FINAL REPORT OF

THE FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE PIPE

RUPTURE AND FIRE INCIDENT ON 3 JUNE 2008 AT THE
FACILITIES OPERATED BY APACHE ENERGY LTD ON
VARANUS ISLAND

Page 10r88 OBJ 10: A53510

REVISION STATUS
Rev Date Description Author Reviewed by

Z Lambert
Investigation
Team
S. Sherman
Member
Investigation
A Draft
Team
B Richardson
Member
Investigation
Team
Member

Z Lambert
B 11/09/08 Draft G. Guyan
.Richardson

Z Lambert
C 12/09/08 Final S Schubach
B Richardson

Z Lambert
G. Guyan
C1 07/10108 Final
B Richardson
S Schubach

DISTRIBUTION
Position Company

1 Records management NOPSA - original and controlled

Director of Petroleum and

2 Dol R - uncontrolled copy
Royalties Division

Page 2 or88 OBJ 10: A53510

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Varanus Island is situated approximately 100 km west of Karratha. Located on the

island are oil and gas production facilities operated by Apache Energy Ltd. A number
of facilities are located offshore in the waters surrounding Varanus Island and are
connected by subsea pipelines to the production facilities on Varanus Island.
Collectively, this complex is operated by Apache Energy Ltd, such that hydrocarbons
are fed to the Varanus Island facilities and processed prior to export either via two
sales gas pipelines to the mainland, or via a crude oil export line to transit tanker
vessels.

On the afternoon of the 3 June 2008, at approximately 13:30, a series of explosions

followed by fires occurred at the Apache operated facility on Varanus Island.

At the time of the event, there were 150 personnel at the Apache facility on Varanus
Island and a further 16 on adjacent offshore platforms.

There were no reported injuries or fatalities as a result of the explosions and fires.

The explosions and fires were concentrated in an area adjacent to the Harriet Joint
Venture (HJV) gas plant, on the NNE beach pipeline corridor, where 6 pipelines in
close proximity to each other cross the beach.

The plant was shutdown, isolated and vented. All personnel at the Apache Varanus
Island onshore facility were mustered and accounted for. By the evening of 3 June
2008 all personnel were evacuated except a skeleton crew of 14 persons who
stayed on the island for monitoring purposes.

The fires were extinguished in the early hours of the 5 June 2008.

Apache oil and gas production related activities on the island are regulated under the
Western Australian Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969 (PPA69), which is administered by
the Western Australian Department of Industry and Resources (WA DoIR). The WA
DolR initiated an investigation into the events of the 3 June 2008. The National
Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) was requested by the DolR to assist
in the conduct of its investigation of the incident and documented terms of reference
for the investigation were prepared.

The investigation found that:

1. The activities on the island prior to the incident can be described as routine.
The Apache production plant was being operated as normal, with only routine
work being carried out. Some project construction work was being
undertaken within the plant area. There is no evidence that this project work
activity had any impact on, or contributed to the incident.

2. There was no evidence of any contemporaneous extrinsic activity contributing

to the cause of the incident.

3. Evidence indicates that the immediate cause of the incident was the rupture
of the 12" sales gas pipeline at the NNE beach crossing and that the gas
released from the ruptured pipeline ignited very soon after the rupture.

4. Evidence to date indicates that the pipe was being operated at a pressure
within its design envelope. The rupture occurred due to thinning of the pipe

Page 3 of88 OBJ 10: A53510

 wall due to corrosion of the external surface of the pipe resulting in excessive
stresses in the pipe wall.

Evidence indicates that as a consequence of the initial 12" sales gas pipeline rupture
and ignition of the gas released, the adjacent Campbell / Sinbad to Varanus Island
12" infield gas pipeline also ruptured and released gas which contributed to the fire .
As a result of direct or radiant heat impact from the initial ruptures and fires on the
beach, the 16" sales gas pipeline and the 6" Harriet Gas Line also ruptured at the
boundary of the HJV plant. In addition, part of the HJV plant was damaged.

Evidence gathered to date indicates that the main causal factors in the incident were:

1. Ineffective anti-corrosion coating at the beach crossing section of the 12"

sales gas pipeline , due to damage and/or dis-bondment from the pipeline.
2. Ineffective cathodic protection of the wet-dry transition zone of the beach
crossing section of the 12" sales gas pipeline on Varanus Island.
3. Ineffective inspection and monitoring by Apache of the beach crossing and
shallow water section of the 12" sales gas pipeline on Varanus Island.

There are aspects of some lines of investigation that have not been settled,
principally due to delays by Apache in providing information and delays in forensic
testing of pipe samples . In particular:

• Completion and full analysis of the forensic testing of pipe samples;

• Statements from key Apache personnel (Apache on behalf of its key
personnel declined requests for interview);
• Identification of specific technical details relating to the cathodic
protection of the 12" sales gas pipeline.

These matters may be resolved in due course . However, such resolution is unlikely
to significantly change the nature of the findings of the investigation and hence this
Report is considered to adequately address the terms of reference ·of the
investigation. It is understood that DolR will review this Report with a view to
considering further action.

The investigation identified that Apache Northwest Pty Ltd and its co-licensees may
have committed offences under:

1. Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969, Sections 36A & 38(b)

2. Petroleum Pipelines Regulations 1970, Regulation 10.

Some findings of the investigation may also constitute non-compliance with pipeline
licence conditions .

Page 4 0r BB OBJ 10: A53510

 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Executive Summary Page 3

2. Table of contents Page 5
3. Abbreviations Page 6
4. Introduction Page 7
5. Background Page 8
5.1 Location Page 8
5.2 Applicable Legislation , Codes and Standards Page 8
6. Investigation Activities Page 11
6.1 Activities at the Apache Operated Facilities on Varanus
Island Page 11
6.2 Activities Subsequent to Site Visit of Apache Facilities on
Varanus Island Page 12
6.3 Impediments to the Investigation Page 13
7. Findings Page 14
7.1 Environmental Conditions Page 14
7.2 Sequence of Events Page 15
7.2.1 Events Leading up to the Incident Page 15
7.2.2 Sequence of Incident Events Page 15
7.3 Potential for Injury Page 16
7.4 Incident Location and Layout Page 17
7.5 The Incident Page 18
7.6 Post Incident Events Page 20
7.7 Damage Page 21
7.8 Failure Mechanism of the 12" sales gas pipeline at Varanus
Island NNE Beach Crossing Page 21
7.9 Pipelines IMMR (Inspection , Maintenance and Monitoring
Regime) Page 23
7.9 .1 Resources and Organisation Page 26
7.9 .2 Apache's Use of Contractors Page 27
7.9.3 Apache12" sales gas pipeline IMMR Page 29
7.1012" Sales gas pipeline C P System design Page 31
8. Conclusions Page 33
8.1 Immediate Cause of the Incident Page 33
8.2 Main Causal Factors Page 34
8.3 Other Factors Page 35
9. Possible Breaches of Legislation Page 36
10. Attachments Page 38

Page 50r88 OBJ 10: A535 10

3. ABBREVIATIONS

AEL Apache Energy Ltd

ALERT Organisation contracted to AEL to
investigate the incident on their behalf
CP Cathodic protection
CS1 Compressor station 1 located on the
mainland
DBNGP Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas
Pipeline
DolR The Western Australian Department
of Industry and Resources
ERT Emergency response team
ESD Emergency Shut Down
ESJV East Spar Joint Venture
GGT Goldfields Gas Transmission
HAT High Astrological Tide
HJV Harriet Joint Venture
IMMR Inspection Maintenance and
Monitoring Regime
LAT Low Astrological Tide
m metre
mm millimetre
NNE North-North East
NOPSA National Offshore Petroleum Safety
Authority
OHS Occupational health and safety'
P&ID Process and Instrumentation Diagram
PL Pipeline Licence
PMP Pipeline Management Plan
POB Persons on board
PPA69 Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969 (WA)
PRO Petroleum and Royalties Division of
DolR
P(SL)A82 Petroleum Submerged Lands Act
1982 (WA)
PSMP Pipeline Safety Management Plan
PTW Permit to Work
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SDV Shutdown valve
WST Western standard time

Page 6 or88 OBJ 10: A53510

4. INTRODUCTION

DolR requested NOPSA to provide investigation services under the WA DoiR's

direction, in order to investigate a pipe rupture and fire that occurred on 3 June 2008
at the Varanus Island gas processing plant operated by Apache Energy Limited.

The request was made in accordance with the Service Contract in place between
NOPSA and the State of WA through the Department of Industry and Resources
dated June 2007.

The investigation team comprising a DolR inspector and two NOPSA inspectors
travelled to Varanus Island on 4 June 2008. Upon arrival on the island at 17:30 the
investigation team was unable to proceed directly to the incident site as Apache
advised that it would be unsafe to do so since small fires were still burning. Apache
also advised that it was anticipated that, by the following morning of 5 June 2008, the
fires would be extinguished and it would be safe to access the incident site.

The investigation team gained access to the incident site on the 5 June 2008, and
commenced the investigation. The investigation team left Varanus Island on 7 June
2008.

The investigation was conducted as per the terms of reference agreed between
DolR and NOPSA (see Attachment 1 for details).

The investigation and its attendant findings were delayed by difficulties experienced
in sourcing information and accessing personnel. These matters are further
discussed in section 6.3.

In accordance with the terms of reference, the focus of the investigation was to
identify:

.• Facts and events relevant to the incident

• The likely causes of the incident
• Any actions and omissions by the operator of the Varanus Island facility, or its
contractors, leading up to the Incident and during the Incident that may have
contributed to the cause of the Incident
• Any potential for injury to persons arising directly from the fire and
explosion(s) at the time of the incident

The terms of reference for the investigation did not include:

• assessment of the extent of the damage to the plant, except where directly
relevant to the main focus of the investigation
• events that occurred after the incident, except where they were directly
relevant to the main focus of the investigation
• actions or omissions by any regulator, in particular the DoIR, regarding
assessment of the appropriateness of the DolR consents and approvals
issued to the pipeline licensee with respect to the Varanus Island plant and
associated licensed pipelines.

Page 7 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

5. BACKGROUND

5.1 Location

The incident occurred at the Apache facilities on Varanus Island which is part of the
Lowendal group of islands located to the east of the northern end of Barrow Island
(approximately 100 km west of Karratha) .

• W est Try al Ro cks

VARAN US
PR ODUCTI ON
• ARE A (V)
12" & 16" Sales
gas pipelines

DBNG pipeline

Compressor
Station No 1

- "__ i 11
'I- GGT pipeline
i
ftibr!99,i -

Map 1 - Location of Apache Varamis Island Facilities

Apache Energy Ltd operates oil and gas production facilities on and around Varanus
Island. Hydrocarbons are piped to the island for processing . After processing, the
hydrocarbon products are exported as either gas to the mainland via two subsea
pipelines (12" and 16" sales gas pipelines, approximately 100 km long), or as crude
oil by tankers from the terminal at the island .

Apache's gas production from its facilities on Varanus Island accounts for
approximately 30% of WA gas consumption .

5.2 Applicable Legislation, Codes and Standards

The WA Petroleum Pipeline Act 1969 (PPA69).

This Act regulates the processing and conveyance of petroleum within WA and is
applicable to the Apache Varanus Island plant. Pipeline licences were issued by
DolR under this Act to Apache and its co-venturers for the oil and gas production
facilities on the island. The relevant licences are:

• PL 12 and variations, for the Harriet Joint Venture facilities and associated
pipelines onshore Varanus Island including the 12" sales gas pipeline.
• PL 29, PL30 for the East Spar Joint Venture facilities and associated pipelines
onshore Varanus Island

Page 8 or88 OBJ /0: A53510

Pipeline licence PL 12, held jointly by Apache Northwest Pty Ltd and two other
entities, covers the area of the Varanus Island facility affected by the incident.
Licence PL 12 was granted in May 1985 with 21 years vailidity. An application for
renewal of the licence was submitted to DolR by Apache in December 2005 and has
not yet been accepted. In the interim, the PPA69 stipulates that the existing licence
remains valid.
Licence PL 12 contains a number of specifications and conditions one of which is the
requirement for a Safety Case, accepted by the Director of Petroleum and Royalties
Division, DoIR, to be in place. The current Apache Energy Ltd Safety Case for the
PL 12 plant was accepted by the Director, PRD of the DolR in December 2007.

The Safety Case requirement was first introduced in September 1998, in PL 12

Variation No. 9P/97-8. A safety case is described as "A document containing
information relevant to the identification, assessment, management and monitoring
of matters, and other information, relevant to safety in the Licence area".

The WA Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969, as it applies on Varanus Island, is

administered by DolR. NOPSA has provided, on request, technical advice on
occupational health and safety matters to DolR under a contract between NOPSA
and DolR.

The WA Petroleum Submerged Lands Act 1982 (P(SL)A82)

The section of the 12" sales gas pipeline directly affected by the incident is located
above the low water mark and is outside the jurisdiction of the P(SL)A82. However,
the P(SL)A82 does apply to those sections of the Apache Varanus Island pipelines
seaward of the low water mark, and under the WA Petroleum (Submerged Lands)
(Pipelines) Regulations 2007, consent is required to construct and operate such
pipelines. The Regulations require that a person must not undertake construction
activities relating to a pipeline unless the WA Minister has consented to the
construction and a pipeline licensee must not operate a pipeline under the licence
unless the WA Minister has granted consent to operate the pipeline.

Specifically, pipeline licences were issued by the DolR under this Act, to Apache
Northwest Pty Ltd. and its co-licensees for the offshore sections of certain pipelines.
Of the 6 pipelines crossing the NNE beach of Varanus Island, 5 were licensed under
this legislation.

The relevant licences are:

• TPL 1 for the 8" Harriet crude oil line

• TPL2 for the 30" crude export line
• TPL5 for the 6" Harriet gas line
• TPL8 for the 12" sales gas pipeline
• TPL 13 for the 16" sales gas pipeline

The Apache 12" Infield gas pipeline from the Campbell and Sin bad offshore facilities
to onshore Varanus Island is not licensed under this legislation. The reason for this is
not known to the investigators.

Under the P(SL)A 82 and its regulations, Apache is required to have a Safety Case
in force for offshore facilities in these waters. Prior to March 2007, DolR was the sole
regulator of this Act. Subsequently, powers were conferred on NOPSA such that the
Safety Case for these offshore facilities must be accepted by NOPSA. In general, the

Page 9 of88 OBJ 10: A53510

P(SL)A 82 regulating the offshore facilities around Varanus Island continues to be
administered by DoIR, with NOPSA administering the regulation of health and safety
matters.

The Apache Energy Ltd Varanus Hub Safety Case is currently a combined Safety
Case document, encompassing the offshore facilities and the onshore process plant.
The Safety Case addresses the requirements of both the P(SL)A 82 and its
regulations, and the requirements of the onshore pipeline licences issued under the
PPA69 (PL 12, 29 and 30) relating to the onshore process plant. The current Safety
Case was accepted in October and December 2007 by NOPSA and the DolR
respectively, each according to the jurisdictions outlined in this paragraph .

Further, effective March 2008, the WA P(SL)Act 1982 and its regulations, requires a
licensee of licensed pipelines to have a Pipeline Management Plan (PMP) in force.
The PMP must contain information pertaining to the matters described in Part 4
Division 2 of the WA Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Pipeline) Regulations 2007.
The PMP must be accepted by the WA Minister. A Pipeline Safety Management
Plan (PSMP), defined as the components of a PMP that provide for the safety and
health of persons at or near the pipeline, must be assessed and accepted by
NOPSA. The WA Minister may not accept a PMP without NOPSA having first notified
the Minister that the PSMP is acceptable .

The Apache Energy Ltd Operational PMP, currently in force for all pipelines operated
by Apache on the North West Shelf, was accepted by DolR under its delegated
powers, in March 2008.

Applicable Codes and Standards

The applicable standards for the design , operation and maintenance of pipelines are
typically specified in the pipeline licences. For the Apache 12" sales gas pipeline , the
licences (PL 12 fo r the Varanus Island section , TPL8 for the subsea section , and
PL 17 for the bnshore mainland section) state that AS2885 -1987 Pipelines - Gas and
Liquid Petroleum (the SM code), is the applicable standard . Section 13 of this
standa rd deals with operation and maintenance.

This standard was later superseded by AS2885.1-1997 , AS2885.2-1995, and

AS2885 .3-1997. The current versions of AS2885 are:

• AS2885 .1 - 2007 Pipelines-Gas and Liquid Petroleum-Design and

• Construction.
• AS2885 .2 - 2007 Pipelines-Gas and Liquid Petroleum-Welding .
• AS2885.3 - 2001 Pipelines-Gas and Liquid Petroleum-Operation and
• Maintenance.
• AS2885.4 - 2003 Pipelines-Gas and Liquid Petroleum-Offshore submarine
• pipeline systems .
• AS/NZS2885.5 : 2002 Pipelines-Gas and Liquid Petroleum-Field pressure
testing.

AS2885.4 - 2003 refers the reader directly to Det Norske Veritas offshore
standard DNV-OS-F101 Submarine Pipeline Systems, and disapplies
AS2885.1, 2, 3 and 5.
Section 10 of DNV-OS-F101 deals with the operation, inspection and repai r of
submarine pipeline systems.

Page 10 or 88 OBJ 10: A535 10

The basis of design for the 12" sales gas pipeline , cites the following standards
related to the cathodic protection system applied to the pipeline:

• AS/NZS 2832.1: 1986 Cathodic Protection of Metals Part 1 Pipes and Cables
and Ducts 1985.
• DNV-RP-B401 Recommended practice for Cathodic Protection Design 1986

6. INVESTIGATI ON ACTIVITIES

6.1 Activities at th e Apache Operated Facilities on Varanu s Is land

The investigation team arrived at the Apache operated facilities on Varanus Island at
17:30 WST on Wednesday 4 June 2008. The investigation team left the island at
12:15 WST on Saturday 7 June 2008.

During the period spent investigating the incident at the island, the investigation team
carried out the following tasks and activities:

• Held a meeting with Apache 's management and an ALERT representative (an
investigator contracted by Apache) to explain the purpose and process of the
investigation .
• Viewed a sample of Apache's incident photographs to develop a perspective on
the nature of the incident.
• Inspected the incident site , took photographs , made sketches (see Attachment 5
&6)
• Interviewed and took formal statements from 9 people who were witness to the
events of the 3 June 2008 and from one person with information relevant to the
investigation (listed in Attachment 7). The personnel interviewed provided
information about:

General conditions and activities at the Apache facilities on the island

prior to the incident
Their own activities and location within the Apache facilities prior to the
incident
The sequence of events of the incident
Post incident events
Their own actions
Actions taken by Apache

• Requested and obtained information from Apache (drawings, reports,

photographs) Attachment 2, Table 2, identifies documentation received from
Apache at site.
• Discussed the manner of removal, transport and testing of samples from selected
pipes from the incident site .
• A process by which the integrity of the testing to be carried out by Apache and its
contractors could be assured was agreed between DolR and Apache . This
process entailed:

Arrangement for the pipe samples to be transported and tested in a

manner that would ensure the continuity of evidence . This involved
acceptance by DolR of the transport protocol.
Verification of pipe samples arriving at the PearlStreet testing laboratory,
Welshpool WA, which involved one of the investigators witnessing the
unpacking of pipe sample containers.

Page 11 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 Acceptance by DolR of the non-destructive and destructive test protocol.
Arranging access to the test results and report.
DolR agreement for the destructive tests to proceed after being satisfied
that non-destructive tests have been satisfactorily completed.

6.2 Activities Subsequent to Site Visit of the Apache Facilities on Varanus

Island

The investigators identified a number of areas as relevant or potentially relevant,

within the scope of the investigation. These formed the basis of the lines of
investigation developed and (see Attachment 2 Table 1 for details), they are
summarised below:

1. Confirmation of the location of the incident site.

2. Examination of the incident site including external examination of the
damaged pipes.
3. Reviewing extent of plant damage.
4. Establishing the number and distribution of personnel at the Apache facilities
on Varanus Island.
5. Identifying activities taking place at the Apache facilities on the island prior to
the incident.
6. Establishing the operating parameters and status of the Apache production
plant and the affected Apache pipelines.
7. Establishing the sequence of events.
8. Examining potential personnel exposure.
9. Identifying post incident events and their relevance to the incident, including:
• Actions taken by individuals, in particular Apache process operators
and supervisors,
• Immediate response to the incident (personnel musters, incident
monitoring and personnel evacuation).
10. Identifying the failure mode of the pipelines, which included review of the pipe
sample test results and independent experts rep'orts, so far as available.
11. Identification of applicable legislation, including subsidiary regulatory
approvals relating to the Apache pipelines and facilities.
12. Review the relevant pipelines design and protection systems.
13. Examining the adequacy of Apache's pipeline inspection, maintenance and
monitoring regime, including past inspection, maintenance and monitoring
records for selected pipelines.
14. Identifying pipeline inspection, monitoring and maintenance requirements as
stipulated in relevant licences, codes and standards.
15. Resources and structure of Apache's pipeline inspection and maintenance
group.
16. Identifying causes of the incident.
17. Identifying possible breaches of legislation.

The following sources of information were used during the investigation (for details
see Attachment 2 Table 1 & 2):

• Site visits
• Witness statements taken from Apache staff and its contractor staff
• Pipe inspections and sample test results
• Independent specialist opinions
• Legislation, licences, codes and standards
• DolR records

Page 12 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 • Apache documentation (drawings, procedures, manuals, reports, data)

Over 250 documents, principally Apache documents, (see Attachment 2 Table 2),
including several reports and manuals, were examined by the investigating team.
This information was provided by Apache after some delay and following
reinforcement of DolR requests . Review of these documents, conducted for the
purpose of extracting relevant information, was carried out in parallel with, and
informed, the other investigation activities which included:

• Developing the lines of investigation

• Arranging and conducting interviews (16 persons in total were interviewed -
Attachment 7)
• Managing information (requesting, receiving and monitoring)
• Liaising with Apache on testing of pipe samples
• Arranging for the engagement of two independent specialists:
A metallurgist; and
A pipeline corrosion expert
• Analysing data
• Report writing

The investigators also reviewed reports (Attachment 2, Table 2, reference item 259)
relating to testing of samples of pipelines removed from the incident site. In total, 11
pipe samples were removed from the incident site . Of the 11 samples, 4 were
considered to be of primary importance to the investigation. These were the
samples removed from either side of the rupture point on the 12" sales gas pipeline,
and from either side of the rupture point on the 12" Campbell/Sinbad pipeline.

As discussed in section 6.1, a testing protocol was agreed by DolR and Apache,
detailing the tests that would be undertaken. These tests were both non destructive
and destructive in nature. The tests proposed included:

Visual examination
Dimensional assessment
Surface deposit sampling and analysis
Ultrasonic examination
Radiographic examination
Examination of fracture surfaces
Crack testing
Examination of the Metallurgy
Mechanical testing
Chemical analysis

At this time, no testing has been undertaken that would permanently alter the pipe
samples from their 'as removed' condition. Findings from the test results received to
date are discussed in section 7.8.

6.3 Impediments to the Investigation

Early in the investigation, the investigation team identified the need to interview key
Apache personnel about, for example, matters pertaining to the pipeline inspection ,
monitoring, maintenance, and repair regime.

Requests for interview were declined by Apache.

Page 13 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Apache subsequently agreed to respond to written question sets developed and
submitted by the investigation team to the individuals concerned. Apache then
advised the DolR investigator that no responses to written questions would be
provided within the investigation time scale. Consequently, the investigators were
unable to question the Apache personnel listed below who were considered to have
knowledge of matters pertaining to the incident, and potentially able to provide
verification of the investigators' understanding of the events leading to the incident:
• Production Manager
• Senior Integrity Engineer (current and previous occupier of the position)
• Corrosion Technician
• Person in Charge of Harriet A platform

It is noted that the investigation team was provided with a document entitled
"Corporate Response by Apache Northwest Pty Ltd to the Questions posed by the
DolR for the Production Manager, Ivor Alexander" on 8 September 2008; over 7
weeks after these written questions were issued to Apache.

Delays were also experienced in accessing the reports arising from the examination
and testing of the pipeline samples removed from the incident site. The initial
indication was that all non-destructive and destructive tests arranged through
Apache would be completed within eight weeks from the date of the incident. The
non-destructive test results were provided to the investigators 11 weeks after the
incident. The destructive testing phase, and some elements of the non destructive
testing that involve physically altering the pipe samples, have not yet been carried
out. At the time of writing, it is estimated that reports on these aspects of the testing
will not be available until mid November 2008.

These matters directly impacted on the ability of the investigation team to develop its
findings within the agreed time period and resulted in aspects of some lines of the
investigation not being fully settled. However, it is considered that resolution of these
matters is unlikely to significantly change the nature of the findings of the
investigation: . . .

7. FINDINGS

Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered by the investigation team in sourcing

information, the following findings have been produced following analysis of the
available information.

Each finding is marked with the letter F and a number. Attachment 2, Table 1,
provides cross reference between the individual finding and the information source
on which the finding is based.

F1. The incident resulted in the shut down of all Apache operated Varanus Island
production facilities and connected platforms, including gas export to the
mainland.

7.1 Environmental conditions

F2. The environmental conditions on the island on the day of the incident were as
follows:
• Wind: East/South East, 10 knots with 12 knots gusts
• Waves: 0.9 m (significant height)
• Visibility: good

Page 14 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

7.2 Sequence of Events

7.2.1 Events leading up to the incident

F3. In the hours leading up to the incident the activities at the Apache facilities on
the island could be best described as normal and routine. There were no
notable production process upsets in the days leading to the incident or
immediately prior to the incident on 3 June 2008.

F4. The production plant operated as normal, with no major work outside of
routine maintenance activities, being conducted on the day.

F5. Contractors were undertaking project works within the plant areas. New
(Mars) compressor installation activities, mainly civil works, were being
carried out by Apache contractor personnel approximately 130 metres from
the incident site. Tie in pipe spools were being fabricated in advance of a
planned shutdown. Appropriate work permits were in place for these works.

F6. At the time of the incident there were 150 personnel on the island and 16
personnel offshore on the Apache Harriet A and Gibson platforms (166 in
total).

7.2.2 Sequence of Incident Events

F7. On the basis of personnel interviews and information provided, the

investigation team believes the sequence of events on the 3 June 2008, was
as follows:

3 June 08 Harriet Joint venture plant in steady state operation, 12" sales gas
pipeline operating at 11100kPa, 16" sales gas pipeline operating at
13200kPa.
• 13:30 ·12" initial explosion heard (12" gas sales line ruptures followed by 12"
Campbell/Sinbad pipeline).
• ESD initiated in the control room. Plant blow-down commenced.
• 13:50 Muster of personnel completed at two locations (control building and
main camp). Large fires observed to north side of Apache HJV plant.
• 13:55 ERT deployed to assess (from a distance) the incident
site. ERT deploys 3 water monitors to cool equipment adjacent to the
incident site and returns to the main camp.
• 14:00 DBNGP Control Room contacted. Request was made to remotely
shut in Compressor Station no 1 (CS1). Following further discussions
it was agreed that DBNGP would continue to take gas from Apache to
reduce pressure in the 12" and 16" sales gas lines.
• 14:18 BK helicopter and an Apache service boat (Loligo) sent to observe
the incident from a distance, take photographs, observe the nature of
the incident and damage, and report to the Apache Field
Superintendent.
• 14:27 16" sales gas line and 6" Harriet gas line rupture.
• 14:27 Apache control room personnel evacuated to the main camp . Second
muster of all personnel completed.
• 14:30 Helicopter departs for the mainland (CS 1) to confirm and if necessary
isolate the 12" and 16" sales lines (the concern was that the contents
of the 16" line could feed through the inter-connector valve to the 12"
sales gas line).

Page 15 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 • Boat (Loligo) departs the incident site to pick up personnel from
Apache Harriet A and Gibson platforms
• Two operators went to the 'A' crude storage tank and closed the inlet
valve, to prevent the crude from feeding the fire if the crude export
line was damaged / ruptured. The remaining tanks ('B' and 'C') were
inactive and isolated prior to the incident.
• 15:00 Meter station at CS1 shut in automatically due to decreased pressure
in 12" and 16" sales gas lines - gas flow into DBNGP stopped.
• 15:15 Boat (Loligo) evacuated all 16 personnel from Apache Harriet A and
Gibson platforms to the Apache facility muster area at Varanus
Island.
• 15:26 Apache personnel sent by Helicopter to CS1 reported that 16" and
12" lines had been isolated manually at CS 1.
• 15:50 GGT Control Room contacted by Apache. GGT flow control valves
closed.
• 16:02 BK helicopter arrives at Barrow Island (from CS 1).
• Boat (Loligo) moves towards the incident site to observe the fires
from a safe distance.
• 17:10 BK helicopter returned to Varanus Island , evacuation of non-essential
personnel commenced.
• 18:00 Boat (Loligo) returned to Varanus Island.
• 18:35 ERT sent to fight small brush fires (returned 19:35).
• 19:41 Last helicopter evacuation flight from Varanus Island, 14 person
skeleton crew stayed overnight on the island.
4 June 08 07:00 ERT team deployed to site. Main fires out. ERT extinguish small
brush fires.

7.3 Potential for Injury

F8. In general, personnel visits to the NNE beach are discouraged due to
environmental concerns. The beach has little recreational utility. The
operational visits are infrequent and short, mainly for the purpose of: .

• Inspecting the pipelines crossing the beach, and

• Setting up a suck back pump on the 30" crude export line every time the oil is
loaded to the visiting tanker (usually once a month).

F9. After the incident Apache introduced formal instructions preventing

unauthorised access to the NNE beach.

F10. Although there were no reported injuries or fatalities , the incident had the
potential to result in casualties. The lack of casualties was mainly due to the
following factors :

• no personnel were on the NNE beach on the day of the incident,

• no personnel were working in the northern corner of the HJV gas plant
adjacent to the incident site. Four people nearest the incident site were
working in the HJV gas plant (approximately 110 -130 meters away from the
point of rupture on the beach); and
• no personnel were using the road on the embankment between the HJV gas
plant and the beach when the first explosion occurred .

Page 16 or BB OBJ 10: A535 10

7.4 Incident Location and Layout

F11 . The incident occurred on the pipeline beach crossing (NNE beach) behind
the Apache Harriet Joint Venture (HJV) gas plant.

F12. A corridor containing 6 pipelines in close proximity to each other traverses the
NNE beach (see Attachment 5, Photos 4a) & 4b). Looking from the beach
towards the gas plant, from left to right, the pipelines are:

Pipe Pipe details Date installed Surface/buried at

(Licence) rupture site.
16" sales gas 75 mm Concrete weight coating
pipeline
4 mm Asphalt enamel corrosion
1999, 20 year
variation 9P/97-8 to coating (sub-sea section) surface
design life
PL 12, TPL 13, &
variation 1OP/97-8
to PL 17
6" Harriet to Stabilisation by trenching and
Varanus Island Gas mattresses offshore-no concrete
line weight coating 1988/89,20
buried
year design life
variation 1/91-2 to 0.4 mm fusion bonded epoxy
PL 12 & TPL5 corrosion coatin~
30" crude oil export 65 mm concrete weight coating
line
1986, 20 year Surface/partial
design life buried
O.4mm fusion bonded epoxy
PL 12 & TPL2 corrosion coating
12" sales gas 25mm concrete weight coating
pipeline
1992, 25 year
4.5mm Asphalt enamel corrosion buried
design life
Variation 1/91 -2 to coating (sub-sea section)
PL 12, TPL8, PL 17
Campbell/Sinbad to 25mm concrete weight coating.
Varanus Island 12"
infield pipeline 4mm Asphalt enamel corrosion 1992, 15 year
buried
coating design life
Variation 1/91-2 to
PL 12.
8" Harriet to Stabilisation by trenching offshore
Varanus Island oil
10 year design
line, O.4mm fusion bonded epoxy buried
life
corrosion coating
(PL 12, TPL 1)

The 6 pipelines are unequally spaced .

The smallest separation gap of 167 mm - as measured on 6 June 2008 -

was between the 12" sales gas line, the first pipeline to rupture, and the
adjacent 12" Campbell/Sinbad line, the second pipeline to rupture (see
Attachment 6, Sketch 1).

This separation distance is a contributory factor in the consequential rupture

of the Campbell Sinbad infield 12" gas pipeline, following the initial rupture of
the 12" sales gas pipeline.

Page 17 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 Review of the formal safety assessment section of the Pipeline Management
Plan for the pipelines indicated that Apache had recognised this as a
potential threat. The document identifies the threat as "failure of an adjacent
pipeline". Control measures were identified as being "minimum separation
between pipelines", and "inspection testing and monitoring of the adjacent
pipeline". The investigators found no information indicating what the
minimum separation distance should be. See discussion in section 7.9 with
respect to pipeline IMMR activities .

7.5 The Incident

F13. There is no evidence that there were any specific events (e.g. process
upsets) immediately prior to the incident, which may have triggered or
contributed to the incident.

F14. Four Apache pipelines ruptured during the incident:

• The 12" sales gas pipe line (ruptured on the beach)

• The Campbell/Sinbad to Varanus Island 12" infield gas pipeline
(ruptured on the beach)
• The 16" sales gas pipe line (ruptured at the top of the seawall
banking)
• The 6" Harriet gas line (ruptured on bend adjacent to 16" SDV 301 L)

F15. Prior to the incident, the pipelines which ruptured were being operated by
Apache within their design operating pressures and temperatures as shown
below.

Pipe Carried Operating Operating

substance Pressure Temperature
(kPa) (DC).

Maximum Actual Maximum Actual

Allowable Allowable
12" sales gas
pipeline to Dry sales
mainland gas 14500 11100 80 59

Campbell/Sinbad Wet gas

to Varanus Island and
12" infield 9700 5160 80 n/a
produced
pipeline water
16" sales gas
pipeline to Dry sales
mainland gas 20160 13200 70 50

6" Harriet to Wet gas

Varanus Island and
Gas line produced 9900 3570 65 34
water

F16. The composition of the fluids conveyed in the pipelines on the day of the
incident was generally within the range quoted in the PMP; the one exception
being the carbon dioxide (C0 2 ) level for the 12" and 16" sales gas lines,
which was between 3.2 and 3.6 mol%, above the 3.0 mol% quoted in the
PMP and 3.1 mol% stated in the TPL8 licence. Although CO 2 is known for its

Page 18 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 corrosive properties, the increased level of CO 2 is not seen as a factor
contributing to this incident in view of the identified failure modes of the
pipelines.

F17. The first line to rupture was the 12" sales gas line. This finding is based on
the following:

• Witness statements taken from control room operators and the

investigators' review of control room data provide evidence that
immediately following the initial rupture, the pressure reading in the
control room on the 12" sales gas pipeline dropped from 11100 kPa to
O. There was no pressure drop indicated on other lines at that time.
• Investigators on-site visual examination and subsequent forensic
testing by Pearl Street testing laboratory, Welshpool WA of the 12"
sales gas line revealed extensive external corrosion (pitting) and
thinning of the pipe wall (from approx 11 mm down to approximately
1.5 mm in a section of the rupture area). The corrosion was observed
along the full length of the ruptured section of the pipe, between 2
o'clock and 8 o'clock.

F18. The second line to rupture was the Campbell/Sinbad to Varanus Island 12"
infield gas pipeline. This is based on the following:

• Witness statements indicating 2 explosions were heard initially.

• The close proximity of this line to the 12" sales gas line.
• The investigators' review of the Varanus Island facility control room data
provided by Apache is inconclusive in indicating the time of this second
rupture, but does indicate that this line was intact prior to the rupture of
the 12" sales gas line.
• The investigators' visual examination and subsequent forensic testing by
Pearl Street, of the Campbell I Sin bad to Varanus Island 12" infield gas
pipeline, adjacent to the 12" sales gas line, revealed similar but smaller
areas of external corrosion. No other pipes in the vicinity showed similar
levels of external corrosion .

F19. The initial explosions occurred on the beach. The nearest elements of the
Apache HJV gas plant are located approximately 75m away, but are
approximately 5m above the level of the pipelines on the beach. Because of
this, the jet fires from the ruptured ends of the 12" pipelines were deflected by
the embankment up into the air, and did not impinge directly into the plant
areas (Attachment 5, Photos 2 and 3).

F20. The ruptures created a crater on the beach approximately 8m wide X 2m

deep X 30m long which exposed the buried pipes (Attachment 5 Photo 5).

F21. No obvious remote source of ignition has been identified. There was no hot
work being undertaken near the rupture site at the time, i.e. there was no
work, involving for example burning, welding or grinding, directly capable of
providing an ignition source.
Potential sources of ignition of the hydrocarbon release include:

• Pieces of ruptured pipes sparking when hitting each other or other

objects,

Page 19 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 • Stones, pieces of concrete and other debris hitting the HJV gas plant
(structure, electrical equipment and cabling) and causing sparks.

F22. As a result of the ruptures, the surrounding areas, including the NNE part of
the Apache HJV gas plant, were showered with rocks, smaller stones, gravel,
and pieces of concrete stability coating thrown from the pipelines Attachment
5 photo 12 shows the largest rock (17.5kg) found within the Apache HJV
plant area. Persons interviewed indicated this rock and other debris, were
not present within the plant area prior to the incident.

F23. Based on a review of tests conducted to date by PearlStreet testing

laboratory, Welsh pool WA on the ruptured pipe samples indicate that:

• The 12" sales gas line ruptured due to a mechanical failure

• The Campbell/Sinbad to Varanus Island 12" infield gas pipeline failed
due to the combination of mechanical and heat impact from the 12"
sales gas line rupture, explosion and fire
• The 16" sales gas line failed due to heat impact/radiation from earlier
fires and explosion
• The 6" Harriet gas line failed due to heat radiation/impact

F24. The 16" sales gas line, failed high on the embankment close to the 16" Shut
Down Valve (Attachment 5 Photo 10). Discharge from this line Get fire) was
away from the plant, towards the beach.

F25. The 16" sales gas line SDV valve position indicator in the Apache Varanus
Island facility control room showed that the valve was "in transit", suggesting
that it did not close properly on activation at the time of the incident.
Subsequent examination by Score Pacific concluded that the valve did move
to the closed position following the ESD initiation (see Attachment 5 Photo
16). The most likely cause of the "in transit" indication in the control room was
a faulty or misaligned valve position indicator. . .

F26. Following the initial ruptures and fire, three water monitors were activated by
the Apache Emergency Response Team (ERT) to create a protective water
cooling curtain between the fires and the plant (Attachment 5, Photo 2). This
action appears to have been effective in preventing more widespread
damage to the Apache HJV gas plant from radiant heat.

F27. At the time of the incident, the prevailing wind was blowing across the
pipelines, pushing the flames across the face of the HJV gas plant, not
towards it (see Attachment 4 Drawing 2).

F28. The metering station at the mainland compressor station (CS1) shut in
automatically due to pressure drop in both 12" and 16" lines. Later, the lines
were also isolated manually at this location by Apache personnel sent by
helicopter.

F29. The Apache production facilities on the island were isolated and blown down
through the elevated flares.

7.6 Post Incident Events

F30. All personnel were accounted for within approximately 20 minutes after the
incident, and initial muster alarm.

Page 20 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

F31. Out of 166 personnel on Varanus Island:

• 152 were evacuated off the island. Of those:

145 were evacuated by helicopters to Barrow Island where they were

provided with temporary accommodation. This required 13 helicopter
flights by 5 helicopters (one BK helicopter, two S76s and two Super
Pumas).
7 were evacuated by boat to Dampier.

• 14 personnel remained on the island overnight to monitor the situation.

7.7 Damage

Four pipelines ruptured during the event (see F14 for details).

F32. There was substantial damage due to fire and heat radiation to the Northern
corner section of the Apache HJV gas plant, including the Hot Oil unit, and
piping around the pipeline Pig launchers/receivers. This included physical
destruction of, or damage to, pipe racks, structures, electrical equipment,
vessels, valves and piping (see Drawing 2 in Attachment 4 & photos in
Attachment 5).

There was also some damage to the adjacent Apache HJV and ESJV plants
from flying debris and heat radiation.

Detailed assessment of the plant damage has not been carried out as part of this
investigation as this matter is outside the investigation Terms of Reference (see
Attachment 1 for details).

7.8 Failure Mechanism of the 12" Sales Gas Pipeline at Varanus Island NNE
Beach Crossing

The following explanation of the 12" sales gas pipeline failure mechanism is based
on the information available to date, which did not include final results and analysis
of forensic tests of pipe samples;

Pipe Sample Examination and Testing

At the time of writing, no testing that would permanently alter the pipe samples from
their 'as removed' condition, has been undertaken. The testing conducted to date
indicates the following:

• 12" sales gas pipeline

The pipe samples removed from both sides of the rupture point exhibit
extensive pitting due to corrosion of the external surface along the entire
length of the samples. Pipe wall thickness assessments are continuing,
however the results to date indicate that over a significant area, the wall
thickness has been reduced from a nominal 11.1 mm down to approximately
3mm to 4mm in areas, with some areas immediately adjacent to the rupture
point significantly less than that.

The pipe samples removed from both sides of the rupture point are devoid of
corrosion coating. It should be noted that the sample removed from the south

Page 21 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 side of the rupture point was largely exposed by the explosion and was
exposed to the subsequent jet fire and heat following ignition of the released
gas. The sample removed from the north side of the rupture remained largely
buried following the explosion and ignition of released gas and was therefore
shielded from the effects of the fire. It is therefore concluded that the
corrosion coating originally applied to this pipe section had deteriorated and
become dis-bonded prior to the incident occurring, and had not simply burned
away.

• 12" Campbell! Sinbad pipeline

The pipe samples removed from both sides of the rupture point exhibit areas
of localised pitting due to corrosion of the external surface. Pipe wall
thickness assessments are continuing, however the results to date indicate
that, in general, the pipe wall thickness has been maintained.

Despite being exposed to fire and radiant heat, the pipe sample removed
from the south side of the rupture point exhibits what is thought to be
corrosion coating residue over intermittent areas of the pipe sample along its
full length. This residue is flaking away from the pipe surface. Pitting of the
external pipe surface is evident beneath this residue.

The pipe sample removed from the north side of the rupture point shows no
signs of pitting to the external surface, and is devoid of corrosion coating
residue. It should be noted that this section of pipe was closest to the
adjacent 12"sales gas pipeline and the heat effects from the ignited gas
flowing from the ruptured end of that pipe.

Pipeline Corrosion

12" sales gas pipeline

In order for" corrosion of the external surface of the 12" sales gas pipelin·e to take
place, the corrosion coating must have failed. This coating failure may have been
due to incorrect application, damage to the coating either prior to, during, or after
installation, or loss of adhesion of the coating during operation. The evidence
available to date is insufficient to determine why the corrosion coating may have
failed.

F33. The extent and depth of corrosion indicates it is likely that the corrosion
occurred over a significant period.

The evidence also suggests that the cathodic protection system was
ineffective in providing an adequate level of protection to the section of pipe
in the environment where sea water either saturates or drains away from the
beach sand (refer photos 14 &15 Attachment 5, and section 7.10).

As a result, due to ongoing external corrosion, the pipeline wall thickness was
progressively reduced in a section of the rupture area from the original
nominal 11.1 mm down to 1.5 mm (this includes thickness reduction / necking
due to material yield).

F34. Although pre-yield wall thickness measurements are not available, the
evidence indicates that on the day of the incident the pipe wall was subject to
a stress level beyond its minimum yield strength. Progressive metal yield and
increase in the pipe diameter raised stresses beyond the ultimate tensile

Page 22 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 strength of the metal resulting in the catastrophic failure of the pipeline. This
occurred under normal process operating conditions (see F. 15)

F35. There is no evidence to indicate that the localised external pitting and
resulting loss of wall thickness evident on the pipe samples removed from the
beach crossing section of the 12" Campbell / Sinbad pipeline was a factor in
this incident.

Apache Pipelines IMMR (Inspection Maintenance and Monitoring Regime)

Apache Safety Case and Pipeline Management Plan

As discussed in section 5.2, the pipeline licence PL 12 held by Apache NorthWest

Pty Ltd and its co-licensees, in conjunction with the P(SL)A82 and its regulations,
require that a Safety Case (SC) be in force for Varanus Island and for the offshore
facilities around Varanus Island. Apache has a single safety case document
addressing the management of the onshore Varanus Island plant and all of the
offshore facilities connected to Varanus Island. This document is known as the
Varanus Hub Safety Case. A component part of the Varanus Hub Safety Case is the
Safety Management System description (SMS), which describes how safety is
managed on these Apache facilities. The safety management system provides for all
activities envisaged to be undertaken on these facilities, with a focus on:

• The identification of hazards and assessment of risks to the health and safety
of people associated with undertaking those activities;
• The implementation of control measures to reduce the risk to personnel to a
level as low as reasonably practicable;
• The ongoing inspection, monitoring and maintenance of control measures
associated with these risks.

One of the key elements of the Apache Safety Management System (SMS) is
Element 7 "Integrity Management". This 'SMS element sets out in general terms , '
Apache arrangements for inspection, maintenance and monitoring of process
facilities, wells and pipelines throughout their lifespan. Apache has an Integrity Policy
which sits alongside its Occupational Health and Safety Policy. In order to meet the
commitments of these policies, management systems have been developed . These
are:

• The Maintenance Management System

• The Corrosion and Inspection Management System
• The Maintenance strategy for safety critical equipment

In addition to the safety case requirement, the P(SL)A82 and its regulations require
that a Pipeline Management Plan (PMP) be in force for facilities that are pipelines. A
component part of the PMP is the description of the management system, which sets
out arrangements for managing all pipelines operated by Apache on the North West
Shelf. Its primary aim is to ensure that the integrity of the pipelines is maintained
throughout their operational life cycle while safeguarding personnel and the
environment.

The Apache SC and PMP management systems are supported by a suite of Apache
policies, systems, manuals and procedures pertaining to integrity management. Two
documents, in particular, set out the specifics of the current framework for inspection,
monitoring, maintenance, and repair (IMMR) activities relative to pipelines. These
documents are :

Page 23 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 • Onshore Pipeline Inspection Manual (AEL Document OP-14-MG-001) and
• Underwater Inspection Manual (AEL Document AE-00-MG-006)

The Onshore Pipeline Inspection Manual is stated to be applicable to the "onshore"

section of the 12" sales gas pipeline. Onshore is defined as being that part of the
pipeline between landfall and the pipeline termination or Pig launcher/receiver. The
term "Landfall" is not defined ; however it is reasonable to conclude that this
document is applicable to the section of pipeline on the beach at the Apache facility
on Varanus Island at which the rupture occurred , since this area is readily accessible
on foot. The cover sheet for this document indicates it was developed in 1997. The
most recent revision is Revision 4, issued for use on the 22/3/06. At the time of
writing , and on the basis of the information provided by Apache, it is unclear what
document was in place and applicable to the onshore section of the 12" sales gas
pipeline prior to the creation of the Onshore Pipeline Inspection Manual.

The Apache Onshore Pipeline Inspection Manual states that the philosophy for
inspection shall be consistent with that described in the applicable pipeline standard ,
AS2885.3-2001. The standard states that pipeline surveillance and inspection
frequencies shall be based on the past reliability of the pipeline, historical records,
current knowledge of its condition, the rate of deterioration of the pipeline and
statutory requirements. In lieu of this approach, the Onshore Pipeline Inspection
Manual cites that an annual frequency is to be applied. The document describes a
typical inspection programme for onshore pipelines:

• Annual topographical survey in surf zone/beach area

• Annual visual inspection of unburied pipework to determine the condition of
the coating , general corrosion and physical damage
• Annual cathodic protection (CP) su rvey to ensure an adequate level of
cathodic protection is being maintained at each test post
• Ann\Jal line walk checking condition of CP anq other marker posts,. including
the use of gas detector to identify any leaks
• Annual checks on surge protection systems and static earth system

The Underwater Inspection Manual describes the means by which Apache manages
and performs underwater inspection activities on all of its offshore assets. It includes
the subsea sections of pipelines. The document describes 4 different levels of
pipeline survey:

• Level I surveys are undertaken using side scan sonar and Remotely
Operated Vehicle (ROV). Should a level I survey indicate that damage has
occurred , then a level II survey is undertaken.
• Level II surveys are carried out using ROV and comprise a visual and
cathodic protection survey. Should significant structural damage be detected
then a Level III survey should be undertaken.
• Level III surveys are undertaken using ROV or divers to examine specific
characteristics of anomalies identified during the Level II survey. Any
significant damage detected during a level III survey would become the basis
for initiating a level IV su rvey.
• Level IV surveys consist of underwater non-destructive testing of areas
based on the results of Level III surveys. In addition to this, Intelligent
Pigging of the pipeline may be considered to assess the inside condition of
the pipeline, and particularly any loss of wall thickness that may have
occurred.

Page 24 or 88 OBJ 10: A53510

The document states that level 1 surveys shall be conducted at least every 3 years,
Level II surveys at least every 3 years, Level III surveys after the discovery of
suspected defect areas, and level IV surveys as required.

There is no prescribed frequency for undertaking intelligent pig surveys in either the
onshore or under-water portions of the pipelines.

Codes and Standards

The pipeline licence PL 12 variation 1/91 -2 held by Apache NorthWest Pty Ltd and
its co-licensees, as applicable to the section of the 12" sales gas pipeline located
onshore Varanus Island, states that the pipeline will be designed, constructed,
operated and maintained in accordance with Australian Standard AS2885-1987
Pipelines-Gas and Liquid Petroleum (the SM Pipeline Code). This standard was in
force in 1992 when the 12" sales gas pipeline was designed, constructed, installed
and commenced operation. This standard has evolved since 1987 such that the
current version now comprises 5 parts, each dealing with a specific area. Australian
Standard AS2885.3-2001 Pipelines-Gas and Liquid Petroleum Part 3, discusses the
requirements for the Operation and Maintenance of pipelines. The requirements of
the earlier version and the current version are slightly different.

AS2885-1987 is prescriptive in that it determines the frequency of inspection of the

CP system for a pipeline. The standard requires that:

• Surveys of cathodic protection potential shall be made at intervals of not

more than 12 months, or where cathodic protection potentials may be
affected by stray DC currents, survey intervals of cathodic protection
potentials shall be approved. Galvanic anode cathodic protection
installations shall be monitored at intervals of not more than 12 months to
ensure their operation.
• the efficacy of a galvanic anode ' cathodic protection installation shall be
established within a period of not more than 12 months of its installation. The
installation shall be monitored at intervals of not more than 5 years to ensure
operation, but intervals may be shortened during the approach of the end of
the design life.

AS2885 .3-2001 does not include any prescriptive requirements that dictate the
frequency of inspections or surveys for operating pipelines. The standard states that
pipeline surveillance and inspection frequencies shall be based on the past reliability
of the pipeline, historical records, current knowledge of its condition, the rate of
deterioration of the pipe and statutory requirements .

Apache references this later version of the standard in its Onshore Pipeline
Inspection Manual.

Pipeline Licence

Apache is also required to comply with the prescriptive requirements for pipeline
inspection, maintenance, monitoring and reporting set out in the relevant pipeline
licences. For the section of the 12" sales gas pipeline located onshore Varanus
Island, the relevant licence is PL 12 variation 1/91-2.

Page 25 or8B OBJ 10: A53510

PL 12 variation 1/91-2 states that:

• The licensee shall be responsible for installing and monitoring the cathodic
protection test points.
• The licensee shall, when required, submit to the Director a report in writing
outlining the results of the corrosion surveys and the details of any resulting
action by the licensee.
• The licensee shall carry out an annual external survey of the pipeline after the
cyclone season and the results of the survey shall be submitted to the
director in writing.

There are no other prescriptive requirements relevant to pipeline inspection or

surveys within this licence variation.

7.9.1 Apache Resources and Organisation

Element 1 in the SMS section of the Apache Energy Ltd . SC and PMP outlines the
personnel responsibilities and organisational arrangements within Apache .

Whilst the Apache Managing Director has the overall responsibility for Apache
operations on Varanus Island, the Apache Production Manager has the responsibility
for the implementation of Apache's integrity policy, including the implementation of
the pipeline inspection and corrosion management measures.

Based on a review of Apache documents , two senior engineers report to the

Production Manager. These are:

• The Senior Integrity Engineer; principally responsible for the identification,

implementation and maintenance of the facilities (including pipelines)
corrosion and inspection activities, condition monitoring and recommendation
of r~medial actions. Key .responsibilities include:

Corrosion Risk Assessment

Development and maintenance of the inspection plans
Scheduling and planning of intelligent Pigging activities
Development of procedures and instructions relating to corrosion and
inspection activities
Analysis of results, assessment of anomalies and recommendation of
corrective actions

• The Senior Corrosion Engineer; principally works in coordination with the

Senior Integrity Engineer in areas of corrosion monitoring, coating and
materials selection. Notable responsibilities include:
Development of corrosion monitoring obligations based on all known
hazards
Recommendation regarding materials selection for repairs,
replacement and additions to facilities,
Management of coatings , including selection of systems, monitoring
and repair

Other personnel in the integrity management group include:

• Subsea Engineer
• Field Superintendent and
• Support personnel and contractors

Page 26 or 88 OBJ /0: A53510

The organisational structure applied to facility integrity management is shown in
detail on page 8 of the Apache Integrity Management and Competencies Description
Doc No AE -91-IO-001, Rev 0, issued January 2008. The investigators were unable
to establish, on the basis of the information provided by Apache, whether:
• There are present incumbents of all positions and
• Which positions are held by Apache employees and which by contractor
company employees.

On the basis of the available information, the investigators were unable to determine
whether the level of resources (historically and at the time of the incident) provided
by Apache was adequate, and whether it was a factor which contributed to this
incident. In particular, no information was produced by Apache or found by the
investigators that demonstrated the adequacy of the provided resources (personnel ,
finance and material) and how the required level of resources was maintained over
time.

The investigators noted , however, that the Lloyd's Register report titled "Apache
Energy Limited, PL 12 Validation Summary Report May 2006 - April 2007" dated 10
May 2007, states on page 14:

"It was observed that manning levels, at Apache, in various disciplines, are low with
key competencies contracted out and / or residing with specific individuals. "

F36. Apache 's management of personnel resources and organisational

responsibilities for pipeline integrity management may have been a
contributory factor in the incident.

7.9 .2 Apache' s Use of Contractors

Apache makes use 'of large and small contractor companies including individual
consultants to fulfil resou rce needs in areas where its in-house expertise is limited or
unavailable. The use of contractors extends to pipelines (installation, inspection,
monitoring and assessment) and involves:

• Corrosion monitoring, chemical and cathodic protection contractors;

• Pigging contractors;
• Integrity and pipeline engineers;
• Corrosion experts and coating contractors
• Diving contractors
• ROV and side scan survey contractors
• Inspection contractors and Certifying Authorities (e .g. Lloyd's, ABS or
DNV) .

Apache has a number of systems and procedures for the management of

contractors . These include:

• "Assurance of contractor safety management" (Doc. No. AE-00-ZF-037)

• "Procedure for preparation and approval of contractors for service" (Doc. No.
AE-91 -IQ-030 Rev C)
• "Procedure for mobilising contractors to site" (Doc. No. AE-00-ZF-012)

Page 27 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Since the commencement of Apache operations at its Varanus Island facilities a
number of specialist companies have been contracted by Apache to carry out
inspections, surveys and assessments, relating to the integrity, including inspection
and maintenance arrangements, of the Apache operated pipelines at or connected
to the Apache facilities at Varanus Island.

Whilst the reports issued by Apache's contractors have often contained

recommendations for improvement, their general conclusions with respect to the
condition of equipment (i.e. the pipeline) and how its integrity is managed are
positive. Some example comments from such reports are:

• Sales Gas line 5 year integrity review SP-14-RL-067, May 2007, by Subsea
Developments:

"There are no findings from the integrity management processes performed

for the sales gas pipelines that provide any reason for any changes to the
ongoing IMR activities that are not already being addressed in the current
risk assessments and anomaly tracking and close out practices"

"The AEL Pipeline Integrity Management process is generally following the

requirements of AS2885 and any specifics included in the pipeline license for
the Sales Gas Pipelines".

• Lloyd's Report titled "Apache Energy Limited, PL 12 Validation Summary

Report May 2006 - April 2007" dated 10 May 2007 states on page 2:

"Provisions were found to be in place with continuous improvement process

to ensure safety of the operational phase and technical integrity for ongoing
operations of the Varanus Island whole plant and facilities covered by PL 12
as fit for purpose for the next 21 years"

and' on page 7

"based on preliminary review from initial information gathering and gap

analysis, the operation was considered to be covered by a comprehensive
integrity management system, sufficient to validate operation for approval for
pipeline licence revalidation for the next 21 years"

Broad statements such as these may have been based on limited information, and
not on a comprehensive physical inspection of equipment, or a review of all aspects
of its operation , inspection, maintenance and repair.

This is particularly relevant to the 12" sales gas pipeline, with 1 documented
inspection by a contractor of the Varanus Island shore crossing section carried out
since its construction in 1992.

F37 In general this investigation found that the link between source data and
conclusions in the reports were unclear. Apache apparently used these
reports as a basis to plan the inspection, maintenance and repair activities of
its pipelines and to assure itself and the regulator that the pipelines were safe
to operate.

Page 28 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

7.9.3 Apache 12" Sale Gas Pipeline IMMR

The investigation team requested from Apache all records of inspection, monitoring,
maintenance and repair activity documentation related to the 12" sales gas pipeline,
since the commencement of operations in 1992.

Following a review of the documentation provided, the investigation team compiled

an IMMR summary table detailing the activities undertaken, when they were
undertaken, and importantly, to what part of the 12" sales gas pipeline the activity
applied. This chart is included as Attachment 8 Table 1.

This was then compared against those activities that Apache was required to
undertake, either by their own documentation, relevant standards, or by conditions in
the applicable pipeline licences held by Apache NorthWest Pty Ltd. and its co-
licensees. These requirements are summarised in a similar table included as
Attachment 8 Table 2.

The investigation team found that:

F38. Variation 1/91-2 to PL 12 (the pipeline licence applicable to the onshore

Varanus Island section of the Apache 12" sales gas pipeline) states that the
licensee shall carry out an annual external survey of the pipeline after the
cyclone season and the results of the survey shall be submitted to the
Director in writing.

From the information provided, regular annual external surveys of the section
of the pipeline onshore Varanus Island did not occur. It is recognised that
surveys of subsea and mainland sections of the pipeline have occurred.
However, in the period 1992 to 2008, there were two documented visual
inspections of the section of the pipeline onshore Varanus Island. It is
unclear whether the results of these reports were provided to the Director,
PRD of DolR as required. These surveys are detailed in the following
docu mentation :

• Varanus Island Ultra shallow water and onshore pipeline inspection,

OP-14-RU-002 , performed in October 2004.
• 2007 Onshore Pipeline Inspection workbook, Sept 2007.

The ultra shallow water and onshore pipeline inspection in 2004 was
undertaken by a contractor to Apache, Netlink Inspection Services. The
report highlights 10 anomalies, one of which pertains to the 12" sales gas
pipeline. This anomaly related to an area of missing weight coating at
pipeline location KP69.703. Apache has provided no information indicating
what action was proposed or taken to rectify this anomaly. Shortly after the
incident on 3 June 2008, it was noted that this anomaly was still present and
apparently degenerated since 2004.

The 2004 report also indicates that there were areas of corrosion and
damage on the onshore section of the pipeline however these were
apparently not significant enough to be categorised as anomalies in the
report. No cathodic protection readings for the 12" sales gas pipeline were
taken during this inspection.

The 2007 Onshore Pipeline Inspection Workbook is a record of Apache

inspections as required by the Apache Onshore Pipeline Inspection Manual

Page 29 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 for a number of pipelines located onshore Varanus Island , including the 12"
sales gas pipeline. The workbook includes a completed, pipeline general
visual inspection record sheet for the Apache 12" sales gas pipeline. A
single CP reading is provided. No anomalies are recorded. However, it is
noted that a significant proportion of this onshore section is buried , and
hence inaccessible for external visual inspection unless excavated .
Excavation of the Agincourt pipeline appears to have been undertaken in
2007 according to the Onshore Pipeline Inspection Workbook for that year. It
is not clear from the inspection report whether this excavation was for
inspection purposes or for remedial works.

A review commissioned by Apache in 2004 highlighted the lack of pipeline

inspection data from the shore crossing zones on Varanus Island :

Review of Apache Energy Pipelines 2004, SP-14-RF-003 .01/03, by QCL

International cites :

"In general it was found that very little inspection data was available for
onshore pipeline sections on Varanus Island , shore sections and subsea
risers ."

"The onshore pipelines on Varanus Island are monitored visually during

standard operations on the island and inspection data is therefore often not
documented. It is also recommended that the inspection procedures for
offshore and onshore inspections should be modified to ensure that the
offshore section is inspected during HAT, and the onshore section is
inspected during LAT, ensuring sufficient overlap"

"At present the shore zones do not seem to be included in either of the
standard inspection work scopes"

F39. Variation 1/91 -2 to PL ·12 (the pipeline licehce applicable to the onshore
Varanus Island section of the 12" sales gas pipeline) states that the licensee
shall be responsible for installing and monitoring the cathodic protection test
points. The licensee shall, when required, submit to the Director a report in
writing outlining the results of the corrosion surveys and the details of any
resulting action by the licensee.

From the information provided , monitoring of the cathodic protection system

onshore Varanus Island occurred in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008 . Records of
these inspections are detailed in:

• Offshore pipelines-onshore section cathodic protection survey August

2004, OP-14-RU -003
• VI Offshore pipework monitoring 18/6/06
• VI Offshore pipework monitoring 18/6/07
• 2007 Onshore pipeline Inspection workbook, Sept 2007.
• VI Offshore pipework monitoring MCC building 2008

The investigation team were unable to find any evidence of the Director, PRD
of DolR requiring any reports outlining the results of the surveys.

F40. The Apache Onshore Pipeline Inspection Manual is applicable to the section
of the 12" sales gas pipeline located onshore Varanus Island.

Page 30 or 88 OBJ 10: A535 10

 This document indicates that a typical inspection programme for onshore
pipelines comprises:
• Annual topographical survey in surf zone / beach area
• Annual visual inspection of unburied pipework to determine the
condition of the coating, general corrosion and physical damage
• Annual cathodic protection (CP) survey to ensure an adequate level of
cathodic protection is being maintained at each test post
• Annual line walk checking condition of CP and other marker posts,
including the use of gas detector to identify any leaks
• Annual checks on surge protection systems and static earth system

From the evidence provided to the investigators by Apache, no annual

topographical surveys of the pipeline in the surf/beach zone area were
undertaken. As discussed above, visual inspections of the pipeline were
undertaken on 2 occasions, 2004 and 2007. Also as discussed above,
cathodic protection readings from the 12" sales gas pipeline in the beach
crossing area were taken in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008.

F41 . From the information provided by Apache, it appears that Apache did not
undertake any maintenance or repair activities on the section of the 12" sales
gas pipeline onshore Varanus Island since its installation in 1992.

F42. On the basis of the information provided by Apache, an appropriate

documented regime for pipeline inspection, maintenance, monitoring and
repair is in place, and this regime is consistent with that required by the
relevant standards and the requirements of the pipeline licence. However,
the available evidence indicates that some aspects of these systems and
processes may not have been rigorously implemented since the pipeline was
installed in 1992.

7.10 Apache 12" Sales Gas Pipeline and Cathodic Protection System Design

The 12" sales gas pipeline was designed and constructed in accordance with
AS2885 -1987 . The following table summarises key design parameters for the 12"
sales gas pipeline:

P'Ipe rme
Outside diameter 324 mm
Maximum allowable working pressure 14500 kPa
Wall thickness 11.1 mm
Design temperature 10-80 DC
Material API- 5L X60
Minimum yield strength 413 MPa
Corrosion coating 4.5 mm Asphalt Enamel
Corrosion allowance 3mm
Weight coating 25 mm
Substance to be conveyed Natural gas (as specified in the PL 12
and TPL8)
Design Code AS 2885
Year installed 1992
Design life 25 Years

AS2832
Bracelet anodes - offshore section onl

Page 3 1 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 The Apache Pipeline Management Plan, document SP-90-RL-002, is applicable to
the full length of the 12" sales gas pipeline. The PMP provides a detailed description
of the 12" sales gas pipeline . All significant pipeline accident events for the pipeline
are identified and assessed. Mitigation measures are identified to reduce the risk of
significant pipeline accident events to a level that is as low as reasonably
practicable.

The formal safety assessment section of the PMP identifies external corrosion as a
hazard to the 12" sales gas pipeline in the subsea, shore crossing and onshore
sections of the pipeline. For the onshore section, external corrosion is assessed as
being of medium risk. At the shore crossing and subsea sections, external corrosion
is assessed as being of low risk.

For each hazard , physical and procedural preventative or mitigation measures, are
identified as follows :

Protection measure Onshore Shore crossing Subsea

section section section
Physical protection measure - Anti
applicable applicable applicable
corrosion coating
Physical protection measure - Cathodic
applicable applicable
Protection system
Procedural protection measure -
Inspection testing and monitoring, applicable
including IP survey
Procedural protection measure-
Inspection testing and monitoring, applicable applicable
including ROV/IP survey

From the above it can be seen that Apache has identified two physical barriers
against external corrosion of the pipeline for the shore crossing and subsea sections
of the pipeiine. . .

However, only one physical protection measure is identified for the onshore section,
this being the anti corrosion coating. Inspection testing and monitoring is cited as a
procedural barrier. The drawings included in the PMP indicate that the onshore
Varanus Island section of the 12" sales gas pipeline is not considered to be
protected by a cathodic protection system .

In practice however, based on the nature of CP readings being taken and other
factors , it appears that Apache considered that the cathodic protection system in
place and active on the subsea and shore crossing sections of the 12" sales gas
pipeline, carries over onto the Varanus Island onshore section and provides some
protection against corrosion.

In order for corrosion to take place, the anti-corrosion coating must fail, either due to
mechanical damage or loss of adhesion . The evidence available to date is
insufficient to determine why the corrosion coating may have failed .

F43. Based on examination of samples of the ruptured pipelines by Pearl Street

Testing Laboratory, Welsh pool WA and the investigators, the anti-corrosion
coating at the beach crossing was ineffective due to mechanical damage or
loss of adhesion resulting in dis-bondment from the pipe.

Page 32 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 The CP system's role is to prevent corrosion if the first barrier, the corrosion
coating, has failed.

The key elements of the system are sacrificial anodes attached to the
pipeline. In this configuration the generated currents flow from the anodes
through the sea water (electrolyte) to the pipeline . Areas which the current
leaves are corroded (sacrificial anodes). Areas where the current enters
(pipeline) are protected.

The effectiveness of the CP system is dependent on the ability of the current

to flow between the anode and the pipe. Subsea, current will flow freely
through the seawater medium. However, at the beach crossing section the
ability of the current to flow is affected by the environmental conditions. At
the beach crossing section the pipeline was buried in sand which was either
saturated with, or drained of, sea water, dependent on tidal movements. This
results in fluctuations in sand resistivity, with drained sand having higher
resistivity affecting the CP current flow. To counter this effect, more negative
CP potentials are needed. Such potentials were not available for the beach
crossing section from the offshore bracelet anodes. There were no other
(onshore) anodes installed to provide cover for this section of the pipe.

F44. On the basis of the available evidence, no aspects of the design of the 12"
sales gas pipeline have been identified (excluding the CP system), which
contributed to this incident.

F45. The available evidence indicates that the design of the CP system for the
offshore section of the 12" sales gas pipeline, would not offer sufficiently
negative potentials to protect the wet / dry transition section of the beach
crossing of the Apache 12" sales gas pipeline located on Varanus Island.

8. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions are drawn by the investigation team based on the
evidence available to date.

The information gathered during the investigation was examined using the TapRoot®
root cause analysis technique. The event analysis chart developed by the
investigation team (Attachment 9) shows the sequence of events, existing conditions
and causal factors.

8.1 Immediate Cause of the Incident

The immediate cause of the incident was the rupture of the Apache 12" sales gas
pipeline due to excessive stresses in the pipe wall.

Thinning of the pipe wall as a consequence of extensive external corrosion of the

pipe resulted in excessive stresses culminating in rupture of the pipe at the beach
crossing at the Apache facility on Varanus Island.

Page 33 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

8.2 Main Causal Factors

The main causal factors of the incident were :

1. Ineffective anti-corrosion coating at the beach crossing section of the Apache

12" sales gas pipeline, due to damage and/or dis-bondment from the pipeline.

2. Ineffective cathodic protection of the wet / dry transition zone of the beach
crossing section of the Apache 12" sales gas pipeline on Varanus Island.

This is because:

a) Sufficiently negative cathodic protection potentials required to provide

effective cathodic protection in sandy environment were not available
from the existing offshore bracelet anodes ,
b) No onshore anodes were installed on the onshore/beach section of
the pipeline.

3. Ineffective inspection and monitoring by Apache of the beach crossing and

shallow water section of the Apache 12" sales gas pipeline on Varanus
Island.

This is because:

a) The external corrosion problem was not detected and addressed at

this location, although the available evidence indicates that the
corrosion progressively affected the pipe over a period of 15 years or
more until the pipeline failed .
b) The technique used to take cathodic protection readings to monitor
the operation of pipeline protectidn was inappropriate for the
environment in which the readings were taken as it did not allow for
the effect of changing resistivity in the wet and dry sandy
environment. The limited cathodic potential measurements taken
suggested to Apache personnel that the pipeline was adequately
protected, which was not the case.
c) Although the Apache 12" sales gas pipeline was built in 1992, there is
a lack of historical documentary inspection data related to the
Varanus Island onshore section of the 12" sales gas pipeline, with
evidence limited to:

• One ultra shallow water and onshore pipeline inspection

undertaken in 2004 . This inspection covered the onshore
beach section of the pipeline but did not comment on the
buried sections of pipeline .

• One documented general pipeline inspection undertaken in

2007. This inspection covered the onshore beach section of
the pipeline but did not comment on the buried section of
pipeline.

d) The Apache inspection regime did not specifically address the

transition section between the subsea and shore crossing sections of

Page 34 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 the pipeline, by for example undertaking inspections at both HAT and
LAT to ensure full inspection coverage in this area.

8.3 Other Factors

The following factors were also found to be relevant to the incident:

1. No Intelligent Pig inspection of the 12" sales gas pipeline was carried out
since the pipeline was constructed in 1992. Although this is not a prescribed
requirement, such an inspection could have led to the prevention of the
incident occurring as it would have detected the pipeline wall thickness metal
loss at the Varanus Island beach crossing.

In response to specific questions from the investigators on this matter,

Apache stated in a letter ("Corporate Response by Apache Northwest Pty Ltd
to the Questions posed by the DolR for the Production Manager, Ivor
Alexander") dated 8 September 2008 that "In 1998, there was some
discussion by a consultant of whether pigging might be done on the 12" line,
with a focus on the mangrove area of the mainland side of the line. The
suggestion was not adopted."

This statement may be referring to the Apache commissioned QCL

International Corrosion risk assessment of certain pipelines and plant
equipment, undertaken in 1997/8. The resulting report, LTS, Sinbad,
Campbell and Compressor Station 1 Corrosion Risk Assessment and
Inspection Scheme, HE-00-MN -003 Rev 1 issued Sept 1998, considered the
risks of internal and external corrosion to the 12" sales gas pipeline.

The report states that that the risk to the pipeline from internal corrosion is
minimal.

The report also states that the ·pipeline is protected from the risks from
external corrosion in the subsea section, as long as the mitigation measures
in place , i.e . the corrosion coating and cathodic protection system, are
monitored, maintained and inspected.

However, the report does recognise that there is a significant risk to the
pipeline due to external corrosion in the coastal and onshore sections.
Section 7.5 of the report states:

"The onshore section, particularly in the coastal mangrove areas, is less

certain. Variation in local soil conditions means that the current requirement
for full protection varies considerably. The location and conditions mean that
close interval potential surveys are difficult, and so detailed checks for
adequate potential in all areas are not currently performed."

"Coastal mangrove waters are more aggressive towards coatings and require
higher polarising currents than open, deep cold seawater. The combination
of warmer conditions, biological activity and tidal effects, mean that the
coastal section is more at risk of external failure than any other part of the
pipeline. Therefore it is important that cathodic protection surveys be carried
out. "

Page 35 or 88 OBJ 10: A535 10

 The report discusses the intelligent pigging option:

"The requirement for intelligent pigging on this line is dictated by the external
corrosion hazard, particularly in the coastal mangrove section of the line. The
most serious risk to the continuing integrity of the pipeline is where the
coating has disbonded, creating a region of wet, bare metal shielded from
corrosion protection current. Corrosion may occur despite adequate cathodic
protection potentials. This is a risk on all coated pipelines, but is most
significant on onshore/inshore lines, particularly under tube wraps and shrink
type field weld coatings. The only methods of detecting such failures are
either to excavate all field joins, or to run an intelligent pig."

The report concludes:

"The economic and safety consequences of a failure of the sales gas

pipeline, coupled with the difficulty of surveying the coastal section, and the
risk of coating disbondment failure mean that regular intelligent pigging of the
line is justified. To save cost, this survey may be concentrated on the coastal
and onshore sections of the line. The period is arbitrary - a figure of 5 years
is suggested, meaning that an intelligent pig run will be necessary next year.
Further surveys will be required depending on the results ."

Whilst the report does not specifically mention the Varanus Island beach
crossing section it is clear that Apache was made aware of significant
external corrosion risks to the coastal and onshore sections of the pipeline.

Apache provided no explanation as to why the recommendation to conduct

Intelligent Pigging to survey / monitor the pipeline for external corrosion, was
not followed .

2. It is noted that an Intelligent Pig inspection' of the 12" sales gas line was
scheduled to be conducted subsequent to the repair works carried out as a
result of the incident on 3 June 2008.

3. Close proximity of the pipelines to each other in the beach crossing zone on
Varanus Island was a factor in the escalation of the event.

9. POSSIBLE BREACHES OF LEG ISLATION

The investigation identified the following sections of legislation within the Petroleum
Pipeline Act 1969 where possible breaches may have occurred:

Section 36A: Work Practices

A licensee shall operate the pipeline specified in the licence of which he is the
registered holder in a proper and workmanlike manner and shall secure the safety,
health and welfare of persons engaged in operations in connection with the pipeline

Section 38b: Marking of Pipeline and maintenance etc. of property

A licensee-

(b) shall maintain the pipeline in good condition and repair; and

Page 36 of 88 OBJ /0: A53510

The investigation also identified the following section of legislation within the
Petroleum Pipelines Regulations 1970 where possible breaches may have occurred:

Regulation 10: Pipeline Construction and operation requirements

The construction and operation of a pipeline shall be carried out-

(a) in a proper and workmanlike manner;

(b) in accordance with good pipeline construction and operation practice; and
(c) in such manner as to ensure the safety health and welfare of persons engaged in
the construction or operation

Some findings contained in this document may also constitute non-compliance with
pipeline licence conditions.

Page 37 or88 OBJ 10: A53510

10. ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1 - Investigation terms of reference

Attachment 2 - Lines of investigation

Table 1- Lines of investigation
Table 2 -Information Log

Attachment 3 - Maps
Map 2 - North West Shelf oil and gas facilities

Attachment 4 - Drawings
Drawing 1 - Varanus Island production facilities
Drawing 2 - Beach explosion

Attachment 5 - Photographs
Photo 1 Varanus Island
Photo 2 Varanus Island fire and explosion
incident, view from helicopter
Photo 3 Varanus Island NNE beach, incident site
Photo 4 a) Ruptured 12" pipelines
Photo 4 b) Ruptured 12" pipelines
Photo 5 Explosion crater
Photo 6 30" crude export line, suck back pump cage
Photo 7 Seawall banking
Photo 8 Damaged gas plant
Photo 9 16" SDV (gas export line)
Photo 10 Ruptured 16" sales gas line
Photo 11 Ruptured 6" Harriet gas line
Photo 12 Debris in HJV gas plant (compressors) area
Photo 13 Seawall banking water and jet fire erosion
Photo 14 Ruptured section 12" sales gas line,
external corrosion and wall thinning
Photo 15 Ruptured section 12" sales gas line,
external corrosion
Photo 16 Inside view of 16" SDV, ball in closed
position

Attachment 6 - Sketch
Sketch 1 - Incident site, pipelines proximity

Attachment 7 - List of interviewees

Attachment 8 - Pipeline IMMR activities

Table 1 - Pipeline IMMR activities
Table 2 - Prescriptive requirements

Attachment 9 - Event Analysis Chart

Page 38 or88 OBJ 10: A53510

 Attachment 1

Investigation into pipeline rupture and fire on Varanus Island which

occurred on Tuesday, 3 June 2008

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Investigation to be undertaken by DolR /NOPSA Investigation Team

9 July 2008 (revised)

BACKGROUND

Western Australia's Department of Industry and Resources is assessing the

damage at the Apache Varanus Island facilities, which are licensed under the
Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969 (PPA1969) as PL 12 and/or the Petroleum
(Submerged Lands) Act 1982 as TPL 8.

The Department of Industry and Resources is responsible for regulating the

safety and integrity of facilities on Varanus Island under the Petroleum
Pipelines Act.

The Department has been administering these responsibilities with input from
the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) under a service
level agreement and other sources.

The Department has authorized an investigation into the incident which is

currently being undertaken by a team consisting of two NOPSA
. representatives ~nd one departmental inspector appointed under the
Petroleum Pipelines Act.

The "Incident" means the failure of pipelines on the NNE beach approach and
the resultant explosions and fire.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the investigation is to:

1. Fulfil the request from the Director, PRO of DolR on 4 June 2008 to
assist in the conduct of an investigation under the terms of the Service
Contract dated 6 July 2007 between WA DolR and NOPSA.
2. Gather information and interview people in a manner that does not
compromise potential legal action. (This to be achieved through the
direction of the WA DolR representative on the investigation team).
3. Identify the facts and events relevant to the Incident.
4. Identify the likely cause(s) of the Incident.
5. Identify potential breaches of legislation based on the legal advice and
direction provided by Dol R.
6. Formally gather evidence consistent with the requirements of Dol R as
advised by the investigation team DolR Inspector.

Page 39 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

SCOPE

The investigation will endeavour to address:

1. The pertinent sequence of events on Varanus Island during the

Incident.
2. The likely cause(s) of the Incident.
3. Any actions and omissions by the operator of the Varanus Island
facility, or its contractors, leading up to the Incident and during the
Incident that may have contributed to the cause of the Incident.
4. The identification of any potential for injury to persons arising directly
from the fire and explosion(s) at the time of the incident.

The investigation will be conducted in the context of, and will have regard to,
good industry practice, the commitments made by the operator in respect of
its operation of the Varanus Island facilities and in the context of the
applicable laws and licence requirements as detailed to the investigation team
by DolR.

The investigation will not address:

• Events that occurred after the incident except where they are directly
relevant to items 1- 4 of the scope detailed above.
• Assessment of the damage to facilities on the island except where
directly relevant to the scope detailed above.
• Adequacy of the arrangements for repair and re-instatement of
damaged plant and equipment.

REQUIREMENTS
DolR may need to require or provide for certain matters pertaining to the
investigation. These include:
1. Obtaining information from the Operator and other parties that is
considered by the investigation team to be required to assist the
investigation .
2. Exercise of powers under the WA Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969.
3. Engagement of independent experts relating to, for example,
metallurgy and corrosion mechanisms.

DELIVERABLE
On completion of the investigation, the team will provide a Report to the
Director, PRD of DolR detailing the findings of the investigation.

Page 40 of 88 OBJ 10: A535 10

 FURTHER SUPPORT
Officers of NOPSA will work with the Director, PRD to review the Report and
provide assistance in the consideration of potential enforcement action or
prosecution, meeting with the SSO as appropriate.

Page 41 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 2
Table 1 - Lines of investigation

Report
finding Table 2
No Area covered Information source or Information Log
section (Item. No)
(Ref. no)
• Site visit by
F11, F12,
investigators
F18, F19,
1 Incident location • PL 12, TPL 8
F21, F23,
5, 53, 54, 56,57
• Apache documents F24
(maps and drawings)
• Apache documents
Personnel, number (POB records for VI
and distribution, on and offshore 1-4, 5, 8, 38, 40·44,
Varanus Island and platforms) F5, F6, 54,46,62,63,64,
2
adjacent offshore • Apache active work F10 68, 69, 71, 72, 75,
platforms on 3 June orders and permits 114,231
2008. (PTW
• Witness statements
Plant operation on
Varanus Island on 3 • Apache control room 1-4,38,40-42,47-
data F3, F4, 50,68,69,71,72,75,
3 June 2008 prior to the
incident (shut down • Apache P&IDs F5, F21 81-83,114,198-
• Witness statements 206
sectionsj.
Operating parameters
for pipelines on the • Apache control room
NNE beach on 3 June data
4
2008, prior to the • PL 12 & TPL8 F13, F 2,3,38,47-50,63,
incident (pressures • PMP 15, F16 198·206
temperatures, • Witness statements
composition of carried
fluids)
• Apache active work
Activities/jobs carried orders and permits F3, F5, 1-4, 7,8,38,40-42,
5 out on Varanus Island (PTW) F10, F13, 62,63, 68, 69,
prior to the incident • Witness statements F21 71,72,75,114

Environmental • Apache document

F2, F21,
1-4,38,40-42,52,
6 conditions on 3 June (weather foreca st) 61, 63, 68, 69,
F23, F27
2008 • Witness statements 71,72,75,114
• Apache control room
data
• Helicopters
movement log
• Pipelines non-
destructive and F1, F7,
1-4,38,40-42,47-
destructive test F14, F17,
50, 55, 59, 62, 63,
Sequence of events on results F18,F24
7 65,68,
3 June 2008 • Pipelines inspection F25,F
69,71 ,72,75-83,93,
and monitoring 26, F28,
113-117,198-209
records F30
• Pipeline corrosion
and metallurgical
expert reports
• Witness statements

Page 42 of 88 OBJ ID: A53510

 Report
finding Table 2
No Area covered Information source or Information Log
section (Item. No)
(Ref. no)
Personnel visits to the F8. F9. 1-4.38,40-42.63,
8
NNE beach • Witness statements
F10 68,69,71,72,75,114
Apache
procedures/standing 1-4, 38,40-42, 63,
9 orders regulating • Apache documents
F9 68,69,71,72,75,114,
access to the NNE • Witness statements
119
beach
Use of the road on the
embankment (between 1-4, 38,40-42, 63,
10 the gas plant and the • Apache documents
F10 68, 69, 71, 72, 75,
beach) by personnel • Witness statements
11,119
1
• Apache documents
(personnel
distribution records,
1-4,5,8,38,40-42,
Personnel exposure emergency response,
11 F10, F19 53,54, 57, 63, 68-
during incident VI drawings)
69,71,72,75,114,
• Site visit by
investigators
• Witness statements

12
Tanker offoading • Apache documents
F8, F10 90
frequency (tanker visits log)
Setting up up/testing of • Apache documents
13 crude export line suck (procedures, work F8 86-89
back pump orders)
F1, F14,
• Site visit by
F19, F21,
1-4,6, 38,40-42, 63,
14 Damage to plant investigators 68,69,
F26, F32,
• Witness' statements 71,72,75,114
F33
Functioning of • Apache control room 1-4,38,40-42,51 ,
pipelines ESD data 62, 63, 59, 68, 69,
15 F24
equipment (ESD • SDV test results 71, 72, 75, 81-83,
valves) • Witness statements 114,226
• Apache individual
Incident response on personnel incident
Varanus Island: response records
• Personnel muster • Apache control and
and evacuation radio room data
• Shutting • Helicopter logs
down/staring up • Apache
plant (including documentation
1-4, 38,40-42,45,
actions near the including:
F25, F26, 53,55, 56, 62-64,
16
incident site and - mainland CS1 F28, F29, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72,
the mainland P&IDs
F30, F31 75, 92, 93 , 113,
compressor - storage tanks 114,116, 241-244
station CS 1) P&IDs
• Incident - P&IDs for fire
assessment and fighting and
monitoring detection systems
• Plant shut down • Information from
and blow down DGNB and GGT
pipeline operators
• Witness statements

Page 43 of 88 OBJ /0: A53510

 Repart
finding Table 2
No Area covered Information source ar Information Log
section (Item. No)
(Ref. na)
Applicable legislation - 0 PPA 69, P(SL)A 82
Pipeline Licenses, SC 0 PL 12, TPL8,
17 & PMP and 0 PMP Sect 9.2
requirements 0 Varanus Hub Safety
Case
12" sales gas pipeline
design and data: 0 Apache
0 design and documentation/recard
fabricatian s (including drawing s
specifications and and reports) F17, F22, 84,85, 185,237-
18
data, 0 PL12, TPL8 F44 240
0 installation records 0 PMP
0 site (NNE beach 0 DolR records
geology). 0 Codes and standards

0 Apache
Anti- corrosion coating documentation 20-25,41,154,
F17, F22,
19 and CP for 12" sales 0 Codes and Standards 163, 164,182,245,
F43,45
gas line. 0 PMP 246, 248
0 PL 12, TPL8
Regulatory approvals
required/obtained by
Apache as stipulated
in PLs (PL 12 & TPL8),
20 e.g. for CP design, 0 DolR recordslfiles 11 .9
intervals of
inspections, corrective
actions (repairs)7

Pipeline inspection 0 Relevant Australian

requirements
and DNV standards
(legislative, codes and Sect 9.2
21 0 PL 12, TPL8 247,248,258
standards, good & 11 .9
industry practice
0 Pipeline corrosion
expert report
Apache pipeline 0 Apache IMMR
Inspection policies, manuals and
9-37, 41, 63, 94-
Maintenance and procedures
112,122-194,210-
22 Monitoring Regime 0 Apache/contractor F38-F42
230, 232-235, 247,
(IMMR)- past and assessment reports
248,258
current of the IMMR
0 Witness statements
Structure of Apache
Pipeline Inspection
Maintenance and
Monitoring
DepartmenUSection, Sect
0 Apache documents
23 past and present, 11 .9.1, 247, 254,255
0 Witness statements
including number of F36.
personnel, positions,
responsibilities,
reporting lines.

Page 44 of 88 OBJ 10: A535 10

 Report
finding Table 2
No Area covered Information source or Information Log
section (Item. No)
(Ref. no)
Resources allocated
24 by Apache over time to • Apache documents
F36
41,63,189-192,
pipeline IMMR. • Witness statements 247,254,255
28,30,31,35,37,
Use by Apache of • Apache documents
95-112,122-152,
contractors and • Contractor pipeline
155-157,159-176,
25 condition and IMMR F37
independent 177-179,180, 195,
assessment reports
specialists. 196,197,210-216,
• Witness statements 218-226, 247
Records of inspection,
surveys and • Apache pipeline
maintenance (repairs) inspection and survey
carried out on reports 17,25,171,175,
26 F38-F41
pipelines crossing • Apache/contractor 176,188
NNE beach, in pipeline assessment
particular, on 12" sales reports
qas line.
• Viewing by
investigators of
ruptured pipes (on
site) , and pipe
samples at
Pearl Street
laboratories F17, F23,
27 Pipelines failure mode F33, F34, 259
• Non-destructive and
F35
destructive test
results
• Pipeline corrosion
expert report
• Metallurgist report

All available information

28 Incident causes Sect. 12
relevant to this incident
Possible breaches of Sect. 9.2,
29
legislation • PPA69
13

Page 45 of 88 OBJ /0: A535 10

Attachment 2
Table 2 - Information Log

. ...
•.'a 8~ "i:'A ,.Po "3-
• 8 (3 (3
<!
0-
8
".
8
8 o.
8
13 8 3 13 N
S is 8u >1 "<,
8
8 0 u B Po A fl
,
.'
0>
B
S '"n" :!" ",..:.
:!
<-
.,""' " l;l
<,
~
!] j.:
N
11" <, f'
"'" .-
N
M D
;:; g
c .1: n" "
- " -
""'" 5 zj ~
"-
>
" n ~

"
0 ~ .,
~

« ., « ~
I'l '"
~ tl
" :t
Ifa .· 'i
:;
[I
Ii!
~
;:;
Ii!
3
G

~
'"0
c: .
G
~
'"
;;
(j .:;"

~
3
"13
~ ~ ~
'" "
~ « "- 3
"
8

§
.. ,.. ~
.. § ~ § ~ ~ ~ ,..
R R R
jj J. ~ J. J. ~ ~

~ u ,. u
x '"

:ll
x
fJ
$,.
8 8 !:! 80 .,
'i .,
f·~
'0
u
f~
~
8 1.<
r.!
~
'" M '" IO!
r~ r·!
."s
I'!
13
'( ~ .,
§ ~
•~ q
0
~
i'f
q

..
~
;;
'":! 1"-
." .if'"
M
Ii;' Ii! "
M • ~
fii " Ii! "
J
0

~J; ~ :;, ...~ ;;- ~

~
f;' 1
"o. r '" ;;" ;;" e-
5 o " ~ ~
0

~
"~
f:l .:;.
.;.
E
C
"~ 8
N
~ U
0- 0 0
,.
~
8 ~ :! 8
..
0
n. ~
"l ~ ..'".
• .,...,1 ~ .,",; c '"i
'"
Ii '"~
S
"-0 ~
0- 0
t; 3' is
"
;!
c:
.."
~
&
,1
8
"~ .'
N
c
"
0
i '1 ii
A ~•. A
• :;
N '".
"~ ~• \;
t; .;
~ Po "
0
~
<I
,~
.1 ~
G \j 8N ~
~ ~ ~
.,
~
n
<3
~
';
·R
.B '" " "!:! n
"jl • Ii "" ~" 'q" "
<3 0 •
~!
tl
Po
,1
U

.'
0

~
~
E
0
, .;,
\i,
8
C
~ .8",
~

8
~ h <l " .:'l i1" (; ~
~
3 ~
~

~ ~
~
~
~
•~
"q" x ~
..a Po H
0

!i <3• "~
l' b a: a
2
q 6 '0
"C " '0
n
"C " ,.ci " .,I!lPo ~
~ II< ., a
8 8 C C C Y & y

" " R ~
N Co 0

\l .\l " • '.

0 0 0 n.
0,
.
0 0 0
I;<
B ~ &.~ ~ ~ ~ ~. If
0 Q
"Po "~ ~
..
0'

f-• "a
~
U t<
U
" b " ~

*. .
j?,
~ ~ ~

[ ~ ~ &. ,0
e c c R P.
~ ,1""• .1 ~,~ G Ii~
" " C,
" 0
•,
0 0 0 0
g g .t: S" .~" " • ' !! i.: ,q 0
<, l\
:: ~
'," '"
~
.~

.
• s, i!" f. q '- " ~ " :~ n <i
:5 ~ •• ~ ~
'";-,
c~ ,, , • .'• ..• ..
5
a !l
'--
~ ~
I/.~I/. R
• ., R ~ Eo
R .. ,. ,. ,. ~
~ ~ ,. IIE
aa•
a
:,: r.: • • • " ~
Q

~ I~
~ F. f. g ~" ~" " " a ;;"
"
"c < .!i,• !'-• 6" g I>;
,
I>;
.3 ~ " ,. ;.
II II $ ~
"
"
"
# ij ij
., ~
~
S 8 8 8 8 8 8• ;:; " "
~ v v v v '"
"
~
~ .. . ~
~
~
~
~
~
~
Q
~

v •
0

".
~ ~ ~ ~ ;~
e e
~~! ~ ~ ~! •
~
ij g• K" K•
"R• ~• a• "Ii R "& "R ~ R• R R• a ~ eR
c e e e
.. .' ..
c
R
e
R
a
• or ~ ~ "- "~ " ~
" 0 0 0 0

" b ~ ~ ~ ~;: ~• "~ "~ "k ~ "~ "~ '"~ ~ "~• "h• "b
~

," "• • •• •.W • > " b .. "b ";,

j ]I II ~ .~ " ~ r, r, b" " \l
, •
0- 0- S 6' S 11 ~ j 8 6' 0- il oS 8 oS 8
~ ~ U ~ ~ t \. I' ~ • g
8 8
~
n n
"ro "ro ~
"
~
" Ifro If
~

ro ro ro
">!l "!!! .,<,\5 "\5
ro ro ro ro ro
. :e ~
~
~ N
~
N

"<! 1!" "1! "!!! "''~" .,'O!"

~ ~ ~ N ~ N ~ ~

ll: "1! "1! "I!!

~ ~ .n
"I!! "~ "iw:< "<!
~ ~ 0
"
<!0 !! "
~
1! "
1!
w ~ '0 ~

'" ~ 0 ~ ~
". '0 .."i:< "<l <l" '<l"
u 0 u

~
i - " M
• ~

"
. ro rn
" ~

" '" ~ !! !' ~

" " H r. ~I n <I H !-l

Page 46 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 2
Table 2 - Information Log

• :'l
,1 13 8 1:! i3 8 il 7
8
il Y.l 13 8 8 1:! 1j t. 1'3 13 13 13
.5 R R " ,~ !'1 Q
8 fI R ,>
."u, " ".> ""<, "" '"c'.,<, "&: .-'"u .,"u uS
~ "~ ""
Ii'
'J
~

li
"
"'"
", I
~
g
~

~
1:
"" .,"
1.; 'I.'
" "~ "~ M '.
" "•'" " .,'" ""'" , I "" " " "
M 7 7 M

,.
~

" - -
,~
" - "
~

i !'!
~
.,IS- .,~ 1utt>
§i ;;•? "
:'l .,fj ,0 •
"
C'
If "iI" ;:; 'l ~
:,10

~
G! ~

"'" .,'i.
~

§ ,•Co .*", "

t
~
'g"-
·
~
~

~ ~
"
ill
~ - Q
- m
"
,. ii
•• ~
H <;

I
.. ~ "
""
11
"
Of
1$
"9 "-'
"'iJ. ~

~
<b

"<I
:3
" ...
~
::l .
til
n.
~
""'"

~ "">
g -
;;:
~•
;;
"g
~ ~
~ <b
~!
.,fI' ". 1
~
~ 13
" 'i/ I!I
"' "c'q ~
N
q fI
~l
'"" • .,
""
• ..
~ " ~
,; 8
"
~

"• ""
! <l Q
q ::l
~ iii
Po '"
~
'ij"
~
0.'
;;; 8
" r.,"
::l •
.;,
8 ro :sfI
u

§
~ ...8
7

.•
n
"
~

t ~ " ~1

~
8
;~
7
8 8
8
'I "d,Q 8
~
8
P- "..," 'l
g
13 fl
"'.::
c ~
p.
"'
;3 n
II M " a ~ •
-, 8 ~
~

•• 0 •• ,>
"& "•
'J

1;,. ~•
8 il
" "Ii .,<I ~-
I•
~ M li ~ Ie ~
~
:;
""',.' uR " ,> 8
8 e ~ ~ •
~ 0
& >.

..,.
u ~ ~

;; ~ ol! ~ "
1c ~
~
~
"f i~ ~
•• c " ",', ~ il c 11 Ii
H
u '" II il ~
~
;; ~ "Ji "il
~.
n §. "13,,; "<b "
9
!<l ~
~ ro ro
•
~
~
~-1
~ ij ii. ? ~~c .~ ~ 8
.~

"• " • '""•

"
1-
~

H t
?:
f.
~
II:
.~
(; fl. 0

"~ '" "~ ~ "• ~ .~ ~ ~

"-'
,, :~~ l-t'" ]"" " :rl Ii~• ::>,
"-
~
~
p. • "'Ji "A ,." " "c'-' <b <b
g "-" ~ 0 u u ~ ~
~
U
•
"i;- .§R
11. '"•
~ ...~ i: ~ ~ ~ P-
~
or. ~ "
0
~~.
11 s S so
~
.;; ~

" ,3 '.
11. «
u " ~
"
m E
I!
.Il
• ••
~
.,i. L'
~ 8
~ i! • 5
~ ~
~:
!l;- ~ ~ 11 S ~ ~ ~ [;'
"•
n
R ~
n ~
.t II li!"
I?
"II
r. ~ u (j, ~"; <>
R :~ ~ ~ :~
tE ~e ~
~ ~ ijF.
•ij "ij~
\j
i II, II, eIl. "R, ,.8.c c
"•8. II,
• "• • • .Ii"
Il. "
It II
It R ~ ~ ~
:! :!
~ ~ E
g §
• ~
•, •.t, •• •• "g ~ ~" ~ !! t! " co I> ~
U !! !!
~ ~ ~ "
~ ~ ~
E
"~ "~n ~ ~ ~ • "~ ~ "~ "~n ~ co

i •U ,• ~ ~ ;: ~ ~ C •
~
• • .ij Ii n~ 1:1 b'• .§" ~ ~" e" e " .§" .§ .§"
~
~
'
~ ~
n
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
a 8' 6' 8' II 8' 15 8' 1:1 8' 8' 8' •
"
., ., "'" '" ..."' ... ... ...
.> ~
R

.» ...~ ~ ~ ~
~
~ ro ~ ~
"
.,
" ...
~
11 ~ ro ~
u
Q

" ¥ ~ .'!!•
• '!! "'!! !:' "\l !:' ~ ~ "I!! ~ "~ "t" i:I ~ ~ '. '" ~ .,I!l t'! i:I
0" " w
"
!!! " " " 'D
" " ~
" ~
" w
" § " " " " " $. !!" l'!
w w
~~

w
~
w w ~ ~ w

! ~'l 11 Pi :;j ;; 1'1 A ;\ ill 11 >1 I'l ~,

" ~ 'I 'I ~ 11 <Ii .. ~ I? ~ ~ !1

Page 4 7 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

"dr
'"
~
~
.....
Sl
.....
DOl.

(:I,'OS.~a
Ooa.nItm (:1..",

:kJ....-:."'J \~:::ItL.IS I~nd rrOI'.::l!la ~

D«:umf'lfTt 111'"

::>"r-::.om -1>.(g:l:O r~;:nd I'rfd::n::::. !ocX:o~ . • LT. , 0.. DF':":,

.l:.t;lRI-F

l.T-lC-CF-O:!1
••V

0
b'Comp
UJom.ll Cen""'1
R"
... V Doc UtI,.
S:as.':!l£J
-I;t>
Q) -
tr-
-Q)
CO (\) C')
Q, 1!.Q3.(13 ~'.....,"'J VI ;:~.!;c::: Gc:1~ I I":",,oJ : - !..,,~c.DG-lJa l LM.-CC..OG-i:QI I\):::T
CO
CO " t:G.oJ~~5
D
,
1 'l',J31:tOO
1 3.t:2~"l I $
'" I e .a;,lJ~ I ~w:"''"9 Il,~ ; :f e ~ G.:i::s : <'.cC:::Orl - Se: or 5
!.G':S.DJ.~9
:::S--1C-~J. ;-4a ,, z-m.'Js -::::I
::::1-

...0'1\)
l'i.1)5;(l6
ES40·J.J./ -li 1$.'Q5.Ce
£s.,c·...'G-OO·F..c Ie I
I 6.'03,CS I I','
3Q)
'" rhI'''' Ol r 'e'II'i{.e( Ol-s:."'t:u:.o n - H....... F&CU""S- ?ol.'\1aOO t'J.,,:r-..l'r.df • LT·OO-CX·OJ5.0: t H lo.DX·OCS.02
::. ::,...4u-u:;.~ ~....
3

",
9:0S'1ooa
~ I ,~?
~
0
lG.C5..tE.(JC4 19:11.\):
S7 I 15,03;Ca I 1'.1 H.:I:::I:doJs A:e:.ldc:"l:!c::3:o:1 _ So~ o1 5 ::::I
~\'~:'IJ $fI.·. I C.OJ.l ~ 4 CS.ca.'C03
tC-f.l5--D~O
, OO:C~.CtJ r-
<;\'.11',.. 0,'-11'; 1 f'Affi1': ? 0
S? -14Dl...QC4 S 12.'IQ,(l7 co
S? ·14. ~ !..C~ S :"5.1:9.'0::-
S;)·'';' Cl.(:Qj S I I.W.(!7
sa I (i.Ol.'CS I Cr;:Iw;:U ' ....1 ROIOIItJo Sc-' (n:,l:c:Io - $« at G S?-I4-C!!..": II 5 12"0," 7
SP·;z·J.C!....;O::l 5 cr:m:C7

i:OO:Ca
----
0;I0r.¥:0" r::~m<n: i<£I'f Coooo. \~!l I"''C Fr~ ~:-J';I I S~'\, r:;.
$ilO.:! ' · : L·(!CS 5 C7XS.,,7

'"
OJ i,os."a O;»r::J:c.' ~mC"l: £\'TlS E:._~A; T:J'Ik h ·.errorl S,~e-tl 03-06-00 3."€."2Cca

0;lc::S:(J' .)oe.,:r.C"I: SSu CO'I~!=I:t ;(ll'(:~ J.c1T~T.ng:o Q3.0&~OO3

.,"
7.0:1."a • \,'J • ""jl.e 3.'Qt"~C.::a

7:C6.lJa S!;>:e-r.... rc ...... :~::;:S P:e:n: -S::lt:o::l'T.""':-S ~'( 3 AE!.. p:'I'$01(."

€3 7.1)5:03 S-:.:.:e-n.:-rt - '.'J:n.:'S$ R~ ?4:<n ( ,'.)l.)

.., i .Q.j,1Ja O;l<?:'aXt." .10!"';>:Irt Aco::In'.1TOda:o,' S -:a:h Ri'?O'tO~?-Z:ca W'~:"!'! Sno;.o:': "":200-'427 3.1';'30'2,003

i.Q.j,1J3 O;:l-:ora:o)" C.:¢Jn'W1' o:Y;,/o! no::<?S Rad", Room ~-200a 3.t6·2003

'"
00 ~ :oo .(!a ?to~.::. Cl"
)(:,t~ H~~

n-.o AIJ~.l\')" - Oi-Cij..~C{l

'O.(!{O'(2 Ro.,:l ,-: T~ '(J -
'" O;:('Ir.I:Ji:;r

S~~o:t - ',''::ne:;::; TO",/ Cr;;..c

C-orc:::ac: ?r.AmO l ot."leO" on \'l

~oOo:.-r.;:n r .'J\) 2C.'C6'~CJ

'" :C.'Q6'CJ

:e:ce;ca S~:cT.ort - '''~!:xl:;::; t:""JC~',.!.:I:-r.d} ····'O'l9 ':"·'A)

'" 23:C.s. ca S:.a:emert - ·.... :ne2 urcac:s..ngCorfi'l.!lo'r A· b,1\!ew l..&.~e:~
ZC'C€.·:c.::a

0
~
'" 4.'Oi.08 S~~e rc ~.o r C1t, .e~
23'Oe.· ~'::2

,.i3 "n -1.(l1.1J3 S ::aY.tt. ... rt

- '..J:n.:,"

-'''~:ne $.lo
r-':'a&

o-a1,TI'lcrTliiS
4.'Ci,'2Cca

-1,(17:20.;0

'"'"<.>
~
73 27,IJ'30'03 S:a:-n;... n: - '.''::ness U "l:)~ngcon:a.ffl r 3 - 3-.a'l Rl<;."'iU::l'SO"l 27.t:t.::.'Zlca
<:>
 -

li' 0 ... alcm.al Corup..lfI~ -Il>

.
'"
m
<0
0
"'"'
74
""'... U«;Umtn1 Ct.'"'

X.'06'c.3 S=:.:c-r.Ci't - '''~ :I"Xl:;:; U:1::ri.:.g Ca:'t::.m r C· 3-t:ln ?...¢I:rd:lO:1

U«.um011 11'Ik- :'1:1 KI:r Rt.~ b;~Comp

"'"
",V 11« 11.:11(0

3C':~'~CiI
Ql ....
00
_Ql
(I)
....
C')

~
9.'07.X::$ S=:.:e-r.<::rt · '''~! n:: ::'l::l 9.X::·j:::C..:a N'"
'"'" "
70 24.Q7,'03 C?<-r.it:(l" 00:::.J i'1 1 ~1 :
?':"..L $dQ>TQ"

.?:O::>=-:'!.i ? r~: A~ ~tn CO"ld.::.orr:;:· ?!1:: .! ?o:o: O::, ·. ... rc - 3 doX!JlIe:'1:-:'

I
-::l
~
.... :4,':;7:03 o,:,:,r.'£Cl"Co.::.mle"1: ?:~-:''il.?l¥I: r~ <." .! G.'il l:... ~~(o.1 S'iS~ Alc m'lll' ?ro:: .! ?~...: E·.. ....,! 1 7.0€;~ca
~ ....
0 N
i'a 2·1.~7:00 ~ r<:r.<:1' C«:.HTI.,..,: ltj~ sa [~ cas.. T~ rd w,mer," olll: 12 (;o.ll;::;..".:s.':iOr :'sc.,a:go!' ~\J 5'2o:J03
.....
3
" 2-1:07:08 ~ 'iJ'.<7 !:;>:lOJ n:~: 12~ Sa [~ ca-;. - TC'!'n:I '.....tda...·ol CM 1 ' ,3:)1 ~ ' 1..302 3.1J5'2tJC3 ....
Ql

0
.,
0; 14,071(:3 ':);lcr.xO" Coc.:Jrn<n: 1:2~ S) Ic:;. G."6 - Trond '.·.'~-yja.,· o fE$G .CI

201.1)7:(:3 O;x:r.xcy COC';Jm.::n: 12-(;,)'T,;:Iool S ;"l:)OO - TrcM ','J:'lO;l wOl 'lm CL."l l :! S i:\1 11n
Spll 0.-0:1 ' 0

£;'1 :;': Hi
:.J.~G'2oca

:.J.I:JC"2cca
::l
r-
0
::4.1)i.'Cil O,xmt.cr C'OOJrnC':l: ir .H:J I ~(l: Q1. TtC'1d '.·~.,o:bwol H:rrl(:! A';¥1:J a &;::o:t (0
"" ~4.1)7.' oa .:..;x:~o- 00cu~C1: r!' Ho:I t ~<l! G.::I~ . Trend '''~ ~d:J \\' H:r'IiC: f\,!;:n " e; G::c:
"J.CC::!Cc.a

"... ~.071 C3 ~"\'InJ 1 2~ Si:.s Gir:; • Po"., r::.. ;:c,o::'ll" ~C· S p· ~ ·Cl. · OO 1 P,,, , ', 5 Si'·Zo-~l.·COl
,
"J.\Je.~Cc.a

7:0<;:2007

e5 :.t,t7.'C3 D.-:.ow""\I l r3~ SiLeO G.:r.l • p, ,,., ~:.. SCJ":·,.1l~~c · SP· 21 ·Cl'l.·OO'5 P,,, , ', 5 S?·Zl-DI,·CCS 5 7,-'::0;.-:::'007

CoX.J:Il...:l: 3iT Clu:J.: Q! . A::~ rd ~2l.o "':k'l3 U.·k Cll Rete'/ '" S ) -;.!e1: · .f>.. E;·91· !H-O:lZP'''''', $ AE~ 1 +!H.oo2
,
'"e:·' -:!<1:C7:C3

~1."71 C8
O:.JeI'< t(o"

C:3\\UlI ;)J~ CM", O J • QI R""'o@', al Sl«l Qc.!ortat01 P e n · OJ-f:'5-<:4J71-'JOCJ Poi-I e e

Cc.,..;:. oo475-c<tl71-ccc3
0
2005

., ~1 .'J 7: ce ~(8.cr COAJn':~: 3J ~ Ctu:I", 0 1 • PrCO!'dJf.;:o :o: Cra .nng ~ ?~ ~ nn;I :or ns.::~t01
, ~~

O;ler.::r;c;r CQC;J iT.~: :r:;::

" ::·UJ7:C3

1201,'C 7:C3
X~CMoOJ · \'l p:otI t.C:t ~ Iw n~ l/:I(1l1(J.1 :d Re(C"~H'f?..

(:OOJ:r:(I'I: ',: J !J~ n !J - 12 iT.O'1:71:).J:.ro 07 - A;T ca 200&C 7..(:3-ltl'om;:l:;01 1 (I.'(l7:Z0ca

'" Q;:lo~c;r
S·.IT.ma~,..\1$

24.'Oi:Cd O,;lor.:ccr (:QCJ:r:o:'I: ALERT ....'(ri( Oroor · 03-<:G-2oo3

" 24.'C7:C3 O;lor.xc;r COCJ:r:c:ai F,~ Coo:-;O' ?",:o~l'r( VI-A!:-,c-zF-<:O' P.o'" I AE _1 O-Zf-QJ 1
3:CG"2CC9

J 1.t:'·ZOO l
""
OJ ::!o:I.'C7:C3 C90r::t:O" ~me1: CO'1:;O:,<bx:d Err.<rgC':1C"f R~O"l!'.e Y.o:Irl - No! h ·....e::.: She.! - AE.CJ-..z.i=-OO2 Reo; .4 Ai; .cC-ZF-OOZ , ,C\::B:XCS

... Z,.t 'Ci:ca 0,xl r::t: 0" D:x:Jmc:n! E.-r.crge"lC'( ?pcC:le Re;:;:. ... ~::r:l - S?-l~--R l ":: d3 Re'; , S?-I.+-R l -C€3 '5,\Ji,'1007

::!<l,(;i,'CS AUSll 53
O;lo:t".s:cr !:'oc::.J:11e'1~ S<! ~~G<1ri ?;>o::!ltJto • klg ~C4 - Fled ::~ S!~ .:'-"" 1 s.(!a'~C<l
"
0; ::!4.1:17:CS
C? $ 'r''''-'1'

O',k r"'QI CocJm...:lt C? Str".:'I - s.;ctc ~ J A-.oOO'!' "~lrt~&1o.- - S:ii'!' ~ G.:. ... ?~~In "" - J •.r1 ~I:::J
A J ':iO"J"
:l:'Qoc:' ==! 11 S201A
,'US' O;:c li,(;6::x1C3
0
~
"''''"' Rll 52C1A
57 ::!4:C7:C9 ~ n'£cr C(CJfr.e'I: C?S',z',.:',. - Vi O~~lo~ ?C.:i:l= -Ort1la:"" 5ec:.O:1.A'.I] ::',J:)4 - O?- '4- Rl..I ·!J~ o P· ' 4· RIJ.C'~ "","" A l c.'J ::!'· ~CS
D
".
., :4.(; 7:08 ~ rK.r:T COOJ m~flt (:':'/0 Sri,,!',.. s,, !~ cas p.:.:r",~ - ~p 2'jt;..1. R~d Ca:a S~i':S ~so:r
?!o,'IlC:::A US, ,54
D:J c .t' :: 1 154..1"J,.\
9 ,~S1Cf}ol

'"
W

'"c
~
;;>
'"
~

'"
... .
OS
::~
~4.'C7: ca
O<>c:umtrn CI.to\1I Ootumftll
O;Jcr.:s:or Coc:.m:cn! C.? SU'"'.C:y - S;Jc.!(:::JI A"tOdo Tdll9 .. S:I\a:::: G:.::: ? ';x::inc
'II'" ~ t. t Hf" "<V 1::Jo:1Gomp

p:.J'XJ/X
U:!nm~C~y
.,
AtlSl 1i'2
'"'V (Joe: OAt..

1 3" ' .' :C~

-I»
Q)'"
0-'"
-Q)
n
-
C CI)
0 roto,OC:: A US ! ;:)~ N:J
'"'"
'00 ::;4.'07:00 0,;Icr.t.(l' Doc.I:r.c:a! C,~ Sr.ci' .. SSe::; G::I::; ?,;:::o'..'-oc .. Co:: :CCS .. RC::d C':t:l S:lQ(!::;
'"= cu.:: F 1 Z'l~ lA~
4.· l~::OC5

I $
re, 24:07:08 ~r&';or C<lCJrr.Cl"I: C?Am~: $.Jf'.C'( - IZ'! 16"' ~<" ~G3, · O:VI«e s..-c:.oo - .).J;.Qc:2CXl6 A'J~
R1371 0lA
A ~ " '2'20r.6
-:::l
Ie:! 24.'07:CS 0,:lI0:n;cGl" ::oo.Jl'lIC!"l: tJ ~c:.O'\ ~ C:r.cdonM.. n",~rrw n !Pc~·.l id . Am~! $.JW*'TISr'1 R~(J't · ~CS · AE:.o: AE.o:: ·R~';·OO4 4.lJl::005
:a, ...
24.'(li:C';! ~ rJ.O' O~ mo?:'l: Pooit".,e l ns.;l~(m Mol:"Iual - 0?-1 +r.f CJX I PI?~' 4
...,
0 N
' OJ Q'I'$.'".:I" 22'J3'z)OO
3
",., Z01,'Q7:ca O;>i!ra::o- Co:amo?:'l : Ri".\~""· at Rot'COnmoen:l ao:orn - t o-n 200.11 .. i':P!':.n:.o ?.6!(A~$$"l'.~:$ Sil' - l4-.q,G-Il3~ MOO''.iSpo;;oc PAU0030.1 l C\H'~Q7 ...
Q)

0
, 0; : 4.'07:<2 0;I0r.r.(l' Coc;umcnt C."An.1I"t~·':; - RC'..;cw~ A;::,x;"IO ~.;JCI l.."'; -l a-C4":CQ7 S?·' ... R·:::;..c.IC MocIu$poc. CoAucooa 13 "~
C2
l CIC4 'Lt07
:::l
AUS 11 ~
, 0; : -I.'C7:C3 O;Ior.:t.or Co:;:.Jrncnt C,DS..-.'O:.·. RO.... SCOU:-.l"l!J RO .;"G:):CI;TI)",·C ~· 11 .:OCC4 A;JXJT
LlI5aJ·~
2: 11:~CC4 r-
;:9J3IACCI A 0
lQ7 ~\Ji:~ V;:!or;:to;r ~J:r.C'l: C? S.......O:f· 1~ t.. 115- Solre::; G:J:;. • 01~.-.: C~ ='ole1!.;,I· :3.i:e..::OOC /J..J~ :!a~'I3::Coo C!l
R!lI ::r2i¢C1A
,ro F9:01,01.rJ::;"\
:!4.\Ji.'Ql O;lO~o;r ~(lC'J:r.o"I: :;15...... 01· 1'Z-t, ld- S:Jrc ~ . ~~ .-.:O ?o:e"l~::Il . ('A~l-::OOC
"'= R~1 3:::r.·..cO I A
.:.I.1:J3'2COO

' 00 24.\J7:03 CY.>:.rsu f C<cJmet'lt OC'...::; St·.... ,·· 0.). 12·:-::00 •....... ~t Me."!1 3:12.'200::
Si'·OJ- :t_·COI · SP·OoJ.
110 24:07:03 Ct"... ·.\l:li,1 12" Sa r~ Q.r;. /I,~ t:i<l rl:J 'XI 1,1 • A:1?1nl'l.'!l: ' St'. 01 13 FIJ~'"
01.~ 1:3

r' . s...~o ! a
"' 24.lJ7!ca C;"::i~\'(."9 16- Safri QD. Cf.!'i>.""1:1~ Pt.: ,..,:::1 ... . Atg~...

liZ 2-1.\J7:<2 ~t~(f:;.x:,.,l'I':on, S"Ia:O"'··....ar.r I ~-ec:on Pr~ rn · RltsU.'.S·:!!03 R ;::·A:,!.31C<l·(; 1 '-0 f,i.(lS'20:'1

113 ~;C 7:ce ~ta:(f C«:JlT'i"'It Sns:l) ..... - V....,..3KKT<!<:."l ~ · C3JJ~2OCa 3'6:00\' .3.·-;r..'2CQl

II. 21.'Oi:C3 S:<I:eT.ort • ·.·~ :no~.:;; l.;x,."l::ri B<:nr.;,: 2 1.C7: 'X<2

115 5,oaoa 0;<r.r.0' Coc::.rr:cn, R ~~:o QJ(X')<=;. I=m CoIR:o CCl COT ",,:03'20(2

116 S,ta.'Ca O;:~a':CJ' Coc:rr~ : S1~J"'" ·1,'i'i-SKK T... e" !..o~ . c:!JJoSo2OCa P.r. 3

117 B.\J9.'Ja ~:" ml· r' . '.'J :"Ie':II~ D.(ICJ'>.':.:.Oi'I oj Prcr,::(r:;..-d R... ·I,....,;J Srrllr)e' Te~ ?\'o:.ocol CS:Cs.':Y,lCS ax:s'2oce
,ra 7.'C3'C8 hl...:, t11Tcr.f(Oil R'!!O~ IJI!'~d a~ P=·..do?d I=m A::!.. R~ ...... ~2 a~ .3 A2 1. 7.>Ja.'200a

' 10 7,tat a 0;~;w:0' COCl..l'l':<:n: ~tJ'j-1''f'J Q-d(J" Fh'o C"iT..:'f'jOO A"c" ~c~Q;td A~.:; SO roo 0 Af t. J,CG,:ooa

, :xl 7.CMa O;:('Ir,xO' Coc.rr.<:n: Too! Sox ,\ !OO:::'l!)lo;:>e ;:;:(I(:,~~ a A: ' 13 'CG'2:c;)

1:::':1 7.C~'CZ O; __ilO' C-oc.rn~: \.~ ~ir!.:,· Acb~'!o\X$?too.:dJ!t:<SI ua: JoJ!Io." 2o::a AE l..
0
~
,'" 7.'CS.~~ !:':::!w""'OJ ;:;:o;:::~ of Jo n: 101 :):; S"';: Cc!:1..!O /0,".;: !:err'N lI: I a~2 ·A94
I I Z7:QS,' lS:fiZ
I I I
,.
~ 'Zl i.'C3.'Ca C/;.:::'iL.0' 1;(I O..t'll1::!.~: HEl.· Q-!-;..' I:I Lt: ':la :~ Qr:I !.U'I... P , ~if1o: th.
"::....:::i~ G.:on.. ~ r I,IYJof' ::rr" rorn:'I:!Ir.a f SJ ~. ", ' IST~J<.\l. 1.>:131:003

'"
w
'"<:;
Attachment 2
Table 2 - Information Log

8 n £> :.<! <1 ., til ~ s::

"., "..,'" ""<, "§'" '"" "" ,.'lI
Cl ~ 0; l<!
~
~
(,l !;I R 31 :>I
p !! p !1 ~
"~ ""§ ":!"'.' "" " "'" - "~- (j
~ ~ ~ ~
"- \"
".,- "g ~
~ N N j .; j .: ~ ,> f.::; j.;
"
~

~
~
"
;f i.:.
- ""' "" " " ~ ~
N
t:.~
n
"" " -~
N
~
N -
"

-
"

- N

Ii
~

f- ~
,c H" ,
<j 8 cr I'l"'~ "" ~ "<j an
0
" :?
R ':.;" H 'SJtl" (j H :!I
~ G ~
IZ 8
13 !3
~iJ
~
u R c, n !oj
~ i'l
~a fj
•
~
"~
I'l
~
x
iil
""
fl
"
'" '" '" '"
fl III
~

"
~ "~ ~ g g "fi u~ ""
til ~

~
~ ~
~
:t"
"

..
C'

,.
~
,. ·n J1 I; 0" 1; 5 ii,"
0' '" !5J; r. tl

g § g r. ~§ ~ ~ n ~ -
t:'

~
0- 0 <
B"
!1J ~
~
i! E b0 11 II '00 gE gEg~ §E ~~
}; o " fi '
~
E

' "
1:5 ~.r.
0
b
~
" ~ &
'"
g§ n ~Il ~ Ii
~;

" t1 8 ~Il ~Il

• 0 00
.r ~u ;"'0 ~
'. u
0 ~
'. u
0

~ n
~
X "
0 0

I'l
"~ ",-0; IS
" '"f)" <> '3
"2: 1\ [I fl
""c'"'
~

" '"
~
~ u I'l q 8
• ~
0
S~ ~ ~
0
~ "", -, 'l .' ~ <l
'"
:;:
• ~
.
f'::;
~
li
~
0:
~
R
• Ii;
~
•
~

.,"" :t
0;

v,
~
'"0,• n,'"• • '"•
~

"'" " ~
~
!;' '"
~ "N
0,
~
n,
N
n
:J'I
n,

m
0
" '" " 0 ~ ~

'" "
-
S
- "
<-
6 •~~ 0
.'5 ,ii
l<
'U
~,
8
'.
Ii
~
!' 3 "0,. g 1 "~
g g

";; ~
~ ~ ~
"B ,..gc ,.'3 ,..gc
~

" ;; 01
r,
P, [I < -' 0 ~

~ .~
~ ~ ~ ,B
",. Ii r. u

""Ii'" ""Ii "Ii

!l; R. ~{- r.: G: t·; 3 0 0
R
~
0 n: !!. Ii ~ no•
~
0
-~ ~ E l! E
'~.' ll. H II H
-f "1l"
'".,
0
c 0
0
r, ""'., 0
.,• .E
• r.
;"i"
, [oj0'
15 "
0
5
"1/l< "~ ",~ '",~ ,. u
..•
.l
E

.. g" "," "" '"" "

~ ~ 0; '
i, 'e ~ ~: Ii
u ~
0,

i3" 2
R
.' "E
0

i'd
7-
'"1\ '" £
"

n: II i!
~ 0
~ ~

'" ".' .'

~

E ~ 8. 0
n -' "
S
B'
n:
=
g B
•
"0 E
0

.. "• ..!l: ..•a ..

w.
r,
~

~
b
~
I;;

'"'.."
E
~
il
c ""• ";; ~
"
'";; ;;
lijo, U-
5
" ,0
c
r.
- .••
c- 6 8 ~ ,; ~
0
J 15
~
~ G

"..'" f! " '""

U U c \l (;
11 U' It E
.~
~ ~
,'" ~ n
0 ~ n .i!-

"ii• '"
0
U 1>. 1>. U ~ ~
80 13 Il!
" ~ c ~ <> r.
6 ,~ ~ "~ "SE w.~• b
0
n:" 0
~ 'l It ~
u
u e ~ ~
0 0 0
~ c c \l
.. ..
~ u
~- R
•
iJ., !l: ~
• f '1;" It "_.
~ E
~
E
Ii {'.
R R
"e ','"'e ""c
~
..
11- '"• Ii 6
•
~
w.•
'..' •Rg
0 § G g
z ~
r.
;0> g
.~
n
OJ! ~
~ 'J
~Q '8" ~ ~ ~
I?
• 8 1!- "
(1 E
)j
"'"E ~ .!l -'!oj 1i& a .
(! (~ (~ g ~

"
0
E 3 C.
~
n,
• ,0" f
c-
n Ii ? "n.&
~
11
'"o '" '" '"
,il
n:" ~ 8
~
8 b
.;
~
5 E
~ h
~ • • • •
~
0' "c
n:" n: "
F F n ~
, •• '3
,r,
.' ~ .. il Ol '
•• ~
• •
~-, ~-,
0
E
~ 2 q
8 •
~
-;[ 6 •
.,.'
fj >I ~I ~I
n ~
& > '0
g
_. «. • " .', f, ~ -'" "'"_. 1< "-,
0
p ~ M
~ 81 ~

'" ...:1: :<: "r.l ~ " x rJ, " ~ .l'" B 8 15 ~ ..,

ij ,I ,I
"' ~ .," tl tl ~
~ ~

:z: ): !.2" "'" ""

il II il • ~ :ti '6 ~ \; g il ii
'" ii 'ii"
5" ~ I:II E I:~ a II lJ § lJ lJ lJ II ,.'II. ,.,II
~
• \i ii
~
r

Ii~ <-

•~ "
0
u
0
0
" " '-' ". '-' ...
0
u
0 0
u
0 0 0
U
0 0
U
0
II II
c.
0
u
0 ,r.' ?'
'!!: ,
?' F.'
;.i
lJ0
"b
II
0
f; l
lJ0
"b
0
I.' 0

b b
• "" • •" •,." • •" " •
b
• •" " b g i.i ,g n
• • ••
"""
b

~ • ~ ~ b U \0 U U ~ " ~ ~
U
~ U
"
15 ""
15 15 15 15 15 15 IJ 15 IJ 0' IJ S 15 15 15 15
..,<. ., ro
..,
• "
., .., .., ..,
15 S 15 " S•
. ;0
~~
"= "'" "<-
ro
v
h
ro
g '"~
,-"
ro
g
"
<-
ro

"
~
',.. ,,"<-' ... ,-'"~ ""'"<- '");l<- ""...'" 0'" "~ II,. ...g Ii<, ,"..,"'.. ,:;;"'.. ,.'"g ,.'"g """
,"0..'
0
" " " " " " ,~

" "", "", " " " " " " ""
~
h
.'.,..,...
«> '"~P.
,.
•
@
'" ~l
!'! " 11 tJ !'! i! :1 ~ ;l 11 !'! l:i :l II! 'I ~ q ~ '1 'II .. ~
"

Page 51 of 88 OBJ ID: A 535 10

Attachment 2
Table 2 - Information Log

• iji t;; l'; \, e_ tl <I ~ 8 8 ., ;; ;; ;; ;; 3 I!!

lI: 8 "8
0
80 <5
";;,'<." "'0'<.•" --- " "i6 " " "- ;,H~
! I' 01 Fl 8 8<, H H
c-I ~
0
" ,-: ;, '..' S "ii" f,;
"
c'
<, :;"
c'
~
c·
!::
c'
<,
~
~
;.
~ :! <- 13 g ~ :;l
"- "'" 11- ~ ;; 0
~
.> ~ ~ "w ~ - :!
" ""
~

~ "
~

"C!
a "~
<;
L ij "f:l "f:l "f:l 8 ., I'" ~

"8o· $ ~
~ "~ ~ ""
t; ~
~ "<1"" ""11
~
A
" r! 1\1
~ "'~ "~ ;,?~ <>~
"<,
1; ~ 3 n:
8
<5
0
8
'ii .. " 1:<
8 iil ~ ~ ~
~
~
w
"'" 8
"'•
~ ~
~ Ii 1
a• ~ ~ ~ C!
u
~
:.; ., w 0'
"'
j.:
0

.
§ G~ "6 -"g!
o~ ., ""l! '='t:
0

" "
0
. g ~ ~
~ !I
,.
~ x g~ g C !I ,.? x &t
~
~.!
~~ ~ ~ g ~ g ~ ""
6-
~
~
0:
~

n ".-,• n ..,
E
~
E
!J.
iZ A' il ,,1 u ~ c " • iZ
y

.
~

~
sup. iZ
", • 1i~ ,(§
g ~ f} ~ ~ ~~
:~g § j ~
0
E ~8 ~8 .0
1'8 ::8 11. Ii • • .fJ !l; 0
~<>
,( ~
" <:

..
~ ., .,
0
"
0<.' 0c,' "0 :.; ~
[j Fl "8
t " ,.t! ,.tl tl
'" "or• ~ ~ "~
J ~
or
~ ~
i)
~
(j
q
~
or
8~ :l <J
J
J

$n. ~ "fl " ;;

"i 0;
"'o.~ :3'I
• ~ n n .I;l
~ l
d, ~
v,
~ n. U>
n.
U>

" " "

0 0
"
U>
U>

<5
f<l
c
il ~~
ro
§ •
~
'";-,6 e
e ""
~
n ro
S!
.'.,
~

.;; 8 ~
"~
0
;; ~
~ 3
fl

- " 0'
""~ ~.~
;0

~
8
fl fl
"
&
0 "'c 8
•
,. "
~ E
,. ,. -< 0 0

.',.• 8 ", £ "..

~ ~ ~

~ .p, !! ~ ~ •
.."~ ~
i
j ~
•-~
l1
I>:
~ ~
fI
I>:
[;;

"<'"
"or
.~
~
/J.
~

'" ~
c
0
~ ~
t:;
0
8
~

<
~

"
c
U>
c
t
5
1>
~"
.l'
e.
E

"
!l 0

~ ...
0
C

~c g " "
c 0 0

~, it~ ~ ~"
c c ~ E
0 0 0 ffi
~
u ~t ~
.. •..'" ..•s~
i:j
a 'i!..
0 ."

~ ~ ~ ~
,~
8 8 "6
~ tl
c

g
rl •.' ~
• ~
" ~ ('l •ff " "''l Po •f, "'ij "'&
~
u c
~ ~ ~ ~
0 0

3§ f
" '*
~
80
•,.,
~
.~ ~

. ~ft .~b" v• (j {i~

~ .;:. u u
a ~, ~, ~, 8
• . ~ Jl ~
.,
~~
Ii ..
Js
"
oc oc
" .' .'
C 0 '".'
0
c
&
0,
0
1l iJ,
0
~ •
i10• "'f; (l
~

• •• "'<:s "~ ~

~:=
• ,"• ~ [~~ ~b ~E' ti"0
;:
"~K "" " "" ~
0
no

,:~ S
"r,
0
n:: R... ,,~ ~~, ~ £-
~ $
•
.."
~ ~
~
"!! !£'" ~ .Oi~
~
.. s u
~ ", ~ (~ (l S .' -~

., ~0
J n
~ oil i,l l1 ... ,'l (!
0 2 S
~

~
2 0
'" E , '"
.)
' v,

••". ., 2
~ ~ ~ ~
E ~
~
" a0" ",«.. !a., ., "
~,(i
~ ~ ~ ~ !e t! ~ ~
"~ .' 0
'" !!- " ~ "9
v,
., -' . ' U>
8
~ ub " Ii
.' ~ J ~ ~ t! <5 5
"' ", "' 5 ~s

Jv
,
~
~
~

~
5 .q5 5 8il
~

~
~

~
~
6
~
0
6 6
" " "~
~., 5 5 5 5 5 5 5, ~ i 5 5 I
'.'t «"'
6 ~ 6 ij ij ij ~
H A

~ Il~ ~
2i
~
,)

0
.5
6
!.-:

~
5
E ... 0 0
u
0
8 8 ,~ 0
u
0
u
0
u I: 8 Il u
0 0
u
0
A Il
• • •
J S• 8.' 8., 8.'
"• b b
"b " b " b
~ g ~ ~ g g ~ ~" b
• b
• b b b
~" .,• "~" b
g "
8= 8 ~
~ ~
~
.' 8•"
~ ~ ~
b ~ ~
8 8 8 8 8 8' 8' 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6'
.,
~

iil
h h
~
~~ " "" "" .,iil
~
<,
h
~

h
~
g
;:! .,i;; ",.~
~

h
~

"~ "
h
ro ~
"l:l "i;l
".. " " .-" ""- "
.) l;l
e_ e-
~
g " ., ~ .'"
~

,-"" ,.- "

h
~

~
<,
h
"g
"
h
" "<, .'<,
.,
:;l
~
" '" '" .- .-
h e.
.'
.,
"
~

e.

~ ~ !i; :R § ~ !! ~ !! ~ ~ ~ ~ !l ~ I?
B !l
" if!
@ (;j
• " E

Page 52 of 88 OBJ /D: A53510

Jl
'"'"
.... 0 ...
R...-:'d
Oocurnt rrt C~ " Uoa;~mt 14k :..ELHH R'V h1Comp ,..,
c..ttlm:.i Cctnp.,lIy
R>V IJx~'~
-fl>
"'-
0"-
<n
w li"Z 7,~Ma O;lcrOlCcr C<lCU'T.a-l: 1':::-: 16- SGl.. Cn:::''YJ:IC! Soc::o~ :C\'G Co~"'J 5:1:.0), AUJta :tCi ; .J 'XI)8 ~( 1.!>:1 R1~lJCl a , ..a3~O::3
-'"
(I) (')
0
-
'"'"
1:::3

l i-\
7.{l.3.1J8 O;~O" D:lc.rUc!1t

Opo!rlr.<)" ~¢..IT.oeon :
12-,'105" SGl. cn:.·I;1 ~

~L5 Y~ a r
S~on Ci'!IGd.c ?!o:.,.c:on kmJ4.' Sr, ... y Au9J~ ZlCi

rr:.;.gt.!',. R ~f.'l",\· -:!Jf'Ji S?- l4-Rl...IJQ

AJ'iICO: ';1':1 !.:d ?1317Cl A 1 .1J.~..'2C~
",:::T
I g
7:08'08 JC.tCl'2:]Qi -::::s
::::s_
' lS 7.0J,'C8 ~o.-;r;O"" CO¢.n'i<n: 2O(J7 0:'1::;.'10'"0 .o.,;JDLn o l'I ~VOc:.O'1 '...·crlc::ook O?·l4-.V.:;;.oo 1 ZOZ:03'1COO 0'",
"'I
l id ;,(:S\:3 Cr,: ct:l':a' ~v.rn<n : -'.'J O~~~ ?C::(I',\"o rio, M01 1 C1' ~"JJ M:::C Suid 'nJ :::003 , A~:x:o: ?'I Ud ::l.{l ~~OOJ
3
1 11 i.1J8'C8 O;;<$~()' C<:iCJ1ld'l t U~cf'W.((~ :t'I *c:.on Md :1J:.i 2'll4 A!:::.QJ··MG~CS , l ~t9.· 2JC4
'"
:!:
l id 7;Oa.Ca 0;~a: 0' Coc..rnon: CCwTO'.. o)"I M ana~tn."f"C S,'S?:TI - co a:ng t"6p~c:.01 Proo~;:hre 2'::00 A::·Sl· ,~53 , 1SC7:ZlC3
0
::::s
' 19 7.0303 O;:cr;:t(J' C<lCUTC"I: GJde'ine:; .. A:-g J.,= oJ k'I ~C:O:'l Rc:a.'::l :TId ;c,mo:l .~A~O"l :;
ucL
5Hll!'l SJJ 3 1.Ca' 19a::l r
h:C e.:J~:J' 0
A'YJ;r,fj'f Ro;xm .. P,;x.i,' 0 Q;n(r('l t m::.;:xlc:.O"I . C.. ~.,· C"'~" I(>1 to ~. C..::y F:o ;xl~ f~ CO
7.'03-::03 O;::~.:O" !.~~..sa!)'? F~ !.o~ O.'~a :o' l og . P\"lo:og r"'''' l nd ~ O's.'1:I~ P P"' I"~ OP.J):;.vX·l0Ul2 2'\'O5' 1~99
"" CO¢STlo?1:
M..s.'lUil!
li'"J'i,p....:::on

'8' 7.CSCa 0;0"":0" CoCUT.~! :)-J:;.'YJ;!o set. iP1.: 17) :>.;:0::'- .0 ~:o.;xlc:.0"I~M" "JJ3' O?.o::- S!..I;Cl ~C5' 1 ~J

H" 7:QaCa o,cr.xcr Coc.n:<n: :';r.a!C.x. ?:o.oc: S;Y.lC%"I:OI'I ~", . O:;).Ql-SX .(!C4 O:I~'crt'l O"I:l'Iod.(. ?:o~ol'l O?-CCS.x.cC4 2 1.Q1:-::CC4

,,, j :ca:C3 O;C-:(£(T c"'c.rr.....,: Q1~~ P t:e:n.,. !r~~o l'l M411J,d::'-:C3 O;>· 14MG-OO l
OCl.
t1:a .... ;)~V1:..
~ l e:C734 1.-::1."20C3

7.-::a-Ca Coc.rr..en: O'ls...., ~ P p .......n;? 11"15;"":::0:'1 l\~a'Ul I l~gg

"",a; j ,lJa.-c a
O;:le-a:,y

0;l~0' Doc.n:C1! H.rrc : G:z::. ?:~ec: $~c.!d:.OI'l No . S?·Cc.GX-ilCJ ?;:cL-.e c.:~'7l &::$
O?-I '~ V::;.o; 1

S?·OJ ....~.(lC3 A
22':;7: 1~99

~~t4' 1 99 1

,a; i:OaCS O;lC':xor Doo.rr.en: U"ldew::tcr ?;:<£:'It I ~O::o., 1\~,'lJ:J' 1999 S~- \4·M1. -ilO\ , OCl
~::a n ., : cn ,,'
1,\: 3'1993
Q:L
O,:lc:r:xo- COo.lT.c:rI: U:'Idc-w::t<Y t1:;;;x:':::o n ,\~:JI"J:J' ~OO3 AE·OO -I\'!G.i;~ ::l.\J£.~CCJ
"" j,lJa.ca
b'lilOn.,::.cn"
lea Ma-Ca O;loe:-a:o- Ooo.rr.e.1: "'J Q:'ls.'"O~ p p-?,,\I) r!( Mo:nt.:nt'Q 200: Ao..r"co e P:,' l.:d \ ,"032CCi'

j,lJ3lJa ~ ~!o:) ~;:~O"I - Cl10 f ;:",d:~o~ S,gnor.:r

"" Q;lc-::to- COC.Tr.crI:

'9' i.I::MJ O;:e-::to- Coo.rr.co: ;>0::;:;0"1 ~;:~O"I • ·:t;:o-::tioo::l Il.~;:rJ::tJo-

o,,,.-¥..;,- Doc..rr:~: Po,," : o)1 C~..c1 P :01 - F,....d SJpo!':l..,:...rr;1e.1:

'"
' 02
7,t3'J3

7.CaCa O;:cr.r;o- Coc.n-~: in»']rt·;M"""'Jcrr.or( :looo4Omo ;:ncl COiT.;xIxnC:eG C«:.c;'I~O ' A::_::l1 -!:)..(lOl 2 4'C l :~C3

0
,,,, 7:C3t3 O;:l~¥.o- Docrr.~: V ~"",,,,·.r. ..... ~~c:un~,!.al\Ja' A~-OO- \~-oCS S.IJa.'2OC5
~ ,,,,, 7.(!3C.a 0;:«,7,(1" :::Oc:.n:cn: :::n~'YJ;!o Pc o:::.o lm.;:oc:ol'l M.:n.nl O:;)·l+:,~:;..oo 1 22t3':X:OO
~
l>
<n
' 95 7.il<lCa O;:o-:xo- Coc.rr.cn: ?:oood:ro ~ Mo:=.:::-.ng Cc.'l~~::;:O S :o AE.cO.z;.c l ~ , 5.C£''2OCe
w
<n
C
 ..... -i»
..., . '.
." 0... l.l.lOm..il~'f
m
.'V
'"
0
C('.JC1JtlW>fTI CI..w\" 00c::umm1 1 11k' AHH,& f'-.",C'.cmp
~.
IO'V Uoc OtIO
"'-
0--
-'"
'"
~
7.C3Ca 0;:'O!'(8.0'" COCJTI~: MsJr<noe- 0: ColtmC!O r sa';JI:'( M~'(I::I l!'I'YIo!'n: A!:-<JO ..Z.F.(t37 JC' 11 : ~(fi
(1) C'l
.,.,g, IS? M31J8 ~e'"ccO'"COCJ"TI~: ?:'~d t.To!' :0- ?~:liI r.l':.on a.,d A~ rO'.a I Ol Co:'I~.r.:::$ ~ r ~~r.O!'s A=·~l --! ::.-.IJJ:J C 1"l;l60':!IOO 1\)"'"
I ~
.'" 7:I:lM3 M~~ r R~a.,~ ~,!~.... r R'!?ol<1n9" M.2 w.~; CJ.IJG:r;:t;8 OO .CC · C3 .oo ~ •.,. Ca::a ;3;1;1i2IJca
-::::I
::::1-

...0'1\)
':II 7:03'(18 MCIlO: Ro.."I(l,, !) .V-tXQ: Ro,d .. ~ .. ~ Wtmr CJ,(j('.. 1OC~ C3;CO -16.00 R.,.\' C","" :).CC'2Cm

'00 {,\:laCS :..!<:U! ~ ~o;,d" 9 ' MZ M~r c:!.C6'~OO 1tS ac .::4 .)J R::r.... !::':t.::I
MdlQr j:l:Gld;'lg ~:ce.::c·~
3
::01 i.Ca.CS Mc:or RmcL'9 :"!dJC r Rcad..'9- /toO w.~: CJ.ce.':o::ca OJ.au ·ca.oo R:r,v i:';:t;;) :J.IJe.:cm '"
!:!.
0
7:CM8
'''' Mur R.....d.... g ':J.'.6::r Re.Jd..... g.W.i w..t~ r c::! .C~' z!oaca .CO - 16.0:: R:ilw ~ 3.1J€.'2Cca ::::I
r
203 i.t~1ja Mo!le: RMd;'J~ ;"~Z!r Re'I\:L1g .. "..;; w.c'.e r C3,'C '3,':tJC8 16 .00 -::!4.oo R........ D-J'..;I ~:C€.'2cca
0
i,'CSC.:!.
CO
2'" MC!Jer Rmd:'l9 \(<ter Rc:sdl'lg - to.'.J I\'.(!er CJ.C6':cm OJ.CO -as 00 it~w Ca'ZI ~.te.:!.;,:.J

,'" i,t~..C~ M.tll! r R_d:.g "~.t~ r R"",dng· ~'.3 M&. r C3,'O <5.'::.ooce ce.oo . 1e:.oo R"w ~"".:I 3.1J€.:~CC3

200 7,o:e.-.::a M~~r R<M<lJ'~ :\~~~r R<M<I.'!l· MJ 1oo.'~~ t ~ ,t.:;.':?,::C3 II}.Cr.t · 24.00 R.t~ ~a:.:t J .1J6·2t;t;.8

ZC; i.<:aca e:;,"'-"""J Lowmml /::;",;nd F.x:..:c:;. CtJdo 0.1 S:O:."l!7J T,,~?!.,:'I~ & 'n:;:vrorc C::tT'lm IT..Qc.-C)(..(X: 1
.-
Oilil i,'(jJ,'C8

i;'O!ta
C':::i",t.-r;J I.owC':I<b1 ~::r.1 d
l..co·,n~·Id.at ~~·td
;~!:e

FliClik:l Pi'CI
S'\Cf):'I'J
P.~ L·.C'f
TQ ,-r:o~e ?1IT..;"!l ?,?t19 S, ' rtt''.J,"rcrt C;"'JQm
l .101{l ., .:o 1.000 OJ!'.'~'''ot! MVS-<0 10:2 Pl.,ng !.
I T.cc..OX.QJ:
.-a
""
210- i.lJz,-ca
C'1::'WI."G ~~,.n:e'I : Di::l(J':)'?I

~..:-.;c<)'~: I UOyd'~ R.....l,~r . AE!.. t ;o:':h ..·.'ot!:,.: Stk-if ~e"a':01"1~ \'<l Cdil~():1 P.... n ~';,'I200t5
LT-CCo-CX·OI2

2S'0 5' :-::~

~ 11 i.-c31J3 0;::cr.x0" Coc.rT.e"l: I Uotd'~ Re<')::.."<: r • lIZ. b:C9'L!'f AI,Ic": RC?3~ 1:.19 MOIl :000 31.'CS::.":0!

2.2 7,'Ca'C09 0;:(r,r,0" CoCUT.G"1: l!.!o't'd':; RQlJ I$Xl r . AE!. No~n Wos: 5110,' O;:Ir.IUrtS \,'.ll <t:l::'G"1 ~"n A..Ij\J~':: 20::'3 a.'Ca~ coo

~1 3 7.'Oe;oa O;e-:iCa ~ca"Ile'! !!O) o:t ~ R~ l~ r . Aa ?l':IOc", h :egrly R.., tc W 12·14 J>J~ ::.":0'; Jc.'C €,·:tOO

:! 14 7.'CalJa O;:...:~a : O<:u'1tc1: I!O)'(f ~ R~ l* :' ~ Pl':lOcS h~{I~ R"/ ~ w J..7 ~gJ:": ~C6 ~ l .(!e.·z.:as

2 15 7.'Cata 0;:0-;1;0" Coe.n:G"1: UOi'd':; RQIJ:$:I)r · AEl ?:oce:;:; Inm'I'f ~(l'.· tJ':" za S~:o m::O"· 2 Oc;to:;~ 2006 '2C' I~'~OO

~ ld 7.(!.eC3 0;:cr.x0' Coorr.a1: Uoyd~ ~OJ:!;):I r. AEl. ? ~ 1~ \.·;.:c.d.xon SU'TLT..:r'f :OC:?J:: It.~;:tl :cOS · A;; rl :CW' PE.· I4-Rl .(!C;J A I.CS:007

2 17 i .Ce.Ca O;J~OI ~c.n;...:It P.~ g.'\l O!SIl:,::::;(o'l P~e.."'t e :;lto.:l Rot!fT'(J·.l:I' 01 ~~ :2 4'O'.i.':O::C:

0
~
"'. Ma.1J3 ~oer<CO" CO¢J'\'l+:l: AE!..· Roeo~l~" 'o:AP8e,'W! El'W! l!<Ii' P D~.n -e-s SP·l·1-RFoOCJO l 3
Q':::1
tl :e !:l:i~(I"l:iJ"
4"-<
:a".o: :(':~C3

2 19 i:CaCS O::,..:-'~(I' ~c.t1:'ot!:'I : O;l~ u rall i ?.;:einr ~~~:n:-r' Pi.. " '.'<.i'JlT.oe 1 SNi·J.Rl.IJc:!. I .1 1:0!'2CC8
Coffl.>J '~"t:
9 Maca l:oc.n:....,~ O;l..:-.;cutlSl} ?;:e.:tk! !l,;,c..-r:oer' »nJ<
h
'"
w
"'" O;~(I' 1\~!'I.:I~n1erc ?,m
- - - - - ---
R.-~~:lC.: SNiQ. P.!..lJC'l.l.2
CO:'l';......:·•.ncr
1.'C!'2oJC8

'"<5
 Ji
'"
~
,~
0:'0
R"C'd
llc<:!nW' rt1 CI.-..'Ii O.oawnmt n 10 .:.I:. l HF§-

.oCo.=n..cc::.2 1
"V ~1Cclm p

'0" <;
.,
UJarn" (;~ if)ln)'
'''" Ox !lite -I»
"'-
cr-
-'"
'"'"
0
221 7:0~(Ia O;« .:I:CW" Co(:.r:T.(t'I: O;:er,xQ:lo'l1? ;:o....."lC t..~"n.'l:7-l""'tt PI'}:! F.;)c:,~C3> Co:;¢"c:~o:.:; $ :>
C"ns.:J'~'"I'l
itI:'l:<
1.'C:l'2CC)
CD n
i'l:::T
~
2Z! ;,'C~,:oa ~~.t.Q" t<lc.rr.e'l: O;~.t.:01'ld 1 ?: ;:..:..,.. r..~..n;s9'"m:f' ?an s..:c~ IZGon Un.: - ;:0 S?..9I).RJ..·C'::22 .e 1 :0~.'1CO!l
'"'" 7."(l~'Ca 0;.e:d.(J! :Clc.t11e'l: o.:~.o:'kl r ?,,::c::1e 1\~.:Irugen t:rc .?Ian Fvml~ S<lle~1 A~~~~r' .!. S.U1Jr.<1I ~( Si'OSC- Rl.·002 4 .1
C.:o:bo1J:::":;
'onk I ~
"" R.-;k
COI'l'$J::m
401"1'"
1.'J3'2Cca -::J
::J_
22-1 M3C-3 0;l~a:0" CO~~ : ~<!'"a:ona l .?1)~· !'II!' i>.~ana?!,m!'n: P,an Sa'~r. l r C ai !.!~ * FSA S P-9" RlJ};2 ·12'5 CO)fI<>.J '~ ~
1.>::3'2003
..,
O'i'l

-'"
'O:1!(
2:::; 7:C3'C8 O;loe!a:o- Doc.rT!~: Q;le-.Y.On.1I .P,pot'..JIo? iI.'aNl:;p!'m!'i"( ~., ,' lV$~ r T~'f! of -Con:~I'I':S SP·9C-R1...QC2
COflS..I'~m
\ .'C3'2CO;l 3
Soct... ~PilC.-'.C)
:2~ 1 .'C9.~a 0::e-;itQ" Coc..rl1«l: \n ~~0:"1 r ~.:.rt or AE!. 1e 1SOJa.. SDV ENGOSOS'..J..A·3S<S-3 ER SCC'.il 12.\:e: ~0!l
?"', Ud
0
2.27 7.<:003 O;«,xo- Coc.n:o!)'l: CO"l'«~'cn W..lI\) ryJrn::n:: S~ :o;r, · Co.:r.n !) hj.;);oc::.O"I Pl'o(.Qdt.rO AE4 I ..!::;.(i05 • 27,'C~1CC7 ::J
228 7;Ca.'Ja 0;J"!(lt.0'" :oc.rr.~: A.,a:,,:;'$ '0 : J r5;l~o n R~t!!> aro R'!'!T.<td.a' ..0.:::01'1$ A:'·9 1· MlJ.C01 2 22~31?::OO
r-
0
10
2:::l 7,<lOC<J 0;:l«;r:0'" COo.rT.(f'I: ?,;:o..."lO Co"rOC. 01 '::l1'Id i m)!)'1t"( M,;'I.,,;t!1'rT:(f'I: S;'.Y,I:!t1f AE.c(;...V ·~C l 2 2-l'O2:~OO

ZX 1,C8C3 0;«.:r.0'" COc.rT.e'I: ::'~c:.01 M,;'I),:lIJt::r E rr;O"~ A::'::.Qt Il'I'Omol ~on Up¢l:O , '::C'; :;';01 ~ AO:l rl(1l :':o(.Odt.r A E·~ I· ' :)'2C3 2 2-l'CO':/.'C0'i

'-I' 7,0303 O;c:.:r.cr COCUT(f'I t \'\ ?:)9 l :;.: 'or 22 lo.';ri 2:00

7,0J3C3 O;Icr:tcr: Coo.rr.ocn: U1!oed G '(l..I;: XC::OO.J:oe J «l ?:o-S~: ~4c:e '!lj

"'" i ,~03 O;:cr,x« C'Oc..n;C)"I: ::.ot,JJ1 ~'....-:; ?\~ .s:<.1~ "'oo t ".] ~' '1J~~
~<tx:~ :~cs~ca

2ZC50'..-cca
2"
2301 i ;/J31Ja Q;l ~.T.(r toc:.n:~: ': '::So)n'$ ?.p ... Fa~ ~c.a:O'l.~1!I Pre- S-.a" t\''''o;r.n~ ',o~ !!> 221JS'?'JG8

""
23l

:x.
,;(lata

Zl,Ca' ~

:!1,(lS:C:1
O;J ~a: or

.. too.rn<?"1! AE!. To~oX< M?~ n g f\~ n'.r. <?i

0:::1'·\',;'19
~, f<rm.:toll Req'.Je::;!(:d::l:t:i ?10·,,<k:d fro :r. ~,E l

'.'~r.J;"U~ ba nd F:lcb,~. ?j:ltl''3 Ganoe;,' At:'3n:J a:TIC"I:

=!cq·.JC ~~ ::Ioo 'J

·l;:lJ n¢la r So Rc:oe'iClr Tronc."l l '3-00 ·~ , c=a 1<.~ LG .-1~QX,\l::3

221J5'?'JQI

2:l. ~1:0a:ce C:li'.\mg V<l :~il l.J'lI l~ru F.c.it .,.-s· ?lO f !., o f ?!.,n:l' L&Jnc:.e( ~ R.,~:.e ( T~ tlC'l lG-OO·:>X.o:9 I LG.oo. ::-X-C::S

l~?IO'''o",:
O:..,-.s:cr: !:.:re.n:cn' For G<J~c..~ (':1iI R"..,:~~:-':o ?_~5 I I
"" Zl:O.e:O!l !!'I~M",~o:n of S.J~~ G<J~ P.;: e:r~-s. ~le"II~ • M..rlflr M~.:v~ P:og<lnll !e S tr. o!O( rTlo:!!'l:.Ii l
Co:"r~~t&'l~
2C,',:?' ,gSl

'''' Zl.ta.'~ O,:cr<e« ::Oc.n:e'I: H<o"rll:t G&$ ?:~.,c:.. P c eJ,."ri · P!O,ce:: ~i:I Boo;':· !\~,:rl'ji~ Tr<lo:. ~~f aru Ce:~!'c;., ' S?..oo.T'.-<X:4 E' ~o:!!'oPt-:~ MP89J2

2-11 :!1 ,(l3'ce C:a'......'ll AS!. M~:~!!IS:a:IO"I ClI;"';; ~i' ::';:",500'1 ~ GOT T@ t150
p·: r
S rrJJ'P.~
7~":?~3 I I s 20]11335

0 ,.., ZI .e,s,·oo C;:J w~""J C$ ) M::c:e.,gS':)~~ FOKJ"::e,- Mecr RU'l 4 So 5 .?l;»,".] 8. h ::;::u,..e;t C::I~ m
?:T
G=>...::9-:X·C:l1 I e I :.~S'1 99S
~ E 'Y)'Y: ~

~
2.., 21.<::3'00 C:;)',\' '''l VI f.x;:.:'~ ?iP1'l!)~ n ::;;nn:o r1 C:~:;:J 'Tl P! GRC(;(l'i~ q.. ' OO.!o P.-200 lc.oo..cX,(;C2 t (;.OO · D(.(X!2
~ ,.... Z1 :Ca:ca !:o·......""J VI i=:x:!::e:: ?,;»:'I.,e. h~UT.CM: ~~ m ? !G l :l~"CW R..3:0 l G.-1COX-i:,:! t G.O::·:x:..c, 2
'"w
'"C
;?
<Q
~
••
0 ...
lIit-.!d
~.J't...,ICIM\ !bo:.... T..,' T., .. A~ , !it;:= 'F\' FII c:.,- ;;
...
.. " .... '\IoICnl >:,.n,
It=\' c..~-:il~.
~l>
1»-
0--
'"'"
0
~
". 21.03C3 P.'wX OJ'";a;::n
~?I«o $."~TI~
~,*,-,~"'SJ"b1;d".!Joo:iM
~ ~ n:~v...:l
0> !.'t'So.....tn ~:i t:cn ~n..;t~bt lZ~SC? a"Id IT

W 'lei ~~wC .. ~'I\o!o:m.tv.l .. t.O'l N;irgo:"lo lar 12·SC? ~ I':;

~a'C<t25 1 a:; 1z: J.ti$
_I»
(1)
",,:I"
C')

~-S 1.0;:(3 :lnC(00.)' .. ~ 2JCCC.325113S1 n , .c3

'"
'" ~i a.'C9:ca Pe-JJI"Inc f s=::.:crne"'l:
C..-n~ r. ::.m"":1 Pv:,."in.,.
~;:I XlRc:::;.;u'I :.c: O:A~(..'IC No::'?,~ fi:( LOd DO e,..ICI ~O"I::..Po :o:::l '3( CoIR tr
S'CS'200S
I
:::l _
~
~od <~·0"1 " Yl • ~Jt'I: A·("< ,..,~ · -:::l
a.'OJ.'C9 ~no ; s::;.::o'TIG"I: ,Il,<Ji'I:€;lI l tJln5~'d.1I!d zaa5-1 ~1 Po<t:no!lo'CoMo K.ld Lqud P«~QU'TI AMCT 1:1XC-CS-C I:" la ' 1087
'"
Zo;9 a.'OO:c.a ~..o"I nc l S:::I:cT.C"I: Uafd'':' .1;>,o9=~ I n:c'T'!'f A.:.Id! Rc;:l(r. , ~ tIO 1~1.\:1'I:'C00 APN: .CC::21W :! 1:0:...:\100
..,0'""
3
>sa

",
a,'Q),ca Pe---••(XUlC) t S:::Ixmal:
a.C9.ca Yer'WOneI5:::l:a::rncn:
Uaicl':. P.c CJ.=: ?~u::.::. l rm9"l=" Rcu:cw I :::to 1.:. JU:'IC;:'::OO

!,.afd':, ~:;J~ ~N"'~ ',',c:': She" ~r.I~Q1 :' ....:li<l..::o:'l ?;:lr'I

APiV:. OC::~t5 :3C'OO':X;:OO

s.IJa: o::oS
-
I»
0
:::l
Z2 $.00.'03 f\n,(nrol ~»T:<nt UOf(l't. .RI:t'J $....... r ? LI2V.1I'.d;(o n s..rnm."I'Y R~ rt M;rf200G·Ao(1 :;:0::7 10.'001:2007 r
0
25J a.~.t:S ~Wla:- I t:.aY.r...:"lt !.io, d·. ~g~", ( ~~ I" .... go';~t R.... .~· 3 e.;,· 7 ":".I.J\A: :Y.l:loS A?AC .CC'222<2 21:ce.' ~05 (0

05< e.cs.CJ ?f!tW'l~ J s:;':ien:cn: O;Ie~~om.crSJ:I,,~otQl ~U;:.l:oc."l:I~'!o 1.'C!~~OCJ

>s' a.oo.c:l ~nel S=Io~cn: ~ h»;J:~f ~btQ9OT.c:1: ?cr>;O'1~I :n::I COT.;:.cxnoC!'!o CO".c."'QI:o" A!:·91.JOCCI ~ .:.'CL' ~

~d a.UI.Cl ='cno:l~! ~:crncn: NO;I$A Add.::cn:t Roql.l:err.e"l'= b: t~ :{>,MP ','';'.:!cl\.''<.xo: ~ .'1 C71

257 a.~.'C3 ~W'ln:1 s:.:.:me'l: ~~ t.o!:o:r . ~:..'I~ ol Cb~ f ~~ !:o:R t()C34IJa'O« :a.'Q.' ~

"'"'..
k.I$o.. .I ....nS:.>l' d;I;d ::Oa:i.J.4.'C(;1 p.~o:~ ·vMooilM UqJ.d ?o:r4olJ'n p,,~ 3' S~'d.l:cl~
a.aJ.'C8 Po:n.o:n;'ll)I ~:.n:(J1: AS2aaS 3-~ 1
"""1liI~lfI!o.""d \\1o (l ,""'a"ICo:' AJ...-:tr.
~:r;:',;,c.oc".
13'C!J.OJ rl:c;.o/!.'!o C~co:t3--l:t;l rI:~O't'!oa,olS' ME: T1 :0 Sf\:.'M ET1S CTl rnd:lg '!o of "'.,J::... e
~b:J-c.c-.... TC"'''': n :;l
1.:00":(0"('0;

o
~
~
l>

~
<3
 • s ~ ~ gA •~ ~
8
~ "
~ .,~ .~,
§ §
~ >
~
i~ ~;; ~ ~ A ~
S • 0
" 0 " 0 < "

I
~ g
I ii"
G G
9 ~ ~il g ~
<
~
I " ~ & ~
B
!
••
II »
~
• ~ ~
~

"
§ ~
i I ;;

§
iii a ~

•E
J
••
•~ giN
~fI i
w
! .i,
~
!:
~
l
~

~
I• j I~ I Hj
d
0
d
0
~j

d
0
~
f
j
d
0
~

~$ ~ ~
0
~ ~
• ij
I 2 ~
~ 8
•< ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3
•~
• j ~
~
~
g ~ s 6

I
~
n t
6
p. ~$
•
• n
!• s~ ~
~
g
Ii
•
j .5, g
•
j •~
9
j Ii
G
~
I•• •i
!
"ti
g
:.
~
i
i
~

~•
• II 0
J ~

I• ! 1
~ ~
s
~
•
• ~ ~
~

J j• I
.~
: 5
~
•
ls I
~
Jj 11 J ~
•
0

i! j• ;; •
t
~
~
~ It § .~

•~
I~
,!
~
~ ~
I i 0
3
i
8
Ii ••" a•
•i • •
•" I
>
~ •
~ ~
~ g
,., '$.

1 ~ ~
I
! i ••i1 ~
I Iw
~ ~ j ~

~ •~
e §
I
§
i~ I• I
~ 0

• •• ~ Ii
j is ~ .~
••
~
~ i
t
~
R ,;. &
!
I j i~ H
<•
~
! K J I i 6

f! I I •~
~ • • ~ ~
~ 5 li u ~ ~
i i • I n ~
~ .,
I• ~
s
~ &

~ " •
~
~
~

3 I
!
.~
ti
B
• S
• ~
!
~
I3 •~
n ~G
>
~
!
>
~E" J i Ii~
3
~.

ii~ ~ ~
g
i~
D ~ ~

! ~ j i I •
al
f
~
0
r.
s
"~
'Ii
§" •
S
•
S
A
z
'Ii S i
~!
~~ ~ I •
~

§
i H
u
~
8 I
j III J § J J ! J ! I ) 1J
~
& I I 0
t I t I I I I t I I a
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

l• ~ ~ n ~ sr. ~ ~ 8 8 a 8
~
8 8
a ~ r.
~ r. r. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ii ~ ii

Page 57 of 88 OBJ fD: A53510

 Attachment 3
North West Shelf Oil & Gas Facilities

,
Map 1 (in the body of the
report) taken from inset

(/) ~
~ ii ii!!liilil!!illiil!iiii.iil iiiil
«
(!)
•I
~ H

~
-0
-oJ

LL. I>
-oJ ~
Wg
:I:~
(/)
l-
(/)
W
~
:I:
l-
e:::
0
z

Page 58 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 4

Drawing -2 taken
from inset
.,,
.' ~

''''011: 1 ~r u
to :"tt ' (lIO "'-.

'.,

\
\

......, ... ~

Drawing 1 - Apache Varanus Island production facilities

Page 59 of 88 OBJ ID: A535 10

 Pipeline explosion
loading line
Willd
dil'l'l'tioll

Approx. plant
damaae area

Approx
100m radius

I
X1
1
~X12
\

Storoot T.nk
1250 .uuuoO""

Drawing 2 - Location of explosion on beach

Page 60 of 88 OBJ ID: A53510

Attachment 5

Top camp muster

_. . ~:....

Photo 1 - Varanus Island

Photo 2 • Varanus Island fire and explosion incident, view from

helicopter

Page 61 of 88 OBJ fD: A53510

Attachment 5

HJV gas plant 16" sales gas

line rupture

12" gas lines rupture

-
, ..
Photo 3 - Varanus Island NNE beach, incident site

16" sales gas pipeline

6" Harriet gas line

8" Harriet oil line

4 a) 4b)

Photo 4 a) & b) - Ruptured 12" pipelines

Page 62 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 5

Photo 5 - Explosion crater

Photo 6 - 30" crude export line valve cyclone protection cage

Page 63 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 5

T ;~'
•

Photo 7 - Seawall banking

16" SDV

Photo 8 -Damaged gas plant

Page 64 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 5

Photo 9 -16" SDV (gas export line)

,'. , .;
t ', : .
'.'

'. ,

-.
Photo 10- Ruptured 16" sales gas line

Page 65 of 88 OBJ ID: A53510

Attachment 5

Photo 11 - Ruptured 6" Harriet gas line

, ..
. ~

17.5 kg rock
"_I~-
•> ..,.

•
, .
Photo 12 - Debris in HJV gas plant (compressors) area

Page 66 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 5

..
. '.
Photo 13 - Seawall banking water and jet fire erosion

Photo 14 - Ruptured section 12" sales gas line, external corrosion and
wall thinning

Page 67 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 5

Photo 15 - Ruptured section 12" sales gas line external corrosion

Page 68 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 5

Photo 16 -Inside view of 16" SDV, ball in closed position

Page 690188 OBJ /0: A53510

 Attachment 6
Not to scale - dimensions as

t measured on 6 June 2006

To Apache VI production Facilities

167
Protective coating (concrete
~
& asphalt enamel)
0383

flow1'l'
directionU

6000 950 1400 1050

~I
If) If)
550 Ol
'"
0> '"
0>
~
Ol
C uO>'" C
:.:
If)
Ol
Q)
·c c
Ol .-
.><-
0>
If)
~
Ol
C
"'=
.oOl
c.o
.....
0>::
·c 0
~ cu:..=
~ ~
UjCl.
'" ~~ If)

" ~
_ E Ol '" Ol
IU
• Ol
<Dc
,.... :.::
IOl
<o~ -
° 0'"
C'">_ ~O> N(\lC
,....0:.=
::CO 2t)

Attachment 6 - Sketch 1 - Incident site, pipelines proximity

Page 70 of 88 GBJ 10: A53510

 Attachment 7

Last Name Given Names Position/Company Date of Interview

Interview Location
1 Beckford Peter Corrosion 6 June Varanus
Technician/Apache 2008 Island
2 Bennett Zachary James Construction 21 July
Clough
Superintendent! 2008
Perth
Clough
4 Davies Ivor Haora ScaffolderlWilson 4 July CFMEU
Pipe Fabrication 2008 Perth
3 Drake Tony Instrument 19 June
Brockman Electrical 2008
WA DolR
Fitter/Chamber of
Perth
Commerce and
Industry
5 Embleton Brian Kevin Construction 6 June
Varanus
Manager VIIEmbo 2008
Island
Engineering Ltd
6 Fletcher Wayne Kevin Process 5 June Varanus
Operator/Apache 2008 Island
7 Jackson Christopher Safety 6 June Varanus
VanHomnQh ManaQer/Apache 2008 Island
8 Morck Justin Michael Production 5 June Varanus
Operator/Apache 2008 Island
9 Paton Ross Adam Varanus Island 7 June
Field 2008 Varanus
Superintendent!Apa Island
che
10 Simcock Wayne Douglas Maintenance 5 June Varanus
Supervisor 2008 Island
11 Smith Gavin James Electrician/Apache 5 June Varanus
2008 Island
12 Solomon Paul William Rigger 9 July
CFMEU
ScaffolderlWilson 2008
Perth
Pipe Fabrication
13 Symington Vincent David Onshore 5 June
Varanus
Production 2008
Island
Supervisor/Apache
14 Thomas Grant Elliot ScaffolderlWilson 4 July
CFMEU
Te-Tahu-O- Pipe Fabrication 2008
Perth
KawatpuaranQi
15 Welten Mark Anthony Medic Safety 6 June Varanus
Officer/Apache 2008 Island
16 Wong Ling Chang Instrument 20 June WADolR
(James) Technician/Apache 2008 Perth

Page 71 of 88 DBJ ID: A53510

 Attachment 8

Apache Pipeline IMMR Activities

Table 1- IMMR Activities

Pages 73 -79

Page 72 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 ....

Varanus Island Subsea Mainland

PL12 KP67.728: KP67.604: KP67.596: TPL13 PL17
Crossing 90 degree Crossing
16" Sales Gas Pipeline: installed Point 12" bend Point 30"
Beach sales gas Tanker Beach KP99.6
1998/9 KP70 Varanus Island crossing crossing KPO.O Mainland
pipeline loading line
KP69 .6 KP.090 CS1

PL12 KP 67.665: KP67.1 : KP66.17: TPL8 PL17

90 degree Split sleeve

I
bend,

II
12" Sales Gas Pipeline: installed grouted Crossing
Beach Beach KP30 .312
Crossing clamp repair Point 30 " KPO.O:
1992/3 KP70 Varanus Island Crossing Crossing Mainland
Point 16" due to Tanker Flange
KP69 .746 KPO.060 CS1
Sales Gas 7degree loading line
pipeline bend
324mm Sal es Gas Pi p elin e
1992 In s p ectio n r epo rt N ov 1992, SP-14-
U L -006

Onshore sal es gas pipeline cathodi c] PO KP31.

1993 protection survey May 1993. OP·14.

1993
RU-00 5

324mm Sales Gas L i ne Pipelin e

Inspection detai led repo rt, May
1993. 0P-OO-UL-O01
1- KP31 1
'KP69.753 KP9.450'
ROV p i peline inspection 12" 5ales ROV inspection
1993 gas pipeline, Aug 1993, SS-14-RU- only. NoGP
005 readings taken

P69.753 KP9.45
324mm Sales G as L i ne Pipeline
S ummary of results and assessment of significant
1993 Inspect ion summary report, A ug
findings from ROV survey undertaken Aug 1993
1993, SP-14-UL-005

~P69. 753 KP9.450

324mm Sales Gas Line 1993
Inspection findings - JPK stability analysis of
1994 and spanning analysis, SP-14-RL- identified areas
026 following 1993
ROVsurvey

1994

1994
Pipeline Embedment survey report
12" sales Gas line and 12" infield
now line volume 1 and 2

12" Sales gas line and 12" infield

now line investigations,SP-29·RL-
r p677

P67.2
side scan sonar
survey

Inspection of various locations of subsea

seabed geology
KP16
KP]

~-

001

KP63.7 P41 .367

Po sitioning report Post cyclone
1994 Bobby, SP-KI-RC-019
Post cyclone positioning survey only

1995
Offshore Installation close out
report 12" SGL pipeline stabilisation
vol 1,2,3, SP-14-RL-004

1995 SGL Pipeline stabilisation

I ~ ~ ,_._,,-,,- _1_' __ " _
Survey of rock bolt locations

J
1995 maintenance, SP·14-RL-018

Page 730f88 OBJ 10: A53510

 -r'
1
AEL Annual pipeline Inspection Post KP17.927
1996 tropical cyclone Olivia, SP-14-RL-024, ROVsurvey
June 1996

-- -
1996
AEL Sales Gas pipeline survey report,
OOP-OO-UL-002, Jan 1996
CP survey
t
Po KP31'1

1996
AEL sales gas pipeline Geophysical
survey, SP-20-RL-007, July 1996
f P67 3
. pipeline survey via seismic and echo sounder
KP3()

~P67. 1
clamp
repair to
12" sales gas pipeline survey KP67.1
1996 bend due to Te Olivia, July/Aug 1996
bend due
to TC
I
Olivia

996 AEL Sales Gas Line Diving survey, July GVI, NDT and CP inspection at 2 locations
1 1996 KP67j jKP40
-
~P67. 127
--- -
12" sales gas pipeline re stabilisation
installation of additional
1996 program interim report, SP-14-RL-028,
pipeline anchors
KP24.830
Nov 1996.
-
j
'f'/<P67.127
12" Sales Gas Line close out report , close out report summarising action
1996 SP20-RL-001, Nov 19996 I taken following TC Olivia
KP24.830

f'/<P67.127
12" Sales Gas pipeline Re stabilisation
anchor pull tests and installation,
1996 program, SP-20-RL-003.03, VOL I, II, III.,
following TC Olivia
KP24.830
Nov 1996

Page 74 of 88 OBJ 10: A5351 0

1997 AEL Sales Gas line survey report, OP-OOI I
RU-001 , Dec 1997
- - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - -~---- - - - Visual and
CP survey
f PO KP31 '1
Onshore Sales Gas Line Cathodic fi(PO KP31 .3t
1997 Protection survey, OP-OO-RU-002, Dec CPsurvey
1997.

1998
12" and 16" Sales Gas Pipeline Mainland
section AS2885 Risk assessment, SP-21
--Do KP3

RF-004, June 1998

1998 12" and 16" Offshore section AS2885 risk

~ ~
assessment, SP-21-RF-003, Aug 1998 RA considers VI onshore section and
subsea seclions of 12" and 16' SGL. I

LTS, Sinbab, Campbell and Compressor

Station 1 Corrosion risk assessment and
1998
inspection scheme, HE-OO-MN-003, QCL
ref5015/1013, rev 1dated sept 1998 RA considers VI onshore, subsea and
onshore mainland sections of 12" SGL

1
f
P69.016 KP1B.976
12" SGL
ROVand
1999 shallow water Inspection report CP
1999 phase 1 and 2, Ref 9-TCR9954[1].001 ,
KP69.192 ... KP67.595
Tambouritha ConSUltants Pty Ltd
16" SGL RO.)
andCP

1999
Assessment of the 1999 shallow water
rov inspection Part 1, SS-00-RU-006, 4
April 2001 . QCL ref 5110/2035
1 A"b,~ r

Page 75 ot88 OBJ 10: A53510

2000
AEL 12" and 16" SGL route
inspection, SP-14-RU-001 , June 2000
t KP10 KP31 J

16" Sales

u """.-
JP Kenny Shallow wa ter p ipelines Gas
Pipeline

I
2000 span assessmen t, JPK 01-OS04-01-P-7 KP69.265
12" Sales
008, SP-14-RL-032, June 2000
Gas
Pipeline t KP69.012
"".00

2000
12" and 16" Sales Gas Pipelines, 4
March 2000 CP potential survey,
F9001A02A, AUS R9133W001A
tKPO KP31 .31

12" and 16" Sales Gas Pipelines, 28

t KPO KP31.3]
2000 June 2000 Onshore Cathodic Potential
survey, F 9031A001A, AUS
R9132K001A

2000
12" and 16" Sales Gas Pipelines 3
December 2000 DCVG survey, AUS A
t 1
9031 KP11.8 KP29.915

12" SGL Rock Anchor failure Review, Assessment by jpk of 20 faile d pipeline anchors on the subsea
2001 SP-20-RG-009, JPK Ref section of the 12" sales gas pipeline, identified in the OCL report line
01/0S04/02JPI7I002, sept 2001

Onshore 12"/16" Sales Gas Pipeline KPO KP31.3

2002 Cathodic Protection survey June 2002
AUS1004 t 1

Page 76 of88 OBJ 10: A53510

 Onshore 12"/16" Sales Gas Pipelines KPO KP?
2003 Cathodic Protection survey July 2003,
AUS1046 R1046001A i 1
Approx KP67. 62 Approx KP15

2003 Shallow water inspection program RE-

AEL-910-0401 , SS-C0-RU-027
t Limited CP readings taken on 16"(5) and
1,"HI
Vis and CP ;ns~ ction via ROV
I I

Sales Gas pipeline Sacrificial Anode

f
2003 maintenance scope of work, June Sacrificial anode
2003, AUS1032 replacement scope of
work.

12" & 16" Sales Gas pipelines,

2004 Post cyclone Monty

f""'' '
wonnich and east spar pipelines, post

""'' ·'1
KP66.5 KP13.5
cyclone Monty sidescan sonar positioning and SSS survey
(12") (12 ')
inspection survey, POODS

12" Sales Gas pipeline September

t t
2004 2004 DCVG Survey AUSl154 DCVG survey of 2 areas
of interest in tidal flats
area downstream of KPO

t t
Review of Apache Energy Pipelines No inspection data available for No inspection data available for tl1e
2004 2004, QCL REF 5226/2942, SP-14-RF- onshore section on VI or the shore onshore section on VI or th e shore
003.01/03 zones at VI and the mainland. zones at VI and the mainland

Sales Gas Pipelines Cathodic

Protection survey August 2004 Field
data sheets, project AUSl153

Offshore Pipelines-Onshore section

Cathodic Protection survey August
t onshore VI j
u
2004 20040P-14-RU-003,
Rl15201A.AUSl153

Page 77 0(88 OBJ 10: A53510

2004
Subsoil pipe coating repair 17-10-04
(P.Beckford report)
i
KPO.ORepair to coating
damage on 12" and 16"
Sales Gas pipelines

2004
Sales Gas Pipeline Cathodic Protection
Sacrificial anode testing 13-11-04,
AUSl172, L117201A
I r
KP12.112
I1
KP20.21
2IKP29.
050
12" Sales
Gas
Pipeline
KP69.7 KP68.243
VI Ultra Shallow water and onshore
pipeline inspection, RE-AEL-916-01 Rev
2004
2, OP-14-RU-002, inspection performed
Oct 2004

f i
GVI only for 12"

2005
December 2005 CP survey,
AUS129901A
-

t P1 95
.
-
KP31 ' j

2005
2005 Annual Summary report of
Inspection and corrosion management Report summarises inspection and corrosion
1
activities AE-00-RN-004 management activities for all assets, including 12''/16''
sales gas pipelines, onshore and offshore sections,
I during the period 200312004, and up to may 2005.
I

2006
Fugro Report for the post Cydone ROV
inspection, SS-OO-RU-038(1), 10th -19th i f f
April 2006
I 16" KP67.5 16" KP62.915 12" KP51 .330
I
2006 VI Offshore pipework monitoring18/6/06 rea:ngs i i

I
Onshore 12"/16" sales Gas pipelines I KPO KP31.3 i

2006 onshore section Cathodic Protection

survey July/Oct 2006 AUS R137101A
__78-0(88
.Page . _..
-OBJ /0 : A53510
.~ ~
t j I
 I

2007 Sales Gas Pipelines - 5 year integrity review SP-14-RL-067, 30 May 2007. Applicable to 12" and 16" sales gas pipelines

I
I
!

2007
PL 12 Varanus Island Validation summary report (Lloyds report) AE-14-RL-
003 REVA May 2007.
Applicable to VI PL 12
t i
I
I
I

ro -
I
license area only

2007
12"/16" SGL Onshore section cathodic protection annual survey R151701 , ~311
August 2007

KP10.25 KP31"}
2007 12"/16" Onshore section DCVG coating survey , R151801, August 2007

::
.
CP readings
2007 VI Offshore pipework monitoring 1/8/07
1
taken onshore
VI

CP and GVI,
I

2007 2007 Onshore pipeline Inspection workbook, sept 2007 all pipelines I

onshore VI
I

Moduspec Review of recommendations from 2004 pipeline risk assessments, 10-

4-2007, PAU0060.1

2007
Moduspec Gap analysis of the QCL review of the AEL pipelines(2004) with the
requirements of AS2885 and the Petroleum submerged Lands Pipeline
Regulations, PAU0060.18, SP-14-RG-040 Review Applicable to all AEL pipelines

- ~

CP readings
2008 VI offshore pipework monitoring MCC building 2008 laken onshore
VI

---_.- --- -------- --_. _.- - - - ---

___ I

Page 79 of 88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 8 (pages 80 - 87)
Table 2 - Prescriptive Requirements

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

36A Work Practices: a licensee shall operate the
pipeline specified in the licence of wh ich he is the
registered holder in a proper and workmanlike manner,
and shall secure the safety health and welfa re of
Petroleum persons engaged in operations in connection with
applicable onshore VI
Pipelines Act and onshore mainland
sections
1969
38(b) A licensee shall maintain the pipeline in good
condition and repair

Petroleum 97(3) Work Practices: a licensee shall operate th e

applicable state waters pipeline in a proper and workmanlike manner, and shall
Submerged sections secure the safety health and welfare of persons engaged
Lands act 1982 in operations in connection with the pipeline

, P9: "ftIe1ieeesee stIaII iIaIIe _ 1 0 Iriwe I'3Iied ... a

~." . . . . . . . , . . . . - -...... atillefwlll;
~"","""'..•. .a~dtllel9Sllls
1ftS t..iraw;e oIea1111~,",e.J1 I Pir ..wily a
(12'" ~u.-ce ~~ eI\!jiIIeeI,lIId lie SIItIsetl,elll
Sales Gas ......... PSt.A
C - lIeR"'" -- -----
~~
Pt3: I:1I'IIe$S CIIIiIeIwise ~ . Ii»j "I/iIeeIfIF,1IIe
~ tcenseeslllllf ~QIIt ... _ _ . . . . . . . ~ "
-'fIIpeIiIIe _ _ _ ~_ ......"'" resuIIs !'"'"""- ~-
of tile be
$¥"ElY . . . IGfISed
vi1118le • . . - aM
iRdtMIe an engifIeeIio:Ig .~ ell
SWoIe!I/
sIlaII ,
,
~eoIleAIaI
..va)'
...... elIIteInaI

"""""
AMuaI eJIteMat
~
~~1'UfIIeY , . . . e-.SPNey ............-
- .- ..... . ..-.- --- .-- -- .- ---
l-. __ _ _ __ i . . . . . - . - _______ ~
- -- - --- .- , "_ _ _ _ '.0 _ • • _ _ • • __
-- -. -----------
~
-
- -- - - ~-- . - ~ ~~--- --' ~ -...........- - -.~

Page BO ofBB OBJ 10: A53510

 PL 12 P7: the licensee shall be responsible for installing
and monitoring the cathodic protection test pOints

PL 12 P7: the licensee shall. when required. submit to

PL12, issued UNDER the director a report in writing outlining the results of the
PPA 69 ·9/5/85 corrosion surveys and the details of any resulting action
by the licensee

PL 12 P7: the licensee shall carry out an annual external

survey of the pipe~ne after the cyclone season and the annual extemal annual extemal annual extemal annual external
annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey
resutts of the survey shall be submitted to the director in survey survey survey survey
writing
- -

the licensee shall be responsible for installing and

monitoring the cathodic protection test points

PL12 Variation 1/91· the licensee shall. when required. submit to the direclor
2, issued 11/5192 (12" a report in writing ouUining the results of the corrosion
Sales Gas Pipeline· surveys and the details of any resulting action by the
consistent with licensee
TPL8)
the licensee shall carry out an annual external survey of
annual external annual external annual external annual external
the pipeline after the cyclone season and the results of annual external survey annual external' survey annual extemal survey
survey survey survey survey
the survey shaR be submitted to the director in writing

PL1 2 and The licensee shall maintain and monitor a

variations system. acceptable to the director. for the
< monitoring and control of corrosion and stress
(Varanus Island) corrosion

the licensee shall. when required. submit to

the director a report in writing oullining the
, results of the corrosion surveys and the details
of any resulting action by the licensee

~
the licensee shall. within 3 months of the date
of commencement of operation of the pipeline.
PL12 Variation 9P/97 have cause to have carried out an inspection
8 (16" Sales Gas of the pipelines cathodic potential and voltage
Pipeline-consistent gradient using the close order potential survey
w ith TPL 13) issued techniques. and ther
30/9/98
- . ~ ~ ~~

not more than 2 yearS after tfie grant Of this

licence .. .. .. ... an'd at intervals of n'Ot more than
five years' tfiereafier... .. .. .... carry OUt a review
to aetennine ti1e likely' eontinuea integritY
of the pipeline. The licensee shall within 60
days 01 finisning this review

The licensee shail carry out an extemal surVey

Cif the pipeline route after each malor storm
activity in order to monitor th e integrity of the
pipeline

Page 81 or 88 OBJ 10: A53510

 - - -

-
Pipeline IMM
Requirements as I

per section 8 of
theAEL document issued for
Underwater use 5/8/05
I

Inspection ,
Manual AE·OO·MG
I
005

IMM requi rements

- Annual inspection
frequency to be applied,
onshore pipeline as per AS2885.3 1997,
applicable for onshore Annual topog raphical
until the risk based
inspection VI and mainland survey in beach zone,
approach introduced in Annual topographica l survey in beach zone,
sections of 12"/16" annual GVI , annual CP,
manual AEL doc AS2885.3 2001 , is annual GVI , annual CP, annual line walk,
pipeline, between annual line walk, annual
OP·14·MG·001 , adopted. Annual annual surge protection system/static earth
landfall and the surge protection
topographical survey in system inspection.
Rev 4, 22/3/06 . pipeline term ination/pig
beach zone, annual GVI,
system/static earth
launcher/receiver. system inspection .
(originally iss ued annual CP, annual line
27/6/97) walk, annual surge
protection system/sta

AS2018·1981 SAA 12" SGPL installed after this standard was superseded
Liquid petroleum applicable to PL 12 by AS2885-1987, therefore the applicability of this
standard to the 12" SGPL is irrelevant
pipeline code

I
,

!
Section 6.9.3.3(a)Buried pipeline: (i) potential surveys
shall be made at intervals of not more than 12 months, i
or where cathodic protection potentials may be affected CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey
by stray DC currents, potential survey intervals shall be
AS2885·1987 AS2885-1987 approved . (iii) galvanic ano
Pipelines · Gas Pipelines- Gas and
liquid Petroleum (the
and liquid SAA Code); applicable
Petroleum (the to TPL8(12" SGPL),
TPL 13(16"SGPL), Section 6.9.3.3(b) Submerged Pipeline: the efficacy of a
SAA Code) galvanic anode cathodic protection installation shall be initial post
--- A..d~hli~hAd within ~ nArinn of not .morA th~n 1? mnnth" _in~t;:al~tinn r.p r.p SJJrvAV -
AS2885.3 - 2001 Onshore pipeline
inspection manual op·
Pipelines - Gas 14-MG.()01 . section
and liquid 2.1. states that the
Petroleum Pt 3 standard provides the
justification for
Operation and implementing the
Maintenance inspection system.

Offshore
Standard DNV-
OSF-101
2000
Submarine
Pipeline Systems
2000
en
f
0
0
N J
J
f
I
CO
0
0
N

J
I
I
l"-
0
0
N

J
(
I
<0
0
0
N

J
I
I
It)
0
0
N

~
I
0
0
N I
J
C")
I .
0
0
N I
i
I
I
N
0
0
N

J
....
0
0
N IJ
!
I
0
0
0
N

J
annual exlernal survey annual external survey annual exlemal survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey

annual external survey annual exlernal survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey annual external survey annual eXlernal survey annual external survey

Integrity review Integrity review

Page 85 of88 OBJ 10: A53510

 level 1 surveys(side s can sonar):
side scan sonar survey
at least every 3 years.
-
level II surveys (ROV CP and
ROV CP and GVI
GVI): every 3 years

-
level III surveys: shall be carried
out following the discovery of
suspect defect areas on the pipeline
either at the same time as the main
I
surveyor as soon as possible after
the defect has been found

I
I
I i level IV surveys(inspection by
diver, lntelligent pig inspection) :
level IV surveys by IP shall be
carried out at a frequency based on
the condition of the pipeline , current
: knowledge of its condition, and the
, rate of deterioration of the pipeline.
Thema

- - '.

Annual topographical Annual topographical Annual topographical Annual topographical Annua l topographical Annual topographical Annual topographical
survey in beach zone. survey in beach zone . survey in beach zone. Annual topographical survey in survey in beach zone, survey in beach zone. survey in beach zone, survey in beach zone .
Annua l topographical survey in beach zone, Annual topographical survey in beach
annual GVI, annual CP, annual GVI, annual CP, annua l GVI, annual CP, beach zone , annual GVI , annual annual GVI , annual CP, annual GVI, annual CP, annual GVI, annual CP , annual GVI . annual CPo
annual GVI, annual CPo annual line walk, zone, annual GVI, annual CPo annual
annual line walk , annual annual line walk. annual annual line walk, annual CP , annual line walk, annual surge annual line walk. annual annual line walk. annual annual line walk, annual annua l line walk, annua l
annual surge protection system/static earth line walk . annual surge protection
surge protection surge protection surge protection protection system/static earth su rge protection surge protection surge protection surge protection
system inspection. system/static earth system inspection,
system/static earth system/static earth system/static earth system inspection. system/static earth systemfstatic earth system/static earth system/static earth
system inspection. system inspection. system inspection. system inspection. system inspection. system inspection. system inspeclion.

CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey CP survey CP sU/vey CP survey

CP survey CP survey

-- ------

Page 86 of88 OBJ 10: A53510

 Inspection as required at a frequency
determined by risk assessment. This
to be detailed in Safety and Operating
Plan . Inspection frequency to be
based on past reliability of the pipeline,
historical records, current knowledge 0
its condition, the rate

Operation Ins pection and Repair: Section 10

Ins pection and monitoring philo sophy,
ASOO : an inspection and monitoring philosophy
shall be establ ished, and this shall form the
basis for the detailed inspection and monitoring
program. The philosophy shall b

Operation Inspection and Repair: Section

106 Pipeline Configuration Survey. 8202 : a
long term inspection program shall be
established reflecting the ove rall safety
objective for the pipeline, and shall be
mainta ined/upd ated on a regula r basis

Operation Inspection and Repair. Section

108 Pipeline Configuration Survey: 6209 :
critical sections of the pipeli ne system
vulnerable to damage or subject to maj or
changes in seabed conditions ie suppo rt a ndlor
burial of the pipeline, shall be inspected

Operation Ins pection and Repair: Section

10C Inspection and Monitori ng of external
corrosion. C304: A survey of the corrosion
protection system should be carried out within 1
year of installation

Operation In spection and repair Section 10D

Inspection and Monitoring of internal
corrosion, D204: The frequency of internal
inspections shall be dete rmined based on
factors such as cri ticality of the pipeline ,
potential corrosivity of the fluid, detectio

Page 87 of88 OBJ 10: A53510

Attachment 9 - Event Analysis Chart

Pipeline Cathodic Pipeline Pipeli ne Pipeline in

constructed and protection inspected and maintenance stcady mode
commissioned installed monitored and repair operat ion

Surveys oCVI beach Post inspection Reduced pipeline

crossing/shallow repairs not always wall thickness at
water sec tion carried carried out beach crossin!.!

Pipeline anti- Muster ESD initiated

corrosion coating (2 locations)
failurddamage at VI completed
beach crossing

CP inspection
and monitoring
Extemal visual ERT deployed Helicopter & boat
inspections to assess sent to observe

Positive
assessments
Ineffective CP Location specific
(rcoons)
inspection problems not taken
freQuency into account

inencetive
arrangements for
Sections. rcvicwine. rCDart s

Usc of specialist lIe1icopter Boat depans Tank A

contractors depans for for Il arriet A isolated
inspection and CS I manuall y
monitoring

.. Causal
Factor
12"& 16"
lines isolated
at CSI
Helicopter
retums to VI
Evacuat ion of
non essential
personnel
Boat rctums
toVI
Fires oul

Page 880(88 OSJ 10: A53510