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Islam, Religiopolitics, and Social
Change.
A Review Article
JERROLD D. GREEN
The Universityof Michigan
Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, edited by Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (New York:
PraegerPress, 1982)
MilitantIslam,by G. H. Jansen(New York:HarperandRow, 1979)
Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, by EdwardMortimer(New York: Vintage
Books, 1983)
In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power, by Daniel Pipes (New York: Basic
Books, 1983)
Althoughthe trade-offbetween relevance and intellectualismis hardlya new
one, the IranianRevolutionraisedthe visibility of Islam and moved studies of
it from the arcaneto the superficial. Despite the fact that the former is more
enlighteningthan the latter, it also necessitates a "blurringof genres." 1 For
the study of Islamic politics requiresunderstandingboth of Islam, its history,
theology, and so on (the realm of humanists)and of the dynamics and con-
cepts of sociopolitical change (the bailiwick of social scientists). Neither the
humanitiesnor the social sciences can boast a monopoly on wisdom. Yet
scholarsclaiming membershipin both unions, rarelythe two simultaneously,
have produceda pasticheof writings when in fact what is needed is a corpus.
The fact that Islamic politics falls at the nexus of the humanitiesand the
social sciences poses a significant epistemological challenge. Humanists, it
seems, are concerned with Islam, while social scientists are interested in
Muslims.2 Or, to escape this obviously false dichotomy, we might posit that
I would like to thank Dr. KhurshidAhmad and Dr. HassanTurabifor their graciousnessduring
my recent visit to Islamabadand Khartoum.Although this paperprovidedsubstantialfodder for
disagreement,I benefitted immensely from our discussions. I would also like to thank several
colleagues in the United States for their insights: Mumtaz Ahmad, Fouad Ajami. Said Amir
Arjumand,Zvi Gitelman, David F. Gordon, Donald Herzog, Daniel Levine, PeterMcDonough,
Augustus R. Norton, Barry Rubin, Peter Wallensteen, Aram Yengoyan, and Marvin Zonis.
Naturally,all the usual exemptions from responsibilityapply.
I See Clifford Geertz, "BlurredGenres: The Refigurationof Social Thought," in his Local
Knowledge:Further Essavs in InterpretiveAnthropology(New York: 1983), pp. 19-35.
2
Although this distinction is hardly a new one, it remains for many Muslims a quite
provocativeone. I am gratefulto a memberof the ulema in Bangladeshwho pointed it out to me
after a lecture I delivered at the Islamic Foundationin Dhaka on March 15, 1983.
0010-4175/85/2780-0923 $2.50 ? 1985 Society for ComparativeStudy of Society and History
312
ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 313
such studiesas well. "Islam is not a religion but rathera way of life." "Islam
does not recognizedistinctionsbetween state and religion." These truismsare
fundamentallycorrect. Yet time and again they are breathlesslypresentedas
exciting new discoveries ratherthan well-known facts. And how these factors
explain contemporaryevents is left unclear. Furthermore,such superficiality
does not recognize that there exists in a more universal sense an engine for
social change which might be termed "religiopolitics."
Religiopolitics can be simply defined as those situationsin which relations
with God provide shape and meaning to one's political actions and orienta-
tions. As liberalism or socialism serve as political ideologies, so too can
Christianity,Islam, or Judaism, althoughperhapsin differentways. That this
theoreticalrelationshipreflects Islamic doctrinedoes not mean that it reflects
politics in Islamic societies. Also, there are other cases which can shed light
on the character of religiopolitics as a more broad-gaugedmeans of so-
ciopolitical change. LiberationTheology in Latin America, the Moral Major-
ity in the United States, Poland's SolidarityMovement, Apartheidin South
Africa, and Zionism in some of its many hues are all inspiredby religion with
political beliefs being mediated through man's spiritual relationship with
God. Are these cases all so different'?At one level they are. Yet why would
Hassan al-Banna concern himself with events in Latin America?6Was he
merely more cosmopolitan than are those who have studied him'?
Certainly, level of analysis here is crucial. Yet Max Weber, despite his
innumerableinsights into the relationshipbetween religion and politics, was
probablywrong when he wrote:
All politicsis orientedto the materialfactsof the dominantinterestof the state,to
realism,andto the autonomous endof maintaining theexternalandinternaldistribu-
tionof power.Thesegoals, again,mustnecessarilyseemcompletelysenselessfrom
the religiouspointof view.7
But is therea religious point of view? Does it not differ from faith to faith and
often within faiths? It seems almost tautological to note that religiopolitical
activists seek a greatersymmetrybetween temporaland spiritualconcerns in
state management.Perhapsmid-level theory may prove useful, for where on
one level macroanalysisis likely to forward certain useful generalizations,
microanalysiswill frame each case as unique. Seeking a balancebetween the
two is the essence of comparative research, after all. And the search for
paradigms, patterns, similarities and/or differences is certainly superior to
thin description.
This problem tends not to be recognized by those writings on Islam and
6 This
interestingfact was related to me by my late colleague Professor RichardMitchell, a
pioneer in the study of religiopolitical movements in Egypt. Personal communication, Spring
1982.
7 Max Weber. The Sociology of Religion (Boston: 1963), p.235.
ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 315
or otherwise, must begin to refine their questions, typologize their cases, and
build/test theories. Ali Dessouki points this out in an excellent introductory
chapter to his edited volume where he notes that: "Islamic movements have
to be seen in relation to the specific process of social change taking place in
their societies, in particular to issues of the changing position of classes and
groups, political participation, identity crisis, the stability of regimes,
and distributive justice" (p. 8). Dessouki's prescriptions are both prudent and
sound. He does not advocate a mutually exclusive approach, but rather a more
well-rounded understanding of how the past influences the present, how re-
ligion becomes politicized and vice-versa. Islamic opposition groups are
products of the very sociopolitical orders they oppose. At the same time,
those elites who attempt to buttress their own legitimacy through reliance on
institutional Islam are at least as committed to political survival as they are to
the spiritual values they so fervently espouse. Max Weber notes that "the
man who is concerned for the welfare of his soul and the salvation of the souls
of others does not seek these aims along the path of politics. Politics has quite
different goals, which can only be achieved by force." 0 Although this max-
imalist view may seem unduly cynical, the record of those political elites in
the umma who rely on Islam for legitimacy seems to verify Weber's insight.
Can political leaders who claim high levels of religiosity maintain the same
level and character of commitment to their core spiritual values while in
power? Certainly there are many in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Islamic
Republic of Iran who question the "Islamic-ness" of their leaders. Weber is
no less skeptical about oppositionists, asserting that:
? . . emotional revolutionis followed by traditionalistroutine. The hero of faith, and,
even more, faith itself fades away or becomes . . . partof the conventionaljargon of
political philistinesand technicians. This developmenttakes place with especial speed
in ideological struggles, because it is usually conductedor inspiredby trueleaders, the
prophetsof the revolution.
As I note above, profits, political in this context, obviate prophets:
... as with every apparatusof leadership,so here, one of the necessaryconditions of
success is to empty the ideas of all content, to concentrateon mattersof fact, and to
carrythrougha process of intellectual(i.e. or spiritual)'proletarisation'in the interests
of 'discipline.' The followers of a warriorof faith, once they have achieved power,
tend to degenerateinto a thoroughlycommonplace class of office-holders.12
Although it appears that Weber may have recently visited Tehran, my point
here is not to denigrate religiopolitical activists/leaders or even to question
their commitment to the religious values they espouse. Rather, it is to argue
that religiopolitics is politics much like other politics. The two influence one
another, but claims by religiopolitical activists to have some sort of special
mandatefrom God which raises them above politics tend not to be persuasive.
For as Weber also notes ". .. he who meddles with politics, who in other
words makes use of the instrumentsof power and violence, concludes a pact
with infernalpowers."'3 That religiopolitical actors exaggeratethe religious
contentof theiractions, while denying the political content, makes the task of
the scholar somewhat more difficult. For it is in the relationshipbetween the
two that the IvI gap appears to be most critical and the objectivity of the
scholarmost unwelcome by those being studied. Those trying to interpretthe
political behaviorof Ayatollah Khomeini are subjectto charges of being anti-
Islamic. Their scholarlycredentialsand goals are either ignoredor dismissed.
Being a Westernerand a non-Muslim provides anotherreason for dismissal,
althoughthese flaws tend to evaporatewhen one praises the Imam instead of
trying to understandhim. Yet if Muslim activists and intellectualscan claim
to understandthe West, even if only to dismiss it, why is it that Westerners
are viewed as being unable to appreciatethe Middle East and beyond?
This issue, only tangentiallytouched upon here, raises questions about the
ability of scholars to study societies which are not their own. An important
correlate to this, although one that is usually overlooked, relates to one's
ability to study one's own society. Ideally, both issues should be raised. But
recognitionthatreligiopoliticsis a subset or a particulartype of politics allows
us to apply the tools of our craft to the study of such politics everywhere.
Despite the possible abuse of some of these tools (e.g., development, elite,
and dependency theories have all been debased, at times), it should be re-
membered that the ax murderer is sent to prison, not the ax. Certainly a
sensitivity to what makes each case unique is an importantas an ability to
glean useful generalizations. The problem with much of the literatureon
Islam and politics is the relative absence of the latter.
13 Ibid.,
p. 220.
318 JERROLD D. GREEN
14 Jerrold D.
Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization(New York:
1982), p. 150.
'5 R. Stephen Humphreyslooks at the historicaldimension of this issue in "The Contempo-
rary Resurgence in the Context of Modem Islam," in Dessouki, pp. 67-83.
ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 319
CONCLUSIONS