Chapter 5 | Admin Law Cases | Dean Roy 2D 2012

CHAPTER 5

DEFINITION OF QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

1. LUPANGCO v CA and PRC

FACTS
In 1986, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105, which prohibited the examinees in
accountancy from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips or the like 3 days before the date of the exam.

As reviewees preparing to take the licensure exam in accountancy that year, Lupangco et al filed with the RTC of Manila a
complaint for injunction against the PRC and for the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said Resolution.

PRC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review and entertain the case, since both
entities are co-equal bodies. To further strengthen its contention, it cited BP 129, Sec. 9 (3), which states that the CA has the
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions... of the RTC and quasi-judicial agencies...."

ISSUE
W/N the RTC and the PRC are co-equal bodies, with the latter having quasi-judicial power

HELD
NO. In order to invoke Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, there has to be a final order or ruling, which resulted from proceedings wherein
the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions.

Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion etc of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. It is a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order, which applies to a specific situation. This does NOT cover rules and regulations of general applicability
issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105, which
was adopted by the PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure exams.

As to the constitutionality of the Resolution, the Court held that although it was adopted for a commendable purpose--to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure exams, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being unreasonable in that the
examinee cannot even attend any review class or receive any handout etc. It is even more unreasonable that one who is
caught violating this prohibition is barred from taking future examinations conducted by the PRC.

Furthermore, the Resolution infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has NO
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure exams. They cannot be
restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants.
The Resolution also violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of
review that these schools believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming a full
fledged public accountant.

It is an axiom in administrative law that admin authorities should NOT act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules
and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view.

2. C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. v HIBIONADA, DIONGON & PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORP.

FACTS
As agent of Pleasantville Development Corp (Pleasantville), C.T. Torres Enterprises (Torres) sold a subdivision lot to
Diongon. Having completed the payments on installment, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the
subject land. However, neither Pleasantville nor Torres complied. This prompted Diongon to file a complaint for specific
performance with the RTC of Negros Occidental.

Torres filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case, as it was the HLURB,
which was the competent body to hear and decide the case.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the premise that pursuant to BP 129, a complaint for specific performance with
damages is a justiciable issue under the New Civil Code and jurisdiction to hear such issue is vested in the regular courts.

ISSUE
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case

HELD
NO. The RTC failed to consider the express provisions of PD 1344 and related decrees and erred in supposing that only the

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regular courts can interpret and apply the provisions of the Civil Code, to the exclusion of the quasi-judicial bodies.

• PD 957 (Subdivision and Condo Buyers' Protective Decree) provides that the NHA shall have the exclusive authority
to regulate the real estate trade and business.

• PD 1344 empowered the NHA to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under PD 957 and
specified its quasi-judicial jurisdiction over cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condo units, among others.

• EO 648 transferred the regulatory functions conferred on the NHA (under PDs 957 and 1344) to the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), which was renamed Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) by EO 90.

Under PD 1344, it is clear that the complaint for specific performance for damages filed by Diongon with the RTC comes
under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. Diongon was a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking specific performance of the seller's
obligation to deliver to him the corresponding certificate of title.

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the Civil Code is out of step with the fast
changing times. There are hundreds of admin bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the
legislature. This quasi-judicial function is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of
regulating certain activities falling under their expertise.

A statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an admin agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the
agency's special expertise. The very definition of an admin agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The
ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to admin agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of
the admin agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly
be handled by the regular courts.

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER DISTINGUISHED FROM JUDICIAL POWER

1. CARIŇO v CHR

FACTS
In 1990 some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting
from alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon their grievances. These mass actions consisted in staying away from
their classes and converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies and the like.

The Sec of Education issued an order directing the teachers to go back to work however this remained unheeded and this
resulted in preventive dismissal and suspension of some of the public school teachers. The teachers also filed a complaint
before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for alleged violation of their right to due process.

The CHR subpoenaed Cariňo requiring his attendance for the alleged violation and in response he filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE
Whether the CHR has jurisdiction over the case

HELD
NO. The CHR cannot be likened to a court of justice having neither adjudicatory powers nor quasi-judicial powers. According
to Article 13 Section 17 of the Philippine constitution, the enumeration of the powers of CHR state that it only has
investigatory powers: “ to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights.” This means that the most that could be conceded to CHR is that it may investigate i.e. it may
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.

Fact finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function and the CHR cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice or even as quasi-judicial bodies do.

The matters are within the original jurisdiction of the Sec of Educ. Being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted
to him under the Civil Service Law, and also within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

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CONFERMENT OF QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS

1. MAGPALE v CSC

FACTS
Petitioner Benigno Magpale Jr. started his career in government as an employee in the Presidential Assistance on
community development in 1960. 15 years later, he transferred to the PPA (Philippine Ports Authority as Arrastre. He was
promoted to the position of Port Manager, and later on reassigned to PPA-PMU in Tacloban City wherein he was discharged
as port manager as well.

According to a Report by the PPA-PMU Inventory committee and the COA, petitioner failed to account for equipment of PPA,
and to liquidate cash advances. He was also found to have incurred unauthorized absences. As such, he was preventively
dismissed and a complaint was filed against him in the DOTC (Department of Transportation and Communication). The
DOTC rendered a decision through its Administrative Action Board finding petitioner guilty of gross negligence on 2 counts
for failing to render 44 assorted units of equipment among them a Sony Betamax and a Tv camera and for failing to render
required liquidation of his cash advances. He was also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences and was meted
the penalty of dismissal from service with accessory penalties.

He then appealed to the MSPB (Merit System and Protection Board) of the CSC which ruled in favour of the petitioner. It
ruled that the petitioner should be reinstated since there is no law requiring him to account for the liquidate the cash
advances and the equipment of PPA.

The General Manager of PPA, Dayan, appealed to the CSC and this is the central issue in relation to Administrative Law

ISSUE
W/Nthe decision of the MSPB is subject to an appeal to the CSC.

HELD
NO. After the case of Mendez vs CSC, the jurisdiction of MSPB is now a settled matter. “The right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the matter prescribed by law.”

A reading of the Phil Service Law (PD 807) does not contemplate review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges. It goes on to state that “appeals where allowable shall be made by the party adversely affected by
the decision.” The phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action. Therefore, the remedy is only available when the
respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, there is
no occasion for an appeal.

In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness for the government. No private interest is involved as the
offense is committed against the government.

Lastly, a tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by
law to hear and decide the case.

2. ANTIPOLO REALTY v NHA

FACTS
Jose Fernando executed a Contract to Sell with petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation over a lot at Ponderosa Heights
Subdivision in Antipolo Rizal. He transferred his rights over the lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. Thereafter, Yuson
assumed the obligations of the vendee under the original contract, including payment of Fernando’s installments in arrears.
However, due to the failure of ARC to develop the subdivision project as stipulated under Clause 17 of the contract, Yuson
paid only the arrears for the month of August 1972 and stopped paying thereafter.

Despite the notice sent by ARC and its citing of an NHA decision both claiming that it had complied with its obligation to
complete the improvements, Yuson refused to pay the Sept 1972-Oct 1976 monthly installments, but agreed as to the post
Oct 1976 installments. ARC reacted by rescinding the contract, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments made
by Yuson.

Aggrieved, Yuson brought the matter to the NHA. The latter ordered the reinstatement of the contract. Motion for
reconsideration was denied. On certiorari before the SC, petitioner cries lack of jurisdiction on the part of NHA and likewise,
notice as to the schedule of the hearing. A minute resolution was issued, affirming NHA, but without prejudice to pursuing an
administrative remedy. ARC then appealed the case to the Office of the Presiden. Again, the contract was upheld. Back to
the SC, ARC now claims that the NHA had not only acted on matter outside its competence/jurisdiction, but had also, in
effect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which it wasn’t authorized to perform.

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ISSUE
W/N the NHA has quasi-judicial functions.

HELD
YES, it has. As a matter of fact, Sec3 of PD No. 957, or “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Decree” vests the NHA
nd rd
with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate real estate trade and business. In its 2 and 3 preambular paragraphs, the statute
discussed the need and scope for NHA’s regulatory authority, that is, the rise of cases where subdivision
owners/developers/sellers renege on their obligations to lot buyers, and other fraudulent means employed by the former to
the detriment of the latter. Most importantly, PD No. 1344 provides that the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature: (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesma,
and (c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots
or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

NHA’s ruling which reinstated the contract is justified under the provisions of Sec 23 of PD No. 957, which provides that no
installment payment shall be forfeited in favor of the owner/developer WHEN the buyer desists from paying DUE TO the
failure of owner/developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the
time limit for complying with the same.

Having failed its obligation to complete certain specified improvements within the period of 2 years, petitioner is NOT entitiled
to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the contract (rescind and treat payments as forfeited in its favor). Instead, in the
light of ARC’s breach with Yuson, it is the latter who has the option either to rescind and receive reimbursement OR to
suspend payment until petitioner has complied. Thus, NHA was correct in its ruling.

3. MILLER v MARDO

FACTS
This case involves one identical question of law, namely, the validity of the Reorganization Plan, prepared and submitted by
the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission presumably under the authority of Republic Act 997, insofar as it
confers exclusive and original jurisdiction to a regional office to decide the claims of laborers for wages, backwages,
underpayment of wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.

HELD
It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered (2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which
may not be necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities,
and functions.

But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the National Government, which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution expressly provides that
"the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. Thus,
judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards
or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of
administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt,
as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection
with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.

CLASSIFICATION OF ADJUDICATING POWERS

1. SALAZAR v ACHACOSO

FACTS
A complaint was lodged with the POEA for alleged illegal recruitment activities of petitioner. In connection with this,
Administrator Achacoso issued a closure and seizure order against petitioner.

HELD
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of
arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.

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2. RCPI v NTC

FACTS
The wife of private respondent sent two rush telegrams to his sister and brother-in-law through petitioner’s facilities but such
didn't reach the supposed to be recipients. This prompted the private respondent to file a complaint with the NTC against
RCPI for poor service. Accordingly, NTC ordered RCPI to answer the complaint and set the case for hearing.

HELD
E. O. 546, it will be observed, is couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of
Communications which exercised powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. The power to impose fines should therefore be
read in the light of the Francisco Santiago case because subsequent legislation did not grant additional powers to the Board
of Communications. The Board in other words, did not possess the power to impose administrative fines on public services
rendering deficient service to customers, ergo its successor cannot arrogate unto itself such power, in the absence of
legislation. It is true that the decision in RCPI vs. Board of Communications seems to have modified the Santiago ruling in
that the later case held that the Board of Communications can impose fines if the public service entity violates or fails to
comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the Commission.

But can private respondent's complaint be similarly treated when the complaint seeks redress of a grievance against the
company? NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No.
546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of
power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render
adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the
agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such
jurisdiction is void and ineffective.

3. BOISER v CA

FACTS
Petitioner owned Premiere Automatic Telephone Network, a company involved in operating a telephone system in Bohol.
Sometime in 1965, petitioner and private respondent PLDT entered into an “Interconnecting Agreement” whereby PLDT will
provide Premiere with the facilities, based in Cebu, to enable it to make and receive long distance calls. Premiere is then
obligated to maintain and preserve said facilities.

However, in 1979, without prior notice to petitioner, PLDT issued an order authorizing its employees to terminate the
connection of the facilities to petitioner’s company. Petitioner then prayed for injunction and damages. CFI of Cebu granted
the TRO against PLDT, and ordered it to preserve the status quo of said agreement. Respondent filed a motion to lift the
TRO with the CFI. A hearing on the merits ensued. However, before the judge was able to render a decision, PLDT elevated
the case to the CA by filing a petition for certiorari on the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction to issue the TRO, as the
subject matter of the complaint was well within the jurisdiction of the NTC.

PLDT asserted that what was questioned by petitioner was a “Circuit Authorization Order”, which relates to a purely technical
matter and was within the ambit of the technical operations of a public utility company, and thus, falls within the jurisdiction of
the NTC.

ISSUE
W/N the NTC has prior jurisdiction, and not the CFI?

HELD
NO. The Interconnecting Agreement provided for a 30 day written notice before the other company may terminate the
contract. It was proven that Premiere defaulted on its payment for a certain period. However, the non-payment by Premiere
still required a 30-day notice before the ties can be severed. PLDT did not comply with said period. Thus, even granting that
petitioner defaulted on the payment, the 30-day notice should have still been followed. Whether or not this has been
complied with calls for a presentation of evidence before the proper tribunal, which was the CFI.

The NTC Commissioner is not given the power to adjudicate cases involving a breach of contract. In cases involving the
award of damages, the CFI has to take cognizance.

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4. DEIPARINE v CA

FACTS
The spouse Cesario (respondent) & Teresita Carungay entered into an agreement with petitioner Ernesto Deiparine, Jr. for
the construction of a 3 storey dormitory in Cebu City. In the course of the constructon, it was reported to respondent
Carungay that petitioner had been deviating from the plans and specifications, thus impairing the strength and safety of the
bldg. The parties then agreed to conduct cylinder tests to ascertain if the structure thus far built complied with safety
standards. Respondent Carungay suggested core testing instead. The core testing was conducted and the samples taken
failed. If not all then most. In view of this finding, the spouses Carungay filed a complaint with the RTC for the rescission of
the K and the damages. Petitioner moved to dismiss, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over construction K, which
were now cognizable by the Phil. Construction Development Board pursuant to PD No. 1746. The motion was denied. The
TC rendered judgment declaring the construction agreement rescinded. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE
W/N the regular courts had jurisdiction over the case.

HELD
YES, such courts had jurisdiction. Firstly, the administrative body which the petitioner should have invoked was the
Philippine Domestic Construction Board (PDCB). Among its functions under Sec. 6 of PD 1746 are the ff: “ 3. Adjudicate
and settle claims and disputes in the implementation of public construction K…; … 5. Formulate and recommend rules and
procedures for the adjudication and settlement of claims and disputes in the implementation of contracts in private
construction.

The wording of the decree is clear. The adjudicatory powers of the PCB are meant to apply only to public construction
contracts. Its power over private construction K is limited to the formulation and recommendation of rules and procedures for
the adjudication and settlement of disputes involving such (private) K. It therefore has no jurisdiction over cases like the one
at bar which remain cognizable by the regular courts of justice.
The counsel of petitioner was held in contempt of court for deliberately changing the language of the decree above. In par.3,
it changed the word public to the word the. In par. 5, it made the wrong emphasis on words to the effect that it stated:
…ADJUDICATION & SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS & DISPUTES in the implementation of K in PRIVATE CONSTRUCTIONS.

SOURCES OF JURISDICTION
ESTOPPEL
1. TIJAM v SIBONGHANOY

FACTS
Almost one month after the effectivity of Republic Act 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 88 of which placed
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount
of demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and cost. The Spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
commenced a case against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00
with legal interest plus costs. After trial upon the issues, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, issued a
writ of execution against the defendants.

The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety’s
bond, against which the Surety filed a written opposition upon two grounds, namely. The Surety prayed the Court not only to
deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also to relieve the company of its liability, under the bond in
question. The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. After the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment,
the plaintiffs, filed a second motion for execution of counter-bond, such motion was eventually granted and the
corresponding writ was issued.

Subsequently, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the following assignment of errors and not of those raises
the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of
Appeals, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from. The Surety filed a Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter
filed a pleading entitled motion to dismiss, alleging that the CFI did not have jurisdiction since the claim did not exceed
P2,000 pursuant to RA 296. The Court of Appeals resolved to set aside its decision and certified the case to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE
W/N surety is estopped by laches to assail the jurisdiction of the CFI.

HELD
It is undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy
was for recovery of sum of P1,908.00 only – an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts. True

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also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the court exclusively by law, and as the lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Supreme Court is of the opinion
that the Surety is now estopped by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything
done in the case with its active participation.

As already stated, the action was commenced almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and unlike the statue of limitations, is not
a mere question of time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction.

EFFECT OF EXPIRATION OF LAW

1. ROXAS v SAYOC

FACTS
Roxas was issued an import control license to import cotton counterpanes. With this, she imported from Japan bales of
cotton counterpanes. However, the license was issued in violation of the Import Control Law. She tried to recover the cotton
counterpanes but the Collector of Customs decided to forfeit said merchandise for being imported in violation of the law.

ISSUE
W/N the Comissioner has jurisdiction despite expiration of the law.

HELD
The decision of the collector was appealed in due time and the case reached the office of the Commissioner of Customs also
in due time while RA 650 was still in force. The commissioner acquired jurisdiction over the case and he was duty bound to
act thereon. Petitioner contends that at the expiration of the law, the commissioner lost his jurisdiction. This is untenable
because it is a settled rule that a court, be it judicial or administrative, that has acquired jurisdiction over a case, retains it
after the expiration of the law governing the case. Herein, once the Commissioner has acquired jurisdiction over the case,
the mere expiration of the law doesn't divest him of his jurisdiction thereon duly acquired while the law was still in force. He
retained jurisdiction and should continue to take cognizance of the case until final determination thereof.

DUE PROCESS
1. RIVERA v CSC

FACTS
Petitioner was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit 1 of the Land Bank of the Philippines when he was charged with
administrative cases. Affidavits by William Lao and Jesus Perez, he allegedly committed dishonesty, receiving personal gifts,
fee and valuable things in the course of official duties, pursuit of private business without permission by the Civil Service
Rules, and misconduct. He was placed under preventive suspension when the case was filed. He was later found guilty by
LBP after formal investigation was done, and forced resignation without separation benefits was the penalty imposed on him.
On appeal to the Merits System Protection Board, the penalty was reduced to one year suspension. Both appealed to the
CSC, which reinstated the LBP penalty. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. On appeal to the SC,
petitioner averred that CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated
findings. SC ruled in favor of CSC. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, now saying he was denied due process when
Thelma Gaminde, who participated in his case as Board Chairman of MPSB, also took part in the CSC ruling as
commissioner.

ISSUE
W/N Rivera was denied due process

HELD
He was denied due process, since a reviewing officer must not have participated in the case he/she is reviewing. In this
case, Gaminde should have inhibited herself from participation in Rivera’s appeal to give a full meaning and consequence to
a fundamental aspect of due process.

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2. PNOC v NLRC

FACTS
Private respondent Danilo Mercado was an employee of Philippine National Oil Company – Energy Development
Corporation when he was dismissed on the grounds of dishonesty due to use of funds for personal use, as well as not
reporting discounts to the company. It was also added that he had absence without leave which delayed company work
activities. Mercado file a complaint for illegal dismissal which includes back wages and reinstatement before the NLRC
Regional Arbitration Branch. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that CSC has jurisdiction over the case, the
company being a GOCC. The motion was denied, and the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Mercado. On appeal to the NLRC,
the decision was affirmed.

ISSUE
W/N NLRC has jurisdiction over the case
W/N PNOC-EDC was denied due process

HELD
NLRC has jurisdiction. Under the present constitution, the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law are the manner of its creation, such that government corporations created by
special charter are subject to its provisions to its provisions while those incorporated under the General Corporation Law are
not within its coverage. PNOC-EDC was incorporated under the General Corporation Law, thus NLRC has jurisdiction.

Denial of due process is done when there is an absolute lack of opportunity present one’s side. When PNOC-EDC was able
to show its position when it filed a motion for reconsideration, it cured the irregularity of denial of due process. NLRC being
an agency with expertise on the case, it has the finality of judgment over the case, and only cases of grave abuse of
discretion can be questioned. PNOC-EDC failed to show proof that Mercado really did those dishonest acts.

3. NERA v AUDITOR-GENERAL

FACTS
Paulino Nera was Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines when he retired on Jan 4, 1954. He applied for
retirement benefits, but was not able to collect the longevity of pay under RA 1134. The Auditor General stated that since RA
1134 only took effect on July 1, 1954, it cannot apply to him since law cannot have any retroactive effect. He further argued
different laws affecting his application, but still it was denied. Seventeen months later, he appealed his case with the help of
a counsel. This request was also denied since it was filed outside the reglementary period of appeal. An appeal the Supreme
Court was made arguing that he was denied due process when petitioner did his application without counsel.

ISSUE
W/N lack of counsel is a denial of due process

HELD
NO. The constitution does not state that on every legal matters and procedures, there must be a counsel, except for certain
instances such as custodial investigation. A counsel is not indispensible, since a person may represent himself, even without
the aid of lawyers. In this case, Nera was very knowledgeable of the circumstances of his application. He was able to cite
relevant laws and opinions made by the Secretary of Justice. It cannot be said that he was denied due process since he was
able to represent himself even without the need of a lawyer. Since the case was filed out of time, the Court cannot rule over
the case anymore.

4. DIZON v PSC

FACTS
Respondent, Juanita Rodriguez, requested authority from the Public Service Commission(PSC) to appropriate the right to
operate 5 units of taxicabs under the certificate of public convenience. Initially these units were in the names of Lolita
Ganzon and Consolacion Dizon but because the ten units owned by GAnzon and Dizon were not registered ofr the whole
year of 1970, they were considerd as abandoned. In Rodriguez application, she stated that there was still a public need for
the operation of the 10 units, which were abandoned.

Both Ganzon and Dizon filed a Motion to Dismiss said application basing solely on the argument that since the units were
already registered in their names, the petition should be of necessity be dismissed. However, the motion was denied
because the record showed that due to negligence or lack of evident desire to serve the public, they have defaulted in their
duty to serve (to register and operate the taxis). Only Dizon elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
W/N there was a denial of due process when respondent PSC did not give Dizon the right to be heard after the latter filed its
Motion to Dismiss.

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HELD
NO. Since what due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the
substance rather than the form being paramount, an allegation based solely on the lack of opportunity to be heard does not
per se merit unconditional approval. In Dizon’s petition, she admitted of the non-registration of 4 taxis and in her motion to
dismiss before the respondent Commission, she referred to 5. She cannot also deny that by 1971, the taxi units were not
registered as shown by Rodriguez’s exhibit. Petitioner should have been afforded the right to be heard after her motion to
dismiss was denied, were it not for the crucial fact that petitioner had admitted that there had been for sometime prior to the
filing of the application of respondent Rodriguez, a failure to register five units. There was no dispute then about such a
matter impressed with decisive significance.

Thus, it appears incontrovertible that there is factual basis of abandonment. . It is equally clear that no additional evidence
whatsoever could even be hinted at by petitioner to disprove the fact of abandonment or to remedy such an admitted failure
to comply with an obligation on her part. Under such circumstances, a hearing would be fruitless. It would be characterized
by futility. A case for the denial of due process cannot thereby be made out.

5. DORMITORIO v FERNANDEZ

FACTS
The Municipality of Victorias owned several parcels of land which were consolidated and were made available for sale. In
1948, Serafin Lazalita bought Lot 1 on installment basis for a period of 10 years and made substantial improvements on the
lot. Upon full payment of the lot in 1958, a deed of definite sale was executed in his favor. However, in 1955 the Dormitorio
purchased a lot also from the Municipality of Victorias designated as Lot 2, registered it in the Registry of Deeds but did not
occupy the lot until 1958. In the same year the Dormitorio spouses brought an ejectment proceedings against Lazalita. It
appeared that there was an overlapping of boundaries between the two lots bought by them. The Municipality of Victorias
had the land resurveyed and found out that Lazalita’s lot was actually Lot 2 which were bought by Dormitorio.

Thus, the CFI of Negros rendered a judgment in favor of Dormitorio ordering Lazalita to vacate (Civil Case 5111). Later on a
Compromise Agreement was entered by the parties wherein Lazalita would be reimbursed for his expenses in transferring
his house to another Lot to be assigned to him by the Municipality of Victorias, and that the Decision in Civil Case No. 5111
shall not be enforced and executed anymore and that the parties moved that the case be rendered based on the Agreed
Stipulation of Facts. Based on this Agreement, Civil Case 6533 was rendered which breathed life to the Agreement.
However, due to some fraud, Dormitorio sought the court before Judge Fernandez for a writ of execution of Civil case 5111
by making the court believe that the decision on civ case 5111 is still enforceable. Then, a petition was made by Laalita to
invalidate the writ of execution by virtue of the Compromise Agreement signed by the parties which was granted by the
respondent Judge.

ISSUE
1. W/N there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge. (sub-issue)
2. W/N petitioner was denied due process when they were not informed by the respondent judge of the petition to set
aside writ of execution.

HELD
NO, the agreement filed by the parties in the ejectment case created as between them new rights and obligations which
naturally superseded the judgment of the municipal court."8 In Santos v. Acuña,9 it was contended that a lower court
decision was novated by subsequent agreement of the parties. Implicit in this Court's ruling is that such a plea would merit
approval if indeed that was what the parties intended(animus novandi). Also it cannot be denied that as the later decision in
Civil Case No. 6553 was the result of a compromise, it had the effect of res judicata. This was made clear in Salazar v.
Jarabe.14 There are later decisions to the same effect." The parties were, therefore, bound by it. There was thus an element
of bad faith when petitioners did try to evade its terms. At first, they were quite successful. Respondent Judge, however,
upon being duly informed, set matters right. He set aside the writ of execution. That was to act in accordance with law.

There is no merit likewise to the point raised by petitioners that they were not informed by respondent Judge of the petition
by private respondent to set aside the writ of execution. The order granting such petition was the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. Under the circumstances, the failure to give notice to
petitioners had been cured. That is a well-settled doctrine. Their complaint was that they were not heard. They were given
the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration. So they did. That was to free the order from the alleged infirmity.
Petitioners then cannot be heard to claim that they were denied procedural due process.

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6. SAVORY v LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA

FACTS
1
Petitioner filed a case against respondent union for violation of the no-strike clause , employing illegal means to strike and
2
staging such strike to obtain recognition . Petitioner had Atty. Emiliano Morabe as witness for the hearing. Respondent was
3
not able to cross-examine said witness for five times . Respondents asked the court to have Morabe’s testimony striken out
when he suffered a heart attack which resulted to his demise alleging that it is a violation of due process. Also, despite the
ability to cross-examine another witness (Bienvenida Ting), respondents requested that Ting be recalled for cross-examining
again.

ISSUES
W/N respondent’s act of not cross-examining Morabe and not being able to recall Ting violates due process.

HELD
NO. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in
nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of
2
due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. The common basic principle on implied waiver is that the party was given the
opportunity but failed to cross-exanine for reasons attributable to himself alone. Here, Morabe was ready, willing and
insistent to be cross-examined but was not cross-examined because of the lack of preparation of respondent.

The applicability of the rule is especially justified in proceedings before tribunals with quasi-judicial powers such as the Court
of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103, which created the Court of Industrial Relations,
respondent court is authorized to disengage itself from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts of justice;
5
it is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure but is enjoined to act according to justice and equity.

Regarding Ting, the motion to recall the witness is intended merely to delay the proceedings and to harass and
inconvenience the witness sought to he recalled. More so, when the motion to recall failed to mention the matters sought to
be established in the additional cross-examination.

DUE PROCESS IN QUASI-CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

1. ASPREC v ITCHON

FACTS
4
Jacinto Hernandez paid Cleto Asprec to survey the area, submit to him a plan and procure an issuance of certificate of title
in Hernandez’s name. These were not done. The plan Asprec sent was only a copy of a plan and one that is for a certain
Damian Alhambra. Hernandez then filed a complaint to the Board of Examiners for Surveyors. The Board resolved by
revoking his license to survey. Thus this petition alleging violation of due process in the board’s process of arriving at such
decision.

ISSUES
W/N there was a violation of due process in quasi-criminal proceedings.
5
HELD:
NO. The following instances showed that he had ample opportunity to be heard:

(a) Hearing of March 31, 1958: Petitioner raised the legal point that the complaint was not under oath. The Board
directed Hernandez to submit a verified complaint. Hearing was postponed to May 12, 1958.

1
There was a stipulation in the Collective Bargaining Agreement that the union should first exhaust all grievance procedures before striking.
2
In fact there was another union certificed by the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) that is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees.
3
First time was because it was unprepared; the second time because it was absent; the third time was because it did not have a copy of the testimony and
the fifth was not explicitly mentioned.
4
Private Land Surveyor
5
A review of the record fails to elicit any representation on the part of petitioner that if the Board's decision and the decision of the Court
below be reversed, a different result may be obtained. He does not advance any fact or circumstance which would constitute a substantial
defense. He does not even offer a new matter which would tilt the scales of justice in his favor. The net result is that if error of procedure
there was, as he claims, such error is reduced to the level of non-prejudicial.

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(b) Hearing of May 12, 1958: Upon the averment that the verified complaint sets forth "new facts", petitioner asked
for a 10-day period to answer. On June 6, instead of an answer, petitioner's counsel filed a motion to dismiss.

(c) Hearing of August 18, 1958. Petitioner prayed that hearing be held in abeyance until the board shall have
resolved his motion to dismiss. The hearing was reset for March 11, 1959.

(d) Hearing of March 11, 1959: This did not pull through although both parties and their respective attorneys were
present, because Asprec's counsel was not feeling well. They all agreed to transfer the hearing to May 11, 1959.

(e) Hearing of May 11, 1959: Hernandez and counsel appeared. But petitioner and counsel were absent. The Board
was not apprised by petitioner of the cause of his or his counsel's failure to appear.

Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of due process.

Technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings.
We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to perform, the
purposes of which they are organized and the persons who compose them

The rule applies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings.

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND RECEIVE EVIDENCE

1. AMERICAN CYANAMID v DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

FACTS
CYANAMID claims to be the owner of trademark Sulmet. SULMET is the trademark of a veterinary product used, among
other purposes, "for the control of outbreaks of ceal and intestinal coccidiosis in turkeys' and for reducing mortality in
pullorum disease in baby chicks, acute fowl cholera in chickens, turkeys and ducks and anatipistifer disease in ducks."
Through long use in the country, SULMET has become popular and well-known and enjoys widespread reputation brought
about by extensive advertisement and promotion through the media. Notwithstanding the above, Tiu Chian filed an
application for registration of SULMETINE as his trademark on a veterinary product used for the same purposes thereby
making respondent's product confusingly with that of petitioner which is unfair and unjust to the label.

Cyanamid filed with the Bureau of Patents a petition to cancel the Certificate of Registration of Tiu Chan of the latter’s
SULMETINE. The case was actually delegated to a hearing officer who collected and received evidence, but it was the
Director who rendered the decision. The Director of Patents denied the petition of cancellation filed by Cyanamid.

ISSUE
W/N the Director of Patents erred in delegating the authority to hear and receive the evidence in this case to a so-called
hearing officer and therefore he has no jurisdiction to render the decision appealed from because he did not hear the case
nor receive the evidence thereof.

HELD
NO. The Director of Patents may validly delegate the task of hearing and receiving evidence. It is well-settled that
while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of
the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made.

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from
utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts,
on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are
those of the officer authorized by law.

The Court also noted that Cyanamid participated all throughout the proceedings before the hearing officer, yet now asks the
Court to nullify the proceedings. At the least Cyanamid is stopped from doing so.

2. SKYWORLD CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v SEC

FACTS
Two petitions were filed against the petitioner SCOAI, one of them contesting the existence of the petitioner as an entity, and
the other, for a writ of preliminary injunction praying that the petitioner be stopped from exercising the prerogatives of a
condominium corporation. The first petition was filed on August 8, 1986 by CBC before the SEC docketed as SEC No. 3035.
The second was filed on October 9, 1986 before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch V (Civil Case No. 915-R) by the

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respondent Baguio Skyworld Condominium Corporation (BSCC) which was organized at the instance of CBC and registered
with the SEC on September 19, 1986.

A hearing was conducted on September 11, 1989 by the PED with Mr. Norberto Ruiz as the hearing officer. The counsels of
the two parties were present. On December 12, 1989, the PED issued a resolution ordering the revocation of the certificate
of registration of the SCOAI. The resolution was prepared by Mr. Norberto Ruiz after studying the substantial evidence he
received and the arguments of the parties in the memoranda submitted by the parties to him. On the same date, the
resolution was presented by PED Director Elnora Adviento before the Commission en banc which approved the same.

ISSUE
W/N the respondent Commission validly approved the alleged unauthorized resolution or decision made by Mr. Norberto B.
Ruiz on the revocation case.

HELD
The contentions are without merit. Pres. Decree No. 902-A vests on the Commission the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving, among others, disputes between the corporation and the state regarding its legal right to
exist, and the power to hear and decide on the suspension or revocation of a certificate of registration of a corporation.

In the consolidated cases, the Commission empowered the PED to conduct the hearing and to decide on the revocation of a
certificate of registration. The task was assigned to Mr. Ruiz for and in behalf of the Commission. In judging the merits of the
case at the instance of the Commission, Mr. Ruiz acted only as a trier of the facts presented to him and not as a prosecutor
at the same time. The resolution arrived at was adopted by the Commission, en banc as its own decision, upon its approval.

The Court agrees with the analysis of the respondent Commission that the petitioner was barred by estoppel by laches from
repudiating the jurisdiction of the hearing officer to whom it has submitted itself and before whom it presented evidence by
way of memorandum.

ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS WITHOUT NOTICE AND HEARING

1. SUNTAY v PEOPLE

FACTS
In June 1954, Dr. Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla (minor), filed a verified complaint with the Office of the City Attorney of QC
against Emilio Suntay, accusing him of taking Alicia with lewd design and having carnal knowledge of her.

In January 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the DFA. Soon after, he left for the US, where he was
enrolled in a school. Meanwhile, Alicia subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction, filed with the
CFI of QC.

In February 1955, the private prosecutor filed a motion to direct the NBI and the DFA to bring back Suntay to the Philippines
so that he may be dealt with in accordance with the law, which the Court granted. The Secretary of DFA instructed the
Ambassador to the US to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel
him to return to the Philippines. However, this order was not implemented.

Suntay contends that as the order of the Court directing the DFA to take steps to bring back Suntay to the Philippines may
be carried out only through the cancellation of his passport, the said order is illegal because while a Court may review the
action of the Secretary of DFA in canceling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the Court
cannot take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order the cancellation of the passport. He further
contends that while the Secretary of DFA has discretion in canceling the passports, such discretion cannot be exercised until
after hearing because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the
Constitution and thus, he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

ISSUE
W/N the Secretary of DFA may, in its discretion, cancel Suntay's passport without the benefit of notice and hearing

HELD
YES. Under EO 1, Sec. 25, the Secretary of DFA is authorized, in his discretion, to refuse to issue a passport or to withdraw
or cancel a passport already issued. True, the discretion granted to the Secretary may not be exercised at whim. But in this
case, Suntay was hailed in Court to answer a criminal charge for seduction. And as the SolGen puts it, his sudden departure
can be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and he cannot now complain if the strong
arm of law should join together to bring him back. In issuing the order in question, the Secretary was convinced that a
miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be
enjoined from carrying it out.

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Quasi-judicial hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal of the passport was not clear
but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade
prosecution, the Secretary of DFA, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to
have acted whimsically or capriciously. Due process does NOT necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is
exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the
passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of the passport. Lack of
such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in
him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of hearing.

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