Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
A PROJECT REPORT
Submitted to the
UNIVERSITY FIVE YEAR LAW COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN
JAIPUR
(YEAR-2011)
Prof. T.BHATTACHARYYA
Supervisor
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
AJIT YADAV.
Student of B.A.,LLB.
(Hons.) Fifth Semester
UFYLC
University of Rajasthan,
Jaipur
Roll No. 007
LIST OF CONTENTS
Certificate.................................................................................. i.
Acknowledgement.....................................................................ii.
CHAPTER-1
Introduction…………………………………………………….1.
Research methodology………………………………………...2.
Hypothesis……………………………………………………..2.
CHAPTER -2
Identical expressions to have same meaning………………….. 3.
CHAPTER- 3
CHAPTER- 4
Table of cases……………………………………………………11.
INTRODUCTION
Words are generally used in the same sense throughout in a statute unless there is
something repugnant in the context. The same expressions, if it appears more than
once in the same statute or for that matter in the same provision, should receive the
same meaning unless, the context suggests otherwise. Where in a statute, a word is
not defined, but it is used in different sections, it ought to be interpreted in the
same sense throughout, unless the context in any particular section plainly requires
that it should be understood in a different sense.
It is a reasonable presume1 that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same
expression in every part of Act. If the language of the statute2 be plain, admitting of
only one meaning, the legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it
has plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced
though it should lead to absurd3 and mischievous4 results.
The proper rule of construction, therefore, is to look at the section itself and find
out the meaning of word in question from the context in which it is used, though it
would be permissible to find out is meaning from the other sections where the
same word is used, if it is not possible to do so, from the section itself. But it is
clear that the same word might carry different meaning when used in different
parts of the statute depending upon the context in which it is used, and in such a
case that sense has to be adopted which is harmonious5 with the context and
promotes in the fullest manner the policy object of the legislation. Indeed cases are
not lacking where the same word would carry different meanings, even though
used in the same section.
1
Presume means Take to be the case or to be true; accept without verification or proof.
2
Statute is (law) an act passed by a legislative body.
3
Absurd means Inconsistent with reason, logic or common sense.
4
Mischievous means Deliberately causing harm or damage.
5
Harmonious means Existing together in harmony.
1.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Researcher has used doctrinal method while dealing with the research project
related to “Principle that identical expressions to have same meaning”.
A word which occurs more than once in the same Act should be given the
same meaning throughout the Act, unless the context shows that the legislature has
used the word in a different sense. This is made clear by the legislature inserting in
the interpretation clause word such as ‘unless the context otherwise requires’.
6
Expression means A word or phrase that particular people use in particular situation.
7
Proposition means A task to be dealt with.
CHAPTER-3
Word defined in a statute may have the same meaning in another statute which is
in pari materia therewith. If the language of the two statutes in all respects is
identical no question of construing one Act with the assistance of the other Act can
arise. It is only when where one Act is ambiguous or some provision appears to be
of doubtful meaning that the assistance is sought from another statute in pari
material to remove the doubt or ambiguity. It is only in such circumstances that
assistance in ascertaining the meaning of an enactment is permitted under this rule
to be obtained by comparing its language with the words given in earlier statute
relating to the same subject.
Law of Limitation and the Civil Procedure Code are statutes in pari materia and
should be read together and taken and construed together as one system and
explanatory of each other. The implication of this is that a particular word in the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 having a particular meaning will be presumed to have
same meaning if it also occurs in the Limitation Act, 1963.
CHAPTER-4
The rule of same word same meaning has been applied and commented upon
vastly by the judiciary while interpreting statutes. Case law is thus probably8 the
best source to view the application of this rule, its entire ramifications9 and to see
its developments and correct usage. Thus case law is the light that will illuminate10
and give us a comprehensive11 understanding of the rule.
8
Probably means With considerable certainty; without much doubt.
9
Ramification means The act of branching out or dividing into branches.
10
The word illuminate means Make free from confusion or ambiguity; make clear.
11
Comprehensive means Broad in scope.
12
AIR1999karn203.
13
Reluctant means Unwillingness to do something contrary to your custom.
14
Contrary means Very opposed in nature, character or purpose.
In Bhogilal v. State of Bombay15, a charge of criminal16 breach of trust was
brought against the appellant17, a cashier in a company. After the happening was
discovered certain officers of the company discussed certain matters with the
appellant in presence of solicitor18 of the company. During the trial19, the solicitor,
who appeared as a witness, gave evidence20 about the happenings which took
place in his presence and wanted to give certain notes in evidence under Section
157 of the Evidence Act as a previous statement of his. On the question whether
such statement has been used many times in different sections of the Act in its
ordinary sense of something that is stated. It is a basic principle of interpretation
that the same expression must have the same meaning unless the context demand
otherwise. There is the nothing in the context so as to give a different meaning to
the word statement used in Section 157 of the Act. It is not necessary that there
should be an element of communication to some other person before that can be
taken to be a statement. So construed21, therefore, the statement in the form of
notes is admissible22.
15
AIR1959SC356.
16
Criminal means Someone who has committed a crime or has been legally convicted of a crime.
17
Appellant is The party who appeals a decision of a lower court.
18
Solicitor is A lawyer who gives legal advice and prepares legal documents.
19
Trial means the determination of a person's innocence or guilt by due process of law.
20
Evidence means all the means by which any alleged matter of fact whose truth is investigated at judicial trial is
established or disproved.
21
Construed means Make sense of; assign a meaning to.
22
Admissible means Deserving to be admitted.
In N.T.Veluswami v. G. Raja Nainar23, the appellant was a successful candidate
in an election to the State Legislative Assembly. The respondent, a voter, filed an
election petition challenging the election of the appellant on the ground that at the
time of scrutiny of the nomination papers of all prospective candidates the
nomination24 papers of all prospective candidates the nomination of one candidate
was wrongly rejected. The appellant then tried to justify rejection on other grounds
and the Election Tribunal25 upheld that such grounds could be urged. The
respondent then filed a writ petition on which the High Court ruled that the
Tribunal could give its ruling only about the ground on which the nomination was
rejected. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and stated that the whole
controversy in this case resolves round the interpretation of the expression
improperly rejected used in section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of People Act,
1951. The word improper exists in section 100(1)(d)(i) also in relation to the
grounds of disqualification mentioned in Section 36(2) of the Act. It was,
therefore, held that the expression improper used in Section 100(1)(c) and 100(1)
(d)(i) must be given the same meaning as there is nothing in the context to hold
otherwise.
23
AIR1959SC422.
24
Nomination means The condition of having been proposed as a suitable candidate for appointment or election.
25
Tribunal means An assembly (including one or more judges) to conduct judicial business.
26
AIR1976SC2608.
In Lal Chand v. Radha Krishan27, the Court observed:
“where the same expression is used in the same statute at different places the
same meaning ought to be given to that expression as far as possible. In the intant
case, the word ‘tenant’ has been used in more than one placein Section 19 of the
Slum Areas(Improvement & Clearance) Act,1956, and it is only reasonable to
construe it in the same sense throughout. So, in the absence of compelling
circumstances, and in order to better effectuate the object of the Act, there is no
reason why the word ‘tenant’ should not bear the same meaning in Section 19(1)(a)
as in Section 19(4)(a). The policy of Act being that the slum dweller should not be
evicted unless alternative accommodation is available to him, the word tenant in
Section 19(1)(a) must for the purpose of advancing the remedy provided by the
statute be construed to include a person against whom a decree or order for an
eviction has been passed.
27
(1977)2SCC88.
28
AIR1957SC23.
In Raghubans Narain v. Government of Uttar Pradesh29, the question involved
was the interpretation of section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which
stated, ‘if the sum which, in opinion of the court, the collector ought to have
awarded as compensation, the award of the court may direct that the Collector shall
pay interest on such excess of the sum which the Collector did award as
compensation, the award of the court may direct that the Collector shall pay
interest on such excess at the rate of 6% per annum’. The argument of the appellant
was that payment at the date of 6% interest was obligatory whereas the respondent
contended that, that was the maximum limit of the interest to be paid. The Supreme
Court said that payment at the rate of 6% interest by the Collector has been
mentioned in Section 34 of the Act also in those cases where amount of
compensation is not paid or deposited before taking possession of the land by the
government. Observing the principle same expression to have same meaning
unless context requires otherwise the Supreme Court held that first part of section
28 which uses the word may direct is non-obligatory, that is to say, the court may
or may not direct the Collector to pay interest. But the latter part of the section
using the word shall means mandatory, that is to say, that once the court has
exercised its option that interest should be paid, there is no option except to pay the
interest at the rate of 6%.
29
AIR1967SC465.
30
AIR1952SC369:1953SCR1.
CHAPTER-5
Conclusion :-