Franklin D.

Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan

Author(s): John McVickar Haight, Jr.
Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 203-226
Published by: University of California Press
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Franklin D. Roosevelt and a

Naval Quarantineof Japan

JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, JR.

The authoris professorof historyin LehighUniversity.

S OME THIRTY-FOUR YEARS AGO, on October 5,

1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed at Chicago that "peace
loving" nations of the world quarantine "aggressors."During a press
conference the next day, newsmen attempted to determine what he
meant, but, aside from his remark, "It might be a strongerneutrality,"
they earned no additional insight.1 As the president provided little
furtherpublic indication of his personalthoughtsand plans forAmerican
foreign policy in that fall of 1937, most historians have agreed that
Roosevelt, without a specific plan for action, quickly dropped his vague
quarantine proposal when faced by a storm of isolationistprotest.2
Actually, President Roosevelt not only had a specific plan in mind,
but he pursued it further during the winter of 1937-1938. As Sumner
Welles disclosedin 1950, the president had developed in the summer of
1937 a plan for a long-range naval blockade of Japan.3 New evidence
reveals that shortly afterJapanese planes sank the U.S.S. Panayin the
Yangtze River on December 12, the president proposed this "naval
quarantine" to Britain and that he also sent to London a highly placed

The preparation of this article has been furthered by the generosity of the Penrose Fund of the
American Philosophical Society and Lehigh University's Institute of Research.
1 PressConferencesofFranklinD. Roosevelt,1937 (Hyde Park, 1956), microfilm, vol. 10, Roll 5,
no. 400.
2 For the view that Roosevelt did not seek to
implement a vigorous policy in the fall of 1937,
see Francis L. Loewenheim, "An Illusion that Shaped History: New Light on the History and
Historiography of American Peace Efforts before Munich," SomePathwaysin Twentieth-Century
History: Essaysin HonorofReginaldCharlesMcGrane,ed. D. R. Beaver (Detroit, 1969), 177-220;
William E. Leuchtenburg, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, 'Quarantine' Address, 1937,' AnAmerican
Primer,ed. Daniel J. Boorstin (Chicago, 1966), 846-856, and FranklinD. Rooseveltand the New
Deal (New York, 1963), 226-230; Dorothy Borg, The UnitedStatesand theFar EasternCrisisof
1933-1938: From the ManchurianIncidentthroughthe Initial Stage of the UndeclaredSino-Japanese
War (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 385-386, 486-518; and Nicholas R. Clifford, Retreatfrom
China: British Policy in theFar East, 1937-1941 (Seattle, 1967), 29-55, 161-167.
3 Sumner Welles, SevenDecisionsthatShapedthe World
(New York, 1950), 71-75.

203
204 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

naval officer, Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, for discussions with the

Admiralty about joint action. It is now clear that Roosevelt did not back
down following his quarantine speech; rather, he sought to restrain not
only Japan, but also Germany and Italy from destroying the peace of
the world.
According to Sumner Welles, it was in mid-July 1937, shortly after
the Japanese launched their undeclared war against China, that
Roosevelt began to explore the possibility of a long-range naval blockade
ofJapan. Welles, who was then Under Secretary of State, recalled that
[Roosevelt] was talking with the Navy about drawing an actual line in the
Pacific to be maintained by the United States, if the British would agree to
cooperate, beyond which Japan would be told she would not be permitted
to trade or to expand in the event she persisted in the policy of military
conquest of China.
The president believed that "Japan's economy depended largely upon
the American and British markets. If these were denied to her, Japan
could not hope for long to continue her onward march." To Welles's
question about the danger of such a blockade resulting in war, Roosevelt
replied that
he did not think so. Japan was already so heavily committed to China that
her economy was stretched to the breaking point. If her trade were cut off she
would bog down long before she could get access to the oil and other raw
materials in Southeast Asia that she would need [so] . . . she would not dare
risk war at this juncture.4
Then the Under Secretary asked "what assurance he had[,] in view of
our past experience, that the British Government would be willing to
go along with so radical a policy." The president replied that he had
reason to hope that Neville Chamberlain's new cabinet, which had
come into office in the past May, "would not only have more 'guts' than
its predecessor, but that it might be able to see [that] the survival of the
British Commonwealth [was] at stake." Welles noted that "the President
used the word 'quarantine' in connection with that line," and he also
remarked that the chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D.
Leahy, favored it. Though Admiral Leahy's diary contains no specific
reference to a quarantine of Japan, it leaves no doubts that this officer
supported an Anglo-American naval demonstration in the Far East.5

4 Ibid.
5 Diary of William D. Leahy, Aug. 24, 28, 29, 30, and Sept. 1, 1937, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress.
 A Naval Quarantine
of Japan 205

By late September, Roosevelt had decided to postpone a blockade of

Japan until he had convinced Americans of the necessity for collective
action against aggressornations.6As a step in this direction he prepared
a major addresson foreign policy. On October 5 in Chicago he declared
in his "QuarantineSpeech," "There is a solidarityand inter-dependence
about the world . . . which makes it impossible for any nation com-
pletely to isolate itself." He warned of the spreading of an "epidemic of
lawlessness" and called for "peace-loving" nations to "make a con-
certed effort to uphold the laws and principles on which alone peace
can rest assured." Likening such action to a quarantine imposed by a
community to prevent the spread of a disease, he concluded that "war
is a contagion" and called for "positive endeavors to preserve the
peace."7
The president'squarantine proposalsdrew favorableheadlines across
the country,8 but raised immediate questions as to his exact meaning.
The press on the following day failed to smoke out the president who
believed public opinion was not ready for the "naval quarantine" of
Japan which he had explored during the past summer. When Britain's
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, queried whether the president fully
understood the implications of a quarantine, he learned to his dis-
satisfactionthat Roosevelt was not yet willing to amplify his plans.9
Though President Roosevelt spoke softly after his quarantine speech,
he privately welcomed two additional opportunities to educate the
public. One was Sumner Welles's plan for an international conference
and the other a meeting scheduled for Brusselsin early November of the
Nine Power Treaty powers, who, in 1922, had established the basis for
Far Eastern peace which Japan now challenged.
By late October Welles's conference plan ran into opposition from
Secretaryof State Cordell Hull, who argued that in the currentinterna-
tional situation such a project was "illogical and impossible." The
president agreed to shelve it, but he kept the plan at hand for a more
propitious occasion.10 In the meantime, the Nine Power conference,
6 SecretDiaries of HaroldL. Ickes (3 vols., New York, 1954), II, 211-213.
7 For text of the quarantine speech, see ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,Japan, 1931-1941
(2 vols., Washington, 1943), I, 379-383 (hereafter cited as F.R. Japan).
8 Travis B. Jacobs, "Roosevelt's 'Quarantine Speech,"' The Historian, XXIV (1962),
483-502.
9 ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates, 1937 (4 vols., Washington, 1954), III, 600-602 (here-
after cited as F.R., 1937). See also Clifford, RetreatfromChina,34-35.
10 Sumner Welles, Timefor Decision(New York, 1944), 13-24, 65-69. For Hull's
opposition,
see The Memoirsof CordellHull (2 vols., New York, 1948), I, 546-549. For the development of
this conference project, see Loewenheim, "An Illusion that Shaped History," 177-186.
206 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

scheduled to open on November 3 in Brussels,offered another oppor-

tunity not only to educate the American public but also to persuade
powers with Pacific interests to act collectively if Japan refused a
mediated peace. Roosevelt instructed the American delegate, Norman
Davis, to make the most of both opportunities.11The president also
discussedwith Davis his plans for a naval quarantine ofJapan.12
Two pieces of evidence reflect the president'scontinuing concern for
the Far East during November. The memorandum written by British
Foreign SecretaryAnthony Eden after his first talk on November 2 with
Norman Davis at Brusselsstated:
Mr. Davis made it plain that the Presidentis deeply concernedat [the]
world outlookand sincerelyanxiousto cooperatein an attemptto stop the
rot.... Mr. Davis alsointimatedthat the Presidentwas deeplyperturbedat
the prospectsin the Far East. He thoughtthat GreatBritainmight be com-
pelled to withdrawfrom her positionthere and that as a consequencethe
United States might somedayhave to deal, maybe alone, with a greatly
strengthened Japanesepoweracrossthe PacificOcean.It wasthisformidable
prospect that was makingthe Presidentwish, if he could,to do somethingto
checkthe tendencynow.13
Roosevelt's continued interest also appeared in a report written by
the French charge d'affaires in Washington, Jules Henry, after a con-
versation with the president on November 6. As France had no am-
bassadorto the United States at this time, Henry had gone to the White
House on routine business, and during the conversation the president
spoke of France's halting, at Japanese demand, the shipment of arms
through Indo-China to Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist forces. Roose-
velt labeled the French "scaredrabbits" for retreatingin Asia. He went
on to explain his reasonsfor using such a term:
Doesn'tone clearlysee in Francethat a Japaneseattackupon Hong Kong or
Indo-Chinaor the Dutch EastIndiesmeansan attackuponthe Philippines?
11 In my earlier article, "Roosevelt and the Aftermath of His Quarantine Speech," Review
of Politics, XXIV (1962), 233-239, I underscored the president's personal interest in a positive
foreign policy until the events of the Brussels conference brought a halt. Subsequent research
in France, England, and the U.S. uncovered the new evidence presented herewith.
12 A letter dated November 24,
1937, from Ambassador William C. Bullitt in Paris to
President Roosevelt, one of the Bullitt letters opened by the Roosevelt Library in the winter of
1970, contains the first evidence I have found that the president had spoken of his naval
quarantine to Davis before sending him off to Paris. Bullitt wrote: "Norman [Davis] has
assured me that just as soon as the Japanese refuse to join the conference at Brussels you would
launch a project for the effective quarantining ofJapan by use of our fleet in the Far East, and
even more violent measures" (Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary File, France, William
C. Bullitt, 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.).
13 Memoirsof AnthonyEden, Earl of Avon,Vol. I,
Facing theDictators(Boston, 1962), 609-610.
 A Naval Quarantine
of Japan 207
If this shouldhappen, our commoninterestswould be endangeredand we
wouldhave to protectthem.
From his remarksto Henry, it seemed that the president believed such
overt Japanese aggression against the territories of any one Western
power would lead all to mutual defensive action and, as a result,Japan
would never dare risk retaliation. Though Henry warned Paris that
"the majority of the country do not share his views on this policy," the
charge did note that Roosevelt "seems to be determined to build up, as
far as possible, a policy of international cooperation and to keep the
public alerted."14
The president's anxiety over the Far Eastern situation, reflected in
these two memoranda, was deepened by the announcement on
November 6 that Italy had finally joined Germany and Japan in their
Anti-Comintern Pact. Fearing the worst, Roosevelt believed that these
three powers had also signed a secret military and naval agreement
making a two-ocean war a serious threat for the first time. Recognizing
the increased danger for the United States and its one-ocean navy, the
presidentorderedthe Navy's War PlansDivision to considerthe problem.
By mid-November the division called for a large ship-building program
and staff conversationswith the BritishAdmiralty about cooperation in
the Pacific.15
The Navy's proposal for talks with London came just when Norman
Davis in Brussels urged collective action against Japan. However,
Roosevelt, believing the isolationists still had strong influence on
American public opinion, permitted Secretary Hull to veto Davis's call
for action as well as the Navy's proposal for staff talks in London.16
Apparently for the same reason, Roosevelt also allowed the State
Department to reject the suggestion of Britain's Foreign Secretary on
November 27 for "an overwhelming display of naval force with the
Royal Navy providing eight to nine battleships."17
14
Henry to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 7, 1937, in "Roosevelt's Kriegswille gegen
Japan, Enthullungen Aus den Akten des Quai d'Orsay," BerlinerMonatshefte,Feb. 1945,
pp. 56-58. For the background to the Roosevelt-Henry conversation, see my "France and the
Aftermath of Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," WorldPolitics, XIV (1962), 299-300.
15 Samuel E. Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston, 1948), 49; Louis
Morton, "War Plan Orange, Evolution of a Strategy," WorldPolitics, XI (1959), 245-250;
Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1940-45," Vol. I, Sec. I, Pt. D,
Ch. IV, pp. 48-50 (Naval History Division, Department of the Navy); and Mark S. Watson,
Chiefof Staff: Pre-WarPlans andPreparations(Washington, 1950), 92-93.
16 For an analysis of the negative impact upon the British of the U.S. backdown at Brussels,
see Clifford, RetreatfromChina,42-44.
17 Memo
by Welles of conversation with British Ambassador (Sir Ronald Lindsay), Nov. 27,
1937, F.R., 1937, III, 724-726. See also Eden, Facing the Dictators,613-617. For others in the
208 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

By late November 1937 Roosevelt apparently felt that his Quarantine

Speech had not sufficiently alerted American opinion. The president,
however, refused to surrender to the isolationists. As Jules Henry had
predicted, "A severe crisis, no doubt, will clarify how far Mr. Roosevelt
will go."18
On December 12 such a crisis arose.Japanese planes sank the U.S.S.
Panay.19Significantly, on the same day, the Japanese ran up their score
on the Yangtze River by also sinkingthreeAmerican tankersand shelling
a British gunboat, H.M.S. Ladybird,plus several British merchant
vessels. The prophecy of Norman Davis in late November now seemed
perilously close to the truth: "the powers must either fight to maintain
the position they have in China or prepare to give up their position
there."20 The State Department, to avoid deepening the crisis, urged
caution until it received full details of the sinking. In the meantime,
the presidentagreed to act independently of Britain and to cable directly
to Japan's Emperor demanding apology and full compensation.21
In contrast to State Department hesitancy, the chief of Naval Opera-
tions responded angrily. While some ranking admirals feared any rash
move,22Leahy, impatient for action, wrote in his diary on December 13,
"It is in my opinion time now to get the fleet ready for sea, to make an
agreement with the British Navy for joint action and to inform the
Japanese that we expect to protect our nationals." On the next day
Leahy went to the White House and proposed "sending ships of the
Fleet to Navy Yards without delay to obtain fuel, clean bottoms, and
take on sea stores preparatory to a cruise at sea." However, as the
admiral noted, "the President is not ready to take action at the present
time." On December 16 the admiral also ran into opposition when he

State Department besides Welles who were skeptical about British intentions, see The Moffat
Papers,Selectionsfrom the DiplomaticJournalsof Jay PierrepontMoffat, 1919-1943, ed. Nancy H.
Hooker (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 153, 154-155, 162, 182.
18
Henry to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 18, 1937, Berliner-Monatshefte, Feb. 1945, pp.
58-60.
19 See Manny T. Koginos, ThePanay Incident:Preludeto War
(Lafayette, Indiana, 1967) for
the most judicious account. For greater detail, see Hamilton D. Perry, The Panay Incident,
PreludetoPearlHarbor(New York, 1969). For a firsthandJapanese report, see Masatake Okumiya,
assisted by Roger Pineau, "How the Panay was Sunk," UnitedStatesNaval InstituteProceedings,
LXXIX, (June 1953), 587-596. See also Alvin D. Coox, "Year of the Tiger," Orient-West,
1964, pp. 83-88.
20 Memorandum by the Delegation of the United States to the Brussels Conference, Nov.
29,
1937, File Box 4, Conversations-Brussels Conference folder, Norman Davis Papers, Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress.
21 For the text of the
president's message to the Emperor, see F.R., Japan, I, 522-523.
22 See Welles, Seven
Decisions,72, and Donald F. Drummond, Passing of AmericanNeutrality
(Ann Arbor, 1955), 66.
 A Naval Quarantine
of Japan 209

conferredwith the State Department. There the majority,though recog-

nizing that "nothing useful can be accomplished by conversationswith
the Japanese," also felt strongly that "America is not yet ready to apply
pressure."However, another person at this conference, Norman Davis,
supported "a demonstration in force." He had just returned from
Brussels where, as Leahy noted, he "has been informed by British
Cabinet officersthat the Britishare preparedtojoin in such a demonstra-
tion with a naval force of as much as six battleshipsand the usual accom-
panying smallervessels."Though some other State Departmentmembers
feared lest the United States "become a junior partner to Great Britain
in policing the world," Davis favored cooperation with the British.23
Despite Roosevelt's apparent hesitancy on December 14 to ready the
Navy, he was already developing two other steps to bring direct pressure
upon Japan. On that same day, he approved the suggestion of the
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., that he explore
plans to freeze Japanese financial assets in the United States.24 On
December 14 the president also determined, with the approval of
Secretary of State Hull, to talk secretly with British Ambassador Sir
Ronald Lindsay and proposejoint naval action.25
Publication of Anthony Eden's first volume of memoirs in 1962
provided the first evidence that on December 16 President Roosevelt
did meet secretly with Ambassador Lindsay and Secretary Hull.26
However, Eden's memoirsdo not reportthe entire conversationbetween
the president and the British ambassador.Lindsay's full report has now
been released by the British Foreign Office, and it deserves detailed
consideration.27
After a diplomatic reception at the White House on December 16,
Roosevelt returned to the privacy of his study with AmbassadorLindsay
23
Leahy Diary, Dec. 13, 14, and 16, 1937. Jay Pierrepont Moffat, who in the fall of 1937
was chief of the State Department's European section, reported in his journal for December 14
and 15, 1937, Davis's actions and thoughts during his first visit to Washington after the Brussels
conference. The quotation about being a "junior partner" is Moffat's own reaction to Davis's
proposal to work with Britain. See "DiplomaticJournals ofJay Pierrepont Moffat," Houghton
Library, Harvard University.
24John M. Blum, From the MorgenthauDiaries, Vol. I, Yearsof Crisis, 1928-1933 (Boston,
1959), 486.
25 Eden, FacingtheDictators,617. On December 13, as soon as he learned of the attack on the
Ladybirdand the sinking of the Panay, Eden told Washington that "action should be taken
jointly." See ibid., 614-616, and F.R., 1937, III, 798.
26 Eden, Facing theDictators,618. Both Clifford, in RetreatfromChina(p. 49), and Loewenheim,
in "An Illusion that Shaped History" (p. 200), cite Eden's report on Lindsay's talk with Roose-
velt, but ignore the president's blockade proposal.
27 Sir Ronald Lindsay to Foreign Office, Dec. 17, 1937, Public Record Office, Reference
Number FO 371-Volume 20961-1937.
210 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

and the Secretaryof State. The president opened by calling for restora-
tion of the secretinformalAnglo-Americannaval stafftalksof 1915-1917.
Lindsay admitted he had never heard of those talks and Roosevelt
pointed out that neither the Foreign Office nor the State Department
had been aware of such liaison between the two navies.
Lindsay prefaced Roosevelt's "first object of Staff conversations"
with his own observation: "We then had a spell of the President in his
worst 'inspirational' mood and I admit that I can give no account of
what he said which is both consistent and sensible." What so upset the
ambassador was the president's proposal to arrange a blockade of
Japan forwhich "he used the word 'quarantine[,]' an echo of his Chicago
speech." Lindsay recalled that the President then said:

The line shouldrun fromAleutiaIsland,throughHawaii,mid-waybetween

the islandsto the northof the Philippinesto Hong Kong.Japanesemandated
islandswouldnot countandcouldbe starvedby militarymeasures.Americans
should look after everythingup to the Philippinesand Great Britainthe
westernsection.Battleshipsshouldnot interveneand shouldbe kept in the
rear and it shouldbe a cruiserblockade .... The purposeof the blockade
should be to cut Japan off from raw materials,and it might take eighteen
monthsto produceresults.It wouldbe necessaryto bringin at least French
and Dutch ... [and]therewouldhaveto be prohibitionof buyingfromand of
selling to Japan and he admittedthat this would necessitatelegislationby
manystates.... The occasionof the blockadewouldhaveto be the nextgrave
outrageby [the]Japanese.

Though the ambassadormight have felt upset, his account nevertheless

spelt out the very "naval quarantine" that Roosevelt had initially
developed with Sumner Welles during the previous summer.
The ambassadornoted that, in an effort to divert the president from
his blockade, "I said that the best way to prevent war without firing a
shot would be for the United States Government to make a demonstra-
tion showing clearly that they would not be indifferent to further dis-
regardof normal morality in international affairs.""To stop the rot and
give pause toJapanese aggression,"Lindsaypushedthe naval demonstra-
tion in the Pacific which Eden had recently proposed.Roosevelt rejected
this as inadvisable, since "it was more important that His Majesty's
government should keep their battleships to look after the situation in
Europe." As far as his naval quarantine was concerned, he noted that
"a reenforcementof cruisers, destroyersand long range submarines in
the Far East would be sufficient, though he also mentioned in passing
one or two battleships."
 A Naval Quarantine
of Japan 211

When Lindsay expressed his belief that American opinion would

not approve of a blockade, the president answered that he thought
public opinion was moving favorably since the Panay incident. He
claimed that 80 percent of the more than 100 letters he had received
that day supported "vigorous action," but he admitted that reports
"were still rather preliminary." Only then did Secretary of State Hull
enter the conversation.He admitted his own concern for adverse public
opinion and advised London against any public talk about "joint
action" with the United States. The president readily agreed.
Ambassador Lindsay's account offers incontestable evidence that by
December 16 President Roosevelt, with the full knowledge of Cordell
Hull, had revived his July plan for a long-range "naval quarantine" of
Japan, and had proposed that the Britishjoin this blockade if Japan
perpetrated another outrage. On the following day Lindsay talked
with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles about his conversation
with the president and reported that "it coincided well with his
[Welles's] understandingof what had passed."28
Indeed, Roosevelt was so excited about his plan for a quarantine that
on the followingday, December 17, he outlined it to his cabinet. Secretary
of the Navy Claude Swanson initiated the conversation by speaking
in favor of war, and, as Secretary Ickes noted in his diary, "At the very
least he wants to send our Navy from the Atlantic to Hawaiian waters."
The president replied that "he wanted the same result that Swanson
did, but didn't want to go to war to get it." Roosevelt then spelled out the
blockade plan he had proposed during the previous evening. Ickes's
recollection of it bears repetition:
The AmericannavycouldblockJapanfromthe AleutianIslandsto Hawaii,
to Wake,to Guam.GreatBritainwouldtakeoverfromourline to Singapore.
This wouldbe a comparativelysimpletaskwhichthe Navy couldtakecareof
withouthavingto send a great fleet. Blockedthus, the Presidentthinksthat
Japan couldbe broughtto her kneeswithina year.
Roosevelt went on to amplify his thoughts about engaging "in hostilities
without being at war." He had just uncovered forgotten powers which
Congresshad granted him in 1933 "to prevent war" and they included
such economic sanctionsas a blockadeofJapan or a freezeof that nation's
financial assetsin the United States.29Secretary of the Treasury Henry
28 Lindsay to Foreign Office, Dec. 18, 1937, ibid.
29 Ickes, Diaries, II, 274. In his "Year of the
Tiger," pp. 89-90, Alvin Coox cites Ickes's
notes on Roosevelt's comments on a blockade ofJapan during the cabinet meeting of December
17, but he adds no comment of his own.
212 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

Morgenthau recorded that the president also announced during this

cabinet meeting that "We want these powers to be used to prevent
war." The president then commented, "After all, if Italy and Japan
have evolved a technique of fighting without declaring war, why can't
we develop a similar one?" When Vice-PresidentJohn Nance Garner
expressed his opinion that only real force would have an effect on the
Japanese, the president replied that economic pressurecould be made
effective but, he added, "We don't call them economic sanctions; we
call them quarantines. We want to develop a technique which will not
lead to war. We want to be as smart asJapan and as Italy. We want to
do it in a modern way."30Significantly, Secretary Ickes added his own
conclusions: "the President is working on some plan looking toward
cooperation with the other democratic countries, particularly Great
Britain and France."31
Though there is no available recordof such conversationswith France,
there is proof that, while Roosevelt talked to the British about joint
naval action, he also gave the green light to Secretary Morgenthau to
initiate talks with London about freezing Japan's foreign assets. The
Secretary'sefforts,however, were quickly frustratedby SirJohn Simon,
Britain'sChancellor of the Exchequer.32
In contrast to Simon's negative reply to Morgenthau, the British
Foreign Secretarywired Lindsay after the December 16 meeting at the
White House that His Majesty'sgovernment would welcome an Ameri-
can naval officerfor staff talks,and hoped that one would be sent with the
least possible delay. Eden also stated that rather than delay Far Eastern
action until furtheroutragesby theJapanese, as Roosevelthad suggested,
both governments should take preparatory measures which might
restrainJapan from furtherbad deeds.33Indeed, the Foreign Secretary
consideredstaff talks with an American naval officerin London to be of
such import that he postponed his own holiday on the French Riviera
for a week, until Ingersoll's scheduled arrival on the last day of
1937.
Eden's acceptance of these staff talks apparently followed the line
laid down by the Britishcabinet. A follow-uppaper attached to Lindsay's
dispatch on his meeting of December 16 with President Roosevelt

30 Blum, MorgenthauDiaries, I, 489.

31 Ickes, Diaries, II, 275-276.
32 Blum, MorgenthauDiaries, I, 489-490.
33 Eden, Facing theDictators,619.
 A NavalQuarantine
ofJapan 213
indicated that Chamberlain'scabinet discussedthe dispatchand, though
not quite sure of Roosevelt's position, it agreed that "this is a useful line
to follow." The cabinet at this time also ordered the subcommittee of its
Imperial Defense Committee to shift its focus from economic pressure
on Germany to economic pressureupon Japan. While some membersof
the cabinet favored such direct action, Prime Minister Chamberlain
was less interested for, as he stated before Parliament on December 21,
he was not ready to become the "policeman of the world."34
In contrastto this Britishactivity, Roosevelt'sadministrationdid little
for the next several days. While Morgenthau suggestedin his diary that
Roosevelt had "cooled off a bit" after the cabinet meeting of December
17, Leahy explained that the president was merely awaiting full details
of the Panayattack from the navy's Court of Inquiry in Shanghai.35
Meanwhile, the navy furthered its plans to send a staff officer to
London and mapped out several points of discussionbesides a blockade
ofJapan. One related to the "Big Navy" program which called for two
or three additional battleships large enough to carry sixteen-inch guns
with adequate protection and range. Before these could be constructed,
the Admiralty must agree to waive the 35,000-ton limit set by the
London Naval Treaty of 1936. Another point related to Americanvessels
joining in the Britishinauguration of Singapore'snew defenses.36
On December 22 the Navy's radio carried the court of inquiry's
report from Shanghai on the sinking of the Panay.For the first time the
wantonness of the Japanese attack and the ruthlessness with which
American survivorswere hunted became fully evident.37
The president'sreaction can be gauged by his meeting early the next
afternoon with SecretariesHull and Morgenthau, Admiral Leahy, and
Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, the Navy's chief of War Plans. Roosevelt
ordered Ingersoll to proceed as soon as possible to London for secret
staff talks. In addition to the problem of capital ships with sixteen-inch
guns, the dispatch of ships to Singapore, and general strategic problems,

34 For the activities of the committee on economic pressure on Germany, see V. N. Medli-
cott, The EconomicBlockade: The History of the SecondWorld War, United KingdomCivil Series
(2 vols., London, 1952), I, 14. For Chamberlain's remark, see Surveyof International Affairs,1937,
ed. ArnoldJ. Toynbee (London, 1938), 35.
35 Leahy Diary, Dec. 19, 1937.
36 See Kittredge, "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1940-45," Vol. I, Sec. I, Pt. D, Ch.
IV, pp. 48-50; and Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans, 92-93. See also Leahy's Diary,
Dec. 14, 17, 19, 22, 1937. None of these sources refers to plans for a naval quarantine ofJapan.
37 The court of
inquiry's report is printed in F.R., Japan, I, 532-541. The State Department's
copy was not received in Washington untilJanuary 5. However, it is likely that the report was
originally sent via navy radio, for Leahy noted its receipt in his diary on December 22.
214 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

the president specifically instructed Ingersoll to discuss a long-range

naval blockade ofJapan.38
Roosevelt, together with Hull and Morgenthau, went directly from
the White House conference with Leahy and Ingersoll to the regular
weekly cabinet meeting. Ickes' diary notes that Roosevelt saw in the
Panay incident "an opportunity for the democratic governments to
reassertthemselvesin world affairs.... The Presidentalso thinks that[,]
if the civil population ofJapan should learn of such a move on the part
of America, there might be a revolution in Japan." In concluding this
entry in his diary, Ickes noted that Roosevelt and Hull believed that
"there is a secret and offensive alliance between Japan, Germany and
Italy"; nevertheless, the president estimated that, if the United States
should take action against Japan, it was probable that "Italy and
Germany would find some way of squirmingout of this agreement.....
They are not preparedforwar." Even so, Germanymight take advantage
of this situation and grab Austria and Czechoslovakia,but such a move,
in the estimation of Roosevelt, would not lead to European war, for
"France probably would not go to war to defend Austria and, in spite
of her treaty, would not send a soldier across the border to protect
Czechoslovakia."39
The afternoon of December 24 brought a new development.Japan's
Emperor answered the president'searlier appeal by apologizing for the
sinking of the Panayand offering to meet all American demands. On
Christmas Day the United States accepted the Japanese note and
officially closed the incident.40
Most historians of American foreign policy have also closed their
studies of the Panayincident with this note. Roosevelt, however, did not.
He determined to prepare for future outrages. According to Ickes, the
president noted in the cabinet meeting of December 31 that "we didn't
get the satisfactoryapology fromJapan that we askedfor." "It may be,"
Ickes wrote, "that the Presidentthinkspublic opinion would not support

38This meetingof December23 in the WhiteHousehas been reconstructedfromAdmiral

Ingersoll'sremarksto the author during an interviewon March 26, 1962. Leahy'sDiary,
December23, recordsthat Ingersollwould discussonly the LondonNaval Treaty. For these
meetings,see also Blum,Morgenthau Diaries,I, 491.
39Ickes, Diaries,II, 276-279. AmbassadorBullitt made a similar estimate of France's
reactionto GermanmovesagainstAustriaand Czechoslovakiain a cable to Washingtonon
December23 (StateDepartmentPapers,File740.00/251,RecordGroup19,NationalArchives).
This sectionof Bullitt'sreportdoes not appearamongthe excerptsreproducedin F.R., 1937,
I, 206-207.
40See, F.R., Japan,I, 549-552.
 A Naval Quarantine
of Japan 215

him if he should go any furtherjust now, but he proposesto be ready if

another incident occurs."41
Indicative of his mood, Roosevelt permitted Ingersoll to sail for
Britain on December 26 without any revision of his orders. If necessary
the Navy was to explain publicly that the chief of its War Plans Division
had gone to London to seek British approval for larger battleships than
those permitted under the Naval treaty of 1936. However, Ingersoll
informed American embassyofficialswho met him in Southampton that
his prime purpose remained "to obtain information on which to plan
and base decisions, if necessary,for future action."42
The president's thinking is also indicated by additional notes Ickes
made on the cabinet session of December 31. When Vice-President
Garner returned to the Far Eastern situation and again, as he had on
December 17, pointedly asked how the president planned to take a
stand, Roosevelt replied:
Severallittle things.Insteadof sendingtwo shipsto Australia,we shallsend
four,and thesefourwill then be sentto Singapore.The Singaporedestination
will not be announceduntilthe shipsreachAustralia.Meanwhile,the restof
the Navy will go to Hawaii. Also, we are having conversationswith Great
Britain.43
On the day of this cabinet meeting, Captain Ingersoll arrived at
Whitehall where he was received by the Foreign Secretary who had
delayed his holiday in order to greet the American emissary. In the
presence of the Foreign Office's new Permanent Under Secretary,
Alexander Cadogan, and the American charge, Herschel Johnson,
Eden assured the American naval officer "that he could count on our
full cooperation." Eden then asked whether "his Government con-
sidered that some joint action should be taken now, or whether the
discussionswhich were to be held between himself and the Admiralty
would be limited to future incidents against which joint action might
later be taken."44The Foreign Secretaryalso asked for furtherinforma-
tion about the White House talk on December 16. "I told him,"
Ingersoll later reported, "that ... the President had directed Admiral
Leahy to send me to London to obtain naval information on which to
41 Ickes, Diaries, I, 279.
42 Captain E.
Royal Ingersoll, "Notes on Arrival in Britain, Dec. 31, 1937," Records of the
War Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Correspondence Re: British-
U.S. Conversations in London, 1938-1939," Classified Archives, Naval History Division,
Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Records of Naval War Plans Division).
43 Ickes, Diaries, I, 279.
44 Eden, Facing theDictators,619-620.
216 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

plan and base decisions, if necessary,as to future action." Ingersoll then

concluded, "I got the impression that Mr. Eden was more interested
right now in immediate gesturesto impressthe Japanese than he was in
long-range future planning."45 According to Eden's memoirs, the
captain's impressionswere correct. The Foreign Secretary left for the
Mediterranean sun, believing no decisions would be required for some
ten days while Anglo-Americannaval discussionswere carried on at the
Admiralty.
The notes of Captain Ingersoll's conversations with the British
Admiralty illustrate the extent of United States Navy thought about
concentrating forces in the Pacific for a long-range naval quarantine of
Japan. The conversationsalsorevealthat the BritishAdmiraltydeveloped
plans to join such a blockade. On Monday, January 3, 1938, Ingersoll
together with the American naval attache in London, Captain Russell
Willson, met the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ernee Chatfield. The
admiral stated that he had opposed sending British reinforcementsto
the Far East in driblets and had refused to dispatch any force "unlessit
can cope with the Japanese fleet." The Admiralty was preparing such
a forcewhich would be ready aboutJanuary 15 "if requiredand ordered
by the Government." Later that afternoon of January 3, Captain
Ingersoll learned the details of British naval preparationsfrom Captain
T. S. V. Phillips, chief of the Admiralty's War Plans Division: "The
British are getting ready to send to the Far East" a force of eight battle-
ships and one battle cruiser.These were to be accompanied by 3 aircraft
carriers, 8 eight-inch gun cruisers and 11 six-inch gun cruisers, 54
destroyers,and 25 submarines. Captain Phillips believed that with the
French covering the western Mediterranean this formidable force
could be taken from the Home and Mediterranean fleets and would
be ready to sail on ten to fourteen days' notice. The Admiralty was fully
aware that this fleet would have to be reduced considerablyif a general
European war broke out. Captain Ingersoll then described such pro-
jected American actionsas "dockingand filling up crewsof certainunits"
which would ready the United States fleet "without causing concern."
He also pointed out that, "until the fleet was prepared to move on and
not return," its first step would be to "take a position of readiness
covering our West Coast and the Hawaiian Islands."46

45 Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, "Note on Conversation with Foreign Secretary, Jan. 1,

1938," Records of Naval War Plans Division.
46 "Notes on Conversations with
Admiralty, January 3, 1938," ibid. The notes for January
3-14 were apparently written by Captain Russell Willson, naval attache, London embassy.
 A Naval Quarantine
of Japan 217

The final "Record of Conversations" which Ingersoll signed on

January 13 provides additional information about how far the United
States Navy was prepared to go in the Pacific. While Ingersoll had
warned Foreign Secretary Eden that the American navy believed "no
gesture should be made unless the Fleet now in commissionis brought
up to 100 percent full complement and preparedin all respectsof war,"
the "Record of Conversation"revealsthat Americansubmarinesand air-
craft on the Pacific coast were already up to 100 percent, that the
advanced force "is now being completed, as far as practicable, to full
complement," and that the capital ships, cruisers,destroyers,and auxili-
aries on the Pacific Coast were at 85 percent of strength. In contrast,
ships on the Atlantic Coast had only a 50 percent complement. All this
meant that "9 or 10 capital ships could be ready to sail 10 to 15 days
after the Declaration of National Emergency."47
During their initial talk on January 3 Captains Ingersoll and Phillips
discussed Roosevelt's plan for a long-range "naval quarantine" of
Japan, and the notes made by the American attache who was with them
bear full quotation because they show a revision of the President's
original plan:
Discussionwas held on the subjectof a distantblockadeor quarantine.No
definiteunderstandingwas reachedbut fromthe discussionit is believedthat
the British are preparedto cover the line from Singaporevia Southern
Philippinesat leastas far eastwardas the New Hebridesand that the United
Statescould cover to the eastwardvia Fiji, Samoa,Hawaii and the United
States.They assumedwe would closethe PanamaCanaland coverthe west
coastof SouthAmericato anyJapanesevesselsthatmightslipbythelong lines
in the easternPacific.We will get moredefiniteinformationon January5.48

When the chiefs of the two war plans divisions met on January 5 for
the second time, they again focusedon the quarantine. The new blockade
line proposed by Captain Phillips reveals that during the two-day

47 "Record of Conversations," signed by Captain Ingersoll and Phillips, Jan. 13, 1938.
This "Record" was initially uncovered for me by Commander P. K. Kemp, Librarian, Naval
Historical Branch, Ministry of Defense, London. Through the assistance of the British Foreign
Office Library, a copy of the "Record" was forwarded by diplomatic pouch to Washington
and there released to me by the U.S. Naval History Division. That Division subsequently
discovered Captain Ingersoll's own copy of the "Record" as well as the "Notes of Conversa-
tions in London, Dec. 31, 1937-Jan. 14, 1938" in Records of the War Plans Division, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, Folder "Correspondence Re: British-U.S. Conversations
in London, 1938-1939," Classified Archives, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.
48 Captain Russell Willson, "Notes on Conversations with
Admiralty, Jan. 3, 1938,"
Records of Naval War Plans Division.
218 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

interval Roosevelt's plan had received serious consideration by the

Admiralty:
The Britishstatedthat they werepreparedto stopallJapanesetrafficcrossing
a line roughlyfromSingaporethroughthe Dutch East Indies,New Guinea,
New Hebridesand aroundto the east of Australiaand New Zealand.This
they feel they can do becausethe greaterpart of this line is a land barrier
with comparativelyfew narrowpassagesthroughit.
The Admiralty suggested another significantchange:
the problemwouldbe verymuchsimplerif the Presidentcouldinfluencethe
SouthAmericanRepublicsto cooperatein the quarantineby non-intercourse,
embargoes,boycottsor similarmeasures.49
The final and official "Record of Conversations"amplifies this revision
further:
The U.S. Navy will be responsiblefor operationsagainstJapanesetrade
throughoutthe West Coast of North and South America, including the
PanamaCanaland the passagearoundCapeHorn.
The United States Navy will also assumeresponsibilityfor the general
Naval defenseof the West Coastof Canada.50

By January 5 the major British and American positions had been

finalized. The officershad agreed on a system of communications and
codes which the fleets could use if called into joint action. They also laid
plans for the dispatch of American cruisersfor the celebrationsopening
the new Britishdefensesof Singapore.During the next week the "Record
of Conversations"was completed, and after approval by the First Sea
Lord the final draft was ready for initialing on January 13 when the
Admiralty held a farewell luncheon for Captain Ingersoll.
Conversationat that affair was, as the American naval attache noted,
"entirely social and had no bearing on the official purpose of Captain
Ingersoll's trip." "However," the attache added, "the fact that the
luncheon was given and the makeup of the membersof the Britishparty
may be an indication of the importance which the British attach to the
'conversations.'"51 The British party was indeed impressive. The First
Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper, acted as official host and was
backed by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Alfred E. M. Chatfield, and the
officers directly involved in the conversations.In the absence of Eden,

49 Ibid.,Jan. 5, 1938.
50 Royal Ingersoll and Russell Willson, "Record of
Conversations," Jan. 13, 1938, ibid.
51 "Note on Conversations with
Admiralty, Jan. 13, 1938."
 A Naval Quarantine
ofJapan 219
the Foreign Office was represented by Permanent Under Secretary
Alexander Cadogan. The party also included a cabinet officer and
close associate of Prime Minister Chamberlain, Sir Thomas Inskip,
Minister for Coordinationof Defense.
After lunch Admiral Chatfield drew the American officersaside and
asked Captain Ingersoll"to convey to Leahy his appreciationfor sending
an officerfrom his office to consider the ways and means of cooperation
between the two navies, should it ever become necessary." Only then
did the admiral discussthe London Naval Treaty, the public reason for
Ingersoll's mission to London. Chatfield readily agreed that tonnage
limitations should be abrogated.52
As the Anglo-American naval talks were being completed at the
Admiralty, President Roosevelt approved steps preparing the United
States Navy for activities in the Pacific. Roosevelt had delayed such
approval until January 10 when the House of Representativesfinally
defeated Louis Ludlow's resolution, which called for a national referen-
dum before the United States took any military action except defense.53
With this isolationistthreat bypassed,the presidentimmediately ordered
three of the steps which he had discussedwith AmbassadorLindsay on
December 16 and with his cabinet on December 31: dispatch of three
cruisersto Singapore, the advance of naval maneuvers by three weeks
to the middle of February, and, finally, transfer of the fleet from the
Atlantic to the Pacific. The president then informed London of his
actions.54
The next day President Roosevelt took another step which he to-
gether with Welles, Davis, and Hull had designed to persuade the
American public to oppose aggressionin the Pacific as well as in Europe.
He revived Sumner Welles's conference plan of the past fall to discuss
essential principles which should be observed in relations among all
nations. This time SecretaryHull agreed, but on condition that approval
of Britain's Prime Minister be obtained.55 Despite the failure of the
Brussels meeting, this approval seemed likely because the idea of an
international conference had been explored often between Washington
and London during the past year. Ever since November 1936, when
52 Ibid.
53 The strength of isolationist support for the Ludlow resolution has been
regarded almost
unanimously by subsequent authorities as final evidence that Roosevelt faced too powerful an
opposition to attempt any interventionist policy. See, e.g. Robert A. Divine The Illusion of
Neutrality(Chicago, 1962), 219-221. See also Hull, Memoirs,I, 563-565.
54 See Leahy Diary, Jan. 10, 1938, and Eden,
Facing theDictators,620.
55 Welles gives due credit to Davis for winning Hull's
support. SevenDecisions,25.
220 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

Eden first heard of Roosevelt's conference plan, the Foreign Secretary

had approved.56
On January 11, 1938, President Roosevelt forwarded to Prime
Minister Chamberlain a letter marked "very secret and immediate."
It spelled out the three goals of the conference which Welles had
originally suggested during the fall: agreement on international law,
reduction of armaments,and equal access to raw materials.Recognizing
that universal acceptance of these principlesmight not secure the peace,
the president added that some inequities of the postwar settlements
might have to be removed, but he went on to remind the British that
by tradition the United States would remain free from political involve-
ment and thus could play no part in determining political frontiers.In
closing, Roosevelt requested a reply by January 17 in order to enable
him to announce the conferencefive days later.57
AmbassadorLindsay,in forwardingthe President'srequestto London,
sent two cables emphasizing that a major purpose of the conference
was to align American opinion behind Roosevelt's foreign policy:
I have long held that the best chanceof avertingdisasteris to rangenot only
the United States Administrationbut also United States public opinion
behindthe objectivesof the democraticgovernments.We definitelyhave no
anxiety as to the Administrationand this presentschememust have a pro-
foundeffecton the publicalso.58
The ambassadorhad discussedthe conferencewith Welles before trans-
mitting the president'sletter to the Prime Minister, and his own report
followed the Under Secretary'sapproach, for it labeled the conference
"a genuine effort to relax the tensionsof the world, to stop the prevalent
deterioration and to restore the influence of the democracies."Lindsay
warned against "destructive criticism, reservations or attempts to
define the issues more clearly," and concluded, "I therefore urge
respectfully but very earnestly that His Majesty's Government give
their reply to this invaluable initiative with a very quick and cordial
acceptance."59
56 Facing theDictators,595-596. The conference idea was further
pursued by Norman Davis
during a visit to Britain in the spring of 1937. Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine'
Speech," Political ScienceQuarterly,XXII (1957), 409-412. Loewenheim, in his "An Illusion
that Shaped History," traces in detail the evolution of this conference idea.
57 For the only published quotations from Roosevelt's letter to Chamberlain of
January 11,
see Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), Nine TroubledYears(London, 1954), 269-271.
Sumner Welles gave the first public account of Roosevelt's proposal to Chamberlain in 1944
when he published his Timefor Decision. (See pp. 66-69. See also his SevenDecisions,25-30.)
58 Eden, Facing theDictators,624-625.
59 Ibid.
 A Naval Quarantine
of Japan 221
Roosevelt's letter, which arrived in London on January 12 while the
Foreign Secretary was still in southern France, was sent to the Prime
Minister at Chequers,his official country estate. In the absence of Eden,
Permanent Under SecretaryAlexander Cadogan advised that Lindsay's
recommendations be followed. However, Chamberlain made up his
own mind. On the night of January 13, four days before Roosevelt's
deadline, he rejected the American call for an international conference.
The Prime Minister requested Roosevelt to "hold his hand for a short
while" and lend American support to Britain's current attempt to
arrangea modusvivendi with Mussoliniby extending dejure recognition
to Italy's conquest of Ethiopia.60
The Prime Minister's private negotiations with Mussolini provided
him with one reason to ask Roosevelt to "hold his hand." There was also
another. This stemmed from Chamberlain's personal view of United
States foreign policy: "It is always best and safest to count on nothing
from the Americans but words."61This view had certainly restrained
the Prime Minister from supporting his Foreign Minister's long search
for common action with the United States against Japan.62 However,
there appears to have been another reason for Chamberlain'srejection
of Roosevelt's proposal for an international conferencefour days before
the president'sdeadline and without consulting Eden. The precipitous-
ness of his rejection can best be explained by the Prime Minister's
discovery on or about January 13 of how far the BritishAdmiralty and
the United States Navy had gone in developingjoint plans for President
Roosevelt's long-range "naval quarantine" ofJapan.
Consideringthe importance of the "Record of Conversations"which
Captains Ingersoll and Phillips had signed on the 13th, the "Record"
most probably was forwarded to higher authorities within the British
government. With its special relevance for Britain's foreign policy, the
"Record" must have immediately come to the attention of Neville
Chamberlain, not only because of his position as Prime Minister, but
also because he acted in Eden's absence as Foreign Secretary. The best
explanation that can now be given for Chamberlain'ssudden rejection
of the president's international conference is that he linked it with
Roosevelt's "naval quarantine" of Japan. He reacted negatively
because he believed any such sanction against Japan, together with

60 For text of Chamberlain's letter to

Roosevelt, dated January 14, 1938, see F.R., 1938, I,
118-120.
61 Feiling, Chamberlain,
328.
62 Eden, Facing theDictators,632.
8
222 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

"standing up" to the European dictators, would mean war on three

fronts before Britain was even ready for war on one front.63By rejecting
Roosevelt's international conference, he effectively sabotaged a Far
Eastern blockade and removed a fundamental challenge to his current
personal effortsto appease Mussolini.
Sumner Welles likened Chamberlain's reply to a "douche of cold
water,"64and indeed it was. Secretaryof State Hull immediately called
in Ambassador Lindsay and condemmed Chamberlain's proposed de
jure recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia because it "would be
capitalized by the desperado nations and heralded as a virtual ratifica-
tion of the opposingpolicy of outrighttreatyviolation, and treatybreaking
and seizure of propertiesby force of arms." The Secretarywarned that
"the repercussionsin the Pacific might be very serious in many ways."
Sumner Welles in turn reported to the British Ambassador that the
presidentwas distressedbecause he thought opinion in the United States
had been crystalizing favorably in the direction he desired and he was
confident de jure recognition would turn it back. The Under Secretary
added his personal evaluation, "it would rouse a feeling of disgust;
would revive and multiply all fear of pulling the chestnuts out of the
fire."65
Despite the initial impact of Chamberlain's cable, Roosevelt con-
tinued for some weeks to hope that the British Foreign Secretarywould
be able to keep Britain from appeasement of Mussolini. The president
had probably been encouraged by Eden's telephone call to Ambassador
Lindsay on January 15 saying he would do everything possible to
persuade the Prime Minister to approve an international conference.66
Evidence that the president misread Chamberlain's rebuff and still
expected British naval cooperation is contained in notes recently found
in Paris. These were written on January 16, 1938, by French Senator
Baron Amaury de La Grange following a private conversation with
Roosevelt at the White House.67 The president obviously talked freely
with his old friend and weekend guest from France and revealed his
personal thoughts and plans.
63 Feiling, Chamberlain,328.
64 Welles, Timefor Decision,66.
65 For Hull's remarks to
Lindsay, seeF.R., 1938, I, 133-134; for Welles's remarks to Lindsay,
see Eden, Facing the Dictators,632-633. See also William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason,
Challengeto Isolation(New York, 1952), 26-27.
66 Eden, Facing theDictators,627-628.
67 Note on White House
stationary by Senator Amaury de La Grange and datedJanuary 16,
1938. The original copy of this note has been presented by the Senator's widow, Baroness de
La Grange, to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
 A Naval Quarantineof Japan 223
Roosevelt focused upon foreign affairs and in speaking about Japan's
invasion of China in July 1937, he noted the European reaction to this
undeclared war. As during his November meeting with Jules Henry of
the French Embassy, he condemmed France for acting like a "scared
rabbit" in October when, upon the threat ofJapanese reprisals,France
closed Indo-China to the transit of war materials to China. France had
been unwise, he felt, because "Japan has complete liberty to replenish
supplies: to deny China the same liberty would be departing from
neutrality." The president then explained that France's Foreign
Minister, Yvon Delbos, had made a mistake when he asked "if the
United States would guarantee the integrity of Indo-China in case of
Japanese attack." This requesthad gone too far and Roosevelt had been
forced to reply that "the United States could not enter into that kind of
a commitment."
The presidentnext turned to Britain,which in his estimationpossessed
the "most important interest in the Far East." It was his opinion that
"England will not tolerate being thrown out of China-even politely-
without actually declaring war on Japan, she will take energetic
measures."The president then told his French visitor of the quarantine
which he had ordered Captain Ingersoll to discusswith the Admiralty:

Formerlya blockadewas carriedout insidethe limitsof territorialwaters.

Now it couldbe established2,000 milesfromtheJapanesecoast.The English
fleet, dependingfor supportupon Hong Kong, Indo-Chinaand the Philip-
pines, would preventany Japaneseship from crossingthis line towardsthe
South, while the Americanfleet would bar the route to the North, from
Manilato Alaska.
Japan could not hold out more than a year and a half. It has petroland
rubberfor aboutthat lengthof time.
Roosevelt had prefaced his remarkson this quarantine by a question:
"Since the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese have invented a
new method which consists of carrying on military operations without
declaring war, why not do likewise?" Then, after sketchingout his long-
range naval blockade, the president admitted, "It is possible that
Germany and Italy in case of blockade, would go to war, but it would
not be us who would declare it." The terms Roosevelt used in his con-
versationwith La Grange reveal an impressivecontinuityof his thinking
since he first discussed a quarantine of Japan with Sumner Welles in
July 1937.
Until Eden announced his resignation on February 20, Roosevelt
continued to hope that the Foreign Secretary would keep Britain from
224 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

swinging from resistanceto appeasement. Eden's message to Lindsay on

January 15 had been encouraging as had Chamberlain's temporizing
letter ofJanuary 21. These must have confusedthe issuesas much as did
Ambassador Lindsay's report of February 9 on Eden's optimism over
Anglo-American cooperation.68 A letter the president wrote to an
English friend on February 10 indicates that Roosevelt still, at that date,
nurtured a hope of Britishsupport for resistanceto the dictators:
I am gettingon betterwith someof yourpeople-for they are reallyshowing
signsof wantingto meet me part of the way-perhaps not fifty percentyet!
I, too, am pursuedby catchriesin thiscountry,and I am in the midstof a long
processof education-and the processseemsto be workingslowlybut surely.69
By then Roosevelt had postponedWelles'splan for a world conference.
However, he presented his "Big Navy" bill to Congress. Isolationists
immediately raised a lusty protest, claiming that the president sought
these extra ships only to strengthen American intervention in world
affairs. Their cries of alarm crescendoed when, at the time Captain
Ingersoll reported personallyto Roosevelt on his London conversations,
word leaked out that Ingersoll had discussed a naval quarantine of
Japan with the BritishAdmiralty.70Though the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions was called in to quiet the storm and divert attention from such a
quarantine, Roosevelt could still write to his English friend on February
10 that his long process of public education was "working slowly but
surely."71What is of particular interest is that the Secretary of State
seems to have shared his optimism. On February 10 Jay Pierrepont

68For Chamberlain'sletter ofJanuary21 to Roosevelt,see Eden,FacingtheDictators,641-

642. See also Eden'sletter of January 25 to Lindsayin which he wrote: "Personally,I now
hope Rooseveltwill now go ahead." (Ibid.,643-644.) See also Welles'smemorandaof Feb-
ruary2 and 9 on conversationswith Lindsay (in F.R., 1938, I, 122, 125) and the reportof
February4 by HerschelJohnson,chargein the United Kingdom,of a conversationwith Eden
and Cadogan.Ibid.,I, 135-136.
69 Roosevelt to ArthurMurray, later Lord Elibank, Feb. 10, 1938, F.D.R., His Personal
Letters,1928-1945,ed. Elliot Roosevelt(2 vols., New York, 1950), II, 757-758.
70 Twojournalsin particular,one Britishand the otherAmerican,carrieddetailed,though
not identical,accountsallegingthat Ingersolltalkedwith the Admiraltyabout a long-range
blockadeofJapan pivotingon the AleutianIslands,Hawaii, the PanamaCanal,and Singa-
pore. They also reportedthat Navy officialsbelievedsuch a blockadewould be 85 percent
effectiveif Britaincontributedsix battleships.Bothjournalsdoubtedwhethertheseplanscould
be put into effectsoon and the Londondaily reportedthat "Americanpublic opinionwould
not at presentsupportany such proposal,. . . [but] future developments-anotherPanay
incidentfor example-might changethe situation."See London Jan. 28, 1938,
Daily Telegraph,
p. 3, and Newsweek, "Periscope"forJan. 31, 1938,which appearedon the newsstandson or
aboutJan. 28.
71 New YorkTimes,Jan. '28,Feb. 4, 5, 9, 1938;Rooseveltto Murray,Feb. 10, 1938,F.D.R.,
His Personal Letters,II, 757-758.
 A Naval Quarantine
of Japan 225

Moffat, chief of the State Department's European section, confided in

his diary that Hull "does not believe that the sentiment of this country is
growing strongly isolationist."72
Roosevelt's expectations of British support for a naval quarantine of
Japan were seriouslyshaken ten days later in February when Anthony
Eden suddenly announced his resignation as Foreign Secretary. This
action apparently came as a surpriseto the president, as well as to most
of the world. Later, in a letter of May 13 to his English friend, Arthur
Murray, he remarked, "Isn't it amazing that in February there was
no thought of the Eden episode."73Eden's resignation spelled the end
to the president's hope for British cooperation in a Pacific blockade of
Japan.
Thirty-four years after Roosevelt's quarantine speech, it can be seen
that the presidentdid not withdrawinto isolation in late 1937. Moreover,
the evidence now at hand indicates that Roosevelt's naval quarantine
founderednot only on American isolationismbut also on Prime Minister
Chamberlain's preference for appeasement. Without Britain's naval
assistance,Roosevelt could not hope to "quarantine"PremierFumimaro
Konoye's Japan.74 With Britain out of the picture, Japan, as well as
Hitler and Mussolini, would be "perfectly safe in discounting the
influence of the United States."75
Though PresidentRoosevelt was forced to put aside his naval quaran-
tine of Japan, he did not retreat before the American isolationists.
Rather he seized a new initiative to restrain the bandit nations. This
became evident onJanuary 16 when La Grange reportedthat he sought
for France 1,000 planes "now in use in the American Army." Shortly
after that afternoon talk in the White House, La Grange wrote to Paris
that his mission had so far been "crowned with success":
[Roosevelt]is well informedabout what is going on in Germanyand he
appearsto be very concernedaboutthe effortbeingmade by [France]in the
field of aviation. ... It is his convictionthat more and moreJapan will
dependon Germanyand Italy and that, in orderto containthe ambitionsof
72 Moffat,
"Diplomatic Journals," Feb. 10, 1938.
73 Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, May 13, 1938, Lord Elibank Papers, "Elibank-F.D.R.
Conversations, Oct. 1938." In August 1961 the late Lord Elibank kindly opened these papers
in London to me.
74James B. Crowley, in his Japan's QuestforAutonomy(Princeton, 1966), 358-378, shows that
between mid-December and mid-January, just at the time Roosevelt was secretly seeking
British cooperation for a naval blockade ofJapan, Premier Konoye and his civilian supporters
in the cabinet reached the decision to pursue a "war of annihilation" against Nationalist
China.
75 Langer and Gleason, Challengeto Isolation,31.
226 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

these three powers, England, France and America will be obliged to combine
their efforts.
The President is thus completely in favor of all measures that the French
Government might believe necessary to reenforce its air formations in time
of peace and in time of war.76

The president's positive and direct actions to clear the way for the
French purchase of the latest American planes show the validity of La
Grange's forecast. This, however, is the subject of another study.77

76
Amaury de La Grange to Senator Joseph C. Caillux, President of the French Senate,
Jan. 21, 1938, La Grange Papers, Paris.
77 See my AmericanAid to France,1938-1940 (New York, 1970).