WTJ 75 (2013): 45-63

THE UNDERSTANDING
OF GISBERTUS VOETIUS AND RENE DESCARTES
ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF FAITH AND REASON,
AND THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

B. H o o n W oo

I. Introduction

n their studies o f the 1640s debate between Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676)

I and R ené Descartes (1 5 9 6 -1 6 5 0 ), m ost m odern scholars co n ten d that

Voetius was an Aristotelian th eologian .1 Ernst Bizer, w ho was o n e o f the

B. Hoon Woo is a Ph.D. student in systematic theology at Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, Mich.
1 For the debate between Voetius and Descartes, see Am oldus Cornelius Duker, School-gezag
en eigen-onderzoek: Historisch-kritische studie van den strijd tusschen Voetius en Descartes (Leiden: D.
Noothoven van Goor, 1861); Josef Bohatec, Die cartesianische Scholastik in der Philosophie und re-
formierten Dogmatik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Teil 1: Entstehung, Eigenart, Geschichte und philosophische
Ausprägung der cartesianischen Scholaslik (1912; repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1966); Gustave Cohen,
Écrivains français en Hollande dans la premiere moitié du 17e siècle (Paris: Champion, 1920); Eduard
Jan Dijksterhuis, ed., Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais: Études et documents (Paris and Amsterdam:
Presses universitaires de France, 1951); Cornelia Serrurier, Descartes: L’homme et le penseur (Paris:
Presses universitaires de France, 1951); Paul Dibon, L’enseignement philosophique dans les universités
néerlandaises à l ’époque pré-cartésienne (1575—1650) (Amsterdam: Institut Français d ’Amsterdam,
1954) ; C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute, Nederlands cartésianisme (Amsterdam: HES, 1954) ; Hans-Martin
Barth, Atheismus und Orthodoxie: Analysen und Modelle christlicher Apologetik im 17. Jahrhundert (Göttin-
gen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971); Thomas A. McGahagan, “Cartesianism in the Netherlands,
1639-1667: The New Science and the Calvinist Counter-Reformation” (Ph.D. diss., University o f
Pennsylvania, 1976); Tom Sorell, Descartes (Past Masters; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987);
René Descartes and Martín Schoock, La Querelle d’Utrecht: René Descartes et Martin Schoock (ed. Theo
Verbeek; Paris: Impressions nouvelles, 1988) ;J. van Oort, De Onbekende Voetius: Voordrachten weten-
schappelijk symposium, Utrecht, 3 maart 1989 (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1989); Maijorie Glicksman Grene,
Descartes among the Scholastics (Aquinas Lecture; Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991);
Theo Verbeek, “Descartes and the Problem o f Atheism: The Utrecht Crisis,” Nederlands Archiefvoor
Kerkgeschiedenis 71 (1991): 211-23; Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian
Philosophy, 1637-1650 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992); J. A. van Ruler, The
Crisis of Causality: Voetius and Descartes on God, Nature, and Change (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995); Roger
Ariew and Maijorie Glicksman Grene, eds., Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections,
and Replies (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1995); Aza Goudriaan, “Die Rezeption des
cartesianischen Gottesgedanken bei Abraham Heidanus,” Neue Zeitschriftfü r systematische Theologie
und Religionsphilosophie 38 (1996): 166-97; Tad M. Schmaltz, Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and
Anti-Cartesianism in Early Modem Europe (London: Routledge, 2005); Roger Anew, Descartes among
the Scholastics (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2011).

45
46 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

early proponents o f this view, argues that what Voetius actually d efen ded was
“Aristotelianism and the validity o f the traditional p ro o f o f God, but n ot the
biblical con cep t o f God.”2 Bizer is convinced that Voetius d efen ded “n o t just
faith, but the whole traditional system o f theology” (i.e., A ristotelianism ), and
that for Voetius, Christian faith and Aristotelianism were “manifestly o n e and
the same thing.”3 In a similar vein, Richard Popkin binds Schoock and Voetius
under the nam e o f A ristotelian.4 Paul Hoffm an argues that the Aristotelian
faculty o f the University o f Utrecht was led by Voetius.5A m ong French scholars,
Cornelia Serrurier and H enri G ouhier also observe the debate o f Voetius and
Descartes from the perspective o f the conflict between Aristotelian philosophy
and the New Philosophy.6 T h eo Verbeek and J. A. van Ruler, w ho have closely
stud ied the debate, drive a w edge in to this view. V erbeek m aintains that
Voetius was a rationalist, and that his Aristotelianism “allowed him to settle
theological problem s w ithout having to consider the relation betw een faith
and reason or to define the role o f reason in interpreting the Bible.”7Verbeek
com m ents on Voetius’s Aristotelianism, “Voetius is not surprised that every-
thing theology n eed s happens to be fou n d in Aristotle.”8 Verbeek’s form er
student, van Ruler, albeit tem pering the strength o f this op in ion , basically
sides with him . Van R uler argues that “V oetius h olds that the A ristotelian
philosophy is m ore in accordance with H oly Writ than are the philosophies
o f those w ho criticize Aristotle.”9
This article, however, will show that the above scholars’ assessment o f Voetius
is n ot quite right. Voetius was on e o f the strong advocates o f the R eform ed
faith.10It is true that Voetius formulated his theology in a broad Aristotelian tra-
dition, but on e can hardly define the main characteristics o f his theology asjust
Aristotelian. Voetius believed that if a philosopher worked with reason alone,
the conclusion could be profoundly flawed. He argued that reason should have
an ancillary status beneath theology, and therefore the use o f reason should
be lim ited in theological studies. His attitude toward philosophy is basically

2 Ernst Bizer, “Reformed Orthodoxy and Cartesianism,”/T C 2 (1965): 24.

3 Ibid., 38.
4 Richard Henry Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (rev. ed.; Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1979), 198; Richard Henry Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From
Savonarola toBayle (rev. ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 162.
5 Paul Hoffman, Essays on Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 18.
6 Serrurier, Descartes: L’homme et le penseur, 137; Henri Gaston Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique
de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962), 346-50.
7 Verbeek, “Descartes and the Problem o f Atheism,” 211-23, at 223.
8 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 7.
9 van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 34.
10 For the life and thought o f Voetius, see Am oldus Cornelius Duker, Gisbertus Voetius (3 vols.;
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1897); van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, ch. 1; Andreas J. Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius
(1589-1676): Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre” (Ph.D. diss., Utrecht University,
2007), 35-59.
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 47

eclectic, and his Aristotelianism is “m odified Christian Aristotelianism.”11 By

contrast, Descartes was not concerned with limiting the use o f reason. Descartes
is considered to be the first m odern philosopher.12 H e used skeptical critique
as his philosophical m ethod in order to exclude any type o f certainty except
the thinking ego (ego cogitans). For Descartes, mathematical reasoning was the
m ost certain way o f finding truth. H e argued that the conclusion o f philoso-
phy could be different from that o f theology, and that theologians should not
interfere with the work o f philosophers.
In this article I will analyze Voetius’s and Descartes,s views o f faith and reason
and the relationship between theology and philosophy, and show that Voetius
and Descartes were different in their understanding o f these issues. The article
will proceed from Voetius to Descartes following the order o f their debate. The
first section will exam ine Voetius’s conception o f faith and reason in Selectarum
disputationum theologicarum, Pars Prima, Chapters 1 -3 .13T he second section will
analyze the relationship o f theology and philosophy in this work. The third
section will deal with D escartes’s n otion o f faith and reason in his letter to
Voetius (Epístola ad Voetium). The fourth section will investigate the relationship
o f theology and philosophy in the letter o f Descartes to Voetius. This article will
show how Voetius and Descartes were different in their understanding o f faith,
reason, and the relationship between theology and philosophy. In so doing,
this study will also dem onstrate that Voetius was not simply Aristotelian, and
that what he defended against Descartes was not Aristotelianism but Christian
doctrine traditionally understood.

II. Voetius’s Understanding of Faith and Reason in Selectarum

disputationum theologicarum, Pars Prima, 1-3

1. Definition and Classification of Reason

W hen Voetius was a professor o f theology at the University o f Utrecht, on e

o f his colleagues, the professor o f theoretical m edicine and botany, Henricus

11 For “Christian Aristotelianism” and the eclecticism o f early m odem philosophy, see Richard
A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca.
1520 to ca. 1725 (4 vols.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006), 1:360-82.
12 For the life and thought o f Descartes, see Adrien Baillet, La Vie de M. Descartes (2 vols.; Paris,
1691 ) ; Serrurier, Descartes: L ’homme et le penseur, Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy
(Bristol: Thoem m es Press, 1968); Sorell, Descartes', Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual
Biography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
13 Gisbertus Voetius, Selectarum disputationum theologicarum (5 vols.; Utrecht: J. à Waesberge,
1648-1669), vol. 1. Hereafter this work will be abbreviated SDTh with volume and page number.
Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. For a Dutch translation o f the first chapter
o f SDTh, see W. J. van Asselt et al., eds., Inleiding in de gereformeerde scholastiek (Zoetermeer: Boeken-
centrum, 1998), 184-200; for an English translation, see W. J. van Asselt et al., eds., Introduction to
Reformed Scholasticism (trans. Albert Gootjes; Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2011), 225-47.
I refer with som e modifications to this translation by Gootjes.
48 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

Regius (1598-1679), received the “New Philosophy” o f Descartes and taught it

to his students. At the same time, the “New Science” o f Copernicus also gained
supporters am ong the European academic society.14 Both the New Philosophy
and the New Science questioned the authority o f the Christian faith. Voetius’s
book Selectarum disputationum theologicarum was published against this intellectual
background.15 N ot surprisingly, Voetius gave m uch space in his book to the re-
lationship between faith and reason and the connection between theology and
philosophy. The first three chapters o f the first volume o f Selectarum disputationum
theologicarum were devoted specifically to these two topics.16 Even though he did
not m ention the names o f Descartes or Copernicus in the entire book, his in ten-
tion was clear in warning against their thinking. He gives much more weight to
the New Philosophy than to the New Science. Yet, the main purpose o f his book
was theological, so he opened the book with the ideas o f the Socinians, who were
regarded as rationalists am ong the members o f the Protestant church.17
T he Socinians, according to Voetius, argued that “n ot only Scripture, but
also and above all, reason is the norm o f religion and o f what is to be believed.”18
Smalcius, on e o f the Socinians, contended in his book Against Franzius, “Only
through reason can a jud gm ent be m ade on the possibility or impossibility o f
the articles o f faith.”19Against these views, Voetius presents his ideas o f faith and

14 Voetius was the first man to promote vigorous debate against Copemicanism in the Neth-
erlands (Rienk H. Vermij, Secularisering en natuurwetenschap in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw:
Bernard Nieuwentijt [Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991], 65). For a detailed narrative of the debate between
Copemicanism and Voetianism, see Rienk H. Vermij, The Calvinist Copemicans: The Reception of the
New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic, 1575-1750 (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie
van Wetenschappen, 2002), Parts 3 and 4.
15 On the disputes o f Voetius and his opponents who argued for the New Philosophy, see van
Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 9-35; and Descartes and Schoock, La Querelle d ’Utrecht, 69-123.
16 Voetius, SDTh 1:1-47. The first chapter (“De ratione humana in rebus fidei”) was delivered
in February 1636, in his first days as professor at Utrecht University. The second chapter ( “De
theologia scholastica”) was presented in February 1640, and the third chapter (“Q uousque se
extendat autoritas Scripturæ”) dealt with the authority o f the Bible in July 1636. For this informa-
tion, see Gijsbert Voet, D. Gysberti Voetii: Selectarum disputationum fasciculus (ed. Abraham Kuyper;
Amsterdam: J. A. Wormser, 1887), 1,10; and van Ruler, Crisis of Causality, 22 n. 38.
17 Aza Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625-1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus Van Mas-
tricht andAnthonius Driessen (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006), 37. On the relationship between Socinianism
and other philosophers in the early m odem period, see Zbigniew Ogonowski, “Der Sozinianismus aus
der Sicht der großen philosophischen Doktrinen des 17. Jahrhunderts,” in Socinianism and Its Role in
the Culture of the 16th to the 18th Centuries (ed. Lech Szczucki, Zbigniew Ogonowski, andjanusz Tazbir;
Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publisher, 1983), 115-23. M. Schneckenburger writes, “Er [Socinianism] ist
die erste Form, unter welcher sich in der protestantischen Kirche der Rationalismus geregt hat, er ist
gewissermassen eine Nachgeburt des alten Pelagianismus [Socinianism is the first form under which
rationalism has emerged in the Protestant church, and it is, in a certain sense, an afterbirth of the old
Pelagianism] ” (Matthias Schneckenburger, Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegriffe der kleineren protestantischen
Kirchenparteien [ed. Karl Bernhard Hundeshagen; Frankfurt: H. L. Bronner, 1863], 30).
18 Voetius, SDTh 1:1.
19 Valentinus Smalcius, Refutatio thesium Wolfgi Franzii de praecipuis religionis christianae capitibus
(Raków: Stemacius, 1614), preface.
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 49

reason. H e defines hum an reason ( ratio humana) as “the capacity o f the rational
soul in man, by which he com prehends intelligible things and makes judgm ents
[facultatem animae rationalis in homine, qua intelligibüia apprehendit à f dijudicat] .2°‫״‬
H e argues that hum an reason also denotes “the light o f natural know ledge
[lumen cognitionis naturalis] ” through m etonym y and m etaphor.21 H e divides
“the light o f natural k now ledge” into two parts, external and internal. The
internal light o f natural knowledge is again twofold: either it is im printed on
all people from birth, that which is called com m on sense (communis sensus) and
com m on notions ( communes notiones), or else it is acquired and newly added to
a person after birth.
Voetius also maintains that hum an reason can be considered either in the
ideal— objectively and abstractly; or else concretely— subjectively and in a
particular state. In the latter consideration, four states are imposed: (1) before
the Fall as gifted with the im age o f God; (2) in the Fall as corrupt; (3) in grace
as free, although imperfect; and (4) in glory as perfect, shining brightly with
the light o f glory.22 Human reason that is considered as the ideal, or objectively
and abstractly, means a work o f God or a good creation o f God; it is the human
reason that was given from God w hen he m ade hum an beings.23

2. Reason and Scripture

The principle o f faith is twofold for Voetius: an external principle and an in-
tem al principle. The form er can also be called an objective principle, the latter
a formal principle. T he former is the Word o f God; the latter is the illumination
o f the Holy Spirit or the supernatural light infused into the mind. The external
principle o f faith, the Word o f God, m ust be primary and trustworthy in and o f
itself ( autopiston) .24All truths, articles, or conclusions o f faith are derived from
this external principle o f faith. Thus, to Voetius, H oly Scripture is the primary
and trustworthy source o f all truths o f the Christian faith. He maintains that
hum an reason can be a principle as m uch as “it draws conclusions from the
only, infallible principle o f the Scriptures, and so by means o f simple apprehen-
sion, o f com position, o f division, and o f discursive reasoning it achieves the
understanding o f what is revealed supematurally or spiritually.”25 For Voetius,
Scripture is the only and infallible principle, and hum an reason is a principle
subordinate to it.

20 Voetius, SDTh 1:1.

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 1:2.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 1:3: Haec tanquam principium quod conclusiones fidei ex unico infcdlibili scripturanim prin-
cipio educit, atque adeo actibus simpticis apprehenswnis, compositionis, divisionis, & discursus tou gnöstou
supematuralis seu spiritualis intelligentia peragit (author’s emphasis; I transliterate the Greek word).
50 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

3. The Superiority of Faith over Reason

Voetius further argues that the supernatural truths o f faith are beyond hu-
man reason in itself or as such, for through reason it is n ot possible to perceive
them unless it is elevated and revealed through a higher light. H e contends,
however, that the supernatural truths do not conflict with hum an reason per se.
If they conflict with reason, it is because o f the accident o f corruption and the
depraved disposition that sticks to the hum an mind. Thus, the Christian faith
and theology can be called com pletely rational, not because they demonstrate
their truth necessarily with argum ents in opposition to those w ho deny the
basic assumptions o f the Christian faith, but because they dem onstrate their
conclusions from the authority o f Scripture and with arguments derived from
Scripture, and because they at least refute those arguments by which unbelievers
charge the Christian faith with contradiction and absurdity.26Voetius contends
that “no hum an reason can be the principle by which or through which, or else on
the ground of which or why we believe, or the foundation, law, or norm for what
must be believed, under whose direction we are to ju d ge.”27 “On the contrary,”
writes Voetius, “our faith opens to Holy Scripture w hen it pertains to the things
that must be believed, and to the illumination o f the Holy Spirit when it pertains
to the act o f faith.”28 T he faculty o f reason o f an unregenerate person is blind
when it com es to the divine law. Voetius argues, with 1 Tim 3:16 and Matt 13:11,
that the entire gospel is called a mystery. Thus, to him, the unspiritual person
does not perceive anything o f all those things without divine revelation. Voetius
also maintains that even regenerate people “do n ot establish the what, how, and
why on the basis o f accurate definitions, but only that it is on the basis o f the
supernatural revelation o f the Holy Spirit.”29
Voetius rigorously limits the ability o f reason in an unregenerate person in
relation to divine knowledge. H e argues that “the essence and attributes o f the
G odhead are never understood by the hum an m ind immediately, adequately,

26 Ibid. Voetius refers to Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theobgiae, I, qu. 1, art. 8. He also writes, “A
similar defense o f the faith can be seen in Athenagoras, Jusdn Martyr, Clem ent o f Alexandria,
Origen, Tertullian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Augustine, Theodoret, Cyril o f Alexandria, and so forth;
in the medieval writers Thomas Against the Pagans, and the other scholastics, if one with discretion
and discernment takes the more solid excerpts; as well as Savonarola in The Triumph of the Cross■,
Raymond o f Sabunde in On Natural Theology, Cardinal Cusanus, Dionysius the Carthusian and
others who wrote against the Muslims; and finally, more recent writers such as Louis Vives, Agostino
Steuco, Charron, the scholastics who treat quaestiones and the commentators on Lombard and
Thomas; but especially Du Plessis in his excellent treatise On the Truth of the Christian Religion’
(SDTh 1:3).
27 Ibid., author’s emphasis: H isprœmissis dicimus nullam rationem humanam essepúncipiumquo seu
per quod, aut ex quo seu cur credamus, aut fundamentum aut legem, aut normam credendorum ex cuius
prcescripto judicemus.
28 Ibid., 1:4: sed contrà resolví fidem nostram, ut notât credenda, in S. Scripturam; ut notât actum
credendi, in illuminationem Spiritus Sancti.
29 Ibid. (author’s em phasis).
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 51

as they are in themselves and therefore also n ot in a perfect manner, but only
by the way o f negation, causality, and em in en ce.”30 An unregenerate person
cannot understand even the 1witness o f G od’s works, let alone the Persons o f the
Trinity, the Savior Christ, and the w hole mystery o f redem ption.31 Even in the
m ind o f a regenerated person, especially if still an infant, divine knowledge is
known only imperfectly and in part because an innate darkness always clings to
the m ind. Therefore, Voetius concludes that “reason is not a principle o f faith
in God in which nothing false can be present.”32
Human beings, according to Voetius, cannot say that they believe in som e-
thing because it is reasonable to them. Rather, they should begin with Scripture
and say that they believe in this an djud ge in this way because God says it in the
Scriptures.33 “H um an reason,” argues Voetius, “is not prior to, m ore known,
or more certain than faith; thus it is not its principle.” He adds, “Reason does
not precede faith; because reason is enlightened by faith.”34 In the conclusion,
Voetius offers an ad hominem argum ent against Socinus and his followers.
Socinus denies all natural theology, or innate and acquired knowledge o f God,
and claims that whatever is or will be found am ong those w ho do not have
Scripture is based on unskilled and therefore m ost fallible proof, that is, on
m ere tradition and hum an testimony. Therefore, it is impossible for Socinus to
assert that hum an reason could ever be the infallible principle o f the mysteries
o f faith. Thus, his view is self-contradictory.35

4. Not Only Through Scripture But Also Through Reason

After his criticism o f the Socinians, Voetius m oves on to the views o f two
Jesuits, Jean Gontery (1562-1616) and François Véron (1 5 78-1649).36 These
two Jesuits argued that the Protestants “may only refute the papacy with the
very words o f Scripture, w ithout any form o f reasoning, discursive thought,
and without drawing conclusions and without proof, and w ho go so far as to
reject and remove all natural, accepted, learned, and useful logic from all the
discussions and disputes.”37Voetius defends the view o f the Protestants that even
though for them Scripture is the only principle o f faith, they do not ignore
the function o f hum an reason in the interpretation o f Scripture.38 H e points

30 Ibid.: Quia essentia & attributa Deitatis ab humanâ mente immediatè, adaequatè, ut sunt in se, atque
adeà perfectè non comprehenduntur: sed tantum per viam negatimis, causalitatis, eminentiae.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.: Non est itaque principium fidei divinae, cut non potest subessefakum.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.: Ratio humana non est prior notior, certiorfide; ergo non est ejus principium. . . . [Ratio] ergo
non est prior. Quia perfidem ratio ilhistratur.
35 Ibid., 1:5.
36 On Gontery and Véron, see van Asselt et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 234-35, nn.
27, 29. Voetius consistently writes these names in this disputation as “Gunterus” and “Verrón.”
37 Voetius, SDTh 1:5-6.
38 Ibid., 1:6.
52 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

out that Protestant theologians also acknowledge and receive adequately drawn
consequences either from the Scriptures or from hum an reason. Here the term
“consequences” (consequentiae) is very important and refers to the truths that are
deduced from the principal truths o f Scripture or the axioms. Voetius argues:

In elenctic theology, or in the refutation of falsities such as purgatory, indulgences,

and so forth, we ought to use discursive thought and consequences even if a rigid op-
ponent denies them, as well as proofs based on consequences derived not only from
the words of Scripture but also from the axioms and principles of the light of nature
known either naturally or by the study of philosophy or logic, so that the correct
relationship of the middle term to the most important major becomes apparent.39

Voetius does n ot ignore the im portance o f the use o f hum an reason in Re-
form ed theology. W hen Protestant theologians have a debate with Roman
Catholic theologians, they use discursive thought, consequences, and proofs
based on con sequ en ces derived not only from Scripture but also from the
axioms and principles o f the light o f nature. Voetius, however, em phasizes that
each truth should be proven from Scripture alone, and he concedes that if
the positions pertain to natural theology, they must b e proved primarily from
Scripture and secondarily from the light o f nature.
Elenctic theology, according to Voetius, does not derive its faith conclusions
from its principles w ithout discursive reasoning, but it deduces theological
theses from the analogy o f faith because it is all the m ore argum entative.40
Voetius is convinced that the elenctic theology o f the apostles and prophets is
argumentative, and that the divinely inspired authors m ade use o f certain forms
and expressions that pertain to argumentation.41 Even Christ, the prophets, and
the apostles prove their doctrines and refute falsities “through consequences”
{per consequential) .42 Most doctrines o f the Christian religion are not contained
literally in Scripture, but can be derived by discursive reasoning or else by
equivalent expressions in Scripture. For Voetius, the following doctrines are
derived from Scripture only through the use o f consequences: that the three
Persons o f the G odhead are really distinct, that the Son is equal in essence
( homoousion) with the Father, that two natures are essentially in the o n e Person
o f Christ w ithout confusion, and so forth.43 T hese doctrines are elicited by
the drawing o f conclusions from their principles in which they are already

39 ]bid., 1:7 (emphasis m ine) : Sententia nostra est, in Theologica Elenctica, seu in refutationefalsitatis
e.g. purgatorii, indulgentiamm, & c. discursu, & consequents utendum esse, à? siquidem praefractus ad-
versarius eas neget, etiam probationibus consequentiarum, non tantum ex sacris litteris, sed etiam ex axiomatis
& principiis luminis naturalis sive naturaliter sive technicè ex Philosophiâ & Logicâ notis, ut appareat apta
connexio medii termini cum majori extremo.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 1:8, 44.
42 Ibid., 1:7-8. Voetius refers to the following scriptural texts: Matt 22:44; John 5:39, 26; Acts 2;
3; 15:8-9,16-17; 17:16-18; 18:28; 26:22; and 1 Cor 15.
43 Ibid., 1:8.
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 53

potentially and virtually contained. Voetius contends that n o disputation is pos-

sible without refutation and contradiction, and that n o judgm ent is made about
contradiction without the rules o f consequences and without the principles
o f reason that are from God. God gives hum an beings not only his truth but
also the m ethod to get the truth. The consensus and practice o f the church
have perm itted the use o f logical reasoning and consequences to refute athe-
ists, pagans, Jews, and heretics. Voetius attests to his view o f the works o f the
church fathers and m edieval theologians.44 Therefore, for Voetius, there is no
tension between the Protestant insistence on “Scripture a lon e” (sola Scriptum)
and the im portance he places on the usefulness o f reason. H e refutes both
Socinianism, which displays a great confidence in hum an reason, and Veron’s
criticism that the Protestants confront Roman Catholicism with biblical texts
only w ithout m aking use o f rational considerations. Voetius dismisses both
views and offers a m iddle position: Holy Scripture is the only principle o f faith
and theology, and hum an reason plays an instrumental, not normative, role
in the pursuit o f truth.45

III. Voetius’s Understanding of the Relation of Theology and Philosophy

in Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, Pars Prima, 1-3

1. Philosophy, Scripture, and the Illumination of the Holy Spirit

On the unity o f truth, Voetius argues that “naturally revealed philosophical

truth does not contradict theological truth.”46 Both biblical truth and reason
are good gifts o f God. Voetius, however, im poses a right order between them.
H e asserts that all truths o f faith are derived from Scripture, which h e calls “the
external principle o f faith.”47 Scripture is the primary source o f all truths o f
Christian faith. Voetius regards the articles o f saving faith not as presupposed,
but as formal. This m eans that the articles o f saving faith can be known only
through the illum ination o f the Holy Spirit or supernatural light. Even those
articles o f faith that are com m on to natural theology and sound philosophy
should be learned from the Scriptures and through the illum ination o f the
Holy Spirit.48 They are such things as the existence o f God, G od’sjustice, that he
is the governor o f the universe, the immortality o f the soul, and so forth. There-
fore, for Voetius, Scripture and the illum ination o f the Holy Spirit have superi-
ority to reason even in the realm o f natural theology. Natural theology does not

44 Ibid., 1:9.
45 Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 36-37.
46 Voetius, “De errore et haeresi, pars sexta” [G. Baxcamp, 22 November 1656] (SDTk 3:750).
47 Voetius, SDTh 1:2.
48 See van Asselt et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 228. Based on the Latin, I describe
Voetius’s intention more clearly than the English translation does. Objectumftdei divinae hie intelligi-
mus formate, non prcesuppositum: h. e. artículos fidm salvificae oikeious, proprios à f stricte dictos, non vero
prœsuppositos, qui ipsi cum Theologia naturali, & cum sanâ Philosophiâ sunt communes.
54 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

leave out Scripture, but presupposes it. It is not an in depend en t theology apart
from Scripture but a part o f biblical theology.49 Furthermore, Voetius contends
that “there is a very great distinction between grace and nature, between the
special revelation o f grace or supernatural light and G od’s general revelation
or the light o f nature, between philosophy and theology or faith.”50 Therefore,
there is n o conflict between biblical truth and hum an reason because the latter
is subjected to the former. All truth o f faith is known from Scripture and the
illum ination o f the Holy Spirit, and confirm ed by hum an reason. Scripture is
the primary principle, and hum an reason can be a derivative principle o f it.

2. Philosophy in Theological Studies

Voetius holds a positive view o f the usefulness o f philosophy for theology.

O n e o f the theses he defends is, “T he light o f nature does not fight with the
light o f grace, nor philosophy with theology. Therefore, a-theological, and
also doing injury to God and His truth, are those w ho condem n philosophy.”51
Philosophy as such is not a source o f heresy, but it can constructively contribute
to theology.52 God recom m ends to hum an beings “the know ledge that is at-
tained by reason and by the senses that serve reason,” and this know ledge is
“nothing other than philosophy.”53 Philosophy provides orthodox theology a
sound logic and discursive thought.54 Elenctic theology can op pose corrupt
reasoning with the assistance o f philosophy. Thus, Voetius defends the use o f
philosophy and logic in theology and repudiates Véron’s “Biblicist” m ethod.55
H e argues that it belongs to the tradition o f the orthodox church to use logic
and philosophy in theology. Even Roman Catholic theologians use logic and
philosophy to dem onstrate their views.56 Nevertheless, Voetius stipulates the
function o f philosophy in the study o f theology w hen h e asserts:

49 On natural theology o f this period, see Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard
Kessler, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), 598-638; and John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the
Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575—1650 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982).
50 Voetius, SDTh 1:5. Voetius references the following texts: 1 John 1:9; Rom 1:19; 2:14-15; Ps
147:20; Acts 14:16-17; and Eph 2:12-13.
51 Voetius, “Assertiones theologicae de praeiudiciis verae religionis” [D. van Boxtel], repr. in
Gisbertus Voetius, Thersites heautontimorumenos (Utrecht: A. ab Herwiick & H. Ribbius, 1635), 347:
Lumen naturae cum lumine gratiae, Philosophia cum Theologia nonpugnant. Itaque atheologoi sunt, insuper
in Deum et veritatem ejus injurii, qui Philosophiam condemnant. Cited in Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy
and Philosophy, 30 n. 5.
52 Voetius, “De errore et haeresi, pars sexta” (SDTh 3:750-58).
53 Ibid., 3:750.
54 Cf. ibid., 1:7.
55 Ibid., 1:9.
56 Ibid., 1:10.
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 55

We convince Christians that the Scriptures are the only principle in our theology.
We use metaphysics and philosophy so that we might support the rules of logical
consequences, and so that we might designate false conclusions and tricks, which
are drawn from the corrupt and perverse reason of pseudo-philosophy.57

Here again, Voetius argues that Scripture is the only principle in Christian the-
ology. However, he contends that theologians can use philosophy to formulate
theology in a better way. Theologians can d ed uce logical conclusions from
“consequences” with the help o f philosophy, and philosophy can contribute
to theological reasoning in elenctic theology.
Voetius’s view o f philosophy is consistent with his notion o f hum an reason.
H e argues for the usefulness o f hum an reason and philosophy in faith and
theology. It is worth notin g, however, that h e confirm s the superiority o f
Scripture and the illum ination o f the Holy Spirit over hum an reason and phi-
losophy. W ithout Scripture and illum ination, hum an reason and philosophy
cannot find the truth o f God; with the help o f sound reason and philosophy,
Christians can attain to m ore sound doctrines and can m ore decisively un-
cover the falsity o f heresies and pseudo-philosophy. The truth o f orth odox
th eology is con sistent with that o f solid philosophy.58 In his Introductio ad
philosophiam sacram, Voetius con ten ds that n o philosophy can be accepted
without reservations, but only the best insights should be taken into the service
o f Christianity. H e opts for philosophical eclecticism and regards traditional
Christian A ristotelianism as appropriate for the study o f theology. Voetius,
however, does not adhere to the philosophical thought o f Aristotle himself.59
H e d oes n ot regard A ristotelianism as a fixed body o f d octrines, but as a
co llection o f m ethods and con ten ts that was passed on by tradition.60 For
Voetius, consistency with Scripture is the norm for selecting any philosophical
affiliation. Thus, it can be concluded that w hen Voetius defended “Christian
Aristotelianism” against the New Philosophy, the cause for which he fought
was n ot the philosophy itself, but the scriptural truths that the tradition o f
the o rth od ox church preserved through Scripture, theology, reason, and
philosophy.61 It was n ot the m ain concern o f Voetius that the New Philosophy
departed from accepted philosophy. Rather, his g en u in e con cern was that

57 Voetius, Thersites heautontimorumenos, 127: Scripturis tanquam único principio Christianis Theolo-
giam nostrampersuademus, Metaphysicam et Philosophiam adhibemus ut regulas consequentiarum fulciamus,
ut sophismata ac strophas ex corrupta ac perversa ratione ex pseudcnphilosophia depromptas delegamus.
Translation mine.
58 Voetius, SDTh 4:757-58:.. . hacphilosophia probépercepta ad solidam eruditionem theologicam.. . .
59 Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 36, 54.
60 Theo Verbeek, “From ‘Learned Ignorance’ to Scepticism: Descartes and Calvinist Ortho-
doxy,” in Scepticism and Irreligión in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (ed. Richard Henry
Popkin and Arie Johan Vandeqagt; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), 44.
61 Along these same lines, Vermij writes, “Cartesian ism was offensive [toVoetiusl not only because
it ran counter to received philosophy, but also because it appeared problematic from a religious
and theological point o f view” (Vermij, Calvinist Copemicans, 162).
56 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

the N ew Philosophy d eparted from the traditional th eology that u sed the
concepts and theories o f the accepted philosophy.62

3. Corrupt Theology and Solid Scholastic Theology

In Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, Voetius deals with the m ethodology

and contents o f scholastic theology.63 H e offers five origins o f corrupt theology
( 1corrupta Theologia) as follows: (1) ignorance o f languages, especially o f Greek
and Hebrew, which God used to write Scripture; (2) ignorance o f history and
ancient culture, especially o f church history; (3) ignorance o f the discipline
o f theology, which includes grammar, philology, philosophy, Aristotelian logic
and physics, ethics, m etaphysics, language, and the discipline o f Lombard;
(4) defect o f the practice and exercise o f piety, and o f care o f the church; and
(5) ignorance o f important texts, which include the works o f the church fathers,
the texts o f church history, and exegetical works o f Scripture.64 Voetius under-
scores both academ ic specialty and practical piety in the study o f theology.
For him, theology is m ost o f all “a practical scien ce” (scientia practica).m H e
underlines that theological students should be pious and eager to take care o f
the church “because many [theological] teachers are purely speculative and
contemplative [Erant enim maximam partem Doctores puré speculativi & umbratici].
It is also notable that Voetius places stress on the philosophical study in theology.
Although Aristotelian logic and physics are not satisfactorily translated, they are
im portant in theological studies. Som e parts o f Aristotelian ethics and meta-
physics should be studied with theology. “This philosophical lesson,” maintains
Votius, “still has not died out anywhere to this present day [hic cursus Philosophi-
eus, qui etiamnum hodie alicubi nondum e x o le u it]Thus, for Voetius, Aristotelian
philosophy is one o f the necessary factors in theological studies.
Following his treatment o f the origins o f corrupt theology, Voetius explains
the custom o f scholastic theology ( usus Theologiae Scholasticae). H e adm onishes
theological students accordingly: (1) acuteness in logic, physics, metaphysics,
ethics, and politics, and in addition, acuteness in theological m ethod, which is
well dem onstrated by Thom as Aquinas; (2) learning o f term inologies and dis-
tinctions; (3) skill in controversy, grammar, oratory, and poetics; (4) pleasurable

62 Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 33. Even though Goudriaan rightly points out
that Voetius’s concern was both theological and philosophical, he fails to demonstrate that the
main concern was theological.
63 Voetius, SDTh l:ch. 3. On Voetius’s definition o f theology, see Gisbertus Voetius, Diatribae, de
theologia, philologia, historia etphilosophia, sacra (Utrecht: S. de Vries, 1668), 2-9.
64 Voetius, SDTh 1:25-26.
65 Beck argues that for Voetius, theology is a practical science. H e writes, “Die Theologie ist für
Voetius in ihrer Eigenart praktische Wissenschaft (scientia practica)” (Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius,
428). Thus, for Beck, Voetius sides with Duns Scotus rather than with Thomas Aquinas, who sees
theology as “a m ixed discipline of theoretical and practical science [eine Mischdisziplin aus theo-
retischer und praktischer Wissenschaft] ” (429).
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 57

phraseology and style; and (5) logic in analysis o f texts and subtle judgm ent in
the use o f Scripture.66 Here again, Voetius maintains that philosophy is necessary
in scholastic theology, and that m ost philosophical problem s are still unsolved.
Solid theology offers sound answers about the mystery o f theological issues
against corrupt views. Philosophy is useful for this purpose. Voetius is convinced
that solid scholastic theology is philosophical and academic as well as biblical
and pious.
In sum, for Voetius, Scripture is the only and infallible principle, and hum an
reason is a secondary principle subordinate to Scripture. T he supernatural
truths o f faith transcend hum an reason but do not conflict with hum an reason
per se. Christian faith and theology can be called com pletely rational. The
ability o f reason in an unregenerate person in relation to divine knowledge is
definitely limited because an innate darkness always clings to it. Nevertheless,
Voetius does n ot n eglect the usefulness o f reason in the study o f theology.
Theologians derive many Christian doctrines from its principles through the
discursive reasoning o f an argumentative m ethod. H um an reason is required
m ore in elenctic theology. The tradition o f the orthodox church used both
scriptural truth and hum an reason to refute heresies. A ccording to Voetius’s
doctrine o f the unity o f truth, revelation has authority over philosophy, and the
truth o f revealed religion and that o f natural knowledge should concur.67 There
is n o tension between biblical truth and philosophical truth, Voetius maintains,
inasmuch as the conclusion o f philosophy should follow the truth o f Scripture.
Solid scholastic theology begins with Scripture and develops with philosophy.

IV. Descartes’s Understanding of Faith and Reason

in His Epistola ad Voetium

1. Requestfor a Reasonable Critique

Descartes wrote a long open letter to Voetius, which was published by Elzevirs
o f Am sterdam in May o f 1643. T he original Latin text was en titled Epístola
RenatiDescartes ad Celeberrimum Virum D. Gisbertium Voetium (“Letter from R ené
Descartes to that distinguished gentlem an M. Gisbertus Voetius”).68 The letter
was intended as a reply to two works in which Voetius had attacked Descartes:
the Confratemitas M ariana (1642) and the Admiranda Methodus (1643).69

66 Voetius, SDTh 1:26.

67 Voetius argues that “the light o f nature does not fight with the light o f grace, nor philosophy
with theology [Lumen Natura cum luminegratia, Philosophia cum Theologia rumpugnat] ” (ibid., 3:750).
For the Latin edition and a French translation, see René Descartes, Œuvres de Descartes (ed.
Charles Adam and Paul Tannery; 11 vols.; Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1957), 8b:1-198
(hereafter AT); also Descartes and Schoock, La Querelk d'Utrecht, 321-99.
69 See René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff,
D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny; 3 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3:220 n. 3
(hereafter CSMK).
58 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

In the argum ent o f his letter to Voetius, Descartes expresses discontent that
som e people fought against him not by reasoning but only through disparage-
m ent, and that Voetius attacked him not by reasoning but by authority alone.70
Descartes claims that his opponents depended on a higher power to attack him,
but that it was not allowed for him to use reason in the debate.71 For Descartes,
Voetius charged him not because he, Descartes, had a bad cause, but because
h e abandoned the teaching to which all the church holds.72 Descartes maintains
that his adversary forsook rational truth for faith. Thus, Descartes asks readers
n ot to believe what his enem ies say, but to believe those words that they can
confirm eith er by testim ony or by reason.73 For him , hum an reason is the
criterion by which one can ju d ge the truth o f an assertion. Even the authority
o f the church, without reasoning, cannot be the principle from which one can
make a sound argument.

2. The Use of Reason in Education

Descartes argues that he cannot find any reasoning in all the works o f Voetius
that he has read.74 H e asserts that they may be useful in “learning,” but not in
“education.” H e distinguishes between the learned (doctus) and the educated
(eruditus). Learning, to Descartes, m eans the reception o f traditional knowl-
edge; so he calls Voetius “the m ost learned m an” {doctissimum). By “educated”
Descartes m eans those “who have polished their intelligence and character by
study and cultivation” { qui studio & cultura ingenium moresque suos perpolivit).75
H e is convinced that such education is to be acquired “not by the indiscriminate
reading o f any book whatever, but by a frequent and repeated reading o f only
the best, by discussion with those who are already educated, when presented
with the opportunity, and, finally, by continually contem plating the virtues and
pursuing the truth.”76 Simple m em orization helps very little in the educational
pursuit o f wisdom. Descartes holds:

Those who seek learning from standard texts and indexes and concordances can
pack their memories with many things in a short time, but they do not emerge as
wiser or better people as a result. On the contrary, there is no chain of reasoning in

70 Descartes, AT 8 b :4 : . . . hi non rationibus, sed solis obtrectationibus me impugnant. . . [Voetius] quia

me non rationibus, sed solâ authoritate aggrediebatwr. All English translations o f Descartes s Latin and
French works are mine except where noted otherwise.
71 Ibid.: Quamvis enirn ab iis qui supremâ utunturpotestate, rationemjudicatipetere non liceat.
72 Ibid., 8 b :8 : Additque rationem, non quod causam malam judicet, vel defenfionem non aequam à?
bonam, sed quod ista quaestio generaliter ad omnes Ecclesias pertineat.
73 Ibid., 8 b : 15: ac mihi non esse amicum, à? ideo nullamfidem iis quae de me dixeris esse adhibendam,
nisi ea certis testimoniis aut rationibus confirmes.
74 Ibid., 8 b :42 : multa legi ex scriptis tuis, atqui nullam unquam in iis reperi ratiocinationem.
75 Ibid. The previous three quotations in the text are also from this page.
76 Ibid. For an English translation of this passage, see CSMK 3 :221 -22 . The translators offer only
a five-page excerpt o f Descartes's letter to Voetius.
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 59

such books, but everything is decided either by appeal to authority or by short

summary syllogisms, and those who seek learning from these sources become
accustomed to placing equal trust in the authority of any writer . . . , so little by
little they lose the use of their natural reason and put in its place an artificial and
sophistical reason.77

For Descartes, the traditional way o f education leads the student to lose and
distort their power o f reasoning. T he true use o f reason is the basis o f all
education, all intelligence, and all hum an wisdom.78 “The true use o f reason,”
m aintains Descartes, “does not consist in isolated syllogisms, but only in the
scrupulous and careful inclusion o f everything required for the knowledge o f
the truths we are seeking.”79 Thus, for Descartes, a traditional education makes
the student grow careless and lose the use o f reason. The Voetian way o f learn-
ing only forms an artificial and sophistical reason in the m ind o f the student.
Descartes asserts that the in d ep en d en t use o f reason is the m ost im portant
factor in education. Teachers should develop the power o f reasoning in the
student. Moreover, Descartes argues that on e should “accept as true only what
is so clear that it leaves no room for doubt.”80 Faith cannot be the presupposi-
tion in education. Everything should be doubted before it becom es clear and
distinct knowledge. This is why he is accused o f being a skeptic or an atheist.81

3. The Autonomy and Priority of Reason

Descartes intends to restore the im portance o f the use o f reason and the
autonom y o f reason.82 In order to confirm the supremacy o f reason over faith,
he gives primacy to the intellect and its power to independendy achieve truth.83
The subordination o f reason to faith means that, in the event o f a clash between

77 Descartes, AT 8 b :43 ; CSMK 3:222.

78 Descartes, AT 8 b :43 ; CSMK 3:222.
7®Descartes, AT 8 b :43 ; CSMK 3 :222 . Neque enim, ut scias, verus ille usus rationis, in quo omnis era-
ditto, omnis bona mens, omnis humana sapientia continetur, in disjundis syllogifmis confifiit, sed tantum
in circumspecâ iff accuratâ complexione eorum omnium, quae ad quaesitarum veritatum cognitionem
requiruntur.
80 Descartes, AT 8b :169- 70 ; CSMK3:223. Et nova ista criteria non alia assertis, quàm qudd ea tantùm
ut vera velim amplecti, quoe tam clara sunt, ut nulkim dubitandi relinquant occasionem.
81 Descartes, AT 8 b :170 , 175 ; CSMK 3:223. Descartes argues that Voetius compares him to the
atheist Cesare Vanini, who was condem ned for atheism and burned at Toulouse in 1619 .
82 For Descartes on reason, see Harry G. Frankfurt, “Descartes’ Validation o f Reason,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 149-56; Hiram Caton, “Will and Reason in Descartes’s Theory of
Error,” TheJournal of Philosophy^, no. 4 (1975): 87-104; Frederick R Van dePitte, “Descartes’ Role
in the Faith-Reason Controversy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research AO (1980): 344-53; Louis
E. Loeb, “The Priority o f Reason in Descartes,” The Philosophical Review 99 (1990): 3-43; John W.
Yolton, Philosophy, Religion, and Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Rochester, N.Y.:
University o f Rochester Press, 1990); Thomas M. Lennon, The Plain Truth: Descartes, Huet, and
Skepticism (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2008); Russell Shorto, Descartes’Bones: A Skeletal History of the Conflict
Between Faith and Reason (New York: Doubleday, 2008).
83 Caton, “Will and Reason,” 96; Van de Pitte, “Descartes’ Role,” 345.
60 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

them , faith is to take preced en ce as being m ore certain and authoritative.84

Descartes argues that “the ideas o f revealed religion are obscure because they
are against the formal reason which consists o f the natural light.”85 H e boldly
m aintains that an infidel w ho em braces Christian faith on the grounds o f
fallacious reasonings, and w ithout the light o f grace, would com m it a sin in
not using reason righdy.86
Descartes argues that Christians should have no difficulty in believing religious
mysteries because the im m ense power o f God can create many things beyond
hum an understanding. H e also explains how this contradiction is to be under-
stood. H e maintains that anyone who teaches that Scripture contradicts natural
reason does so only to “show indirectly that he has n o faith in Scripture. For as
we were born m en before we were m ade Christians, it is beyond b elief that any
man should seriously embrace opinions which he thinks contrary to right reason
that constitutes a man, in order that he may adhere to the faith by which he is
a Christian.”87 The theological im plication o f the Cartesian doubt renews the
old struggle between faith and reason. The theological argum ent o f Descartes’s
works and his request for reasoning in the letter to Voetius is intended to restore
the autonom y o f reason. His resolve to achieve clarity and to accept nothing
but clear ideas, as Hiram Canton rightly puts it, is already an im plicit rejection
o f faith and authority.88 By contrast, correcting the Cartesian trust o f hum an
reason, Voetius insists that the hum an m ind is op en to error; thus, hum an
reason cannot be the norm for the pursuit o f truth.

V. Descartes’s Understanding of the Relation of Theology and Philosophy

in His Epistola ad Voetium

1. Philosophy Against Orthodox Theology

The jud gm ent o f the Academy o f Utrecht ( Academia Ultrajectina) , o f which

rector Voetius was a part, condem ned the philosophy o f Descartes as “forging
various false and absurd opinions, and in so doing, fighting against orthodox
theology.”89 W hen Descartes asked at what point his philosophy becam e an

84 Caton, “Will and Reason,” 96.

85 Descartes, AT 7:148: propter quam rebusfidei assentimur, sit obscura; nam contrà haec ratioformalis
consistit in lumine [naturale],
86 Ibid.: Nec sane Turcae aliive infideles ex eopeccant, cùm non amplectuntur religionem Christianam,
quôd rébus obscuris, ut obscurae sunt, nolint assentiri, sed vel ex eo quôd divinae gratiae interms illos moventi
repugnen[, vel quàd, in aliis peccando, se gratiâ reddant indignos.
87 Ibid., 8b :353 -54 .
88 Caton, “Will and Reason,” 99.
89 Descartes, AT 8 b :4 : Cùmque, anno superiore, judicium quoddam nomine Academiae VUrajectinae,
cujus tunc Rector erat, edidisset, in quo meam Phüosophiam eo praetextu condemnabat, quàd fingeret varias,
faifas, & absurdas opiniones ex eâ consequi, pugnantes cum orthodoxâ Theologiâ (Descartes’s
emphasis). The judgm ent is from March 17, 1642 , and is reproduced in Descartes’s letter to P.
Dinet (see ibid., 7:590).
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 61

op pon en t o f orthodox theology, Voetius wrote the book Admiranda Methodus

in response. Descartes could n ot find any rational argum ent in the allegations
o f the book but only discovered what he determ ined to be m ore savage false
accusations added to the previous judgm ent.90
In his response to Voetius, Descartes argues that he always regarded com m on
theologians m ost virtuous and truly Christian.91 H e claims that n ot any word o f
his works damages the cause o f orthodox theology.92 H e is quite convinced that
his philosophy should not be regarded as heretical.93 H e argues that his faith
does n ot differ from that o f traditional religion,94 stating that this view is the
same as that o f H enricus Regius, w ho asserts that the New Philosophy does
n o t have anything against the teachings o f traditional philosophy, scholastic
theology, or other related science, including m edicine.95

2. Philosophy Independent of Theology

Descartes contends that without the cognition o f old theology, one can easily
understand philosophical truth.96For Descartes, Regius offers purely philosophi-
cal questions, which in fact have nothing to do with theology.97 Descartes tends
to avoid discussion o f theological issues and follows the orthodox position o f the
Roman Catholic Church. H e separates philosophy and theology. For him the
two are simply unconnected.98 Thus, Descartes denies that his philosophy and
the m ethod o f doubting could ever have any detrimental effects on theology.
Regarding his rejection o f various proofs for the existence o f God, he points out
that the famous Jesuit scholar Gregory o f Valentía (c. 1551-1603) also criticized
Thomas Aquinas’s proofs for the existence o f God and showed those proofs to
be invalid.99 Thus, Descartes argues that philosophy has its own independent
space for the study o f truth. H e adds that even his letter to Voetius does not
attempt any theological objection against him. He claims that he simply tried to
demonstrate that the judgm ent o f the Academy o f U trecht was unjust.100

90 Ibid., 8 b :5 .
91 Ibid., 8 b :14 : vulgare Theologis; quod ego virtutem maximam & veré Christianam semperputavi.
92 Ibid., 8 b : 17.
93 Ibid., 8 b : 17, 32.
94*Ibid., 8 b : 111. He also confirms that the most important virtue in Christianity is love ( chantas)
(112). He asks his opponents for love in dealing with this issue (115).
95 Ibid., 8 b :33 -34 .
96 Ibid., 8 b :93 .
97 Ibid., 8 b : 132.
98 Descartes’s axiom that “one truth can never be in conflict with another” (una ventas alten
adversary nunquampossit) should be interpreted from this perspective (ibid., 7:581). See also Theo
Verbeek, “Tradition and Novelty: Descartes and Some Cartesians,” in The Rise of Modem Philosophy:
The Tension Between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz (ed. Tom Sorell;
Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 170.
99 Descartes, AT 8 b : 176.
100 Ibid., 8 b : 180.
62 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

D escartes’s philosophical letters, however, show that his philosophy has a

com m on ground with theology. In his 1641 letter to Regius, Descartes criticizes
the view o f theologians on substance. According to Descartes, theologians ar-
gue that n o created substance is the im m ediate principle o f its operation. H e
understands that by this they m ean that n o creature can operate without the
concurrence o f God, and n ot that it needs som e created faculty, distinct from
itself, by which to operate. To Descartes, however, “it would be absurd to say
that such a created faculty could be the im m ediate principle o f an operation,
while the substance itself could not.”101 Thus, Descartes’s philosophy does have
a theological connotation, as his letter confirms.
Descartes maintains that his book Meditations is the primary cause for the
debate, but that the faculty o f U trecht University could not understand the
book. H e asserts that he did not present any atheistic argum ent in the book.102
Voetius, however, does not accept this view. He basically objects to Descartes
for disrupting the relation between faith and reason by means o f hyperbolical
doubt, which is the basic m ethod o f Meditations. For Voetius, Cartesian doubt
is in fact n othing other than skepticism. Voetius argues that skepticism occurs
if som eone “rejects, derides, or doubts all certainty o f knowledge.”103 To him,
skepticism is an act o f bad faith. T he fundam ental m otive b ehind V oetius’s
accusation o f Cartesian doubt is to com bat vain curiosity, which he asserts is a
seed o f unbelief.104
In sum, Descartes tried to restore the autonom y o f reason. He asserted that
his philosophy was not developed in opposition to orthodox theology, but in
fact h e confirm ed the suprem acy o f reason over faith. By contrast, Voetius
em phasized that there is n o on e w ho is free from errors, no m ore than one
w ho is free from misery or sin.105 For Voetius, any philosophy that is n ot based
o n Scripture and the illum ination o f the Holy Spirit is vain.

VI. Conclusion

In his long letter to Voetius, Descartes m entioned Aristotelianism only twice;106

by contrast, the topics o f theology, faith, and atheism were put on the table
hundreds o f times. Both Descartes and Voetius acknowledged that the issue
they treated was m ost o f all theological. Voetius pursued the faith-seeking-

101 Descartes, AT 3:372; CSMK 3:182. On Descartes’s notion o f substance, see R. S. Woolhouse,
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics (London: Rout-
ledge, 1993).
102 Descartes, AT 8 b:165, note a.
103 Voetius, SDTh 1:126:.. . omnern scientiae certitudinem explodit, ridet, in dubium trahit.. .
104 Cf. Verbeek, “From ‘Learned Ignorance’ to Scepticism,” 33-34,43.
105 Voetius, SDTh 3:701.
106 Descartes, AT 8 b :14,19. Descartes argues that the first seven pages ofVoetius’s book Philoso-
phia Cartesiana offer only com m on arguments against the innovators and a praise o f Aristotle (14),
and that his opponents allow only the reasoning that comes from Aristotelian principles (18-19).
 UNDERSTANDING VOETIUS AND DESCARTES 63

u nd erstan ding program w hereas D escartes repu d iated the faith-lacking-

understanding project. T he primary concern o f Voetius was n ot to preserve
Aristotelianism but to keep the biblical truth that, as he put it, was received
from orthodox tradition. Descartes insisted that the article o f faith did not fall
under the regime o f hum an reason because faith was som ething one could not
fully grasp with reason. H e argued that whoever em braced the articles o f faith
from incorrect reasoning would com m it a sin n o less grave than those w ho
rejected them . What Descartes desperately d efen d ed was the autonom y o f
hum an reason and its proper use. In his philosophical enterprise, faith seem ed
to hinder the autonom y and the use o f reason. H e believed that his m ethod o f
doubt would provide a firm road to perfect knowledge. Voetius, however, argued
that hum an reason was surrounded by error and sin, so that perfect knowledge
was impossible for humans. H e m aintained that hum an beings would be able
to learn the truth from divine revelation, which was the only principle in the
pursuit o f truth. Therefore, for Voetius, Cartesianism was primarily confronted
with scriptural truth, not with Aristotelianism.
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