RESEARCH PAPER

Indo-US Nuclear Deal and its implications for strategic stability in South Asia.

Submitted to : Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Submitted by : M. Ishtiaq

Department of International Relations

Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad

 CONTENTS

A. Introduction to Deal.
a. Overview of the deal.
b. Approval of deal.

B. Rationale behind deal

a. Strategic considerations
b. Economic considerations
c. Nuclear non proliferations
d Competitive consideration

C. Reactions over deal

a. Reactions at global level
b. Reactions at domestic level

D. Conclusion
 Bibliography.
Introduction to Deal

The indo- US civilian nuclear agreement the name commonly attributed to a bilateral agreement
of cooperation between US and the Republic of India. The framework of this agreement
statement by Indian Prime Minster Man Mohan Singh and US president George W.Bush,under
which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities place civil facilities under
international atomic energy agency(IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States
agreed to work towards full civil nuclear cooperation with India the statement also referred to
Indo-US strategic partnership initiative launched in 2004,which ,according to statement, “
provides the basis for expanding by bilateral activates and commerce in space ,civil nuclear
energy and duality use of technology”1

The Indo-US deal is one of the major steps taken by the United States to build strategic
partnership with a country like India, which has emerged in recent years a political power of the
region. It was due to this that US under sectary of state Nichols Burns, called it a unique
agreement with a unique country.2

The basis of Indo-US nuclear deal lies a Henry J.Hyde United states – India peaceful atomic
energy cooperation act of 2006 ,also known as the Hyde act ,which is us domestic law that
modifies the requirements of section 123 of the us atomic energy act to permit nuclear
cooperation with India in particular to negotiate a 123 agreement to operational zed the 2005
joint statement thus 123 agreement defines terms and conditions for a bilateral civilian nuclear
cooperation required separate approvals by the US. Congress and by Indian cabinet ministers.

On august 1, 2008 the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India, after which the
United States approached the nuclear suppliers group (NSG). To grant a waiver to India to
commence civilian nuclear trade, the 45, nations NSG. granted the wavier to India on
spetamber6,2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology fuel from other countries .it
1
“Indo-US Joint Statement, 18 July 2006”, the Hindu
http://www.hindu.com/theindu/nic/indousjoint.htm cited in IPRI Fact File, Islamabad Policy
Research Institute, Islamabad, April 2006, p.1
2
The Daily Dawn, 19 November 2006
may who ever be noted that the implementations of this behaviour makes the India the only
known country with nuclear weapons which not yet signed NPT. But is still allowed to cry out
nuclear comments with the rest of the world.

the us house of representative passed the bill on the 28 th of august 2008.on October 1,2008 the us
senate also approved the civilian nuclear agreement , allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and
technology from the united states .us president signed the legislation on the indo us nuclear
deal, approved by the us congress in to law now law the united state –India nuclear cooperation
approval and non proliferation enhancement act on October 8,2008.The agreement was finally
signed by Indian External Affairs Minister Purnab Mukherjee and his counterpart Secretary of
state Condoleezza Rice , on 10 October .

Having experienced the great set backs of criticism from different political circles, at domestic
level as well as global level, two countries finally made it reality, and fulfilled the commitment
that leaders of the both countries made in early march by proclaiming that the two countries
agreed to “bind them in strategic partnership and recognized that it is need of the hour to make
their relationship broad-based .3

Thus the gates of civilian nuclear energy were opened by the superpower of the world, which
highlights the significance of the India as a potential regional power that will help US to achieve
its desired objectives at the regional level.

A. Rationale behind the Deal.

3
Dr. Mavara Inayat, “US-Indo Partnership: Implications for Asia and Beyond”, Regional
Studies, Vol. XXIV, No.2, Spring 2006, p.2
 The Indo US civilian nuclear agreement has underlying implications which are considered to be
real rationale behind this agreement .The following are essentially the rationale behind the deal:

a) Strategic considerations.

b) Economic considerations

c) Nuclear Non Proliferation

d) Competitive Considerations

a Strategic Consideration

Since the end of the Cold War, The Pentagon, along with certain US ambassadors such as Robert
Black will, has requested increased strategic ties with India and a de-hyphenization of Pakistan
with India, i.e. having separate policies toward India and Pakistan rather than just an “India-
Pakistan Policy. The United States also sees India as a viable counter-weight to the growing
influence of China, and a potential client for which it must compete with Russia. Thus US want
not only to strengthen its relations with India but it also wants that, as a strategic partner, India
should keep an eye on US interests in the region.4

Moreover, it is commonly believed in United States that India is a rising power with great
intrinsic merits, including its attachment to democracy, and thus it is a natural partner with the

4
Aftab Ahmed Khan, “US-India Cooperation: Widening Influence in World Affairs”, Daily the
News, 7 February, 2007
United Stats in the global system. The United States therefore should cultivate a partnership with
India and enhance India’s international power. A more powerful and collegial India will balance
China’s power in Asia.5

b. Economic considerations

Financially, the US also expects that such a deal could spur India’s economic growth and bring
in $ 150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the US wants a share. The
huge emerging market in India can benefit the United States in a big way. But it will also be very
beneficial for the India as well. It is India’s stated objective to increase the profuction of nuclear
power generation. According to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, the agreement will help
India meet its goal of adding 25,000 MW of nuclear power capacity through imports of nuclear
reactors and fuel by 2020.

c. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognises India’s “de facto” status even
without signing the NPT. The Bush administration justifies a nuclear pact with India because it is
important in helping to advance the non-proliferation framework by formally recognising India’s
strong non-proliferation record even though it has not signed the NPT.

d. Competitive Considerations

5
George Perkovich, “Faulty Promises”, Carneegie Endowment for World Peace (September
2005) – Quoted in “Indio-US 123 Agreement: Impacts on Deterrence Stability in South Asia”,
by Dr. Nasrullah Mirza and M. Sadiq, SASSI Research Report 7 (January 2008)
The growing energy demands of the Indian and Chinese economies have raised questions on the
impact of global availability to conventional energy. The Bush Administration has concluded
that an Indian shift toward nuclear energy is in the best interest for America to secure its energy
needs of coal, crude oil, and natural gas. Keeping in view this fact, the availability of advanced
unclear technology from the US at reasonable cost would enable India to overcome its current
power shortage and accelerate its GDP growth and export further.6

B. Reactions over Deal

Since the announcement of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal it has created ripples in the circles of
world politics. This US act surprised the world because the deal undermines the provisions of
Nuclear Non Proliferation (NPT). Thus the deal generated a variety of reactions both within and
outside the two signatory countries. Different global and regional level powers view it in their
own light. So following is the brief description as to how the world looks this unique deal. This
can be understood by dividing this subject into to parts, i-e:

a. Reactions at the Global Level

b. Reactions at the Domestic Level

a. Reactions at the Global Level

6
Aftab Ahmed Khan, “US-India Cooperation: Widening Influence in World Affairs”, Daily the
News, 7 February, 2007
The deal had initial support from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Russia,
and Germany. After some initial opposition, there were reports of Australia, Switzerland, and
Canada expressing their support for the deal. For example, the Americans have termed it as the
symbolic centerpiece of a growing global partnership between two countries.7 One reason why
America sees it in that way can be understood by looking at it through the lenses of economy of
the US, i-e: the wants the improvement of its ailing trade/current account balances as a result of
import of uranium and other related items.8

Norway, Austria, Brazil, and Japan all warned that their support for India at the IAEA did not
mean that they would not express reservations at the NSG. For instance, China argued the
agreement constituted a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime.

b. Reactions at the Domestic Level

At domestic level, there are different views regarding the conclusion of this civilian nuclear del
between America and India. The agreement was met with stiff opposition by some political
parties and activists in India. Although many mainstream political parties including the Congress
supported the deal along with regional parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Rashtrya
Janata Dal. Also, in November 2007, former Indian Military chiefs, bureaucrats and scientists
drafted a letter to Members of Parliament expressing their support for the deal. Those who
support the present government see the deal as offering a way to sustain and expand the nuclear
energy program.9 those who are against this deal also argue different reasons for that matter. For
instance, one of the leading columnists of India considered it as a bar on the independent foreign
policy course of India. He said “my point of concern is that the deal has put a question mark
against our independent foreign policy.”10

7
Najmuddin A. Shaikh, “Implications of the N-Deal”, Dawn, 29 August, 2007
8
Aftab Ahmed Khan, “US-India Cooperation: Widening Influence in World Affairs”, Daily The
News, 7 February, 2007
9
Aftab Amed Kha, “US-India Cooperation: Widening Incluence in World Affairs”, Daily the
News, 7 February, 2007
10
Kuldip Nayar, “N-Deal to Exact a Heavy Price”, Daily Dawn, 21 September, 2007
The Indo-US Nuclear Deal thus created a huge controversy among the Indians of all shades.
Some argued in its favour while others rejected it out rightly. It was but natural to expect that the
deal of such a nature will generate domestic reactions because eve since its independence India
has remained as non-aligned nation, i-e: during the Cold War days the India remained neutral
and followed independent course of action in its foreign policy. But this would not be the case
once India becomes the strategic partner of the United States. Then it would have to tow the line
of action dictated by the United States in its foreign policy behaviour.

Thus it is considered to be a great blow for the country like India, and will surely have serious
repercussions for India and future.

One of the prominent Pakistani scholars, Pervez Iqbal Cheema, has analysed the domestic
reaction over Indo-US nuclear deal in a very detailed manner. According to him the following
are the major arguments put forwarded by the critics and those who favour this deal.11

The Critics of this deal argue that:

a) Its going to make India a heavily dependent country somewhat similar to what was
pursued on armaments;
b) India would be buying expensive reactors while it could early invest that amount to
commercially develop its own energy resources’;
c) The deal does not allow testing which implies that the nuclear program is effectively
constrained.

The promoters and advocates of this deal argue that:

Pervez Iqbal Cheema, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal & Debate in India”, Daily Pakistan, 11
11

September, 2007
 a) It allows India to become part of the U.S. led non-proliferation system; in other words,
India is being recognised by the Sole Superpower as one of the important actor of the
operative international system;
b) It allows India to secure much desired recognition of its status of a nuclear weapon state
though indirectly;
c) India would be unable to import nuclear reactors and fuel once the Americans being to
influence the members of NSG;
d) By developing strategic partnership with U.S; not only India strengthens its position at
the global level but it also gains access to latest nuclear technology;
e) If India needs to conduct a test; it will have to come out of its unilaterally imposed
moratorium.

Conclusion
In the light of foregoing discussion it may be concluded that the recently concluded Indo-US
Nuclear Deal carries in its bosom the far-reaching consequences, which seriously threaten the
peace and security of the region. The deal is likely to have far reaching and negative fall out. It
can trigger a new arms race in South Asia in which strategic stability between India and Pakistan
will challenged. Moreover, it can lead to a multiplier effect in non-nuclear weapon states for
more concessions, thereby further deteriorating and undermining the credibility, integrity and
universality of NPT.

Although Indo-US deal on civilian cooperation is a bilateral matter between the two countries, it
has serious global and regional implications, the deal poses a potential threat to international
non-proliferation regime. It ca trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, involving Pakistan, India
and China. It can adversely affect the movement of already slow peace process between Pakistan
and India. If the peace process is stalled it can have over spilling effect, affecting Pakistan’s
relations with Afghanistan.12

The strategic stability in South Asia is most likely to be disturbed as a result of Indo-US nuclear
deal because the deal would enable India to divert its indigenous uranium reserves to the
exclusive use for making more and improved nuclear weapons. Under the agreement, India has
consented to place 14 of its 22 nuclear facilities under IAEA monitoring, to ensure that nuclear
fuel in these reactors would not be used for production of weapons. But it has kept eight and an
unlimited number of future reactors outside international safeguards. These reactors would
12
Dr. Rashid Ahmed Khan, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for the Region”
continue to produce fissile material for producing nuclear weapons, free from any international
control.13

Since Pakistan has pleaded with China at the highest level not to let it down in the nuclear
balance with India, Beijing is apparently working out a nuclear deal with Islamabad, in case the
Indo-US nuclear agreement is okayed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the sources told
PTI here preferring anonymity. At the same time, China is making active preparations for a
counter-deal involving Pakistan, they said, while taking note of the recent spate of critical repots
on the Indo-US nuclear agreement in the official Chinese media.

To sum up, the American nuclear deal with India, has elements that lend themselves to both
status quo as well as revision in the world nuclear order, both designed to work in American
favor. Which of these paths lies ahead, depends on how the Chinese respond, and crucially for
them, only one of these paths might actually work out in the Chinese interests.25

13
 Bibliography

1. Adil “Sultan Mohammad, “Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement: Implications for South
Asian Security Environment”, the Henry L. Stimson Centre, July 2006.

2. Iqbal Pervez cheema, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal & Debate in India”, Dail Pkistan, 11
September 2007.

3. Inayat Mavara Dr., “US-India Partnership: Implications for Asia and Beyond”, Regional
Studies, Vol.XXIV, No.2, Spring 2006.

4. Jacob Jabin T., “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: The China Factor”, Institute of Peace and
Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, Special Report 14, March 2006.

5. Khan Aftab Ahmed, “US-India Cooperation: Widening Influence in World Affairs”,

Daily the News, 7 February 2007.

6. Khan Rashid Ahmed Dr., “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for the Region:, IPRI
Journal, Vol. VII, No. 1, Winter 2007, Policy Research Institute, Islamabad.

7. Nayar Kuldip, “N-Deal to Exact a Heavy Price”, Deail Dawn, Islamabad 21 September,
2007.

8. Perkovich George, “Faulty Promises”, Carneegie Endowment for World Peace

(September 2005) – quoted in “Indo-US 123 Agreement: Impacts on Deterrence Stability
in South Asia”, by Dr. Nasrullah Mirza and M. Sadiq, SASSI Research Report 7 (January
2008)

9. Shaikh Najmuddin A., “Implications of the N-Deal”, Daily Dawn, Islamabad, 29 August,
2007.

10. Tabassum Shahista Dr., “Implications of the Ind-US Nuclear Deal Discussed”, Daily
Dawn, Islamabad, 29 May, 2008.

11. Talbott Strobe, “Good Day for India, Bad for Non-Proliferation”, Daily Times (Lahore),
25 July, 2005.

12. The IPRI Fact File, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Islamabad, April 2006.