THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC

DISTINCTION

Though Kant (rationalist) and Ayer

(empiricist) disagree on many points, they
agree on the following:

There is a basic, fundamental difference

between analytic and synthetic propositions.

Quine intends to ‘out-empiricize’ Ayer:

• Not only are there no a priori truths
about the world…
• There is no such thing as an analytic
proposition!

In other words, every proposition is

sensitive to empirical experience.

Quine has two arguments…

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Argument I: Circularity

Quine identifies two types of analytic claim:

I. Logically true:
•P=P
• No unmarried man is married

The truth of these depends only on the

logical terms (‘not’, ‘=’). They are true no
matter how we re-interpret the other words.

II. The rest:

• Plato is the teacher of Aristotle
• No bachelor is married

These can be transformed into type I by

replacing words with their synonyms.

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Synonymy

Quine: So, a full understanding of

‘analyticity’ rests on the notion of
‘synonymy’.

But is the latter any clearer than the former?

Suggestion: Yes.
• A is synonymous with B if one is defined

as the other.

Quine: how do we know that A is defined as

B?
• Check a dictionary?
• This just tells us that lexicographers

believe that A and B are considered

synonymous.
• Circular!

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Truth by definition

Okay, how about the following:

• A and B are synonymous if A = B is true

by definition.

Quine: we introduce definitions to do three

things:

1. accurately paraphrase a notion we

already have
2. Improve on a concept while preserving
old usage
3. Create a new meaning

However, paraphrase is good only if it

preserves meaning—i.e. is synonymous.

New usage is good only if it is synonymous

in old contexts.

Hence, only #3 does not rely on a prior

notion of synonymy, but it is insufficient for a
full notion of ‘analyticity’.

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Interchangeability

Perhaps A is synonymous with B if and only

if ‘A’ and ‘B’ can be interchanged without
changing the truth value of a sentence.

Quine: then ‘bachelor’ is not synonymous

with ‘unmarried man’:

• ‘“Bachelor” has seven letters’ = true

• ‘“Unmarried man” has seven letters =
false.

Reply: okay, but they can be interchanged

when it is their meanings that are under
consideration.

Quine: In other words, interchangeability

works when their meanings are the same.
• But ‘same meaning’ = ‘synonymous’
• So we still haven’t escaped the circle.

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Necessity

How about this:

• ‘All and only bachelors are unmarried

men’ is analytic = necessarily, all and
only bachelors are unmarried men.

Quine: to say that a sentence is necessarily

true is just to say that it is analytic.

• I.e., Necessarily, P will be true when

and only when ‘P’ is analytic.

In sum: all attempts to define ‘analytic’ are

circular or rest on terms that are no clearer
than ‘analytic’.

So, the analytic-synthetic distinction has

never been properly defined.

Quine also has a second argument that

would rule out even logical truths as
analytic…

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Argument II: Holism and indeterminacy

Quine: To test any claim, a whole series of

background beliefs must be accepted.

E.g.: I want to see if M1 and M2 fall at the

same rate.
• I drop each at the same time and
observe when they land.

I assume:
• Mass stays constant during test.

• Force of gravity is the same on each.

• Space-time doesn’t “warp” for one.

• My clock works properly.

• My eyes function properly.

• Etc.

If M1 and M2 don’t land at the same time,

any one of these beliefs might be false.
• I can’t pick out which one just on the

basis of that observation.

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What this tells us

Quine: Experiment can only tell us that a

system of beliefs has an error in it
somewhere.

We may choose to give up or hold on to any

belief so long as we are willing to change
others.

• No experiment can determine once and

for all how to adjust the system!

So:
• No statement or belief has individual
meaning: only entire theories are
testable against experience.

How does this impact the analytic-synthetic

distinction?

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Revision knows no bounds

Quine: Given a surprising or recalcitrant

experience, you may revise your system of
beliefs as you see fit (so long as you
preserve observational claims).

If, for example, it turns that the simplest way

to respond to an observation is to revise
classical logic, you are entitled to do so.

• Since entire systems are tested, not

individual claims, no individual claim can
be said to be non-revisable in principle.

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The web of beliefs

Beliefs form an interconnected web:

• Statements about observations are at

the periphery.
• Others are more central.

• Logic and math are near the middle.

But…since all claims are interconnected,

changes in one area can impact changes
anywhere else.

Though we may hold on to logical beliefs

very tightly—they are in the middle—there is
no reason they can’t be changed to
preserve other areas of the web.

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Conclusion

Quine: Any revision that is useful for

predicting or explaining experience is
acceptable.
• We can’t give logical laws a privileged, a

priori status—any part of the web of

belief is revisable!

Conclusion: there are no analytic truths; no

truths are necessary or empirically
untouchable.

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A rationalist response

Chisholm disagrees with Ayer and Quine.

Ayer: All a priori truths are rules about how

to use language.

Chisholm: This means that, e.g., ‘no square

is round’ is true only because it is a rule that
it is true. But the following is obvious:

(T) ‘P’ is true if and only if P

So,

• ‘No square is round’ is true if and only if

no square is round.

I.e. a certain relation between properties

must exist for the claim to be true.

Second argument: ‘No square is round’

does not refer to words so it can’t be rule
about their usage!

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Against Quine

Quine: there is no way to tell from observing

linguistic behaviour whether it is necessary
that if ‘P’ applies to x, so does ‘Q’.

Chisholm’s response: even if we can’t

empirically observe synonymy, it doesn’t
follow that there are no analytic truths.

Quine needs a principle such as:

In order for there to be analytic truths, we

must be able to determine synonymy
observationally.

But how could Quine defend this?

• It can’t be observed.
• It’s not true by definition (which Quine

rejects at any rate).

• It appears to be a synthetic a priori
claim.

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The upshot of this

Chisholm:
• The traditional empiricist account of a

priori knowledge is implausible.

• So is Quine’s denial of a priori truth.

So, we should reject empiricism and defend

the analytic/synthetic distinction and the
possibility of a priori knowledge.

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Reviving the a priori

Chisholm: certain relations hold necessarily:

• Red includes coloured
• Square excludes round

Could we learn these by observation

(induction)? Chisholm thinks not:

1. There are no actual squares.

2. Induction presupposes a priori truths.

Defence of #2:

Say we observe the world and find no red

things that are non-coloured. We want to
conclude ‘red includes coloured’ or ‘all red
things are coloured’.

We must first know that ‘any observation of

a non-coloured red thing contradicts “all red
things are coloured”’.
• I.e., we need deductive logic to perform
induction, so at least some claims are
knowable a priori

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Axioms

Okay, if knowledge requires a priori truths,

what is the nature of such propositions?

Chisholm: A priori truth = once you accept

it, you see it is true. Note:
• You must really accept it; you must
reflect on it and understand what it says.
• It must be certain, i.e. there is nothing
more reasonable to accept than it.

Chisholm calls these ‘axioms’.

Also: suppose that:

• E is known a priori

• If E then H is known a priori.

• Then, if you understand H, it is also

known a priori.

Thus, a priori reasoning can expand your

knowledge.

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In sum

Some claims are such that if you

understand them, you see they are true.

• They can’t be known by observation.

• Empiricist accounts of how they could
be known independently of observation
are implausible.

So, either some propositions are known a

priori, or else we must remain sceptical.

But it is absurd to remain sceptical about:

• No square is round.
• All bachelors are unmarried.
• Etc.

Chisholm: so, a priori knowledge is

possible.

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Analyticity revived

Chisholm: “All S is P” is analytic =

1. Either S is the same as P, or
2. S is a conjunction of logically
independent terms, one of which is P.

P and Q are logically independent =

• Neither P nor not-P entails Q or not-Q.
• Neither Q nor not-Q entails P or not-P.

#2 tells us what it is for a predicate to be

contained in a subject.

E.g.: ‘all fathers are parents’ is analytic

because
• ‘Father’ = ‘male parent’.

• ‘Male’ does not entail ‘parent’ and vice

versa.

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Why logical independence?

Consider: ‘All fathers are parents’.

• Here the predicate, ‘parent’ has truly

been ‘analyzed out’ of the subject
because ‘father’ = ‘male and parent’.

But now consider: ‘Everything that is a

father and a parent is a parent’.

• Has ‘parent’ really been analyzed out of

the subject?

Chisholm: No. The second ‘parent’ in the

subject is redundant.
• It is already logically implied by ‘father’.
• So, we haven’t really analyzed ‘father’.

Genuine analysis involves breaking down a

concept into its ‘atoms’, its most basic parts.

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Synthetic a priori propositions

Are all a priori claims analytic (e.g. Ayer)?

Chisholm: consider ‘All squares have

shape’. This is a priori.

If it is analytic, then ‘square’ can be reduced

to logically independent concepts, one of
which is ‘has shape’, i.e.:

‘Everything that is ____ and has shape has

shape’.

• We need to fill the blank with something

that preserves the original meaning and
is logically independent of ‘has shape’.
• Can this be done?

Chisholm: no.

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Some attempts

I. ‘Everything that is square and has

shape has shape’.

I.e., ‘Square’ = ‘square and has shape’.

Problem: ‘Square’ entails ‘has shape’, so

they are not logically independent.

II. ‘Everything that is (i) either square or

without shape and (ii) has shape, has
shape.

Problem: these are not logically

independent.
• I.e., not-(ii) entails (i).
• If ‘has shape is false’ then ‘without
shape or square’ is true.

Chisholm: try others—there is little hope

here.

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Upshot

1. It is implausible to deny that we know

that ‘All squares have shape’.
2. This claim can’t be confirmed
observationally.
3. This claim is not analytic.

Therefore,
4. Synthetic a priori knowledge is
possible.

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Metaphysics

The picture of metaphysics that emerges

from Chisholm:

1. Metaphysics involves reflection on

concepts such as ‘person’, ‘object’,
‘time’, ‘cause’, ‘substance’, etc.

2. Some claims involving these concepts

are such that if you understand them,
you see they are true.

3. Thus, a priori, metaphysical

knowledge is possible.

4. Logic is knowable a priori.

5. We can use logic to build on and

extend the knowledge gained in #2.

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A sceptical objection

Objection: Suppose you reflect on a

proposition and become certain it is true.
• How do you know that this kind of

experience guarantees truth?

Surely you need to know a general

principle, such as:
• ‘Any proposition whose contemplation
gives rise to a feeling of certainty must
be true’.
• But people have made mistakes about
what they were certain about.
• So no such principle is sensible.

Chisholm: If all knowledge requires

application of principles, then principles are
only known if there is a principle to justify
them.
• This leads to a regress.

Knowledge can’t get off the ground unless

some of it is a priori and foundational.

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Summary

Quine Chisholm
There are no All a priori knowledge
necessary truths is of necessary truths
There is no analytic- Not all necessary
synthetic distinction truths are analytic
All claims are There is synthetic a
empirically revisable priori knowledge
There is nothing for Metaphysics is
metaphysical possible and can
speculation to give rise to
accomplish other knowledge
than pragmatic ends

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