CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Article 1: Local Gov’t Units

y disputes between two LGUs.

Q — What body has the power to settle boundary disputes

between two local governments? Explain.

ANS: Under R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is the primary
tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes
between or among two or more municipalities located in the same province.
With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced – that in
the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a
certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case.

Notably, unlike R.A. No. 6128 and B.P. 337, the LGC of 1991 grants an
expanded role on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned in resolving
cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of
bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the
amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now
specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the
dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its
implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the
old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under which
the provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the parties and
eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand, under the
LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases
of municipal disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the
proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the same. (Mun. of Sta. Fe
v. Mun. of Aritao, G.R. No. 140474, September 21, 2007).

Effect of nullification of proclamation.

Q — What is the effect if the proclamation of the mayor is nullified?

Explain.
 ANS: With the nullification of the proclamation, the position became vacant
and the vice-mayor shall became the mayor. (Sec. 44, RA 7160).

Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of mayor’s proclamation is in

the nature of a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a “permanent
incapacity to discharge the functions of his office.” (Jainal v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 174551, March 7, 2007, Tinga, J).

Article 2: Extradition

As a rule prospective extradites are entitled to notice and hearing only when
the case is filed in court and not during the process of evaluation.

When may bail be granted to a possible

extraditee.

Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
(Rodriguez, et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila Branch 17, et al.,
supra.).

Right to Bail in Extradition.

Q— Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hongkong Court with 3
counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as agent in
violation of Section 9 (1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
Cap. 201 of Hongkong. He was also charged with seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law
of Hongkong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ
received a request from the Hongkong Department of Justice for the
provisional arrest of Muñoz. The NBI later on arrested him on the
basis of a warrant issued by the RTC, Manila. The order was declared
void by the CA, but its validity was sustained by the SC. In the
meantime, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the
 RTC a petition for his extradition. He applied for bail which was
initially denied but which was reconsidered later, granting the
petition for bail. There was a motion to vacate the order but it was
denied, hence, a special civil action for certiorari was filed alleging
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, Muñoz maintained that the right to

bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Is a prospective extraditee entitled to bail? Explain.

ANS: Yes, in view of recent developments, in international law. The following

trends in international law cannot be ignored, such as: (1) the growing
importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20 th
century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of the Court to balance the
rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law
on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects
of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded
towards the second half of the past century.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. (Gov’t. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Hon.
Felixberto Olalia, et al., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007).

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights.
Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty,
and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While
not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) the
Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of
the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall
not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, this is not the first time that the Court has an occasion to
resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted
bail.
 In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, it was
held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is “available only in criminal proceedings,” thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction”,

the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings
because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to

bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule that
the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.” (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. In cannot be taken
to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature. (Gov’t. of Hongkong
Special Administrative Region, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007,
Gutierrez, J).

Q— The SC in USA v. Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to

criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, is a reexamination of this
Court’s ruling in Purganan in order, such that, the right to bail may
be available in extradition proceedings? Explain.

ANS: Yes. First, the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his
liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have
likewise been detained.
 Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to
our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. The SC has admitted
to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has
been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency
of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco, 12 Phil. 490 (1909), is illustrative. In this

case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary
certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that
“To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law;” and that while deportation is not a criminal
proceeding, some of the machinery used “is the machinery of criminal law.”
thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prison and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,

90 Phil. 256 (1951), it was ruled that foreign nationals against whom no
formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the
finality of an order of deportation. The Court of Mejoff relied upon the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to
bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it

should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue. (Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Hon.
Olalia, et al., supra.).

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this

jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Q— What is extradition? Explain.

ANS: Section 29a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities
to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government.”

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,

created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other
state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not a punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing
its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a
trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a
full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its
object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime
and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of
trial or punishment.

Q — How is extradition characterized if it is not a criminal proceeding?

Explain.

ANS: While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the

following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also “the machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No.
1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest
of justice.” Section 20 allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask
for the “provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;” and that release from provisional arrest “shall not prejudice re-
arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently.”

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears

all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Q — What is the standard of proof when a prospective extraditee
applies for bail? Explain.

ANS: An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required
in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt
in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in
civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object
of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing
our jurisdiction. In his Separation Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed, “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence

to show he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail
on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”

Article 3: Amendatory provisions-people’s initiative

Requirements of proposal to amend the

constitution thru people’s initiative.

The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on direct proposal by the people.

This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by

the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of
the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
xxxx.

Form required of the proposals.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
 The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face
of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the
fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. (Raul
Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153 and other cases, October 25,
2006).

The people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments;
reason.

The unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that
the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. (State ex. Rel. Patton vs. Myers, 127 Ohio St., 95,
186 N.R. 872 (1933).

The rationale for this requirement is that, as signature requirement would be

meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is
that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation
of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A
person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a
potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or
even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the
signer’s liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the
person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has
a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for
the ballot. (Capezzito vs. State Ballot Commission, 407 Mass. 949, 955
[1990]).

Extent of the coverage of a people’s initiative to change the Constitution.

A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment

of the Constitution and not revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revision to the Constitution.
(Art. XVIII, Sec. 2, Constitution.

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the

Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of
all its members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a people’s initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
“Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2
of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to “Amendments to
this Constitution.”
Two-part test in initiative clauses in Constitution.

There are the qualitative and quantitative tests.

The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the “substance entirety” of the constitution
by the deletion or alteration of numerous provisions. (Amador Valley Joint
Union High School District vs. State Board of Equalization, 583 P. 2d. 1281,
1286 [1978]). The court examines only the number of provisions affected and
does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
“accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” whether there is an alteration
in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change
in the nature of the basic governmental plan” includes “change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes
that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances.” (Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC. et al.).

Effect of change in the structure of

government, revision not mere
amendment.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative

tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s
proposed changes overhaul two articles –
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on
the Executive – affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government,
from presidential to parliamentary, and from
a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as

when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging
the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
Effect if initiative proposes more than one subjects.

The Lambino Group’s logrolling initiative also violated Section 10(a) of RA

6735 stating, “No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x.” The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the initiative
embraced more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group’s initiative will still fail. (Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC).

Article 4: Public Offices

Reorganization.

President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any
branch or agency of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in
good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. R.A. No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees
made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant
increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and
another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of
offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and (e)
where the removal violates the order of separation. (Malaria Employees &
Workers Assn. of the Phils., Inc., et al. v. The Hon. Exec. Secretary, et al., G.R.
No. 160093, July 31, 2007).

Article 5: Judicial Department

Intermediate review of death

penalty cases by the Court of
Appeals.

Q — May the Supreme Court provide that such cases shall first be
reviewed by the Court of Appeals? Why?
ANS: Yes, because the Constitution is not preclusive in character. While the
Constitution requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure
utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deemed it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all
possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an
accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A
prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual
issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of
Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding
penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final
disposition. In this instance, then, the Supreme Court may exercise its
“exclusive appellate jurisdiction” over all cases where the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed by lower courts, under
applicable laws like Republic Act No. 296 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
(People vs. Mateo, 433 SCRA 64, [2004]).

Article 6: Executive Department

Power of inquiry of Congress in relation

to the Commander-in-Chief Power.

The President prevents a military officer from appearing before Congress can
do it by virtue of his/ her power as commander-in-chief. The ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before the Congress does
not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the
armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. A contrary rule,
would unduly diminish the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-
chief. The exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the
armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will
without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After
all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate,
who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. (B/Gen. Gudani, et al. vs.
Lt. Gen. Senga, et al., G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, Tinga, J.).

President’s refusal to allow a member of the AFP to appear is reviewable.

The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear

before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
 recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions the conduct of inquiries in aid
of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative
inquiries.

The constitutional and legal order sanction a modality by which members of

the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief
Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the
courts. (B/Gen. Gudani, et al. vs. Lt. Gen. Senga, et al., G.R. No. 170165,
August 15, 2006).

Nature of the calling out power of the President.

While the President’s “calling out” power is discretionary and solely vested in
his wisdom, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. Judicial power is the
power to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The latter
part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, the
discretion of the political departments of the government. It speaks of judicial
prerogative inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the court not that the
President’s decision is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily.
The standard therefore, is not correctness but arbitrariness. (David, et al. vs.
Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 and other companion cases).

The President’s power in case of emergency is not absolute, because the

Constitution has created a government in the concept of balance of power
structure. Executive, legislative and judicial powers are dispersed to the
President, the Congress and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is
supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times
of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check
upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his
power. In times of emergency, the Constitution reasonably demands that a
certain degree of faith be reposed in the basic integrity and wisdom of the
Chief Executive but at the same time obligates him to operate within
carefully prescribed procedural limitation.

Distinction between the President’s

authority to declare a state of rebellion
and the authority to proclaim a state of
national emergency.
 While the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from
the powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority is Section 4, Chapter 2,
Book II of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

“Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of

public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.”

The President’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely

an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in
the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, P.P. 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency the President did not only rely
on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She
also relied on take over provision of privately-owned public utility and
business affected with public interest. Indeed, P.P. 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such proclamation cannot
be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in
the case of Sanlakas, (David, et al. vs. Arroyo, et al., supra.).

Contention that the President’s

inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in
P.P. 1017 is an encroachment on the
legislature’s emergency powers.

This is an area that needs delineation.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to

declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers.
To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But as to the second,
national constitutional issues arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

“Section 23. (1) The Congress, by vote of two-thirds of both houses in

joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power
to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
 sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.”

The second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but
also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a
“state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out
power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a
state of war), then the framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not
intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can
declare a “state of national emergency.” The logical conclusion then is that
the President could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. (David, et al. vs. Arroyo, et
al.)

Agency vested with emergency powers.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in

the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers
to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power nor repose upon
it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible
or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the framers of
the Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency

powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public
interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof. (David, et al. vs. Arroyo, et al.).

Article 7: House of representatives Electoral tribunal-COMELEC

Michael Planas filed his certificate of candidacy for representative of

the Third District of Quezon City. Anna Liza Cabochan likewise filed
her certificate of candidacy but had to withdraw the same due to the
Petition to Deny Due Course” filed by a registered voter for the
reason that the Notary Public who notarized it had an expired
commission. Matias Defensor filed his certificate of candidacy in
 substitution of Cabochan. A Petition to Deny Due Course to the
certificate of Defensor was filed but before it could be resolved with
finality by the COMELEC, the election was conducted, Defensor won
and was proclaimed and took his oath and assumed. The COMELEC
ruled that with his proclamation, it was divested of jurisdiction and
that the HRET has now jurisdiction. Is the ruling of the COMELEC
correct? Explain.

ANS: Yes, because at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who

garnered the highest number of votes, the resolution invalidating his
certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time
remained qualified.

His proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of
office and assumed his duties as representative, the COMELEC had been
effectively divested of jurisdiction over the case. (Planas v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 167594, March 10, 2006, Carpio Morales, J).

Q— Is the rule absolute? Why?

ANS: No.

Note:

The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional candidate

divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is
not without exception. In Mutuc, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., it was ruled that it
is indeed true that after proclamation the usual remedy of any party
aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so
only on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation. Where
however, the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in
any way affect the basic issues. (Planas v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167594,
March 10, 2006).

Q — How do you distinguish Codilla v. De Venecia, et al., 442 Phil. 139

(2002) from Planas v. COMELEC? Explain.

ANS: In Codilla, the proclamation of Codilla, who garnered the highest number of
votes but who was facing charges of many counts of indirect solicitation of
votes, was ordered suspended even if he had not yet been summoned to
answer the charges. Codilla thereupon filed a motion to lift the suspension
order. The COMELEC Second Division, without resolving Codilla’s pending
motion, issued a resolution declaring his disqualification and directing the
immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number
of votes. Despite Codilla’s timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the
votes cast for Codilla were declared stray and Locsin, who garnered the
second highest number votes, was proclaimed winner. It was held therein
 that at the time of the proclamation of Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division [disqualifying Codilla] was seasonably
challenged by [Codilla] in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence,
the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In other words, at the time Codilla was declared disqualified by the Second
Division and his rival Locsin who garnered the second highest number of votes was
proclaimed, the Division Resolution which declared Codilla’s disqualification was not
yet final, as Codilla’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof had yet to be acted upon
by the COMELEC En Banc which had exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same. The
HRET could not thus assume jurisdiction as Locsin’s proclamation was invalid.
(Planas v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167594, March 10, 2006, Carpio-Morales, J).

Q— When does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review decisions

of the HRET? Explain.

ANS: The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET
operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of
discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of
passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law. (Abubakar v. HRET, et al., G.R Nos. 173310 and 173609, March 7,
2007).

Article 8: Legislative Department

Safeguards that proscribe the

legislative power of inquiry.

The power of Congressional inquiry is not absolute.

Section 21, Article VI establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the

legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in
accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted
without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an
imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights.

These abuses are, or course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper
suit filed by the person affected, even if they belong to the executive branch.
Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, wherein a clear
pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established,
resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the
 executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending
on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall
these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et
al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20, 2006).

Concept of executive privilege.

Executive privilege is “the power of the Government to withhold information

from the public, the courts, and the Congress.” It is the right of the President
and high-level executive branch offices to withhold information from
Congress, the courts and ultimately the public. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et
al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20, 2006).

Types or kinds of executive privilege.

Executive privilege is not a clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed

claims of varying kinds.

One variety of the privilege, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S.
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is
such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic
objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally,
a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intra-
governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which government decisions
and policies are formulated. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777,
April 20, 2006).

Basis for the three kinds of executive

privilege.

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety
of privileges to resist disclosure of information, the confidentiality of which
they felt was crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities
of the executive branch of our government. courts ruled early that the
executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or
state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold
the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified
right to withhold information related to pending investigations. (In re Sealed,
121 F. ed. 729, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 276; Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R.
No. 167777, April 20, 2006).

Appearance during the question hour

not mandatory.
 The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such
appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to
conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the
question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from
the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads
may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean
that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in
all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question
period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the
performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.

Basis of the power of Congress to

compel the appearance of executive
officials or the lack of it.

The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under

Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle
of separation powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing
to comply with its demands for information, otherwise, it would not be able to
perform intelligently its power of legislation. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al.)

Meaning of the requirement of prior

consent of the President or the head of
office allowing an official to appear
before the Congress.

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President

that an official is “covered by the executive privilege,” such official is
“covered by the executive privilege,” such official is subject to the
requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before the Congress. This requirement effectively bars the
appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The provision allowing the President to give its consent means
nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already
exists by virtue of E.O. 464.

Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by

the head of office, authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the
President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is
covered by executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis
for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to
be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress
that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the
President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however,
even without mentioning the term “executive privilege,” amounts to an
 implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch,
by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there
is an implied claim of privilege. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al.).

Invocation of executive privilege to be

accompanied by reasons.

The invocation of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific

reasons.

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that
the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so,
and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such
declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information
could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that,
on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why
the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has
requested.

No need to specify the exact reason.

Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite
degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination.

No claim of executive privilege by mere

silence.

Such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the

privilege. Executive privilege is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique rule and
responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where
exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important
executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus,
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity,
be kept confidential in the pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh
the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. (Senate, et
al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20, 2006).

Only the President can claim privilege.

 In view of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege, it is essential to limit
to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course
authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By the
order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her.
The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may
not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less
reason to uphold such authorization where the authorization is not explicit
but mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is invalid on this score.
(Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 167777, April 20, 2006).

Article 9: Delegation of Power

Congress delegated the power of ascertainment of facts upon which the

enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent to the Secretary of Finance. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006 contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the 12% rate upon factual matters outside the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of

the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of
the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to
the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent
of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which
its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary becomes the means or tool
by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that
he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much
broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His personality in such
instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the
agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or
modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Congress simply granted the
Secretary the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact. If it is exists, the
Secretary, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the
President who must impose the 12% VAT rate. There is no undue delegation
of legislation power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
This is constitutionally permissible. (Abakada Guro Party List, etc., et al. vs.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, and other cases, September 1, 2005).
Q — Section 34 of RA 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 200_” (EPIRA) imposes Universal Charge upon
end-users of electricity (a charge imposed for the recovery of
stranded cost; stranded debts refer to any unpaid financial
obligations of the NPC which has not been liquidated by the
proceeds from the sales and privatization of NPC Assets; stranded
contract costs of NPC or distribution utility refer to the excess of the
contract cost of electricity under eligible contracts over the actual
selling price of the contracted energy output of such contracts in the
market.

ERC issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations defining

Universal Charge refers to the charge, if any, imposed for the
recovery of Stranded Debts, Stranded Contract Costs of NPC and
Stranded Contract Costs of Eligible Contracts of Distribution Utilities
and other purposes pursuant to Section 34 of the EPIRA. (Rule 4 (rrr,
IRR).

National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-

SPUG) filed with Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for
the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary
Electrification.

The ERC decided the NPC’s petition authorizing it to draw up to

P70, 000, 000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation
Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental
Fund component of the Universal Charge.

On the basis of the said ERC decisions, Panay Electric Company,

Inc. (PECO) charged Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with
the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills
starting from the month of July 2003.

Hence, this original action.

 Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR
which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the
following grounds:

1. The universal charge provided for under Section 34 of the

EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of
the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all
electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to
tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation
of said power to any executive or administrative agency like
the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited
authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the
Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by
the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary
legislative authority.

2. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine

where the funds collected should be used.

3. The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is

oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without
representation as the consumers were not given a chance to
be heard and represented.

Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the

characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the
NPC. They argue that the cases Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886,
March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 703; Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory
Board, G.R. Nos. L-79601-03, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 521; and
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, L-77194, March 15, 1988, 158
SCRA 626, invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory
purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case
at bench. In said cases, the respective funds were created in order
to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as
buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso
devaluation, and other variables which cannot be adequately and
timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to
delegate powers to administrative bodies. They posited that the
Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar purpose.

The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:

 1. Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec.
34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative

power to tax on the part of the ERC.

Decide.

ANS: 1. As to the first issue.

No, the Universal Charge is not a tax. In exacting the said charge through
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State’s police power, particularly its regulatory
dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates
the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, and which can be
amply discerned as regulatory in character.

Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used

as an implement of police power. (Osmeña v. Orbos, Gaston v. Republic
Planters Bank, Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, No. L-75697, 151 SCRA
208, 216, and Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1955)). In Valmonte v. Energy
Regulatory Board, et al. and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, it was held
that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund
(SSF) were exactions made in exercise of the police power. The doctrine was
reiterated in Osmeña v. Orbos, with respect to the OPSF.

With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under
the administration of PSALM.

As aptly pointed out by the OSG, evidently, the establishment and

maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section
34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power and
responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic
survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign
authority we designate as the police power of the State.
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same
is an exaction imposed primarily in the pursuit of the State’s police
objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures attainment and perpetuity
of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the
viability of the country’s electric power industry. (Gerochi, et al. v. Dept. of
Energy, et al., G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, Nachura, J).

2. As to the second issue.

No, there is no undue delegation of powers to the ERC. The EPIRA, read and
appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and it contains sufficient standards.

Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from
the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and
approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and
therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge,
the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters
provided by the law itself when it provided for the promulgation and
enforcement of a National Grid Code, and a Distribution Code.

This is also the case when the EPIRA law authorized the PSALM to compute
the stranded debts and stranded costs of the NPC which is to form the basis
of the ERC in determining its universal charge.

As to the second test, the Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient
standards the following: “interest of law and order;” “adequate and efficient
instruction;” “public interest;” “justice and equity;” “public convenience and
welfare;” “simplicity, economy and efficiency;” “standardization and
regulation of medical education;” and “fair and equitable employment
practices.” Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power”, and “watershed rehabilitation
and management” meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they
provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are
sufficient standards. (Gerochi, et al. v. Dept. of Energy, et al., G.R. No.
159796, July 17, 2007, Nachura, J).
Note:

It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC’s conferred
powers were challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy
Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157, it
has been held:

“In determining the extent of powers possessed by the

ERC, the provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate
parts. Rather, the law must be read in its entirely, because a
statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one general
purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any
single part thereof but from a general consideration of the
statute as a whole. Considering the intent of Congress in
enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is
plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the
regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to
implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA.
When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the
ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already
conferred upon ERC’s predecessors. To sustain the view that the
ERC possess only the powers and functions listed under Section
43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in

relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions
over electric power as a vital public utility, to wit:

Over the years, however, the range of police power

was no longer limited to the preservation of public health, safety
and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in
earlier times. Police power now requires the State to “assume
an affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that
are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy.”
Police power is not exerted “to further the public welfare – a
concept as vast as the good of society itself.” When the police
power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory
functions, its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police
power takes on an even broader dimension in developing
countries such as ours, where the State must take a more active
 role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The
Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of
the State in the exercise of police power. We should have
exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach
is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric
power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a
traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a
few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in
encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of
progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of
electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a
result of power outrages or unreliable electric power services.
The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police
power with great flexibility, when the need arises.

This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for

Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 163935, February 2,
2006, 481 SCRA 480, where it was held that the ERC, as regulator, should
have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by
multifarious factors affecting public utilities.

From the foregoing disquisitions, we there fore hold there is no undue

delegation of legislative power to the ERC.

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the

Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation.
Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution of
August 3, 2004. Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves
questions of fact, and thus, the Court is precluded from reviewing the same.

Note:

One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in

recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure and
regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The new thrust is to tap
private capital for the expansion and improvement of the industry as the
large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the
industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the
program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of
the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission
sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution side was
fragmented with over 10 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The
pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity;
extremely high and uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to
consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the government power
 sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for
overcoming these shortcomings.

Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the

industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the
delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private
entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct
sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply. Corollarily,
the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business
spun off and privatized thereafter. (Freedom from Debt Coalition v. ERC, G.R.
No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157).

Article 10: Citizenship

Citation under rule 8171

only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:

a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to

aliens; and

b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their

Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is

a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by
derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171
is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-
born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine
citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate
under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according
to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had
children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus
 sanguinis or blood relationship; the children acquire the citizenship of their
parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
however, the children must be minor age at the time the petition for
repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have
the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake
a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children
cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
(Tabasa vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006).

If a person, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA

8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No.
9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. (Tabasa vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006).

Limited coverage of the law.

A reading in Section 1 of RA 8171 shows that the manifest intent of the

legislature to limit the benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos
who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity, in addition women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725),
which was enacted on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63,
also gave to the same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate
but without the limiting phrase, “on account of political or economic
necessity” in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to
RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law
only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost
their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the
sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo where she stated that there
are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country.

The first is what we call the “economic refugees” who go abroad to work
because there is no work to be found in the country. Then we have the
“political refugees” who leave the country for fear of their lives because they
are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third
type are those who have committed crimes and would like to escape from the
punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have those Filipinos who feel that they
are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere.
 Of these four types of Filipinos, the first two have to leave the country not of
choice, but rather of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer
abode for themselves and their families. It is for these two types of Filipinos
that this measure is being proposed for approval by this body.

Thus, the intent of the law is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned
their country for reasons other than political or economic necessity. (Tabasa
vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 125793, August 2006).

Effect if foreign country cancels the

passport of an alien.

If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a
valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country,
under the Immigration Act, Section 10 and 15 (Schonemann vs. Santiago, et
al., G.R. No. 81461, 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege
obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of
Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be
immediately executory.

Right to vote of dual citizens.

There is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225 – requiring

“duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines
first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225,
in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee
voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in
essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save
for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary citizen, are qualified to
vote. Thus, it was ruled in Macalintal vs. COMELEC, 405 SCRA 614:

“It is clear from these discussions of the

Constitutional Commission that it intended to enfranchise
as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have
not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission
even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach
voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in
 the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for
the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the

Commission provided for Section 2, Article V, immediately
after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, …., the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for
an exception to qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do
not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution.

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an

exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1
of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when
Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and RA 9189 and the
expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of RA 9225, the
irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage
thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. RA 9189
defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:

“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which

qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their
right to vote;

“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the

Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this
Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on
the day of elections. (Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs.
COMELEC, G.R. 162759, August 4, 2006).

Rule cover the next generation of duals.

The expanded thrust of RA 9189 extends also to what might be tagged as the
next generation of “duals”. This may be deduced from the inclusion of the
provision on derivative citizenship in RA 9225 which reads:
 Sec. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried
child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines. (Loida Nicolas-Lewis,
et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006).

Q — What is naturalization? Give the modes of becoming a citizen by

naturalization.

ANS: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the
political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a
citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an
alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative
naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant
to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of
a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.(So v.
Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007).

Q — In a petition for naturalization, it was contended that the

qualifications of an applicant for naturalization should possess those
provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473.
Is the contention correct? Why?

ANS: No. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization

by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other
hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and
disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. (So
v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007).

Q — State the rationale for the enactment of RA 9139 otherwise known

as Administrative Naturalization Law.

ANS: R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the
process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and
more encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who,
by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession,
 thus promoting “brain drain” for the Philippines. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603,
January 29, 2007).

Q— Are the qualifications prescribed under Act No. 473 applicable to RA

9139? Explain.

ANS: No. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the
former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born
aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any
other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs
and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A.
No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather
than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing
from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended
or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribed another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be
availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born
alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization,
subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

Second, if the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made

applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be
broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born.
It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in
the Philippines and have been residing here.

Third, applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is

contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization
procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139
is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been
residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country,
though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application
is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct
qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under
R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
 Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law
stands and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are
maintained. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007).

Q — State the basic requirement of witnesses in a naturalization

proceeding. Explain.

ANS: The witnesses presented should be competent to vouch for his good moral
character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. The
character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the
applicant’s conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific
facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. (So v. Rep.,
G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007, citing Rep. v. Hong, G.R. No. 168877,
March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 405).

Q — State the duty of an applicant for naturalization before he can be

naturalized. Explain.

ANS: In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not

only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of
his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons. Within the purview of the
naturalization law, a “credible person” is not only an individual who has not
been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has
no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or
testimony is not credible. What must be credible is not the declaration made
but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good
standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that
he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken
on its face value; as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. (So v.
Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007).

Q — In naturalization proceedings, may the State appeal the decision

even if it did not oppose the petition? Explain.

ANS: Yes. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and

the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of
 naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the
applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and
jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization
upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the
certificate. If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with
more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary
period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court. (So v.
Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007).

Note:

It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest

privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a
privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for
it, and upon strict compliance with the law.

Q — Who has the burden to show that a person is entitled to be

naturalized? Explain.

ANS: It is well-settled rule that “it is the bounded and inescapable duty of anyone
applying for naturalization to carry at all times the burden of proving his right
thereto, not only by complying with all the substantive and procedural
requirements and submitting proof thereof at the trial. (Tiu v. Rep., 158 Phil.
1137 (1974); In Re: Petition for Admission as Citizen of the Phils., Shewak A.
Keswani, et al. v. Rep., G.R. No. 153986, June 8, 2007).