Presented to the 9th annual conference of the European Public Relations

Education and Research Association, Bled, Slovenia, 6 July 2002

Relationships between media organizations and their commercial

content providers in a society in transition: a discussion of a South
African experience

François Pierre Nel1

Department of Journalism
University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK / FPNel@uclan.ac.uk

ABSTRACT
Societies in transition require new processes and new relationships for their visions to be
effected. While it is acknowledged that the barriers to change are significant and that the
levers for change are varied, there is usually an appreciation that the news media have an
important role to play. Therefore, it is not surprising that the mainstream news media –
newspapers, television and radio -- in particular, are typically under pressure to both help
drive social change, and to demonstrate that they had been affected by the social change.
An investigation of the debate on the South African media‟s transformation following the
country‟s first democratic elections on April 27, 1994, shows that the role of news
information sources – and particular the relationships between commercial media
organizations and public relations practitioners – has largely escaped the public scrutiny
to which other elements of media influence have been subjected. Drawing on a series of
in-depth interviews with editors and senior public relations practitioners, this paper
explores the state of the relationships between the daily newspapers in the legislative
capital city, Cape Town, and their commercial content providers, with reference to
Huang‟s (2001) cross-cultural, multi-item scale for measuring organization-public
relations (called Organization-Public Relations Assessment [OPRA]). The paper also
investigates to what extent these organization-public relationships (OPRs) have been
impacted by the national transformation agenda. Amongst the key findings are that the
decline in skills amongst journalists and the corresponding increase in capacity of
publicists have resulted a change in the power dynamic between the two parties. This
discussion paper aims to contribute to a further study in which it will be argued that
alterations in the media environment have eroded the gate-keeping function of the news
media and subsequently its power in a democratic society.

1
Francois Pierre Nel is course leader for the Master‟s Programme in Strategic Communication,
www.stratcom.org, offered by the Lancashire Business School at the University of Central Lancashire in
Preston, UK, which was developed in partnership with the Cape Technikon in Cape Town, South Africa.

1
 BACKGROUND
It is a basic assumption that the mass media – especially newspapers, radio, and
television – are of considerable importance in modern societies. The reasons, as McQuail
(1987) observed, seem to lie in the fact that the media are: a power resource, i.e. a means
of influence, control and innovation; the primary means of transmission and source of
information essential to the working of most social institutions; an arena where many
affairs of public life are played out; a major source of definitions and images of social
reality; a primary key to fame and celebrity status; and the source of an ordered and
public meaning system, which provides a benchmark for what is normal.
While it is difficult to draw a line between ideas about mass media and wider theories
of society, the point of view of this discussion paper is that media are social institutions
and, as such, they are dependent on „society‟, particularly on the institutions of political
and economic power, although there is scope for influence in return.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that in times of dramatic social change the
media are typically under pressure to both help drive the change and to demonstrate that
they had been affected by the change. The divergent, and often conflicting, pressures on
media organizations come from both external and internal sources2. Following on the
work of Gerbner (1969), McQuail (1981) outlined these sources as:
a. External: social/political pressure, government/law, pressure groups, owners,
investors, advertisers, audience, and sources.
b. Internal: Three primary organizational goals - profit, communication, and craft.
Examining these pressures on the media in South Africa may be useful because, in
many respects, the country typifies many of challenges of societal change in other parts of
the globe as influenced by social/political trends, economics, globalisation, competition,
technology, and demographics.
Social/political trends. In line with the dominant global trend, South Africa is
implementing the decision voters made in 1994 to move from an authoritarian (apartheid)
government to a democratically-elected one. The country‟s legal system is now based on
Roman-Dutch law and a progressive constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa (Act 108 of 1996)3, which enshrines rights to all citizens regardless of
“race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual

2
What McQuail identifies as the external „pressure groups‟ could also be described in public relations
terms as „stakeholders‟ following the definition of Emshoff and Freeman (1979): „a group whose
collective behaviour can directly affect the organization‟s future, but which is not under the
organization‟s control‟.
3
The Constitution is a successor to the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993), which was drafted during
the talks leading up to the country‟s first democratic elections.

2
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth” (Bill
of Rights, 9.1). Like in the EU, the official powers are geographically dispersed. South
Africa has three capitals: Cape Town, which is the seat of the legislature; Pretoria, which
is heart of the administration; and Bloemfontein, which hosts the Constitution Court and
the Appellate Division.
Economics, globalization, competition. The advent of democracy based on
universal adult suffrage resulted in the lifting of economic and cultural sanctions by the
international community and South Africa‟s re-acceptance into bodies such as the United
Nations and the Commonwealth, where it plays a prominent role. The new regime
committed itself to a (essentially) free-market economy that has been integrated into
wider economic and political relations of exchange, competition and also domination or
conflict. Ranked by the World Development Report as the world‟s 28th largest economy -
higher than some so-called developed economies such as Portugal (ranked 34th) (SA
2001-2002, p.159) – South Africa is amongst the loudest voices calling for changes
international trade rules at forums such as the World Trade Organization. The country has
also hosted major international conferences, such as the World Conference Against
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in August 2001 and
a year later, it will host the United Nations‟ World Summit on Sustainable Development
2002.
Technology. South Africa‟s power, communications and public transport continues to
develop rapidly. According to the World Development Report 2000 (SA 2001-2002,
p.94), the country produces over half the African continent‟s electricity and has nearly
60% of the telephone lines. There was also an estimated 10 million mobile telephone
users at the end of 2001, and this is expected to rise to more than 20 million (about half
the current population) by 2006, according to the Stellenbosch University‟s Unit for
Future Research (SA 2001-2002, p. 95).
Demographics. Some general statistics might be useful to further contextualise the
discussion. South Africa, a country of 1,221, 037 sq km, is about five times the size of
the UK (244,100 sq km) but has a similar size population: 43,7 million (SA 2001-2002,
p.2). Much like the city of London, about four fifths of the country belongs to the
dominant race group. Note that while the racial divisions expressed may seem peculiar –
and even offensive – to those outside of SA, they are commonly used within in its
borders. They are: African (black): 77.6% (33.9m); white: 10.3% (4.5m); coloured
(mixed race): 8.7% (3.8m); Asian: 2.5% (1.1m). The remainder, 0.9% (0.4m), are listed
as „unspecified‟ (SA 2001-2002, p.22). The term „black‟ is often used to describe

3
Africans, coloureds and Asians.
When it comes to official languages, the comparison is best made with the European
Union. Much like the 15-member EU, there are three principal language groups in SA:
isiZulu, isiXhosa and Afrikaans (as opposed to French, German and Spanish). However,
English, while ranked fifth amongst the country‟s 11 official languages (with less than
17% of the population listing it as their home language), is considered the lingua franca of
commerce and government (SA 2001-2002, p.22).
The end of apartheid also meant the demise of restrictions on movement and, as was to
be expected, there was a significant migration from less-developed areas (mostly former
black „homelands‟) to developed urban centres. And much like sections of the EU, SA‟s
integration into the global community has, arguably, gone more smoothly than the
integration of its own internal communities (consider the UK riots in Oldham and
Burnley in the summer of 2001).
The issue of race, which was the point of departure of the apartheid (separate
development) policies of the National Party regime from 1948-94, continues to dominate
discussions about transformation. Frequently this perspective ignores other factors such
as class, sexual orientation, age, education, etc (Steenveld, 1998). In reality, of course,
those play a significant role. Consider, for example, that the country counts amongst its
citizens the first surgeon to successfully conduct a heart transplant (Christiaan Barnard)
and some of the world‟s most primitive peoples (such the San, sometimes referred to as
Bushmen, whose culture has essential remained unchanged since 100,000BC) (SA 2001-
2002, 169 & 178).
For public relations this examination of the South African situation should be of
particular interest for three primary reasons: firstly, the context in which many
professionals operate is increasingly characterized by significant diversity; secondly,
media continues to be an important tool for organizations to manage their stakeholder
relationships; finally, many of the external groups that exert pressure on the media, as
identified by McQuail (1987), employ public relations practitioners to manage these
media-organization relationships.
In the following section, there will be a brief discussion of each of the identified
pressure groups, apart from some elements of source-relationships, which are the focus on
this exploratory study. The media-government relationship will to be considered on three
levels: firstly, the government as political pressure group and legislative power; secondly,
the government as information source; thirdly, the government as media owner.

4
 Social/political pressure on the media.
Words such as reconstruction4, transformation and even renaissance5 all feature
prominently in the formal and informal discourse of government, business and civil
society in post-apartheid SA. After the first democratic election of April 27, 1994, the
country itself was described as „the New South Africa‟, a phrase still used when a
distinction between the pre- and post-apartheid era needs to be drawn. This is typified by
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), which in its preamble
states:
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the
supreme law of the Republic so as to
 Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic
values, social justice and fundamental human rights;
 Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government
is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by
law;
 Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person;
and
 Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a
sovereign state in the family of nations.

It was clear that the vision for the „New South Africa‟ would require new processes
and new relationships to be effected. The mass communication media were considered
vital to this process. And to this end, the „transformation of the media‟ became the subject
of much public debate. However, as pointed out by Steenveld (1998), these discussions
often surfaced as race debates. “Race essentialism is the premise for most arguments
about the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) or particular journalists for the task of
communication to South African audiences.” (Steenveld 1998, p.4)
In November 1998, about four months after Steenveld‟s observations were published,
the intensity of these „transformation discussions‟ ratcheted up several notches with a
complaint to the South African Human Rights Commission 6 by the Black Lawyers
Association (BLA) and the Association of Black Accountants of South Africa (Abasa).

4
The African National Congress (ANC) government‟s initial socio- economic policies were framed as the
Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP).
5
The African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (Bill 104 of 1994) was amongst the
legislation discussed by Parliament in the first year of the „New‟ South Africa. President Thabo Mbeki,
seen as a key proponent of the notion, signed it into law as Act 51 of 2000.
6
The South African Human Rights Commission is an independent national state institution provided for
in Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996). It is one of the state
institutions supporting constitutional democracy. The Constitution came into effect on 7 February 1997.
The Commission was established in terms of the Human Rights Commission Act (Act 54 of 1994).
Following due parliamentary process, the President appointed 11 members of the Commission who then
assumed office on 1 October 1995.

5
The groups accused two newspapers, the Mail and Guardian7 and the Sunday Times8, of
racism. The Commission „decided that it would be in the interests of the media more
generally, and the society as whole if it did not focus solely on the request, but widen its
scope to examine racism in the media more broadly‟ (Faultlines 2000, p.5). What
followed was a lengthy enquiry, which included much-debated research by independent
consultants,9 and public hearings. On 24 August 2000, almost two years after the initial
complaint, the Commission‟s findings were made public in a 96-page report, “Faultlines:
inquiry into racism in the media”. The observation, which were far-reaching and touched
on media ownership, law, staff composition, and training, all stemmed from the first, key
finding:

To the extent that expressions in the South African media „reflect a persistent patter‟ of
racist expressions and content of writing that could have been avoided, and given that
we take seriously the fact that many submissions complained that such expressions
cause or have the effect of causing hurt and pain, the South African media can be
characterized as racist institutions [emphasis added]. (Faultlines 2000, p. 89)

Though disputed by several media organizations, particularly those, such as the Mail
& Guardian, who could point to their records of public opposition to apartheid. (see also
Ronig 2000), the report arguably shifted the debate. The view that media are neither
omnipotent nor powerless, but nonetheless powerful is, of course, in line with those of
leading contemporary media theorists (Murdoch 1992, Thompson 1995, et al), and the
inclination to blame the media for misusing this power is also not unusual (see also
Drotner 1991). Clearly, though, the watchdogs were being watched and they needed to, as
it were, get their houses in order.
This was confirmed when in October 2000, two months after the HSRC report,
representatives from media organizations, non-governmental organizations and academic
institutions met for two-day colloquium entitled, “Training for media transformation and
democracy”. At that occasion, the Special General Manager: Corporate Affairs for
Naspers, country‟s largest media group, Conrad Sidego, said: “It is generally
acknowledged that media ownership, staff and content are not reflective of our diversity

7
The Mail and Guardian, which was named by the initial complainants, was particularly affended as it is
widely acknowledge as one of the main media voices opposing the apartment government during the
1980s and early 1990s. Founded in 1985 as the Weekly Mail with a specific anti-apartheid agenda, it
was named Newspaper of the Year in 1995 by the International Press Directory in recognition of the
quality of it‟s work and contribution to the struggle despite much harassment from the then regime.
8
The Mail and Guardian is partly owned by The Guardian in the UK, while the Sunday Times is owned
by Johnnic, a publicly traded company in South Africa, which has no known direct links to a foreign
media house.
9
The research findings by independent consultant Claudia Braude, which used anecdotal semiotic
analysis, came under particular fire from both the media organizations and academics.

6
which includes the range of opinions and perspectives of South African society.” (Sidego
2000). This supported what Steenveld, the Chair of Media Transformation at Rhodes
University, described as the „flawed view‟ of „race essentialism‟ that had dominated
transformation discussions in South Africa (Steenveld, 1998, p.4)10.
Steenveld‟s arguments notwithstanding, the African National Congress government‟s
position is clear: it supports a capitalist state that is non-discriminatory (as outlined in the
Bill of Rights) and in which „affirmative action‟ is applied as a policy with respect to race
and gender, but not to class, sexual orientation, age, etc.
Government/law.
The Bill of Rights, enshrined in Section 16 of the Constitution, is an important point of
departure for a discussion of the legal context in which the media operate. It includes, in
part, the right to freedom of expression and, more specifically, freedom of the press and
other media.
Parliament has passed further legislation11 to support these freedoms, most notably the
Promotion of Access to Information Act (Act 2 of 2000), which gives effect to the access
to information right in the Bill of Rights..
Though the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand in
Johannesburg has drawn up a list of 10 apartheid-era laws that are still believed to be in
conflict with the Constitution (Garman 2001, p. ), the media by-and-large go about their
business unfettered. This is likely to be because on a fundamental level – the definition of
a free press -- the government and media largely agree. In fact, the chair of the South
African National Editors Forum, Mathathu Tsedu, has said the organization concurs with
President Thabo Mbeki‟s definition of press freedom, a concept which, as he put it that
“amounts to no more and no less than the elementary right of all people to have unfettered
access to the means of truly expressing their opinions and conversely having access to
media that fully reflect their life experiences and their aspirations.” (Garman 2001, p. 2).
Therefore, it could be argued that, following Merrill‟s assertion (1974) that (although
10
The basic premise, according to Steenveld, was this: “only black (or white) journalists „know‟ what the
„black (or white) experience‟ is. Steenveld argued, following on the work of Hall (1977), Held (1970) and
others, that „this perspective ignores how structural conditions such as class, gender, sexual orientation,
educational background, etc. construct the frameworks for „making sense‟ of any experience.”
11
Other significant legislation includes the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. The objectives of
this piece of legislation are contained in the preamble which in turn reiterates the contents of the right in
the Bill of Rights:
"WHEREAS section 33 (1) and (2) of the Constitution provide that everyone has the right to
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and that everyone whose rights
have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.."
Furthermore the preamble says the Act is enacted in order to: *promote an efficient administration and
good governance; *create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public
administration or in the exercise of a public power or the performance of a public function, by giving
effect to the right to just administrative action.

7
there gradations in between) there are only two fundamental kinds of theory of state-press
relations – authoritarian, characterized by strict government control, and libertarianism,
which essentially sees the media as a separate, „Fourth Estate‟ in society - South African
media function in a broadly libertarian context. However, consensus on this point does
not mean that there is no conflict between the state and the media on how such freedoms
are articulated.
The government‟s perspective (Pahad 2001), is probably best summed up by these
words from the Minister in The Presidency12, Dr Essop Pahad:
Social transformation, informed by the needs and aspirations of South Africans sets
the context for interrogating the issues of communication in a changing society. To the
extent that our society rests on a founding consensus to improve the quality of life of
all, that must be the point of departure for all that we do, as government, as society, as
a Fourth Estate. (Pahad, 2001, p.5).

The subtext is that media should work with the government to achieve national
objectives. On the other hand, while the majority of commercial media organizations
clearly seek to play an active part in society (if statements from Sanef are to be
considered representative) their point of view is somewhat different from that of
government. The forum considers it the media‟s responsibility to:
inform the public;
keep guard over the public interest – be a watchdog
be accountable to our shareholders and the public; and
fulfill our role as an indispensable pillar of an open democracy. (Sanef, 2001, p.3).

And how does the SA media respond to the suggestion that supporting a democracy
means, by extension, support for the democratically-elected government? The general
view may be deduced from this excerpt from the code of conduct of The Star, the
English-language daily in the country‟s economic hub, Johannesburg: „one can be pro-
South Africa without being pro-party or government‟ (In Sanef, 2001, p.7).
This tensions between the two groups can arguably be described with reference to
three classic media theories: libertarianism, neo-Marxist, and development theories. It is
clear that media‟s perspective (as mentioned above) has its root is traditional
libertarianism. This view which had its early (seventeenth century) origins in the writings
of Milton (Areopagitica) and John Stuart Mills (On Liberty), and can be described as
having three main characteristics: no licensing or censorship by a third party; no
restrictions on criticism of government, official or political party; and no compulsion to
publish anything.
On the other hand, the government‟s perspective may be interpreted by some as being
12
An unusual title to describe what many believe is true power „behind the throne‟

8
an example of the neo-Marxist13 variant described by Louise Althusser (1971). He
explained that this process worked by what he called „ideological state apparatuses‟ (all
means of socialization, in effect) rather than overt „repressive state apparatuses‟ (such as
the army and police). Support for this conclusion could be that while there are few overt
restrictions, there is significant pressure from government to diversify ownership
(including initiatives such as the Media Diversity Development Agency Bill, which was
under discussion in March 2002, as this paper was being written), establish
“representative” staff contingents (particularly significant here is the Employment Equity
Act, which amongst other things, sets targets for gender and racial equality in businesses
with over 50 employees), tone down criticism (including insinuations that such criticism
is motivated by racism), and to publish particular types of news (Pahad, 2001).
However, it should be remembered that the government‟s inclinations are still subject
to a Constitution and, as such, a closer fit to the contemporary South African scenario
might be a combination of Hachten‟s (1981) developmental and Picard‟s (1985) social
democratic systems. Hachten emphasizes the primacy of the national development task:
the pursuit of cultural and informational autonomy; support for democracy; and solidarity
with other developing countries. Picard, in his social democratic theory, which is
essentially a “Western” press model, argues for the legitimacy of public intervention, or
even collective ownership, in order to ensure true independence from vested interests,
access, and diversity of opinion (McQuail 1987, pp. 132-3).
Therefore, while Sanef and governments statements generally typify the former
(development theory), further legislation, particularly the Media Diversity Development
Agency Bill (Bill 2 of 2002), which seeks to use private and public resources to
development of alternative media voices, is support for the latter (social democratic
theory). This, of course, also reflects the large dichotomies of South African society
where so-called developed and developing societies have long operated in parallel.
Media ownership and audiences.
The earliest challenge to the industrialized media order of the twentieth century
concerns the danger to democracy and freedom concerned the concentrations of power in
the hands of press „barons‟, especially in the USA and Britain (McQuail 1987, p.136).
The, then mainly North American phenomenon, of one-newspaper cities and formation of

13
The Marxist-Leninist or Soviet theory, which held an influential position in the early part of the last
century, assigned the media the role as collective agitator, propagandist and educator in the building of
communications (see Hopkins, 1970). The main principle was the subordination of the media to the
Communist Party – the only legitimate voice and agent of the working class. To this extent, there may
be some parallels drawn to the forces in the ruling African National Congress that view allegiance to the
party as patriotism.

9
large „chains‟ fuel anxiety about reduced freedom and independence of news and views
(Bagkikian, 1988). It is not surprising then that this issue is also raised in SA. At the
point of the country‟s first democratic elections in 1994, the media were in the hands of
the white minority and, as noted by Berger, by-and-large “media distribution networks
had set up to reach whites in white areas. Pricing was pitched at a white market. Literacy
levels in the publications were pitched at a white market. And advertising was geared to
the white market” (Haffajee 1999, p.1).
In the SA media world these “white hands” where essentially of two types:
government, which controlled broadcasting, and private capital, which owned print 14.
Broadcasting regulation. The African National Congress, under the leadership of
Nelson Mandela, moved swiftly to transform the broadcasting landscape – and got the
process going even before the 1994 elections. There was pressure on the then government
to provide all political parties fair access to the media and to curb biased reporting by the
national broadcaster. Subsequently, the Independent Broadcasting Authority15 was
created by the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act (153 of 1993), which enabled the
IBA to take over those broadcasting tasks that were previously performed by the Minister
of Home Affairs and the Postmaster General16. In 1993, a new SABC board was
appointed, chaired by Dr Ivy Matsepe-Cassaburi (a black woman).
Radio. The most dramatic change has arguably been in this area. The IBA
introduction of three radio license categories: public, private and community. In early
2002, there were 19 stations under control of the national broadcaster, the South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 15 private stations and 65 community stations (Icasa,
2002). In a country with such diverse language groups and range of literacy levels, it is
not surprising that radio has the widest reach of all mass media.
Television. As all terrestrial broadcasting was in the hands of the national broadcaster
and there was a single cable station, M-Net, which was not allowed to broadcast news
bulletins. The initial focus of government was to ensure internal changes in the SABC.
This started with dramatic changes to the board and moved through other levels of staff

14
As popular use of the Internet, and particularly the World Wide Web, was in its infancy in 1994, it is
not directly relevant to this part of the discussion. The Audit Bureau of Internet Standards (Abis), is an
official division of the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) of South Africa. In March 2002, it was reported
that there were almost 1 million users of the Internet, or about 4% of the adult population.
15
The IBA was charged with the promotion of a diverse range of sound and television broadcasting
services on a national, regional and local level which, when viewed collectively, would cater for all
languages and cultural groups and provides entertainment, education and information
16
On 1 July 2000, The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the South African
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) merged to form The Independent Communications
Authority of South Africa (ICASA). The ICASA Act (Act 13 of 2000) Govt. Gazette No. 21154 provides
for the dissolution of the IBA and SATRA and enables the functions of both bodies to be transferred to
the new organization.

10
and ultimately to the programming. As a result, the SABC in early 2002 offered three
full-spectrum terrestrial channels that broadcast in all 11 official languages and claim to
reach a daily adult audience of about 14 million. (SABC, 2001). Later, a terrestrial
broadcast license was issued to a private broadcaster, e-tv [sic], which is considered
black-owned.
Magazines. At the end of 2001 the South African Advertising Research Foundation
(Saarf), which provides statistics on the leading media products, monitored 84 magazines,
including 61 monthly magazines. The magazines with the widest reach are local products
such as, Bona, a general-interest monthly aimed at black readers which reaches 3,660
million (Saarf 2001b). The most significant developments in this area since 1994 were
arguably the introduction of international titles. Amongst those now producing South
African editions are: Condé Naste Home and Garden, Elle, Elle Décor, FHM, GQ,
Hustler, Marie Claire, and Oprah.
Newspapers. At the end of 2001 Saarf reported on 16 daily and 25 weekly newspapers.
The top-selling daily, the Sowetan, reached more than 1,839 readers per issue, and the
top-selling weekly, the Sunday Times, reached 3,279 (Saarf 2001b). Since 1994, the most
significant shift in newspaper products has been the introduction of two new national
Sunday titles, The Sunday Independent and the Sowetan Sunday World, and a national
business title, Business Report. By contrast, this period has also been witness to the
demise of all but one of the then politically alternative (i.e. anti-apartheid) papers. These
included: Vrye Weekblad, Learn & Teach, and South.
White control has been substantially eroded by a deal saw the second-largest English-
language media group, Times Media Limited (owner of the Sunday Times) pass to the
black-owned National Empowerment Corporation (for details see Haffajee, 1999).
While the colour of newspaper owners in this country may have changed, Haffajee
points out (1999) it is still a highly monopolized industry: four major groups controlled
the majority of newspapers in the past, six groups own 17 daily titles and 11 weeklies.
Only five newspapers17 that fall outside their ambit. One group, Independent Newspapers
Holdings Limited (INHL) 18, under the chairmanship of Tony O‟Reilley of Ireland, has
the lion‟s share - 14 titles that cover all of SA‟s main metropolitan centres and account for
60% of English language newspaper readership and 64% of metropolitan newspaper

17
They are: The Daily Dispatch, The Evening Post, Langa, Mail and Guardian and The Natal Witness
18
Independent Newspapers Cape publishes the Cape Argus, the Cape Times, the Weekend Argus and
13 Cape community newspapers. Independent Newspaper Gauteng publishes in Johannesburg,
Pretoria and Kimberley, where its main titles are The Star, the Saturday Star, the Pretoria News, the
Diamond Fields Advertiser and the Sunday Independent. Independent Newspapers KwaZulu Natal
publishes the Daily News, The Mercury, the Post, The Independent on Saturday and the Sunday
Tribune.

11
readership.
Overall newspaper readership shows a downward trend (Haffajee 1999). Audit Bureau
of Circulation figures for the period June to December 2001 reveal a total newspaper
circulation of 3.1 million daily and weekly sales (ABC, 2002). Commercial newspapers
are now selling at the rate they were prior to 1992. In 1992, the figure dropped to a low of
1.15 million newspapers.
Advertising. The primary revenue stream for most media organizations, advertising,
has not gone unexamined. In January 1998, the trade publication Marketing Mix and the
weekly Mail & Guardian newspaper, conducted a study into the country‟s media
planners. The point of departure was this: media planners who work for advertising
agencies can make or break media businesses by considering (or not) particular media in
the placement of advertising for their clients. An assertion in the study, which comprised
98 telephone interviews, was that media placement is influenced by the planner‟s
personal preferences. This was supported by the findings that showed, for example, that
the radio stations the planners most listened to were also the ones that enjoyed the
greatest share of advertising. Some of the other findings were: 58% of the media planners
were in the age group 18-30; 80% were women; 43% said they did not know who what
the most popular black youth TV programme was; and 65% said they did not know who
was the editor of the Sowetan – the country‟s largest circulation daily with a
predominantly black readership. Given these facts and the general tone of discussions
about media transformation, it was not surprising that charges of racism were leveled
against the industry by members of Parliament. In early 2002, the South African
Advertising Research Foundation undertook to conduct research on the matter. Part of
this inquiry was a series of public hearings, which started on March 27, 2002, and, as
such, could not be included in this paper.
Internal pressures on media organizations: goals of profit, communication, or
craft
The ownership of the South African media has a direct baring on the organizational
goals. Government-controlled broadcasting, which is funded primarily through a
combination of license fees and advertising, are primarily concerned with communication
objectives.
Privately-owned media groups, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with
providing value for share-holders. While this is true of all media organizations, there are
differences in the degree to which economic objectives dominate communication
objectives. These distinctions could be generalised as a split between the foreign-owned

12
news media (primarily targeting English readers) on the one hand and, and the locally-
owned news media (primarily targeting Afrikaans and black English speaking readers) on
the other. 19
The role the media organizations‟ ownership and goals play in „transformation‟, i.e.
meeting gender and race targets, is also interesting. (The possible influence it has on the
organizations‟ relationships with public relations practitioners is explored further later in
the investigation.)
While comprehensive details of the demographic shifts in South African newsrooms
are not readily available, Sanef says all its members have moved towards changing the
racial and gender composition of their staff. For example, INHL says in its employment
equity policy that it is committed to “redressing (these) past discriminatory practices by
ensuring that those designated groups will in future be fully integrated into the company”
(Sanef 2001, p.11). Primedia, whose interests are largely in radio and cinema, is much
more specific stating that they aim to achieve “a 50/50 racial and gender representation at
all levels of the company by the year 2003” (Sanef 2001, p12)
The most significant changes have, not surprisingly, come from the area most directly
under government control and thus are more content than profit driven: the national
broadcaster. The SABC‟s top management structure, which in June 1993 was 100%
white, was by January 2000 67% African and 33% white. In 1994, the SABC had its first
black CEO Zwelakhe Sisulu.
But while there has been progress in the private sector companies, both print and
broadcast organizations report that they experiencing significant barriers in their attempts

19
Consider, for example, that the Ireland-based company controlled by Tony O‟Reilley, which publishes
the English-language daily newspapers in every major South African metropolitan centre, Independent
Newspaper Holding Limited (INHL), on its corporate website described the company‟s goals simply in
economic terms. Nowhere on the site was there any prominent discussion about the role of the media in
society. In journalism parlance, this could be described as the approach that sees the editorial copy as
necessary to “provide eyeballs to advertisers”. On the other hand, the site of the country‟s largest
circulation daily, the Sowetan (www.sowetan.co.za), which was locally (black) owned and circulated
primarily amongst black Africans, had a tagline of „Building a nation‟. The site described, in some detail,
the paper‟s history, its role in South African society and its contribution to the future. The website of the
largest Afrikaans-language group, Naspers (www.naspers.com), which was locally (white) owned,
opened with a mission statement which included both economic and social goals. The corporate page
for their Cape Town daily, Die Burger (www.dieburger.co.za), prominently displayed the values in its
editorial policy: “A multiparty democracy; A free-market economy; Personal freedom; Press freedom;
Full and equal status for Afrikaans; Die Burger is opposed to the abuse of power, corruption and
maladministration.” This division has historical roots. The first privately-owned English-language paper
in the country was established in 1824 by the printer Charles Greig, and named South African
Commercial Advertiser, which described its content. By contrast, the first black-owned paper was
founded by a missionary-trained teacher, John Tengu Zabavu, to promote black African concerns and
was aptly named Imvo Zabantsundu, meaning “voice of the people”. The first Afrikaans-language daily
was established in 1915 and named DeBurger (now Die Burger), meaning „”the citizen”, and was edited
by a Dutch Reformed Church minister, DF Malan, and promoted Afrikaaner nationalism. From this
platform he went on to become the National Party‟s first Prime Minister (1948-54) (Nel 1989, pp.299-
301).

13
to achieve similar results. The editorial executives linked to Sanef point out that they
“have hit impediments to change” (Sanef 2001, p. 12).
They identify the key barriers as:
 Recruitment. On this issue the Sanef executives say their experience is in line
with that of other business, 45% of which, according to a Department of
Labour survey, identified this as a primary barrier to implementing equity
policies.
 Skills shortage. This, Sanef executives attribute to the practices of apartheid,
which reserved most educational and training opportunities for the country‟s
ruling elite. Educational institutions, they also say, have also been slow to
change. In addition, internal training programmes and tertiary-level bursaries
for previously disadvantaged students are in place in all media institutions in
the Sanef fold. “It‟s worth noting that a serious problem the media encounter
is that their investment in money and time in training previously disadvantaged
young reporters is often lost when government departments and other private
companies woo these reporters away.” (Sanef 2001, p.15)
 Poaching of skilled employees by non-media organizations, including
government. The traditionally low salaries paid to journalists, as compared to
corporate and government communication workers, is only one of the factors
that come into play here, as will be further discussed in the research findings.
 Unrealistic expectations of would-be journalists. As evidence Sanef referred to
incidents where recent black journalism graduates demand salaries of between
30 and 50% more than the going rate. (Sanef, 2001)

While the pressures on media organizations -- from without and within -- have been
significant since the advent of the “New South Africa”, there are those that say the status
quo has not shifted dramatically. The Minister in The Presidency Essop Pahad has
pointed out that while South Africans clearly have significant choice, these media
products are consumed by a relatively small percentage of the society (Pahad, 2001). He
substantiates his opinion with research that shows:
 Access to media is predominantly urban
 About 20% of the population is beyond the reach of FM signals;
 About 30% read newspapers;
 Internet access is restricted to less than 10% of urban South African (and
approaches zero in rural areas);
 Even where there may be physical access [to media products], it is often
impeded by illiteracy and aliteracy, as well as alienation both from the news

14
 agenda and the ownership pattern. (Pahad 2001, p.3)
Sources. The one pressure group on media organizations that has thus far escaped the
level of scrutiny afforded other groups are the sources of news. This is a significant
omission. “News,” as Sigal (1987) noted, “is not what happens, but what someone says
has happened or will happen. Reporters are seldom in a position to witness events
firsthand. They have to rely on the accounts of others.” (In: Manoff & Schudson 1987,
pp.15, 27-8). 20 Given then that news sources have a significant agenda-setting role, it is
significant that to date only media-government relationships have been openly discussed.
The most comprehensive of these were when members of the Cabinet, including
President Thabo Mbeki and Deputy President Jacob Zuma, met with members of the
South African National Editors Forum on 29-30 June, 2001, in what was called an
“Indaba”, a word traditionally used to describe a serious meeting.
The government‟s discussion paper, issued prior to the conference, concluded as
follows: “South Africa does not face a problem of freedom of expression. Our challenge
is how to use that freedom to promote positive change” (Pahad 2001, p.14). While all
parties agreed that the discussions were constructive, it‟s also clear that much more needs
to be done.

PURPOSE
Given that pressure groups on South African media organizations have come under the
spotlight, the purpose of this exploratory study is consider the state of relationships
between the commercial media organizations and their commercial content providers, that
is public relations practitioners not employed by government or non-governmental
organizations, with reference to the five themes of organization-public relationships
(OPRs) as employed by Huang (2001). The aim of the study is to contribute to a
hypothesis of a further study in which it will be argued that alterations in the media

20
Sigal‟s classical US study on „Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of
Newspaper‟ (1973) analysed a representative sample of 2,850 domestic and foreign news stories that
appeared prominently in two major American qualify papers of over a period of 25 years. He noted that
nearly half of all sources for all national and foreign news stories on page one of the New York Times
and the Washington Post were officials of the United States government. Other sources were officials of
other governments, major corporations and other established corporations. A total of more than three-
quarters of all identifiable sources were official ones (Sigal 1973, p.121). Nearly a quarter-century later,
a similar study of six daily newspapers, and another one of television news confirmed that the
proportions were still the same (Brown et al, 1987; Whitney et al, 1989). British studies came to similar
conclusions (O‟Sullivan et al, 1988).

15
environment has eroded the gatekeeping function of the South African news media and
subsequently its perceived power in society.

METHOD
Using an action research approach, the author gathered data through hour-long
interviews with five senior public relations practitioners and three newspaper editors in
Cape Town, South Africa, during January and March 2002. The convenience sample was
further refined to by the following criteria:
1. Interviewees had been practicing in the field prior to the country‟s first
democratic election on April 27, 1994, and could therefore provide insight on the
effects of the new socio-political agenda on media organization-public relations
practitioner relationships. Because the race-based policies of the previous regime,
which included job reservation and unequal access to education, there were
obviously very few black professionals working in the field. The only black PR
interviewee was also the only one identified by the Cape PR Consultants Forum
chair (also a respondent) to have been professionally active in Cape Town before
the advent of democracy. While both of the English-language dailies in Cape
Town had had black editors in the period since 1994, both had move on. One was
promoted, while the other resigned after some public debate about his
competency. At the time of the interviews, the editors of the Cape Town‟s three
daily newspapers were white men.
2. Public Relations practitioners needed to have significant media contact, meaning
that their professional activities needed to include generating publicity for their
clients. In all cases, the practitioners were owners/directors of their consultancies;
three of the consultancies focused on publicity), and preferred to be referred to as
publicists, while the other two offered their clients a range of services, including
publicity, and preferred the term „”ublic relations practitioner”. Four of the five
interviewees had also worked in-house. One of the interviewees had earned
numerous awards for professional achievement, including the SA Public
Relations Consultant of the Year Award.
3. The journalists needed to be senior editorial staff representing the three daily
newspapers in Cape Town. These interviewees included: the senior assistant
editor of the Afrikaans-language Die Burger (the citizen), published by Media24,
a division of Naspers; and the assistant editor of the English-language afternoon
paper, Cape Argus (which is also the oldest daily still published in the country).

16
 When attempts to interview senior staff at the English-language morning paper,
Cape Times, proved difficult to arrange within the time available, an e-mail
interview was conducted with the Editorial Chief of Staff of Independent
Newspapers Cape, which owns both the Cape Times and the Cape Argus,
amongst others. All the journalists were members of the South African National
Editors Forum, on whose executive committee one of the respondents also served.

The interviews were transcribed and analysed with reference to the four key elements
Organization-Public Relationships (OPRs)21, which, as Huang (2001) pointed out, occur
consistently in the Western literatures of interpersonal and organizational relationships:
trust, control mutuality, commitment, and satisfaction. (See Appendix for interview
schedule)
Trust. Huang summarised literature on trust (Parks, Henage, and Scamahorn, 1996,
Yamagishi, 1986, et al) by saying „trust highlights one‟s confidence in and willingness to
open oneself up to fair and aboveboard dealings with the other party.” And, therefore,
supports Hon and J.E. Grunig‟s (1999) definition of trust as „one party‟s level of
confidence in and willingness to open oneself up to fair and aboveboard dealings.” Also,
evident from Huang (1999) study was that an organization‟s use of symmetrical and two-
way communication can generate trust. Inversely, a lack of trust contributes to a public‟s
use of “forcing” strategies (Huang, 2001, p.67).
Control mutuality. Stafford and Canary (1991) defined control mutuality as “the
degree to which partners agree about which of them should decide relational goals and
behavioural routines” (p.224). Huang (1999) demonstrated that the use of symmetrical
and two-way communication could help produce control mutuality in a relationship.
Therefore, the ease with which the information flowed between the two parties in this
investigation was noted.
Relational commitment. Hon and J.E. Grunig (1999) defined relational commitment
as “the extent to which one party believes and feels that the relationship is worth spending
energy to maintain and promote” (p.14) In this study the aspect of continuing
commitment is emphasized. And like Huang (2001), I believe that the four components
contributing to organizational relationships identified by Aldrich (1975, 1979) –
formalization, intensity, reciprocity, and standardization – can be seen as forms of
commitment in OPRs.

21
Huang defined OPRs as “the degree that the organization and its publics trust one another, agree on
one has rightful power to influence, experience satisfaction with each other, and commit oneself to one
another” (Huang 1998, p.12, in Huang 2001, p. 65).

17
 Relational satisfaction. The extent to which both organizations and their publics
were satisfied with their relationship has been said (Ferguson, 1984, in Huang, 2001) to a
significant indicator for gauging OPRs. Since the tension between public relations
practitioners and journalists is the stuff of industry legend, some may consider that
measuring affection between the two parties would be almost futile. A view of relational
satisfaction that suits this content is the social exchange perspective offered by Stafford
and Canary (1991), who suggest that a satisfying relationship is one in which „the
distribution of rewards is equitable and the relational rewards outweigh the costs” (p.
225).
“Goa gunaxi”. In her OPR Assessment (OPRA) study, Huang included a fifth social
relations dimension found in Eastern culture, “goa gunaxi” (Huang 2001), explained as:
“the exploitation of personal relations or human networks, [which] the suppressed class
often uses to show its association with power and to solve its practical daily life
problems” (Huang 2001, p.69). There is also an important social element to relationships
in African society – “ubuntu”. Most ubuntu thinkers (Khoza, 1994; Chikanda, 1990;
Makhadu, 1993; Mbigi, 1992), concur with Makhudu (1993), who described this African
view of life and worldview as one that implies ”a person is a person through other
persons” (pp.40-41), or, “I am, because you are” (Prinsloo 1998, p.43). While an
investigation of the extent to which this element affects media organization-public
relations OPRs is clearly relevant, this line of enquiry was not pursued in this paper as all
but one of the interviewees was white (for reasons outlined above).

FINDINGS
Media coverage generated by publicity efforts can generally be considered to fall in
the area where the interests of the source and the interests of the media, and by extension
their perceptions of the interests of their audience, intersect. Typically then the four key
elements of OPRs are clearly evident in the extent that publicists continue to operate
(commitment, control mutuality), press releases and the like are published (trust), and
both parties benefit from the exchange (relational satisfaction).
All the respondents pointed out that while the socio-political and socio-economic
transformation processes in South Africa had significantly affected these relational
elements, broader environmental factors also played a role. Primary amongst them were:
1. Changes in the media options. While deregulation of broadcasting in 1994 had
opened up the airwaves, there was another technological advance that greater
influenced the media environment: the Internet. And, more specifically, the

18
 applications of e-mail, which provided a new channel of communication between
journalists and their sources, and also the World Wide Web (WWW), which
allowed for the development of graphic-rich news.
2. Changes in news definitions. With the increase of 24/7 news options – television,
radio and the news sites on the WWW – three respondents noted that newspapers
have had to concentrate less on breaking “hard news” than on “softer” news-
behind-the-news stories. For this, journalists were increasingly relying on
publicists to provide innovative angles for stories and/or sources.

However, the single most important factor that affected media-PR OPRs, according to
all interviewees, was the changes in the skill levels of the two sectors. Journalism
standards and skills were said to have declined and, inversely, those of the commercial
content providers (i.e. public relations practitioners not working in government) had
increased. A range of reasons for this shift was offered. In addition to the factors already
identified – general lack of resources, career paths that lead reporters out of the newsroom
and into management (Pahad, 2001), and poaching of staff by corporations and
government (Sanef, 2001) – interviewees identified the migration of journalists into
public relations for ideological and personal reasons. The public relations industry was
also said to have benefited from the tertiary (higher) education programmes that were
introduced in the late 1980s and which have grown steadily since.
The key personal and ideological reasons for the attrition of skilled journalists were:
changes in the news story and changes in the personal goals of journalists.
Changes in the “big new story” in South Africa. One respondent noted that during the
period leading up to the demise of apartheid many journalists joined the profession as a
way of participating in the fight for democratic change commonly referred to in South
Africa as “the struggle”. The advent of a constitutional democracy meant the demise of
their raison d’etre for being journalists – both for those on the left and the right of the
political spectrum.
Others, it was noted, left journalism because, for them, the new “big news story” was
no longer exciting enough. This may explained because news of the “struggle”, which
dominated all other stories for several decades, had all the elements generally considered
to be newsworthy: great scale and intensity; clear and unambiguous; of significant
consequence to the intended public; having continuity – “already in the news and
consistent with past images and expectations” (McQuail 1987, p. 214; see also Glasgow
Media Group, 1976; Shoemaker and Reese, 1991; Hetherington, 1985; in: McQuail,

19
1987) and, specifically for newspapers and television, having great visual appeal. By
contrast, what followed was a more complex (the good guys and bad guys were more
difficult to tell apart) – and less obviously dramatic – story of the implementation of the
new democracy, which had was dominated by parliamentary debate and policy
formulation, and relatively unexciting activities such as building of houses, and teaching
people new skills.
Changes in the goals of media organizations and journalists. Whether the shift in
emphasis from communication goals toward economic goals was because the
normalisation of the society, changes in ownership, or wider economic pressures, all
respondent agreed that the emphasis by media organizations on the economic bottom line
had resulted in the rise of the “what‟s in it for me” attitude amongst journalists. This
attitude was said to not only be prevalent amongst experienced journalist who, after years
of working for a cause, had decided that is “payback” time, it is also common amongst
new journalists.
One respondent noted that this was especially commonplace amongst those who want
to move from the relative anonymity of newspapers, to higher-profile careers in radio and
television, which provided greater social and economic benefits: “[This] new bread of
journalist, [is] less of a newshound, more of a free agent focused on a personal agenda…
they‟re looking for a sensationalist approach. They‟re always thinking „what do I get out
of the story‟…the story is a stepping stone.”
Trust
To the extent that the media organization and their corporate content providers are in a
symbiotic relationship, there is an element of trust. However, one editor pointed out that
many young journalists were more inclined to trust because they were less inclined to
question (this was attributed, in part, to approaches to learning in schools). In addition,
because they were less experienced, these young journalists were more reliant on public
relations practitioner to provide them with information. But an increase in trust amongst
older journalists was also noted. One editor said, “A lot of journalists who worked during
the so-called Struggle period and so forth have walked into corporations. I think that has
changed the interaction with [people like me]...They are news driven… and putting that
into corporate environments has changed the interaction.”
Furthermore, the pressure to produce more stories with fewer resources meant that
journalists were also less likely to verify information. That, however, did not imply that
that the information they published was less likely to be accurate. The reasons given were
that while public relations practitioners may indeed still “spin” stories, they also realised

20
that even if the journalists or editors were unable to verify the facts, there was likely to be
those amongst the audience who would – and, specifically given the resources available
online, were able to do so.
Control mutuality
While the media organizations retain the power to develop products, set production
schedules and allocate resources that determine the news agenda, the extent that
journalists have increased their reliance on their commercial content providers for story
ideas and access to networks to other sources, the scale has tipped in favour of public
relations practitioners. As one public relations consultant pointed out: “Because they‟re
learning, they‟re leaning on publicists whom they know… [are] friendly and user friendly
(and most of us are) who will either give them a story or put them on to someone who
can.”
Relational satisfaction
Seen through the social transaction lens described earlier, the media-public relations
OPRs showed high levels of satisfaction. Certainly there were interviewees on both sides
who referred to stereotypical encounters of “pushy publicists” and “rude journalists”, but
none of the respondents said that they did not get what they wanted from the relationship
– public relations practitioners got significant media coverage for their clients and
journalists got the stories they needed to publish their papers.
Relational Commitment
As noted, formalization, intensity, reciprocity, and standardization are forms of
commitment. To the extent that the public relations consultancies continue to flourish
(formalization, reciprocity), and courses suggest formats for news releases
(standardization), there is significant evidence of relationship commitment. Additional
evidence include the fact that the public relations practitioners now enjoy full
membership privileges of the forums such as the Cape Town Press Club, and even serve
on the steering committee.
The effect of the transformation agenda on the public relations industry
The respondents also highlighted the differences in the extent to which the national
transformation agenda – specifically race and gender targets – have impacted the two
parties; media organizations and public relations practitioners. While the former point has
been explored in some detail, the latter may warrant further discussion. One obvious
reason for the difference is that typically public relations consultancies employ fewer than
50 staff and, as such, fall outside of the influence of legislation, such as the Employment
Equity Act. However, other reasons are more complex, as expressed by the black

21
respondent, who was a rare example of a black public relations professional with a degree
in Public Relations Management who had practised since before the political transition.
The respondent described the transformation of the public relations industry as having
gone through two waves to date. The first was referred to as the “smash and grab” phase,
while the second could be described as the “slow, but not steady” phase.
In the first phase, there was an attempt to transform the industry came with the
entrance of many unprepared people entering the industry. Because of the low barriers to
entry (no specific qualification, etc) and the perception that public relations was a tactical
rather than a management or even strategic function, it was considered by many to an area
that could be relatively easily transformed. Subsequently, there were typically two groups
of entrants. One group came from outside the country‟s borders, the other from other
professions inside the country. The external entrants were returning foreign-trained exiles
and black foreigners (notably Americans), who saw the opportunity to create companies
that could benefit both from the government contracts and those from white-owned
businesses who were eager to be seen to buy into the new political reality. Amongst both
these groups there were numerous examples of non-delivery. Some were the “„smash and
grab” types who just took the money and ran. “Others tried, failed and, 9 times out of 10,
they folded.”
Then there were those internal candidates that public relations consultancies and
corporations recruited from other professions, particularly education (teachers and
lecturers), for their social and language skills. Because of a mismatch of expectations on
both the side of the employer and the employee, the majority of these entrants have also
left the industry.
The next wave was described as the “slow, but not certain” phase. There were
primarily two key groups in this phase. One comprised legitimate new entrants who have
suitable education and training. Unfortunately, the respondent said, many of these also
leave the profession when they realise that there are easier ways to make a living than in
the public relations industry, which is typified by high-pressure and long working hours.
The other key groups comprised the few start-ups from the first phase that had
survived either because they learned fast and developed many of the necessary skills, or
because they formed partnerships. The former group endured, according to the
interviewee, primarily as a result of government contracts, because often businesses
(including black-owned ones), which recalled the “smash and grab” phase, did not want
risk contracting them. It was noted “there is an increase in partnerships, but these
alliances are not out of mutual interest but alliances of mutual need.” Many partnerships

22
had formed when black-owned companies, who had the connections and the “politically
correct profile” but not the skill, had subcontracted to white-owned consultancies that had
the skill, but not the right profile or connections. Some of these partnerships, it was noted,
had subsequently resulted in mergers.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Some key conclusions about the influence of the socio-political and socio-economic
transformation agenda on media organizations–commercial content providers OPRs are:
1. It has served to break down many traditional barriers between the two parties and,
as such, have strengthened the relationships.
2. Social transformation is more likely to happen in where economic objectives are
not the primary goal of the organization, such as in government.
3. The transformation agenda – particularly in reaching race targets – has primarily
affected commercial media organizations and has had less influence on
commercial public relations activity.
4. Defining transformation primarily as meeting race and gender targets may result
in under-prepared entrants into the profession whose underperformance then
harms the reputation of suitably qualified individuals and businesses.
5. The turmoil in which the media in South Africa finds itself significantly affects
the traditional gatekeeping function of the media and provides significant
opportunities for well-trained publicist to control the flow of news.
For the vision of the New South Africa, as outlined in the Constitution, be reflected in
commercial media organizations and their commercial content providers, it will arguably
require more than simply meeting race and gender targets which see white people
replaced with back people, men with women. It will take time: time for the political and
economic system to stabilize and prosper, time for educational programmes (particularly
those for journalists) to develop suitably prepared and confident practitioners, and time
for organizational management systems change to provide a context in which the personal
and professional goals of practitioners can be met.
While there is little doubt that the mainstream commercial media and public relations
organizations represented in this investigation are committed to the broad societal goals
of equity and prosperity, their first priority is economic. The bottom line of business is to
make money, and the bottom line of a government is to make a better society for its
citizens. And clearly while these two (bottom) lines may intersect, they do not necessarily
overlap. As such, while the social, political and legislative pressures may correctly serve

23
to encourage the social-political agenda, when it inhibits commercial organizations‟ and
individuals‟ ability to realize their own aspirations it is likely to be resisted. Alternatively,
as has clearly been the situation with journalists, they may simply leave and apply their
skills in other areas – or in other countries.
There are considerable opportunities for further research in this area. Amongst the
priorities should be examinations into the following: a definition of transformation that
fully reflects the values in the Constitution; how changing curricular offerings are
affecting the new journalist or media specialist in the country; and what the influence of
ubuntu is on OPRs in a multi-cultural context.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Dr Cathy Barrett for her valuable suggestions on drafts of this paper.

24
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