Chapter 6

Stacks
Stacks, like storage tanks, have been the sites of numerous explosions.
They have also been known to choke.

6.1 STACK EXPLOSIONS

(a) Figure 6-1 shows the results of an explosion in a large flarestack.

The stack was supposed to be purged with inert gas. However, the
flow was not measured and had been cut back almost to zero to
save nitrogen. Air leaked in through the large bolted joint between
unmachined surfaces. The flare had not been lit for some time.
Shortly after it was relit, the explosion occurred-the next time
some gas was put to stack. The mixture of gas and air moved up
the stack until it was ignited by the pilot flame.
To prevent similar incidents from happening again:
1. Stacks should be welded. They should not contain bolted joints
between unmachined surfaces.
2. There should be a continuous flow of gas up every stack to pre-
vent air diffusing down and to sweep away small leaks of air into
the stack. The continuous flow of gas does not have to be nitro-
gen-a waste-gas stream is effective. But if gas is not being
flared continuously, it is usual to keep nitrogen flowing at a linear
velocity of 0.03-0.06 d s . The flow of gas should be measured. A
higher rate is required if hydrogen or hot condensable gases are
being flared. If possible, hydrogen should be discharged through a
separate vent stack and not mixed with other gases in a flarestack.

136
 Stacks 137

Figure 6-1. Base of flarestack.

3. The atmosphere inside every stack should be monitored regular-

ly, say daily, for oxygen content. Large stacks should be fitted
with oxygen analyzers that alarm at 5 % (2% if hydrogen is pre-
sent). Small stacks should be checked with a portable analyzer.
These recommendations apply to vent stacks as well as
flarestacks.
138 What Went Wrong?

(b) Despite the publicity given to the incident just described, another
stack explosion occurred nine months later in the same plant.
To prevent leaks of carbon monoxide and hydrogen from the
glands of a number of compressors getting into the atmosphere of
the compressor house, they were sucked away by a fan and dis-
charged through a small vent stack. Air leaked into the duct
because there was a poor seal between the duct and the compressor.
The mixture of air and gas was ignited by lightning.
The explosion would not have occurred if the recommendations
made after the first explosion had been followed-if there had been
a flow of inert gas into the vent collection system and if the atmos-
phere inside had been tested regularly for oxygen.
Why were they not followed? Perhaps because it was not obvi-
ous that recommendations made after an explosion on a large
flarestack applied to a small vent stack.
(c) Vent stacks have been ignited by lightning or in other ways on
many occasions. On several occasions, a group of ten or more
stacks have been ignited simultaneously. This is not dangerous pro-
vided that:
1. The gas mixture in the stack is not flammable so that the flame
cannot travel down the stack.
2. The flame does not impinge on overhead equipment. (Remember
that in a wind, it may bend at an angle of 45".)
3. The flame can be extinguished by isolating the supply of gas or
by injecting steam or an increased quantity of nitrogen. (The gas
passing up the stack will have to contain more than 90% nitrogen
to prevent it from forming a flammable mixture with air.)
(d) A flare stack and the associated blowdown lines were prepared for
maintenawe by steaming for €6hours. The next job was to isolate
the system from the plant by turning a figure-8 plate in the 3541.
(0.9-m) blowdown line. As it was difficult to turn the figure-8 plate
while steam escaped from the joint, the steam purge was replaced
by a nitrogen purge two hours beforehand.
When the plate had been removed for turning, leaving a gap
about 2 in. (50 mm) across, there was an explosion. A man was
blown off the platform and killed.
 Stacks I39

The steam flow was 0.55 ton/hr, but the nitrogen flow was only
0.4 ton/hr, the most that could be made available. As the system
cooled, air was drawn in. Some liquid hydrocarbon had been left in
a blowdown vessel, and the air and hydrocarbon vapor formed a
flammable mixture. According to the report, this moved up the stack
and was ignited by the pilot burner, which was still lit. It is possible,
however, that it was ignited by the maintenance operations.
As the steam was hot and the nitrogen was cold, much more
nitrogen than steam was needed to prevent air from being drawn
into the stack. After the explosion, calculations showed that 1.6
tonshr were necessary, four times as much as the amount supplied.
After the explosion, the company decided to use only nitrogen in
the future, not steam [5].
Should the staff have foreseen that steam in the system would
cool and that the nitrogen flow would be too small to replace it?
Probably the method used seemed so simple and obvious that no
one stopped to ask if there were any hazards.
(e) Three explosions occurred in a flarestack fitted, near the tip, with a
water seal, which was intended to act as a flame arrestor and pre-
vent flames from passing down the stack. The problems started
when, as a result of incorrect valve settings, hot air was added to the
stack that was burning methane. The methane/air mixture was in the
explosive range, and as the gas was hot (3OO0C), the flashback
speed from the flare (12 m/s) was above the linear speed of the gas
(10 m / s in the tip, 5 m/s in the stack). An explosion occurred, which
probably damaged the water seal, though no one realized this at the
time. Steam was automatically injected into the stack, and the flow
of methane was tripped. This extinguished the flame. When flow
was restarted, a second explosion occurred, and as the water seal
was damaged, this one traveled right down the stack into the knock-
out drum at the bottom. Flow was again restarted, and this time the
explosion was louder. The operating team then decided to shut
down the plant [6]. We should not restart a plant after an explosion
(or other hazardous event) until we know why it occurred.
( f )Another explosion, reported in 1997, occurred, like that described
in (a) above, because the nitrogen flow to a stack was too low. It
was cut back by an inexperienced operator; there was no low-flow
alarm or high-oxygen alarm [7]. The author shows commendable
140 What Went Wrong?

frankness in describing the incident so that others may learn from

it, but nowhere in the report (or editorial comment) is there any
indication that the lessons learned were familiar ones, described in
published reports decades before.

For other stack explosions see Section 7.13 c and Reference 1.

6.2 BLOCKED STACKS

(a) Section 2.5 a described how an %in.-diameter vent stack became

blocked by ice because cold vapor (at -lOO°C) and steam were
passed up the stack together. The cold gas met the condensate run-
ning down the walls and caused it to freeze. A liquefied gas tank
was overpressured, and a small split resulted. The stack was
designed to operate without steam. But the steam was then intro-
duced to make sure that the cold gas dispersed and did not drift
down to ground level.
(b) The vent stack was replaced by a 14-in.-diameter flarestack with a
supply of steam to a ring around the top of the stack. A few years
later this stack choked again, this time due to a deposit of refracto-
ry debris from the tip, cemented together by ice (as some conden-
sate from the steam had found its way down the stack). Fortunate-
ly, in this case the high pressure in the tank was noticed before any
damage occurred. There was no boot at the bottom of the stack to
collect debris (Figure 6-2). A boot was fitted [2].
(c) On other occasions, blowdown lines or stacks have become
blocked in cold weather because benzene or cyclohexane, both of
which have freezing points of 5"C, were discharged through them.
Steam tracing of the lines or stacks may be necessary.
(d) Blowdown lines should never be designed with a dip in them, or
liquid may accumulate in the dip and exert a back pressure. This
has caused vessels to be overpressured [3].
(e) A blowdown line that was not adequately supported sagged when
exposed to fire and caused a vessel to be overpressured.
(f)Water seals have frozen in cold weather. They should not be used
except in locales where freezing cannot occur.
 Stacks 141

Debris

Actual Better

Figure 6-2.Flarestack after fall of debris.

Flare and vent systems should be simple. It is better to avoid

water seals than install steam heating systems and low-temperature
alarms, which might fail.
(g) Vent stacks are sometimes fitted with flame arrestors to prevent a
flame on the end of the stack from traveling back down the stack.
The arrestors are liable to choke unless regularly cleaned. They are
also unnecessary, because unless the gas mixture in the stack is
flammable, the flame cannot travel down the stack. If the gas mix-
ture in the stack is flammable, then it may be ignited in some other
way. Stacks should therefore be swept by a continuous flow of gas
to prevent a flammable mixture from forming, as discussed in Sec-
tion 6.1.
There are, however, two cases in which flame arrestors in vent
stacks are justified:
1. If the gas being vented can decompose without the addition of
air; an example is ethylene oxide. Whenever possible, such gases
should be diluted with nitrogen. If this is not always possible, a
flame arrestor may be used.
2. In the vent pipes of storage tanks containing a flammable mix-
ture of vapor and air (Section 5.4.1). Such flame traps should be
inspected regularly and cleaned if necessary. Section 5.3 a
described how a tank was sucked in because the flame arrestors
on all three vents had not been cleaned for two years.
A type of flame arrestor that can be easily removed for inspec-
tion without using tools is described in Reference 4.
(h) Molecular seals have been choked by carbon from incompletely
burned gas, and water seals could be choked in the same way. For
142 What Went Wrong?

this reason, many companies prefer not to use them. If they are
partly choked, burning liquid or particles of hot carbon may be
expelled when flaring rates are high [9] (see Section 5.5.2 d).
(i) The relief valve on a liquid hydrogen tank discharged to atmos-
phere through a short stack. The escaping hydrogen caught fire. The
fire service poured water down the stack; the water froze, and the
tank was overpressured and split. The fire should have been extin-
guished by injecting nitrogen up the stack, as discussed in Section
6.1 c.

The common theme of many of these items is that blowdown lines and
flare and vent stacks should be kept simple because they are part of the
pressure relief system. Avoid flame arrestors, molecular seals, water
seals, and U-bends. Avoid steam, which brings with it rust and scale and
may freeze.

6.3 HEAT RADIATION

The maximum heat radiation that people are exposed to from a

flarestack should not exceed 4.7 kW/m2 (1,500 Btu/ftz/hr), about three
times the peak solar radiation in the tropics. Even this amount of radia-
tion can be withstood without injury for only a minute or two. The maxi-
mum to which people may be exposed continuously is about 1.7 kW/m2
(500 Btu/ftz/hr). In the neighborhood of flarestacks (say, wherever the
radiation could exceed 1.7 kW/m2), the temperatures reached by cables,
roofing materials, and plastic equipment should all be reviewed to make
sure they cannot be damaged [8,9].

REFERENCES

1. J. L. Kilby, Chemical Engineering Progress, June 1968, p. 419.

2. T. A. Kletz, Chemical Engineering Progress, Vol. 70, No. 4, Apr.
1974, p. 80.
3. T, J. Laney, in C. H. Vervalin (editor), Fire Protection Manual for
Hydrocarbon Processing Plants, Vol. 1, 3rd edition, Gulf Publishing
Co., Houston, Texas, 1985, p. 101.
 Stacks 143

4. T. A. Kletz, Learning from Accidents, 2nd edition, Butterworth-

Heinemann, Oxford, UK, 1994, Section 7.6.
5. Loss Prevention Bulletin, No. 107, Oct. 1992, p. 23.
6. V. M. Desai, Process Safe0 Progress, Vol. 15, No. 3, Fall 1996,
p. 166.
7. T. Fishwick, Loss Prevention Bulletin, No. 135, June 1997, p. 18.
8. E P. Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd edition,
Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, UK, 1996, Chapter 16.
9. D. Shore, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol.
9, No. 6, Nov. 1996, p. 363.