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Soldiers of the United States of America are involved in armed combat with the insurgent
army of Iraq. This war, like every other war throughout history, has presented unpredictable
situations where those involved must make split-second moral judgments. In normal
circumstances, we have a well-defined legal and moral code of conduct by which we can measure
the actions of citizens and determine whether or not they are permissible. During instances of war
and combat however, these legal and moral conventions may not always apply, as the situations
that one finds him or herself in, are often abnormal and unpredictable. To uphold a code of moral
conventions that is regulated by normality and a set of circumstances wholly unrelated to the
incidents in question, is unfair to those involved in combative situations. The customs of a war
and of everyday life are vastly divergent and incomparable in terms of moral issues.
To understand this fully, we must first understand the basic role of the American Armed
Forces in Iraq. Traditionally the role of standard combat soldiers is to take over a specified
territory and to hold it until military victory is achieved. The term “military victory” however is
vague and indeterminate. It is redefined for every war and may even change throughout the course
of a particular war. For the members of the United States Army in Iraq, we can take it to mean
peace. Their job has been to come into Iraq and hold their position within a specified area, and to
bring about certain changes through which peace will ultimately be the result. This is exemplified
most explicitly by the sign that was nailed to the wall of Colonel Kauzlarich’s office in Iraq that
read, “MISSION: TO CREATE A BALANCED, SECURE, AND SELF-SUFFICIENT ENVIRONMENT FOR THE
IRAQI PEOPLE.”1 This sentiment is repeated several times throughout The Good Soldiers; their
mission or goal is to rid the area of an enemy (namely the insurgents) so that the people of Iraq are
The book Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 is the field manual sent out to all battalion leaders,
including to Col. Kauzlarich, outlining the proper procedures of the war that they were engaged
in, as best is possible.2 This newly updated text outlining the tasks and duties the soldiers were to
perform was sent out due to the fact that their mission had changed in tide with the climate of the
ongoing war. Inside this manual, it advised that the best way to defeat the enemy would be to
focus on the needs of the general population and to ensure their security as opposed to “killing
their way to victory.”3 Further to that extent, it explained that winning over the people and
controlling the population would lead to military victory, and that this new system of war didn’t
always rely on force and weaponry, rather upon control and understanding.4 The tactics to be used
then, were not to be overly physical or forceful when not absolutely necessary, but instead to help
develop a secure environment and a sense of safety for the people. They would kill insurgents
when it was vital that they do so, but the majority of their plan was to provide aid and stability in
Understanding all of this, we can see that the intent of the American soldiers in Iraq was
to provide safety and security to the citizens and not to inflict undue harm. The third rule in the
doctrine of double effect for Michael Walzer is that “the intention of the actor is good, that is, he
aims only at the acceptable effect, the evil effect is not one of his ends.”5 Looking at the role of
the members of the United States Army in this way, we cans see that they, as a group, have acted
as proper moral agents in that they pursued the good ends of a safer, more stable Iraq and have not
intended on killing any innocent people. Looking solely at their intentions, they could be seen as a
peacekeeping force as opposed to a traditional army regime. This could be true, however the third
rule of the doctrine of double effect extends further than just the intentions of a moral agent. It
goes on to say, “nor is [evil] a means to his ends”6 meaning that the actions he or she takes to
achieve the desired good ends may not in themselves be inherently bad. War itself is often
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considered at the very least not good, if not morally bad. While killing enemy soldiers is generally
civilians. This additional information changes how we must view the American Armed Forces in
Iraq. Rather than being simple keepers of peace, they are actively involved in removing,
sometimes with deadly force, an enemy from the territory they are situated in. This necessarily
involves an increased risk amongst innocent civilians as well, based solely on their nearness to
conflict.7 We must then continue to view the American Armed Forces as a unit of soldiers
Whether or not it is morally permissible to kill them is questionable based on many factors
as well as different interpretations of those factors. If the intention of the Iraqi insurgents is
merely to remove Americans from their homeland through the use of terrorist activities, then their
acts are necessarily evil as their intention is bad and the end result is not unequivocally good for
all people of Iraq, and thus it is impermissible. If the main desire is to preserve their cultural
norms from the invasion of a Western-style culture and civilization, then they are more likely to
be considered to be morally right, however the means to their ends is still questionable in terms of
moral propriety. Leaving out the intentions of the insurgents of Iraq, we can look only at the role
of Americans within Iraq to determine whether or not the Iraqi forces are morally sanctioned to
shoot at or kill them. Considering that the American Army is in fact a military presence carrying
out a military operation, it can be seen as permissible to shoot at and/or kill them. Since they are
obeying the conventions of wartime procedure in that they have identified themselves as militants
engaged in fighting, there must be an opposition force that they are engaged in fighting against. In
a traditional combatant versus combatant style war, it would be morally permissible for some
group of organized soldiers to engage in munitions warfare against them which would have the
inevitable result of killing some soldiers. The tactics the Iraqi insurgents have employed in their
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version of war however, are not morally permissible, though that topic will be explored in greater
According to the Geneva Convention, a code of humanitarian law, only those who are
identified as a combatant or as a medic may involve themselves in any way with the war effort
and all others are to be recognized as innocent. Medical officials are to be left unharmed and
allowed to carry out their duties so long as they are identified either by a red cross, red crescent,
or the recently introduced red crystal all upon a white background; the international symbols for
medical attendants.8 Soldiers then must also identify themselves as combatants by way of a
uniform that is distinguishable from the typical dress of civilians of the area and labeled via a
clear and discernible emblem. This is to ensure that only those involved in military combat are
targeted in ammunition warfare while civilians are allowed to carry on with their lives without
fear of unwarranted attack. In Iraq it has become especially difficult to see any type of distinction
between resident and combatant due primarily to the fact that Iraqi soldiers are not unified into a
common grouping, and thus do not bear a distinguishable uniform by which they may be
identified.
The lack of opposition uniform is not an entirely new phenomenon in the realm of
warfare, nor is it a new enemy to the American military. Larry May describes events that took
place in the Vietnam War between American soldiers and the citizens of Vietnam or, more
specifically, of My Lai.
threat… [S]ince the soldiers often do not know which civilians are
This is strikingly similar to the situation that the American Armed Forces face in Iraq where the
civilian and the combat soldier are virtually indistinguishable from one another. According to
May, this radically transforms the thinking of a combatant soldier, especially when on enemy
territory. The general conception one has of strangers is to presume they are ingenuous unless
they give some indication (whether by way of dress or of action) that they are not to be trusted. In
situations such as Iraq or Vietnam as May suggests, “the burden of proof is on the stranger to
demonstrate trustworthiness, otherwise distrust will be the ‘norm’.”10 That is to say that the
mental state of American soldiers in Iraq is one of suspicion and trepidation, which is abnormal
for everyday circumstances. Since the Iraqis lack a uniform, they are able to hide in plain sight
and thus gain a twofold unfair advantage over the Americans who have clearly identified
themselves. The first advantage is unmistakably that if they are unidentifiable to the Americans,
then they are unlikely to be shot at and killed. The second advantage is of no less significance as it
takes a toll on the mentality of the members of the US Army. Since they are unable to determine
who is the enemy, they are under constant fear of attack and their mental stability will be shaken,
leaving many paranoid, insecure, and anxious. If they cannot plausibly pinpoint their opposition,
The insurgent army of Iraq, in their use of the tactic of hiding in plain sight, is already
carrying out a terrorist action against the members United States Army. Terrorism has many
variant definitions but for the sake of this paper I shall take it to mean any action that is carried
out with the intention of inflicting fear, worry, and uncertainty into the “other” as well as to
demoralize them. Terrorism itself is not an immoral act as it plays a role in every war; it is a
necessary and effective tool used to strike fear and unease into the enemy other. This “other” is a
defined group of individuals who share a specific and unambiguous set of beliefs or
characteristics. For the Iraqi insurgents, the “other” is the United States Army and vice versa.
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Terrorism is a fundamental part of war. To strike fear into the “other” is at the very foundation of
terrorism and indeed of war. To deny that the infliction of fear is necessary, or to deny that the
objective is to terrorize, is to misunderstand the concept of terrorism. It is used to cause fear and
demoralization of the opposition – to make them reconsider their objective and their actions.
Walzer himself claims terrorism is acts against a specified grouping – the “other” – in order to
create a sense of fear in their everyday life and to force precaution and insecurity onto them.11
The Iraqi insurgents repeatedly employ deliberate terrorist activities against the American
Armed Forces as their main tactical approach to war. The most blatant example of this is their use
of Improvised Explosive Devices or more simply, roadside bombs. These bombs are detonated at
random as convoys pass by. They are not targeted at specific individuals, nor are they always
targeted at the front of a convoy; a soldier in the last vehicle is just as vulnerable as a soldier in
the first one. The attack that killed PFC Jay Cajimat was on the third vehicle in a convoy on six 12
and the attack that killed PFC James Harrleson was on the second vehicle in the line.13 This
uncertainty of when and where an attack could occur and the fear that any vehicle could be hit
served not only as a way to physically destroy the enemy, but to mentally ravage them as well. As
Walzer puts it, “[i]t is virtually impossible to protect people against random and indiscriminate
attack.”14 Fear, more so than death, is the main objective of these attacks. An example of Iraqi
insurgents’ disregard for moral customs is their betrayal of religious sanctuary. Places of religious
worship are generally considered safe places where one can connect with their God(s) in times of
need and struggle, even during instances of war. Islamic tradition is deeply spiritual and requires
prayer five times per day and has a holy day where most believers go to a mosque to pray
amongst members of their congregation. Instead of finding a sacred haven, members of the 2-16
Rangers, or more formally, the Second Battalion, Sixteenth Infantry Regiment of the Fourth
Infantry Brigade Combat team, First Infantry Division discovered on at least one occasion that
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insurgents began storing weapons and ammunition within a mosque.15 While American soldiers
were able to carry out random raids on homes and businesses, they were unable to set foot into a
mosque except with special permissions or on rare instances of pursuit on the grounds that they
are religious territories where there are certain customs that are to be followed within them.
Members of the US Army obeyed this protocol because morally they were obligated not to
infringe upon religious customs, however Iraqi citizens and imams, who are supposed to be moral
and spiritual leaders, disobeyed the sanctity of the mosques and of religious grounds to further
warfare may be seen as a cunning approach to ensure their victory, but it is in fact morally
impermissible. When engaging in warfare, there are certain conventions that have been put into
place that should not be broken based purely on moral grounds. While war itself is an act that very
few desire to be a part of, it is sometimes necessary that two nations, as with people, disagree.
Both sides often will have such strong beliefs regarding their position that they will fight to the
death in order to preserve their ideals. In doing so, they are morally required to abide by a certain
set of conventions so as to minimize the death toll and the overall negative effects that war has
both on combatants and civilians. The Iraqi insurgents have failed to follow these standardized
customs and their actions can only be seen as morally wrong. The use of car bombs by insurgents
for example, most often not only injures but targets innocent civilians. This tactic can never be
looked at as morally proper because it involves the killing of individuals not associated with the
war effort.
The United States Army itself had employed tactics of terrorism, albeit less explicitly
violent ones. One such example is Operation Ranger Dominance, where every member of the 2-
16 Rangers geared up and walked through the sixteen square mile area they had been allocated to
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patrol days after arriving. The point of this walk was to “see and be seen.”16 In essence, the
purpose was to let Iraqi citizens know they were there and they were unafraid and to strike fear
into the Iraqi insurgents. Another such instance of this intention to terrorize occurred July 12th,
2007, when the 2-16 swarmed an area that had been particularly violent around that time with
“240 soldiers, 65 Humvees, several Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and … two AH-64 Apache
Helicopter gunships.”17 The point was again to intimidate the enemy with their size and firepower
and to show that they had not been unsettled by the recent rise in insurgent activity. While these
terrorist acts were not directly harmful physically, they were used as tools to inflict unease and
fear into their enemy, namely the insurgents. The intent was not to cause physical trauma, but
rather to terrorize. The point is to undermine the enemy’s power and to discourage them from
further attacks.
Going back to May’s idea that the way of thinking for a combatant soldier is radically
changed during times of war, especially when on enemy territory, he wonders if it is permissible
to hold people, namely soldiers, up to the moral standards for normal people given that the
conditions and thought processes of wartime are abnormal.18 In war, the perception of what is and
is not morally allowable can be shifted. War and regular, everyday life are not the same, and thus
cannot be held to the same standards of moral accountability. The circumstances are so entirely
shifted that regular thinking does not apply; there is no room for normal perception in such
abnormal times. Such is true of the day where an innocent photojournalist and his assistant were
killed.
Photojournalists, like medics, are often granted access to war zones if they are clearly
identified and if they are there only to document the situation rather than to involve themselves
within it. They are considered innocent and thus we would see it as immoral for anyone engaged
in combat to knowingly shoot at or kill them in normal circumstances. The risk of them being
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killed accidentally rises exponentially with their proximity to armed combat, and they knowingly
take that risk. The day when Namir Noor-Eldeen and Saeed Chmagh were killed was a day filled
with escalated violence, which is what drew them to the area. Their presence in the area was
unknown to the American military, the soldiers in the area or those flying in the Apache
All morning long, this part of Al-Amin had been the most hostile . . . east
Al-Amin had been filled with gunfire and some explosions. There
In an environment where violence had reached such chaotic levels, paranoia and presumption may
take hold of even the most experienced soldier. From the height of the Apache helicopter, a man
carrying a camera equipped with a long telephoto lens might look strikingly similar to a man
carrying a gun. This is especially true considering the fact that the photojournalist and his assistant
were surrounded by men carrying very real and very dangerous weapons such as AK-47’s and
rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Under the strain of a day filled with increased hostilities,
Namir and Saeed could easily be mistaken for combatants, especially considering the Iraqi
insurgents do not have any type identifying attire. While the gunner of the Apache helicopter may
have been hasty in his decision to begin firing at Namir and Saeed after they began to run away,
he would have expected anyone, innocent or guilty, to run away from heavy machine gun fire.
This is a classic example of the mentality of war taking charge; running away implying guilt, not
fear. Left without the opportunity to investigate further or to consider that the men running were
not insurgents and were not in fact going to turn around and shoot at them, the soldiers made their
decision and acted. To say that their acts were immoral would be to misunderstand the entire
situation. Looking at the larger picture of the mentality of war, the escalation in violence of that
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day, the training of soldiers, and the general mental conceptions of them, one can clearly see their
Michael Walzer may have said it best when he wrote that the laws of war “leave the
cruelest decisions to be made by men on the spot with reference only to their ordinary moral
notions or the military traditions of the army in which they serve.”21 The abnormal status of war
requires soldiers to use their best personal judgment in instances of conflict in combination with
their military training. The Americans acted with the sole intention of killing enemy combatants,
but in the blur of war, innocent people were caught in the crossfire and killed. On June 9th, 2007,
we can see another example of American soldiers relying on their training and instincts to make
split-second moral judgments in instances of conflict. On this day, a convoy of forty-two soldiers of
the 2-16’s Alpha Company went out with eight vehicles into the night with the help of an informant
nicknamed “Batman” to identify two Jaish al Mahdi leaders.22 The night turned frenzied when they
made a stop along Route Tomatoes and “all hell broke loose.”23 The circumstances turned hostile
and the American soldiers had no choice but to react to the situation at hand. What seemed to be a
routine stop became a frenzied firefight that no one could have foreseen. A night where the plan
was to capture two Iraqis turned into a deadly night of self-defense that resulted in the death of
thirty-five Iraqis.24 Their intentions were only to apprehend two known militant leaders in order to
loosen the grip of fear that had taken over the area. Instead their hand was forced by the outbreak of
gunfire directed at them. The actions of the soldiers that night can also be seen as morally
permissible for if they were not shot at, they would not have begun shooting.
As has been shown, there have been many instances where American soldiers acted
morally during fast paced moments of war and their instincts kicked in, but those are not the only
instances of Americans acting morally. The riskiest illustration of their morality was when Brent
Cummings said to Izzy, Colonel Kauzlarich’s interpreter, “bring your daughter here”25 after she
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had been injured by a car bomb. Cummings knew that this girl likely was not entitled to American
military medical assistance but he could not knowingly let a young girl die, so he told Izzy to
bring his daughter to the aid station on the US Army Base. Rules were rules, so Izzy had to get his
family to the FOB, but Cummings had alerted medical staff to be ready to receive a female victim
for when they arrived. As soon as they did, soldiers ran out and “[t]hey lifted her up. … They
carried her through the gate without stopping. They ran with her into the aid station . . . [and soon
she] was surrounded by American doctors and medics.”26 Rules and regulations were forgotten
and all that mattered was saving the life of an innocent eight-year-old girl.27 This is an occasion
where moral duty trumps wartime procedure, where saving the life of a child became more
important than anything else. Despite the fact that Izzy’s daughter was not entitled to care,
morally they could not turn her away. Another less dramatic example of American morality was
when a soldier of the 2-16 stopped by Izzy’s room on the FOB. Upon seeing that someone had
written that no person of Iraqi descent was worth spilling the blood of any American he
apologetically said that that was not right, took a wet cloth and rubbed away at the words trying to
remove them as best as was possible.28 While this may have been a simple gesture, the soldier was
guided by a moral conscience. He believed that statement was wrong, especially in a place where
Izzy, and Iraqi citizen, would have to see them. Erasing those words was not a grand act, but it
Morality during times of war can sometimes seem like an oxymoron since killing others is
not often considered to be a morally permissible action. This may be true of normal situations, but
war is a wholly abnormal set of circumstances and the way in which one is permitted to act
follows a different set of moral conventions. That is not to say that there are no laws to be upheld
or that war erases all moral culpability from agents, but rather that the customs are altered to fit
the situations. Terrorism is a part of war, as is death, but agents are not given a free pass to use
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these tactics. The United States Armed Forces has acted morally right in that they abided by the
moral rules citizens of the world have laid out for times of war, but the Iraqi insurgents have not
done so. While it is permissible to engage in warfare with the Americans, there are ways in which
this can be appropriately carried out. War is an undesirable state of affairs and in order to limit the
negative effects that it has both on civilians and soldiers there must be limits on what is and what
is not allowable. Things that are permissible in times of war may differ from what is permissible
during times of peace, but they all stem from proper moral conceptions of right and wrong while
taking into account the mental state of an acting agent. Sometimes moral duty takes precedence
over conventions of war. In war, as in peace, it is most important that moral duty be upheld.
1
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 268.
2
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 25-7.
3
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 27.
4
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 27.
5
Michael Walzer, “Double Effect and Double Intention,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 194.
6
Michael Walzer, “Double Effect and Double Intention,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 194.
7
Michael Walzer, “Double Effect and Double Intention,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 193.
8
International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
Additional Protocols” ICRC
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions/index.jsp
9
Larry May, “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception,” in The Morality of War,
ed. Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 436-7.
10
Larry May, “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception,” in The Morality of War,
ed. Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 435.
11
Michael Walzer, “Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 297.
12
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 21.
13
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 112.
14
Michael Walzer, “Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 302.
15
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 95.
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16
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 17-8.
17
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 92.
18
Larry May, “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception,” in The Morality of War,
ed. Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 434.
19
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 96-7.
20
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 97.
21
Michael Walzer, “Double Effect and Double Intention,” in The Morality of War, ed.
Larry May et al. (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2006), 193.
22
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 70-1.
23
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 71.
24
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 72.
25
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 154.
26
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 156.
27
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 153-7
28
David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009), 161-2.
Bibliography
Finkel, David. The Good Soldiers. Douglas & McIntyre: Vancouver, 2009.
International Committee of the Red Cross. “The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
Additional Protocols.” ICRC.
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions/index.jsp (accessed November 4, 2010)
May, Larry. “Superior Orders, Duress, and Moral Perception.” In The Morality of War,
edited by Larry May, Eric Rovie and Steve Viner, 430- 439. New Jersey: Pearson
Education, 2006.
Walzer, Michael. “Double Effect and Double Intention.” In The Morality of War, edited by
Larry May, Eric Rovie and Steve Viner, 193 – 199. New Jersey: Pearson Education,
2006.