insignificant in
their Anglo-Saxon liberal counterparts. Elsewhere, the pattern was much
more diversified.
Others have extended the layout of access beyond the European realm
focusing on intergovernmental forums as formal mechanisms of institu-
tionalised bargaining between different levels. These are assumed to pro-
vide leverage for subnational autonomy as predictable rules, and regular
meetings enhance the incentives for cooperation (Do Vale 2015). This
type of access thus seems a confirmation of the functional clout and con-
comitant degrees of freedom of local government. It may be considered as
a layered phenomenon taking into account the corporate organisation,
consultation and representation of local authorities (see also Chap. 1).
8.3 Measuring Access: Consultation,

Representation and Influence
The measure proposed in this chapter is presented in Table 8.1 below. It
thus focuses on the indirect and institutionalised mode of vertical access
with corporately organised interest mediation either through routinised (if
not always formalised) consultation or via formal representation with the
ultimate aim to influence policy-making at the central or regional level.
This runs parallel with similar conceptions of regional autonomy in execu-
tive control (i.e. the extent to which a regional government co-determines
Table 8.1 Vertical access (CRA)—operationalisation/coding

Central or To what extent local authorities 0–3 0 local authorities are never
regional are consulted to influence consulted by higher-level
access higher-level governments’ governments, and there are no
policy-making formal mechanisms of
representation
1 local authorities are consulted
and/or have access to higher-level
decision-making through formal
representation but influence is
limited
2 local authorities are regularly
consulted through permanent
consultation channels and have
substantial influence
3 local authorities are either
consulted or have access to
higher-level decision-making
through formal representation and
substantial influence
national policy in intergovernmental meetings)2 and lawmaking (i.e. the

extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation)3
as dimensions of shared rule for the upper tier of subnational governance
(Hooghe et al. 2016).
The four-point range of the measure is conceived around the absence
(0) or presence (1 or more) of consultation and/or representation further
differentiated by their alleged ability to influence (limited or substantial)
the upper tiers of government. In line with the overall conception of local
autonomy adopted in this book, the assumption is that higher values on
the index of vertical access reflect larger degrees of municipal discretion
(i.e. access as confirmation).
In what follows we will describe the resulting values on this measure
with a particular focus on the main trends over time for the period covered
by our data (1990–2014) as well as on the (evolving) similarities and dif-
ferences between the 39 countries included. Where pertinent, the chapter
also analyses potential explanations for major changes and/or variation
between and within our cases.
2
Differentiating whether these meetings are routinised and/or have the authority to reach
legally binding decisions.
3
By structuring representation or the nature thereof (direct or indirect, majority or minor-
ity, scope in the second chamber) at the national level.
VERTICAL ACCESS 199
8.4 Results and Analysis
8.4.1 Evolution over Time: Increase Through a Surge

First, we will discuss the overall aggregate evolution of central or regional
access for the countries and years included in the analysis. Figure 8.1 rep-
resents the mean value for all cases (N = 39) at the points in time consid-
ered (1990–2014).
The figure demonstrates mean values between 1 (denoting consulta-
tion and/or representation but limited influence) and 2 (referring to reg-
ular and/or permanent consultation with substantial influence) for the
two and a halve decades covered by our data. More specifically, this repre-
sents a range from 1.23 (in 1992) to 1.71 (in 2010). Over time, the score
for access has thus increased mainly due a surge (of +0.4) between 1995
and 2002. Before, the evolution was a bit more capricious whilst after-
wards it levelled off (though with a slight tendency to increase). As the
more detailed analysis by country below will highlight the ascendancy of
that era was particularly situated in some of the post-communist countries
in Central and Eastern Europe which tended to move from the absence of
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
1995
1996
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Fig. 8.1 Vertical access—overall trend. (Note: For Albania, Latvia, Malta,
Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990; the first years of measurement are
1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991, respectively)
consultation and/or representation to the presence of either of these

(albeit to a large extent with limited influence). No clear relationship exists
with the timing of (a candidacy for) EU accession of the countries under
consideration.4 In addition, a number of countries (spread over Europe)
moved from limited to substantial influence whilst others remained highly
constant in either of these categories. Overall, there does not seem to be a
discernible impact of the financial and economic crisis since 2008 on
access.
8.4.2 Comparing Countries: High, Medium and Low Access

with(out) Changes
The latter development evidently points to potential similarities and dif-
ferences between and/or within countries concealed by the aggregation
around the overall mean at a given and/or on various moment(s) in time.
Figure 8.2 takes an alternative perspective by displaying the mean for cen-
tral or regional access by country for the whole period under study (in
blue) and the range of the changes occurring (in orange) therein (i.e.
comparing the score in 2014 with that in 1990). For more particular data,
see Table 8.4 in the Appendix.
For the discussion of specific cases, we have regrouped our countries
in three categories based on their overall mean as having low (less than
1), medium (1 or more but less than 2) and high (2 or more) access. This
grouping reflects the distribution of the quantitative values found in
Table 8.4 in the Appendix but also takes into consideration the qualita-
tive differences between the categories of the original measure of access
(i.e. low represents the absence of consultation and/or representation
mechanisms at least at several points in time as visible in the table; medium
their presence but predominantly with limited and high that with sub-
stantial influence). We’ll discuss pertinent cases in each of these groups
based on the country reports that underlay the local autonomy codifica-
tion (Ladner et al. 2016). In addition, we will pay attention to relevant
changes in the categories mentioned. Table 8.2 summarises the findings
expanded upon below.
4
As the discussion by countries clarifies, substantial variation in access exists between the
cases situated in the CEE region. This also holds over time. When discerned, increases often
well preceded accession. And some countries have indeed witnessed a decrease thereafter.
Only in two Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania) and in the formerly unified Czech and Slovak
Republic, the momentum of EU accession seems to coincide with enhanced corporate
access.
VERTICAL ACCESS 201
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Turkey
Romania*
Serbia
Austria
Hungary
France
Ireland
Luxembourg
Albania*
Iceland
Greece
Denmark
Latvia*
Norway
Finland
Germany
Netherlands
Italy
Belgium
Georgia
Macedonia
Poland
Malta*
Sweden
Slovenia
Liechtenstein
Spain
Croatia
Ukraine*
Estonia
Moldova
Switzerland
Lithuania
Slovakia
Portugal
Bulgaria
Cyprus
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
-0.50
-1.00
-1.50
-2.00
Fig. 8.2 Vertical access—development in the different countries. (Note: * For

Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990. The first
years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991)
Table 8.2 Countries in (sub)categories of access with(out) change

Category Subcategory; change Countries
High access (near) maximum; constant Austria and Switzerland

(N = 13; mean = 2 >2; increase to maximum Poland, Lithuania, Iceland,
or more) Malta and Slovak Republic
2; constant France, Finland, Denmark,
Sweden, Netherlands and
Germany
Medium access > 1; change (incremental or leaped Latvia, Slovenia, Portugal,
(N = 19; mean = 1 increase + decrease) Italy, Norway, Estonia,
or more but < 2) Hungary, Bulgaria, Belgium
and United Kingdom
1; constant Spain, Luxembourg,
Liechtenstein, Greece, Turkey,
Cyprus, Ireland, Georgia and
Croatia
Low access Increase to 1 or more Serbia, Ukraine, Czech
(N = 7; mean < 1) Republic, Albania, Romania,
Macedonia and Moldova
8.4.2.1 High Access

In 13 out of 39 countries (about 33%), access can be denoted as high (a
mean of 2 or more over the period studied). Here, local authorities have
substantial influence either through institutionalised consultation or for-
mal representation. Even in these cases, the latter does not take the form
of a separate local chamber in a designated political body at the regional
and/or central level (as regions tend to be represented in a federal pol-
ity). If any, political localism here works through informal contacts
(sometimes galvanised by the possibility of dual mandate-holding). What
differentiates within this group, however, is the degree of formalisation of
the consultation (either through constitutional guarantees and/or the
establishment of intergovernmental forums routinely involved in specific
policy areas).
Hence within this group, Austria and Switzerland consistently score
(near) the maximum of our measure for access.5 In Austria, the federal
constitution recognises the right of the associations of cities and munici-
palities to represent the interests of the local communities materialising
in a number of domains (e.g. partaking in negotiations on fiscal equalisa-
tion or partnering in EU-related matters). In equally federal Switzerland,
the standard pattern of access is bottom-up in that local authorities are
supposed to address their regional counterparts (cantons) which in turn
deal with the central level. There is no representative chamber of local
authorities at the regional level so access mainly runs through elected
politicians (in parliament or government). This happens either by
regional associations or via dual mandate-holding. In addition to the
standard pattern, access to the federal level exists but is less formalised.
Representatives of the subnational level (including those from munici-
palities) are members of expert groups consulted by the national admin-
istration and/or of extra-parliamentary commissions. The associations of
Swiss municipalities and cities take part in (sometimes obligatory) pre-
parliamentary consultation procedures and generally operate as lobby
organisations. However, here also no chamber exists formally represent-
ing local authorities.
Five countries within this group have a mean score above 2 (Poland,
Lithuania, Iceland, Malta and the Slovak Republic). A closer look at both
the figure and the table reveals this represents a change in central or
5
In Switzerland and as an exception, the canton of Basel-Stadt has a score of 2 slightly
lowering the overall mean.
VERTICAL ACCESS 203
regional access gradually increasing to the maximum score on our mea-

sure. For all but one country this has been acquired in the last decade. In
Poland, immediately after the local government reforms, associations were
created with an aim of representing local interests in negotiations with
central government. This has been institutionalised in 1993 with the
establishment of the Joint Central and Local Government Committee as a
forum to discuss draft laws and regulations before adoption. Without
being binding, the result of these consultations is deemed to have an
impact on the final decision. Together with Poland, the Slovak Republic
displays the biggest change over time (comparing 2014 with 1990).
Recent systematic relations imply that no important central government
decision affecting its subnational counterpart can be made without a form
of agreement with the main associations of local government. The two
countries also share mechanisms that give individual local authorities
direct access to influential central-level politicians (in the Slovak Republic
through dual mandate-holding at the regional and local level). In
Lithuania, Iceland and Malta, the increase in access is less outspoken. It is
mainly due to an incremental formalisation of (mostly already institution-
alised) consultation mechanisms between central government and local
government associations (particularly in areas where central actions may
affect local interests). Often, informal access adds up to the substantial
nature of the influence.
The remaining six countries within this group (France, Finland,
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany) have a mean of 2
which is constant over the time period studied. These cases are consistent
in having regular and permanent (if not always formalised) consultation
mechanisms with allegedly substantial influence on decision-making of
higher-level governments. In France, the particularity of its composition
(representing subnational interests and characterised by dual mandate-
holding) denotes the Senate as the “chamber of local governments” add-
ing to the potential impact of various associations of local authorities. The
latter also have a longstanding history to act as mediator between munici-
palities and the central government in the three Nordic countries in this
subgroup. The role of Local Government Denmark is a case in point of
this type of systemic consultation. The association regularly meets on a
functional basis with representatives of the various ministries to discuss
matters of mutual interest (particularly in the socio-economic domain). In
the Netherlands, the municipal sector is included in the neo-corporatist
mode of decision-making. Their association provides a wide range of ser-
vices including advice, networking and lobbying. It is considered to be an

important partner in central-local consultations and negotiations (ampli-
fied by the interwoven nature of decision-making). Routine involvement
in the development of relevant policy issues can mount to formalised inter-
governmental agreements. A code on intergovernmental relations is the
procedural basis for exchange. A similar pattern with regional shades can
be discerned in Germany as the Basic Law and those of the Länder variably
describe the principles and the mechanisms of regular and/or permanent
local government consultation at the subnational level (which has become
mandatory when affecting local concerns, see also Vetter 2010).
8.4.2.2 Medium Access

In 19 out of 39 countries (or about 49%), access can be denoted as medium
(a mean of 1 or more over the period studied). Here and at least at some
point in time, local authorities are deemed to be consulted and/or have
access to higher-level decision-making through formal representation but
with limited influence. A closer look at the figure and the table reveals two
subgroups in this category differentiated by their relative mean score and
change over the period studied.
The first subgroup of ten countries (Latvia, Slovenia, Portugal, Italy,
Norway, Estonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Belgium and the United Kingdom)
has a mean of access that is above one. This evidently reveals a form of
change over time.
The most common pattern is that where access has increased from a
score of one towards two in more recent times. It represents a temporal
shift in alleged influence from limited to substantial. This applies to Latvia,
Slovenia, Portugal, Norway and the Flemish region of Belgium. Slovenia
could be considered as an early adaptor. Here, municipalities (as territorial
interests and next to their functional counterparts) are represented in the
national council basically functioning as a second chamber with some
competencies of initiation and limited veto powers. Their presence therein
does not imply default local government influence however. In addition,
associations of municipalities can be established and (if representative)
need to be consulted when adopting legislation affecting the local govern-
ment system. The country has recently abolished dual mandate-holding.
In Latvia and remarkably (in particular for this specific area in Europe),
local and regional governments have joined forces in a single association
embarking in an allegedly advanced system of consultation and negation
VERTICAL ACCESS 205
with central government (including the promotion of local democracy).

This partnership has been witnessing a certain crisis over the last few years,
gradually overcome most recently. Portugal and Belgium share a joint his-
tory in the Southern type of local government systems. In the latter coun-
try, the organisation of corporate interests has been regionalised (following
constitutive competencies and main policy domains relevant for local gov-
ernment). Especially the Flemish association is deemed to have become
more important (professionalising staff and developing networks for pro-
active lobbying towards the centre). Routinely involved in relevant policy
areas, there is no legal obligation for consultation or representation how-
ever. In addition, direct access through dual mandate-holding remains a
complement for corporate interest representation (also in the other
regions). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the pattern for
Norway is highly comparable to that of the other Nordic countries (cf.
supra).
In Bulgaria and Italy, the twenty-first-century leap is more outspoken
from the absence of consultation or representation to the presence thereof
rendering substantial influence. In Bulgaria and after a period of centrali-
sation, the latter is the result of a stepwise process beginning with the
creation of local government associations after which the forms of interac-
tion were negotiated, the scope of consultation gradually increased (with
a focus on budgetary matters) and participation in forums for exchange
extended. In Italy municipalities are now also said to have substantial
influence on central decision-making through their main association and
permanent joint conferences as a part of the move towards quasi-federalism
and substituting direct linkage through party patronage networks (see also
Bolgherini and Lippi 2016). From a more contemporary perspective, all
of these cases in the subgroup would thus now be included in the high
category of access.
Alternatively, Estonia and Hungary display the opposite pattern see-
ing their score on access substantially decreasing to a limited amount of
influence. This is mainly situated at the regional level. In the former
country, this has been curbed at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury with associations facing a decline and the politicisation of the county
level traditionally rendering corporate access (see also Sootla and Kattai
2011). Hungary displays a similar pattern with the county level since the
midst of the 1990s no longer being selected by electors of local govern-
ment (as a form of formal representation). Moreover, effective corporate
bargaining is hindered by the existence of various local government asso-

ciations (with the existing umbrella only having a coordinating function)
leaving the centre without a single negotiation partner. It is further
weakened by the lack of capacity of smaller municipalities impeding
supralocal activity and the degree of party politicisation in their larger
counterparts turning loyalties to national divisions instead of a common
local interest (see Soós 2010).
Within this subgroup, the United Kingdom is a bit of an outlier as the
country mean conceals extensive regional differences. Whereas local
authorities in England and Northern Ireland consistently score 1 in terms
of access, their counterparts in Wales and Scotland respectively amount to
2 and 3 for the period studied.6 The associations in the latter regions have
easier access to their own devolved institutions exercising competencies
relevant to local authorities. In the former “…the lack of consistent chan-
nels of influence and contact…is a defining characteristic of local govern-
ment…”. Weak local representation aligns with a centrally controlled
technocratic approach. The local government association is thus depen-
dent on the willingness of the centre (i.e. the UK government) to address
and respond to local concerns in a compromising manner. Alternative
forums or informal contacts through parties are equally considered rather
top-down (John and Copus 2011: 34–37).
The second subgroup of 9 countries (Spain, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein,
Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Ireland, Georgia and Croatia) have a consistent
score of 1 (hence without changes over time). In these cases, consultation
and/or representation of local government at the regional or central level
may exist but the influence thereof on higher-level policy-making is
assessed as limited. Despite meaningful shifts in intergovernmental rela-
tions, Spain seems close to the traditional Southern model of access in
which the confined influence of corporate municipal representation (e.g.
in the committee for local issues or in areas that affect the organisation of
the local level) seems compensated by party channels (with dual mandate-
holding as a specific albeit infrequent form thereof). The same seems to
hold for Luxembourg (where direct access is enhanced by the small scale
of the state). A habit of consultation of local government associations may
6
The small decrease in access (see column change) is due to the lowering of the number of
local authorities in several regions of the United Kingdom (which was relatively more out-
spoken in Scotland and Wales than in England) affecting the scores on the weighted mean.
VERTICAL ACCESS 207
have developed in the cases of this subgroup. However, this tends to be

less institutionalised (giving regional or central government more discre-
tion in taking the interests of localities into account) and is often con-
strained to delineated areas (such as municipal borders, land use or
granting). Here, Liechtenstein, Greece and Cyprus are illustrative. Also, as
the case of Ireland emphasises, the footage of exchange tends to be more
unequal (with central government holding an overbearing and supervi-
sory position).7
8.4.2.3 Low Access

For the remaining 7 out of 39 countries (or about 18%), access can be
denoted as low (a mean of less than 1 over the period studied). In this
group (with Serbia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Albania, Romania,
Macedonia and Moldova), at least at some moment in time consultation
and representation of local authorities by higher levels of government was
totally absent. This pertained particularly to the 1990s and changed over
the course of the last decade(s). Nowadays all countries in this group have
seen their scores increase to at least 1 indicating the presence of the mech-
anisms studied in this chapter albeit with limited influence. In Serbia,
change has been most outspoken, and influence is now even substantial (a
shift from low to high access) with consultation of associations and repre-
sentation in an intergovernmental conference (but timely concerns exist
over the stability of both mechanisms). Macedonia may be seen as illustra-
tive for the recent catch-up of corporate access principles and mechanisms
in these countries. In some instances, associations of local authorities are
only recently covering all municipalities (e.g. Ukraine). In others, the
same novelty characterises forums of consultation and arenas of negotia-
tion in clear need of further institutionalisation (see Albania, Romania and
Moldova).
8.5 Conclusion: Confirmation with Compensation?

This chapter scrutinised access as the array of entrance mechanisms local
authorities dispose of towards upper tiers of government. Apparent in
much of the literature on intergovernmental relations and applied to a
widening range of cases, conceptual consensus emerged on the existence
7
For Turkey, Georgia and Croatia, there is no justification of the consistent score of 1.
of two main modes with different means and rationales of vertical linkage:
a direct and individual variant associated with political localism and com-
munalism compensating lower functions and discretion vis-à-vis an indi-
rect and institutionalised counterpart identified with legal localism and
service orientation confirming the autonomous position of local govern-
ment. Empirically, this chapter concentrated on the indirect and institu-
tionalised form of access with corporate interest mediation (through local
government associations and in intergovernmental forums). The discrete
quantitative measure developed accordingly galvanised around the
absence or presence of access through consultation and/or representation
further distinguishing limited from substantial influence on higher-level
policy-making.
Our analysis showed that over time access has overall increased
largely due to a surge in a rather limited time frame (1995–2002). This
era has often been associated with wider reform and change in inter-
governmental relations and the broader local public sector especially in
newer democracies (Denters and Rose 2005; Kuhlmann and Bouckaert
2016). Evidently, general evolutions often conceal similarities and dif-
ferences between and/or within particular countries. We subsequently
discussed the (potential dynamics in the) scores for access of the latter,
discerning between high, medium and low with(out) changes.
Table 8.3 summarises our findings from a slightly different perspective
focusing on the number (and share) of countries in the main categories
of our measure contrasting 1990 with 2014 (instead of the mean for
the whole period).
The table shows two main trends. The first is that by the end of our
reference period in every country included, some form of consultation
Table 8.3 Central or regional access (CRA), a synthetic overview

Type of access (Consultation and/or representation; Number of countries (% of total)
influence)
Year 1990 (N = 34) 2014 (N = 39)
Absent (CRA = 0) 6 (17.6) 0 (0)

Present (CRA = 1 or >) 28 (82.4) 39 (100)
Limited (CRA = 1 to 2) 16 (47.1) 20 (51.3)
Substantial (CRA = 2 or >) 12 (35.3) 19 (48.7)
VERTICAL ACCESS 209
and/or representation existed. The second is an incremental shift in the

amount of influence on higher-level government policy-making. Whereas
for a majority of countries, this could be termed as limited, in a growing
number it is nowadays deemed substantial. In many instances, this is the
result of a gradual process characterised by the routinisation of consulta-
tion of local authorities’ associations and/or the institutionalisation of
their representation in intergovernmental forums. Often, this process is
open to interpretation (i.e. in most countries associations and forums at
least formally exist, whereas their informal meaning differs) and qualifica-
tion (i.e. limited to designated policy issues or pertinent areas).
These trends in turn cover both cases where no change in access
occurred between the beginning and the end of the reference period (17
countries or about 43.6%) and those where this was indeed the case (22
countries or about 56.4%) either positively (19 countries or about 48.7%)
but also negatively (3 countries or about 7.7%). Moreover, change (or the
absence thereof) in access seems to occur in a path-dependent manner as
a positive correlation exists between 1990 and 2014 values (pear-
son = 0.42). Thus, even if major tendencies appear, patterns in access are
also diversified and complex.
This brings us back to the initial question in the title of the chapter.
From the perspective of confirmation and in line with the European
Charter of Local Self-Government, the (variegated) evolutions discerned
in access point to an enhancement of local autonomy. The indirect and
institutionalised mode is now universally present and local authorities in
more states are currently considered to have substantial influence on
central or regional policy-making. Still, many country reports (exempli-
fied above) emphasise the enduring relevance of direct and individual
access compensating (formal) limits to local autonomy. Whereas the
most outspoken (and often debated) forms (such as dual mandate-hold-
ing or party patronage) may have become less frequent and/or decisive
(although not everywhere), in many and different instances access
remains a matter of balance between theoretically often juxtaposed
modes. Future research may seek answers as to where, when and why
which combinations of each appear and how these affect the entrance of
local into central and regional authorities and ultimately different aspects
and dimensions of place-bound autonomy and wider modes of multi-
level governance.
Appendix
Table 8.4 Organisational autonomy (OA) by country (mean, reference years
and changes)
Mean
value Changes
(1990– 1990–
2014) 1990 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2014
Austria 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
Switzerla
nd 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.98 2.98 0.01
Poland 2.88 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Lithuania 2.56 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Iceland 2.48 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Maltaa 2.27 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.00
Slovakia 2.16 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
Denmark 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Finland 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
France 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Germany 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Netherla
nds 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Sweden 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
Latviaa 1.71 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Slovenia 1.68 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.00
Portugal 1.64 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Italy 1.56 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Norway 1.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Estonia 1.52 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 –1.00
Hungary 1.36 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 –2.00
Bulgaria 1.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Belgium 1.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.58 1.58 1.57 0.57
United
Kingdom 1.22 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.21 –0.02
Cyprus 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Georgia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Greece 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Ireland 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Liechten
stein 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Luxemb
ourg 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Spain 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Turkey 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Croatia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Serbia 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Ukrainea 0.73 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00
Czech
Republic 0.68 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Albaniaa 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Romaniaa 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Macedo
nia 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Moldova 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

a
ment are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
VERTICAL ACCESS 211
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CHAPTER 9
The Local Autonomy Index (LAI)
9.1 Introduction
After having presented the different variables to measure local autonomy
in the preceding Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, we are now interested whether
there is a meaningful single measurement of local autonomy. Such a mea-
surement will be called a local autonomy index (LAI). In order to find out
whether and how the different variables can be combined to such an index,
we have to know more about the relation between the different variables.
This will not only tell us whether they measure similar, related or different
aspect of local autonomy but also how they have to be combined.
In a first step, we therefore attempt to identify what we call the most
important dimensions of local autonomy. These dimensions consist of one
or more variables measured and presented in the previous chapters. In a
second step, we combine the dimensions to an overall measurement of
local autonomy. Such a procedure raises complex questions and asks for
important choices. Nevertheless, we believe that an aggregate measure-
ment of local autonomy consisting of a smaller number of clearly visible
dimensions not only better reflects the theoretical backgrounds of the
concept but is also a useful starting point for descriptive and analytical
purposes. A single indicator never contains the same amount of informa-
tion as a larger number of variables or dimensions, but by reducing com-
plexity it has an analytical value in its own right.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_9
After some methodological remarks about the creation of indices, we

suggest a method to aggregate the information collected and test the indi-
cator of local autonomy by comparing it to other measurements of local
autonomy and decentralisation. Finally, we will show the results when the
indicator is applied to the different countries and present rankings and
maps with the countries covered in this project.
9.2 Indicators: Different Ways to Aggregate

Information
An indicator or an index is a compound measure aggregating a number of
variables. It is used to grasp something which generally cannot be mea-
sured with a single variable because it is more abstract or too complex. The
quality of an indicator, apart from its theoretical soundness, depends on
the way its components are measured and the way they are combined.
Unfortunately, there is no single best way to construct indicators out of a
set of variables. How it is done depends on the nature of what it intends
to measure, on the relation between the different components and on the
relation between the components and the indicator. Without going too
much into details—which is mainly done in the debate about construct
validation of indicators (see e.g. Jarvis et al. 2003; Bollen and Lennox
1991)—there are different settings possible:
1. All components contribute in equal parts to what we attempt to

measure, and there is no hierarchy between the different compo-
nents. In our case this would mean that all aspects of local autonomy
measured through the different variables are of equal importance.
2. All components contribute to what we attempt to measure, but they
are of different importance. Some aspects of local autonomy are
more important compared to others.
3. Some components are more important and can be considered as
preconditions for other components. There is a clear hierarchy
between the different variables. If these preconditions are not ful-
filled, it is very unlikely that the conditions on other components are
fulfilled, or the added value of the less important variable is only very
limited.
4. The components are mutually exclusive. Either of the main compo-
nents contributes to a high score of the indicator. There are differ-
ent ways to achieve the highest score.
THE LOCAL AUTONOMY INDEX (LAI) 215
With the relative importance and the internal relations of the different
components, the way to construct the index as well as its nature vary. In
the literature about index construction and validation, a useful distinction
between formative and reflective indicators is made (see MacKenzie et al.
2011).
• In the case of a formative indicator, the measured variables are the

causes. A change of one component will result in a change of the
overall value of the indicator. No specific relationship between the
different components is demanded. Test statistics like, for example,
Cronbach’s alpha are not meaningful to assess the quality of the indi-
cator (MacKenzie et al. 2011: 314). The variables used for the con-
struction of the indicator do not have to correlate.
• In the case of a reflective indicator, the effective relation between the
variables has to be zero. If they are correlated, it is because changes
of them are caused by changes of the indicator. If we control for the
indicator, there are no correlations between the components. The
internal consistency of a reflective indicator can be tested with
Cronbach’s alpha.
Other important questions turn around the dimensionality and the way
to aggregate the components. In the first case described above, we can
easily assume that there are different dimensions and a simple aggregation
is the most obvious way to construct the indicator. In the second case, the
indicator consists of different dimensions, but we cannot simply add them
and have to take their importance into account (weighting). In the third
example, the indicator covers only one dimension. The components can
be added up but the question of weighing might arise. In the fourth case,
there are more than one but rather a limited number of dimensions.
Adding up the different components might be sufficient, but the indicator
does not distinguish between different profiles. The correlations between
the components are likely to be low.
Admitting that local autonomy has to be measured through different
components like, for example, legal, organisational, functional or financial
aspects, the question is, whether these aspects are or have to be related to
each other or whether there is some sort of hierarchy among them. Do the
four elements equally contribute to the overall degree of local autonomy,
meaning, for example, that high levels of legal and functional autonomy
lead to equally autonomous municipalities as high levels of organisational
and financial autonomy (see case 1)? Are, as some might argue, financial
and functional autonomy more important than legal and organisational
autonomy (case 2)? Is legal autonomy, like, for example, the guarantee of
existence, the basic element of local autonomy, and without it, there is no
way to achieve a higher level of autonomy (case 3)? Or, are municipalities
either legally autonomous but not necessarily functional or does financial
autonomy not necessarily go hand in hand with functional autonomy but
either of them lead to a high degree of autonomy (case 4)? Before simply
adding up different variables to an indicator, a closer look at the relations
between the different components and their role for the overall indicator
is necessary. If there are different dimensions—measured through a larger
number of variables—behind the overall construct, we have to clarify,
what the dimensions consist of and how important they are compared to
each other.
In our case, we believe given the diversity of the concept of local auton-
omy that the index of local autonomy (and its components) has a forma-
tive character, not all components are of equal importance, but that there
are no necessary preconditions to meet before scoring on the index (case
2). The variables might then measure similar things and correlate with
each other.
Apart from these methodological and conceptual considerations, it is
also the theoretical soundness of the construct and its dimensions on
which scholars and the specific literature should agree. This is termed con-
tent validity of an indicator. The range of the components used should
coincide with what is generally discussed in the literature, as we presented
it in Chap. 1.
Another strategy to guarantee the quality of an indicator is called con-
vergent validity. Convergent validity assesses whether a given indicator is
empirically associated with other indicators that conform to theoretical
expectations: it involves comparing alternative measures of the same con-
cept or comparing measures of different concepts (Ray 2007: 12). In our
case, measurements of local autonomy should—at least partially—con-
verge with concepts measuring similar aspects, like, for example, the vari-
ous measurements of decentralisation, meaning that they should correlate
across a given set of cases. Statistically, however, the correlations should
not be too high or perfect since otherwise it measures exactly the same as
other measurements and there is not added value using a larger number of
variables to come to the same results.
9.3 Creating an Index of Local Autonomy

Creating an index is—as we have seen—a rather complex endeavour since
such a construct usually combines different pieces of information with
varying meanings and significance. Our data on local autonomy collected
on the basis of the codebook presented in the Table 2.7 in the Appendix
consists altogether of 33 variables measuring various aspects of local
autonomy. These aspects, however, are not of equal importance and some
of them are covered more extensively than others. For policy scope and
effective political discretion, we use 12 variables each, 4 variables cover
financial aspects, and the vertical relation is described with 2 variables. In
addition to the content, the ranges of the variables vary, too. Some vari-
ables range from 0 to 3, others from 0 to 4. In the case of policy scope and
effective political discretion, we divided the values for the 12 variables by
3 in order to have a possible range between 0 and 4.
All the variables measured touch upon elements of local autonomy
which are discussed in the literature. But apart from the theoretical argu-
ments to include them, there was also a pragmatic moment behind it. Our
aim was to cover a wide range of aspects to compare the countries and to
analyse trends. We abstained from testing a predefined construct of local
autonomy. Each variable—as they were presented in the previous chap-
ters—was of interest in its own right, but in addition it could be used to
construct an overarching measurement of different dimensions of local
autonomy and of local autonomy as a whole.
For an index combining existing variables, the crucial question is how to
use and aggregate the information we dispose of. To calculate a simple sum
of the different variables is not necessarily the best way to create such an
index. The number of variables used to measure something as well as the
range they were given already represents an implicit form of weighting.1 For
financial aspects of local autonomy, for example, we have four different vari-
ables which make financial autonomy four times more important than
organisational autonomy which is measured by a single variable. Are all
components of financial autonomy needed to the same extent or do they
basically measure the same thing? And, institutional depth is measured on a
scale from 0 to 3 which lowers its weight compared to effective political
discretion which is measured on a scale from 0 to 4, for instance.
For further purposes, we therefore have to do three things:
1
For such the simple construction of a measurement of local autonomy, see Ladner et al.
(2016).
1. We have to transform the variables to make them more equal and

comparable.
2. We have to check the relation between the different variables to find
out whether they measure the same or different things and whether
they can be combined to a dimension.
3. We have to decide what the importance of the different

variables/components is and whether or how we should weight and
aggregate them.
As for the first point, we suggest to transform the different scales to a

scale reaching from 0 to 100.2 Table 9.1 shows the means of the 11 vari-
ables and their standard deviations as they were measured originally for
2014 and in their transformed form.3 The picture, fortunately, does not
completely change, but there are some small differences. The highest pos-
sible degree of autonomy according to the standardised values can be
found with respect to institutional depth whereas the unstandardised mea-
surement pointed at organisational autonomy. And with respect to fiscal
and organisational autonomy, the unstandardised measures tend to over-
estimate the heterogeneity in our sample. If we stick to the more reliable
(comparable) transformed measures, the strongest deficits in terms of
autonomy in 2014 are found for fiscal autonomy and for effective political
discretion, and the biggest variation among the countries concerns the
financial transfer system and financial self-reliance.
As for our second concern, the relations between the different variables
(whether they are likely to measure the same or different things) we pro-
ceed as follows: The correlation matrix (see Table 9.2) based on all obser-
vations (N = 966)4 shows which variables of local autonomy are related to
each other.5
2
This can simply be done by dividing the values through the highest possible value of the
old scale and multiplying it by 100.
3
By transforming the scales reaching from 0 to 3 or 0 to 4 to a scale reaching from 0 to
100, we only seemingly inflate the differences within the scores, the relations between the
different scores, however, remain unchanged.
4
Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine were not independent in 1990. The data
for these countries starts in 1991, 1992 or 1993. For the other 34 countries, observations
for 25 years (1990–2014) are taken into account.
5
An alternative method to test whether there are some possibilities to combine different
variables would be a factor analysis with the 11 initial variables measured. For this strategy,
see our report to the European Commission (Ladner et al. 2015).
Table 9.1 The 11 variables to measure local autonomy (2014)—original and

standardised scales
Measured values Standardised values
Min. Max. Mean STD Min. Max. Mean STD
Institutional depth 0.00 3.00 2.49 0.72 0.00 100.00 82.91 24.03
Policy scope (total) 0.50 3.67 2.31 0.79 12.50 91.67 57.76 19.76
Effective political
discretion (total) 0.17 3.17 2.04 0.68 4.17 79.17 51.05 17.05
Fiscal autonomy 0.00 4.00 1.87 0.95 0.00 100.00 46.79 23.77
Financial transfer system 0.00 3.00 1.62 1.10 0.00 100.00 54.09 36.53
Financial self-reliance 0.00 3.00 1.89 0.90 0.00 100.00 63.03 30.14
Borrowing autonomy 0.69 3.00 1.64 0.65 23.02 100.00 54.78 21.66
Organisational autonomy 1.00 4.00 2.69 0.94 25.00 100.00 67.34 23.38
Legal protection 0.00 3.00 1.94 0.68 0.00 100.00 64.77 22.64
Administrative supervision 0.00 3.00 1.79 0.72 0.00 100.00 59.68 24.04
Central or regional access 1.00 3.00 1.69 0.76 33.33 100.00 56.21 25.31
Note: N = 39, extreme values highlighted
Despite the theoretical expectation to measure two different things,

the strongest correlation is found between policy scope and effective
political discretion (see also Chap. 4). Policy scope and effective politi-
cal discretion also correlate quite strongly (>0.4) with institutional
depth, and policy scope correlates similarly with fiscal autonomy, organ-
isational autonomy and central and regional access. As for the financial
variables, there is a quite strong correlation between fiscal autonomy
and financial self-reliance, between financial transfer system and finan-
cial self-reliance and between borrowing autonomy and financial self-
reliance. There are no strong correlations between legal protection or
administrative supervision and any of the other variables. Apart from
the correlations between the financial aspects and the correlation
between policy scope and effective political discretion, the picture is
thus rather disparate.
Table 9.2 The 11 variables measuring local autonomy (correlation matrix)

Institutio Policy Effective Fiscal Financial Financia Borrowi Organisati Legal Administr Centra
nal depth scope political auton transfer l self- ng onal protection ative l and
discretion omy system reliance autono autonomy super region
my vision al
access
Institutional 1.000 0.541 0.412 0.243 0.263 0.207 0.435 0.379 0.118 0.230 0.470
depth
Policy scope 0.541 1.000 0.758 0.442 0.263 0.163 0.283 0.409 0.043 0.193 0.443
Effective 0.412 0.758 1.000 0.208 0.179 –0.074 0.209 0.352 0.103 0.140 0.250
political
discretion
Fiscal 0.243 0.442 0.208 1.000 0.304 0.579 0.300 0.237 0.032 0.094 0.349
autonomy
Financial 0.263 0.263 0.179 0.304 1.000 0.443 0.190 0.041 –0.146 0.297 0.245
transfer
system
Financial 0.207 0.163 –0.074 0.579 0.443 1.000 0.399 0.031 –0.167 0.105 0.266
self-reliance
Borrowing 0.435 0.283 0.209 0.300 0.190 0.399 1.000 0.334 0.218 0.225 0.381
autonomy
Organisatio 0.379 0.409 0.352 0.237 0.041 0.031 0.334 1.000 0.237 0.350 0.256
nal
autonomy
Legal 0.118 0.043 0.103 0.032 –0.146 –0.167 0.218 0.237 1.000 0.238 0.080
protection
Administrati 0.230 0.193 0.140 0.094 0.297 0.105 0.225 0.350 0.238 1.000 0.249
ve
supervision
Central and 0.470 0.443 0.250 0.349 0.245 0.266 0.381 0.256 0.080 0.249 1.000
regional
access
Note: N = 966, all correlations higher than 0.1 and lower than −0.1 are significant, values higher than 0.4
are highlighted
The debate about the different dimensions of local autonomy, their

components and the construction of an overall index fails to produce a
commonly accepted result. We believe—as it has been said—that it is far
too ambitious to suggest a comprehensive model of local autonomy which
would qualify for a reflective indicator. We therefore rather assume a for-
mative structure which means that the different components can but do
not necessarily have to correlate. We also believe, and the results of the
correlation matrix seem to confirm this, that local autonomy is a multidi-
mensional phenomenon. The way we combine the variables has ultimately
to take theoretical and empirical considerations into account.
Policy scope and effective political discretion are two variables which
show a very strong correlation. The question, however, is: Do they really
measure the same thing or do they measure two theoretically different
aspects which coincide more incidentally? The strong positive correlation
seems to support the principle of fiscal equivalence (e.g. Olson 1969).
Municipalities which are involved in the delivery of services through their

own financial resources and through their own workforce should also have
the possibility to decide at least on some aspects of the service delivery. If
policy scope is large, there should also be more political discretion. There
is, however, a frequently expressed concern that municipalities very often
have to pay and execute (administrative decentralisation) without any
decisional competences (political decentralisation) and that delivering ser-
vices and effectively deciding politically upon them are distinct aspects
which do not necessarily coincide. Although the data does not strongly
support this concern, we believe that we should maintain the distinction
between scope and discretion. We suggest to analyse them separately and
abstain from combining them to a single dimension. For theoretical rea-
sons also, we combine institutional depth with effective political discre-
tion, with the former designed to the allocation of task and the latter to
the discretion when it comes to the execution of these tasks.
As for the financial variables, we believe that three of them have directly
something to do with local government’s financial autonomy. Financial
self-reliance measures to what extent they depend on their own resources,
fiscal autonomy measures their possibilities to influence their tax income
and borrowing autonomy is also a possibility to increase the resources at
their disposal independently. The three variables are measuring related
things as the significant correlations show, but more than that they are also
located on a single dimension. We therefore suggest to aggregate them
under the heading of financial autonomy. Whereas for the question whether
transfers from higher level are conditional or unconditional, we argue that
this is more in line with the influence of higher levels and to a lesser extent
with financial autonomy, since earmarked grants allow also for more con-
trol by higher levels of government (Prud’homme 1994; Gurr and King
1987). We therefore combine it with administrative supervision.
Based on these theoretical arguments and the empirical observations,
we combine the seven variables to the three dimensions:
• Political discretion: the formal distribution of power and the effec-

tive decision-making competences with respect to services delivery
(= institutional depth + effective political discretion)
• Financial autonomy: the financial resources available locally and the
possibility to decide on their sources (= fiscal autonomy + financial
self-reliance + borrowing autonomy)
• Non-interference: the extent of liberty left by higher levels of gov-
ernment in their control (= financial transfer system + administrative
supervision)
The other four dimensions are measured straightforward through a

single variable each:
• Policy scope: the scope of services for which local governments are
responsible (= policy scope)
• Legal autonomy: the legal status and protection of local govern-
ments (= legal protection)
• Organisational autonomy: the free organisation of local political are-
nas and administration (= organisational autonomy)
• Access: the degree of influence of local governments on political
decisions at higher levels of government (= central or regional access)
These seven dimensions of local autonomy fit nicely into the overall
framework of the different theoretical and disciplinary approaches to con-
ceptualise local autonomy as described in Chap. 1 (see Fig. 9.1). The legalis-
tic approach is mainly concerned with the right of existence (legal autonomy)
Constitutional status and general Specific decision-making

competences (ID/EPD) competences and functional
responsibilities (PS)
Legal framework Capacities
Legal protection (LP) Financial resources (FA/FSR/BA)
Central or regional control Administrative apparatus (OA)

(AS/FTS)
Vertical relations Self-regulation
Central or regional access (CRA) Local political system (OA)
Fig. 9.1 The operationalisation of the different dimensions of local autonomy in

the light of the different theoretical approaches
and the decision-making competences when it comes to new tasks or the

execution of tasks (political discretion). The functionalist approach combines
the scope of local government (policy scope) on the one hand and the finan-
cial resources (financial autonomy) on the other hand. Aspects of self-gover-
nance and organisational autonomy with respect to the administration and
the local political systems are covered by the organisational approach, and
the politics approach of intergovernmental relations covers the vertical rela-
tions combining the municipalities’ access or influences on decisions on
higher political level (access) and the absences of control from higher level
through administrative supervision or through transfers which leave the
municipalities no leeway when it comes to the execution of tasks
(non-interference).
Having reduced the complexity of the original 11 variables to 7 theo-
retically and at least partially empirically meaningful dimensions of local
autonomy, there are still the problems of aggregation and weighting to be
solved (see the third point in the list of the things to do). (1) Are all the
variables of equal importance when we combine them to the three newly
constructed dimensions? (2) Are all dimensions of equal importance when
we combine them to an overall index of local autonomy? The question of
weighting arises twice, firstly when we combine variables to dimensions
and secondly when we combine the dimensions to an overall indicator of
local autonomy. Whereas for the question of aggregation, we suggest in
both cases to stick to a simple sum of the weighted components given the
formative character of our indicator.
As far as the importance of the different variables is concerned, we base
ourselves on our reading of the literature and the discussions within the
core team of the project (see Ladner et al. 2015: 65). We decide to attri-
bute the highest importance (3) to effective political discretion, financial
self-reliance and fiscal autonomy. Policy scope and organisation autonomy
are of medium importance (2) and institutional depth, legal autonomy,
borrowing autonomy, administrative supervision and central and regional
access were considered of comparatively lesser importance (1). We are, of
course, well aware that the weight given to the different variables is quite
subjective and there are arguable different possibilities to weight the vari-
ables. In our understanding of local autonomy, we deliberately favour a
functional and economic approach and consider legal aspect and intergov-
ernmental relations of lesser importance. Law scholars would (and can)
weigh the variables differently.
Based on the weights given to the individual variables, we first con-

struct the dimensions consisting of more than one variable:
• Political discretion = (institutional depth + 3 * effective political

discretion)/4
• Financial autonomy = (3 * fiscal autonomy + 3 * financial self-
reliance + 1 * borrowing autonomy)/7
• Non-interference = (financial transfer system + administrative
supervision)/2
The other four dimensions (policy scope, organisational autonomy,

legal autonomy and access) do not need a specific construction since they
consist of one variable only.
In a next step, we construct our index of local autonomy. In order to
clarify the concept and to show the importance given to the different
dimension, we use the form of the triangle (see Fig. 9.2). Our triangle of
local autonomy presents functional, legal, organisational and vertical
aspects of local autonomy and covers therefore all the important elements
discussed in the literature. These elements can also be found in the
European Charter of Local Self-Government.
The triangle also shows the importance we attribute to the different
dimensions. At the bottom are the two most important dimensions which
are political discretion and financial autonomy (3). Above them, we place
policy scope which is closely related to political discretion on the right and
Legal autonomy
Non-interference Access
Organisational
Policy scope
autonomy
Financial Political
autonomy discretion
Fig. 9.2 The triangle of local autonomy

organisational autonomy on the side of financial autonomy (2). At the top

finally, we have access to higher-level decisions and non-interference by
higher level and legal autonomy (1). Legal autonomy, financial autonomy
and political discretion form the three cornerstones or pillars of local
autonomy.
Having identified and constructed the seven dimensions of local auton-
omy and decided on the importance we want to attribute to the different
dimensions, we can now easily construct our overall index of local auton-
omy. Similarly to what we did while creating the compound dimensions,
we restrict ourselves to a simple addition of the weighted dimensions.
Subsequently, the weighted overall index of local autonomy (LAI) is cal-
culated as follows (see Box 9.1):
Box 9.1: The Calculation of the LAI

LAI = (1 * legal autonomy + 3 * political discretion + 2 * policy
autonomy + 3 * financial autonomy + 2 * organisational auton-
omy + 1 * non-interference + 1 * access)/13
The advantage of this form of presentation is that the quality of an

indicator and the importance of its components become directly visible,
and we get a better understanding what we really measure. It will be the
subject of further sections to see whether our indicator also yields mean-
ingful results. Interesting to note, however, is the fact that the new index
is not too far away from what we presented in our first report to the
European Commission, for which we measured local autonomy simply
through an overall aggregation of the 11 variables (Ladner et al. 2015).
This is, at least, understandable in so far as the weight given implicitly to
the different aspects of local autonomy through the mere selection of the
variables to be measured. Although the conceptual construction
described above differs only slightly, we believe, however, that it is theo-
retically sounder, more harmonised, more transparent and makes our
choices visible.
As it had been pointed out, a strategy to test the quality of an indicator
is to assess whether it is empirically associated with other indicators that
attempt to elucidate the same phenomenon (convergent validity).
Generally speaking, a new index of local autonomy must be at the same
time similar and different when compared to already existing measure-

ments of local autonomy. If it is too similar, it can be criticised that it has
no added value; if it is completely different it implies that all that has been
known so far is wrong.
Given the construction of our index out of a distinct number of dimen-
sions, we can apply a twofold strategy to compare it to other measure-
ments of local autonomy. We can test the correlations of the different
dimensions with other indicators and we can test the correlation of the
overall index with all the other measures. The dimensions are expected to
correlate more with more specific measures whereas the index should cor-
relate with more general measurements of local autonomy.
In fact, there is an important number of significant correlations of our
overall index and the seven dimensions with similar measurements pro-
duced by Ivanyna and Shah (2014), Sellers and Lidström (2007), Brancati
(2006), Treisman (2002) and the OECD (see Table 9.5 in the Appendix).
The results clearly reveal that our overall index—as expected—has the
highest number of significant correlations with other measurements.
Political discretion, policy scope and financial autonomy also correlate
very often with other measurements of decentralisation. This is to a lesser
extent the case for legal and vertical aspects of local autonomy as well as
for organisational autonomy.
Financial aspects of local government measured through their share
of total government revenue or total government tax revenue correlate
quite strongly with our financial autonomy dimension as well as with
our overall index. Although measured slightly differently, our index
seems to capture these aspects quite well. The correlations also reveal a
certain closeness between financial aspects and policy scope and politi-
cal discretion. Resources seem in general to go hand in hand with tasks
and even with some decisional and organisational autonomy. Although
these are often—and rightly—treated as different aspects of local auton-
omy, there seems to be a certain empirical link between them. The more
you do, the more financial resources you need and the more you can
decide.
Without going into more details, the figures confirm that there is quite
some convergence between our dimensions and the overall index com-
pared to other measurements of decentralisation but that they contain also
elements other measurement do not. This confirms the added value of our
methodology.
9.4 Results for the Dimensions of Local

Autonomy
In the remaining part of the chapter, we have a closer look at the results.
We start with the seven dimensions of local autonomy and will then
present the LAI. The results for the dimensions consisting of one vari-
able only are identical with what has been presented in Chaps. 3, 4, 5,
6, 7 and 8, whereas for the dimensions constructed out of several vari-
ables, they are different. The standardisation described above allows for
a comparison of the results for the different dimensions. In general, we
present the mean values for the five five-year periods between 1990 and
2014.
Organisational and legal autonomy score highest on our scale from 1 to
100 with values over 60 throughout all periods observed for the former
and at least for the last three periods for the latter dimension (see Fig. 9.3).
For almost no dimension, we find a decrease when comparing the last five-
year period to earlier periods. The only exception being financial auton-
omy where the value for the last period (2010–2014) is slightly below the
previous period which is due to a reaction to the financial crisis in some
countries (Georgia, Liechtenstein, Spain, Hungary, Greece, Iceland and
Croatia). The lowest scores are found for financial autonomy and access to
higher levels. The strongest increase has taken place in access and legal
autonomy. In the case of access, the increase started with the change of the
millennium, whereas the increase of legal autonomy set off a little bit
earlier. For political discretion, policy scope and financial autonomy, the
increase was steadier and less pronounced. The weakest increase can be
found in the case of non-interference and organisational autonomy. If
there have been changes here, they mostly took place in the 1990s in the
aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
If we look at the standard deviations and their development over time,
we find the most important differences between the countries in the case
of access, whereas for political discretion and to some extent also in the
case of policy scope, the difference between the countries in all five periods
are of lesser importance. Municipalities seem to do rather similar things,
and when they do it, they can also—to some extent—decide on how they
want to do it. Or, when they have the discretion in a certain area (given
the legal base), they tend to deploy activities in it, and discretion is to a
certain extent not only a corollary of scope but a precondition to it.
Mean values
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ss
pe
ce
y
om
om
om
tio
ce
n
co
re
re
Ac
on
on
n
ys
rfe
to
isc
ut
ut
lic
au
te
ld
la
la
Po
in
al
ica
cia
na
n-
g
Le
lit
tio
an
No
Po
sa
Fin
ni
ga
Or
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14
Standard deviations
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14
Legal autonomy Access Policy scope
Political discretion Financial autonomy Organisational autonomy
Non-interference
Fig. 9.3 Changes of local autonomy on seven dimensions (five-year periods),

means and standard deviations
The values of the single countries on the seven dimensions illustrate

the rather abstract description of the general trends. Table 9.3 shows
the values of all countries for the five most recent years (means
2010–2014):
Table 9.3 Country ranking on the seven dimensions (means 2010–2014)
Country Legal Country Political Country Policy Country Financial Country Organisational Country Non- Country Access
autonomy discretion scope autonomy autonomy interference
BGR 100.0 FIN 84.4 NOR 91.7 CHE 97.7 CZE 100.0 DNK 83.3 AUT 100.0
CZE 100.0 ISL 80.0 DNK 87.5 LIE 91.4 DNK 100.0 FIN 83.3 ISL 100.0
EST 100.0 CZE 78.1 DEU 87.5 SWE 89.3 EST 100.0 FRA 83.3 LTU 100.0
FRA 100.0 LVA 78.1 FRA 83.1 FIN 84.5 ISL 100.0 LUX 83.3 MLT 100.0
LIE 100.0 LTU 75.6 FIN 79.2 DEU 77.4 LIE 100.0 MLT 83.3 POL 100.0
ROM 100.0 DEU 75.0 POL 79.1 ISL 75.7 NOR 100.0 NOR 83.3 SVK 100.0
CHE 93.7 SWE 75.0 HUN 78.3 BEL 73.8 POL 100.0 PRT 83.3 CHE 99.2
ALB 66.7 EST 72.5 BGR 77.5 FRA 73.8 CHE 100.0 SRB 83.3 BGR 66.7
AUT 66.7 DNK 71.9 SWE 75.0 NOR 73.8 BEL 75.0 ESP 83.3 DNK 66.7
BEL 66.7 ROM 69.2 ISL 73.3 IRL 69.1 BGR 75.0 SWE 83.3 FIN 66.7
CYP 66.7 MKD 68.8 CHE 69.7 ESP 68.1 FIN 75.0 TUR 83.3 FRA 66.7
FIN 66.7 NOR 68.8 SRB 69.2 AUT 67.7 ITA 75.0 ITA 80.0 DEU 66.7
GEO 66.7 BGR 68.1 LTU 67.5 DNK 65.5 LTU 75.0 GBR 76.2 ITA 66.7
DEU 66.7 NLD 68.1 ROM 66.7 LUX 65.5 MKD 75.0 ISL 73.3 NLD 66.7
GRC 66.7 SVN 67.8 AUT 65.8 CYP 64.1 NLD 75.0 AUT 66.7 NOR 66.7
HUN 66.7 LUX 65.6 EST 62.5 ITA 62.4 SRB 75.0 GRC 66.7 PRT 66.7
ITA 66.7 POL 64.5 ITA 62.5 POL 59.5 SVK 75.0 LVA 66.7 SRB 66.7
LVA 66.7 HUN 64.4 LVA 62.5 PRT 59.5 SVN 75.0 LIE 66.7 SWE 66.7
LTU 66.7 ITA 62.5 NLD 62.5 SRB 59.5 SWE 75.0 POL 66.7 LVA 53.3
LUX 66.7 HRV 62.0 MKD 58.3 SVK 59.5 UKR 75.0 DEU 65.7 BEL 52.5
MKD 66.7 SRB 60.9 UKR 57.7 MKD 54.8 GBR 75.0 CZE 60.0 GBR 40.5
MLT 66.7 PRT 60.6 HRV 56.8 HRV 53.0 HRV 75.0 HRV 57.0 SVN 40.0
NLD 66.7 FRA 60.2 ESP 56.6 BGR 48.8 ALB 62.5 EST 50.0 ALB 33.3
POL 66.7 BEL 59.4 ALB 54.2 GRC 48.8 DEU 62.5 LTU 50.0 CYP 33.3
(continued)
Country Legal Country Political Country Policy Country Financial Country Organisational Country Non- Country Access
autonomy discretion scope autonomy autonomy interference
PRT 66.7 UKR 57.0 BEL 54.2 ALB 46.9 HUN 62.5 CHE 47.3 CZE 33.3
SRB 66.7 AUT 56.3 PRT 54.2 NLD 45.2 ROM 62.5 HUN 43.3 EST 33.3
SVK 66.7 SVK 54.2 SVN 51.4 TUR 44.1 ESP 55.0 UKR 42.5 GEO 33.3
SVN 66.7 CHE 53.6 LUX 50.0 ROM 40.5 AUT 51.4 CYP 38.5 GRC 33.3
ESP 66.7 ALB 53.1 SVK 50.0 GBR 40.5 CYP 50.0 ALB 33.3 HUN 33.3
UKR 66.7 LIE 51.0 CZE 45.8 CZE 39.3 GRC 50.0 BGR 33.3 IRL 33.3
GBR 65.7 MDV 47.9 GEO 45.8 EST 34.5 LVA 50.0 MKD 33.3 LIE 33.3
DNK 33.3 ESP 47.5 LIE 45.8 LTU 34.5 MDV 50.0 NLD 33.3 LUX 33.3
ISL 33.3 GRC 42.3 GRC 36.7 HUN 33.6 PRT 50.0 ROM 33.3 MKD 33.3
IRL 33.3 GEO 38.1 MDV 33.3 MLT 33.3 TUR 50.0 SVK 33.3 MDV 33.3
MDV 33.3 TUR 31.9 GBR 32.9 GEO 29.8 FRA 25.0 SVN 33.3 ROM 33.3
SWE 33.3 MLT 28.1 CYP 22.1 MDV 21.2 IRL 25.0 IRL 30.0 ESP 33.3
TUR 33.3 CYP 24.9 IRL 20.8 SVN 15.5 LUX 25.0 BEL 20.3 TUR 33.3
HRV 33.3 GBR 24.7 TUR 20.3 UKR 14.0 MLT 25.0 GEO 20.0 UKR 33.3
NOR 0.0 IRL 24.0 MLT 12.5 LVA 9.1 GEO 5.0 MDV 0.0 HRV 33.3
Note: Country abbreviations: ALB Albania, AUT Austria, BEL Belgium, BGR Bulgaria, HRV Croatia, CYP Cyprus, CZE Czech Republic, DNK Denmark, EST Estonia, FIN
Finland, FRA France, GEO Georgia, DEU Germany, GRC Greece, HUN Hungary, ISL Iceland, IRL Ireland, ITA Italy, LVA Latvia, LIE Liechtenstein, LTU Lithuania, LUX
Luxembourg, MKD Macedonia, MLT Malta, MDV Moldova, NLD Netherlands, NOR Norway, POL Poland, PRT Portugal, ROM Romania, SRB Serbia, SVK Slovakia, SVN
Slovenia, ESP Spain, SWE Sweden, CHE Switzerland, TUR Turkey, UKR Ukraine, GBR United Kingdom
Legal autonomy: Local government is protected through constitutional

clauses or statutory regulations in a large majority of the countries. A
noteworthy exception here is Norway where no such protection exists.
In a considerable number of countries, local authorities have access to
the judicial system to settle disputes with higher authorities (values over
33.3). In Switzerland, Liechtenstein and France as well as in the Czech
Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania, there seems to be an even
stronger protection of the municipalities’ existence, and they cannot be
amalgamated top down.
Political discretion: In most cases municipalities are not limited to man-
dated or very narrowly defined scopes of tasks. Their possibilities for
authoritative decision-making when it comes to their tasks, however, are
limited. The municipalities seem to be most influential in the Nordic
and the Baltic countries as well as in the Czech Republic and in Germany.
Policy scope: In countries with high political discretion, the scope of poli-
cies is usually also high. This is particularly true for the Nordic countries
and Germany. Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary, together with France,
also score higher than on the previously discussed dimension. Switzerland
also moves up in the ranking meaning that municipalities are implied in
a considerable number of policies but they have—due to their small size
and the importance of the cantons—less political discretion when it
comes to executing these tasks. In the Czech Republic, it seems to be
the other way round. Political discretion is high but for a rather limited
number of tasks.
Financial autonomy: Swiss municipalities and the municipalities in
Liechtenstein enjoy the highest degree of autonomy when financial
issues are concerned. This is not astonishing since they collect an impor-
tant part of the income tax directly, decide on the tax rate and achieve a
very high level of financial self-reliance. Other countries with high
financial autonomy are the Nordic countries together with Germany,
Belgium and France.
Organisational autonomy: Municipalities have in general quite some
autonomy with respect to their internal organisation. Eight out of 39
countries reach the highest level and decide independently on their local
administration and their political system.
Non-interference: In about half of the countries, the interference of higher
levels is quite restricted. Financial transfers are in general unconditional,
and supervision is limited to compliance with the law. In the other half
of the countries, however, the control and influence by higher levels are
more developed.
Access: Compared to non-interference, there are fewer countries scoring

highest with respect to access. In the majority of countries, municipali-
ties do not have access to decision-making on higher levels through a
formal representative body or a compulsory consultation. In a bit more
than one third, however, they are regularly consulted and have at least
some influence.
Table 9.3 also reveals that there are not many countries scoring simi-
larly high or low on all seven dimensions:
• Denmark, Sweden and Norway, for example, are at the bottom of

the list when it comes to legal autonomy but score considerably bet-
ter—clearly in the upper part or even at the top—on the other
dimensions of local autonomy.
• Switzerland scores rather low for political discretion and to some
extent also for non-interference but is general among the highest
ranked countries on the other dimensions. Germany ranks also very
high for most of the dimensions apart from fiscal autonomy and to
some extent organisational autonomy.
• France ranks very high on six dimensions but not with respect to organ-
isational autonomy, whereas Italy scores very constantly behind the top
groups and Spain is located in the second part of the ranking if it is not
for financial autonomy and non-interference from higher levels.
• Belgium has its ups and downs scoring relatively high for financial
autonomy and low for non-interference whereas the Netherlands
finds itself in the middle of the ranking with a relatively low score for
organisational autonomy.
• Poland ranks on three (policy scope, organisational autonomy and
access) of the seven dimensions among the leading countries and is
placed in the middle on the other four dimensions. The Czech
Republic is also on three dimensions (legal autonomy, political discre-
tion and organisational autonomy) among the leading countries but
scores considerably lower for policy scope and financial autonomy.
• Great Britain finally is almost constantly located in the lowest third
of the rankings apart from organisational autonomy and access where
it finds itself in the middle.
Obviously, there are different patterns of local autonomy to be found

among the countries under scrutiny. The characteristics of the most impor-
tant profiles and whether there is a decipherable logic behind it will be the
subject of the following chapters. Already at this stage, however, we can

conclude that there are quite a few different configurations to take into
consideration and more traditional cultural or regional similarities do not
seem to be the only explanatory factor. In a next step, we will look—by the
means of spider graphs—at a selection of particular countries which repre-
sent typical patterns of local autonomy.
9.5 Patterns of Local Autonomy and Selected

Country Profiles
Using the scores of the countries on the different dimensions, we can draw
a specific profile for the different countries (see Fig. 9.9 in the Appendix).
The spider graphs for a selection of countries presented here (see Fig. 9.4)
reveal an astonishing diversity among the countries and the most typical
patterns. The spiders are arranged on the basis of our triangle of local
autonomy (Fig. 9.2) with financial autonomy and political discretion at
the bottom and legal autonomy at the top of the web. On the right-hand
side, we map policy scope and the possibility to influence decisions on
higher political level regarding the municipalities and their activities, and
on the left-hand side, we have their organisational autonomy and the
extent to which they are controlled by higher levels.
The spider graphs reveal the strengths and weaknesses of each country
in terms of our comprehensive concept of local autonomy, and more spe-
cifically, they show whether autonomy is based on scope and resources, on
legal matters or whether it is a matter of vertical relations. The larger the
surface area, the more autonomous are the municipalities and countries
where local autonomy is very limited have a profile which is smaller than
the average profile of all countries.
Without going too much into all the details which can be discovered by
the readers on their own, there are some characteristic patterns to be
presented:
• Finland definitely has the fullest autonomy profile. No other country

scores well above average on all dimensions in a similar way. Italy,
Poland and Serbia are also above average on all dimensions but rather
close to the average values on almost all of them. An exception here
is Poland which scores very high on access and organisational
autonomy.
Finland Denmark
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Finland European Mean Denmark European Mean
France Switzerland
LA
100 LA
100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
France European Mean Switzerland European Mean
Czech Republic Hungary

LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Czech Republic European Mean Hungary European Mean
Spain Ireland
LA
LA 100
100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD
FA PD
Spain European Mean Ireland European Mean
Fig. 9.4 Selected spider graphs (means 2010–2014). (Note: LA legal autonomy,
AC access, PS policy scope, PD political discretion, FA financial autonomy, OA
organisational autonomy, NI non-interference)
• The Nordic countries Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland score

very high on all but one dimension. They lack the formal legal rec-
ognition which gives them a profile which tends to the bottom and
both sides but nothing at the top.
• A high legal autonomy with lesser autonomy on the other dimen-
sions is, on the contrary, characteristic for newer Eastern democra-
cies such as Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia and the Czech Republic.
The latter two distinguish themselves from the other countries by
their high degree of organisational autonomy.
• France, after its decentralisation efforts, allows for quite a lot of
autonomy on almost all dimensions with the exception of the munic-
ipalities’ local political system and their administration. This can be
seen as a specific form of centralised institution building.
• Switzerland has its weaknesses at the top of the left- and the bottom
of the right-hand side of the spider. Municipalities are autonomous
in financial and organisational questions and enjoy legal protection,
but they are to a lesser extent free from interference from higher
levels and able to decide and execute their policies (policy scope and
political discretion). We understand this as a consequence of federal-
ism which allocates effective political discretion to the cantons and as
a product of the small size of the majority of the municipalities with
a few thousand inhabitants and less. The German municipalities—
despite the federalist structure of the country—are more autono-
mous on the right-hand side (scope and discretion). The municipalities
in Germany are usually much bigger.
• Hungary, Slovenia and Ukraine have a similar profile with a lack of
financial autonomy and deficits on the vertical dimensions. They
reach average autonomy on the other four dimensions.
• In Spain municipalities are quite autonomous in terms of non-
interference, and they are just above average for financial autonomy.
The former quality, they share with the United Kingdom. As for the
other dimensions the municipalities are generally less autonomous in
the United Kingdom.
• The profiles for Georgia, Moldova and Ireland finally show very low
levels of autonomy on virtually all dimensions.
Again, all these differences, apart from being interesting by their own
right, raise a series of questions. How can they be explained, which are the
most typical and distinct profiles as we shall see in the next chapter, and
can we say anything about their consequences and their impacts for the
functioning of local governance in the countries (Chap. 13)? In the next
section, however, we will present the results for the overall index of local
autonomy.
9.6 Results for the Index of Local

Autonomy (LAI)
After having discussed the results for the different dimensions, we now
look at the overall value of the index of local autonomy. The LAI is con-
structed according to the formulae presented earlier in this chapter (see
Box 9.1). The most eye-catching way to present the results is the form of
a ranking. Here, the different patterns presented above disappear, and
there are different ways to reach high scores. Sometimes small differences
rank the countries quite differently, and it can be more appropriate to
compare simple countries with higher or lower levels of autonomy. And,
to look at the results for one year only can be incidental and misleading,
but an average over a too long period of time might cover changes and the
most recent developments. We will therefore present the results in differ-
ent ways in order to gain a more comprehensive picture.
For the year 2014, Switzerland reaches the highest score of autonomy
of all 39 countries under scrutiny, closely followed by Finland (see
Fig. 9.5). Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Germany and Norway also
reach values over 70, whereas Malta, Georgia, Moldova and Ireland are
found at the rear of the ranking.
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Turkey
Serbia
Hungary
France
Iceland
Austria
Belgium
Luxembourg
Greece
Finland
Italy
Slovakia
Latvia
Albania
Ukraine
Bulgaria
Netherlands
Denmark
Poland
Germany
Liechtenstein
Macedonia
Romania
Croatia
Spain
Cyprus
Georgia
Slovenia
Malta
Moldova
Ireland
Switzerland
Norway
Sweden
Lithuania
Estonia
Portugal
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
Fig. 9.5 Local autonomy index (LAI), country ranking 2014

In order to grasp geographical differences a map is very helpful.

Figure 9.6 shows countries with a high level of autonomy in dark shadows
and countries with less autonomous municipalities in brighter colours.
The map clearly reveals that local autonomy is high in the north with the
exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland, in Germany, Switzerland
and Liechtenstein and to some extent in the Baltic countries and rather
low in the south and particularly in the east of Europe. Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg have medium-low degrees of autonomy.
Poland is the former communist country with the highest degree of
autonomy nowadays.
The degree of local autonomy in the different countries has not
remained unchanged over the last quarter of a century. If we look at the
changes between the early 1990s and the 2010s, we find the highest
increase in countries with a medium or low degree of autonomy (see
Fig. 9.7). The increase has been particularly strong in Albania, Bulgaria,
Romania and Macedonia. Countries with a significant decrease are
Hungary and Luxembourg.
To gain a steadier and more comprehensive picture, we can again look
at the mean values for all the five five-year periods between 1990 and
2014. For all countries together, the mean values increase from 51.3 for
1990–1994 to 59 for 2010–2014, whereby the changes are considerably
Fig. 9.6 Countries with high and low degrees of local autonomy (LAI 2014)
100
80
60
40
20
0
Czech Republic
Hungary
Serbia
Turkey
Cyprus
France
Luxembourg
Belgium
Ukraine
Norway
Austria
Latvia
Slovakia
Romania
Greece
Iceland
Germany
Spain
Macedonia
Albania
Malta
Georgia
Finland
Denmark
Poland
Italy
Netherlands
Croatia
Bulgaria
Ireland
Moldova
Sweden
Liechtenstein
Estonia
Lithuania
Portugal
Slovenia
Switzerland
United Kingdom
-20
LAI_mean Changes
Fig. 9.7 Degree and changes of local autonomy between 1990–1994 and
2010–2014 (mean values). (Note: For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and
Ukraine, there is no data for 1990. The first years of measurement are 1992, 1991,
1993, 1992 and 1991)
stronger between the first and the second and between the second and the
third period (3 points between 2 periods each time) than between periods
3 and 4 (1.5 points). There has been hardly any increase between periods
4 and 5 (0.3 points).
The whisker plots in Fig. 9.8 confirm the overall picture showing an
increase of the median value (the bold line within the boxes), splitting the
39 countries into two equally numerous groups, from slightly above 50
towards 60. The figure equally reveals that differences between the coun-
tries decrease (the boxes become smaller) and the distance between the
highest and the lowest level (the two whiskers) decreases, too. This
decrease is due to a catching-up effect among the countries with little
autonomy rather than an increase among all countries. The figure also
shows that for the last period (2010–2014) the differences between quar-
tiles 1 and 3 have slightly increased again, which is due to a reduction of
some elements of local autonomy in countries which were particularly hit
by the financial and economic crisis starting in 2007.
The final table of this chapter (Table 9.4) shows the mean values for all
five five-year periods for all countries. This gives us the most detailed
impression of the magnitude of autonomy and the changes over time. The
Fig. 9.8 Whisker plots of the LAI. (Note: LAI 1990–1994, 1995–1999,
2000–2004, 2005–2009 and 2010–2014)
figures confirm limited dynamics in countries with a high level of auton-

omy. The Nordic countries, short of one exception, together with
Switzerland, Germany, Liechtenstein and Poland, constantly reach values
over 70 and form the top group in terms of local autonomy. The excep-
tion is Norway which joined this group in the midst of the 1990s.
The second highest group (between 60 and 70) has grown in number
from 7 to 12. Interesting to note here is that only very few of the countries
originally belonging to this group remained in the group throughout the
years. Norway left the group upwards whereas Hungary, Luxembourg and
Spain dropped to the next lower group. This leaves Estonia, France and
Austria remaining within this group throughout the whole period of
observation. These three countries, however, have eventually been joined
by Serbia, Italy, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Belgium, Slovakia,
Portugal and the Netherlands. It can be assumed that all these countries
successfully tried to increase the autonomy of their municipalities without
becoming top leaders in terms of local autonomy, yet.
The only country remaining in the middle group (50–60) is Latvia. All
the other countries (Italy, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Belgium,
Portugal and Lithuania) originally belonging to this group left it upwards.
Table 9.4 LAI, five-year means and five country groups
240
1990–94 1995–99 2000–04 2005–09 2010–14
Switzerland 78.4 Switzerland 78.7 Finland 79.4 Finland 79.4 Switzerland 79.5
Denmark 75.8 Finland 78.2 Switzerland 79.3 Switzerland 79.3 Finland 79.4
Finland 75.2 Denmark 75.8 Iceland 77.6 Iceland 79.1 Iceland 78.5
Germany 73.6 Poland 75.5 Sweden 75.1 Sweden 75.1 Sweden 75.1
Sweden 73.1 Sweden 75.1 Poland 74.3 Poland 74.2 Denmark 74.7
A. LADNER ET AL.
Liechtenstein 72.7 Iceland 74.9 Denmark 73.8 Denmark 74.1 Poland 74.1
Iceland 70.6 Germany 73.8 Germany 73.5 Norway 73.9 Norway 73.9
Poland 70.2 Liechtenstein 72.7 Norway 72.8 Germany 73.5 Germany 73.6
Norway 70.3 Liechtenstein 72.7 Liechtenstein 72.7 Liechtenstein 70.7
Estonia 66.8 Estonia 69.7 Estonia 66.9 France 66.8 France 66.8
Norway 66.2 Czech 66.7 France 65.2 Italy 64.7 Serbia 66.6
Republic
Hungary 64.8 France 64.2 Czech Republic 64.1 Czech Republic 64.7 Italy 66.4
France 64.2 Austria 62.6 Lithuania 63.2 Estonia 64.4 Bulgaria 65.8
Austria 62.9 Luxembourg 61.3 Spain 63.2 Austria 63.8 Austria 64.6
Luxembourg 61.9 Spain 61.1 Austria 62.8 Lithuania 63.7 Czech 64.4
Republic
Spain 60.6 Belgium 60.1 Italy 62.4 Spain 63.2 Lithuania 64.0
Belgium 60.5 Serbia 62.3 Estonia 63.8
Belgium 61.1 Belgium 61.3
Bulgaria 60.8 Slovakia 60.9
Portugal 60.4
Netherlands 60.1
Italy 56.1 Hungary 59.1 Bulgaria 59.5 Portugal 59.7 Macedonia 59.3
(continued)
1990–94 1995–99 2000–04 2005–09 2010–14
Netherlands 54.2 Latvia 56.2 Hungary 59.5 Hungary 59.5 Romania 58.0
Czech 53.7 Italy 55.8 Luxembourg 58.6 Macedonia 59.3 Spain 57.9
Republic
Belgium 51.9 Netherlands 55.7 Portugal 58.2 Netherlands 59.3 Croatia 56.3
Portugal 51.8 Lithuania 53.7 Netherlands 57.8 Slovakia 58.7 Luxembourg 55.9
Latvia 51.8 Portugal 52.9 Latvia 56.3 Luxembourg 58.6 Hungary 55.3
Lithuania 50.0 Slovenia 52.7 Romania 53.2 Romania 57.1 Latvia 51.8
Slovenia 52.7 Latvia 56.2 Albania 51.3
Slovakia 52.5 Slovenia 52.2
Serbia 51.6 Albania 51.3
Croatia 50.2
Serbia 48.4 Bulgaria 48.7 United 46.8 Ukraine 47.3 Slovenia 49.4
Kingdom
United 46.8 Serbia 47.7 Croatia 46.6 United 46.8 Ukraine 47.8
Kingdom Kingdom
Slovakia 44.5 United 46.8 Ukraine 46.5 Greece 44.2 Greece 47.2
Kingdom
Ukraine 43.7 Ukraine 45.4 Albania 44.1 Cyprus 42.3 United 45.7
Kingdom
Greece 41.5 Slovakia 45.2 Greece 43.9 Turkey 40.1 Cyprus 42.3
Croatia 41.0 Romania 44.1 Cyprus 42.4
Turkey 40.2 Greece 43.3 Macedonia 41.4
Croatia 42.4 Turkey 40.1
Turkey 40.2
Cyprus 37.4 Cyprus 38.8 Ireland 36.2 Ireland 36.2 Turkey 39.9
THE LOCAL AUTONOMY INDEX (LAI)
Bulgaria 36.7 Ireland 34.2 Georgia 34.3 Georgia 34.7 Malta 39.2
Macedonia 33.4 Macedonia 33.4 Malta 33.4 Malta 34.6 Ireland 36.0
241
(continued)
242
1990–94 1995–99 2000–04 2005–09 2010–14
A. LADNER ET AL.
Ireland 32.5 Malta 30.8 Moldova 33.3 Moldova 29.2 Moldova 33.9
Romania 31.8 Georgia 29.1 Georgia 32.7
Malta 30.1 Moldova 23.5
Slovenia 29.4 Albania 15.0
Georgia 23.0
Moldova 19.0
Albania 13.5
Note: For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990. The first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991
The group, however, has been joined by countries moving downwards

and others moving upwards which underlines the pivotal character of this
middle category.
The second lowest group (40–50) constantly consisted of the three
countries the United Kingdom, Greece and Ukraine. This group has origi-
nally been larger but lost quite a few countries upwards and Turkey down-
wards. The three countries have been joined by Slovenia from above and
Cyprus from below.
The group of countries with the least autonomous municipalities (less
than 30) has grown smaller in the 1990s. Malta, Moldova, Georgia and
Ireland constantly belonged to this group, and they have recently been
joined by Turkey.
The overall picture that can be drawn from this table, also supported by
the other figures and tables within this section, oscillates between stability
and change. There are some countries in which the degree of local auton-
omy has not changed much over the last 25 years, and in these countries
local autonomy is very high or very low. In a quite large number of
countries, there is an upwards trend and municipalities grow more auton-
omous, but there are also countries where municipalities lose their auton-
omy. There is no overall convergence among all countries to be found, but
a dominant trend towards more autonomous municipalities is definitely
detectable.

The aim of this chapter was the creation of a new index of local autonomy
covering our 39 countries and the time between 1990 and 2014. We
started off with some general remarks about the importance of indices and
indicators and the challenges to be met in the course of such an endeav-
our. Given the multidimensionality of local autonomy, we concluded that
our indicator had to be formative and did not depend on a strong correla-
tion between the different variables we had at our disposal. Nevertheless,
we argued that our 11 standardised variables could be combined to 7
dimensions: legal autonomy, political discretion, policy scope, financial
autonomy, organisational autonomy, access and non-interference. These
seven dimensions, however, are not of equal importance, and we sug-
gested a weighing procedure putting the emphasis on political discretion
and financial autonomy. The overall autonomy index is calculated on the
basis of a simple aggregation of the weighted dimensions.
After having compared our measures with other measurements of

decentralisation, we first presented the results for the different dimen-
sions. On average, the countries under scrutiny reach the highest scores
with respect to legal and organisational autonomy; the degree of auton-
omy has increased on all dimensions except for financial autonomy where
we find a very slight decrease in the most recent period. The most impor-
tant variance among the countries is found in the case of access to higher-
level decisions and organisational autonomy, but the differences among
the countries are rather decreasing. The countries usually do not score
equally well on the seven dimensions which means that there are different
ways to reach a specific degree of autonomy. This led us to present the
different country profiles by the means of spider diagrams. The 39 dia-
grams reveal an astonishing diversity. Finland, for example, has a “full”
profile reaching high levels of autonomy on all seven dimensions, whereas
for Moldova the opposite is the case. The Nordic countries usually show a
full profile at the bottom (financial autonomy and political discretion) but
lack legal recognition.
As for the overall index of local autonomy (LAI), the Nordic coun-
tries—Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway—consistently
rank among the countries with the highest degree of autonomy together
with Switzerland, Germany, Liechtenstein and Poland. This group is fol-
lowed by France, Serbia, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Estonia, Belgium, Slovakia, Portugal and the Netherlands.
Countries with a particularly low degree of local autonomy are Cyprus,
Turkey, Malta, Moldavia, Georgia and Ireland.
The increase of local autonomy took place between 1990 and 2005,
above all in the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. A clearly
visible decrease of local autonomy took place in Hungary and Luxembourg.
Taken all together, the development shows stability among the countries
with a high level of autonomy and increase in countries with less auton-
omy. There are also a few low autonomy countries which did not change
much. The differences between all the countries decrease, but we are still
far away from overall convergence.
In a next step, we will try to regroup the countries according to their
characteristic profiles and construct a typology presenting the most char-
acteristic patterns of autonomy. Then we will attempt to explain the differ-
ences and evaluate their effects.
Appendix
Table 9.5 Correlations between the seven dimensions and the LAI and other measures of decentralisation
LA AC PS PD FA OA NI LAI N
Yvanyna_LG_RI −0.277 0.087 0.505** 0.397* 0.146 0.430** 0.149 0.409* 38

Yvanyna_LG_SE −0.183 0.287 0.635** 0.459** 0.413** 0.520** 0.372* 0.659** 38
Yvanyna_FDI −0.049 0.421** 0.528** 0.337* 0.573** 0.201 0.272 0.590** 38
Yvanyna_PDI 0.150 0.047 0.137 0.059 0.334* 0.217 0.374* 0.318 38
Yvanyna_ADI −0.140 −0.088 0.653** 0.507** 0.103 0.401* 0.228 0.458** 38
Yvanyna_DI −0.303 0.306 0.567** 0.356* 0.485** 0.475** 0.353* 0.610** 38
Yvanyna_GCI −0.213 0.265 0.568** 0.358* 0.539** 0.480** 0.422** 0.649** 38
Sellers_Local_Capacities_A 0.213 0.189 0.267 0.451 0.107 −0.060 0.188 0.297 16
Sellers_Local_Capacities_B −0.282 0.223 0.277 0.384 0.069 0.223 0.441 0.311 16
Sellers_Local_Capacities_C −0.570* 0.443 0.611* 0.574* 0.278 0.649** 0.212 0.592* 16
Sellers_Local_Capacities_D −0.247 0.387 0.525* 0.648** 0.211 0.343 0.372 0.547* 16
Sellers_Local_Capacities_E −0.580* 0.148 0.402 0.341 0.173 0.517* 0.110 0.347 16
Sellers_Local_Capacities_F −0.458 0.430 0.640** 0.590* 0.546* 0.561* 0.383 0.687** 16
Sellers_Local_Capacities_G −0.534* 0.445 0.645** 0.601* 0.422 0.629** 0.301 0.658** 16
Sellers_Local_Capacities_H −0.408 0.448 0.624** 0.676** 0.331 0.508* 0.365 0.643** 16
Sellers_Supervision_A 0.138 0.599* 0.535* 0.564* 0.365 0.001 0.377 0.556* 16
Sellers_Supervision_B 0.107 −0.650** −0.093 0.082 −0.258 0.141 −0.047 −0.111 16
Sellers_Supervision_C −0.369 0.208 −0.085 0.089 −0.516* −0.380 −0.494 −0.326 16
Sellers_Supervision_D 0.317 0.123 0.033 0.155 −0.351 −0.352 −0.167 −0.096 16
Sellers_Supervision_E 0.223 0.086 0.239 0.438 −0.212 −0.178 −0.001 0.130 16
Sellers_Supervision_F −0.187 −0.380 −0.367 −0.301 −0.415 −0.040 −0.372 −0.434 16
Sellers_Supervision_G −0.258 0.446 0.168 0.052 −0.092 −0.155 0.000 0.015 16
Sellers_Supervision_H −0.174 −0.247 −0.459 −0.643** −0.316 −0.362 −0.480 −0.617* 16

Sellers_Supervision_I −0.316 −0.212 −0.478 −0.635** −0.479 −0.366 −0.557* −0.690** 16
Sellers_Supervision_J −0.077 −0.098 −0.197 −0.171 −0.481 −0.409 −0.428 −0.424 16
245
(continued)
246
Brancati_dcen 0.232 0.024 −0.114 −0.317 0.524 −0.037 0.053 0.132 14

Brancati_dcen_index 0.148 −0.008 −0.120 −0.410 0.352 −0.020 −0.003 0.006 14
Brancati_dcen_index2 0.228 −0.063 −0.058 −0.390 0.461 0.101 0.142 0.127 14
Brancati_expshare −0.173 0.599 0.318 −0.542 0.969** 0.212 0.504 0.727* 14
Brancati_revshare −0.215 0.558 0.589 −0.527 0.938** 0.456 0.696 0.908** 8
A. LADNER ET AL.
Brancati_RGI 0.096 −0.130 −0.095 −0.409 0.548* −0.192 0.015 0.036 7

Treisman_VD_nb of tiers 0.180 0.240 −0.152 −0.411* 0.171 −0.343 0.048 −0.130 32
Treisman_DD_Weak autonomy 0.137 0.041 −0.140 −0.274 0.437** −0.152 0.024 0.024 34
Treisman_DD_Residual authority 0.140 −0.032 0.132 −0.106 0.484** 0.002 0.192 0.228 34
Treisman_DD_Subnational Veto 0.145 −0.015 0.214 0.077 0.329 0.168 0.233 0.308 34
(non-financial)
Treisman_DD_Subnational Veto 0.145 −0.015 0.214 0.077 0.329 0.168 0.233 0.308 34
(financial)
Treisman_AD −0.056 0.023 −0.169 −0.047 0.081 0.005 −0.086 −0.046 33
Treisman_ED 0.003 −0.058 0.067 −0.096 −0.110 −0.074 −0.012 −0.087 33
Treisman_FD_Subnational share −0.191 0.254 0.411* 0.043 0.512** 0.269 0.440* 0.502** 26
of budget spending
Treisman_FD_Subnational share −0.200 0.394* 0.588** 0.410* 0.572** 0.380 0.529** 0.736** 26
of tax revenues
Treisman_PD_Non-central share −0.014 0.373 0.353 0.160 0.563** 0.165 0.304 0.480* 26
of total government employment
OECD_LG_D%tot_2014 −0.361 0.378 0.580** 0.528** 0.194 0.596** 0.267 0.609** 24
OECD_LG_R%tot_2014 −0.255 0.454* 0.558** 0.572** 0.434* 0.447* 0.340 0.700** 24
OECD_LG_Rtrans%tot_2014 −0.177 0.126 0.256 0.188 −0.245 0.437* 0.009 0.159 24
OECD_LG_TaxAut1%tot_2014 −0.339 0.396 0.560** 0.485* 0.431* 0.410 0.335 0.618** 23
OECD_LG_TaxAut2_2011 −0.144 0.223 0.276 0.398* 0.071 0.257 0.157 0.325 25
OECD_LG_TaxAut3_2011 −0.384 0.377 0.559** 0.469* 0.568** 0.369 0.371 0.647** 25
(continued)
OECD_NonEar0_2010 −0.315 0.429 0.488 0.204 0.525 0.317 0.484 0.565 12

OECD_NonEar1_2010 −0.399 0.413 0.480 0.373 0.332 0.298 0.329 0.481 12
OECD_NonEar2_2010 −0.461 0.444 0.714** 0.471 0.416 0.389 0.472 0.639* 12
Note: Levels of significance: **0.01, *0.05
Sources: Ivanyna and Shah (2014), Sellers and Lidström (2007), Brancati (2006), Treisman (2002) and OECD Database
Operationalisation: Ivanyna_LG_RI: The relative importance of local governments (LG) is measured by share of LG expenditures in consolidated general
government expenditures for all orders of government. Ivanyna_LG_SE: Local government security of existence is measured by LG independence. Ivanyna_
FDI: The following variables are used to assess local government fiscal autonomy: LG vertical fiscal gap, LG taxation autonomy, LG unconditional transfers,
LG expenditure autonomy and LG borrowing freedom. Ivanyna_PDI: Political decentralisation refers to home rule for local self-governance and is examined
using the following criteria: LG legislative election, LG executive election and direct democracy provisions. Ivanyna_ADI: administrative decentralisation,
captured through LG HR policies and LG employment. Ivanyna_DI: The aggregate decentralisation index, which incorporates the relative importance of
LG, the security of existence of LG and fiscal, political and administrative indexes. Ivanyna_GCI: government closeness index
Sellers_Local_Capacities_A: Constitutional protections on local autonomy (LA); Sellers_Local_Capacities_B: Corporate representation for LGs; Sellers_
Local_Capacities_C: LG employment as percent of public employment (%); Sellers_Local_Capacities_D: Politico-administrative capacities (average); Sellers_
Local_Capacities_E: LG expenditure as proportion of public expenditure (%); Sellers_Local_Capacities_F: Local tax revenue as proportion of total tax
revenues (%); Sellers_Local_Capacities_G: Tax revenue as proportion of total tax revenues (%); Sellers_Local_Capacities_H: Average of fiscal and politico-
administrative; Sellers_Supervision_A: Local supervisory officials (prefect or equivalent); Sellers_Supervision_B: Supralocal appointment of local executive;
Sellers_Supervision_C: Supralocal control of governmental form; Sellers_Supervision_D: Translocal civil service; Sellers_Supervision_E: Politico-administrative
supervision (average); Sellers_Supervision_F: Grants as percent of local revenue (%); Sellers_Supervision_G: Local tax autonomy; Sellers_Supervision_H:
Supervision of local borrowing; Sellers_Supervision: Fiscal supervision (average); Sellers_Supervision_J: Fiscal and politico-administrative supervision
(average)
Brancati_dcen: Decentralisation; Brancati_dcen_index: Decentralisation index; Brancati_dcen_index2: Decentralisation index2; Brancati_expshare:
Regional expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures; Brancati_revshare: Revenue as a percentage of total government revenue;
Brancati_RGI: RGI
Treisman_VD_nb of tiers: Structural decentralisation; Treisman_DD_Weak autonomy: Decision-making decentralisation _Weak autonomy; Treisman_DD_
Residual authority: Decision-making decentralisation _Residual authority; Treisman_DD_Subnational Veto (non-financial): Decision-making decentralisa-
tion _Subnational Veto; Treisman_DD_Subnational Veto (financial): Decision-making decentralisation _Subnational Veto; Treisman_AD: Appointment
247
(continued)
248
centralisation; Treisman_ED: Electoral decentralisation; Treisman_FD_Subnational share of budget spending: Fiscal decentralisation_Subnational share of
budget spending; Treisman_FD_Subnational share of tax revenues: Fiscal decentralisation _Subnational share of tax revenues; Treisman_PD_Non-central
share of total government employment: Personnel decentralisation _Non-central share of total government employment
OECD_LG_D%tot_2014: Consolidated local government expenditure as percentage of total general government expenditure in 2014; OECD_
LG_R%tot_2014: Consolidated local government revenue as percentage of total general government revenue in 2014; OECD_LG_Rtrans%tot_2014:
Intergovernmental transfer revenue earned at the local level as percentage of total government revenue (both internally consolidated between the central and
social security sectors only); OECD_LG_TaxAut1%tot_2014: Local government’s tax revenue as percentage of total general government tax revenue in 2014;
OECD_LG_TaxAut2_2011: Local government own tax revenue as a percentage of subnational government tax revenue; OECD_LG_TaxAut3_2011: Local
A. LADNER ET AL.
government own tax revenue as a percentage of general government tax revenue; OECD_NonEar0_2010: Local government non-earmarked grants revenue;
OECD_NonEar1_2010: Local government non-earmarked grants revenue as a percentage of subnational government grants revenue; OECD_NonEar2_2010:
Local government non-earmarked grants revenue as a percentage of GDP
Albania Austria
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Belgium Bulgaria
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Croatia Cyprus
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Czech Republic Denmark

LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Fig. 9.9 Patterns of local autonomy (2010–2014 means). (Note: European

mean is in orange)
Estonia Finland
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
France Georgia
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Germany Greece
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Hungary Iceland
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Fig. 9.9 (continued)

Ireland Italy
LA LA
100 80
NI AC NI 60 AC
50 40
20
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Latvia Liechtenstein
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Lithuania Luxembourg
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Macedonia Malta
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD

Moldova Netherlands
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Norway Poland
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Portugal Romania
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Serbia Slovakia
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD

Slovenia Spain
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Sweden Switzerland
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
Turkey Ukraine
LA LA
100 100
NI AC NI AC
50 50
0 0
OA PS OA PS
FA PD FA PD
United Kingdom
LA
100
NI AC
50
0
OA PS
FA PD

References
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Perspective (Unpublished Manuscript). http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/
faculty/treisman/Papers/defin.pdf
PART III
The Local Autonomy Index as Tool

for Comparative Analysis
CHAPTER 10
A New Typology of Local Government?

Beyond North-South and East-West
10.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters, the different aspects and dimensions of our mea-
sure of local autonomy have been extensively discussed and aggregated into
an index of local autonomy (LAI). However, the data gathered allow for
further comparisons of modes and dynamics of local autonomy both across
space as well as over time. This chapter is concerned with a question for a
long time pertinent to the wider comparative study of local governance,
and here applied to our research object: to what extent can certain types of
countries be discerned, that is, as clusters with similar configurations in
terms of local autonomy? And subsequently: how do these types relate to
anterior classifications in the literature? Also: has the number of types and
their composition (i.e. the position of specific countries therein) evolved
over time and how can this be explained? A project covering 39 countries
for a period of 25 years offers a unique opportunity to at least probe deeper
into these issues trying to identify territorial shapes in the multifaceted pat-
terns of local autonomy characterising contemporary Europe.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we will review existing typolo-
gies of local government systems in Europe with a focus on local auton-
omy as a key dimension of intergovernmental relations. This discussion
will include both considerations on the evolving approaches to as well as
on the emerging outcomes of preceding attempts at typology building

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_10
to further outline the potential added value of our own efforts. Second,
we will present the method and the results of our empirical typology of
local autonomy. This is based on a combination of policy and polity
dimensions of the latter feature and measured at different key moments.
After determining specific combinations therein as constituting desig-
nated types, we will expand upon to the main tendencies across coun-
tries and/or over time. In the conclusion, the main findings will be
summarised and discussed as to their implications in the light of earlier
classifications.
10.2 Typologies of European Local Government

Systems: Beyond the Intergovernmental North-
South Divide
This section provides a synthetic overview of existing typologies of local
government systems pertaining to intergovernmental relations with a
focus on place-bound autonomy.1 That will help to situate the roots and
the potential for accretion of the empirical typology developed below con-
cerning 39 European countries since the 1990s.
In the overall development of comparative local government studies
(Lidström 1998), typology building (i.e. identifying dimensions, estab-
lishing categories, determining criteria and subsequently assigning clus-
ters of cases) is often associated with its so-called second phase (Stoker
2006).2 Herein, scholars aimed to explain similarities and differences
between local government systems predominantly based on path-depen-
dent state traditions (Baldersheim and Wollmann 2006; Heinelt and
Hlepas 2006; Wolman 2008). Much of this research is concerned with the
intergovernmental perspective discussing the relationship between local
and central layers equally crucial to our focus. Over time, qualitative and
categorical approaches have been complemented with quantitative and
1
Local government system here refers to the constitutive arrangement of institutions,
actors and processes on and of the municipal tier characteristic of a country or equivalent
subnational unit (Sellers 2005).
2
The first phase was mainly descriptive. In addition, and as part of the evolution inherent
to the second phase, gradually more emphasis on change (over continuity) emerged. In the
most recent third phase, the informal construction and persistence of arrangements and their
effect on decision- and policy-making became central together with the development from
analytical frameworks to more integrated theories (Stoker 2006).
A NEW TYPOLOGY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT? BEYOND NORTH-SOUTH… 259
discrete measures. Meanwhile, the original confinement to (part of) the

West has been extended (in Europe mainly to include the East). Below,
we will briefly revisit the concomitant types of typologies.
10.2.1 From Qualitative and Categorical

Early intergovernmental typologies mostly relied on expert interpretations
(albeit often supported by data) of country positions on dimensions pre-
sumed as relevant, subsequently discerning geographically labelled
categories.
Page and Goldsmith (1987a) provide a case in point. Characterising
intergovernmental relations (and local government in particular) through
functions (i.e. importance as service provider), discretion (i.e. autonomy
from central regulation) and access (i.e. frequency and nature of contact
between levels), the authors distinguished between a Northern and a
Southern European type. In the former (exemplified by the United
Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries), both functions and discretion
are extensive (an instrumental local government enjoys substantial degrees
of freedom in mainly statutory regulation). Access to the centre occurs
indirect and corporatised (i.e. through associations engaged in institution-
alised interest mediation). In the latter (with France, Spain and Italy), the
pattern juxtaposes with limited functions and discretion (i.e. a mode of
detailed administrative regulation from the centre). Access is direct and
often personalised (with particular place-bound interest relaying either
through dual mandate-holding or multilevel partisan networks). Page and
Goldsmith (1987b) asserted that different aspects of history mattered for
the development of these types: for example, in the South anti-statist
Catholicism, feudal clientelism, Napoleonic centralism and the later and
less localised anchorage of the welfare state comprise the tradition (galvan-
ised by the relative small size of local government largely unaffected by the
scale-enlarging territorial reforms found in the North). In later work the
South has equally been associated with legal centralism (i.e. more limited
local policy space) vis-à-vis political localism (i.e. more direct central link-
age) as well as patronage (Page 1991; Goldsmith 1992).
Further developments in this stream have built on the default North-
South divide at the same time criticising the limited number of (solely
unitary) states included and the dichotomy-like nature of the typology
especially pinpointing differentiation within the geographical North (John
2001).
Hence, at the beginning of the 1990s, Hesse and Sharpe (1991) com-
pared intergovernmental relations in about 20 Western industrial states
scrutinising the constitutional status (i.e. constitutive protection), discre-
tion (i.e. extent of autonomy) and rationale (i.e. provider of public ser-
vices vis-à-vis representing political community) of local government. The
authors discerned interdependencies in these dimensions bearing three
distinct types. The Franco group resembled the Southern European tradi-
tion and Napoleonic influence (with France, Spain, Italy, Belgium,
Portugal and Greece). Here, local government is political rather than
functional. First and foremost, it expresses the (constitutionally protected)
identity of a designated political community. Its central counterpart is the
prime renderer of (place-bound) public services and supervises the (rela-
tively confined) discretionary local policy space. However, as a counter-
weight the centre is colonised by local elites (in parties or via dual
mandates).
Consequently, it is in the broader Northern template that the other two
types emerge. In the Anglo group (exemplified by the United Kingdom or
Ireland), local government lacks constitutional status. Hence, it is often
tagged as a creature of state (i.e. the centre can freely (re)set its boundar-
ies, shape or leverage) with the ultra vires principle (i.e. a closed and non-
residual set of statutory tasks, responsibilities and competencies for local
government)3 functionally galvanising intergovernmental relations. Once
its action space is determined by the centre and in daily routine, local gov-
ernment allegedly disposes of a substantial degree of discretion (varying
by policy-domain). Mechanisms of direct access to the centre are thereby
less frequent and meaningful. The North- and Middle-European group
(with the Scandinavian and Germanic countries) balances the political and
functional rationale of local government. Representing a political com-
munity, it is commonly granted the general competence of local self-
government (i.e. open and residual for matters of place-bound interest).
Local government is constitutionally protected and disposes of substantial
clout in terms of functions and discretion (especially in services and provi-
sions regarding the welfare state).
Yet others have emphasised the internal variation within the latter
group discerning the Scandinavian core from the Germanic periphery
3
The ultra vires rule has been replaced in the United Kingdom by the Localism Act in
2011. But discussed typologies are referring to historic traditions, in which the ultra vires
play an important role in Anglo-Saxon countries.
(Loughlin 2004). In the former, local government assumes a leading role

in a place-bound welfare state as the bulk of the associated functions are
exercised by the municipal sector itself. In the latter, it is more common
for (place-bound) third-sector organisations to take up public services
within the frameworks set by central and/or local government. Therefore,
some authors ultimately distinguish between four categorical traditions in
intergovernmental relations with Southern European, the British Isles,
Nordic and Rhinelandic states (Loughlin et al. 2010).
10.2.2 To Quantitative and Discrete

The overview above already shows clear variation depending on the iden-
tification and operationalisation of relevant dimensions and giving way to
different categorisations (especially regarding the geographical North).
Recently, more quantitative and discrete approaches have been added.
These are aiming to refine and objectify typologies through numerical and
scalar indicators. Often, they also take an increasing number of dimensions
and aspects of intergovernmental relations into consideration. Moreover,
these approaches acknowledge the importance of timely actualisations as
existing state traditions have come under pressure challenging, reforming
or changing local autonomy alike in a general shift towards multilevel gov-
ernance (Denters and Rose 2005; Goldsmith and Page 2010; Hendriks
2014; Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016). Still, there is no strict separation
between the two approaches. For one thing, the values assigned on the
ensuant measures often combine objective data with expert assessments.
For another, scores on attendant indicators frequently result in classifica-
tions clustering cases in types deemed as pertinent groupings (albeit in a
more empirical and inductive manner).
Sellers and Lidström (2007) represent this approach. The authors cap-
ture the capacities of and supervision on local government in a range of
indicators for about 20 advanced democracies. The first is the mean of a
fiscal (share of public expenditures by local government and income from
local taxes) and a political-administrative (constitutional protection of
local autonomy, corporate interest representation of local government and
share of public employment by local government) variant. Here, the
Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) scored high-
est. Further South (e.g. in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and
Greece), the capacities of local government were clearly lower. This was
also the case in the Anglo-Saxon world (e.g. United Kingdom, Ireland,
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).
The second equally distinguishes between a fiscal (share of general and
earmarked grants in local income, local tax autonomy and supralocal
supervision on borrowing) and political-administrative (presence of local
supervisory officials, supralocal appointment of the local executive,
supralocal control of local government form and trans-local civil service)
component in a measure of central tendency. Here, the results indicate
that in the United States and Canada, local government was the least
supervised. The latter also holds for Switzerland and to a lesser extent
most of the Nordic countries (with Norway as the exception with more
supervision). In some countries in the South (such as Belgium, Greece
and Spain), supervision was more outspoken. Overall, key dimensions
were related to varieties in the welfare state: especially in the social-
democratic type local autonomy (as the combination of governing capac-
ity and relative absence of central supervision) appears more extensive
than in its conservative, Southern European or liberal counterpart.
10.2.3 Integrating West with East

Both approaches have struggled to classify the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. Often, the comparative local government literature
assumes a strong degree of homogeneity in that geographical area.4 Shared
historical or cultural backgrounds come with a common communist past
strongly affecting intergovernmental relations in a wider model of local
state government (Baldersheim et al. 1996).5 Since the 1990s, processes
of transition and transformation have altered local government systems in
the region to a general mould of place-bound self-government often
opposing the choices of the preceding era and thus frequently dubbed as
the post-communist model of new local democracies. However, unity in
systemic principles has often been accompanied by diversity in practical
4
Alternative positions stress differences preceding the communist era. Some countries
developed along the lines familiar to the West (at times also the result of a specific connection
with a particular country therein), whilst others were much more affected by the Ottoman
Empire or Russia (Loughlin et al. 2010). In some instances (e.g. Poland or the Balkan), dif-
ferent influences appeared depending on the specific region of the country.
5
Characterised by undemocratic elections, real decision-making power in the hands of the
communist party, strong bureaucratic steering and supervision, an ideology of democratic
centralism and the predominance of economic structures over territorial entities.
arrangements with country-specific configurations in predominantly tem-

porary equilibria (Illner 2003; Coulson and Campbell 2008).6
Swianiewicz (2014: 292) has criticised this sustaining ambiguity: “most
of the academic research treats Eastern Europe either as terra incognita
(…) or puts the whole region into one basked described as ‘new local
democracies’ (…)”. The author rejects the principle of one post-communist
model. He does acknowledge a number of shared features in the local
government systems of the region (such as the belief in the principles of
decentralisation, the weakness of the subnational meso or the emergence
of some managerial reform trends). At the same time, he emphasises sub-
stantial differences on several crucial dimensions (such as the extent of
functional decentralisation, territorial organisation, the electoral system,
the position of the mayor and the role of national political parties). This
variance is the onset for the development of a new typology including
about 20 countries in the region. This is based on a number of key indica-
tors of territorial organisation (number of layers and fragmentation), func-
tional decentralisation (share of public expenditure), financial discretion
(share of taxes in local income, system of granting and degree of debt) and
horizontal power relations (position of the mayor and electoral system for
the council).
Analysing the subsequent scores leads to five clusters of countries: the
champions of decentralisation, the relative decentralised, the Balkan, those
with very high level of territorial consolidation and those with a strong
centralisation and territorial fragmentation.7 The author concludes that in
comparison with the rest of Europe none of these types approaches the
Nordic model. At the same time, no country in the rest of Europe is as
centralised as his last type. The first two types resemble the North- and
Middle-European group whilst the third tends towards the Southern (or
Franco group) tradition. Whilst differentiating within the geographical
East, the typology is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal: it provides a
snapshot of various local government systems crystallised in the region at
the moment of measurement of the associated indicators and does not
take potential evolution over time into account.
6
Complicating the establishment of stable types in this group. However, at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, Illner (2003) already differed between East-Central Europe, the
Baltic States, South-East Europe and the former USSR.
7
The types respectively refer to Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic; the Czech
Republic, Estonia and Latvia; Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Rumania,
Slovenia and Ukraine; Georgia, Lithuania and Serbia; Armenia and Azerbaijan.
10.2.4 Adding Depth and Scope

Given the evolutions discussed above, our empirical and inductive typol-
ogy builds on the quantitative and discrete approach. It aims to distin-
guish clusters of countries with similar configurations of local autonomy.
We claim it adds depth (i.e. dimensions and aspects included in our
numerical and scalar measurement) and scope (i.e. range of countries and
points in time scrutinised) to this emerging stream in the literature. In the
context of this project, we measured local autonomy in 39 countries prob-
ing into potential evolutions over time from 1990 to 2014. At the same
time, we expect this endeavour may complicate the concomitant end goal
of coming to designated types without risking a substantial loss of infor-
mation on the multiple faces of local autonomy.
10.3 Towards an Empirical Typology of Countries

Based on LAI
Following discussion of the previous section, our approach is to construct
an empirical, quantitative typology, what implies that we are looking for:
(i) dimensions/ criteria and (ii) the method of empirical aggregation. We
do not start with any pre-assumptions on the grouping of certain coun-
tries (e.g. geographical clusters).
We should stress that our typology is not going to be a comprehensive
typology of local government systems. We focus on local autonomy at the
municipal level, so we disregard:
–– Position of other subnational tiers (counties, regions etc.)

–– Horizontal power relations (e.g. position of mayor vis-a-vis local
council and local administration)
–– Territorial organisation (e.g. territorial fragmentation/size of
municipalities).
An empirical typology of local autonomy poses several difficult

dilemmas:
1. Whether and if yes, how to reduce the number of dimensions?

Twenty-five years of data collection with 7 dimensions for every year
means 175 dimensions, an information chaos which cannot be left
for quantitative methods of complexity reduction only.
2. To what extent should the typology reflect the most recent picture
(2014) and to what extent earlier data as well? Should each of the
years of data collected be treated as equally important or give more
weight to the most recent picture? Should we take dimensions for
each of 1990–2014 years, or is it enough to pick up, for example,
every five or every ten years’ pictures?
3. To what extent should the final result be driven by the variation of
the synthetic LAI, and to what extent should it reflect the internal
structure of the LAI (dimensions)?
4. Which method of data complexity reduction should we use? After
testing more sophisticated formal quantitative methods (factor anal-
ysis—principal component and hierarchical clustering analysis based
on Ward’s method leading to dendrogram classifying countries), we
have decided for a simpler (but still formalised) approach which is
explained in the following section. The results obtained through
cluster analysis and factor analysis methods were very difficult for
interpretation and—more importantly—were producing clusters
with considerably higher internal variation of indices (i.e. clusters
were less homogenous) than in the method we describe below.
Our typology shows similarities with some elaborations in the

POLLEADER project (Heinelt et al. 2018), which partially discusses a
potential typology of vertical power relations in Europe. The dimensions
used in that chapter have been taken from the LAI. But there are also dif-
ferences making our chapter a different product: (i) we take into account
a methodology of indices developed within the LAI project, while in the
POLLEADER project only some individual variables have been analysed;
(ii) we address the changes over time, while POLLEADER project focuses
on a snapshot of the present situation; (iii) we include a wider set of 39
countries (instead of 29 countries covered by the POLLEADER study).
10.4 Empirical Analysis: Method and Results

10.4.1 Method
The applied method is based on an analysis of the value and internal struc-
ture of the LAI. We construct a typology for three time points: 2014 (the
most recent data), 2004 (mid of the analysed period) and 19908 (the first
8
To be more precise, we refer to the earliest available data. For various reasons (mostly
related to turmoil of the early post-communist transformation in Eastern Europe), we have
year covered by LAI analysis). The basic typology is constructed on the

basis of 2014 data. But additional typologies, using exactly the same meth-
odology, are constructed for 2004 and 1990 data, so one may follow the
changes of the position of individual countries. This allows indirect obser-
vation of dynamics of LAI changes through the migration of individual
local government systems between types.
The method to construct our typology refers to the discussion in the
previous chapters. In particular, to reduce the complexity of data and
allow for clear interpretation of identified types, we focus on two dimen-
sions, which are identified in Chap. 9, as the most significant for LAI:
–– Political discretion (consisting of the weighted sum of institu-

tional depth and effective policy discretion9)
–– Financial autonomy (the weighted sum of fiscal autonomy, finan-
cial self-reliance and borrowing autonomy)
The scale of both dimensions is divided into three classes:
–– High values—score higher than the mean for 2014 + 0.4 standard
deviation in 2014
–– Medium values
–– Low values—score lower than the mean for 2014–0.4 standard
deviation in 2014
If the distribution of the score is close to natural, we may expect divi-

sion of all countries into three groups which are of equal size.
The same breaking points are used for all three years (based on calcula-
tions for 2014 data, as explained before), what allows easier comparison of
changes in local autonomy in individual countries. The division into three
classes is illustrated in Table 10.1. In that way, the scores on two dimen-
sions allow to distinguish between nine types, which may be characterised
as in Table 10.2. Obviously, the number of types is potential, not all cells
have to be filled by real countries.
no 1990 data for Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine. In those cases, we take into
account the earliest possible year, which respectively are 1992, 1991, 1993, 1992 and 1991.
9
Note that scores on effective political discretion to some extent also reflect the position
of local government systems on the variable “policy scope” since high scores on EPD is
measured as the sum of scores on the same 12 functions that constitute policy scope; in other
words, for local authorities to reach high scores on EPD, they must also be assigned respon-
sibilities for an extensive range of functions.
Table 10.1 Breaking points for division of dimensions of typology into classes
Political discretion Financial autonomy
Low Below 52.5 Below 46.4

Medium From 52.5 to 65.5 From 46.4 to 63.4
High Over 65.5 Over 63.4
Table 10.2 Types of local autonomy

Political discretion
Low Medium High
Financial Low Type IX (tutelle) Type Type V (chained

autonomy VIII democracy)
Medium Type VII Type III Type IV
High Type VI (guided Type II Type I (partnership)
democracy)
Note: Types’ numbers are ordered in descending mean scores of LAI in 2014
Combining the two dimensions yields a picture of the extent of local

democratic space in the respective countries, that is, the range of policy
choices open to local councils and voters. The more local control over
functions, the more policy goals may be set by local decision-makers, and
the more local control over finances, the more local choice there is over
the means for realising those goals.
Ultimately, there are four ideal types defined by the low or high values
on both dimensions and five transitional types, which include medium
values on one of the two dimensions. We could give the following labels
to these ideal types. Type I which is characterised by the highest autonomy
on both dimensions is called “partnership” (of central and local govern-
ments). Type V in which political discretion is high but financial auton-
omy is low can be labelled as “chained democracy”. Type VI in which
financial autonomy is high, but political discretions low (so local govern-
ments depend on central steering) may be addressed as “guided democ-
racy”. Finally type IX with a low level of autonomy on both dimensions
may be called “tutelle” (as in the traditional French Napoleonic system,
that is, as an extensive form of supervision through tutelage). We will use
these types as labelled to guide the discussion of our empirical research. In
the conclusion to this volume, these threads will be picked up further and
interwoven with other aspects and dimensions of local autonomy.
10.4.2 Results
The results of our typology (or typologies constructed for 1990, 2004 and
2014 data) are presented in the Tables 10.3, 10.4 and 10.5. As we may
see, in 2014 we identified the existence all nine potential types, although
one of them (type 7) includes only one case. In both 1990 and 1994 we
identified eight types, and in addition one of the types in 1990 (type 8)
consists of one country only.
Let’s concentrate on the 2014 typology first (see Table 10.3 and
Fig. 10.1). Type 1 (partnership) includes seven countries with the highest
level of autonomy on both dimensions. It comprises seven countries, five
of which are located in Nordic Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden) plus Germany and Luxembourg.
On the other extreme, we have type 9 (tutelle). Countries belonging to
that cluster score low on both political discretion and financial autonomy.
There are five countries in this group, four of them located in Mediterranean
or Eastern Europe (Georgia, Malta, Moldova and Turkey). But the fifth
member is the United Kingdom, which was classified separately (in the
Anglo-Saxon or North European group) by earlier typologies.
Types 2–4 are at least medium on both dimensions. Type 2 includes
countries which are highly autonomous on the financial dimension, but
Table 10.3 Typology of local autonomy in 2014

Low Medium High
Financial Low Type IX (tutelle) Type VIII Type V (chained

autonomy Georgia, Malta, Albania, democracy)
Moldova, Turkey, Hungary, Czech R., Estonia,
United Kingdom Ukraine Latvia, Lithuania,
Netherlands, Romania,
Slovenia
Greece Croatia, Poland, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Serbia, Slovakia Portugal
democracy) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Cyprus, Ireland, France, Italy, Germany, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Spain Switzerland Luxembourg, Norway,
Sweden

Low Medium High

autonomy Malta, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine democracy)
Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Czech R.,
United Kingdom Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia,
Netherlands, Slovenia
Georgia, Greece, Albania, Austria,
Slovakia Croatia, Italy,
Poland, Portugal
democracy) Belgium, France, Denmark, Finland,
Cyprus, Ireland, Switzerland Germany, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway,
Spain Sweden

Low Medium High

autonomy Albania, Bulgaria, Czech R., Netherlands democracy)
Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary,
Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Italy, Latvia,
Romania, Serbia, Turkey, Slovenia
Ukraine, United Kingdom
Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Austria,
Slovakia Poland,
Portugal
High Type VI (guided democracy) Type II Type I
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Spain, Iceland, (partnership)
Switzerland Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France Germany,
Luxembourg,
Norway, Sweden
Fig. 10.1 Typology of local autonomy—2014
their political discretion (mainly related to scope of functions as well as

discretion in service delivery) is on a lower level. It is no coincidence that
members of this group are usually countries with small and very small
municipalities, which are often incapable to deliver a broad range of ser-
vices on their own (France, Switzerland, Italy, Austria and the relatively
more consolidated Belgium). Type 4—created by two South-East
European countries, Bulgaria and Macedonia, grouped together with
Portugal—can be characterised in the opposite way to type 2. Their politi-
cal discretion is high, but financial autonomy is at best on a medium level.
Type 3 (with Croatia, Poland, Portugal, Serbia and Slovakia) is more bal-
anced on both dimensions.
Types 5–8 score low on at least one of the two indices. The most
numerous is the cluster in type 5, which is characterised by high political
discretion but low financial autonomy (chained democracy). It consists of
the Netherlands and six countries of Central-Eastern Europe (Czech
Republic, the three Baltic States, Romania and Slovenia). Type 6 (the
guided democracy of Cyprus, Ireland, Liechtenstein and Spain) has an
opposite characteristic. The countries in this group are relatively autono-
mous in financial terms but score low on political discretion.
The groups identified by our method are of course, as it is always a case
in similar exercises, internally diversified. But, as demonstrated in the
Table 10.6, the level of homogeneity of types is relatively high. In most of
cases, the standard deviation of indices within individual types is lower
than half of the standard deviation for the whole set of European coun-
tries. There are only a few exceptions to this rule, there is no single case in
which variation within the group would be higher than for the whole
population of 39 countries.
If we compare the typology conducted for 2014 data with similar
results based on information from 1990 and 2004, we note both examples
of stability and change. Almost half of all (18 out of 39) countries stay in
the same type in all three time points covered by our typology. In particu-
lar, type 1 (partnership) has been very stable. All but one countries of this
Table 10.6 Characteristics of types in 2014

LAI 2014 Political discretion 2014 Financial autonomy
2014
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Type I 75.3 2.6 76.0 5.8 77.6 8.5

Type 2 67.6 7.6 58.4 3.4 76.6 12.0
Type 3 62.8 6.5 60.8 4.5 57.9 3.3
Type 4 60.3 1.6 67.2 1.8 57.1 7.1
Type 5 56.6 6.8 72.8 5.3 32.1 12.0
Type 6 54.7 16.6 34.4 12.7 73.3 9.3
Type 7 48.6 44.8 48.8
Type 8 47.8 2.2 57.6 4.7 29.3 15.0
Type 9 38.7 5.9 35.4 10.3 35.5 6.5
Total 58.5 12.9 59.0 16.4 54.9 21.3
Note: Standard deviations which are higher than half of the standard deviation for the whole set of 39
European countries are marked with italic font
group appear in the same type regardless the time point of the typology.
The only exception is Iceland, which joined type 1 after decentralisation
reforms (parallel to territorial consolidation) implemented in the 1990s.
Significant stability can be found also in the remaining ideal types 5
(chained democracy—Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia being classified in this
group since 1990), 6 (guided democracy—stable membership of Ireland,
Liechtenstein and Spain) and 9 (tutelle—constant presence of Moldova,
Turkey and United Kingdom).
Two stable members can be found in type 2 (Belgium and France) and
one in type 3 (Poland). The remaining 21 countries were changing their
allocation among types between 1990 and 2014.
Interestingly, countries of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe
are strongly under-represented among those that remained in the same
type throughout the whole analysed period. Less than one third (5 out of
17) of the countries of CEE have remained in the same type. This is con-
trary to West European countries where the full stability concerns almost
two third (11 out of 19) of the countries.
The comparison between results for 2004 and 2014 shows more simi-
larities. Only ten countries change their allocation to types during the last
decade. Among those, eight are countries of CEE and only three (Austria,
Italy and Portugal) are located in Western Europe.
The comparison of results of our typology for 1990, 2004 and 2014
demonstrates two processes. The first is related to the progress of
decentralisation reforms. Each time there are less and less countries classi-
fied as type 9 (which is characterised by the lowest scores on both dimen-
sions), and there are also other numerous cases of moving upward (to the
types with higher level of autonomy). When we compare the typology for
2004 and 2014, we realise that seven out of ten countries that change
their allocation have moved to the type with a higher level of autonomy.
There were only three opposite cases (Albania, Georgia and Hungary),
who migrated to the type with lower autonomy.
The second clear process is convergence in local autonomy. The level of
variation of local autonomy among European countries has been clearly
decreasing over the last 25 years. The main drivers of that change have
been decentralisation reforms implemented in post-communist Central
and Eastern Europe, but the same process might be observed in other
countries as well. Those processes are well illustrated by change in means
and standard deviations of major indices. Every five years all means have
been growing, and their standard deviation has been decreasing (see
Table 10.7 and the graphic illustration in Fig. 10.2).
Table 10.7 Decentralisation and convergence of local government systems in

Europe (1990–2014)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Political discretion Mean 49.03 51.18 53.79 57.64 58.42 59.02

St. dev. 21.00 20.27 18.47 17.06 16.50 16.37
Financial autonomy Mean 46.86 49.25 52.41 54.47 54.36 54.89
St. dev. 29.12 27.36 25.82 23.37 22.58 21.30
LAI Mean 50.11 53.03 56.13 58.48 59.03 59.21
St. dev. 17.80 17.10 14.89 13.31 13.19 12.77
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Political discretion - mean Financial autonomy - mean
LAI index - mean Political discretion - stand.dev.
Financial autonomy - stand.dev. LAI index - stand.dev.
Fig. 10.2 Decentralisation and convergence of local government systems in

Europe (1990–2014). (Note: For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine,
there is no data for 1990; the first years of measurement are 1992, 1991, 1993,
1992 and 1991, respectively)
Our data clearly suggest that there is nothing like a universal typology
of local government systems in Europe which might be used and valid for
a long time. The shape of intergovernmental relations is very dynamic in
many countries, and the patterns of variation among European countries
are constantly evolving. This point also brings us to some issues for discus-
sion in the conclusion.
10.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have tried to develop an empirical typology of local
autonomy clustering countries with similar configurations. Aligning with
the broader developments in the comparative local governance literature,
we approached local autonomy through the discrete quantitative measures
elaborated in this book, meanwhile trying to add depth and scope to the
already established classifications. With regard to the first and for analytical
purposes, we have reorganised different aspects of local autonomy along
the dimensions of political discretion and financial autonomy. We have
recategorised each in turn with low, medium and high scores and assigned
our country cases based on empirically observable combinations thereon.
Pertinent to the second and likewise, we have scrutinised the patterns
materialising at the beginning, in the middle and at the end (as the core
reference) of the period studied for each of our country cases. What are
the main findings, in light of earlier classifications?
First, it is possible to classify about 40 countries into 9 different types
of local autonomy. The latter implies that all of potential combinations in
terms of the defined polity and policy ranges are indeed empirically observ-
able. This finding holds over time although it is evident that the number
of countries in each type and where every case is more specifically situated
will differ. This amount clearly exceeds that of the (up to) five types identi-
fied in the categorical classifications of intergovernmental state traditions
in Western Europe (Loughlin et al. 2010). The analysis also demonstrates
it represents more than just adding the five types discerned earlier in the
Eastern part of the continent (Swianiewicz 2014). Including evermore
aspects of local autonomy for an increasing number of countries evidently
renders a more diversified classification then hereto available (also when
earlier quantitative attempts based on welfare state types are taken into
consideration). Still, it is possible to reduce this basic typology into four
ideal types based on high versus low values on both dimensions of local
autonomy (from partnership, over guided and chained democracy to
tutelle). In addition, five transitory (or intermediate) types can be dis-
cerned (with medium values on at least one of the two dimensions). In the
conclusion of this volume, we will return to these ideal types of local
autonomy as defined by those two dimensions.
Second, whereas central in many of the former typologies, geographical
location only continues to matter to a certain extent. This applies to both
the West as well as to the East of the continent. It is most apparent in the
outspoken combinations of policy and financial autonomy (where at least

one of the two is low or high). For the West, the stable core of type I
(labelled as partnership)—with relatively high scores on both dimen-
sions—is clearly Scandinavian with the German periphery either included
or in the subsequent type (with a lower extent of policy autonomy). In
addition, the United Kingdom tends to stick with their Anglo-Saxon tra-
dition of low political discretion and financial autonomy captured in type
IX (tutelle). But, as suggested by Swianiewicz (2014), the countries of the
eastern part of the continent are scattered among all types from III to IX,
which confirms considerable variation of local government systems among
post-communist countries.
Nevertheless, other types have a much more diversified topography
than erstwhile expected merely based on spatial proximity. In the West, the
contemporary dispersion of Southern Europe is noteworthy ranging from
Italy, France and Portugal (respectively in type III and IV) to Spain and
Greece (in type VI and VII, respectively). The Benelux countries are
equally dispersed. In the East, the same holds for designated cases. The
autonomous position of local government in countries like Poland and
current Slovakia (both in type III) is noteworthy with the rest of the
Visegrád levelling off, whereas some of the Baltic or Balkan countries dis-
play evidently more autonomy than others (compare Lithuania with Latvia
or Serbia with Albania). Consequently, there are but few types where the
former distinction between the West and the East or the North and the
South strictly upholds. This is in line with more contemporary assertions
of variation in intergovernmental relations within the wider embedding of
multilevel governance (Goldsmith and Page 2010).
Third, as most of the earlier typologies rooted in state traditions they
tended to emphasise path dependencies over critical junctures galvanised
by their predominantly cross-sectional approaches. Our analysis shows
local autonomy may indeed have rather static features in a substantial
number of cases (a bit less than half remains in the same type at each
moment in time considered). However, in most of our cases, it is more
dynamic albeit to different extents and with some specific patterns. As can
be expected, the evolution is most apparent taking the beginning of mea-
surement as a reference. Also, it usually expresses a move towards more
local autonomy for the cases involved. In the 1990s, a trend towards
decentralisation can be distinguished expressed in our scheme by an
increasing number of cases in the first and a decreasing amount in the last
type of local autonomy. This trend was most outspoken in the East of the
continent. However, a few countries see their local autonomy lower (often
in a wider trend of centralisation) and subsequently shift types. This is
equally a more recent phenomenon.
Our data clearly suggest that there is nothing like a universal and
encompassing typology of local government systems in Europe which
might be used and valid for a long time. The shape of intergovernmental
relations (with autonomy as a critical characteristic thereof) is very dynamic
in many countries, and the patterns of variation among European coun-
tries is constantly evolving. Therefore, it is not surprising that our results
are very different not only from those obtained by earlier authors in
researches conducted in the 1980s (Page and Goldsmith 1987; Hesse and
Sharpe 1991) or in the early years of the twenty-first century (Loughlin
2004; Loughlin et al. 2010) but also from the results of more recent stud-
ies (e.g. Swianiewicz 2014). The difference is not only due to a different
methodology or the set of countries covered by the study but also to the
constantly changing world of decentralisation and recentralisation reforms.
We believe that our result is a fair synthesis of “snapshots” of particular
points in time, but we have no doubt that the typology might be different
again in five to ten years from now. This holds, even if the methodology
to construct types might have a more stable character and may further
allow us to follow the evolution of local autonomy architecture in differ-
ent countries.
Finally, whereas our empirical typology has indeed added depth and
scope to the morphology of earlier classifications, further research should
probe deeper into the ontology and implications of these configurations.
Why can certain countries be found in specific types of local autonomy,
and how can we explain some moving from one type to another whereas
others sustain their level of policy or polity autonomy? Additionally, we
must also question whether these types matter beyond a more fine-grained
assessment of (dynamics in) local autonomy. What, if any, are their effects
for the broader effective and democratic functioning of local government
as the nexus of contemporary local governance?
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CHAPTER 11
Who Governs? Patterns of Responsiveness

and Accountability
11.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the long-standing issue of “Who governs?” is addressed
through an analysis of components of the local autonomy index (LAI). In
Robert Dahl’s classic study of this issue, and in the ensuing “community
power debate”, the distribution of power among actors in the local com-
munity was brought into focus (Dahl 1961). We argue here that a fuller
understanding of power over local decision-making must also take the role
of the state into account. Since local government in many countries per-
forms functions of national importance, national lawmakers face basic
dilemmas about vertical division of power and legitimacy in their respec-
tive countries.1
In political and legal discourse, there are several contradicting argu-
ments, concerning competing choices for or against local autonomy.
Proponents stress the merits of vicinity to citizens and problems (also lead-
ing to efficient distribution of public resources), of direct democratic
accountability and immediate responsiveness, they highlight the reinforce-
ment of democratic legitimacy (especially input and throughput legiti-
macy) through multiple sources, the economies of scope through
multipurpose local authorities, the avoidance of diseconomies of scale, the
1
We recognise, of course, that a detailed account of power holders in the local community
would require data beyond the LAI.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_11
advantages of multilevel governance, identity and trust-building aspects,

as well as the development of civicness, local knowledge, local innovation
and much more (John 2001; Hambleton 2015).
Critics highlight perils of inequality and regional discrepancies, of
reduced redistributive state capacities and reinforced social segregation,
sometimes also the risk of “leaving important decisions of technical nature
in the hands of elected ignorants” instead of trusting impartial profession-
als and knowledge-based administration. Furthermore, critics highlight
the risk of turning an important part of public administration into a dis-
puted arena of competition among politicians and parties that could lead
to fragmentation and endanger social cohesion or even national unity in
some extreme cases. Proponents of centralisation stress the consistency in
decision-making, public interest, coordination, economies of scale, the
merits of professionalism and expertise, standardisation of services, equali-
sation of living standards, faster and smoother implementation of policies,
containment of nimby syndromes and much more (Rhodes 1981).
What about the people? Local politicians often seem to take popularity
of decentralisation for granted, but this is not necessarily the case. In the
past, central government initiatives for regionalisation have been rejected
by popular vote in Europe, as the examples of the French (1969) and of
the Portuguese (1998) referenda have shown. In fact affinity, trust and
loyalty of citizens to local government is not essentially stronger than their
corresponding attitudes towards central government, while partisanship is
nationally defined, turnout in parliamentary elections is higher and the
identification of citizens with their nation is usually stronger than their
identification with the locality where they live or where they come from.2
The relation of citizens to their local authority is, of course, influenced
by a wide variety of factors, including local contextual and individual per-
sonal ones. But this relationship is also configured by institutional patterns
and concrete legal choices. The LAI includes several dimensions which
reflect different legal choices of the institutional framework shaping this
relationship. This framework configures the political community, the
“demos” (Lepsius 1986; Pyta 2014: 221) at the local level. Following
diverse institutional choices, different patterns of local political commu-
nity, of local “demos” emerge.
2
See http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/europa.php?ids=2531&year=2008;
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index (consulted
in 2018).
WHO GOVERNS? PATTERNS OF RESPONSIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 281
This chapter will shift the focus to this relation between citizens and
local authority as it is framed by basic legal determinants. Moreover it will
attempt to configure patterns of this relationship, different ideal types of
local political community. We will refrain from analysing previous com-
parative typologies and classifications since this has already been done in
the previous chapter of this book. In this chapter we will first highlight the
double role of local government between the locality and the state, before
we analyse the core aspects of this role, consisting of dimensions of the
LAI. In the next parts, the method will be explained and the results shown,
before conclusions are drawn.
11.2 Serving Two Masters: The Double Role

of Local Government
Many theoretical approaches of local autonomy seem to focus on the rela-

tion between local government and the state. This “vertical” dimension
has often been used in comparative works in order to classify the different
local government systems and develop typologies (Hesse and Sharpe
1991; John 2001; Heinelt and Hlepas 2006; Sellers and Lidström 2007;
Swianiewicz 2014). This is a reasonable option since modern local govern-
ment is an integral part of the state and local authorities are in many ways
accountable to state bodies; for instance through the classical supervision
mechanisms and rules, furthermore the municipalities are obliged to
respond to policy priorities and targets set by state governments, locally
implementing these policies, often using resources given thereto (e.g. ear-
marked grants) and controlled therein by the state (and/or other higher
levels of governance). Nowadays, local and state governments are “dis-
tinctive, interdependent and interrelated”.3
A second, “horizontal” dimension of the different local government
systems that is highlighted in comparative local government literature is
usually defined with reference to horizontal power relations within the
local authority, mainly between the executive, the council and the profes-
sional administration (Mouritzen and Svara 2002; Heinelt and Hlepas
2006). In other words, this internal horizontal dimension reflects the
3
See the particularly interesting South-African Constitution of 1996, Chap. 3 “Cooperative
Government”, Art. 40 “Government of the Republic”, par. 1 “In the Republic, government
is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive,
interdependent and interrelated” http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/
SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf (consulted in 2018).
structural features of the local authority itself, leaving aside the question
about the relation between the municipality and the local citizenry which
defines the very essence of the local authority as a political entity. Local
authorities are not completely identical with their citizens, since there is
also a system of political representation at the local level. This kind of
external horizontal relation between citizens and municipality is, however,
much more important for local autonomy than the internal balance of
power within the city hall.
Local autonomy is rather defined through the balance between this
external “horizontal” dimension (the relation between the municipality
and its local citizenry) on the one hand and the “vertical” dimension (the
relation between the municipality and the state), on the other hand. As
political entities with democratic legitimacy, local authorities are account-
able and responsible to their citizens. As integral parts of the multilevel
system of democratic polity and public administration subject to the rule
of law, they are also accountable and responsible towards upper levels of
governance, not only towards their own citizens. This integrative double
role of local government is not clearly captured by some previous com-
parative approaches that seem to be based on bipolar perceptions of state
and locality.
As a responsible political entity, the local authority is accountable for
the use of resources and the implementation of policies, both to its elec-
torate (the local citizens) and to its parent entity, the state. As an operat-
ing administration that should satisfy collective needs and preferences
(Ostrom and Ostrom 1977), the local authority has to fulfil tasks for and
be responsive to both higher-level and local-level definitions of needs and
priorities. In other words, local government seems to have a kind of
“Janus Head”, looking both at the direction of the state and at the direc-
tion of the local community. This “double” nature of modern local gov-
ernment has been reflected in various versions in the long-lasting debate
in legal and political theory, already from the beginning of the modern
state (Hlepas 1990). Local government has a double legitimacy (drawing
both from the state and from the local community) (Lidstrom and
Baldersheim 2016) and, as already shown, a double accountability and a
double responsiveness. It is mainly the balance between local and supra-
local accountability and responsiveness that configures the relation of the
local authority to the local citizenry and the type of the corresponding
local political community.
11.3 The Orientation of Accountability

and Responsiveness: Defining the Type of Political
Community at the Local Level
Accountability to the local community is formally realised through elec-
tion, some other voting (e.g. local referenda) and participatory proce-
dures. Voters hold incumbents accountable for their performance in
office; they can reelect or vote out local politicians. To do so, “voters
must be able to assign clearly the responsibility for government perfor-
mance” (Przeworski et al. 1999: 47). This presupposes a sufficient
amount of information understandable by voters. At first glance the
local level seems to offer ideal conditions for easily accessible informa-
tion, except for large-scale municipalities. But even in smaller munici-
palities, clear lines of authority and responsibility with visible decision
roles are a precondition for political accountability, since it must be clear
who is to be made accountable and for what. The phenomenon of the
“misinformed citizen” is particularly evident in financial politics and in
financial policies and procedures (Liguori et al. 2012): If local authori-
ties derive most of their revenue from state grants and other financial
transfers, the problem of fiscal illusion (Mourao 2008) emerges and
local accountability is frustrated, since local policy costs are invisible to
the citizen because they are masked by the roundabout nature of
national taxation and municipal spending (Buchanan and Wagner
1977).
In the liberal democratic tradition, accountability of decision-makers
refers mainly to the use of taxpayers’ money by the government. The
famous American slogan “no taxation without representation” demanded
decisions on taxation to be made by a body where the American taxpayers
would be directly represented, not to be taken by the distant British parlia-
ment. In a similar vein, local authorities were described as truly autono-
mous only when they derived the most part of their revenue from local
taxation, imposed and decided by the locally elected representative body
(the municipal council/assembly) that was accountable to the local citi-
zenry. Then, municipal resources would be efficiently allocated according
to particular circumstances and preferences of the citizens (Oates 1972),
who would choose what they are willing to pay for (Olson 1969: 482),
drastically increasing the so-called citizen effectiveness (Dahl and Tufte
1973: 29).
Today, nevertheless, the notion of “accountability” should be perceived

as a dynamic procedure, which does not only include voting and elections
but also a complexity of modern representative and trust-winning (or los-
ing), deliberative and argumentative processes (Mansbridge 2004, 2009;
Saward 2014). It is precisely this complexity that makes independent local
taxation a particularly important4 clear and reliable measure of account-
ability towards the local citizenry for the level of local taxation and the
corresponding policy outcomes (Olson 1969). People know who decided
how much taxes they have to pay to the municipality and what they have
received as municipal services, what they have gained (or missed) in terms
of local development and infrastructure. Usually, these policy outcomes
are also reflected in city attractiveness and in prices of real estate which are
easily realised and contextualised by citizens, who can “vote with their
feet” for jurisdictions with a balance of taxes and services to their tastes
(Tiebout 1956: 422). Finally, this self-defined capacity to act (Pitkin
1967) through independent local taxation is an obvious and accurate mea-
sure for local autonomy and for the self-determination of the community
involved.
This level of local taxation autonomy (or fiscal autonomy, the variable
FA included in the codebook) can be supplemented by the level of bor-
rowing autonomy (BA, a variable included in the codebook) of the local
authority (Rodden 2002) that is accountable to the local community for
borrowing decisions and their outcomes (e.g. important development
projects, infrastructure or other needs). In addition, the level of financial
self-reliance (FSR, a variable included in the codebook) is also a reliable
indicator for local political accountability: A high percentage of own
sources can obviously encourage independent decision-making at the
local level and enhance accountability to local citizens. These three vari-
ables, fiscal autonomy (FA), borrowing autonomy (BA) and the level of
financial self-reliance (FSR) constitute the dimension of financial auton-
omy as it has been elaborated in Chap. 9 (as the weighted sum of FA,
FSR and BA).
While the dimension of financial autonomy can be a measure of munici-
pal accountability towards the local citizenry, the dimension of control
and non-interference that has also been elaborated in previous chapters of
this book, consisting of administrative supervision (AS) and financial
4
It is also worth mentioning that the corresponding Art. 9 par. 3 of the European Charter
is its most often violated article (Council of Europe 2017).
transfer system (FTS), can be a measure of municipal accountability towards

the state (as the weighted sum of AS and FTS). Through administrative
supervision (AS, a variable included in the codebook), government bod-
ies, agents or other authorities review municipal decisions in order to
ensure compliance with national policies or/and with laws passed by the
parliament or with other supra-local legal acts. When municipal decisions
are subject to expediency control by supervision mechanisms, account-
ability is oriented towards state authorities. Expediency control is allowed
by the European Charter (Art. 8 par. 2) only for delegated tasks. In fact,
even when supervision is explicitly restricted into legality control, detailed
legal provisions and decision criteria imposed by law sometimes seem to
blur the distinction between expediency and legality control. As a general
principle, however, legality review simply means that local government is
subject to the rule of law just as any other administrative entity and politi-
cal discretion of local governing bodies remains untouched, even though
state supervision includes additional control mechanisms that often delay
the implementation of local political decisions.
The financial transfer system (FTS, a variable included in the code-
book), is also mentioned in the European Charter (Art. 9 par. 7), where it
is provided that “as far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be
earmarked for the financing of specific projects”. Instrumentalisation of
state grants is a widespread practice of central governments willing to sub-
ordinate or manipulate local authorities. In any case, earmarked and con-
ditional grants make local governments accountable to their financial
supporters for the use of money they have received. On the contrary,
unconditional financial transfers can decrease accountability towards the
central state and shift the focus of accountability for the use of these
resources to the local citizenry who is the final recipient of works and ser-
vices paid thereof.
Similar to accountability, responsiveness of local authorities, as
already mentioned, is also double-oriented towards the state and the
local community. It is evident that a high level of local discretion in
policy implementation and service provision enhances responsiveness
towards the particular circumstances, the needs and preferences of citi-
zens. Furthermore, the possibility to take on residual tasks further
enhances responsiveness of local authorities towards the citizens. On the
contrary, restricted discretion and initiation powers would decrease local
responsiveness, since local authorities would follow rules and execute
decisions taken at higher levels of governance, irrespective of local cir-
cumstances and peculiarities, of local needs and preferences. In other

words, municipalities would provide services and implement policies
designed by higher levels of government; they would be entitled to
locally administer tasks and would not enjoy real local autonomy, since
an effective “policy space for local democracy” would barely exist
(Ladner et al. 2016: 325). Executing policies is one thing, but deciding
on aspects of the services delivered determines the level of local auton-
omy in specific policy fields. The power of local governments to deter-
mine for themselves “the mix of local goods and services” has been
highlighted as a basic component of local autonomy (Goldsmith 1995:
229). As long as this power is defined by law, it is reflected by the dimen-
sion of political discretion which was elaborated in Chap. 9 and com-
posed of the weighted sum of the variables “institutional depth” (ID)
and “effective political discretion” (EPD). Very weak scores of ID and
EPD entail stronger responsiveness towards the state, since local author-
ities “only perform mandated tasks” (or have very limited choices) and
most aspects of municipal functions are decided by higher levels.
Therefore, the scores of these two variables are expected to reflect
whether responsiveness of local authorities is rather state or
locality-oriented.
11.4 Method
Following the previous analytical framework, we have chosen legal
determinants for different patterns of local government as a political
community, alongside the corresponding dimensions consisting of LAI
dimensions. We define as “legal determinants” some fundamental
choices of the legal framework which configure basic institutional
aspects of the relation between local government and citizens. The
core dimensions of this relation are accountability on the one hand and
responsiveness on the other hand. We have selected the combination of
corresponding dimensions of local autonomy elaborated in previous
Chap. 9 and reflecting legally determined accountability (financial
autonomy + non-interference) and legally determined responsiveness
(policy discretion), following the argumentation in the previous part of
this chapter. The calculation of the indicators of accountability and
responsiveness is indicated in Box 11.1.
Box 11.1: Calculation of Accountability and Responsiveness on the

Basis of LAI Variables
Accountability = non-interference + financial autonomy
with non-interference = (1* administrative supervision (AS) + 1
financial transfer system (FTS))/2 and with financial autonomy = (3*
fiscal autonomy (FA) + 3* financial self-reliance (FSR) + 1* borrowing
autonomy (BA))/7.
Responsiveness = political discretion
with political discretion = (1* institutional depth (ID) + 3* effec-
tive political discretion (EPD))/4.
Higher scores than the half of the maximum score (180/2 = 90 < score)

indicate that local accountability prevails, while lower scores (score < 90)
indicate that supra-local accountability prevails. The same pattern exists
for responsiveness: Higher scores than the half of the maximum score
(90/2 = 45 < score) indicate that responsiveness to the locality prevails,
while lower scores (score < 45) reflect stronger responsiveness towards the
state or other levels of supra-local governance.
Combining these two core dimensions (accountability and responsive-
ness), different patterns of relations between the local citizenry and the
local government emerged, and a corresponding typology of local political
communities was elaborated (see Fig. 11.1).
II. I.
Local Service community Self-determined community
RESPONSIVENESS
IV. III.
Supra-Local Patronised community Contributors’ community
Supra-Local Local
ACCOUNTABILITY
Fig. 11.1 Responsiveness and accountability as determinants of community type

in local government
Type I: “self-determined community” (local accountability and local

responsiveness). In this type, local orientation of both accountability
and responsiveness prevails. Local government is structured around
functions local citizens are willing to pay for (“fiscal equivalence”; Olson
1969: 482). Therefore, local government has the political discretion to
decide about the level of local taxation and the use of local resources in
order to respond to the needs and preferences of the local community
who holds accountable thereto the elected local politicians. This type of
local community can be characterised as “self-determined” since setting
of political goals and priorities and collection of corresponding resources
are predominantly being decided by local politicians held accountable
by the local electorate. It is, obviously, the strongest type of local politi-
cal community and the closest one to the normative ideals of local
autonomy enshrined in the European Charter.5
Type II: “service community” (supra-local accountability and local respon-
siveness). In this type local orientation of responsiveness prevails, while
accountability is predominantly oriented towards supra-local levels of
governance. Strong state supervision and upper-level decision-making
about taxation can be combined to local policy autonomy when upper
levels of governance maintain control over certain standards and the
financial resources but concede policy discretion to the local level. Local
government is responsive to local needs and preferences concerning the
provision of services. The focus of the relation between local govern-
ment and the local citizenry lies on local services; therefore, this type of
local political community can be labelled as “service community”.
Type III: “contributors’ community” (local accountability and supra-local
responsiveness). In this type, the orientation of accountability is pre-
dominantly local, while the orientation of responsiveness is predomi-
nantly supra-local. Policy initiatives and priorities are decided at higher
levels of governance. This can be the case, when there is a strong ten-
dency for standardisation and uniformity of public services. At the same
time, local government mainly relies on its own financial resources and
has a high level of taxation autonomy (financial autonomy dimension),
5
See the last paragraph of the Preamble of the European Charter: “Asserting that this
entails the existence of local authorities endowed with democratically constituted decision-
making bodies and possessing a wide degree of autonomy with regard to their responsibili-
ties, the ways and means by which those responsibilities are exercised and the resources
required for their fulfilment” (Council of Europe 1985).
being accountable to local citizens for the use of their money and
resources. This can be combined to a moderate level of state supervi-
sion, since the central government has little incentive for control when
local authorities are predominantly spending money deriving from the
contribution of local taxation. Moreover, endowing unconditional
grants means that the state refrains from intervention in local spending
priorities (non-interference dimension). In such cases, the focus of the
relation between local government and local community lies on local
resources and especially on local taxpayers’ contribution through local
taxation; therefore, this type of local political community can be labeled
as “contributors’ community”.
Type IV: “patronised community” (supra-local accountability and supra-
local responsiveness). In this type the orientation of both accountability
and responsiveness is predominantly supra-local. Local government is
mainly accountable to supra-local levels of governance and responsive
to policy initiatives and choices decided at higher levels. The relation-
ship between local government and local community is overshadowed
by decisions taken at higher levels of governance who decide about ser-
vices and resources of the local level according to their own criteria.
Local authorities are state-dependent and the state appears as a patron
of the local level. Therefore, this type of local political community can
be labeled as “patronised community”. It is, obviously, the weakest type
of local political community (and the most distant one from the norma-
tive ideals of the European Charter), since it does imply free election
and formal democratic legitimacy, but local government lacks powers
required for immediate responsiveness and accountability to the local
citizenry.
11.5 Results
The distribution of the different countries among these four types of local
political community has been examined for the years 1990 (the first year
covered by LAI analysis: see Fig. 11.2), 2005 (the year after EU accession
of many former communist countries: see Fig. 11.3) and 2014 (the most
recent data: see Fig. 11.4).
In 1990 the type of “self-determined community” was prevailing at
the municipal level of no less than 18 countries: Many of them belonged
to the “champions” of local autonomy (Ladner et al. 2016). Apart
from Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
90
80
LUX
ITA DEU
EST FIN SWE
70 SVN NOR DNK
HUN
POL FRA
60 BEL ISL
NLD AUT PRT
responsiveness
LTU SRB HRV

50 CHE ESP LIE
40
BGR MKD
MDV TUR
30
GEO SVK GBR
CZE GRC
20
CYP
IRL
10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
accountability
Fig. 11.2 Distribution of political community types (accountability and respon-

siveness) among countries in 1990. (Note: N = 34, for Albania, Latvia, Malta,
Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990)
Iceland), mid-European federal (Switzerland, Germany, Austria) and small

(Lichtenstein, Luxembourg) countries, also two Mediterranean countries
(France and Spain) where local government has a strong role in politics and
decentralisation reforms were recently implemented, belonged to this
group, as well as Portugal and Belgium. Poland, Croatia, Hungary and
Estonia were the ex-communist countries belonging to this group already
in 1990. Among the two dimensions, accountability reached higher scores,
compared to responsiveness in most countries of this group, reflecting a
tendency of the national level to confine discretion of local authorities.
The type of “service community” included 5 countries in 1990. Among
them there were three ex-communist countries (Serbia, Lithuania and
Slovenia), the Netherlands and Italy. In all countries belonging to this
quite diverse group, a common characteristic is local discretion focusing
90
FIN
80
LVA CZE ISN
EST
LTU DEU SWE
LUX
70 NLD MKD DNK NOR
SVN
BGR HUN
POL
HRV ITA
60 BEL FRA
UKR SRB AUT PRT
ROM
ALB CHE
responsiveness
50 ESP LIE
SVK
40 MDV
GEO
GRC TUR
30
GBR
CYP
IRL
20 MLT
10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
accountability

siveness) among countries in 2005. Note: N = 39
on services, while supra-levels are more important for legal control and
taxation decisions.
The type of “contributors’ community” included 6 countries in 1990:
the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Slovakia, Greece, Turkey and the Czech
Republic. While local accountability reached high scores (due to financial
autonomy and rather limited state interference), local responsiveness was
low (particularly in Cyprus), since local initiative and policy discretion
were constrained.
The type of “patronised community” included 5 countries in 1990.
The largest part thereof comprised of Balkan and Black Sea countries,
sharing a common Ottoman and, more recently, a communist past,
characterised by centralism and authoritarianism: Bulgaria, Georgia,

90
FIN
80
LVA CZE ISL
EST
LTU DEU SWE
LUX
70 NLD MKD DNK NOR
SVN
BGR HUN POL
HRV ITA
60 BEL FRA
UKR SRB AUT PRT
ROM
ALB CHE
responsiveness
50 LIE
ESP
SVK
40 MDV
GEO
30 GRC TUR
GBR
CYP
IRL
20 MLT
10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
accountability

siveness) among countries in 2014. Note: N = 39
Macedonia and Moldavia. Ireland had a very low score in responsiveness,

while its accountability score was the highest, in this group.
After the democratisation period in Eastern Europe and EU accession
of many ex-communist countries in 2004, it was anticipated that several
countries would shift to a different type of local political community. Also
in some Southern European countries, 1990–2005 was a period of decen-
tralisation and local government reforms. Our findings seem to reflect
these developments, since three ex-communist countries (Albania, Serbia
and Slovakia) joined the group of “self-determined” communities, while
six countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Romania and Ukraine)
moved to the group of “service communities”. During the same period,
Italy joined the group of “self-determined” communities.
In the period following 2005, democratisation and decentralisation

processes stepped forward in several countries. On the other hand, the
financial crisis triggered recentralisation tendencies or slowed down decen-
tralisation dynamics, especially in the most heavily affected countries.
Therefore, a number of countries shifted into different types, while the
group of “self-determined” communities lost three members. Spain
moved to the type of “contributors’ community”, while Albania and
Hungary moved to the group of “service community”. The latter was
also joined by Moldova, while Ireland moved to the group of “patronised
community”, as the single member. Georgia and Greece became
borderline cases, since Greece nearly reached a shift to the group of “self-
determined” communities and Georgia to the group of “service
community”.
Reviewing this period of 25 years (1990), it becomes obvious that there
were remarkable shifts in most European countries, considerably increas-
ing the number of countries belonging to the “service” community type
(from 5 in 1990 to 12 in 2014), while the number of countries belonging
to the “strongest” type of “self-determined” communities culminated in
2005 (22 countries) but decreased in 2014 (19 countries), obviously due
to the crisis and/or to political changes in some countries. The “contribu-
tors’ community” type remained stable in numbers, while the weakest
type of “patronised community” considerably decreased from five coun-
tries in 1990 down to only one in 2014. This development reflects the
orientation of many local government reforms in these years, mainly aim-
ing at democratisation of politics and/or decentralisation of policies. On
the other hand, increase of “service community” type shows that many
European countries would rather concede policy discretion (“service com-
munity”) without taxation powers and freedoms from state interference
than the other way around (“contributors’ community”). These choices
are also reflected in the following detailed Table 11.1.
In the period under examination (1990–2014), there were important
changes both in responsiveness and in accountability scores. Nevertheless,
in certain countries stability or minimal change prevailed. Concerning
responsiveness, stability prevailed in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Liechtenstein, Norway and Slovenia, while minimal change (less than 10%
increase or decrease) was found in Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In 23 out of 36
countries, there was an increase in responsiveness scores, the highest
being registered in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia,
Table 11.1 Accountability and responsiveness 1990–2005 to 2014/change 1990–2014
294
Country Accountability Accountability Accountability Change Responsiveness Responsiveness Responsiveness Change

(2014) (2005) (1990) (1990– (2014) (2005) (1990) (1990–
2014) 2014)
Albania 77.38 91.67 0 77.38 53.13 53.13 0 53.13

Austria 135.51 126.46 129.56 5.95 56.25 56.25 56.25 0.00
Belgium 94.08 90.48 90.48 3.60 59.38 59.38 59.38 0.00
Bulgaria 82.14 57.14 0 82.14 68.75 65.63 37.5 31.25
A. LADNER ET AL.
Croatia 114.78 108.37 98.81 15.97 62.1 61.7 51.04 11.06

Cyprus 102.58 102.96 92.17 10.41 24.92 24.97 16.54 8.38
Czech Republic 105.95 105.95 105.95 0.00 78.13 78.13 25 53.13
Denmark 148.81 148.81 159.52 −10.71 71.88 68.75 68.75 3.13
Estonia 84.52 84.52 101.19 −16.67 71.88 75 69.79 2.09
Finland 167.86 167.86 151.19 16.67 84.38 84.38 71.88 12.50
France 157.14 157.14 157.14 0.00 60.2 60.2 60.18 0.02
Georgia 63.1 59.52 29.76 33.34 44.79 36.46 28.13 16.66
Germany 145.14 143.75 141.49 3.65 75 75 75 0.00
Greece 115.48 120.24 120.24 −4.76 44.79 32.29 26.04 18.75
Hungary 46.43 105.95 95.24 −48.81 62.5 65.63 68.75 −6.25
Iceland 140.48 161.9 161.9 −21.42 81.25 78.13 59.38 21.87
Ireland 85.71 102.38 85.71 0.00 23.96 23.96 15.63 8.33
Italy 152.38 126.19 63.1 89.28 62.5 62.5 75 −12.50
Latvia 82.14 71.43 0 82.14 78.13 78.13 0 78.13
Liechtenstein 152.38 166.67 166.67 −14.29 51.04 51.04 51.04 0.00
Lithuania 84.52 84.52 51.19 33.33 78.13 75 51.04 27.09
Luxembourg 148.81 148.81 165.48 −16.67 65.63 71.88 78.13 −12.50
Macedonia 88.1 88.1 33.33 54.77 68.75 68.75 36.46 32.29
Malta 116.67 116.67 0 116.67 28.13 19.79 0 28.13
Moldova 29.76 15.48 4.76 25.00 47.92 39.58 33.33 14.59
Netherlands 78.57 45.24 45.24 33.33 65.63 68.75 56.25 9.38
(continued)
Country Accountability Accountability Accountability Change Responsiveness Responsiveness Responsiveness Change
(2014) (2005) (1990) (1990– (2014) (2005) (1990) (1990–
2014) 2014)
Norway 157.14 157.14 135.71 21.43 68.75 68.75 68.75 0.00

Poland 126.19 126.19 126.19 0.00 64.47 64.6 62.5 1.97
Portugal 142.86 142.86 132.14 10.72 65.63 57.29 56.25 9.38
Romania 73.81 57.14 0 73.81 69.79 55.21 0 69.79
Serbia 142.86 101.19 79.76 63.10 62.37 57.29 52.08 10.29
Slovakia 92.86 92.86 103.57 −10.71 54.17 47.92 26.04 28.13
Slovenia 48.81 42.86 33.33 15.48 67.77 67.73 68.75 −0.98
Spain 157.14 157.14 157.14 0.00 37.55 50 50 −12.45
Sweden 172.62 172.62 172.62 0.00 75 75 71.88 3.12
Switzerland 145.57 136.98 136.97 8.60 53.8 53.07 49.73 4.07
Turkey 127.38 127.38 127.38 0.00 31.52 32.38 32.71 −1.19
Ukraine 55.03 62.41 0 55.03 57.05 57 0 57.05
United 116.59 116.48 116.26 0.33 24.68 27.33 27.34 −2.66
Kingdom
Note: For Albania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Ukraine, there is no data for 1990 and the score is 0
Accountability = {[(1 *AS + 1*FTS)/2] + [(3 *FA+ 3 *FSR + 1 * BA)/7]}.
Responsiveness = (1 *ID+ 3 *EPD)/4)
WHO GOVERNS? PATTERNS OF RESPONSIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
295
Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and the Ukraine. A decrease in

responsiveness was found in Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey
and the United Kingdom. The sharpest decrease was registered in Spain,
after the outbreak of the crisis.
Concerning accountability, stability prevailed in the Czech Republic,
France, Ireland, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom,
while minimal change (less than 10% increase or decrease) was found in
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Liechtenstein, Portugal
and Switzerland. In 20 out of 36 countries, there was an increase in
accountability scores, the highest being registered in Albania, Bulgaria,
Georgia, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and the Ukraine.
A decrease in accountability was found in Denmark, Estonia, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania and Luxembourg. The strongest decrease
was registered in Hungary, following political change, and Iceland, after
the outbreak of the crisis.
The aforementioned findings illustrate, once more, a distinct geogra-
phy of change which is mostly concentrated in former communist coun-
tries (who also reached the strongest increase rates). A closer look reveals
that in many of these cases, changes in policy responsibility and especially
policy decentralisation were comparatively stronger (or/and more attrac-
tive) than changes in financial autonomy and state interference. In many
post-communist countries, there is a strong path dependency on financial
tutelage and trust rates still remain, in most cases, comparatively lower
(Hlepas 2015). On the contrary, increase of accountability was stronger
than responsiveness increase in a series of western countries (Italy,
Netherlands, Norway and Portugal), while in Denmark and Greece that
had recently undergone amalgamation reforms, responsiveness increased
but accountability decreased. Stability or minimum change characterised
many western countries (and Poland), showing that most of the mature
democracies are not prone to change the type of local political community
they belong to.
11.6 Conclusions
The triangle relationship of national government, local government and
the citizens is often overlooked in comparative local government studies.
Out of this tripartite relationship, we focused on the relation of local gov-
ernment to the state on the one side and to the local citizenry, on the
other. While the relation of local government to upper levels of gover-
nance has often been used as a component in comparative classifications of

local government systems, this has barely been the case for the relation of
local authorities to their citizenry. Our basic argument is that a classifica-
tion of the different legal statuses of local government should take into
consideration the double role of local authorities for the sake of the citi-
zens’ community and for the sake of the state.
In this chapter we are focusing on two core aspects of these relations:
On the aspect of accountability and on the aspect of responsiveness, since
we argue that these are the main configuring factors for the different kinds
of political community emerging at the local level. The prevailing orienta-
tion of either the accountability or the responsiveness of local government
has been assessed, using the combination of corresponding dimensions of
the LAI and reflecting legally determined accountability (financial auton-
omy + non-interference) and legally determined responsiveness (political
discretion). For each one of the aforementioned two aspects, namely, of
the accountability and the responsiveness of local authorities, the orienta-
tion prevailing in each country can be either local towards the citizenry or
supra-local towards the state (border cases are also possible). In this way a
parsimonious model of four possible combinations has been elaborated,
and four versions of this state-local government-local community relation-
ship emerged who define four corresponding types of local political com-
munity: Type I, “self-determined community” (local accountability and
local responsiveness); Type II, “service community” (supra-local account-
ability and local responsiveness); Type III, “patronised community”
(supra-local accountability and supra-local responsiveness); Type IV,
“contributors’ community” (local accountability and supra-local
responsiveness).
The distribution of the different countries among these four types of
local political community has been examined for the years 1990, 2005
(the year after EU accession of many countries) and 2014, and it was
found that there were important changes across time in a majority of
countries, moving from one type of local political community to another:
The type of “patronised community” (supra-local orientation) which is
the weakest one initially included five countries but dropped down to two
members in 2005 and finally to only one in 2014. On the contrary, the
type of “service community” that initially included 5 countries in 1990
reached 8 members in 2005 and finally 12 members in 2014. The stron-
gest type (local orientation) of “self-determined community” has always
been the one including the biggest number of countries, namely, 18 coun-
tries in 1990, 22 in 2005 and 19 in 2014. Finally, the “contributors’ com-
munity” type was nearly stable in numbers (from 6 in 1990 and 2005 to
5 in 2014), but there were countries entering and/or leaving this group
during the same period. In other words, a considerable mobility across
these different types has been recorded, reflecting the readiness and the
ability of several countries to quit path dependencies or simply change
recent options and shift types.
These remarkable changes of local political community type were not
only due to the fact that many ex-communist countries combined democ-
ratisation with decentralisation reforms but also to developments in
Southern Europe. Most ex-communist countries moved to the group of
“service community” and some to the group of “self-determined com-
munity”, which included the Southern European case of Italy in 2005,
while Spain had left this group in 2014 in order to join the group of coun-
tries belonging to the “contributors’ community”. This typology has
shown that geographical areas often used in previous typologies do not
identify with distinct types of political community in local government,
especially in Eastern Europe (Swianiewicz 2014) and in Southern Europe,
where most shifts happened. It is, however, different in the so-called
mature democracies but also in some countries with peculiar political char-
acteristics: Also in this typology, the most stable and consistent group
across time is the Nordic one, while another group of “alpine” and federal
countries (Austria, Switzerland and Germany) also remains stable and the
same applies to the Low Countries and France. All of them (under the
exception of the Netherlands) belonged to the “self-determined” com-
munity type. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Cyprus
and Malta constantly belonged to the “contributors’ community” group
of countries. This group has barely attracted newcomers (Spain, after the
crisis, was the only exception).
In these stable country cases, strong historical legacies and path depen-
dencies could be the reason why they did not shift away from types of local
community which were not attractive (“contributors’ community”) to oth-
ers. Path dependency could also be an explanation for the choice stability of
other countries belonging to the two “attractive” groups (“service” and
“self-determined” community, gradually joined by many other countries),
but in these cases also other factors could have played a role, such as the
“impression of success”, “logic of appropriateness”, trust and several others.
A shift away from supra-local and towards local orientation has been
found to be obvious and comparatively stronger in the dimension of
responsiveness than in the dimension of accountability, especially among

ex-communist countries. It seems that in these cases, central decision-
makers are ready to concede policy discretion to lower levels of gover-
nance but they tend to retain control over local government through
supervision and conditional grants, while they refrain from decentralising
taxation powers, eventually in order to sustain their redistributive capaci-
ties (and political leverage there from) and their intra-country grip on fis-
cal policies.
Future research should try to detect the concrete factors explaining the
shift of many European countries to different types of local political
community and eventually even the relative importance of each one of
these factors. Next to the well-known explanations of institutional isomor-
phism, imitation, evolutionary paths, goodness of fit or misfit, notions of
appropriateness and more, there is also the question about the influence of
societal features and their changes in time, of factors such as trust, con-
sumerism, inequalities, social mobility and others. Finally, we should ask
how these different types of local political community reflect upon atti-
tudes and perceptions of both citizens and their elected representatives.
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CHAPTER 12
Roadmap to Local Autonomy? Drivers

of Variation
12.1 Cross-Country Variations in Local

Autonomy Persist: Why?
As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, local autonomy and its com-
ponents vary substantially across the 39 European states analysed here.
How are we to account for the variation in local autonomy? With the
intense learning among municipalities going on across European borders
regarding good governance and with the Council of Europe’s Congress of
Local Authorities as a guardian and advocate of local autonomy, one
would perhaps have thought there would have been more convergence by
now. Nevertheless, variations persist.
Six different theoretical traditions are explored in search of potential
explanations of this variation: theories of rational preferences manage-
ment, reform “theory”, two versions of institutional theory (evolutionary
logic and path dependency highlighted by historical institutionalism),
multilevel governance, and, finally, what is denoted, for want of a better
term, a political logic model.The first hypothesis relates the variation of
local autonomy to the rational choice approach of Tiebout (1956) and the
decentralisation theorem of Oates (1972). The theorem suggests that
decentralised government is useful for responding to territorially varied
preferences of citizens in order to achieve an efficient distribution of public
resources (see Chap. 1). Presumably, the more varied such preferences are,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_12
the more autonomy is required for local decision-makers to respond effec-

tively in this regard. European countries vary greatly as to their ethnic,
cultural or socio-economic heterogeneity, and presumably, such heteroge-
neity will be reflected in variation across municipalities in terms of citizens’
demands for public services. The main hypothesis is that the more varied
preferences are across the territory of the state, the more autonomy will be
granted to local government to allow it to manage such variety
effectively.
Two measures of heterogeneity are used here: country size in terms of
population and institutional structure, that is, a distinction between fed-
eral and regional states on the one hand and unitary states on the other
hand. The simplest measure is that of country size: it is assumed that the
larger the country, the more varied it will be demographically, ethnically,
or economically, and preferences for government services will be corre-
spondingly varied.1 Furthermore, the choice of a federal or regionalised
constitution for a state is in itself recognition of the existence of political
and/or social heterogeneity on the territory of the state; such heterogene-
ity could also be expected to be expressed in terms of local autonomy to
further deal with heterogeneity at the local level. In this analysis, the fol-
lowing countries are regarded as federal or regionalised states: Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
However, in federal and regional states, local government is usually the
responsibility of the regional level. Therefore, an alternative hypothesis in
this regard could be that in federal and regionalised states heterogeneity is
absorbed by semi-autonomous government institutions at the regional
level and that further autonomy at the local level is not needed.
Consequently, such states could have less autonomous local government
than other states.
Hypothesis 2 relates local autonomy to the scale of local government in
the respective countries. In many European countries, local government
reformers have been preoccupied with the scale of local government, argu-
ing that larger size of municipalities is needed to deal with the various
pressures of socio-economic modernisation (Baldersheim and Rose 2010;
1
The impact of population size on government structures as regards regionalisation has
been investigated by Hooghe and Marks from a somewhat different angle (Hooghe and
Marks 2012). They argue that (larger) population size increases communication needs con-
cerning policy development; hence, larger countries tend to be more decentralised than
smaller ones in order to facilitate “soft” communication.
ROADMAP TO LOCAL AUTONOMY? DRIVERS OF VARIATION 305
Swianiewicz 2010). Consequently, amalgamations have often been a fea-

ture of reforms. Although amalgamations are usually guided more by
series of practical concerns rather than theoretical considerations, such
attitudes have been labelled “reform theory” (e.g. Bish and Ostrom 1973;
Mouritzen 1991).
In the academic literature (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Denters et al. 2014)
as well as among decision-makers in many countries, there is ongoing
debate on what the appropriate size of local government units is. According
to Dahl and Tufte, there is a trade-off to be made between two equally
important democratic qualities: system capacity and citizen effectiveness.
A preference for greater system capacities tends to lead to larger local gov-
ernment units, while a preference for citizen effectiveness favours smaller
units. National reformers of local government often prefer more system
capacity (Baldersheim and Rose 2010). The hypothesis in this regard is
that the smaller the scale of local government, the more reluctant central
governments will be to grant extensive powers to local government or to
entrust it with important functions; the reluctance may be due to sheer
practical difficulties that small municipalities will face in carrying out sub-
stantial tasks or it may be due to fear of local improprieties in small com-
munities where everybody knows everybody else.
A further development of hypothesis 2 focuses more directly on the
efforts of reformers of the scale of local government. Such efforts are often
accompanied by promises to delegate powers and extend functions to
local government. Consequently, it is expected that the more national
governments have succeeded in reducing the number of municipalities
over the last decades, the more tasks and powers they have allocated to
local government and the higher their score on the local autonomy index
(LAI).
Hypotheses 3 and 4 draw on new institutionalism theories, first on the
theory of evolutionary institutionalism and then on historical institution-
alism. The two perspectives agree on the importance of institutions but
differ as to the precise mechanisms of their impacts. The former argues
(e.g. Fürstenberg 2016; Lustick 2011; Steinmo 2010; Thelen 2004) that
institutional development may follow the logic of biological evolution:
from streams of random change (mutations), some formats become
favoured (“selected”) and survive because they represent more effective
adaptations to the existing environment; and conversely, a changing envi-
ronment may make existing institutional formats ineffective and provide
openings for the growth and spread of new formats. How to apply this line
of thinking to the development of local autonomy? The most immediate

environment of local government is that of the state of which it is a part.
The state traditions vary across Europe, as pointed out by Dyson (1980)
and further developed by Loughlin and Peters (1997). Loughlin et al.
(2010) has demonstrated how local government varies systematically with
state traditions. Local autonomy is an adaptive mechanism of local govern-
ment and indeed of the state. While high levels of local autonomy may
provide effective adaptations in some state traditions, it may not in others.
As long as a state tradition does not change, the level of local autonomy is
not likely to change in states of that tradition.
As a preliminary approach, this idea may be analysed by grouping
countries according to state traditions and check to what extent these
countries have more or less the same level of local autonomy. For the pur-
pose of this analysis, three groups of countries have been singled out that
presumably represent different traditions: the Nordic countries, the
Napoleonic group and post-communist democracies. The two former tra-
ditions have been described as organic and legalistic, respectively (Loughlin
et al. 2010), while the post-communist group is harder to describe and
may indeed demonstrate important internal variations (Swianiewicz
2014). It may tentatively be characterised as technocratic with reference
to the recent communist past and its belief in an engineering logic of
social development (Illner 2010). While the organic tradition represents a
soft approach to governance (consensual decision-making style) in which
confrontation is avoided in a spirit of reasonableness, the legalistic state
abhors the fuzziness of responsibilities of the organic tradition while run-
ning the risk of siloisation. Technocracies tend to rely on rational-analyti-
cal approaches to social problems in which there is little room for local
political choice and bargaining. In the first group, conflicts are solved at
the bargaining table, in the second group through the courts (modified by
elitist camaraderie across levels of government), and in the third group by
appeals to expertise.
Consequently, the third hypothesis is that the level of autonomy is
expected to be highest in the organic state group and lowest in the post-
communist technocratic group, with the Napoleonic group in between.The
notion of path dependency insists that institutions tend to be shaped by
their history. Once an institutional format has been chosen, it tends to stay
in place partly because of sunken costs—change is costly, as pointed out by
Williamson (1981), and partly for normative reasons (over time, institu-
tions shape the identity of their members according to a logic of appropri-
ateness, which makes institutions resistant to change, as suggested by
March and Olsen (1989). The fourth hypothesis, accordingly, is that the
level of autonomy at one particular point in time is expected to be a good
predictor of the level of autonomy at later points in time.In many European
countries, local authorities are institutions in a larger machinery of multi-
level governance, which may include regional authorities as well as inter-
mediate provinces above the local level. France exemplifies an extremely
complex structure of multilevel governance with regions, departments
and inter-municipal bodies on top of its 36,000 communes, while reform-
ers in the United Kingdom, in contrast, have long made efforts towards a
single-level structure of territorial governance. Since the late 1980s, the
EU’s implementation of the single market and concomitant institutional
reforms has triggered efforts to strengthen the regional level in member
countries (Keating and Loughlin 1997; Hooghe and Marks 2001) as a
component of a policy of solidarity. The guiding reform ideology has been
that of partnerships across levels of government. Nevertheless, an element
of competition and jealousy has remained a feature of relations between
local and regional government in a number of countries. In Norway, for
example, local authorities, and especially the cities, are always on their
guard against any signs that the regions might develop into much-feared
“super-communes” with powers of oversight and instruction in relations
to local authorities (Baldersheim et al. 2011). Based on multilevel gover-
nance as a competitive game, the fifth hypothesis says that local autonomy
is inversely related to regional autonomy. The more highly developed
regions are the less autonomy is granted to (or needed for) local govern-
ment. The measure of regional autonomy used in this analysis is the
Regional Authority Index developed by Hooghe et al. (2016).
Hypothesis 6 shifts the perspective to citizens and suggests that local
autonomy is a function of citizen trust and/or interest in local govern-
ment. In countries where citizens have high confidence in local govern-
ment, national governments may be more willing to delegate functions to
the local level than in countries with low levels of citizen confidence. The
data for exploring this hypothesis come from a Eurobarometer survey of
citizens about their confidence in the elected bodies at local and regional
levels in 30 European countries in 2012.
Table 12.1 Accounting for local autonomy: correlates of local autonomy (local
autonomy scores 2014), Pearson’s correlation coefficients
LAI Components of local autonomy N
2014 Policy Financial Inter
autonomy autonomy active
rule
H1 Rational preferences management
(heterogeneity)
- Country size (population log) 0.026 0.089 –0.001 0.061 39
- Regional plus federal states (0–1) 0.004 –0.211 0.376* 0.026 39
H2 Modernisation “theory”
- Municipal size – mean population 2012 log –0.161 –0.118 –0.072 –0.166 39
- Pct. change in number of local authorities 0.120 0.124 0.006 –0.014 39

1994 – 2014 0.398*(a)
H3 Institutional evolution/state traditions

- Nordic group (5 Nordic countries –0–1) 0.517** 0.466** 0.410** 0.078 39
- Napoleonic group (4 countries Fr, Sp, It, Port 0.098 0.018 0.228 0.302 39
–0–1)
- Post-communist group (17 countries –0–1) –0.181 0.182 –0.666** –0.263 39
H4 Path dependency
- History (LAI scores 1990–94 with scores 0.813** 39
2010–14)
H5 Multi level governance game
- Regional Authority Index 2010 0.302 0.131 0.501** 0.182 35
H6 Political logic model

- Citizen trust in local and regional authorities 0.378** 0.337 0.270 0.260 28
Source of data for citizen trust: Eurobarometer (2013, 79.3, QA12)

Notes: (a) Correlation of pct. change of no. of municipalities 1994–2014 with change of LAI scores
between first and last period (1990–94 and 2010–14). A positive correlation indicates that an increase in
number of municipalities is related to an increase in the LAI.
Levels of significance: **0.01, *0.05
12.2 Results
These hypotheses are explored in Table 12.1. With few cases (N = 39–28)
it is difficult to test them in a rigorous way statistically. We investigate the
suggested relationships through correlation analysis, which of course indi-
cates correlates only, not causal paths. Nevertheless, the correlation coef-
ficients may provide clues as to whether we are barking up the right trees
or not. The main dependent variable is the overall LAI measure for 2014
(weighted and standardised scores). However, correlation coefficients are
also presented for selected components of the LAI. These are Policy
Autonomy (policy scope plus effective political discretion; see Chap. 4),
Financial Autonomy (three of the four financial variables; see Chap. 9),
and Interactive Rule (administrative supervision, access and legal protec-

tion; see Chap. 2). The three components are only moderately intercor-
related (coefficients vary between, 257 and, 304) so it is interesting to
check whether the suggested hypotheses apply to the overall measure of
LAI or instead to one or more of its components.
So far, the results indicate that three of the six hypotheses may be point-
ing in the right direction regarding the understanding of variation of local
autonomy. The high correlation coefficients with the Nordic and post-
communist groups (positive and negative coefficients, respectively) sug-
gest that an evolutionary mechanism is at work, as predicted. Or, in other
words, that high levels of autonomy are compatible with the Nordic tradi-
tion while the technocratic legacy of the communist past makes it difficult
to integrate highly autonomous local government in those state
traditions.
The path dependency hypothesis is also strongly supported, as demon-
strated by the high levels of intercorrelations between scores of the LAI
at various points in time. This finding also suggests that it may be very
difficult for reformers to break out of the state traditions mentioned
above.
The third hypothesis with some support is that of citizen trust in local
and regional government. The higher the trust, the more autonomy for
local government. We hasten to add that we cannot, of course, proclaim
this to be a causal relationship, but again, we think this relationship is
worth exploring further in order to better understand the interaction
between citizen trust and institutional development.
However, the non-confirmation of three of the hypotheses also has
interesting implications.
It is, for example, highly surprising, in view of ongoing amalgamation
reforms, to find that there is hardly any connection between levels of
autonomy and the scale of local government (H2). Size is of little impor-
tance in this regard. Indeed, if there is a relationship it points in the direc-
tion of a negative connection, that is, more autonomy in countries with
small municipalities. It is in fact puzzling that the average size of a munic-
ipality matters so little for levels of autonomy granted to local
government.
It is also puzzling that modernisation efforts are not related to (higher)
levels of autonomy (H2). Countries that have reduced their number of
municipalities (measured in relative terms) over the last 25 years or so have
not granted more autonomy to their municipalities than countries where
the number has remained stable. One may wonder why they bother to
pursue amalgamation strategies then. In fact, when change in the number
of local authorities is related to change in the LAI, there is actually a posi-
tive relationship, which means that countries with a growing number of
local government units have granted their local government more auton-
omy in one way or another.
There is also little support for the idea that heterogeneous states grant
more autonomy to local government than homogeneous states do. State
size is not related to local autonomy. Small, and presumably, more homo-
geneous states give their local authorities just as much (or little) autonomy
as large states do.2
Furthermore, the hypothesis of multilevel governance as a competitive
game is not confirmed. The relationship is rather the opposite: regional
autonomy correlates positively with local autonomy. Strengthening
regions is not accompanied by devaluing the position of local government.
This pattern may indicate that the relationship between regional and local
government is more of a partnership than that of a competitive game. Or
at least it does not appear to be the zero-sum game that so many local
authorities have feared.
The analysis of correlations with the components of Local Autonomy
does not substantially modify these patterns although there are some
interesting deviations. First of all, the significant relationships with Local
Autonomy indicated above do not apply to Interactive Rule; thus
Interactive Rule seems to represent a dimension of Local Autonomy dif-
ferent from those of Policy Autonomy and Financial Autonomy. While the
latter is about enabling local government to perform its functions,
Interactive Rule is more about the power balance in central-local relations.
For example, the highly autonomous position of the Nordic countries
overall and with regard to policy and finances does not extend to Interactive
Rule. On this component the Nordics do not stand out at all. Instead,
they seem to achieve their overall high scores despite being behind on
Interactive Rule.
2
This finding is in contrast to that of Hooghe and Marks (2012), who found supporting
evidence for a positive relationship between population size and decentralisation measured as
regionalisation by the Regional Authority Index. The divergent findings may suggest that
decentralisation to different levels of government may be driven by different sets of factors.
It is also interesting to note that the low scores of post-communist

countries on the overall Local Autonomy Index is reflected even more
strongly when it comes to Financial Autonomy (r = −0.666**); appar-
ently, local government in this group of countries is still under strict finan-
cial tutelage.
So we are left with four potential explanations of levels of local auton-
omy—path dependency, institutional evolution/state tradition, multilevel
partnerships and citizen confidence. The next question to be addressed is
the relative significance of these drivers of autonomy. Path dependency is
left out of the analysis since it seems to be just the other side of state tradi-
tions—over time the relative position of individual countries remains
extremely stable.
Table 12.2 presents the results of regression analysis with the three
remaining independent variables that were found to correlate significantly
with local autonomy: citizen trust, state tradition (the Nordics vs. the rest)
and regional authority.
Table 12.2 shows all three variables to contribute substantially
towards explaining local autonomy. Trust on its own explains around
11% of the variation. When the Nordics vs. the rest is added to the equa-
tion, the level of explanation rises to nearly 24% (Model 2). With regional
authority included, well above 30% of variation can be accounted
for (Model 3).
On its own, citizen trust is a significant factor. However, the impact of
trust diminishes as the other two factors are brought into the analysis. In
the end, it is the Nordic factor that weighs most heavily and then regional
authority.
Table 12.2 Local autonomy (2014): the significance of citizen trust, state tradi-
tion, and regional authority; regression analysis, beta coefficients
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Citizen trust in local and regional authorities 0.378* 0.181 0.125

Nordic group 0.435** 0.499**
Regional authority (RAI) 0.348*
Adj. R2 0.110 0.237 0.337
Notes: Levels of significance: ***0.001, **0.01, *0.05; N = 30

12.3 Discussion: How to “Get to Denmark”?

The rankings reported in preceding chapters show the Nordic countries
along with Switzerland and Germany to be among the most autonomous
local government systems in Europe while, for example, many of the post-
communist countries of Eastern Europe are lagging behind (Poland is an
exception in this regard). In a recent report to the Congress of Local and
Regional authorities on the implementation of the European Charter of
Local Self-Government, deficiencies were identified in a number of coun-
tries. Many countries failed to live up especially to the standards set out in
art. 4 and 9, that is, articles specifying norms regarding decision-making
powers and financial resources (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
2016: 21). Decision-making was often restricted by excessive controls
from central government, and financial resources were inadequate in view
of tasks allocated to local government. New democracies of the Black Sea
region (former Soviet republics) especially had some way to go in this
regard.
The measurement of local autonomy demonstrates the technicalities
behind high levels of local government autonomy, that is, how it is techni-
cally achieved. However, the further question that needs to be addressed is,
to quote Francis Fukuyama’s famous phrase: “How to get to Denmark?” by
which he meant how to achieve a stable state of good governance, which his
analysis found Denmark to exemplify particularly well (Fukuyama 2014).
As Denmark is in the group of Nordic high-fliers, a reasonable level of local
autonomy may thus be assumed to be a component of good governance.
In this chapter, six potential paths to (higher) local autonomy were
explored in the form of six explanatory hypotheses regarding drivers of
autonomy. Of these drivers, institutional mechanisms and citizen trust
were the drivers that were most closely associated with levels of autonomy.
Most surprisingly, neither municipal scale nor reforms of scale were potent
drivers of autonomy. In other words, countries with a preponderance of
small municipalities do not necessarily find such a scale an obstacle to
granting municipalities high levels of autonomy, nor does a dominance of
large municipalities automatically lead states to allocate more responsibili-
ties or freedom of decision-making to their local authorities. Furthermore,
structural “modernisation” in the form of amalgamations is not necessarily
accompanied by more autonomy. Apparently, modernisers often proceed
in a half-hearted manner.
So what is the road to Denmark like? An institutional configuration

that is highly path- or tradition-dependent is not easily copied by oth-
ers, and citizen trust is unlikely to be enhanced just through central
government command. Institutionalism suggests that change is not
easily obtained but may, nevertheless, be triggered by dramatic envi-
ronmental change or the collapse of internal equilibria. The implosions
of the communist regimes in 1989 and the accession to the EU of a
number of new countries since the mid-1990s are two sets of environ-
mental changes that clearly led to higher levels of autonomy. The
changing political equilibria towards less liberal regimes going on in
some states may drive local autonomy in the opposite direction.
Nevertheless, as the intercorrelation of time series of the LAI shows,
individual countries have only marginally changed their positions in
the overall ranking of countries over the course of 25 years. High-fliers
tend to remain high-fliers and low-fliers stay in the lower regions of the
rankings, where they remain (well?) adapted to their respective state
traditions.
It is, however, important to bear in mind that local government
reforms take place in an environment of multilevel governance. Local
autonomy does not develop as a zero-sum game in relation to other lev-
els of government. To the contrary, local autonomy was found to be
positively related to regional autonomy. A sound reform track seems to
be one that coordinates the development of local and regional auton-
omy. A hypothesis to be pursued in subsequent research is that conjoint
levels of local and regional autonomy are foundations for robust territo-
rial governance.
Furthermore, recalling the importance of citizen trust for local
autonomy, it should be pointed out that citizen attitudes to local politics
are increasingly shaped by consumerist expectations, that is, citizens
judge local authorities according to their satisfaction with service provi-
sion and other aspects of municipal performance. Political office-holders
must satisfy citizens according to criteria of so-called output legitimacy
(Scharpf 1999). If citizen trust depends on municipal performance, and
municipalities are actually able to perform to citizens’ satisfaction, then
this may over time extend into higher levels of autonomy. In this per-
spective, the fate of local government lies in the hands of local govern-
ment itself.
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& Shair-Rosenfield, S. (2016). Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist
Theory of Governance (Vol. I). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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CHAPTER 13
Blessings of Local Autonomy? Does It

Matter? For What? How?
13.1 Introduction
In this chapter we address the typical “so what?” question (see Lijphart
1999: 258). Having seen that there are important differences in terms of
local autonomy and having attempted to explain these differences, we
would like to know now whether local autonomy matters and makes a dif-
ference. In other words: We are interested whether local autonomy really
has a positive impact on desirable achievements of social and political sys-
tems as well as the countries’ economic performance.
As we have pointed out in the introductory chapters of this book, this
perspective draws upon the “freedom to approach” identified by Pratchett
(2004: 365), which gives the underlying normative rationale of local
autonomy, and asks whether autonomous local governments “have an
independent impact on the well-being of their citizens” (Wolman and
Goldsmith 1992: 45).
Normative and to a large extent also theoretical points of view consider
local autonomy a positive asset of any local government system. Autonomy
is not only something, which has to be achieved or guaranteed because it
is either constitutionally or legally demanded, but more specifically,
because it is meant to foster the quality of local democracy and the eco-
nomic development of a country. Why would otherwise the European
Charter of Local Self-Government of the Council of Europe, the World

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_13
Bank or the European Union invest a considerable part of their energy and
resources in the promotion of local autonomy?
The arguments why local autonomy should have a positive impact, as
we will see, are quite similar with those used for the allegedly positive
impact of decentralisation. They focus on concepts familiar to political
theorists and economists, like the quality of democracy, a better awareness
of and the possibility to respond to the preferences of the citizens, compe-
tition between territorial units or the principle of fiscal equivalence, mean-
ing that the provider of a service should also decide how to provide it and
be responsible for the funding.
Despite the quality of the arguments and the broad consensus that a
high degree of local autonomy is a positive asset of a country, there are
astonishingly few empirical studies, which convincingly prove that local
autonomy has a direct and positive influence. In this chapter, we shall
therefore analyse whether the data gathered in the framework of this proj-
ect reveals direct links between local autonomy, measured globally through
the local autonomy index (LAI) and along different dimensions we identi-
fied, and various—what we shall call—performance indicators.
Before we look at the correlations between our different measures of
local autonomy and selected performance indicators, we start with a short
presentation of the rationale behind the expected effects. Due to the
nature of our data, we have to limit our analysis to the country level
neglecting that there are possible differences within the countries both
with respect to the dependent variable and with respect to the indepen-
dent variables.
13.2 Theoretical Arguments

Very much like to the call for more local autonomy, decentralisation
reforms shifting competences and responsibilities towards levels of gov-
ernment closer to the citizens have begun to sweep the globe since the
1980s (Ivanyna and Shah 2014). Advocated by many important European
and international institutions as key tools of “good governance” meant to
enhance democracy and efficiency (UN-Habitat 2009; UCLG 2008;
White 2011; OECD 2004), local autonomy and decentralisation are
sometimes used almost synonymously or at least closely associated. Their
relation, however, varies with respect to the considered approach of decen-
tralisation (Fleurke and Willemse 2004).
BLESSINGS OF LOCAL AUTONOMY? DOES IT MATTER? FOR WHAT? HOW? 319
Decentralisation often describes the process of transferring more power

and responsibilities over public policies from the centre towards the sub-
national units on a given territory. The underlying values are not primarily
related to local autonomy but rather to efficiency, effectiveness and democ-
ratisation (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014; Dardanelli et al. 2017; De
Vries 2000). With respect to the extent of downward transfers of compe-
tences and the level of autonomy granted to lower units, we can distin-
guish different forms of vertical decentralisation, namely, devolution,
delegation and deconcentration (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). Only
devolution increases the amount of local autonomy in a comprehensive
manner. In the case of delegation to lower unit and deconcentration, no
real shift of power and competences takes place. The extent of decentrali-
sation is thus not necessarily equivalent to the degree of local autonomy.
Decentralisation as a process also implies the existence of a central govern-
ment, whereas in some non-centralised political system local authorities
pre-existed the central government and their far-reaching autonomy was
not the result of decentralisation process (Elazar 1976; Bennett 1990).
For the analysis of the actual impacts of local autonomy, however, we
rather consider decentralisation as a static state. The extent of decentralisa-
tion becomes a characteristic of the politico-administrative system (Fesler
1965; Smith 1985). In this approach, decentralisation can be apprehended
as synonym of local autonomy (Fleurke and Willemse 2004), and the
assumed general consequences can be highlighted in relying on the litera-
ture with no differentiation.
In this latter form, it is interesting to note that the impacts of decentrali-
sation have been more often questioned both theoretically and empirically
than the impacts of local autonomy. This is probably due to the more con-
troversial claims of fiscal federalism compared to the more general claims
for autonomy in the light of centralisation and a more globally organised
world order. In any case, the findings show that the assumed impacts of
decentralisation are rather contradictory (Kuhlmann and Wayenberg 2016;
Treisman 2007; De Vries 2000; Andrews and de Vries 2007). Centralised
solutions tend to be more uniform and for all citizens alike, which can be
a goal to aspire to, and competition between territorial units is not univo-
cally seen as positive since there tend to be winners and losers.
With respect to the virtues and vices of local autonomy, we can distin-
guish two lines of arguments. The first relates to what can be called—
using Scharpf’s well-known terminology (Scharpf 1970)—the input
dimension of a political system, and the second centres around the output
dimension. The former comprises the involvement of the citizens in politi-

cal decision-making whereas the latter concentrates on the (economic)
performance. This distinction occurs in various forms and slightly differ-
ent meanings in the work of other authors distinguishing, for example,
between citizen effectiveness and system capacity (Dahl and Tufte 1973).
As for the effect of local autonomy on output-related aspects of a politi-
cal system, the basic idea is that autonomous municipalities are not only
better equipped but also more inclined to create the necessary conditions
for a well-functioning (local) economy. If the municipalities have the nec-
essary resources, they are well placed to provide the infrastructure business
and firms need and to create an environment attractive for future employ-
ees. The distances between the different actors involved are shorter and
one can expect a greater awareness of local particularities and possibilities.
If the municipalities’ revenues depend to a large extent on tax payed by
employees and business, there is a strong incentive to promote economic
development and to create jobs and if they can freely set the tax rate, mar-
ket mechanism are meant to increase quality and attractiveness at the best
possible costs. This, of course, only functions under the conditions of an
ideal market situation with perfect information and high mobility, which
in reality hardly occurs. More often there will be winners and losers, and
equalising state interventions becomes necessary. Still, local autonomy
should have a positive impact on economic development compared to a
system where all the respective decisions are taken centrally. Nevertheless,
a trade-off exists between the efficiency-increasing assumed impact of local
autonomy and some inefficiencies due to the reliance on transfers and
grants from higher levels of government, the negative effects of spatial
externalities, as well as the degradation of vertical economies of scale and
horizontal overlapping responsibilities which point out potential difficul-
ties in coordination processes.
On the input side of a political system, the questions turn around the
form and the quality of local democracy. The more autonomy municipali-
ties have, the more room is there for political decisions. If everything is
taken care of and decided at the national level, there will be no political
debate on the local level. Interest in local politics can be expected to be
low as well as participation in local elections. If municipalities can decide
on what they want to do and how they want to do it, if land use planning
and building permits or the construction of schools and hospitals, the
employment of teachers or the services they offer to families, children and
elderly people are at their discretion, there will be lively political debates.
This will even more be the case if the municipalities’ expenses will have to
be covered by their own financial resources and have a direct impact on
the amount of tax their citizens have to pay.
Taking more actively party in local politics because local political deci-
sions matter can also have a variety of other positive consequences reach-
ing from a more intensive control of local politicians to less corruption,
less alienation from politics in general and higher degrees of trust, satisfac-
tion and happiness.
But autonomy and room for political decisions, this must not be for-
gotten, almost automatically lead to diversity. Some societies may be more
egalitarian, and there is a smaller urge for deviating organisational forms
and practices, but in general, given the possibilities to decide on some-
thing only makes sense if the decision can go either way. If there is a high
degree of local autonomy and the citizens fully use the possibility to
decide, one might expect a high degree of variation which may lead to the
inequality of living conditions.
Autonomy means also less control by the central state. This concerns
political processes taking place on local level, which might deviate from
what is generally preferred, as well as the local politicians in charge. If local
democracy is not sufficiently developed to decide and control these issues,
autonomy may also go hand in hand with corruption and nepotism.
Despite the soundness of the theoretical arguments exposed above,
there is little hard empirical evidence that these effects are really taking
place. This is basically a methodological problem since the different ele-
ments combined are situated on different levels and unequally spread
around the country. Participation in local elections varies from one munic-
ipality to another within a single country, and there are huge regional
differences with respect to economic performance. The same applies—as
it has been argued throughout this book—to the degree of local auton-
omy within a country. Since such peculiarities cannot be taken into account
here, the following analyses have to be interpreted with caution.
13.3 Local Autonomy and Input-Related Aspects

of a Political System
Testing the effects of local autonomy on input-related aspects of local

democracy is quite a challenge since there is—at least in a broader interna-
tionally comparative perspective—only a very limited amount of data
about the quality of local democracy available. Most indicators, such as,
for example, political interest, trust and participation, address more gen-
eral aspects of politics or are related to political institutions on national
level. Since such performance variables were not part of our study at the
outset, we have to rely—despite obvious shortcomings—on data available.
Nevertheless, we assume that some of the characteristics measured on
national level are not completely disconnected from the local level.
A rather comprehensive way to measure the quality of democracy can
be found in the democracy barometer (Bühlmann et al. 2012; Merkel
et al. 2012). The democracy barometer was developed to capture possible
differences in advanced democracies compared to the more traditional
measures such as the freedom house, the polity or the Vanhanen’s index.
The barometer is constructed out of about 100 variables and suggests an
elaborated concept based on freedom, control and equality. Each of these
sub-dimensions is divided in three additional sub-dimensions.1 Freedom
contains the sub-dimensions individual liberties, rule of law and public
sphere; control consists of competition, mutual constraints and govern-
mental capability; and equality combines transparency, participation and
representation.
Table 13.1 reveals that the LAI correlates positively with the overall
quality of democracy as well as with the majority of the sub-dimensions of
the democracy index. As far as the different dimensions of local autonomy
are concerned, it is financial autonomy, which is also in almost all cases
positively related to the different measurements of democracy. The quality
of democracy increases when municipalities have more and more directly
access to financial resources. Only in the cases of individual liberties and
competition we find no significant correlations. Policy scope and to a
lesser extent political discretion also seem to go hand in hand with some
measurements of democracy, and so does on three occasions also organisa-
tional autonomy. It therefore seems that citizens will be more inclined to
participate in the political process when local authorities are responsible
for a broad range of tasks and when the range of issues they can decide
upon independently is greater. Legal autonomy and the two vertical mea-
surements non-interference and access are not linked to the quality of
democracy.
The results support the idea that local autonomy and the quality of
democracy have something in common and justify attempts to maintain
1
See http://www.democracybarometer.org/concept_en.html (consulted in 2018).
Table 13.1 Local autonomy (2014) and the quality of democracy (2014) (Pearson corr)
Local Legal Political Policy Financial Organisational Non- Access N
autonomy autonomy discretion scope autonomy autonomy interference
index (LAI)
Individual liberties 0.439** −0.090 0.376* 0.292 0.247 0.398* 0.082 0.310 37
Rule of law 0.389* −0.205 0.173 0.233 0.535** 0.101 0.340* 0.152 36
Freedom 0.500** −0.157 0.326 0.341* 0.449** 0.326 0.188 0.298 34
Competition 0.427** −0.181 0.438** 0.410* 0.244 0.452** −0.156 0.154 37
Mutual constraints of 0.484** 0.233 0.282 0.378* 0.411* 0.258 0.032 0.240 36
constitutional powers
Government 0.237 −0.066 0.042 0.053 0.412* −0.003 0.174 0.243 36
capability
Control 0.345* −0.044 0.138 0.152 0.480** 0.083 0.142 0.277 35
Transparency 0.587** −0.189 0.459** 0.533** 0.492** 0.348* 0.156 0.227 36
Participation 0.488** −0.194 0.253 0.447** 0.545** 0.286 0.046 0.208 37
Repression 0.502** −0.172 0.279 0.376* 0.611** 0.115 0.254 0.280 37
Equality 0.645** −0.223 0.421* 0.557** 0.653** 0.312 0.196 0.293 36
Quality of democracy 0.525** −0.132 0.292 0.336 0.586** 0.236 0.193 0.332 34
Notes: * sig. = 0.05, ** sig. = 0.01

Source: Democracy Barometer (www.democracybarometer.org)
BLESSINGS OF LOCAL AUTONOMY? DOES IT MATTER? FOR WHAT? HOW?
323
and foster independent municipalities strongly involved in the fulfilment

of tasks and the delivery of services. They also justify the emphasis on
financial and policy-related aspects of local autonomy. Finally and yet
importantly, it shows that our index combining different relevant aspects
of local autonomy results in the highest number of significant correlations
with the different elements of democracy, which underlines its
significance.
Significant correlations do not necessarily mean that there is a causal
link between local autonomy and the quality of democracy. There might
be other—hidden—variables responsible for a seemingly positive relation-
ship. If they are both positive related to local autonomy and the quality of
democracy, the correlation between local autonomy and democracy is
positive, but a high quality of democracy is not directly caused by local
autonomy.
There are at least two variables we need to control for: the first is the
size of the municipalities and the second is the democratic tradition of the
countries. There is a long debate about the assumed influence of the size
of a municipality on local democracy (see Dahl and Tufte 1973), and
newer studies come to the conclusion that the preconditions for a well-
functioning local democracy are better in smaller municipalities (Denters
et al. 2014). As for the second variable, it is commonly acknowledged that
societies do not become democracies overnight, and it can be argued that
in post-communist countries the degree of local autonomy is lower and
the quality of democracy is lower at the same time.
That there is a direct impact of local autonomy on the quality of democ-
racy is confirmed by our regression models, which control for the mean
size of local government and whether the country belongs to the group of
the post-communist countries. Table 13.2 shows that the independent
Table 13.2 Local autonomy (LAI 2014) and the quality of democracy (regres-
sion models, standardised beta-coefficients)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Local autonomy index (LAI) 0.525** 0.620** 0.550**

Mean size of local governments 0.305 0.202
Post-communist countries −0.302*
Rsquare adj. 0.253 0.318 0.383
Note: * sig. = 0.05, ** sig. = 0.01

impact of local autonomy remains significant in all three models. The fact
that a country belongs to the group of the former communist countries
also has an independent negative effect on the quality of democracy, but
the impact of the autonomy of local government remains significant and is
stronger.
More directly linked to local politics are characteristics such as turnout
at local elections, trust in local government and strength and indepen-
dence of local government. Table 13.3 shows that there are no significant
correlations between the different measurements of local autonomy and
local turnout. This result is rather unexpected at first sight but might be
due to the diversity in the ways to elect or design the local executive body,
which makes the turnout figures barely comparable. The second indicator
measures if and which part of the local authorities are elected and there-
fore legitimised by the citizens. Here the distinction in our sample is
mainly between countries where the executive body is elected and coun-
tries where the local assembly (council) is elected. The LAI as well as their
constitutive dimensions political discretion, policy scope and access are
positively related. The measurement of trust in local and regional authori-
ties only reveals a weak but significant correlation with the overall index of
local autonomy (LAI 2014).
The multivariate analyses confirm for the election of the government
and for trust in local and regional government the importance of local
autonomy. In both cases, the coefficients remain significant even when we
control for other variables (see Table 13.4). In the cases of turnout at local
elections, only a communist past seems to have a (negative) effect.
Taken all together, there is evidence that a high degree of local auton-
omy goes hand in hand with other characteristics of local democracy,
which are generally considered as positive assets. The correlations, how-
ever, are weaker than those we found for the general aspects of democracy.
This might be due to the weakness of the data.
13.4 Local Autonomy and Output-Related

Aspects of a Political System
Output-related aspect of a political system and its legitimacy focus on
results and performance. Since the measurement of performance is a rather
complex endeavour and there are no commonly agreed upon indicators,
we have again to rely on proxies. We are interested in the links between
326
Table 13.3 Local autonomy (2014) and the quality of local democracy (Pearson corr)
A. LADNER ET AL.
Local Legal Political Policy scope Financial Organisational Non- Access N=

autonomy autonomy discretion autonomy autonomy interference
index (LAI)
Turnout at local 0.062 −0.297 −0.066 −0.017 0.353 −0.160 0.192 0.060 28
elections (2009-12)
Local government is 0.671** 0.228 0.496* 0.652** 0.405 0.420 0.238 0.560** 21
elected (2014)
Trust in local and 0.378* −0.012 0.283 0.353 0.270 0.007 0.177 0.267 28
regional government
(2013)
Notes: * sig. = 0.05, ** sig. = 0.01

Sources: Lidström et al. (2016), Coppedge et al. (2016) V-Dem 6, Eurobarometer 79.3, QA12, http://wwwgesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/data-
access/
Table 13.4 Local autonomy (LAI 2014) and turnout, elections and trust
(regression models)
Turnout at local Local government Trust in local and
elections is elected regional government
Local autonomy index −0.109 0.732** 0.398*

(LAI)
Mean size of local −0.378 −0.149 0.014
governments
Post-communist −0.584** 0.173 −0.312
countries
Rsquare adj. 0.272 0.422 0.148
Notes: * sig. = 0.05, ** sig. = 0.01
the economic performance of the countries (measured with the GDP per
capita), the perceived corruption and the overall happiness of the citizens
as some sort of a proxy for the satisfaction with services.
Local autonomy (overall index, financial autonomy and non-
interference) and economic well-being measured through the gross
domestic product per person and corrected for the purchasing power are
positively related (see Table 13.5). Countries with more autonomous
municipalities are usually better off than countries where the autonomy of
the municipalities is low. Not astonishingly, financial autonomy seems to
play the most important role, which is also conformed through the signifi-
cant positive correlation with the increase of the GDP over the last
25 years.
Local autonomy goes hand in hand with less perceived corruption as
measured by transparency international.2 The argument for this could be
that local autonomy brings decisions closer to the municipalities and
allows citizens to control what is going on. Here again, the correlation is
particularly strong with respect to financial autonomy and at least signifi-
cant in the cases of policy autonomy and access to the decisions on higher
political levels.
Perhaps the most outstanding result is that local autonomy seems to
make people happier. If we can trust the results of the world happiness
report, there is a positive correlation with our overall index of local auton-
omy as well as with the financial autonomy, non-interference and access.
2
See https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (consulted in 2018).
328
Table 13.5 Local autonomy (2014) and output-related aspect of a political system (Pearson corr)
A. LADNER ET AL.
Local Legal Political Policy Financial Organisational Non- Access N

autonomy autonomy discretion scope autonomy autonomy interference
index (LAI)
GDP 2014 0.380* −0.183 0.104 0.212 0.592** 0.013 0.376* 0.254 37
GDP increase 0.180 −0.264 0.068 0.094 0.437* −0.090 0.250 0.159 29
1990–2014
Public debt by −0.186 −0.079 −0.344* −0.237 0.157 −0.257 0.088 −0.117 38
GDP 2015
Corruption 0.509** −0.210 0.228 0.356* 0.622** 0.203 0.315 0.355* 36
perceptions index
2014
Happiness index 0.477** −0.293 0.153 0.235 0.630** 0.231 0.330* 0.421** 38
2013–2015
Notes: * sig. = 0.05, ** sig. = 0.01

Sources: World Bank, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results#myAnchor1, CIA World Factbook, World Happiness Report 2016
Table 13.6 Local autonomy (LAI 2014) and output-related aspect of a political

system (regression models)
GDP 2014 GDP Public debt Corruption Happiness
increase by GDP 2015 perception index 2013–2015
1990_14 2014
Local 0.248 0.225 −0.283 0.493** 0.406**

autonomy index
(LAI)
Mean size of 0.008 0.290 −0.066 0.244 0.084
local
governments
Post-communist −0.629** −0.320 −0.464** −0.500** −0.580**
countries
Rsquare adj. 0.482 0.165 0.164 0.592 0.549
Notes: * sig. = 0.05, ** sig. = 0.01
The expectations that local autonomy really has an impact on output-

related aspects of local government are tempered when we run our multi-
variate model. When controlling for the average size of the municipalities
and post-communist countries, there are only two significant correlations
remaining, namely, between local autonomy and a low degree of corrup-
tion and a high degree of happiness (see Table 13.6). The three economic
variables do not have a significant impact but at least their algebraic signs
point into the right direction. Important is the distinction between post-
communist and other countries, with the former being worse-off, encoun-
tering more corruption and enjoying lower degrees of happiness.

This chapter shows that local autonomy and its different dimensions
measured on the aggregate level as we did are positively related to a
large number of performance measurements, be it on the input side or
be it on the output side of the political system. Most often, it is the LAI
which is positively related to the performance measurements, but finan-
cial autonomy play almost consistently an important role. Quite often
there are also positive links with the policy scope of local government
and with their political discretion, whereas legal autonomy does not
seem to be related to any of the performance variables. This, once more,
confirms our conceptual position to consider political discretion and
financial autonomy the most important elements of local autonomy (see

Chap. 9).
Measuring the effects of local autonomy on a political system in general
and on local government in particular, however, is quite a demanding
research endeavour. In our case we relied on aggregate data on country
level, not taking regional differences or municipality specific characteristics
into account. Other problems to solve are not only the different perfor-
mance measurements but the assumed causalities. Here, more qualitative-
oriented research designs will be needed.
Assuming, for example, that there really is a positive link between local
autonomy and happiness, the conclusion that one simply can increase local
autonomy to make people happier is misleading. A closer look at the cor-
relations and the values for the different countries reveals that there are
always more or less the same countries performing well. The Nordic coun-
tries together with Switzerland and Germany score high with respect to
local autonomy and with respect to almost all performance indicators.
Speaking about direct effects of local autonomy in this respect is incor-
rect. The relation between local autonomy and the different performance
indicators is most probably two-sided or circular. Local autonomy enforces
trust in political institutions and politicians on the one side, but sound
institutions and trustworthy politicians are also a precondition if you want
to give more autonomy to local government. Capacity building not only
has an institutional but also a cultural component.
This by no way questions the importance international organisation
(European Council, World Bank, European Union or OECD) attribute to
local autonomy and their attempts to promote it. It simply shows that the
task is perhaps a bit more difficult.
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CHAPTER 14
Conclusions: Local Autonomy—Patterns,

Dynamics and Ambiguities
14.1 Point of Departure

Local autonomy is generally understood as a positive asset of any local
government system and is promoted by international organisations such as
the Council of Europe, the World Bank, the OECD or the European
Union. The European Charter of Local Self-Government obliges the sig-
natory countries to safeguard the autonomy of their municipalities and to
provide them with the necessary resources to fulfil their tasks accordingly.
The extent to which European countries follow these instructions is regu-
larly monitored by an independent group of experts appointed by the
Council of Europe.
Local autonomy is also a salient topic in the literature on local govern-
ment. Disciplines such as law studies, economics and political science
intensively discuss the various aspects of local autonomy, suggest defini-
tions and describe a variety of aspects and components. There is, however,
no commonly agreed upon theoretical framework describing the core ele-
ments of local autonomy nor is there a single and broadly accepted way to
measure the degree of local autonomy comprehensively. Consequently,
there is lack of comprehensive comparative studies depicting variations
across countries and monitoring their evolution over a longer period of
time.
In this study, we have identified seven dimensions of local autonomy:
legal autonomy, policy scope, political discretion, financial autonomy,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8_14
organisational autonomy, non-interference and access. The indicator of

legal autonomy measures the extent to which the existence of municipali-
ties is constitutionally guaranteed and whether or not municipalities can
be amalgamated against their will. Policy scope describes the number of
tasks they fulfil, while the indicator of political discretion asks whether
they also have some decisional power while fulfilling these tasks. Financial
autonomy means that municipalities have their own financial resources,
can collect tax and decide on the base and the rate of their tax, have the
possibility to borrow money and are not constrained by the conditionality
of transfers. The possibility to organise and staff their administration and
to decide on features of their political system is described as organisational
autonomy. The vertical relations with the higher levels of state, finally,
consist of the way supervision is organised (non-interference) and whether
they can influence higher-level decisions (access). Further analysis led to
the conclusion that the cornerstones of local autonomy are political discre-
tion, financial autonomy and legal autonomy. These three dimensions
form our triangle of local autonomy with the former two building the
baseline.
Based on a codebook consisting of 11 variables leading to these 7
dimensions, we measured the degree of local autonomy in 39 countries
and how it developed between 1990 and 2014. In order to do so, we
enlisted the assistance of a network of about 40 experts on local govern-
ment. The resulting data as well as additional information on the coun-
tries, including justification of the coding of the respective countries, can
be found under http://local-autonomy.andreasladner.ch/.
14.2 Local Autonomy: Step by Step

For the different dimensions of local autonomy, we found that lawmakers
in Europe seem to follow a general trend to gradually strengthen the level
of autonomy granted to local authorities. After an initial phase where sev-
eral countries tried to catch up with common legal standards of demo-
cratic local governance, mostly set by the Council of Europe through the
European Charter, there is a certain mobility of countries changing basic
patterns of legal determinants of local government and moving from a
“patronised community” type to the type of “self-determined” commu-
nity. There is, however, in a number of cases, also persistent patterns and
path dependency.
CONCLUSIONS: LOCAL AUTONOMY—PATTERNS, DYNAMICS… 335
With respect to policy autonomy, there is still substantial variation

across European countries, with the Nordic countries along with some
Central and East-Central European states (Germany, Poland) at one end
of the scale and some Black Sea countries and the United Kingdom and
Ireland at the other end. Policy autonomy also varies across policy fields
such as education, land use, housing, health and so on. Policy autonomy
is most extensive in the fields of land use (zoning, building permits) and
responsibility for school buildings, housing, caring functions and public
transport. These are functions that municipalities have responsibility for in
many European countries. Having responsibility for police or what actu-
ally goes on in school buildings (educational programmes and hiring and
paying teachers) is more unusual. So is responsibility for health services.
What municipalities have to do and how much they can decide while they
are doing it, are, at least theoretically, two different things. In reality, how-
ever, scope of activities and political discretion with respect to most of the
activities are fairly closely connected. Interesting to note, finally, is the
finding that a high level of policy autonomy is not necessarily accompanied
by financial autonomy or freedom in implementation of decisions.
Financial autonomy witnesses a huge variation, both across time and
among the countries. For the most of the 1990–2014 period, the domi-
nant trend has been an increase of financial autonomy. This has been espe-
cially true for post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
which had a very low level of financial autonomy at the beginning. There
was also an increase in some countries from other parts of the continent
(e.g. Italy and Malta). With the financial crisis in 2008, the overall trend
has been reversed, most visibly in changes related to borrowing regula-
tions and in countries that were the most severely hit by the crisis. In the
case of transfers, the characteristic phenomenon has been cyclical waves—
periodic reforms consolidating fragmented specific grant systems into
block grants followed by the revival of conditional grants. It is interesting
to note, finally, that there is no evidence that a large scope of functions
allocated to local governments generates demands to tighten control over
municipal finance. Rather the opposite seems to be the case: Taxation and
borrowing autonomy are often higher in countries with more functional
decentralisation. It seems that countries that opt for more decentralisation
are usually ready to accept more local autonomy both functionally and
financially.
Local government enjoys quite high levels of organisational freedom in
most European countries. Municipalities usually have the possibility to
elect their local executive directly and have some leeway when it comes to
organising their local administration. In some countries, municipalities
can decide on elements of their electoral system, such as, for example, the
number and size of their electoral districts, whether they prefer majority
elections or proportional representation (PR) or the form and the size of
their local executive. In most countries, however, these parameters are set
by national legislation. As for local administration in most countries, local
government has the freedom to hire own staff, fix the salaries of employ-
ees, choose their organisational structure and establish legal entities and
municipal enterprises. There are, however, also countries where the local
administration is more directly organised and administered by the central
state. The development across time is not particularly spectacular. If there
have been changes in the degree of organisational autonomy, most of it
took place in the 1990s. For many countries, particularly for those of
Eastern and Central Europe, this was a period of consolidation of active
democratic reforms and transformation of the prevailing political culture.
As stipulated by the European Charter, administrative supervision is in
most countries limited to control of the legality of municipal decisions.
This pattern has remained stable over the last 25 years. Supervision is only
in a few cases extended to cover the merits of local decisions or details of
accounts or spending priorities. However, behind this static map of appar-
ent convergence, a subtle trend towards more control emerges. In quite a
number of countries, the experts reported an increasing number of con-
trols, either focussed on financial matters as a way to discipline local bud-
gets and fight the fiscal crisis or just as a mean of steering municipal
policies.
Access, understood as the array of entrance mechanisms local authori-
ties dispose of towards upper tiers of government, has increased, largely
due to a surge in a rather limited time frame (1995–2002) often associ-
ated with wider reform and change in intergovernmental relations and the
broader local public sector especially in newer democracies. The indirect
and institutionalised mode of access, such as, for example, nationwide
peak associations of local government, is now very common practice, and
local authorities in more states are currently considered to have substan-
tial influence on central or regional policy-making. This is not necessarily
the case for direct and individual access in the form of dual mandate-
holding by local politicians compensating for (formal) limits to local
autonomy.
14.3 Patterns of Local Autonomy

After having presented the different dimensions of local autonomy, we
attempted in a first step to create an overall indicator of local autonomy,
our local autonomy index (LAI). Our triangle of local autonomy served as
the starting point to rearrange the different dimensions and to distinguish
the importance of the various dimensions. The weighted values of the
countries on the seven dimensions were aggregated and an overall score of
local autonomy was calculated. The results consistently show that
Switzerland and the Nordic countries—Finland, Iceland, Denmark,
Sweden and Norway—rank among the countries with the highest degree
of autonomy together with Germany, Liechtenstein and Poland. This
group is followed by France, Serbia, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, the Czech
Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, Belgium, Slovakia, Portugal and the
Netherlands. Countries with a particularly low degree of local autonomy
are Cyprus, Turkey, Malta, Moldavia, Georgia, Ireland and the United
Kingdom.
More telling than a simple overall ranking, however, is the search for
country-specific patterns of local autonomy. Finland, for example, has a
“full” profile reaching high levels of autonomy on all seven dimensions,
whereas for Moldova the opposite is the case. The Nordic countries usu-
ally show a full profile at the bottom of our triangle of local autonomy
(financial autonomy and political discretion) but lack legal recognition. In
contrast, high legal autonomy with lesser autonomy on the other dimen-
sions is characteristic for newer Eastern democracies such as Bulgaria,
Romania, Estonia and the Czech Republic. The latter two distinguish
themselves from the other countries by their high degree of organisational
autonomy.
France, after its increased decentralisation efforts in the 1980s, demon-
strates a substantial degree of autonomy on almost all dimensions, with
the exception of features of the local political system and administrative
organisation. In Switzerland, municipalities are autonomous in financial
and organisational affairs and enjoy legal protection, but they are to a
lesser extent able to decide on their policies (political discretion). This is
related to their small size and the Swiss form of federalism, which allocates
political discretion to the cantons. The German municipalities—despite
the federalist structure of the country—are more autonomous with respect
to policy scope and political discretion.
The three countries Hungary, Slovenia, Ukraine have a similar pattern

with a lack of financial autonomy and deficits with respect to access and
non-interference. They score average on autonomy on the other four
dimensions. Interesting to note are also the similarities between Spain and
the United Kingdom. In the former country, however, organisational
autonomy is low and financial autonomy is high whereas in the latter the
opposite is the case. The patterns for Georgia, Moldova and Ireland,
finally, show very low levels of autonomy on virtually all dimensions.
A widespread form of reducing complexity is the creation of typologies
clustering countries with similar configurations. In the third part of the
book, we develop a new typology. The typology draws on the dimensions
of political discretion and financial autonomy recategorising scores as low,
medium or high and probing into observable combinations thereof at the
beginning, the middle and the end of the reference period. The results
show: First, it is possible to classify the 39 countries into 9 different types
of local autonomy summarised into four ideal and five transitory types.
Second, although central in existing classifications, geographical location
only continues to matter to a certain extent according to our data. Third,
as most of the existing classifications referred to stable state traditions, our
findings suggest a combination of static as well as more dynamic features.
Hence, we conclude that there is no such thing as a universal and encom-
passing typology of local autonomy that will be valid and reliable for the
long term. Future research should revisit and update dimensions and clas-
sifications and delve deeper into the ontology and implications of their
configurations.
The next chapter addresses a classical issue in local political studies: who
governs? The analysis takes into consideration the double role of local
authorities: governance for the sake of the local community and for the sake
of the state. Patterns of accountability and responsiveness are the main con-
figuring factors for different versions of community governance. Four types
of governance emerge, the “self-determined community” includes the big-
gest number of countries, while the “patronised community” has gradually
become a rare exception. The shift away from supralocal and towards local
orientation of governance was more evident on the dimension of respon-
siveness than on accountability, especially among ex-communist countries.
Finally, a considerable mobility across types was recorded in Eastern
and Southern Europe, while stability characterised the rest. Future research
should try to detect factors explaining persistence and change and
should also focus on the possible effects of different community types

upon attitudes and perceptions of both citizens and politicians.
14.4 Local Autonomy: Why So Much Variation?

Does It Matter?
The next two chapters analyse the causes and the consequences of local
autonomy. Why do countries (still) differ? And does it matter? Six poten-
tial paths to (higher) local autonomy were explored in the form of six
explanatory hypotheses regarding drivers of autonomy. Of these drivers,
institutional mechanisms and citizen trust were the drivers that were most
closely associated with levels of autonomy. Most surprisingly, neither
municipal scale nor reforms of scale were potent drivers of autonomy. In
other words, countries with a preponderance of small municipalities do
not necessarily find such a scale an obstacle to granting municipalities high
levels of autonomy, nor does a dominance of large municipalities auto-
matically lead states to allocate more responsibilities or freedom of
decision-making to their local authorities. Furthermore, structural “mod-
ernisation” in the form of amalgamations is not necessarily accompanied
by more autonomy. Apparently, modernisers often proceed in a half-
hearted manner. There is, we believe, no straight “road to Denmark” or
other systems with highly autonomous municipalities. Institutional con-
figurations that are highly path- or tradition-dependent are not easily cop-
ied by others, and citizen trust is unlikely to be enhanced just through
central government command. Institutionalism suggests that change is
not easily obtained but may, nevertheless, be triggered by dramatic envi-
ronmental change or the collapse of internal equilibria.
However, we think that trying to increase local autonomy is worth the
effort, at least in the long run. Local autonomy—as we have measured
it—is to some extent positively related to a series of aggregate perfor-
mance measures, be it on the input side or be it on the output side of the
political systems. Our analyses also show that financial autonomy is the
dimension of autonomy that almost consistently correlates most strongly
with the different performance measures. Quite often, there are also posi-
tive links with the policy scope of local government and political discretion
on the one hand and performance indicators on the other hand, whereas
legal autonomy does not seem to be related to any of the performance
variables.
It remains, of course, an open question to what extent an increase

in local autonomy directly leads to better performance. Local autonomy is
most probably also a product of a well-functioning and trust-based society.
We cannot claim that there is a causal and direct link between autonomy
and performance. Local autonomy and system performance may be mutu-
ally reinforcing systemic features. The strategy of the international organ-
isations (European Council, World Bank, European Union, OECD) to
promote local autonomy makes sense, but a simple increase of local auton-
omy is not enough. Countries also need economic resources and social
and political capital to make autonomous municipalities work
successfully.
14.5 Interactive Rule as a Dimension of Political

Decentralisation
In this last section, we wish to highlight findings regarding interactive rule
and, furthermore, to show how such findings can be combined with indica-
tors of local democratic space into a measure of political decentralisation.
The analysis of Chap. 10, by crossing indicators of functional and finan-
cial autonomy, identified four types of local democratic space, ranging
from a constrained tutelle type to an extensive partnership type. Presumably,
the more extensive the democratic space is, the more choice is available to
policy-makers and voters and the more decentralised the overall national
political system may be said to be. However, as pointed out in Chap. 11,
local government may also be of importance to the national government.
Consequently, local democracy may be constrained through the back door
by central government interventions, for example, excessive supervision or
one-sided interpretation of regulations without recourse for local govern-
ment to independent arbitration. This is why a measure of the power bal-
ance between central and local government is needed in order to arrive at
a fuller picture of decentralisation. This is what we have tried to achieve
with the concept of interactive rule.
Scholars have long recognised that the relations between central and
local governance cannot, in all cases, be captured by notions of clear-cut
demarcation of responsibilities or spheres of influence or as unilateral, top-
down hierarchies (Dente and Kjellberg 1988). A series of concepts has
been suggested to characterise non-hierarchical relations across levels of
governments, such as Politikverflechtung (Scharpf et al. 1976), policy net-
works (with a distinction between policy communities and issue networks)
Table 14.1 Modes of central-local coordination (2014)

Access and influence at higher levelsa
Low High
Legal- Low Bureaucratised Consultative

administrative ALB, BEL, HRV, CYP, ISL, DNK, FIN, NLD, NOR,
autonomya,b GEO, HUN, IRL, MDV, SWE
TUR
High Judicialised Thick
CZE, EST, GRC, LIE, LUX, POL, AUT, LTU, MLT, SVK,
MKD, ROM, ESP, UKR, CHE, BGR, FRA, DEU, ITA,
SVN, GBR LVA, PRT, SRB
Notes:
Cut-off point for high/low = 66.66 points on standardised variables
a
Legal-administrative autonomy 2014 = (administrative supervision 2014 + legal protection 2014)/2,

b
with standardised variables; countries have been inserted based on their scores on the two indicators
ALB Albania, AUT Austria, BEL Belgium, BGR Bulgaria, HRV Croatia, CYP Cyprus, CZE Czech
Republic, DNK Denmark, EST Estonia, FIN Finland, FRA France, GEO Georgia, DEU Germany, GRC
Greece, HUN Hungary, ISL Iceland, IRL Ireland, ITA Italy, LVA Latvia, LIE Liechtenstein, LTU
Lithuania, LUX Luxembourg, MKD Macedonia, MLT Malta, MDV Moldova, NLD Netherlands, NOR
Norway, POL Poland, PRT Portugal, ROM Romania, SRB Serbia, SVK Slovakia, SVN Slovenia, ESP
Spain, SWE Sweden, CHE Switzerland, TUR Turkey, UKR Ukraine, GBR United Kingdom
(Rhodes 1999) or collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2008) and so

on. The related concept of multilevel governance with origins in studies of
the roles of subnational units in processes of European integration (e.g.
Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001) has sought to denote bottom-up influ-
ence on decision-making in the EU beyond that of national governments.
With the concept of “interactive rule”, we have wished to highlight
central-local relations as a two-way street of coordination and conflict res-
olution. Of course, national governments have ample opportunities to
influence the operations of local government through legal, financial and
political means. However, local government also has means with which to
withstand national interference or to influence national decision-making.
In our analytical scheme, interactive rule is covered by three indicators: the
legal protection of local government, the supervision of local government
and the access of local government to higher government levels. These
indicators all have an interactive element, the details of which have been
presented in Chaps. 3, 7 and 8.
The three indicators of interactive rule are weakly or negatively inter-

correlated1 which points to the existence of distinctive national systems for
coordination and conflict resolution across levels of government. We have,
nevertheless, tried to work out a somewhat simplified picture of modes of
multilevel governance by crossing two sets of indicators (see Table 14.1):
Access to higher levels of government on the one hand and legal-
administrative autonomy on the other hand. The latter is a combination of
legal protection and administrative supervision. Both of the latter variables
have a strong judicial element and highlight coordination through the
enforcement of rules and regulations. As mentioned above, administrative
supervision refers to the workings of bureaucratic modes of conflict reso-
lution in cases where deviance from regulations are deemed to occur while
legal protection opens up the court system for local as well as central gov-
ernment. The channels of access to higher levels of government are, as
mentioned, of a more political nature and often involve deliberation and
negotiation between local and national political elites in more or less insti-
tutionalised fashions (see Chap. 8).
In the cases where the score is low on both dimensions, we think it is
appropriate to term the mode of governance bureaucratised since the level
of access is low or non-existent and legal-administrative autonomy is also
low. The latter means supervision is detailed and intense while local
authorities have no recourse to the courts in cases of disagreement with
supervisory agencies or other representatives of the state.
The cases in the opposite situation, with high scores on both dimen-
sions, exemplify thick governance. Here, governance runs on several
tracks: In terms of supervision, local government is granted much admin-
istrative autonomy and is also empowered to initiate court cases over rul-
ings of government agencies; at the same time, institutionalised access is
available for conflict resolution at a political level.
In systems with high scores on access and low ones on legal-
administrative autonomy, the term consultative governance may describe
the situation. Local government is subject to fairly detailed supervision
and have weak legal protection but have well-established access to higher
government. Therefore, local government may influence central govern-
1
The Pearson correlation coefficients for the most recent years (2014) are 0.142 between
legal protection and administrative supervision, −0.045 between legal protection and central
of regional access and 0.187 between administrative supervision and central or regional
access.
ment through consultative procedures. Of course, such procedures also

bring opportunities of influence for central government but may in the
long term favour the development of mutual understanding and trust
between levels of government.
The fourth combination is one where access is limited but legal-
administrative autonomy high. We term this situation judicialised gover-
nance since legality-focused supervision, strong constitutional guarantees
and access to the court system is what characterises interaction between
levels of government.
The analysis of decentralisation proceeds by crossing an indicator of
local democratic space with an indicator of interactive rule. The indicator
of local democratic space is obtained simply by adding the two indices
from which that of democratic space is constructed, that is, indices of
functional autonomy and financial autonomy (see Chap. 10). The indica-
tor of interactive rule consists of the sum of the variables legal protection,
administrative supervision and central and regional access outlined above
(and also presented in Chaps. 3, 7 and 8).
The first issue to be addressed is whether the dimensions of decentrali-
sation develop in parallel? Do countries that grant wide democratic space
to local government also develop thick interactive rule? If the purpose of
the procedures of interactive governance is to coordinate decision-making
at local and national levels of government, one might logically assume that
the more space for local policy-making granted to local government, the
more developed interactive governance would have to be in order to coor-
dinate local and national government. Wide local democratic space means,
after all, that local government is responsible for a range of important
functions of national concern and has corresponding financial powers.
One could, furthermore, expect that in cases where democratic space is
especially wide access to higher levels of government would take on special
importance since procedures of consultation and deliberation provide
more flexible modes of coordination than those of supervision and litiga-
tion. The more responsibilities taken on at the local level, the greater flex-
ibility is required in order to coordinate across levels of government.
The first assumption that of a positive connection between extent of local
democratic space and development of interactive governance is to some
extent confirmed by correlation analysis. The Pearson’ s correlation coeffi-
cient for the two summary measures is, 326 (p<0.05), in other words, a
modest but positive association, which means that the more extensive local
democratic space is, the more diverse multilevel governance tends to become.
100.00
90.00
80.00
70.00
60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
Turkey
Serbia
Austria
Hungary
France
Ireland
Iceland
Belgium
Luxembourg
Greece
Denmark
Slovakia
Albania
Latvia
Cyprus
Georgia
Ukraine
Finland
Italy
Bulgaria
Netherlands
Romania
Malta
Slovenia
Moldova
Sweden
Germany
Switzerland
Liechtenstein
Poland
Macedonia
Croatia
Spain
Norway
Lithuania
Estonia
Portugal
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
Democratic space (2014) Interactive rule (2014)
Fig. 14.1 Dimensions of decentralisation: Interactive rule and local political

space by country (2014). (Notes: Democratic space 2014 = (financial autonomy
2014 + political discretion 2014)/2, with standardised dimensions; interactive
rule 2014 = (legal protection 2014 + administrative supervision 2014 + central or
regional access 2014)/3, with standardised variables)
Nevertheless, the relatively modest coefficient also indicates that the

relationship is more nuanced and not a straightforward one. This is fur-
ther explored in Fig. 14.1 which ranks countries according to scores on
local democratic space and also presents the scores on interactive gover-
nance alongside the former. This figure demonstrates that there are indeed
cases where there is a conspicuous gap between the two indices. Especially
Malta, the United Kingdom and Estonia stand out in this regard, with
much higher scores on interactive rule than on local democratic space.
The latter pattern suggests that these countries may have sought to fulfil
the criteria on intergovernmental relations specified in the European
Charter but have not been so willing to actually allocate functions and
financial freedom to local government.
Table 14.2 demonstrates how countries can be grouped according to
their scores on the respective dimensions of decentralisation. The figure
shows that of the 17 countries with high scores on democratic space 11
are also high on multilevel governance while 6 of them are nevertheless
Table 14.2 Decentralisation as observed in 39 European countries by 2014

Interactive governance indexa,b
Low High
Local Low Subordinate Hollow autonomy

democratic space GRC, ROM, UKR, SVN, ALB, BGR, EST, LTU, MLT,
indexa,b HRV, CYP, GEO, HUN, NLD, SVK, CZE, LVA, ESP, GBR
TUR, IRL, MDV
High Semi-autonomous Empowered
BEL, DNK, LUX, MKD, NOR, CHE, POL, AUT, FRA,
SWE ITA, FIN, DEU, ISL, LIE,
POR, SRB
Notes:
a
Operationalisation: Local democratic space index = financial autonomy + functional autonomy, with stan-
dardised dimensions; interactive governance index = legal protection + administrative supervision + cen-
tral or regional access, with standardised variables
b
Cut-off point high/low = 60 points on standardised variables
ALB Albania, AUT Austria, BEL Belgium, BGR Bulgaria, HRV Croatia, CYP Cyprus, CZE Czech
Republic, DNK Denmark, EST Estonia, FIN Finland, FRA France, GEO Georgia, DEU Germany, GRC
Greece, HUN Hungary, ISL Iceland, IRL Ireland, ITA Italy, LVA Latvia, LIE Liechtenstein, LTU
Lithuania, LUX Luxembourg, MKD Macedonia, MLT Malta, MDV Moldova, NLD Netherlands, NOR
Norway, POL Poland, PRT Portugal, ROM Romania, SRB Serbia, SVK Slovakia, SVN Slovenia, ESP
Spain, SWE Sweden, CHE Switzerland, TUR Turkey, UKR Ukraine, GBR United Kingdom
found in the cell with low scores on the multilevel governance index.
Three of the latter are Nordic countries that are lacking on legal protec-
tion (see Chap. 3). Still, according to Chap. 8, all of the Nordics are
strong on consultative governance, which is in conformity with the expec-
tation that wide democratic space would favour the emergence of more
political modes of coordination.
A detailed analysis of Table 14.2 points to four different levels of decen-
tralisation in countries across Europe. The patterns describe where local
government has arrived in the respective countries after 25 years of reform
and development in an increasingly Europeanised context under the aegis
of the Council of Europe.
Countries that combine high scores on interactive governance (multi-
stranded interactive rule) and high scores on local democratic space (many
responsibilities and genuine decision-making powers) may be said to be
moving towards a fully autonomous or empowered status of local govern-
ment in the sense envisaged by the European Charter as drawn up by the
Council of Europe (see Chaps. 1 and 3). Three of the countries found in
this group are in fact formal federations (Switzerland, Austria, Germany)
and their federal features seem to extend to the local level. Some of the
other countries in this group also have features that point in the same
direction (e.g. Italy).
The contrasting cases are found in the cell that combines thin interac-
tive governance and narrow democratic space—the subordinate local
authorities. This means that local government is endowed with few func-
tions and powers and there is little interaction with higher levels. Local
government deals with unimportant functions, for the national govern-
ment there is little at stake at the local level and, consequently, coordina-
tion is underdeveloped. The question is, is this a trend that is self-reinforcing?
Will these countries remain underdeveloped with regard to space for local
democracy precisely because interactive governance is underdeveloped,
that is, local government lacks the clout to gain more powers and
functions?
Countries that are high on democratic space and low on interactive
governance have developed semi-autonomous local government with
wide powers but access to higher levels is limited. Local government per-
forms functions that presumably are of vital national interest and with
leeway for local decision-making but with limited opportunities for local
government to challenge national interventions. Interestingly, three of the
Nordics are found in this group along with Belgium and Macedonia.
Finally, there is a group of countries that combines high levels of inter-
action with narrow democratic space—a situation that may be appropri-
ately described as one of hollow autonomy. The multistranded system of
interactive rule in operation (on paper?) has no counterpart in broad arrays
of functions and powers at the local level but appears instead as rather top-
heavy governance of local trifles. This group covers a number of post-
communist countries and also includes Spain and the United Kingdom.
The analysis of Table 14.2 modifies findings from earlier studies and
also those based on the full LAI, in which the Nordic countries tend uni-
formly to stand out among the most decentralised countries of Europe.
When details of interactive rule are taken into account, the most fully
empowered local government systems include, for example, Poland,
Serbia, France, Switzerland or Austria, while three of the Nordics are
found in the group of semi-autonomous systems (Denmark, Norway,
Sweden).
Two major questions emerge out of the patterns of decentralisation in

Table 14.2. First, what does it take for local government to become fully
empowered, that is, with wide space for local democracy and thick
interactive governance? Second, is full(er) empowerment of local govern-
ment a desirable goal for a polity? Does it matter?
The first question What does it take? can be addressed at two levels,
diagnostically and analytically. Diagnostically, the answer can be found by
inspecting country scores on the respective indicators analysed through-
out this book; low scores indicate what remains to be done for a country
that might wish to further empower its local authorities. Analytically, the
issue is more complicated: what are the political and socio-economic con-
ditions that favour (or block) decentralisation? The links identified in this
regard in Chap. 12 suggest that historically conditioned system features
are important drivers of variations in local autonomy; an inspection of
Table 12.1 indicates that this is so with regard to both dimensions of
decentralisation and in particular for the sub-indicator of financial auton-
omy. The historical-institutional background of a country is, of course,
difficult to change in the short term. Nevertheless, citizen trust in local
government also plays a role, albeit a smaller one when system features are
controlled for; consequently, measures that enhance citizen trust may be
steps on a road to further decentralisation. The second issue Is decentrali-
sation worthwhile? Does it matter? was addressed in Chap. 13. The analy-
sis demonstrated decentralisation indicators to be positively linked with
more general quality of democracy indicators as well as with social system
performance measures (e.g. economic growth or happiness in life). The
overall LAI was found to be highly correlated with both types of measures
while the two more focussed decentralisation dimensions were more selec-
tively associated with performance. The local democratic space dimension
was the one that was most clearly linked to performance while interactive
governance indicators were less so (see Tables 13.1 and 13.5), except for
positive associations with “happiness”. However, both dimensions of
decentralisation were found to be strongly linked to positive public per-
ceptions of ethical standards in government (absence of corruption): in
other words, where there is more decentralisation, there is less corruption.
This is a finding that goes against widespread assumptions about corrupt
practices in local government. An hypothesis for further research in this
regard could be that decentralising financial responsibilities to local coun-
cils allows the public to keep a close watch on how money is spent, which
again may have a disciplinary effect on government officials.
This must remain a preliminary speculation, but findings such as those

above should certainly encourage scholars to develop further hypotheses
about the effects of local autonomy and decentralisation and the causal
chains that link autonomy and performance.
References
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571.
Dente, B., & Kjellberg, F. (Eds.). (1988). The Dynamics of Institutional Change.
London: Sage.
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (1996). Europe with the Regions’: Channels of Regional
Representation in the European Union. Publius: The Journal of Federalism,
26(1), 73–91.
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1999). Control and Power in Central-Local Government
Relations (Revised ed.). Gower/Brookfield: Ashgate.
Scharpf, F. W., Reissert, B., & Schnabel, F. (1976). Politikverflechtung: Theorie
und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik. Kronberg im
Taunus: Scriptor.
Index1
A 188, 207, 237, 263n7, 266n8,

Access, 22, 24, 27, 42, 53, 54, 94, 268, 269, 272, 275, 292–294,
126, 127, 158, 171, 188, 219, 296
222–225, 227, 231–233, 243, Alienation, 321
244, 259, 260, 309, 322, 325, Amalgamation, 305, 309, 310, 312
327, 334, 336, 338, 341–346, Association, 78, 81
342n1 Asymmetry, 41, 56
and influence at higher levels, 334, Austria, 28, 39, 41, 47, 55n8, 55n9,
341 58, 59, 88, 153, 157n8, 158n10,
Accountability, 6, 18, 104, 152, 155, 159, 159n14, 166, 178, 187,
157, 279–299 201, 202, 239, 244, 268–270,
Administrative decentralisation, 221 272, 290, 293, 294, 296, 298,
Administrative supervision, 7, 22, 53, 304, 337, 346
54, 67, 82, 93, 96, 97, 175–190,
219, 221, 223, 284, 285, 287,
336, 342–345, 342n1 B
Administrative tutelage, 189 Belgium, 39, 41, 45, 55n8, 55n9, 59,
Aggregation, 215, 223, 225, 243 128, 143, 153, 156n6, 157n8,
Albania, 5, 29, 40, 55n8, 58, 86n5, 158, 158n11, 159, 162, 164,
88, 92, 112, 139, 141–143, 167, 178, 185, 188, 189, 201,
156n6, 157n8, 158n10, 164, 204, 205, 231, 232, 237, 239,
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95642-8
350 INDEX
244, 260–262, 268–270, 272, Citizen trust, 307, 309, 311–313

290, 293, 296, 304, 337, 346 Civil servants, 153, 155, 160–162,
Black Sea countries, 112, 120 168–171
Borrowing autonomy (BA), 51, 52, Civil service, 161, 166, 169
132, 134, 136, 137, 140, 144, Classical liberal theory, 9
148, 219, 221, 223, 224, 266, Codebook, 49–54
284, 287, 335 Coding scheme, 49, 64–67
Borrowing regulations, 136, 137, 144 Cohesion policy funding, 9
Bottom-up perspective, 193, 202 Collaborative governance, 341
Budget control, 180, 181, 187, 190 Committee of Regions, 4
Building permits, 110, 114, 115, Communist state tradition, 309
117–120 Community, 78, 80, 83, 84, 88n8,
Bulgaria, 40, 55n8, 86n5, 88, 95, 90n9
118, 139, 142, 143, 158n10, Comparative local/multi-level
164, 166, 167, 183, 185, 187, governance, 5
201, 204, 205, 231, 235, 237, Comparative study, 41
239, 244, 263n7, 268–270, Competence, 80, 82–93
291–293, 296, 337 Components, 214–218, 220, 223, 225
Bundle(s) of tasks/policies, 103–105, Comprehensive measurement, 23, 37
118–119 Conditional grants, 136, 143, 144
Conditional transfers, 131, 143
Congress of Local and Regional
C Authorities, 7
Capacities, 9, 12, 14–16, 19–22, 245 Consensual decision-making, 306
Career system, 161, 162 Consistency, 47, 56
Caring functions, 108, 109, 114, 117, Constitutionalism, 79
118, 120 Construction of an indicator, 215
Categorical qualitative approach, 258 Content validity, 216
Central control/domination, 3, 22 Controlling authority, 177
Central functions of local government, Control of legality, 178, 181, 182,
10 184
Centralism, 77, 81, 97 Control of opportunity, 178, 181, 189
Central or regional access (CRA), 53, Convergent validity, 216, 225
54, 198–200, 203, 208, 222, Cornerstones of local autonomy, 225
344, 345 Correlation matrix, 218, 220
Chained democracy, 267–269, 271, Corruption, 6, 321, 327–329
272, 274 Council of Europe, 4, 7, 8, 8n5, 17
Choice, 279, 280, 286, 289, 293, 298 Country-configurations, 257, 263,
Citizen effectiveness, 320 264, 274
Citizenry, 282–285, 287–289, Country expert, 55, 55n8
296–297 Country group coordinator, 55, 55n9
Citizens’ participation, 15 Country ranking, 229–230, 236
INDEX 351
Country size, 304 Direct access, 196, 203, 205, 206

Croatia, 38, 41, 55n8, 56, 86n5, Direct democracy, 156, 159, 159n14,
156n6, 157n8, 158n10, 164, 160
167, 206, 207n7, 227, 263n7, Disciplinary approaches, 5, 16–17, 23,
270, 290 27
Cross-functional coordination, 6 Discrete quantitative approach, 259,
Cyprus, 41, 55n8, 55n9, 89, 112, 261, 264, 274
118, 119, 141, 157n8, 158n10, Discretion, 13, 15–19, 22, 26
164, 166, 188, 206, 207, 243, Distributive policy, 115
271, 291, 298, 337 Diversity, 151, 158–160, 162, 163,
Czech Republic, 38, 40, 55n8, 86n5, 170, 216, 233, 244
92, 112, 114, 118, 143, 153, Divided societies, 4
154, 154n3, 156n6, 157n8, Drivers of local autonomy, 339, 347
157n9, 159, 159n14, 164–166, Drivers of variation, 303–313
207, 231, 232, 235, 239, 244,
263n7, 271, 291, 293, 296, 337
E
Economic crisis, 128n1, 134, 136,
D 144
Decentralisation, 41–47, 46n5, 56, 59, Economic development, 317, 320
60, 78, 80, 81, 84, 92, 96, 280, Economic efficiency, 6, 10, 27
290, 292, 293, 296, 298, 299, Economic theories, 17–20
318, 319 Economies of scales, 11–12
reform, 4, 6 Effectiveness, 155
theorem, 18 Effective political discretion (EPD),
De-concentration, 319 50, 51, 54, 54n7, 56n13, 69,
Delegation, 177, 319 90–93, 96, 97, 99, 108–114,
Democracy, 4–8, 10–13, 19–21, 23 138, 139, 217–221, 223, 224,
legitimacy, 11 235, 266n9, 286, 287, 308
Democratisation, 292, 293, 298 Effects of local autonomy, 348
Demos, 280 Efficiency, 155
Denmark, 38, 44, 47, 55n8, 95, 111, Efficiency-democracy dilemma, 10
126, 138, 139, 142, 143, 156n6, Elections, 104, 120
157n9, 158, 158n12, 159, 164, Electoral system, 156, 159, 160, 162,
187, 188, 203, 232, 235, 236, 163, 165, 166, 170
244, 261, 268, 289, 293, 296, Elementary services, 79
312–313, 337, 339, 346 Empirical typology, 258, 264, 274,
Devolution, 319 276
Dimensions, 213, 215–218, 220–233, Employment system, 161
236, 243–248 Empowered local government, 345,
Dimensions of local autonomy, 333, 346
334, 337 Equitability, 155
352 INDEX
Estonia, 55n8, 86–87n5, 93, 112, Finland, 44, 47, 55n8, 111, 126, 138,
139, 142, 156n6, 157n8, 157n9, 139, 156n6, 157n8, 157n9, 159,
164, 183, 186, 204, 205, 231, 159n14, 164, 203, 233, 236,
235, 239, 244, 263n7, 272, 290, 244, 261, 268, 289, 337
292, 293, 296, 337, 344 Fiscal autonomy (FA), 43–45, 51,
Ethics, 9, 10 135, 138, 218, 219, 221, 223,
European Charter of Local Self- 224, 232, 247, 266, 284
Government, 4, 7, 152, 153n1, Fiscal decentralisation, 43, 46, 46n5,
154n4 47, 59, 60
ratifications, 28–30 data/indicators, 43, 46, 47
European Union (EU), 4, 5, 8, 9 Fiscal equivalence, 106
Evolutionary institutionalism, 305 Fiscal federalism, 125, 126, 130, 132,
Executive, 77, 78 134, 144, 319
Expedience, 9 Formative index/indicator, 215
Expediency, 177, 179, 181–183, 189, France, 38, 40, 41, 47, 48, 55n8,
190 55n9, 56, 78, 80, 83, 85, 95,
Expenditure decentralization, 129, 110, 118, 139, 141, 143, 153,
134 156n6, 157n8, 157n9, 159n13,
Expression of local identity approach, 159n14, 161, 164, 187, 203,
15 231, 232, 235, 239, 244,
259–261, 270, 272, 275, 290,
293, 296, 298, 307, 337, 346
F Free administration, 80
Federal constitution, 304 Freedom to approach, 14
Federalism, 41, 42, 46–47, 56 Functional approach, 17–19, 223
Federalist/unitary countries, 37, 41, Functions, 103, 105–108, 111,
42, 44, 45 113–120, 305, 307, 310
Financial autonomy, 18, 20, 22, 45,
125–144, 216, 217, 221,
223–227, 231–235, 243, 244, G
266–268, 270, 271, 274, 275, GDP change, 137, 144
284, 286–288, 291, 296, 297, General competence, 80, 85, 88
308, 310, 311, 322, 325, 327, Geographical location, 259, 261, 263,
329, 330, 333–335, 337–340, 274
343–345, 347 Georgia, 5, 38, 55n8, 87n5, 88, 88n7,
Financial equalisation, 127 95, 118, 137, 139, 143, 154,
Financial management, 181, 187, 189 154n3, 164, 167, 168, 184, 188,
Financial self-reliance (FSR), 51, 52, 206, 207n7, 227, 235, 236, 243,
131–135, 138, 140, 147, 218, 263n7, 268, 272, 291, 293, 296,
219, 223, 266, 284, 287 337, 338
Financial transfer system (FTS), 22, Germany, 38, 41, 47, 55n8, 55n9, 78,
51, 52, 133, 134, 142, 146, 218, 111, 114, 120, 133, 139, 158,
219, 221, 224, 284, 285, 287 158n10, 159n14, 164, 203, 204,
INDEX 353
231, 232, 235–237, 239, 244, Ideal vs. transitory types autonomy,
268, 290, 293, 296, 298, 304, 274
312, 330, 335, 337, 346 Identitification, 280
Good governance, 105, 303, 312 Immunity, 12–15
Governance, 5, 6, 19–21, 27, 236 Impact of local autonomy, 320, 324,
Greece, 38, 45, 55n8, 55n9, 85, 92, 325
112, 118, 137, 141, 142, 153, Inclusiveness, 155
158n10, 159n13, 166, 178, 187, Increase of local autonomy, 244
206, 207, 227, 243, 260–262, Index of local autonomy (LAI), 337,
275, 291, 293, 296 346, 347
Guarantees, 79, 80, 83 Indicator, 213–216, 223, 225, 226,
Guided democracy, 267–269, 271, 243
272 Indirect access, 196, 208
Guidelines, 79 Individual access, 195–197, 209
Individual freedom, 9, 10
Inequality, 6
H Initiation, 12–15
Happiness, 321, 327–330 Initiatives, 159
Health centres/services, 107, 108, Input-related aspects of local
114, 115, 118–120, 119n2 autonomy, 321–325
Heterogeneity, 304 Institution, 79, 80, 84, 96
Historical institutionalism, 107, 303, Institutional access, 195–197, 208
305 Institutional depth (ID), 49, 50, 54,
Hollow autonomy, 345, 346 82, 84, 86–89, 96–98, 217–219,
Horizontal, 12, 14, 25 221, 223, 224, 266, 286, 287
Housing, 108, 109, 114, 115, Institutionalism, 339
117–120 Institutional theories, 5
Hungary, 40, 58, 59, 87n5, 112, 137, Interactive governance, 343–347
139, 142, 157n7, 157n8, Interactive rule, 340–348
158n10, 159, 159n13, 159n14, Interference/non-interference, 284,
164, 184, 185, 188, 189, 201, 289, 291, 293, 296
204, 205, 227, 231, 235, 237, Intergovernmental linkage, 198, 204,
239, 244, 263n7, 268, 269, 272, 207
290, 293, 296, 338 Intergovernmental relations, 193, 204,
206, 208
Intergovernmental transfers, 133, 135,
I 143
Iceland, 5, 29, 38, 39, 45, 47, 55n8, International Monetary Fund (IMF),
58, 59, 92, 111, 126, 137–139, 4
142, 156n6, 157n8, 157n9, 164, Ireland, 28, 38–40, 55n8, 55n9, 58,
185, 201–203, 227, 235, 236, 59, 85, 89, 112, 118–120, 139,
244, 268, 269, 272, 290, 294, 143, 156n6, 157n8, 157n9, 158,
296, 337 164, 185, 188, 201, 206, 207,
354 INDEX
235–237, 243, 260, 262, 268, protection, 7, 8n5, 24, 49, 54, 67,
269, 271, 272, 292–294, 296, 80, 82, 83, 94–97, 100, 219,
335, 337, 338 222, 235, 309, 337, 341–345,
Italy, 28, 39, 48, 55n8, 55n9, 57–59, 342n1
79, 83, 88, 92, 106, 107, 112, status, 77, 81
121, 137, 142, 144, 157n7, Legal-administrative autonomy,
157n8, 158, 158n10, 159, 341–343
159n13, 159n14, 164, 167, 168, Legalistic approach, 16–17
184–186, 201, 204, 205, 232, Legitimacy, 279, 282, 289
233, 239, 244, 259–261, Liechtenstein, 5, 39, 55n8, 55n9, 128,
268–270, 272, 275, 290, 292, 138, 139, 142, 154, 154n3, 164,
294, 296, 298, 304, 335, 337, 185, 201, 206, 207, 227, 231,
346 237, 239, 244, 268, 269, 271,
272, 293, 296, 337
Literature review, 41n3
J Lithuania, 40, 55n8, 85, 87n5, 88,
Joint conferences, 197, 205 112, 139, 156n6, 157n8, 157n9,
Jurisdiction, 284 158, 164, 184, 185, 200n4,
201–203, 239, 244, 263n7, 268,
269, 275, 290, 296, 337
K Local
Knowledge, 280 administration, 151, 153, 158n12,
160–163, 166–168, 170, 171
assembly, 156, 157, 159–161, 163
L autonomy, 3–30
Latvia, 29, 38, 40, 55n8, 58, 85, 87, autonomy typology, 257, 264, 268,
87n5, 88, 114, 121, 128, 139, 269, 272, 274–276
141, 156n6, 157n8, 157n9, 167, competition, 6
169, 185, 187, 200n4, 201, 204, council, 157, 163, 166–169
239, 263n7, 266n8, 268, 269, democracy, 27, 104, 110, 120
272, 275, 292–294, 296 democratic space, 340, 343–345, 347
Law compliance, 177, 179, 182, 183, efficiency, 11
186 executive, 156, 157, 158n10, 163,
Legal 170
approach, 222 financial management, 178, 179
autonomy, 216, 222–225, 227, government, 4–27, 25n7, 152, 154,
231–233, 235, 243, 322, 326, 156, 158, 159n14, 161–163,
329, 333, 334, 337, 339 165, 167–170
discourse, 77–82 government systems classifications,
entities, 162, 163, 166–170 257, 263, 266n9, 273
framework, 22, 24, 222 parliament, 157, 160
order, 79 revenues, 129
INDEX 355
Local authorities Multilevel governance, 303, 307, 310,

associations, 194, 203, 207 313
consultation, 194, 197, 198, 204, Municipal
209 enterprises, 162, 163, 166–170
influence, 202, 207, 209 performance, 313
representation, 197, 207 scale, 312
Local autonomy index (LAI), size, 309
213–248 Municipalities, 6–9, 6n3, 12, 16, 20,
Logic of appropriateness, 307 21, 23–24, 37–41, 44, 45, 47–54,
Loi organique sur les lois de finances 56, 57, 64, 66, 67
(LOLF), 161
Luxembourg, 39, 55n9, 139, 141,
156n6, 157n8, 158n11, 159, N
159n13, 162, 164, 184, 189, Nation state, 77
201, 206, 237, 239, 244, 268, Netherlands, 45, 55n8, 55n9, 143,
269, 290, 296 153, 157n8, 158n11, 159, 162,
164, 178, 188–190, 203, 232,
237, 239, 271, 290, 296, 298,
M 337
Macedonia, 5, 38, 55n8, 55n9, 87n5, New public management (NPM), 161,
88, 142, 143, 157n7, 157n8, 162
158n10, 164, 187, 207, 237, Nimby syndromes, 280
263n7, 270, 292, 296, 346 Non-interference, 221, 223–225, 227,
Malta, 55n8, 55n9, 87, 89, 93, 94, 231, 232, 235, 287, 297, 322,
96, 97, 111, 112, 119, 135–137, 327, 334
141–143, 145–148, 156n6, Normative claims, 155
157n9, 164–166, 172, 183, 184, Normative rationales/values, 9, 10,
191, 199, 201–203, 210, 236, 15, 26
238, 242, 243, 266n8, 268, 273, North-South divide, 259
296, 298, 335, 337, 344 Norway, 5, 29, 39, 45, 47, 55n8, 58,
Mayor, 156–159, 156n6, 157n8, 59, 106, 107, 111, 114, 126,
157n9, 158n10, 161, 162, 138, 139, 143, 157n8, 157n9,
166–168, 170 159, 164, 165, 167, 169, 184,
Mean values, 227, 237, 238 185, 187, 188, 201, 204, 205,
Methodology/observation/ 231, 232, 235, 236, 239, 244,
aggregation, 39–40, 226 261, 262, 268, 269, 289, 293,
Moldova, 5, 55n8, 87n5, 114, 118, 296, 307, 337, 346
138, 139, 141, 143, 164,
167–169, 169n15, 188, 189,
207, 235, 236, 243, 244, 263n7, O
268, 272, 293, 296, 337, 338 Old institutionalism, 16–17
Multidimensional concept, 6, 23–26 Opportunity, 176, 188, 190
Multidimensionality, 243 Organisational approach, 19–21, 223
356 INDEX
Organisational autonomy, 43, 53, 54, networks, 340

155, 160, 162–165, 167–172, typology, 105
216–219, 222–227, 231–235, Policy scope (PS), 50, 54, 54n7,
243, 244, 322, 334, 336–338 56n13, 64, 68, 84, 108–110,
Organisation for Economic 112–114, 120, 121, 129, 130,
Co-operation and Development 138, 217, 219–224, 226, 227,
(OECD), 4 231–235, 243, 266n9, 308,
Output legitimacy, 313 322, 325, 329, 333, 334, 337,
Output-related aspects of local 339
autonomy, 320, 325–329 Political discretion, 90, 114, 221,
Outsourcing, 161 223–227, 231–233, 235, 243,
Own revenues, 130, 132, 134 244, 266–271, 273–275, 285,
286, 288, 297, 322, 325, 326,
329, 333–335, 337–339, 344
P Political institutions, 151, 156, 170,
Parliamentary system, 156–158, 171
156n6 Political interest, 322
Participation Political logic model, 303
budgeting, 159 Political parties, 104
planning, 159 Political stability, 6, 8
Partnership, 267–269, 271, 274, 275, Political system, 151, 152, 155–160,
307, 310, 311 162, 163, 166, 171
Path dependency, 303, 306, 309, 311 Politico-administrative system, 151,
Patronise, 289, 291, 293, 297 155, 161, 162
Patronised community, 334, 338 Politics
Patterns of local autonomy, 232–234, approach, 193
337–339 approach of intergovernmental
Performance, 155, 161, 166, 283 relation, 21–23, 223
Personality, 78–80 decentralisation, 221, 226
Poland, 29, 40, 41, 45, 55n8, 58, 59, localism, 196, 202, 208
87n5, 92, 111, 112, 114, 120, Politikverflechtung, 17–19, 340
138, 156n6, 158n10, 159n13, Polity, 282
164, 165, 185, 201–203, Pork-barrel policies, 6
231–233, 236, 237, 239, 244, Portugal, 39, 45, 55n8, 55n9, 59,
262n4, 263n7, 268–270, 272, 139, 143, 157n7, 157n8, 157n9,
275, 290, 293, 295, 296, 312, 164, 185, 201, 204, 205, 239,
335, 337, 346 260, 261, 268–270, 272, 275,
Police, 103, 107–109, 114, 115, 117, 290, 296, 337
118, 120 Post-communist countries, 324, 327,
Policy 329
autonomy, 103–117, 120, 308, 310 Post-communist model, 262, 263
experimentation, 6 Pouvoir municipal, 77, 78
INDEX 357
Power, 279, 279n1, 281, 282, 285, Romania, 40, 55n8, 58, 87, 87n5, 89,
286, 289, 293, 299 92–94, 96, 97, 111, 112, 114,
vertical division of, 279 139, 142, 143, 157n7, 157n8,
Power-sharing, 3 158n10, 164, 167, 170, 185,
Presidential system, 152, 156n6, 157, 188, 189, 201, 207, 231, 235,
157n7, 158, 162 237, 238, 266n8, 268, 269, 271,
Preventive control, 180, 190 292, 296, 337
Privileged penetration, 195 Rule of law, 155
Proportional, 80, 93, 178
Public choice, 11
Public interest, 280 S
Public policies, 319 Satisfaction, 321, 327
Public-private partnership, 161 Scandinavian countries, 330
Public transport, 108, 109, 114, 117, Schools, 105, 107, 114, 117
120 buildings, 108, 117–120
Segregation, 280
Self-determined community, 334, 338
Q Self-regulation, 24
Quality of democracy, 322, 324, 325 Semi-autonomous, 345, 346
Serbia, 5, 29, 40, 41, 55n8, 58, 87n5,
121, 138, 142, 154, 164–166,
R 178, 184, 185, 201, 207, 233,
Random change, 305 239, 244, 263n7, 268–270, 275,
Rational preferences, 303 290, 292, 295, 296, 337, 346
Re-centralisation, 134, 142 Size of the executive, 166
Redistributive policy, 106, 115 Slovakia, 40, 58, 59, 87n5, 112, 128,
Referendums, 152, 159, 280, 283 143, 158n10, 184, 189, 239,
Reflective index/indicator, 215, 220 244, 268–270, 275, 291, 292,
Reformers, 304, 305, 307, 309 296, 337
Reforms, 157n7, 161–163, 169, Slovenia, 38, 40, 41, 55n8, 59, 87n5,
171 88, 92, 114, 118, 137, 138, 143,
Regional Authority Index (RAI), 46, 158n10, 159, 159n13, 164, 165,
49n6 167, 169, 185, 201, 204, 235,
Regional autonomy, 42, 46–47, 307, 243, 263n7, 268, 269, 271, 272,
310, 313 290, 293, 338
Regionalisation, 46 Socialism, 79
Regionalised states, 304 Social services, 107
Regulatory policy, 105, 115, 117 Spain, 28, 39, 41, 45, 55n8, 55n9, 58,
Representation, 77 59, 88, 95, 112, 118, 121, 137,
Research questions, 5 139, 141, 156n6, 157n7, 157n8,
Responsiveness, 155, 279–299 157n9, 159, 167, 169, 185, 186,
358 INDEX
201, 206, 227, 232, 235, 239, Territorial organisation, 7

259–262, 268, 269, 271, 272, of states, 3
275, 290, 293, 295, 296, 298, Theoretical perspectives, 12, 14
304, 338, 346 Theories of decentralisation, 5
Staff, 153, 154, 163, 166–170 Transparency, 155
Standard deviations, 218, 227, 228 Triangle of local autonomy, 224,
Standardisation, 227 233
State traditions, 112, 258, 261, 274, Trust, 280, 296, 298, 299, 321, 322,
275, 306, 309, 311, 313 325–327, 330
Subordinate local authorities, 346 Turkey, 5, 29, 39, 41, 55n8, 55n9, 56,
Subordination, 3 58, 112, 118, 119, 128, 139,
Subsidiarity, 9, 16, 17 143, 157n7, 157n8, 158n10,
Supervision of expediency, 179, 189 164, 185, 201, 206, 243, 268,
Supervisory authority, 176, 178–180, 269, 272, 291, 293, 295, 296,
190 298, 337
Sweden, 28, 39, 44, 47, 55n8, 58, 59, Tutelage, 267
83, 88, 95, 126, 138, 139, 143, “Tutelle,”, 184, 189
156n6, 157n8, 157n9, 158, Type I autonomy, 14, 24
158n12, 159, 159n14, 164, 165, Type II autonomy, 14
185, 187, 188, 201, 203, 232,
235, 236, 244, 261, 268, 269,
289, 293, 295, 296, 337, 346 U
Switzerland, 5, 39, 41, 47, 55n8, Ukraine, 5, 29, 38, 40, 41, 55n8, 58,
55n9, 56, 114, 117, 126, 128, 87, 87n5, 89, 93, 94, 96, 97,
138, 139, 141, 143, 153, 154, 111, 112, 135–139, 143,
156, 157n8, 158, 158n10, 159, 145–148, 157n7, 158n10,
159n13, 159n14, 164, 178, 185, 159n13, 164, 165, 172,
186, 201, 202, 202n5, 231, 232, 183–185, 187, 191, 199, 201,
235–237, 239, 244, 262, 207, 235, 238, 242, 243, 263n7,
268–270, 290, 293, 296, 298, 266n8, 268, 269, 273, 292, 296,
304, 312, 330, 337, 346 338
System capacity, 305, 320 Unconditional grants, 143
Systems of local government, 37, 55 Unconditional transfers, 133, 135
UN-Habitat, 4, 6
United Cities and Local governments
T (UCLG), 6, 8
Tax United Kingdom, 15, 16, 16n6, 28,
policies, 125, 132, 135, 140 39–41, 47, 55n8, 55n9, 58, 59,
sharing/shared revenues, 133 89, 89n9, 112, 120, 139, 157n9,
Teachers’ pay, 114, 117, 118 158, 158n10, 158n12, 159n13,
Technocratic state tradition, 309 159n14, 164, 185, 186, 201,
Territorial, 77, 79, 80, 82–83 204, 206, 206n6, 235, 237, 243,
units, 319 259, 260, 260n3, 262, 268, 269,
INDEX 359
272, 275, 291, 293, 295, 296, Veto players’ theory, 21–23
298, 304, 307, 335, 337, 338, Vote, 280, 283, 284
344, 346
United Nations Centre for Human
Settlements (UNCHS), 8 W
Units of comparison, 37 Weighting, 215, 217, 223
Welfare services, 106
World Associations of Cities and Local
V Authorities Coordination
Variables, 38, 42, 48, 49, 54, 54n7, (WACLAC), 8
56, 56n13, 64, 67 World Bank (WB), 4, 6n4
Vertical, 12, 14, 17, 18, 27
access, 193–209
coordination, 176 Z
relations, 21, 24, 26, 217, 223, 233 Zoning, 108, 110, 114, 115, 118–120

Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe

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Patterns of Local

More information about this series at

ISSN 2524-728X ISSN 2524-7298 (electronic)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950553

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

Part I Assessing and Measuring Local Autonomy 1

1 What Is Local Autonomy? 3

2 Measuring Local Autonomy 37

Part II Towards the Local Autonomy Index 75

9 The Local Autonomy Index (LAI) 213

Part III The Local Autonomy Index as Tool for Comparative

10 A New Typology of Local Government? Beyond

11 Who Governs? Patterns of Responsiveness and

12 Roadmap to Local Autonomy? Drivers of Variation 303

13 Blessings of Local Autonomy? Does It Matter? For What?

14 Conclusions: Local Autonomy—Patterns, Dynamics and

Andreas Ladner is Professor of Political Institutions and Public

government reform, the democratic anchorage of local governance net-

Fig. 1.1 Local autonomy’s approaches and constitutive aspects 25

Fig. 7.2 Administrative supervision (AS)—development in the different

Table 1.1 State of countries’ ratification of the European Charter of

Table 10.2 Types of local autonomy 267

Box 3.1 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 2,

Box 8.2 European Charter of Local Self-Government, Art. 10, Local

Assessing and Measuring Local

What Is Local Autonomy?

© The Author(s) 2019 3

ers who claim that democratic decision-making depends on citizens who

Our study proposes a theoretically rooted measure of local autonomy

and suggest a theory-based multidimensional concept of local auton-

1.2 Why Is Local Autonomy Important?

The European Charter of Local Self-Government, adopted by the Council

implementation of the European Charter have been issued. The explana-

The importance of autonomous local government is also underlined by

1.3 Conceptualising Local Autonomy

associated groups of individuals as well as to the large panoply of issues

accurately translates public preferences into public policies. For econo-

For a public good-the consumption of which is defined over geographical

Aside from normatively legitimising local government as an appropriate

1.3.2 Local Autonomy as the “Freedom from”, “Freedom to”

• Initiation and immunity are high: Locality “is totally autonomous

This raises a number of questions: First, the source of legitimacy is not

the discretion local governments possess to act, free from control by

The different theoretical insights mentioned so far remind us of the

1.4 Disciplinary Approaches and the Different

self-government” states: “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised,

1.4.2 The Functional Approach, Economic Theories

to the appropriate levels of governments has been longstanding issues of

financial) resources (European Charter, art. 9) for local authorities to be

1.4.3 The Organisational Approach, Democracy

• First, “contextual conditions” referring to the general judicial, socio-­

and neoliberalism (especially by what is known as new public manage-

1.4.4 The Politics Approach of Intergovernmental Relations

subfield of public administration has referred to “authority”, as “the for-

of influence, refers to various formal arenas of interaction like, for exam-

1.5 A Theory-Based and Multidimensional

crucial importance, whereas if we talk about the importance of munici-

Constitutional status and general Specific decision-making

Legal framework Capacities

Legal protection Financial resources

Central or regional control Administrative apparatus

Vertical relations Self-regulation

Central or regional access Local political system

Part I Assessing and Measuring Local Autonomy 1

1 What Is Local Autonomy? 3

2 Measuring Local Autonomy 37

Part II Towards the Local Autonomy Index 75

9 The Local Autonomy Index (LAI) 213

Part III The Local Autonomy Index as Tool for Comparative

10 A New Typology of Local Government? Beyond

11 Who Governs? Patterns of Responsiveness and

12 Roadmap to Local Autonomy? Drivers of Variation 303

13 Blessings of Local Autonomy? Does It Matter? For What?

14 Conclusions: Local Autonomy—Patterns, Dynamics and

Fig. 1.1 Local autonomy’s approaches and constitutive aspects 25

Table 10.2 Types of local autonomy 267

• First, “contextual conditions” referring to the general judicial, socio-