Russia and NATO: Cooperation after Lisbon

NATO's new Strategic Concept redefined the organization in terms of the new set of threats faced such
as prevention of human and drug trafficking, anti-piracy, and counter-terrorism. Some of these issues
are areas in which Russia and NATO will find little resistance or conflict in cooperating while others,
namely missile defense, expansion of NATO membership, and in some cases counter-terrorism, are
sources of conflict. Russia's willingness to compromise is limited by a NATO outlook that would
integrate states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) into the security organization and by Russia's
inability to influence the decision-making process within NATO, either as a member or as it stands
today, in a greater capacity than its former clients. Further, Russia seeks a position of greater influence
in the operations of missile defense in Europe while the US and NATO are more interested in
coordination and information-sharing. Counter terrorism is the dominant operational paradigm for
NATO and for the west more generally but Russia sees this notion as one that creates alliances between
the west and the FSU as the War in Afghanistan created the need for bases in Central Asia.

Russia's security outlook was codified in the National Security Strategy which highlighted Russia's
strategic areas of focus and defined how economic reform and strategic flexibility will allow the nation
to regain its position as a world power.1 Among the threats it listed, the expansion of NATO and
western influence in the near abroad are foremost in the Kremlin psyche. 2 In other areas Russia has
greatly increased its willingness to cooperate with western powers and has resulted in ubiquitous
labeling of Russia's foreign policy as “pragmatic.”3

NATO Expansion: Georgia and Ukraine

The question of including Georgia and Ukraine in NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) is the most
controversial issue on the table from Russia's perspective. A war in 2008 with Georgia and repeated
use of natural gas supplies as a lever for control of Ukraine are evidence of Russia's strong desire to
maintain control over these countries. In contrast, the need for Georgia and Ukraine to distance
themselves from Moscow and achieve a greater degree of independence and integration in the
international system has led them to actively promote their membership and cooperation with NATO
and other western powers. Admittedly, NATO expansion poses a dilemma to the organization's efficacy
because it makes it more difficult to align member states' views of security threats around a plan of
action.4 The ability of NATO to provide a means of outreach and integration for the post-socialist
states will only continue to create distance between NATO's drive to become more global both in its
membership and mission and Russia's goal of regaining its former prominence.

Expansion, inasmuch as it is linked with the west's desire to integrate, if not influence, states in what

1Dimitrakopoulou, Sophia and Liaropoulos, Andrew, “Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A
Great Power in the Making?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Winter 2010, (p. 35-42)
2Volker, Kirk, “NATO Summit Reality Check: Brilliant Policy vs. Real World Resistance,” Christian
Science Monitor, 11/22/2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/1122/NATO-
summit-reality-check-Brilliant-policy-vs.-real-world-resistance
3Dimitrakopoulou, Sophia and Liaropoulos, Andrew, “Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A
Great Power in the Making?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Winter 2010, (p. 35-42)
4“A Planning We Will Go,” Transitions Online, 6/4/2010, http://www.tol.org/client/search/?
search=a+planning+we+will+go
Russia considers its backyard is the most pressing threat to Moscow.5 The fear that NATO and the US
are attempting to encircle and isolate Russia through expansion of NATO membership and the creation
of a missile defense shield that not only excludes Russian cooperation but, in Russia's view, is targeted
at its nuclear capabilities, leads Moscow to a response that is best described as a pragmatic attempt to
influence outcomes. What is termed pragmatism is only extraordinary since Russia was, for many
years, in a position where it did not need to make compromises.

Today Russia is heralded for its more flexible attitude towards foreign policy but there are times where
Putin's drive to return Russia to its former glory leaves their position rigid. In the case of NATO
expansion, Russia's unwillingness to accept a position equal to that of its former clients means there
can be no compromise in membership or decision-making. Russia will continue to boycott NATO and
attempt to enhance other regional integration bodies such as the OSCE, CSTO, SCO, EurAsEC, and
BRIC group.6 Unless it can influence NATO as an instrument of its foreign policy, Russia will
continue to try to check NATO's influence in Eurasia. Further evidence of Russia's desire to have a
prominent role in the security architecture of Europe was Moscow's proposal of a pan-European
security pact and in its proposals for missile defense coordination with NATO and the US.7

Missile Defense

In an effort to “reset” relations with Russia, President Obama announced the withdrawal of plans for
missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. 8 While the move was welcomed by
Moscow, Russia shows continued concern with the process by which the US is negotiating the location
of its batteries and is working with NATO in an attempt to take on a greater role in the European
missile defense system.

Following the NATO summit in Lisbon the prevailing mood was optimistic as cooperation between
Russia and NATO was agreed upon in many fields including missile defense. Russian, US, and NATO
leaders met to discuss, among other things, the future of missile defense in Europe and Russia agreed to
study missile defense cooperation and to determine how the two might eventually coordinate their
systems.9 Russia's main concern regarding US missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech
Republic, and continues with more recent talks, is that it will nullify its nuclear deterrent, something
which remains a key element of Russia's defense mechanisms. 10 The announcement that new
installations will be made in Romania11 further aggravates US efforts to reset relations with Moscow

5Volker, Kirk, “NATO Summit Reality Check: Brilliant Policy vs. Real World Resistance,” Christian
Science Monitor, 11/22/2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/1122/NATO-
summit-reality-check-Brilliant-policy-vs.-real-world-resistance
6Dimitrakopoulou, Sophia and Liaropoulos, Andrew, “Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A
Great Power in the Making?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Winter 2010, (p. 35-42)
7Dimitrakopoulou, Sophia and Liaropoulos, Andrew, “Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A
Great Power in the Making?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Winter 2010, (p. 35-42)
8“A Planning We Will Go,” Transitions Online, 6/4/2010, http://www.tol.org/client/search/?
search=a+planning+we+will+go
9LaFranchi, Howard, “Cold War Era Fades Further as Russia, NATO Agree to 'reset' Relations,”
Christian Science Monitor, 11/21/2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/1121/Cold-war-
era-fades-further-as-Russia-NATO-agree-to-reset-relations
10Dimitrakopoulou, Sophia and Liaropoulos, Andrew, “Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A
Great Power in the Making?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Winter 2010, (p. 35-42)
11Barry, Ellen, “Russia Cool to U.S. Plan for Missiles in Romania,” The New York Times, 2/5/2010,
and will only make it more difficult for agreement on the form that future European missile defense
will take.

Russia's view of missile defense, outlined by President Medvedev in Lisbon, is for “sectoral missile
defense” in which countries are responsible for shooting down missiles flying over their respective
territories.12 Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, noted that the missile defense system
proposed by NATO “roughly amounts to agreeing not to keep missile-defense systems inside the region
– something that raises our suspicions – and arrange for the systems to be pointed outwards.” 13
According to a NATO spokeswoman, NATO is basically interested in coordinating two systems and
creating mechanisms for joint-study and information sharing regarding missile defense in the region. 14
The differences between Russia and NATO's visions center on at the question of control. By
maintaining an essentially independent system, NATO's missile defense capabilities do not rely on
Russian cooperation and as Moscow continues to value its nuclear deterrent as an instrument of its
foreign policy, it will not be willing to accept measures that could compromise that. Therefore, Russia
will continue to argue for a system in which it can exercise a greater degree of sovereignty and as such
will not find a willing partner in either the US or NATO.

Transportation and the War in Afghanistan

The need for transportation routes and bases of operation for the war in Afghanistan has brought
unprecedented attention to Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and poses a
serious threat to Russia's control over its near-abroad. Russia recently agreed to expand its cooperation
with the NATO effort in Afghanistan in two key ways: First, Russia, for the first time, agreed to allow
non-lethal military equipment leaving Afghanistan to exit across its borders. 15 Second, Russia agreed
to cooperate in backing the Afghan government.16

Russia's agreement to expand the use of railway transit in and out of Afghanistan will allow non-lethal
materials including armored cars to be transported much more efficiently and is a major gain for
NATO.17 Previous arrangements relied on airlifting in supplies and using trucks to transport material
via Pakistan.18 The use of railway transit through the north is a safer and 90% less expensive. 19 While

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/world/europe/06romania.html
12White, Gregory L., and Fidler Stephen, “Russia Rebuffed on Missile Offer,” The Wall Street Journal,
11/26/2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703678404575636670857107444.html
13White, Gregory L., and Fidler Stephen, “Russia Rebuffed on Missile Offer,” The Wall Street Journal,
11/26/2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703678404575636670857107444.html
14White, Gregory L., and Fidler Stephen, “Russia Rebuffed on Missile Offer,” The Wall Street Journal,
11/26/2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703678404575636670857107444.html
15LaFranchi, Howard, “Cold War Era Fades Further as Russia, NATO Agree to 'reset' Relations,”
Christian Science Monitor, 11/21/2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/1121/Cold-war-
era-fades-further-as-Russia-NATO-agree-to-reset-relations
16Fidler, Stephen, “Russia Closes Meeting on Upbeat Note,” The Wall Street Journal, 11/20/2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704496104575627033257735208.html
17Fidler, Stephen, “Moscow Expands NATO's Routes,” The Wall Street Journal, 11/18/2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703688704575620882049694928.html
18Fidler, Stephen, “Moscow Expands NATO's Routes,” The Wall Street Journal, 11/18/2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703688704575620882049694928.html
19Fidler, Stephen, “Moscow Expands NATO's Routes,” The Wall Street Journal, 11/18/2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703688704575620882049694928.html
this is an important step for relations between NATO and Russia it must be seen as a way for Russia to
expand its relevance and to limit western reliance on Central Asian countries. However, the need for
military installations in the region will remain an issue as Russia will not agree to allow lethal materials
through its borders.

While Russia has agreed to cooperate in fields such as counter-terrorism and in fighting human and
drug trafficking and cyber-security, these issues will not see progress until Russia expands its focus on
these issues domestically. Its vast borders, the huge amount of computer piracy based in Russia, and
the limited overlap between western and Russia terror-related security threats make cooperation in
these fields simple in theory but complex in practice.

Ultimately, Russia's drive to cooperate with NATO, while a positive development considering the
historical relationship between the two, must be seen as an attempt for Russia to gain a greater degree
of influence in NATO's operations in the region. Russia tends to follow a path of engagement that
begins with attempting to control, if not influence, decision making by foreign organizations and
proceeds to opposition where possible and cooperation when necessary. As such, the US and NATO
will continue to limit the scope in which Russia is capable of exercising sovereignty over security
apparatus in Eurasia while Russia will continue to seek to oppose the expansion of any measure that
does not include a strong Russian influence. Cooperation is the middle ground for both Russia and the
west but will not expand into meaningful sharing of decision-making, the grounds for a more secure, if
not uncomfortable, partnership. Therefore, in terms of missile defense we will not see cooperation
beyond the scope of information sharing with the hope of some joint, though non-interdependent,
development, and coordination. Russia joining NATO is unlikely save any major change in structure of
the organization in terms of decision-making as Moscow will not accept a role in any organization it
sees as threatening, unless membership provides a way to influence the operations of that body.
Finally, transit from Afghanistan through Russia may continue to expand but it is unlikely that Russia
will provide a route for military materials and the US and NATO's reliance on Central Asian countries
will remain intact.