Iron and Steel Authority v Court of Appeals

GR 102976; October 25, 1995

Facts:
[Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by P.D. No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and
promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government,
embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proc. No.
2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines withdrawing from sale or settlement a large
tract of public located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate
occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by
a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (“MCFC”), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, was issued directing
the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.]

While an expropriation case filed by ISA, a non-incorporated agency created by PD 272, was
pending, the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a
juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this motion and urged that the RP, being
the real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be substituted for ISA. The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration.

[ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court. At the
same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was premature for the trial court to have
ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering that the parties had not
yet rested their respective cases.]

Issue: Can ISA be substituted by the Republic in the case?

Ruling: Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated
with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as
possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the
Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the RP.

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions
as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the
Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other
disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions,
etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back
into the GRP and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision
having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the
Republic.
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION v CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND VIOLETA GARCIA

Campos, JR.

> EO 649 reorganized the LRC—a valid reorganization measure

> All positions in the LRC were deemed non-existent
> Abolition of a position doesn’t involve removal since removal implies that the post subsists
and that one is merely separated therefrom
> After abolition, there is in law no occupant and no tenure to speak of
> It was ruled in this case that the respondent, not a member of the Bar, cannot be restituted to
her former position

FACTS
Violeta Garcia was a bachelor of laws graduate and a first grade civil service.
-She was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII
- She was later appointed as DEputy Register of DEeds II, upon reclassifiation of the
position
-She was designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of MEycauayan, Bulacan

EO No 649 was enacted. It authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to
NAtional Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and it regionalized the offices of
the registers therein. The law imposed a new requirement of BAR membership to qualitfy for
permaned appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher.

Garcia was issued an appointment as DEputy REgister of Deeds II on temporary status for not
being a member of the Ph Bar.

Sec. of Justice notified Garcia of the termination of her services on the groung that she was
receiving Bribe money. Garcia appealed, but the Merit Systems Protection Board (MXBP)
dropped her appel on the ground that the temrination of her services was due to the expiraiton of
her temporary appointment.
CSC issued a resolution, directing that Garcia be restored to her position. According to CSC,
under the vested right theory, the new requirement of the BAR membership wwill not apply to
her but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer position on or after Feb. 9, 1982. the date the order
took effect.

NALTDRA assailed the validity of the CSC Resolution

ISSUE:
WON membership in the bar, which is a qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to
the position Deputy REgister of Deeds under EO 649, Sec. 4 should be applied only to new
applicants and not to those who were already in service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at
the time of the issuance and implementation of the EO

RULING.
Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and required new
appointments to be issued to... all employees of the NALTDRA.
Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an
implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are deemed
non-existent. This, however, does not mean... removal. Abolition of a position does not involve
or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely
separated therefrom.
Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the
operation of the Land Registration Commission.
To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the
NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new... development of the
times.
Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds
did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the
NALTDRA. The... additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it
was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute
right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special... immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
There is no vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office. Not... being a
member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for
permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her former
position without violating the express mandate of... the law.
[Garcia has no vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office. She cannot be
reinstated to her former position. CSC Resolution reinstating Garcia was set aside]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
questioned Resolution of the Civil Service Commission reinstating private respondent to her
former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II... or its equivalent in the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration.
Calalang v Williams

Facts:

 Maximo Calalang brought a petition for a writ of prohibition against the following
respondents: Chairman of the National Traffic Commission (A.D. Williams), Director of
Public Works (Vicente Fragante), Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications (Sergio Bayan), Mayor of the City of Manila (Eulogio Rodriguez), and
the Acting Chief of Police of Manila (Juan Dominguez).
 It is alleged in the petition that the respondents have caused and enforced the prohibition
of animal-drawn vehicles from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street (from 7:30am-12:30pm and from 1:30-
5:30p.m.); and Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street (from 7-11a.m.) for a period of one year from the date of the opening of
the Colgante Bridge, to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as
well.
 The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548, infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people

Issues Ratio:

 WON CA No 548 is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power –

NO
o The provisions of CA No 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
o The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the
rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly.
o The delegated power is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely
the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application
of said law is to be predicated.
o To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine
when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion
of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said
that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. 

 
  WON CA No 548 constitutes as an unlawful interference with legitimate business or
trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion – NO  
o Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise
of the paramount police power of the state.
o In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies
at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations.
o Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state. 

 WON CA No 548 infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice – NO
o The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
o Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. 
o Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
 The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
 1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
 Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
 2)  along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
 Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
 The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption
of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions 
of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from 
the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
 On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
 Issues:
 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?
 2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
 Held:
 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the
said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made
to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
 paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means
of insuring its preserving.
 2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,”
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may  at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
 Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”
Facts:
Symaco filed an application for building permit with the Office of the Mayor of Malabon,
particularly seeking authority to repair the eaves and partitions of Symaco's house of strong
materials located at Gen. Luna Street, Malabon.
The Municipal Mayor granted or issued a permit pursuant to the application filed above-
mentioned. Mendoza, a duly appointed building inspector, wrote a letter to Symaco informing
the latter that he should file the necessary building permit for the contract in of a new building,
because as per ocular inspection conducted by the said building inspector, it had been noted
and found out that instead of mere repairs of the eaves and partitions of the old building, the old
building was demolished and a new one was then being constructed. Symaco applied with the
District Engineer for the necessary permit to construct a new building. However, there was a
civil action for forcible entry filed against Symaco by A.M. Raymundo and Company the subject
matter of which covered a portion of the parcel of land in which the Symaco was constructing
his building. Thus, Aquino, Municipal Mayor, denied the application. Article I of Ordinance No.
20, series of 1941, of the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, states that “Every owner, tenant,
manager or contractor, shall, before beginning the construction or repair of any edifice, obtain
the necessary permit from the Municipal Mayor, stating in the application the name of the
owner, location of the building, kind of materials to be used, and the floor area. The above-
quoted provision of the ordinance requires the applicant for a building permit to state in his
application the name of the owner, the location of the building, the kind of materials to be used,
and the floor area therefore. Said requirement, it appears, was complied with by Symaco.
Issue: Having thus complied with said requirement, was it a discretionary or ministerial duty on
the part of the Mayor to issue the permit in question?
Ruling: A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be per-formed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
The court said that the moment Symaco complied with the requirements under said ordinance
for the issuance of a building permit, Symaco became entitled to it and the Mayor's duty
became ministerial and it was, thereupon, incumbent upon him to issue the same. There is
nothing in the ordinance which grants the Mayor the discretion to refuse the issuance of a
building permit to an applicant owner, tenant, manager, or contractor. All that the ordinance
requires is that said applicant must state the data mentioned therein. The mayor's failure,
therefore, to perform an act which the ordinance enjoins him to do, upon compliance with the
conditions therein provided, entitled Symaco to the writ of mandamus prayed for.
Marcelino v. Cruz
Summary: A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando
Cruz, Jr. from promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910, entitled “People of the Philippines
versus Bernardino Marcelino,” and for release from detention of petitioner, the accused in said case, on
the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the case for failure to decide the same
within the period of ninety [90] days from submission thereof.

Facts:
 Marcelino was charged with rape before the CoFI of Rizal (People v Marcelino)
 The trial was conducted and concluded on August 4 1975. On the same date, the attorneys
for both parties moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda, with
the court granting them 30 days (Marcelino’s counsel submitted theirs but no memo was
submitted by the people)
 On November 28, 1975, Cruz filed with the deputy clerk of court his decision in the case for
promulgation
 On the date set for promulgation, the counsel for the accused moved for postponement,
saying the trial court already lost JD since the case wasn’t decided within 90 days from
submission thereof for decision  so Cruz set the promulgation of the decision to January
19, 1976 at 8:30 AM and then to January 26, 1976
 While this was happening, on January 12, 1976, counsel for Marcelino filed this case and on
January 16, 1976, a TRO was issued to Cruz from promulgating his decision
o They said that the 3 month period prescribed by section 11(1) of Article X of the
1973 constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory and that non-
observance of it will result in the loss of JD of the court over the case

Issue: WON the Trial court lost its JD over the case
Held: NO
 Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or eighty-five [85] days from September 4, 1975
the date the case was deemed submitted for decision when Cruz filed with the deputy clerk of
court the decision, Cruz filed with the Deputy clerk of court his decision. He had thus veritably
rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period prescribed by the Constitution.
o In JP (Comia v. Nicolas, Ago v. CA, Balquidra v CoFI): the rendition of the judgement in trial
courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt
that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and
not to the promulgation thereof
o Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning this Court
ruled that date because the same necessarily comes at a later date, considering that
notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event
which is beyond the control of the judge
 In this case, the SC divined rules to distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions
of the consti since no authoritative interpretation has been promulgated yet
o GR: consti provisons are mandatory unless expressly mentioned otherwise
o Difference between the two is often determined on the grounds of expediency since less
injury results to the general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law
o In Trapp v McCormick: it was said that the statutory provisions which may be thus departed
 from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and
purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. Thus, in said case, the
statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.
 On this view, authorities are one in saying that: Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment
forthwith or immediately after the trial or verdict have been held by some courts to be merely
directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if
the statute had intended such result it would clearly have indicated it.
 In Mikell v. School Dis. of Philadelphia, it was ruled that “the legal distinction between directory
and mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws.”
 To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the
exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase “unless reduced by the Supreme Court,” it is
evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court in accordance
with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New constitution to “promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.” And there can be no doubt that said
provision, having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of
procedure.
o Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris, declares that constitutional provisions are directory,
and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.
 In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. This Court had at various
times, upon proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior courts
additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases submitted to them.
The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the general public
than would its strict application.
 Mr. Henry Campbell Black: “Thus, where the contrary construction would lead to absurd,
impossible or mischievous consequences, it should not be followed.”
 We here emphasize the rule, for the guidance of the judges manning our courts, that cases pending
before their salas must be decided within the aforementioned period. Failure to observe said rule
constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In fact, a certificate to
this effect is required before judges are allowed to draw their salaries
Republic v Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
Doctrine:
As distinguished from other pecuniary burdens, the differentiating factor isthat the purpose to be
subserved is the raising of revenue. A tax then isneither a penalty that must be satisfied nor a liability
arising from contract.Much less can it be confused or identified with a license or a fee as
amanifestation of an exercise of the police power."
The Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of itsagents. It follows that, in so
far as this record shows, the petitioners have notmade it appear that the additional tax claimed by
the Collector is not in factdue and collectible. The assessment of the tax by the Collector creates,
itmust be remembered, a charge that is at least prima facie valid." Thatprinciple has since been
subsequently followed. While the question here isone of the collection of a regulatory fee under the
police power, reliance onthe above course of decisions is not inappropriate.
Facts:
Plaintiff -appellant Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint againstdefendant-appellee Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. on January 17, 1963alleging that the latter, as the registered owner of motor
vehicles, paid to theMotor Vehicles Office in Baguio the amount of P78,636.17, for the
secondinstallment of registration fees for 1959, not in cash but in the form ofnegotiable backpay
certificates of indebtedness Thus, it sought the paymentof such amount with surcharges plus the
legal rate of interest from the filingthereof and a declaration of the nullity of the use of such
negotiablecertificate of indebtedness to satisfy its obligation. The defendant-appellee,countered that
what it did was in accordance with the Backpay Law, both theTreasurer of the Philippines and the
General Auditing Office having signifiedtheir conformity to such a mode of payment. It then sought
the dismissal ofthe complaint
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendant-appellee upheld thevalidity and efficacy of
such payment made and dismissed the complaintholding that the National Treasurer upon whom
devolves the function ofadministering the Back Pay Law (Republic Act 304 as amended by
RepublicAct Nos. 800 and 897), in his letter to the Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office,had approved
the acceptance of negotiable certificates of indebtedness inpayment of registration fees of motor
vehicles with the view that suchcertificates 'should be accorded with the same confidence by
othergovernmental instrumentalities as other evidences of public debt, such asbonds and treasury
certificates'. Significantly, the Auditor General concurredin the said view of the National Treasurer.
The Republic of the Philippines appealed. While originally the matter waselevated to the Court of
Appeals, it was certified to the Supreme Court, thedecisive issue being one of law.
Issues:
1. Is the registration fee a tax, and as such, its payment bybackpay certificates valid?
2. Whether or not estoppel lies against the government for themistaken interpretation arrived at by
the national treasurer and the auditorgeneral.
Held:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. A tax refers to a financialobligation imposed by a state
on persons, whether natural or juridical, withinits jurisdiction, for property owned, income earned,
business or professionengaged in, or any such activity analogous in character for raising
thenecessary revenues to take care of the responsibilities of government.
As distinguished from other pecuniary burdens, the differentiating factor isthat the purpose to be
subserved is the raising of revenue. A tax then isneither a penalty that must be satisfied nor a liability
arising from contract.Much less can it be confused or identified with a license or a fee as
amanifestation of an exercise of the police power. It has been settled law inthis jurisdiction as far
back as Cu Unjieng v. Potstone, decided in 1962, thatthis broad and all-encompassing governmental
competence to restrict rightsof liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect
aregulatory fee. Unlike a tax, it has not for its object the raising of revenue butlooks rather to the
enactment of specific measures that govern the relationsnot only as between individuals but also as
between private parties and thepolitical society. To quote from Cooley anew: "Legislation for these
purposesit would seem proper to look upon as being made in the exercise of thatauthority ... spoken
of as the police power."
The registration fee which defendant-appellee had to pay was imposed bySection 8 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law. Its heading speaks of"registration fees." The term is repeated four times in the
body thereof.Equally so, mention is made of the "fee for registration." A subsection startswith a
categorical statement "No fees shall be charged." The conclusion isdifficult to resist therefore that
the Motor Vehicle Act requires the paymentnot of a tax but of a registration fee under the police
power. Hence theinapplicability of the section relied upon by defendant-appellee under theBack Pay
Law. It is not held liable for a tax but for a registration fee. Ittherefore cannot make use of a backpay
certificate to meet such anobligation.
2. Insofar as the taxing power is concerned, Pineda v. Court of FirstInstance, a 1929 decision,
speaks categorically: "The Government is neverestopped by mistake or error on the part of its
agents. It follows that, in so faras this record shows, the petitioners have not made it appear that
theadditional tax claimed by the Collector is not in fact due and collectible. Theassessment of the tax
by the Collector creates, it must be remembered, acharge that is at least prima facie valid." That
principle has since beensubsequently followed. While the question here is one of the collection of
aregulatory fee under the police power, reliance on the above course ofdecisions is not
inappropriate. There is nothing to stand in the way, therefore,of the collection of the registration fees
from defendant-appellee.
WHEREFORE, the decision of November 24, 1965 is reversed and defendant-8/3/2019 Republic vs.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Inc Digest 4/4appellee ordered to pay the sum of P78,636.17.