Beat UODebt C 03

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8 When the legal establishment starts putting on seminars to teach lawyers how to
9deal with people like me, we know we’re starting to cause the corrupt legal establishment
10grief. What follows in Beating Up On Debt Collectors are strategies that put people in a
11position to win. Not only can you win using these strategies, you will make lawyers
12absolutely miserable. It is time for the predator to become the prey and the prey to
13become the predator! As Maximus said before the battle, “Unleash Hell!”
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15 Richard Luke Cornforth
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2 BEATING UP ON DEBT COLLECTORS
3 Table of contents
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5Responding to the arbitration racket 5-15
6Phone scripts 16
7Disputing the “debt” 17-23
8Pleading against domestication of an arbitration award 25-36
9Moving to dismiss their suit for collection 37-41
10Responding to their answer to your motion to dismiss 42-44
11Answering in their suit for collection and filing a counterclaim 45-47
12Skipping the motion to dismiss and just filing a counterclaim that
13 overwhelms your prey (notice discovery) 48-56
14Moving for summary judgment against them 57-62
15Responding to a report and recommendation 63-67
16Filing an instanter 68-74
17Responding to a request for production of documents 75-76
18Another rendition of requesting discovery 77-82
19Motion to compel 83-91
20Being deposed 92-98
21Motion for summary judgment 99-102
22Presenting oral argument 102-110
23Motion for default judgment against them 111,113
24Notice and demand 114-116
25Petition for writ of mandamus 117,118
26Dealing with a dishonest referee in the mandamus process 119-122
27Motion to vacate a void judgment 124-135
28Appealing a judgment in foreclosure of a debt 136-165
29Civil Rights complaint after wrongful foreclosure of debt 166-175
30Preliminary injunction for civil rights suit 176,177
31Attacking a void judgment in bankruptcy court 178-180
1Beating up on Debt Collectors 2

1Racketeering suit 182
2 BEATING UP ON DEBT COLLECTORS
3 First, lets refresh on the debt collection racket. As you knew already or learned
4from Secrets of The Legal Industry: credit card contracts are not transferable; when a
5third party debt collector attempts to collect any consumer debt including state income
6taxes, the debt collector must obey the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act or they are
7subject to suit. Additionally, federal RICO (racketeering) law provides that a cause of
8action lies where one or more members of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce
9commit two or more acts of fraud or extortion resulting in damages to property or a
10business. Property includes bank accounts and money. Lost business opportunity is a
11damage to a business interest. Before any party can legally prevail in any lawsuit, the
12party must be prepared to show standing to sue in the jurisdiction and standing to sue the
13respondent party. Corporations must also be prepared to show that the corporation’s
14charter authorizes the activity sued over and also authorizes suing. The party legally
15prevailing in any lawsuit must show that a contract exists if the matter is a breach; and
16regardless, every prevailing party must “prove up” a claim of damages. After judgment
17is rendered, there must always be a second proceeding in rem for collection. Even though
18in rem proceedings have been simplified in most jurisdictions, don’t count on attorneys
19knowing how to file an in rem petition. Also, executions must be bonded: this means, if
20they are going to take your property in satisfaction of judgment, in addition to following
21the proper procedure for proceeding in rem the judgment creditor must post bond before
22taking property to satisfy the judgment. The debt collection racket is one of the biggest
23components of the obscenely corrupt legal industry. I have yet to examine any debt
24collection case that was done properly – no even one.
25 One other thing – a copy of your state’s rules of civil procedure is absolutely
26indispensable. I also recommend subscribing to Versus Law at versuslaw.com.
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3 Arbitration has become quite popular as a way of lawyers and their crooked
4buddies, the judges, ripping people off. There are some folks out there who are
5counterattacking them before they have a chance to work this con. Internet searches will
6likely take you to some sites where counselors inform you how to get an arbitration
7award against them. The following are letters to send to the slimeballs who try to trap
8you in an arbitration forum. Actually, for the most part, arbitration clauses in contracts of
9adhesion, like other ‘choice of law” or “forum selection” clauses are unconstitutional. (A
10contract of adhesion is one printed in mass. They all look the same and you either
11“adhere” to the contract or reject it).
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17WHAT TO SAY TO THESE LITTLE DARLINGS WHEN THEY TRY TO GET YOU
18TO GO FOR THE ARBITRATION CON.
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3 NOTICE
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5Kenneth L. Good & Laverne Good certified mail number ( )
62128 Winter Road
7Somewhere, Florida 32000
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11Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
12Two Irvington Centre
13702 King Farm Blvd. 5th Floor
14Rockville, MD 20850
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16 And
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18The Forum
19P.O. Box 50191
20Minneapolis, MN 55405-0191
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24Sirs:
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26We are objecting to the notice of arbitration in re: your contract FA0308000191962. We
27have two grounds for our objection: (1). Forum selection clauses in contracts of adhesion
28are unenforceable unless the clause could have been rejected without impunity (cite
29omitted), and (2). The United States Supreme Court has instructed that arbitration clauses
30are only enforceable to the extent that they permit parties to effectively enforce their
31substantive rights (cite omitted). In addition to not being allowed discretion relative to
32the forum selection clause, the arbitration forum of Minneapolis seems an obvious
33subterfuge deliberately intended to abridge the sustantive rights of Floridians such as our-
34selves. We also believe that we can introduce witnesses who will testify that your
35arbitration form is a sham where no actual proceedings take place and those with the
36wherewithal to attend such proceedings are given the “old run around.”
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38Fifteen days from the verifiable receipt of this notice, your silence shall verify that the so-
39called notice of arbitration is a fraud wherein you used the United States Mail in an

1attempt to create a legal disability where none existed. If you succeed in taking any
2money or property from us or interfering with a business interest which we may have,
3your receipt of this letter shall be added to our evidence file in support of a racketeering
4suite against you.
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6Most sincerely,
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9Kenneth L. Good Laverne Good
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12October 4th 2003
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16Copy to: (state attorney general)
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18Charlie Crist
19State of Florida
20The Capitol PS-O
21Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
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1And if they don’t get the point –
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4 SECOND NOTICE AND WARNING
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6Kenneth L. Good & Laverne Good certified mail number ( )
72128 Chester Road
8Yulee, Florida 32097-4905
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12Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
13Two Irvington Centre
14702 King Farm Blvd. 5th Floor
15Rockville, MD 20850
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19The Forum
20P.O. Box 50191
21Minneapolis, MN 55405-0191
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25To the personal attention of: Laura Johnson & Ronald M. Abramson:
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27 Leave us alone! Your so-called National Arbitration Forum is a complete, total,
28and utter fraud. Because you are both ignorant of the law and in spite of the fact that you
29are contumacious, we are affording you the courtesy of reviewing controlling authorities.
30WARNING! Your continued harassment may result in criminal RICO charges against
31you and shall result in a civil RICO suit against proper parties. We request: (1). Your
32written assurance that you will leave us alone, and (2). Your written assurance that you
33will cease and desist with your ridiculous fraud, “National Arbitration Forum.”
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35 Mbna America Bank NA’s reliance on an arbitration clause in Mbna’s contracts
36of adhesion is morally, ethically, and legally wrong. See Myers v. MBNA America and
37North American Capitol Corporation, CV 00-163-MDWM (D. Mont. , March 20, 2001),
38Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000), Circuit
39City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002), (citing Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60

1Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Ct.App. 1997), Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038,
21042 (9th Cir. 2001), Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1961),
3Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382(Ct. App. 2001),
4Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002), ACORN v.
5Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002), Mandel v.
6Household Bank, 2003 SL 57282, at *4(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2003) (applying Nevada
7law), Murcuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678 (Ct. App. 2002), Gilmer v.
8Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20 (1991), In re: Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482,
9Shankle v. B-G Maint., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999), In re: Doctor’s
10Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688, and Ting v. AT&T, NO. 02-15416 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2003).
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13Stop harassing us. Leave us alone.
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15Most sincerely,
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17Kenneth L. Good Laverne Good
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19November 19th 2003
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21Copy to: (attorney general)
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23Charlie Crist
24State of Florida
25The Capitol PS-O
26Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
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32What if the wiseguys get the picture and try to get you into an arbitration
33forum in your state? Object to an arbitration forum even if it is in your
34state! The following two documents were developed by Dean Gerhart –

1Dean is one of the most successful anti-shysters in the country!
2dgerhart@columbus.rr.com
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5Sue Bear Rue
61234 Delightful Lane
7Hometown, Michigan 00000
8Respondent
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12 IN THE
13 NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM
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: NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO ARBITRATION
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: RULE 13A(2)
MBNA America Bank, N.A., : Forum File Number: BR 549
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Claimant, :
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v. :
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Sue Bear Rue :
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Respondent, :
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:
16 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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18Sue Bear Rue, Respondent, hereby asserts Respondent’s objection to this claim for the
19following reasons as instructed pursuant to Rule 13A of the National Arbitration Forum
20Code of Procedure July 1, 2002 hereafter, the Code:
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22 STATEMENT OF CASE
23 1. Claimant has submitted a claim to this Forum stating that this is a claim for
24 money and other relief.
25 BASIS FOR OBJECTION TO ARBITRATE
26 2. I reject this claim as filed on the basis that this forum lacks both Personal and
27 Subject matter jurisdiction in this matter and has failed to comply with the rules of
28 the Code. Based on the documentation I have received from this forum and the
29 Claimant I have reason to believe that this claim as filed lacks several key

1 elements required to be considered a valid claim and I demand strict proof
2 thereof:
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4 a. Rule 1 of the Code states that both parties agree to arbitrate. I have never
5 agreed to waive my right to meaningful access to due process by way of
6 contract.
7 b. Rule 12A (2) of the Code requires that the initial claim shall include: a
8 copy of the Arbitration Agreement or notice of the location of a copy of
9 the Arbitration Agreement;
10 c. Rule 12 A (3) of the Code requires a copy documents that support the
11 Claim.
12 d. Rule 12 A (4) of the Code requires an affidavit asserting that statements
13 and documents in the Claim are accurate.
14 e. Rule 12 A (5) of the Code requires that the appropriate Filling Fee be paid.
15 f. Rule 12 B Requires that Claimant promptly file with the forum proof of
16 service of the initial Claim on the Respondent.
17 g. Rule 20 A of the Code indicates that the Arbitrator has powers provided
18 by the code, the agreement of the Parties and the applicable Substantive
19 law.
20 h. Rule 20 C of the Code indicates that the Arbitrator does not have the
21 power to decide matters not properly submitted under this code.
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LAW23AND ARGUMENT
24 NO VALID AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
25 3. Claimant has filed a claim with this forum listing false and misleading allegations
26 regarding the agreement to arbitrate. Arbitration Agreement is clearly defined in
27 the Code under Rule 2 C and is requirement in order to establish the existence of a
28 valid claim. Without first establishing the existence of this agreement any ruling
29 rendered by this forum for either party would be void on its face for lack of
30 personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
31 4. The courts have upheld that a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a dispute
32 cannot be forced to do so. In addition is has been established that the party
33 making the claim must show that the respondent in the claim was made aware of
34 the arbitration agreement, and that they agreed to its provisions. Casteel v. Clear
35 Channel Broad., Inc.
36 5. Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be compelled or required to
37 submit to arbitration any dispute he has not agreed to submit. A party who has
38 not agreed to arbitrate a dispute cannot be forced to relinquish the right to trial.

1 6. Further, under the first step in analysis to decide whether a dispute must be
2 arbitrated under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a party may challenge the
3 validity of an arbitration agreement under general contract principles. 9 U.S.C.A.
4 Sec.1 et seq.; See also In Re David’s Supermarkets, Inc. 43 S.W.3d 94 (2001). In
5 addition, the federal policy favoring arbitration does not apply to the
6 determination of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the
7 parties; instead ordinary contract principles determine who is bound. 9 U.S.C.A
8 Sec. 1 et seq.; Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, opinion
9 supplemental on denial of rehearing 303 F.3d 453.
10 7. Claimant claims that there was an alleged agreement to arbitrate. This would then
11 be governed by provisions under the FAA. Even under the FAA, there must be
12 evidence of a valid agreement. Courts are clear in upholding an agreement to
13 arbitrate must be clear to both parties. Otherwise, the legislative intent of
14 arbitration is abused and devalued. In Stout v. Byrider, 50 F.Supp.2d 733,
15 affirmed 228 F.3d 709, the court held that arbitration is a matter of contract, and
16 thus, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate any claims he or she did not agree to
17 arbitrate when making the contract. In the case at hand, Claimant never agreed to
18 arbitration. Claimant never received any agreement or contract, or information
19 regarding an arbitration clause.
20 8. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A., provides that the purpose of arbitration
21 is to give arbitration agreements the same force and effect as other contracts,
22 where parties expressly agree to submit to disputes to arbitration. Further, there
23 must be a clear agreement to arbitrate. In the case at hand, Respondent did not
24 receive notice or agreement to arbitrate, nor did Respondent ever expressly agree
25 to arbitration. On this basis it is reasonable to assume that Respondent was also
26 not notified of his/her right to opt out of this provision with out impunity.
27 9. No arbitration agreement exists between Respondent and Claimant whatsoever,
28 and none of Respondent’s arguments should be construed to mean that such
29 agreement exists.
30 NO JURISDICTION UNDER THE FAA

1 10. “Federal law preempts state law on issues of arbitrability.” Three Valleys Mun.
2 Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton (9th Cir. 1991) 925 F.2d 1136, 1139. “...a party who
3 contests the making of a contract containing an arbitration provision cannot be
4 compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an agreement to
5 arbitrate. Only a court can make that decision.” Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist.
6 v. E.F. Hutton, at 1140/1141.
7 11. 9 USC Sec. 2 requires a written agreement to arbitrate. The requirement is
8 jurisdictional. Without a written agreement, the FAA does not apply. Further,
9 there is no requirement under the FAA mandating that the jurisdictional defense
10 of “no agreement to arbitrate” be raised within a particular period of time.
11 12. In the alternative, even with Claimant’s assertion that there was an agreement to
12 arbitrate, the alleged agreement is unenforceable. In Badie v. Bank of America,
13 67 Cal.App 4th 779, although a California case, the appellate court held that the
14 alleged agreements in the terms and conditions cannot be construed as agreement
15 to arbitrate. Therefore, even if Respondent had received an agreement to
16 arbitration notice, it would be unenforceable. The court stated that “the initial step
17 in determining whether there is an enforceable ADR agreement between a bank
18 and its customers involves applying ordinary state law principles that govern the
19 formation and interpretation of contracts in order to ascertain whether the parties
20 have agreed to some alternative form of dispute resolution. Under both federal
21 and California state law, arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties.”
22 (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944-945; see also
23 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 56-57, 62-63;
24 Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8.) As the United States
25 Supreme Court has stated, “The ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
26 agreements,’ [citation] . . . is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of
27 private contractual arrangements.” (Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-
28 Plymouth (1985) 473 U.S. 614, 625; see also Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland
29 Stanford Jr. U. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 478.) Similarly, the California Supreme
30 Court has stated that, “[T]he policy favoring arbitration cannot displace the
31 necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate.” (Victoria v. Superior Court

1 (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, italics in original.) “Although ‘[t]he law favors
2 contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties’ [citation omitted], ‘ “there is
3 no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they
4 have not agreed to arbitrate . . . .” ’ [Citation omitted.]” (Id. at pp. 744; see also
5 Arista Films, Inc. v. Gilford Securities, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 495, 501;
6 Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 632, 640.).
7 13. Myers v. MBNA America and North American Capitol Corporation, CV 00-163-
8 M-DWM (D.Mont., March 20, 2001), although not an appellate case, is similar in
9 ruling as the above mentioned Badie case. The judge ruled that a mandatory
10 arbitration clause cannot be enforced. In that case, the arbitration clause in the
11 alleged credit card agreement was held unenforceable because the defendant
12 never agreed under the contractual relationship between parties to arbitrate her
13 dispute with MBNA. The judge found that no such agreement could be implied.
14 The judge further stated that “MBNA skipped offer and went straight to
15 acceptance. . . if MBNA’s argument that Myers agreed to arbitration . . . there
16 would be no reason to stop at arbitration. . . MBNA could amend the agreement
17 to include a provision taking a security interest in Myers’ home or requiring
18 Myers to pay a penalty if she failed to convince three friends to sign up for
19 MBNA cards.” Id.
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21WHEREFORE, there is no consent or agreement on the part of Respondent to arbitrate,
22Respondent respectfully requests that this matter be dismissed as outlined in the Code
23Rule 41 A.
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25_____________________________
26Sue Bear Rue
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29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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31 The undersigned parties hereby certifies that on this date a copy of the foregoing
32document was duly served upon the Claimant by depositing same in the United
33States Mail, postage prepaid, via facsimile and/or hand delivered at their last known
34addresses:

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2 MBNA America Bank, N.A.
3 702 King Farm Blvd.
4 Two Irvington Centre
5 Rockville, MD 20850-5775
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7DATED: , March ____, 2004
8
9 __________________________
10 Sue Bear Rue
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12Sue Bear Rue
131234 Delightful Lane
14Hometown, Michigan 00000
15Respondent
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21 IN THE
22 NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM
23
:
: NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO ARBITRATION
:
: RULE 13A(2)
MBNA America Bank, N.A., : Forum File Number: BR 549
:
Claimant, :
:
v. :
:
Sue Bear Rue :
:
Respondent, :
:
:
25 Respondents motion to strike the so called affidavits of Bruce Buttkiss, Jr.

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27 Brief in support
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29 The putative affidavits of Bruce Buttkiss, Jr. are nullities for the reason that: (1).
30Mr. Bredicakas incorporates documents by reference which Bridicakas did not sign and
31date there for, Bredicakas has no actual knowledge of the articles Bredicakes purports to

1swear to, and (2). The affidavits do not include any actual accounting and therefore are
2merely idealistic and theoretical notions of Bredicakas.
3 Conclusion
4 This forum’s swift to admit that the so-called affidavits are nullities avoids the
5conclusion that the arbitration forum is openly colluding with MBNA America Bank,
6N.A. in violation of 18 USC 1961, 1962 & 1864(a).
7
8
9Prepared and submitted by:
10
11_____________________________
12Sue Bear Rue
13726 Iowa Street
14Ashland, Oregon 97520-2944
15
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18 The undersigned parties hereby certifies that on this date a copy of the foregoing
19document was duly served upon the Claimant by depositing same in the United
20States Mail, postage prepaid, via facsimile and/or hand delivered at their last known
21addresses:
22
23 MBNA America Bank, N.A.
24 702 King Farm Blvd.
25 Two Irvington Centre
26 Rockville, MD 20850-5775
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28DATED: March ____, 2004
29
30 __________________________
31 Sue Bear Rue
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9 PHONE SCRIPTS TO USE WITH THIRD PARTY COLLECTORS
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Commentary
11 on the morality of debt: We believe that if we owe, we should repay. The fallacy is that we
rarely12owe when a collector calls. The following phone scripts are not mean spirited when we realize
that the
13 caller is trying to get us to pay money that we don’t owe!
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In spite
15 of caller id or other screening, if a collector calls you,
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Thank
17you for calling. May I have your full name please? Thank you. Please spell your full name for
me. Now,
18 (their name) what is your social security number? (After listening to their protest say) I just
need 19
to have your identity so I will be suing the correct person if you violate my rights under the fair
debt collections
20 practices act.
21 - or -
Thank
22you for calling. Do I have a contract with your company? (They’ll tell you they’re call regarding
your 23
xyz bill). That’s not my question. Do I have a contract with your company? Don’t ever call me
again.24
25 - or -
Thank
26you for calling. I was not expecting your call and I’ll need a while to look up some helpful
information.
27 Would you please hold? (Don’t wait for their answer. put the phone down and walk away).
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WHAT
5 IF THE SLIMEBALLS FOLLOW THE TRADITIONAL PATH OF CONTACTING YOU
WITH6A DUNNING LETTER?
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Dispute
9 letter to a debt collector (credit card, mortgage or other loan)
10Your Name (print certified mail number here)
11Your address
12City, state, zip code
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14The name of the person who sent you the collection letter
15Their address
16City, state, zip
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18Sir or Madam:
19 You are in receipt of notice under the authority of The Fair Debt Collections
20Practices Act regarding your file #XXXXXXXXXXX #OOOOOOO 000000 RMS008. It
21is not now, nor has it ever been my intention to avoid paying any obligation that I
22lawfully owe. In order that I can make arrangements to pay an obligation which I may
23owe, please document and verify the “debt” by complying in good faith with this request
24for validation and notice that I dispute part of, or all of the alleged debt.
25 1. Please furnish a copy of the original promissory note redacting my social

26security number to prevent identify theft and state under penalty of perjury that your
27client named above is the holder in due course of the promissory note and will produce
28the original for my own and a judge’s inspection should there be a trial to contest these
29matters.
30 2. Please produce the account and general ledger statement showing the full
31accounting of the alleged obligation that you are now attempting to collect.
32 3. Please identify by name and address all persons, corporations, associations, or

33any other parties having an interest in legal proceedings regarding the alleged debt.

1 4. Please verify under penalty of perjury, that as a debt collector, you have not
2purchased evidence of debt and are proceeding with collection activity in the name of the
3original maker of the note.
4 5. Please verify under penalty of perjury that you know and understand that
5certain clauses in a contract of adhesion, such as a so-called forum selection clause, are
6unenforceable unless the party to whom the contract is extended could have rejected the
7clause without impunity.
8 6. Please verify under penalty of perjury that you know and understand that credit
9card contracts are a series of continuing offers to contract and as such are non-
10transferable.
11 7. Please provide verification from the stated creditor that you are authorized to
12act for them.
13 8. Please verify that you know and understand that contacting me again after
14receipt of this notice without providing procedurally proper validation of the debt
15constitutes the use of interstate communications in a scheme of fraud by advancing a
16writing, which you know is false with the intention that others rely on the written
17communication to their detriment.
18Disputing the “debt”
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20Your signature
21Your name
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23month day year
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25Copy to:
26 Consumer Response Center
27 Federal Trade Commission
28 Washington, D.C. 20580
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30Tip: Dayna Breyer, one of the most effective anti-shyters in the country
31recently learned from the horse’s mouth that the Federal Trade
32Commission will be on your side if the creditor has failed to resolve a
33billing error dispute. So, dispute often!
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Dispute
10 letter to a debt collector ( attempting to collect state taxes)
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12Kenney F. Love registered mail number______________________________
13916 E. Maple Blvd.
14Sunnyville, Oklahoma 74000
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16GC Services Limited Partnership
17C/o P.O. Box 271376
18Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73137
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20Jess Moran:
22Practices Act regarding your file #ITIS235242479. It is not now, nor has it ever been my
23intention to avoid paying any obligation that I lawfully owe. In order that I can make
24arrangements to pay an obligation which I may owe, please document and verify the
25“debt” by complying in good faith with this request for validation and notice that I
26dispute part of or all of the alleged debt.
27 1. Please furnish a copy of the assessment this so-called debt is based on redacting
28my social security number to prevent identify theft and state under penalty of perjury that
29Oklahoma Tax Commission is the holder in due course of the original assessment and
30will produce the original for my own and a judge’s inspection should there be a trial to
31contest these matters.
32 2. Please name the person or persons who completed the assessment along with
33their verification under penalty of perjury showing the full accounting of the alleged
34obligation that you are now attempting to collect.
39Oklahoma Tax Commission.
40 5. Please provide verification from the Oklahoma Tax Commission that you are
41authorized to act for them.

2writing, which you know is false with the intention that others rely on the written
5Kenney F. Love
6April 30th 2003
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9Dispute letter to a debt collector ( attempting to collect a bill for services)
10
11Bobby Farmer ( )
12Route 1, Box 60
13Union City, Oklahoma 73090
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15Lawrence R. Scott
162519 N. W. 23rd Street, Suite 204
18
19Sir:
21Practices Act regarding your file “INTEG CANADIAN VALLEY REG.”. It is not now,
22nor has it ever been my intention to avoid paying any obligation that I lawfully owe. In
23order that I can make arrangements to pay an obligation which I may owe, please
24document and verify the “debt” by complying in good faith with this request for
25validation and notice that I dispute part of or all of the alleged debt.
26 1. Please furnish a copy of the original contract redacting my social security

27number to prevent identify theft and state under penalty of perjury that your client is the
28bona fide party in interest of the contract and will produce the original for my own and a
29judge’s inspection should there be a trial to contest these matters.
31accounting of the alleged obligation that you are now attempting to collect.


3original contracting party.
5certain clauses in a contract of adhesion, such as a so-called forum selection clause, are
6unenforceable unless the party to whom the contract is extended could have rejected the
7clause without impunity.
8 6. Please provide verification from the stated creditor that you are authorized to
9act for them.
13writing that you know is false with the intention that others rely on the written
14communication to the detriment of Bobby Farmer.
16
17
18Bobby Farmer
19
20May 28th 2003
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12Dispute letter to a debt collector ( attempting to domesticate a foreign judgment )
13
14Your Name (print certified mail number here)
15Your address
16City, state, zip code
17
18The name of the person who sent you the collection letter
19Their address
20City, state, zip
21
22Sir or Madam:
24Practices Act regarding your file #Il-10969. It is not now, nor has it ever been my
25intention to avoid paying any obligation that I lawfully owe. In order that I can make
26arrangements to pay an obligation which I may owe, please document and verify the
27“debt” by complying in good faith with this request for validation and notice that I
28dispute part of or all of the alleged debt.
29 1. Please furnish a copy of the alleged judgment and document that the court file
30in the original proceeding shows a copy of the original promissory note redacting my
31social security number to prevent identify theft and state under penalty of perjury that the
32judgment debtor named was the holder in due course of the promissory note and will
33produce the original for my own and a judge’s inspection should there be a trial to contest
34these matters. I also request that the “debt” be fully extinguished in the event that I pay
35off the note by returning the original to me Brightered paid in full and signed by an
36officer of the holder in due course.
38accounting of the alleged obligation that the judgment was based on.

5original maker of the note.
6 5. Please verify from the record in the proceedings in case number IL-10969 that
7the record in the trial court established that I was a resident of Illinois, operated a
8business in Illinois, or owned property in Illinois establishing the Illinois Court’s personal
9jurisdiction over me. If personal jurisdiction was based on a forum selection clause,
10please give ten examples of parties who were allowed to line through the forum selection
11clause in the contract of adhesion with the judgment creditor.
13contracts which go to the credit of the parties are non-transferable absent a specific
14enabling clause fully disclosed at the time of contracting and cite the enabling clause in
15the contract the judgment was based on a accompany the document with an affidavit of
16the party co-signing the contract that the transfer clause was fully disclosed to me.
17 7. Please verify under penalty of perjury that you know and understand that credit
18card contracts are a services of continuing offers to contract and as such are non-
19transferable.
20 8. Please provide verification from the stated judgment creditor that you are
21authorized to act for them.
25writing which you know is false with the intention that others rely on the written
28
29Your signature

1Your name
2
3month day year
4
5Copy to:
6 Consumer Response Center
7 Federal Trade Commission
8 Washington, D.C. 20580
9
10 Astute students of the legal industry will recognize that the above and foregoing
11dispute letters go beyond what is required under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.
12So why do they work? Because you are offering to contract with them – otherwise known
13as a conditional acceptance. I have yet to hear of anyone being contacted again after
14sending one of the above letters to a debt collector. Also, very important I advise
15against sending a cease and desist letter or any letter containing the words “cease and
16desist.” A cease and desist letter is an invitation to being sued!
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33What if they get an arbitration award against you? Remember they still have to
34proceed in rem otherwise known as “domestication” of the judgment. When they sue
35for domestication of their judgment, file a motion for summary judgment against
36them as follows:
37
38
39
40
41
42

1
2
3
4
5
6
7Disputing an arbitration award from another state:
8
9State of Wisconsin Circuit Court Dane County
10
11In the Matter of the
12Arbitration between
13
14Mbna America Bank N A 665 Paper Mill Road Stop 1411 Wilmington DE 19884-1411
15A foreign corporation,
16P.O. Box 15168
17Wilmington DE 19850
18
19Vs. Case No. 03-CV 8888
20
21William D. King
22 South CT
23McFarland, Wisconsin 53000
24
25
26 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
27
28
29
30 Brief in support
31
32 William D. King moves this court for summary judgment of this court in favor of
33William D. King.
34 Affidavit
35I, William D. King, of age and competent to testify, state as follows based on my own
36personal knowledge:
371. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Mbna America Bank NA has
38standing to sue in any Wisconsin court by virtue of being duly registered as “Mbna

1America Bank NA,” or by “Mbna America Bank NA” meeting the minimum contacts
2requirements for in personam jurisdiction.
32. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I have a contract with Mbna
4America Bank NA.
53. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I owe Mbna America Bank
6NA money.
74. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Mbna America Bank NA
8authorized this action or is even aware of it.
95. As a result of the harassment of James A. Day, I have been damaged financially,
10socially, and emotionally.
11 ________________________________
12 William D. King
13
14STATE OF _______________ INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
15COUNTY OF _____________
16 Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State on
17this ____ day of ________, 200__, personally appeared __________________________
18to me known to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument
19and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as his free and voluntary act.
20 Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written.
21My commission expires __________
22
23 ________________ Notary Public

24
25
26 Memorandums of law
27
28 Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that arbitration clauses in contracts of
29 adhesion are impermissible under the law and unenforceable
30
31 Mbna America Bank NA’s reliance on an arbitration clause in Mbna’s contracts
32of adhesion is morally, ethically, and legally wrong. See Myers v. MBNA America and
33North American Capitol Corporation, CV 00-163-MDWM (D. Mont. , March 20, 2001),
34Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000), Circuit
35City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002), (citing Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60
36Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Ct.App. 1997), Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038,

11042 (9th Cir. 2001), Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1961),
2Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382(Ct. App. 2001),
3Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002), ACORN v.
4Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002), Mandel v.
5Household Bank, 2003 SL 57282, at *4(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2003) (applying Nevada
6law), Murcuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678 (Ct. App. 2002), Gilmer v.
7Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20 (1991), In re: Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482,
8Shankle v. B-G Maint., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999), In re: Doctor’s
9Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688, and Ting v. AT&T, NO. 02-15416 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2003).
10
11 Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that
12 party alleging to be creditor must prove standing
13
14 Mbna America Bank NA has failed or refused to produce the actual note which
15Mbna America Bank NA alleges William D. King owes. Where the complaining party
16cannot prove the existence of the note, then there is no note. To recover on a promissory
17note, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of the note in question; (2) that the party
18sued signed the note; (3) that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a
19certain balance is due and owing on the note. See In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco
20Homes, Inc. No.98-50117 February 18, 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.) Volume 29
21of the New Jersey Practice Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically states,
22“...; and no part payments should be made on the bond or note unless the person to whom
23payment is made is able to produce the bond or note and the part payments are endorsed
24thereon. It would seem that the mortgagor would normally have a Common law right to
25demand production or surrender of the bond or note and mortgage, as the case may be.
26See Restatement, Contracts S 170(3), (4) (1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469 in Carnegie
27Bank v Shalleck 256 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div 1992), the Appellate Division held, “When
28the underlying mortgage is evidenced by an instrument meeting the criteria for
29negotiability set forth in N.J.S. 12A:3-104, the holder of the instrument shall be afforded
30all the rights and protections provided a holder in due course pursuant to N.J.S. 12A:3-
31302" Since no one is able to produce the “instrument” there is no competent evidence
32before the Court that any party is the holder of the alleged note or the true holder in due

1course. New Jersey common law dictates that the plaintiff prove the existence of the
2alleged note in question, prove that the party sued signed the alleged note, prove that the
3plaintiff is the owner and holder of the alleged note, and prove that certain balance is due
4and owing on any alleged note. Federal Circuit Courts have ruled that the only way to
5prove the perfection of any security is by actual possession of the security. See Matter of
6Staff Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977), “Under the Uniform
7Commercial Code, the only notice sufficient to inform all interested parties that a security
8interest in instruments has been perfected is actual possession by the secured party, his
9agent or bailee.” Bankruptcy Courts have followed the Uniform Commercial Code. In Re
10Investors & Lenders, Ltd. 165 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994), “Under the New Jersey
11Uniform Commercial Code (NJUCC), promissory note is “instrument,” security interest
12in which must be perfected by possession ...”
13
14 Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that to prove
15 damages in foreclosure of a debt, party must enter the account and general ledger
16 statement into the record through a competent fact witness
17
18 To prove up claim of damages, foreclosing party must enter evidence
19incorporating records such as a general ledger and accounting of an alleged unpaid
20promissory note, the person responsible for preparing and maintaining the account
21general ledger must provide a complete accounting which must be sworn to and dated by
22the person who maintained the ledger. See Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62
23Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96
24Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28 Conn. L. Rptr.
25371, (Conn. Super.2000), and Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc. 513
26A.2d 1218, 201 Conn.1 (1986). See also Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Il.
27
28 Mandatory judicial notice
29 Mbna America Bank NA is a subset of the debt collection racket, a wide-spread,

30far-reaching scam of artists such as Rausch, Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C. How the scam
31works: In a back room of the Chicago Board of Trade, worthless bundles of commercial
32paper in the form of copies of charged off debt are sold at auction. The typical face value

1of the bundles often amounts to tens of millions of dollars. The mortgagees are often not
2harmed because they often have hypothecated the loan and have risked nothing. Actors
3up line from such artists as Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C. then break apart the bundles and
4resell the worthless commercial paper in clusters based on the original mortgagee and
5geographic location. Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C. are the actual holders in due course
6although typically in the scam, artists such as Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C. invest as
7little as 75 cents on the hundred face for the worthless commercial paper, then allege they
8are third party debt collectors attempting to collect for the original maker of the loan.
9This racket is particularly heinous in the case of credit card contracts, which as a
10continuing series of offers to contract, are non-transferable. The scam is complete
11when artists such as Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C, with the cooperation of a local judge,
12defraud parties such as William D. King. This scam is wide-spread, far-reaching and the
13main racket of the private business organizations to which artists such as Sturm, Israel &
14Hornik, S.C. belong. For other examples of this racket, see Discover Bank versus
15Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Civil Action File number 03-CV-2295, Muscogee
16County, Georgia, Discover Bank versus Larry Pasket, case number 03-SC-640, Clark
17County, Wisconsin, and Discover Bank versus Roger Braker and Sharon A. Braker, case
18number CS-2003-2488, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Bancorp. V. Carney, Los Angeles
19County, California, case number EC 032786, First USA Bank v. Borum, Oklahoma
20County, Oklahoma case number CS 99-332-25, Bank of America v. Bascom, County of
21Monroe, New York, index number 4522/00, Discounts R. US (a major syndicate player in
22the holder in due course fraud racket) v. Hausler, General Sessions Court, Smith County,
23Tennessee, case number 8758-24-179, Banco Popular v. Plosnich, DuPage County,
24Illinois, case number 98 CH 0913, Citicorp Mortgage v. Tecchio, Monmouth County,
25New Jersey, case number F-12473-97, Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank v.
26Sommers, Caddo County, Oklahoma case number CS-2002 116, Creditors Recovery
27Corporation v. Choisnard, Tulsa County, Oklahoma case number CS 02-7225, First
28Collection Services v. Elowl, General Court of Justice, New Hanover County, North
29Carolina case number 02 SP 338 & 02 SP 598, CitiMortgage v. Lance, Court of
30Common Pleas, County of Orangeburg, South Carolina, docket number 00-CP-38-1033,
31UMB USA Verus David Misurelli, Combined Court Fremont County, Colorado, case

1number 2003C 000890, Capital One Bank versus Barbara Davis and Phil C. Davis,
2Highlands County Michigan, Case number 03-754-SPS, and Conseco Finance
3Corporation v. Ray, Court of Common Pleas, County of Columbia, South Carolina,
4docket number 00-CP-02-397.
5
6
7 Declaration
8 Fifteen days from the verifiable receipt of this motion for summary judgment, an
9order shall be prepared and submitted to the court for ratification, unless prior to that
10time, Mbna America Bank NA presents a competent fact witness to rebut all articles -
11one through four - of William D. King’s affidavit, making their statements under penalty
12of perjury, supporting all the rebutted articles with evidence which would be admissible
13at trial, and sets the matter for hearing.
14
15Prepared and submitted by: _________________________________________________
16 William D. King
17
18 Certificate of service
19I, William D. King, certify that _________________, 2003, I mailed a true and correct
20copy of the above and foregoing motion for summary judgment via certified mail, return
21receipt requested to: Mbna America Bank NA’s agent for service of process.
22
23 ______________________________
24 William D. King
25
27Peg Lautenschlager
28P.O. Box 7857
29Madison, Wisconsin 53707-7857
30
31Courtesy copy to: (slimeball attorney)
32James A. Day
332448 South 102nd Street

1Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53227
2
3
4Answering a confirmation of an arbitration award where the so-called arbitration hearing
5was held in your state depriving you of the defense that the arbitration forum was a
6trespass on you substantive due process rights. Remember: in every lawsuit, there are two
7suits – one to get the judgment, and one to collect the judgment. A confirmation of an
8arbitration award is a variation of an “in rem” proceeding for collection – they still have
9to prove their claim.
10State of Wisconsin Circuit Court Dane County
11
12In the Matter of the
13Arbitration between
14
15Mbna America Bank N A 665 Paper Mill Road Stop 1411 Wilmington DE 19884-1411
16A foreign corporation,
17P.O. Box 15168
18Wilmington DE 19850
19
20Vs. Case No. 03-CV 8888
21
22William D. King
23 South CT
25
26
27 Brief in opposition to confirmation of an arbitration award
28
29
30
31 Brief in support
32
33 William D. King moves this court for summary judgment of this court in favor of
34William D. King.
35 Affidavit
36I, William D. King, of age and competent to testify, state as follows based on my own
381. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Mbna America Bank NA has
39standing to sue in any Wisconsin court by virtue of being duly registered as “Mbna
40America Bank NA,” or by “Mbna America Bank NA” meeting the minimum contacts
41requirements for in personam jurisdiction.

12. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I have a contract with Mbna
2America Bank NA.
33. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I agreed to arbitraton.
44. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Mbna America Bank NA
5authorized this action or is even aware of it.
65. As a result of the harassment of James A. Day, I have been damaged financially,
8 ________________________________
9 William D. King
10
12COUNTY OF _____________
19
20 ________________ Notary Public

21
22
24
25 Title 9, Section 4 provides remedy for failure to engage in arbitration; however,
26absent a written agreement, the federal district court is deprived of jurisdiction to order
27arbitration. Forum selection clauses in contracts of adhesion are unenforceable if the
28clause is expressed in fine print, placed in the contract to avoid litigation, or if the forum
29selection clause could not have been disputed without impunity as part of a freely
30negotiated contract. See Johnson and Johnson, v. Holland America Line-Westours, Inc.,
31557 N.W.2d 475, Forum selection clause must be reasonable communicate terms and be
32fundamentally fair Deiro v. American Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987).
33The forum selection clause must be “fundamentally fair.” Shute, 499 U.S. at 595, In re:
34Hodes, 858 F.2d at 908, and Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 866 (1st
35Cir. 1983).

1
4
5 Mbna America Bank NA has failed or refused to produce the actual note which
6Mbna America Bank NA alleges William D. King owes. Where the complaining party
7cannot prove the existence of the note, then there is no note. To recover on a promissory

4
5
9
19
21 Mbna America Bank NA is a subset of the debt collection racket, a wide-spread,

22far-reaching scam of artists such as Rausch, Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C. How the scam
27up line from such artists as Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C. then break apart the bundles and
28resell the worthless commercial paper in clusters based on the original mortgagee and
29geographic location. Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C. are the actual holders in due course
30although typically in the scam, artists such as Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C. invest as
31little as 75 cents on the hundred face for the worthless commercial paper, then allege they
32are third party debt collectors attempting to collect for the original maker of the loan.

1This racket is particularly heinous in the case of credit card contracts, which as a
2continuing series of offers to contract, are non-transferable. The scam is complete
3when artists such as Sturm, Israel & Hornik, S.C, with the cooperation of a local judge,
4defraud parties such as William D. King. This scam is wide-spread, far-reaching and the
5main racket of the private business organizations to which artists such as Sturm, Israel &
6Hornik, S.C. belong. For other examples of this racket, see Discover Bank versus
7Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Civil Action File number 03-CV-2295, Muscogee
8County, Georgia, Discover Bank versus Larry Pasket, case number 03-SC-640, Clark
9County, Wisconsin, and Discover Bank versus Roger Braker and Sharon A. Braker, case
10number CS-2003-2488, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Bancorp. V. Carney, Los Angeles
11County, California, case number EC 032786, First USA Bank v. Borum, Oklahoma
12County, Oklahoma case number CS 99-332-25, Bank of America v. Bascom, County of
13Monroe, New York, index number 4522/00, Discounts R. US (a major syndicate player in
14the holder in due course fraud racket) v. Hausler, General Sessions Court, Smith County,
23UMB USA Verus David Misurelli, Combined Court Fremont County, Colorado, case
28
29
30 Declaration

1 Fifteen days from the verifiable receipt of this motion for summary judgment, an
2order shall be prepared and submitted to the court for ratification, unless prior to that
3time, Mbna America Bank NA presents a competent fact witness to rebut all articles -
4one through four - of William D. King’s affidavit, making their statements under penalty
5of perjury, supporting all the rebutted articles with evidence which would be admissible
6at trial, and sets the matter for hearing.
7
9 William D. King
10
12I, William D. King, certify that _________________, 2003, I mailed a true and correct
13copy of the above and foregoing motion for summary judgment via certified mail, return
14receipt requested to: Mbna America Bank NA’s agent for service of process.
15
16 ______________________________
17 William D. King
18
21P.O. Box 7857
23
24Courtesy copy to: (slimeball attorney)
25James A. Day
262448 South 102nd Street
28
29
30Like I say, hit them hard!
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

1
2
3
4
5
6
7What if they give up on collections and file suit against you? File a motion to dismiss
8their suit.
9STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT CLARK COUNTY
10
11Discover Bank
12 Plaintiff,
13
14Vs. Defendant’s motion to dismiss
15 Case Number 03-SC-3333
16Larry Cherry,
17An individual
18N12654 Golden Ave.
19Glenwood, Wisconsin 54444
20 Defendant.
21
22 Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
23 a claim upon which relief can be granted
24
25 Brief in support
26
27 Larry Cherry motions this court to dismiss case numbered as 03-SC-640 with
28prejudice. Discover Bank has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
29 Affidavit
30I, Larry Cherry, of age and competent to testify, state as follows based on my own
321. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that corporations have standing to
33sue in the small claims courts of Wisconsin.
342. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Discover Bank has standing to
35sue in any Wisconsin court by virtue of being duly registered as “Discover Bank,” or by
36“Discover Bank” meeting the minimum contacts requirements for in personam
37jurisdiction in Wisconsin.
383. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I have a contract with
39Discover Bank.

14. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I owe Discover Bank money.
25. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Discover Bank authorized this
3action or is even aware of it.
46. As a result of the harassment by Matthew J. Richburg, I have been damaged
5financially, socially, and emotionally.
6
7 ________________________________
8 Larry Cherry
9
11COUNTY OF _____________
18
19 ________________ Notary Public

20
24
25 Matthew J. Richburg failed or refused to produce the actual note which Discover
26Bank alleges Larry Cherry owes. Where the complaining party can not prove the
27existence of the note, then there is no note. To recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff
28must prove: (1) the existence of the note in question; (2) that the party sued signed the
29note; (3) that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a certain balance
30is due and owing on the note. See In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes, Inc.
31No.98-50117 February 18, 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.) Volume 29 of the New
32Jersey Practice Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically states, “...; and no
33part payments should be made on the bond or note unless the person to whom payment is
34made is able to produce the bond or note and the part payments are endorsed thereon. It

1would seem that the mortgagor would normally have a Common law right to demand
2production or surrender of the bond or note and mortgage, as the case may be. See
3Restatement, Contracts S 170(3), (4) (1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469 in Carnegie Bank v
4Shalleck 256 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div 1992), the Appellate Division held, “When the
5underlying mortgage is evidenced by an instrument meeting the criteria for negotiability
6set forth in N.J.S. 12A:3-104, the holder of the instrument shall be afforded all the rights
7and protections provided a holder in due course pursuant to N.J.S. 12A:3-302" Since no
8one is able to produce the “instrument” there is no competent evidence before the Court
9that any party is the holder of the alleged note or the true holder in due course. New
10Jersey common law dictates that the plaintiff prove the existence of the alleged note in
11question, prove that the party sued signed the alleged note, prove that the plaintiff is the
12owner and holder of the alleged note, and prove that certain balance is due and owing on
13any alleged note. Federal Circuit Courts have ruled that the only way to prove the
14perfection of any security is by actual possession of the security. See Matter of Staff
15Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977), “Under the Uniform Commercial
16Code, the only notice sufficient to inform all interested parties that a security interest in
17instruments has been perfected is actual possession by the secured party, his agent or
18bailee.” Bankruptcy Courts have followed the Uniform Commercial Code. In Re
22
26

5
6
8 Discover Bank is a subset of the debt collection racket, a wide-spread, far-
9reaching scam of artists such as Matthew J. Richburg. How the scam works: In a back
10room of the Chicago Board of Trade, worthless bundles of commercial paper in the form
11of copies of charged off debt are sold at auction. The typical face value of the bundles
12often amounts to tens of millions of dollars. The mortgagees are often not harmed
13because they often have hypothecated the loan and have risked nothing. Actors up line
14from such artists as Kohn Law Firm S.C. then break apart the bundles and resell the
15worthless commercial paper in clusters based on the original mortgagee and geographic
16location of the individual copies. Artists such as Kohn Law Firm S.C. are the actual
17holders in due course although typically in the scam, artists such as Kohn Law Firm S.C.
18invest as little as 75 cents on the hundred face for the worthless commercial paper, then
19allege they are third party debt collectors attempting to collect for the original maker of
20the loan. This racket is particularly heinous in the case of credit card contracts, which as a
21continuing series of offers to contract, are non-transferable. The scam is complete when
22artists such as Matthew J. Richburg, with the cooperation of a local judge, defraud parties
23such as Larry Cherry. This scam is wide-spread, far-reaching and the main racket of the
24private business organizations to which artists such as Matthew J. Richburg belong. For
25other examples of this racket specifically involving “Discover Bank” see Discover Bank

1versus Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Civil Action File number 03-CV-2295,
2Muscogee County, Georgia, Discover Bank versus Naomi R. Williams, case number 02-
3CVF 1514, Rocky River Municipal court, Rocky River, Ohio, and Discover Bank versus
4Roger Braker and Sharon A. Braker, case number CS-2003-2488, Oklahoma County,
5Oklahoma. This court’s inquiry, reasonable under the circumstances, establishes a
6pattern of racketeering with Discover Bank as the enterprise unless Discover Bank
7enters an appearance in this instant case and joins in the vacation of void judgment
8number 02-CVF-1514.
9 Declaration
10 September 23rd 2003, an order shall be prepared and submitted to the court for
11ratification, unless prior to that time, Discover Bank presents a competent fact witness to
12rebut all articles - one through five - of Larry Cherry affidavit, making their statements
13under penalty of perjury, supporting all the rebutted articles with evidence which would
14be admissible at trial.
16 Larry Cherry
17Certificate of service
18I, Larry Cherry, certify that _________________, 2003, I mailed a true and correct copy
19of the above and foregoing motion to dismiss via certified mail, return receipt requested
20to: Discover Bank’s agent for service of process.
21
22 ______________________________
23 Larry Cherry
24Copy to:
26P.O. Box 7857
28
29
30

1
2
3How to respond to some slimeball’s answer to your motion to dismiss.
4
5
6
7
8
9STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT CLARK COUNTY
10
11Discover Bank
12 Plaintiff,
13
14Vs. Defendant’s reply, response, and counter
15 motion for summary judgment
16 Case Number 03-SC-333
17Larry Cherry,
18
19 Defendant.
20
21 Defendant’s reply to plaintiff’s brief in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss /
22 response to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment /
23 defendant’s counter motion for summary judgment
24
25 Reply to plaintiff’s brief in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss
26
27 Matthew J. Richburg’s brief in opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss is a
28substantive and procedural nullity, frivolous on its face. Richburg purports to state facts
29in Richburg’s so-called STATEMENT OF FACTS; however, as all competent legal
30advisors know, statements of counsel in brief or in argument are not facts before the
31court. What Richburg calls facts are in actuality Richburg’s theories and conclusions
32about this instant case. There being no attempt to state actual facts through a competent
33fact witness, this court cannot notice the conclusory materials contained in Richburg’s so-
34called statement of facts; for as all competent legal advisors know, a party cannot be both
35witness and counsel in the same cause. See United States v. Lovasco (06/09/77) 431
36U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, Gonzales v. Buist. (04/01/12) 224 U.S. 126,
3756 L. Ed. 693, 32 S. Ct. 463, Holt v. United States, (10/31/10) 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed.
381021, 31 S. Ct. 2, Telephone Cases. Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Company,
39Molecular Telephone Company v. American Bell Telephone Company. American Bell
40Telephone Company v.. Molecular Telephone Company, Clay Commercial Telephone

1Company v. American Bell Telephone Company, People’s Telephone Company v.
2American Bell Telephone Company, Overland Telephone Company v. American Bell
3Telephone Company,. (PART TWO OF THREE) (03/19/88) 126 U.S. 1, 31 L. Ed. 863, 8
4S. Ct. 778, and Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D. C. Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647.
5 Response to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment: rebuttal of Matthew J. Richburg’s
6 patently frivolous arguments
7
8Rebuttal of Mr. Richburg’s frivolous argument: “I. This Court has personal
9jurisdiction over the defendant and defendant’s motion to dismiss should be
10denied.” Matthew J. Richburg is literally so ignorant that he doesn’t know the difference
11between those elements for personal jurisdiction over a defendant which are: domiciled in
12a jurisdiction, operating a business in a jurisdiction, owning property within a
13jurisdiction, or committing an act within a jurisdiction, and standing to sue within a
14jurisdiction which relies on either being licensed to do business in a jurisdiction or
15evidence minimum contacts within the jurisdiction. This court is noticed: Discover
16Bank failed or refused to rebut the affidavit of Larry Cherry challenging the
17standing of Discover Bank to sue. The following fact is before this court: This court
18does not have jurisdiction over this instant case for reason that Discover Bank lacks
19standing to sue in Wisconsin courts.
20
21Rebuttal of Mr. Richburg’s frivolous argument: “II. Plaintiff’s complaint does state a
22claim upon which relief can be granted and defendant’s motion to dismiss should be
23denied.” Again, Matthew J. Richburg demonstrates his incompetence in the law. To
24state a claim in a debt collection action, plaintiff must show: (1). Standing to sue in the
25venue, (2). Standing to sue by actual possession of the note, and (2). Damages as
26evidenced by the account and general ledger statement signed and dated by the party
27responsible for account. This court is noticed: Larry Cherry challenged whether
28Discover Bank had a contract with Larry Cherry, whether Larry Cherry owed
29Discover Bank money, and whether Discover Bank authorized this action. This
30court is further noticed: Discover Bank failed or refused to rebut Larry Cherry’s
31affidavit: This court has actual knowledge: Discover Bank does not have a contract

1with Larry Cherry; Larry Cherry does not owe Discover Bank money; Discover
2Bank did not authorize this action.
3Rebuttal of Mr. Richburg’s frivolous argument: “III. There is no genuine issue as to
4any material fact, and the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
5law.” Richburg is correct: there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; however, it is
6Larry Cherry who is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
7
8 Defendant Larry Cherry’s motion for summary judgment
9 Brief in support
10 Triable issues of material fact to which there is no dispute: (1). Discover Bank
11lacks standing to sue in Wisconsin courts, (2). Discover Bank has no contract with Larry
12Cherry, (3). Larry Cherry does not owe Discover Bank money, (4). Discover Bank did
13not authorize this action, and (5). Larry Cherry has been damaged financially, socially,
14and emotionally by this frivolous action.
15 Conclusion, remedy sought, and prayer for relief
16 The cause of justice and proper administration of law require judgment for Larry
17Cherry and against Discover Bank along with monetary sanctions applied against
18Matthew J. Richburg sufficient to amend Richburg’s bad behavior of filing a patently
19frivolous lawsuit. This court’s swift response to apply the remedy avoids the conclusion
20that this court is willfully involved in violation of law including law occurring at 18 USC
21§ § 1961, 1962, & 1964(a).
23 Larry Cherry
25I, Larry Cherry, certify that _________________, 2003, I mailed a true and correct copy
26of the above and foregoing reply, response and motion to: Matthew J. Richburg, 312 E.
27Wisconsin Ave. Suite 501, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 53202-4305.
28 ______________________________
29 Larry Cherry
30Copy to:
32P.O. Box 7857

1
2
3What if the court (judge) denies your motion to dismiss? File an answer and a
4counterclaim:
5COMBINED COURT OF FREMONT COUNTY, COLORADO
6
7Fremont County Courthouse
8136 Justice Center Rd.
9Canon City, Colorado 81212
10 ______________________________
12 Case Number: 2003C 000000
13__________________________________________
14 Division A
15UMB USA,
16 Plaintiff and defendant on counterclaim
17
18David Majestic
19 Defendant and plaintiff on counterclaim
20_______________________________________________________________________
21_
22 Answer and counterclaim
23_______________________________________________________________________
24_
25
26
27 Answer brief
28
29 FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: This court is deprived of subject matter
30jurisdiction to hear UMB USA’s claim. Third party debt collectors and racketeers,
31Kuhlman and Kuhlman violated David Majestic’s due process rights by proceeding with
32collection activity without validating the debt. Documents proffered by Kuhlman and
33Kuhlman are insufficient to validate the alleged debt.
34 SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: David Majestic denies that UMB USA
35has standing to bring suit in Colorado courts and demands strict proof.
36 THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: David Majestic denies that UMB USA is a
37current contract holder with David Majestic and demands strict proof.
38 FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: David Majestic denies that David
39Majestic owes UMB USA money and demands strict proof.

1 FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: This court is deprived of subject matter
2jurisdiction to rule favorably for UMB USA for reason that UMB USA, by and through
3Kuhlman & Kuhlman have worked a fraud on this court.
4
5
6 Brief in support of counterclaim
7 UMB USA by and through Kenton H. Kuhlman and Kuhlman & Kuhlman have
8committed fraud by preparing and submitting false documents to this court with the
9intention that this court and David Majestic rely on the false documents to the detriment
10of David Majestic
11 Affidavit
12I, David Majestic, of age and competent to testify, state as follows based on my own
141. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that UMB USA has standing to sue
15in any Colorado court by virtue of being duly registered as “UMB USA,” or by “UMB
16USA” meeting the minimum contacts requirements for in personam jurisdiction.
172. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I have a contract with UMB
18USA.
193. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I owe UMB USA money.
204. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that UMB USA authorized this
21action or is even aware of it.
225. As a result of the harassment of Kenton H. Kuhlman, I have been damaged financially,
23socially, and emotionally, ________________________________
24 David Majestic
25
27COUNTY OF _____________
34 ________________ Notary Public

1
2
3 Second mandatory judicial notice
4 This court was previously informed that UMB USA and Kuhlman & Kuhlman are
5involved in racketeering. This court breached duty occurring at 18 USC 4 to make
6inquiry, and for reason that this court has actual knowledge that UMB USA failed to
7rebut the affidavit of David Majestic, this court has willfully acceded to fraud absent this
8court’s swift response to dismiss UMB USA’s fraudulent claim sua sponte and assist in
9the prosecution of UMB USA and Kuhlman & Kuhlman under authority of 18 USC 1961
10& 1962.
11 Remedy sought and prayer for relief
12 The rule of law requires dismissal of UMB USA’s claim with prejudice, remand
13of UMB USA and Kuhlman & Kuhlman to other authority for prosecution, and subject
14to a jury’s determination that UMB USA and Kuhlman & Kuhlman have committed
15fraud, whatever sum is necessary to amend the bad behavior of UMB USA and Kuhlman
16& Kuhlman.
17
18TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED
19
21 David Majestic
23I, David Majestic, certify that _________________, 2003, I mailed a true and correct
24copy of the above and foregoing answer and counterclaim via certified mail, return
25receipt requested to: Kenton H. Kuhlman, 5290 DTC Parkway, Suite 170, Greenwood
26Village, Colorado 80111-2764
27
28 ______________________________
29 David Majestic
30Copy to:
31Ken Salazar
321525 Sherman St. 7th floor
33Denver, Colorado 80203
34
35

1Or, skip being “Mr. Nice Guy” and go for the jugular! NOTICE IN THIS
2STRATEGY, WE LAUNCH DISCOVERY UP FRONT.
3
4
5Docket number CV-03—00000
6
7Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. ) Superior Court
8 ) Middlesex Judicial
9 plaintiff and defendant on counterclaim, ) District
10 )
11 v. )
12 )
13David P. Aaron, )
14 )
15 defendant and plaintiff on counterclaim. )
16
17 Defendant’s amended answer and counterclaim
18
19 Brief in support of answer
20 David P. Aaron disputes that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. has standing to sue in
21Connecticut courts and demands strict proof.
22 David P. Aaron disputes that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s corporate charter
23authorizes Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. to engage in consumer lending and demands
24strict proof.
25 David P. Aaron disputes that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s corporate charter
26authorizes Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. to sue in foreclosure of consumer debt and
27demands strict proof.
28 David P. Aaron disputes that David P. Aaron has a contract with Citibank (South
29Dakota) N.A. and demands strict proof.
30 David P. Aaron disputes that David P. Aaron owes Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
31money and demands strict proof.
32 David P. Aaron disputes that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. authorized this action
33by delegating authority to Solomon and Solomon, P.C. of 5 Columbia Circle, Albany,
34New York and demands strict proof.
35
36 Brief in support of counterclaim

1 Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., by and through Solomon and Solomon, P.C. has
2committed fraud by preparing and submitting a known false document to this court with
3the intention that David P. Aaron rely on the false document to deprive David P. Aaron
4of money and property. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., by and through Solomon and
5Solomon, P.C. falsely alleges that David P. Aaron has a contract with Citibank (South
6Dakota) N.A., and fraudulently alleges that David P. Aaron owes Citibank (South
7Dakota) N.A. the sum of $7,653.30 warranting damages to be paid to David P. Aaron in a
8sum of not less than twenty-two thousand, nine hundred fifty nine dollars and ninety
9cents ($22,959.90) or the standard damages for fraud.
10
11
12 Prepared and submitted by:
13 ____________________
14 David P. Aaron
15 3 Ridgefield Drive
16 Middletown, CT 06444
17
18
20
21 I, David P. Aaron, certify that February ____, 2004, I mailed a true and correct
22 copy of the above and foregoing answer and counterclaim to:
23
24 Linda Clark Devaney
25 5 Columbia Circle
26 Albany, New York 12203
27
28 ________________________
29 David P. Aaron
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
13 )
14 v. )
15 )
16David P. Aaron, )
17 )
19
20
21 Defendant’s request for admissions to plaintiff Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
22
23To: Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. (please note: where discovery requests are directed to
24a corporation, counsel for the corporation is required to nominate officers of the
25corporation to answer).
26
27 Defendant, David P. Aaron, submits the following request for admissions to
28plaintiff Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. You are required to answer each request for
29admissions separately and fully, in writing, under oath, and to serve a copy of the
30responses upon David P. Aaron within (30) days after service of these requests for
31admissions.
32 Instructions
33 1. These requests for admissions are directed toward all information known or
34available to Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. including information contained in the records
35and documents in Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s custody or control or available to
36Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. upon reasonable inquiry. Where requests for admissions
37cannot be answered in full, they shall be answered as completely as possible and
38incomplete answers shall be accompanied by a specification of the reasons for the
39incompleteness of the answer and of whatever actual knowledge is possessed with respect
40to each unanswered or incompletely answered request for admission.

1 2. Each request for admissions is to be deemed a continuing one. If, after serving
2an answer to any request for an admission, you obtain or become aware of any further
3information pertaining to that request for admission, you are requested to serve a
4supplemental answer setting forth such information.
5 3. As to every request for an admission which you fail to answer in whole or in
6part, the subject matter of that admission will be deemed confessed and stipulated as fact
7to the court.
8 Definitions
9 a. “You” and “your” include Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. and any and all
10persons acting for or in concert with Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
11 b. “Document” includes every piece of paper held in your possession or generated
12by you.
13 Requests for admissions
14First admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. is not licensed to do
15business in Connecticut by virtue of being registered with the Secretary of State of
16Banking and nominating an agent for service of process.
17Admitted____
18Denied____
19Second admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. has no regular,
20systematic way of doing business in Connecticut, also known as “minimum contacts” as
21would be evidenced by such things as yellow pages listings for Citibank (South Dakota)
22N.A and logos appearing at retail outlets clearly signing “Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.”
23Admitted____
24Denied____
25Third admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s charter does not
26authorize Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. to engage in consumer lending.
27Admitted____
28Denied____
29Fourth admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s charter does not
30authorize Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. to bring suits in foreclosure of consumer debts.
31Admitted____

1Denied____
2
3
4
5Fifth admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s is not the present
6holder of a contract with David P. Aaron.
7Admitted____
8Denied____
9Sixth admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. sold the contract
10which Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. had with David P. Aaron.
11Admitted____
12Denied____
13Seventh admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. has been informed
14by counsel that a credit card contract is a continuing series of offers to contract and as
15such is not transferable.
16Admitted____
17Denied____
18Eighth admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. never had any sums
19of money or capital at risk in the contract with David P. Aaron.
20Admitted____
21Denied____
22Ninth admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. possesses no
23account and general ledger statement verifying that David P. Aaron presently owes
24Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. money.
25Admitted____
26Denied____
27Tenth admission: Admit or deny that officers of Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. know and
28understand that after a credit card is charged off, it is common practice to sell the charged
29off debt for deep discounts to lawyers in the debt collection business.
30Admitted____
31Denied____

1
2
3
4
5Eleventh admission: Admit or deny that officers of Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. know
6and understand that attorneys who purchase evidence of debt and then file lawsuits in the
7name of the original maker of the debt are committing felony fraud.
8Admitted____
9Denied____
10Twelfth admission: Admit or deny that officers of Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. know
11and understand that Solomon and Solomon P.C. routinely purchases evidence of debt
12from Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., then rely on Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. to aid and
13abet felony fraud.
14Admitted____
15Denied____
16Thirteenth admission: Admit or deny that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. cannot be
17affected financially by the outcome of litigation against David P. Aaron, as, if the suit is
18lost, it is Solomon and Solomon P.C.’s loss, and if the suit is won, it is Solomon and
19Solomon P.C.’s win.
20Admitted____
21Denied____
22
23____________________ _________
24__________________________________________
25 Print name title Officer of Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
26 State of __________________
27 County of __________________
28
29 Before me this day appeared _____________________, known to me as
30 the person who made the above and foregoing statements of his own free will.
31

1 My commission expires ___________
2
3 _____________________________
4
5 Notary
6Prepared and submitted by: ________________________
7 David P. Aaron
8
10I, David P. Aaron, certify that ___________ ____, 2004, I mailed a true and correct copy
11of the above and foregoing request for admissions via certified mail, return receipt
12requested to:
13
15 5 Columbia Circle
17
18 ________________________
19 David P. Aaron
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
13 )
14 v. )
15 )
16David P. Aaron, )
17 )
19
20 Defendant’s request for production of documents to
21 plaintiff Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
22
23To: Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
24
25 Defendant, David P. Aaron, submits the following request for production of
26documents to plaintiff Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. You are required to inform David P.
27Aaron of the date, place, and time that David P. Aaron can view the documents (in
28Middletown, Connecticut) and make copies. Alternately, you can furnish David P. Aaron
29with verified copies of all documents. If the document does not exist, you are required to
30state that it does not exist. Failure to comply fully or partially with this request within
31thirty days of receipt of service shall be deemed a confession that the document does not
32exist or that Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. is committing fraud by concealment.
33 Instructions
34 1. These requests for production of documents is directed toward all information
35known or available to Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. including information contained in
36the records and documents in Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s custody or control or
37available to Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. upon reasonable inquiry.
38 2. Each request for production of documents is to be deemed a continuing one. If,
39after serving an answer to any request for an admission, you obtain or become aware of

1any further information pertaining to that requested production of documents, you are
2requested to serve a supplemental answer setting forth such information.
3
4
5
6 Definitions
7 a. “You” and “your” include Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. and any and all
8persons acting for or in concert with Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
10by you.
11 Requests for production of documents
12First document: All pages, front and back of Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.’s corporate
13charter.
14
15Second document: The account and general ledger of each and every contract Citibank
16(South Dakota) N.A. alleges David P. Aaron has with Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
17showing all receipts and disbursements, verified under penalty of perjury by an employee
18of Citibank (South Dakota) N. A.
19
20Third document: The copy, front and back, of the contract Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
21alleges David P. Aaron has with Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. showing any and all
22assignments or allonges.
23
24Fourth document: The copy, front and back, of the contract for services which Citibank
25(South Dakota) N.A has with Solomon and Solomon, P.C.
26
28 David P. Aaron
29

1I, David P. Aaron, certify that ___________ ____, 2004, I mailed a true and correct copy
2of the above and foregoing request for production of documents via certified mail, return
3receipt requested to:
5 5 Columbia Circle
7 ________________________
8 David P. Aaron
9
10What if your time to answer is past? File a motion for a summary judgment.
11 State of Michigan
12 In the 45-B Judicial District Court
13
14
15Discover Bank
16
17 Plaintiff,
18
19Vs. Case No. 03-11111 GC
20
21John W. Smart
22Donna Smart
23
24 Defendants.
25___________________________/
26
27 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
28
29
30 Brief in support
31
32 John W. Smart and Donna Smart move this court for summary judgment of this
33court in favor of John W. Smart and Donna Smart.
34
35 Affidavit
36I, John W. Smart, of age and competent to testify, state as follows based on my own
39sue in any Michigan court by virtue of being duly registered as “Discover Bank,” or by
41jurisdiction.

2Discover Bank.
44. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Capital One Bank authorized
5this action or is even aware of it.
65. As a result of the harassment of Alma L. Tyler, I have been damaged financially,
8 ________________________________
9 John W. Smart
10
12COUNTY OF _____________
19 ________________ Notary Public
20 Affidavit
21I, Donna Smart, of age and competent to testify, state as follows based on my own
24sue in any Michigan court by virtue of being duly registered as “Discover Bank,” or by
26jurisdiction.
28Discover Bank.
304. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Capital One Bank authorized
31this action or is even aware of it.
325. As a result of the harassment of Alma L. Tyler, I have been damaged financially,
34 ________________________________
35 Donna Smart

2COUNTY OF _____________
9 ________________ Notary Public
10
12
15
16 Discover Bank has failed or refused to produce the actual note which Discover
17Bank alleges John W. Smart and Donna Smart owe. Where the complaining party cannot
18prove the existence of the note, then there is no note. To recover on a promissory note,
19the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of the note in question; (2) that the party sued
20signed the note; (3) that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a

12
16
26
27 Memorandum in support of the point of law that when jurisdiction is challenged, the
28 party claiming that the court has jurisdiction has the legal burden to prove that
29 jurisdiction was conferred upon the court through the proper procedure. Otherwise, the
30 court is without jurisdiction.
31
32 Whenever a party denies that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it becomes
33the duty and the burden of the party claiming that the court has subject matter jurisdiction
34to provide evidence from the record of the case that the court holds subject-matter

1jurisdiction. Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist.
21991) ("the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it."). Until the
3plaintiff submits uncontroversial evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction to the court that
4the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the court is proceeding without subject-matter
5jurisdiction. Loos v American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d
6841(1988)("Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the
7plaintiff."). The law places the duty and burden of subject-matter jurisdiction upon the
8plaintiff. Should the court attempt to place the burden upon the defendant, the court has
9acted against the law, violates the defendant's due process rights, and the judge has
10immediately lost subject-matter jurisdiction.
11
13 Discover Bank is a subset of the debt collection racket, a wide-spread, far-

14reaching scam of artists such as Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L. P.A. How the scam
19up line from such artists as Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L. P.A. then break apart the
20bundles and resell the worthless commercial paper in clusters based on the original
21mortgagee and geographic location. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L. P.A. are the
22actual holders in due course although typically in the scam, artists such as Weltman,
23Weinberg & Reis Co., L. P.A. invest as little as 75 cents on the hundred face for the
24worthless commercial paper, then allege they are third party debt collectors attempting to
25collect for the original maker of the loan. This racket is particularly heinous in the
26case of credit card contracts, which as a continuing series of offers to contract, are
27non-transferable. The scam is complete when artists such as Weltman, Weinberg & Reis
28Co., L. P.A., with the cooperation of a local judge, defraud parties such as John W. Smart
29and Donna Smart. This scam is wide-spread, far-reaching and the main racket of the
30private business organizations to which artists such as Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co.,
31L. P.A. belong. For other examples of this racket, see Discover Bank versus Angie G.

1Walker and Esler C. Walker, Civil Action File number 03-CV-2295, Muscogee County,
2Georgia, Discover Bank versus Larry Pasket, case number 03-SC-640, Clark County,
3Wisconsin, and Discover Bank versus Roger Braker and Sharon A. Braker, case number
4CS-2003-2488, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Bancorp. V. Carney, Los Angeles County,
5California, case number EC 032786, First USA Bank v. Borum, Oklahoma County,
6Oklahoma case number CS 99-332-25, Bank of America v. Bascom, County of Monroe,
7New York, index number 4522/00, Discounts R. US (a major syndicate player in the
8holder in due course fraud racket) v. Hausler, General Sessions Court, Smith County,
17UMB USA Verus David Majestic, Combined Court Fremont County, Colorado, case
22
23 Declaration
24 Fifteen days from the verifiable receipt of this petition to vacate, an order shall be
25prepared and submitted to the court for ratification, unless prior to that time, Discover
26Bank presents a competent fact witness to rebut all articles - one through four - of John
27W. Smart and Donna Smart’s affidavits, making their statements under penalty of
28perjury, supporting all the rebutted articles with evidence which would be admissible at
29trial, and sets the matter for hearing.
31 John W. Smart Donna Smart

2I, John W. Smart, certify that _________________, 2003, I mailed a true and correct
3copy of the above and foregoing motion to dismiss via certified mail, return receipt
4requested to: Discover Bank’s agent for service of process.
5 ______________________________
6 John W. Smart
7What if the court you’re in has magistrate judges or referees who make
8recommendations to the court? OBJECT!
9 Rocky River Municipal Court
10 21012 Hilliard Blvd., Rocky River, Ohio 44116-3398
11 440,333,2003
12
13 September 16th 2003
14
15Discover Bank
16 Plaintiff,
17
18Vs.
19
20Naomi R. Sweet,
21P.O. Box 549
22Westlake, Ohio 44444
23 Defendant.
24
25 Defendant’s objection to the magistrate’s recommendation
26
27 Naomi R. Sweet objects to the Magistrate’s recommendation that Naomi R.
28Sweet’ motion to vacate be denied.
29 Grounds for objection
30 No court has authority to deny a jurisdictional challenge. No court has judicial
31authority to make a judicial ruling on a jurisdictional challenge. A jurisdictional
32challenge is only resolved one of two ways: (1). The party asserting jurisdiction, in this
33case Discover Bank, proving jurisdiction by showing on the record that (1).
34Corporations have standing to sue in the municipal courts of Ohio, (2). that Discover
35Bank has standing to sue in Ohio courts by virtue of being duly registered as “Discover
36Bank,” or by “Discover Bank” meeting the minimum contacts requirements for in
37personam jurisdiction, (3). Verifying that Ohio municipal courts have subject matter
38jurisdiction to litigate breach of contract cases. (4). verifying that Ohio municipal courts

1have subject matter jurisdiction to litigate civil cases involving controversy amounts
2exceeding fourteen thousand dollars. (5). Verifying that Naomi R. Sweet has a contract
3with Discover Bank, (6). verifying that Naomi R. Sweet owes Discover Bank money, and
4(7). Verification that Discover Bank authorized this action OR, without each and every
5one of this items being verified on the record, the matter is void.
6 It is immaterial if the case is closed as there is no statute of limitations applying to
7void judgments. A “void judgment” as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense
8to actions taken there under, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus
9here, by ). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to
10be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have
11grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen
12the old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and
13adjudication had never been. 10/13/58 FRITTS v. KRUGH. SUPREME COURT OF
14MICHIGAN, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97.
15 Notice to the court
16 Irrespective of whether a party moves to vacate a judgment, Ohio courts have
17inherent authority to vacate a void judgment. Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68.
18A void judgment is one that is rendered by a court that is "wholly without jurisdiction or
19power to proceed in that manner." In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192, 195, 105
20N.E.2d 35, 37. A judgment is void ab initio where a court rendering the judgment has no
21jurisdiction over the person. Records Deposition Service, Inc. v. Henderson & Goldberg,
22P.C. (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 495, 502; Compuserve, Inc. v. Trionfo (1993), 91 Ohio
23App.3d 157, 161; Sperry v. Hlutke (1984), 19 Ohio App.3d 156. In Van DeRyt v. Van
24DeRyt (1966), 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 36, 35 Ohio Op. 2d 42, 45, 215 N.E.2d 698,704, we
25stated, "A court has an inherent power to vacate a void judgment because such an order
26simply recognizes the fact that the judgment was always a nullity." Service of process
27must be reasonably calculated to notify interested parties of the pendency of an action
28and afford them an opportunity to respond. A default judgment rendered without proper
29service is void. A court has the inherent power to vacate a void judgment; thus, a party
30who asserts improper service need not meet the requirements of Civ.R. 60(B). (Emphasis
31added.) Emge, 124 Ohio App.3d at 61, 705 N.E.2d at 408. We note further that

1appellant's main contention is that the default judgment granted by Judge Connor is void
2because it was rendered against a non-entity. As will be addressed infra, judgments
3against non-entities are void. A Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate a judgment is not the
4proper avenue by which to obtain a vacation of a void judgment. See Old Meadow Farm
5Co. v. Petrowski (Mar. 2, 2001), Geauga App. No. 2000-G-2265, unreported; Copelco
6Capital, Inc. v. St. Brighter's Presbyterian Church (Feb. 1, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No.
777633, unreported. Rather, the authority to vacate void judgments is derived from a
8court's inherent power. Oxley v. Zacks (Sept. 29, 2000), I. THE TRIAL COURT
9ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MR. FINESILVER'S MOTION TO
10VACATE VOID JUDGMENT WHEN THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY OF
11MR. FINESILVER SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT SHOWS THAT MR.
12FINESILVER NEVER RECEIVED THE COMPLAINT OF C.E.I., OR NOTICE OF
13THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT. II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
14DISCRETION BY FAILING TO HOLD A HEARING ON MR. FINESILVER'S
15MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT WHEN MR. FINESILVER TESTIFIED
16THAT HE NEVER RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE ACTION FILED BY C.E.I. III. THE
17TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING MR. FINESILVER
18RECEIVED SERVICE OF THE COMPLAINT WHEN C.E.I. DID NOT OBTAIN
19SERVICE OF PROCESS AS REQUIRED BY THE OHIO CIVIL RULES. IV. THE
20TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT MR. FINESILVER
21WAS SERVED AT A PROPER BUSINESS ADDRESS WHEN MR. FINESILVER
22HAD LEFT THE STATE AND NO LONGER MAINTAINED ANY PHYSICAL
23PRESENCE AT SAID BUSINESS ADDRESS. After reviewing the record and the
24arguments of the parties, we reverse the decision of the trial court. Cleveland Electric
25Illuminating Company v. Finesilver, No. 69363 (Ohio App. Dist.8 04/25/1996). "The
26authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from Civ.R. 60(B), but rather
27constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts." Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35
28Ohio St.3d 68, paragraph four of the syllabus; Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v.
29Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 368. Because a court has the
30inherent power to vacate a void judgment, a party who claims that the court lacked
31personal jurisdiction as a result of a deficiency in service of process is entitled to have the

1judgment vacated and need not satisfy the requirements of Civ.R. 60(B). State ex rel.
2Ballard v. O'Donnell (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 182, paragraph one of the syllabus;
3Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. at 368; Patton at paragraph three of the syllabus;
4Thomas at 343. See, also Sweet v. Ludlum (Aug. 20, 1999), Portage App. No. 98-P-0016,
5unreported, at 7, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3869. The authority to vacate a void judgment,
6therefore, is not derived from Civ. R. 60(B), "but rather constitutes an inherent power
7possessed by Ohio courts." Patton, supra, paragraph four of the syllabus. A party seeking
8to vacate a void judgment must, however, file a motion to vacate or set aside the same.
9CompuServe, supra, at 161. Yet to be entitled to relief from a void judgment, a movant
10need not present a meritorious defense or show that the motion was timely filed under
11Civ. R. 60(B). ("A void judgment is one entered either without jurisdiction of the person
12or of the subject matter." Eisenberg v. Peyton (1978), 56 Ohio App.2d 144, 148. A
13motion to vacate a void judgment, therefore, need not comply with the requirements of
14Civ.R. 60(B) which the petitioner ordinarily would assert to seek relief from a
15jurisdictionally valid judgment. Demianczuk v. Demianczuk (1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 244,
16485 N.E.2d 785. Entry was void because it constituted a modification of a property
17division without a reservation of jurisdiction to do so--an act the court may not perform
18under Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 399, at paragraph one of the syllabus, and our
19opinion in Schrader v. Schrader (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 25. Because the notices
20required by R.C. Chapter 5715 were not given to Candlewood prior to the BOR's July 2,
211997 hearing and after its August 18, 1997 decision, and no voluntary appearance was
22made by Candlewood, the BOR's August 18, 1997 decision is a nullity and void as
23regards Candlewood. As one Texas appellate court so aptly stated concerning a void
24judgment, "[i]t is good nowhere and bad everywhere." Dews v. Floyd
25(Tex.Civ.App.1967), 413 S.W.2d 800, 804. A court has an inherent power to vacate a
26void judgment because such an order simply recognizes the fact that the judgment was
27always a nullity." The term "inherent power" used in the two preceding cases is defined
28in Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 782 as "[a]n authority possessed without its being
29derived from another. A right, ability, or faculty of doing a thing, without receiving that
30right, ability, or faculty from another." Because this claim challenged the subject matter
31jurisdiction of the trial court, it was not barred by res judicata because a void judgment

1may be challenged at any time. See State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 45-46, 652
2N.E.2d 196, 200, fn. 6. If the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction of
3defendant's case, his conviction and sentence would be void ab initio. See Patton v.
4Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941, paragraph three of the syllabus. A
5void judgment is a mere nullity, and can be attacked at any time. Tari v. State (1927), 117
6Ohio St. 481, 494, 159 N.E. 594, 597-598. A movant, however, need not present a
7meritorious defense to be entitled to relief from a void judgment. Peralta v. Heights Med.
8Ctr., Inc. (1988), 485 U.S. 80, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75. Nor must a movant show
9that the motion was timely filed under the guidelines of Civ.R. 60(B) if a judgment is
10void. In re Murphy (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 134, 10 OBR 184, 461 N.E.2d 910; Satava v.
11Gerhard (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 598, 585 N.E.2d 899; see, generally, Associated
12Estates Corp. v. Fellows (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 112, 11 OBR 166, 463 N.E.2d 417.
13 This court is further noticed: the magistrate’s recommendation was SENT
14TO THE WRONG ADDRESS.
15
17 Naomi R. Sweet
18
19Certificate of service
20I, Naomi R. Sweet, certify that _________________, 2003, I mailed a true and correct
21copy of the above and foregoing motion to dismiss via certified mail, return receipt
22requested to: Discover Bank’s agent for service of process.
23
24 ______________________________
25 Naomi R. Sweet
26
28Jim Petro
29State Office Tower
3030 East Broad Street, 17th Floor
31Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428
32
33

1
2
3
4What is they call you in for a hearing and you haven’t filed anything in the case? Is
5there anything you can do? Yes, you can file an instanter.
6
7
8
9
10
11 In the Chancery Court of Smith County, Tennessee
12
13
14Citizens Bank, )
15 )
16 Plaintiff, )
17 )
18vs. ) No. 6666
19 )
20Naomi Rosecrans, )
21 )
22 defendant. )
23 )
24 )
25
26 Defendant’s instanter motion to dismiss / memorandums of law / notice to the court
27
28 Brief in support of motion to dismiss
29
32
33 James L. Bass failed or refused to produce the actual note which Citizens Bank
34alleges Naomi Rosecrans owes. Where the complaining party cannot prove the existence
35of the note, then there is no note. To recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff must
36prove: (1) the existence of the note in question; (2) that the party sued signed the note; (3)
37that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a certain balance is due
38and owing on the note. See In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes, Inc. No.98-50117
39February 18, 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.) Volume 29 of the New Jersey Practice
40Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically states, “...; and no part payments
41should be made on the bond or note unless the person to whom payment is made is able

1to produce the bond or note and the part payments are endorsed thereon. It would seem
2that the mortgagor would normally have a Common law right to demand production or
3surrender of the bond or note and mortgage, as the case may be. See Restatement,
4Contracts S 170(3), (4) (1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469 in Carnegie Bank v Shalleck 256
5N.J. Super 23 (App. Div 1992), the Appellate Division held, “When the underlying
6mortgage is evidenced by an instrument meeting the criteria for negotiability set forth in
7N.J.S. 12A:3-104, the holder of the instrument shall be afforded all the rights and
8protections provided a holder in due course pursuant to N.J.S. 12A:3-302" Since no one
9is able to produce the “instrument” there is no competent evidence before the Court that
10any party is the holder of the alleged note or the true holder in due course. New Jersey
11common law dictates that the plaintiff prove the existence of the alleged note in question,
12prove that the party sued signed the alleged note, prove that the plaintiff is the owner and
13holder of the alleged note, and prove that certain balance is due and owing on any alleged
14note. Federal Circuit Courts have ruled that the only way to prove the perfection of any
15security is by actual possession of the security. See Matter of Staff Mortg. & Inv. Corp.,
16550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977), “Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the only notice
17sufficient to inform all interested parties that a security interest in instruments has been
18perfected is actual possession by the secured party, his agent or bailee.” Bankruptcy
19Courts have followed the Uniform Commercial Code. In Re Investors & Lenders, Ltd.
20165 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994), “Under the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code
21(NJUCC), promissory note is “instrument,” security interest in which must be perfected
22by possession ...” Whereas James L. Bass has practiced subterfuge by filing a pleading
23and scheduling a hearing for determination which abridges Naomi Rosecrans’s due
24process rights, Naomi Rosecrans places this court on notice of other state’s laws
25regarding necessity of proving standing.
26
28 even in a default judgment, damages must be proved
29
30 Trial court could not award damages to plaintiff, following default judgment,
31without requiring evidence of damages. Razorsoft, Inc. v. Maktal, Inc., Okla.App. Div. 1,

1907 P.2d 1102 (1995), rehearing denied. A party is not in default so long as he has a
2pleading on file which makes an issue in the case that requires proof on the part of the
3opposite party in order to entitle him to recover. Millikan v. Booth, Okla., 4 Okla. 713, 46
4P. 489 (1896). Proof of or assessment of damages upon petition claiming damages, it is
5error to pronounce judgment without hearing proof or assessing damages. Atchison, T. &
6S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 31 Okla. 300, 121 P. 654, Ann.Cas.1913E, 329 (1912); City of
7Guthrie v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co., 5 Okla. 774, 50 P. 84 (1897). In the assessment of
8damages following entry of default judgment, a defaulting party has a statutory right to a
9hearing on the extent of unliquidated damage, and encompassed within this right is the
10opportunity to a fair post-default inquest at which both the plaintiff and the defendant can
11participate in the proceedings by cross-examining witnesses and introducing evidence on
12their own behalf. Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999). A default declaration,
13imposed as a discovery sanction against a defendant, cannot extend beyond saddling
14defendant with liability for the harm occasioned and for imposition of punitive damages,
15and the trial court must leave to a meaningful inquiry the quantum of actual and punitive
16damages, without stripping defendant of basic forensic devices to test the truth of
17plaintiff's evidence. Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999). Fracture of two toes
18required expert medical testimony as to whether such injury was permanent so as to allow
19damages for permanent injury, future pain, and future medical treatment on default
20judgment, and such testimony was not within competency of plaintiff who had no
21medical expertise. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R.5th 913 (1991).
22Rendition of default judgment requires production of proof as to amount of unliquidated
23damages. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R.5th 913 (1991). When face of
24judgment roll shows judgment on pleadings without evidence as to amount of
25unliquidated damages then judgment is void. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20
26A.L.R.5th 913 (1991). In a tort action founded on an unliquidated claim for damages, a
27defaulting party is deemed to have admitted only plaintiff's right to recover, so that the
28court is without authority or power to enter a judgment fixing the amount of recovery in
29the absence of the introduction of evidence. Graves v. Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702
30(1975). Presumptions which ordinarily shield judgments from collateral attacks were not
31applicable on motion to vacate a small claim default judgment on ground that court

1assessed damages on an unliquidated tort claim without first hearing any supporting
2evidence. Graves v. Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975). Rule that default judgment
3fixing the amount of recovery in absence of introduction of supporting evidence is void
4and not merely erroneous or voidable obtains with regard to exemplary as well as
5compensatory damages. Graves v. Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975). Where
6liability of father for support of minor daughter and extent of such liability and amount of
7attorney's fees to be allowed was dependent on facts, rendering of final judgment by trial
8court requiring father to pay $25 monthly for support of minor until minor should reach
9age 18 and $100 attorney's fees without having heard proof thereof in support of
10allegations in petition was error. Ross v. Ross, Okla., 201 Okla. 174, 203 P.2d 702
11(1949). Refusal to render default judgment against codefendant for want of answer was
12not error, since defendants and court treated answer of defendant on file as having been
13filed on behalf of both defendants, and since plaintiff could not recover without offering
14proof of damages and offered no such proof. Thomas v. Sweet, Okla., 173 Okla. 601, 49
15P.2d 557 (1935). Under R.L.1910, §§ 4779, 5130 (see, now, this section and § 2007 of
16this title), allegation of value, or amount of damages stated in petition, were not
17considered true by failure to controvert. Cudd v. Farmers' Exch. Bank of Lindsay, Okla.,
1876 Okla. 317, 185 P. 521 (1919). Hearing Trial court's discovery sanction barring
19defendant from using cross-examination and other truth-testing devices at post-default
20non-jury hearing on plaintiff's damages violated due process. Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995
21P.2d 1088 (1999). Whereas James L. Bass has practiced subterfuge by filing a pleading
22and scheduling a hearing for determination which abridges Naomi Rosecrans’s due
23process rights, Naomi Rosecrans places this court on notice of other state’s laws
24regarding necessity of proving a default judgment.
25
29

8Whereas James L. Bass has practiced subterfuge by filing a pleading and scheduling a
9hearing for determination which abridges Naomi Rosecrans’s due process rights, Naomi
10Rosecrans places this court on notice of other state’s laws regarding necessity of prove up
11of the claim.
12
13 Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that a void judgment cannot operate
14
15 The general rule is that a void judgment is no judgment at all. Where judgments
16are void, as was the judgment originally rendered by the trial court here, any subsequent
17proceedings based upon the void judgment are themselves void. In essence, no judgment
18existed from which the trial court could adopt either findings of fact or conclusions of
19law. Valley Vista Development Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow, 766 P.2d 344, 1988 OK
20140 (Okla. 12/06/1988); A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no
21rights are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless, in itself, all
22proceedings founded upon it are necessarily equally worthless, and have no effect
23whatever upon the parties or matters in question. A void judgment neither binds nor bars
24anyone. All acts performed under it, and all claims flowing out of it, are absolutely void.
25The parties attempting to enforce it are trespassers." High v. Southwestern Insurance
26Company, 520 P.2d 662, 1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974); and, A void judgment cannot
27constitute res judicata. Denial of previous motions to vacate a void judgment could not
28validate the judgment or constitute res judicata, for the reason that the lack of judicial
29power inheres in every stage of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered.
30Bruce v. Miller, 360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960). Whereas James L. Bass
31has practiced subterfuge by filing a pleading and scheduling a hearing for determination

1which abridges Naomi Rosecrans’s due process rights, Naomi Rosecrans places this court
2on notice of other states’ laws regarding the un-inforceability of void judgments.
3
5 a void judgment is not void when declared void but is void ab initio
6
7 If the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction of defendant's case, his
8conviction and sentence would be void ab initio. See Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio
9St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941. Whereas James L. Bass has practiced subterfuge by filing a
10pleading and scheduling a hearing for determination which abridges Naomi Rosecrans’s
11due process rights, Naomi Rosecrans places this court on notice of other states’ laws
12regarding the law that void judgment is not void when vacated but is void ab initio. .
13
14 Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that party seeking to vacate a void
15 judgment is invoking the ministerial powers of the court / courts lack discretion when it
16 comes to vacating void judgments
17
18 When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not
19discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).
20See also, Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262 (holding that trial court has not only power but duty
21to vacate a void judgment). Whereas James L. Bass has practiced subterfuge by filing a
22pleading and scheduling a hearing for determination which abridges Naomi Rosecrans’s
23due process rights, Naomi Rosecrans places this court on notice of other states’ laws
24regarding the law that the court, in considering a jurisdictional challenge has not judicial
25capacity..
26
27 I, Naomi Rosecrans, of lawful age and competent to testify state as follows based
28on my own personal knowledge:
29 1. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Citizens Bank has
30standing to sue in Tennessee courts.
31 2. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I have a contract with
32Citizens Bank

1 3. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I owe Citizens Bank
2money.
3 4. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Citizens Bank
4authorized suit against me or is even aware of it.
5 5. I am not in receipt of a motion for judgment by default or motion for summary
6judgment on behalf of Citizens Bank.
7 6. As the result of James L. Bass’ pattern of acts against me, I have been
8damaged financially, socially, and emotionally.
9
10 ___________________________
11 Naomi Rosecrans
12STATE OF TENNESSEE INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
13COUNTY OF _____________
20
21 ________________ Notary Public
22
23Prepared and submitted by: ___________________________
24 Naomi Rosecrans
25
27I, Naomi Rosecrans, certify that August ___, 2003, I hand delivered a true and correct
28copy of the above and foregoing motion to vacate via certified mail, return receipt
29requested to:
30
31James L. Bass
32
33
34 __________________________
35 Naomi Rosecrans
36

1
2
3
4
5
6Can they ask you for discovery? Yes, answer them as follows:
7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MUSCOGEE COUNTY
8 STATE OF GEORGIA
9
10
11Discover Bank, )
12 )
13 Plaintiff, )
14 )
15v. ) Case number SU-03-CV-2295
16 )
17Angie G. Silver, and )
18 Esler C. Silver, )
19 Defendants. )
20
21 Defendant’s response to plaintiff’s request for production of documents
22
23Response to requests numbered 1, 2, 4, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, & 16: Defendants respectfully
24decline to comply at this time: (1). Lawful treatment of defendants’ motion to dismiss
25will dispose of Discover Bank’s claim, (2). Discover has defaulted on Angie G. Silver
26and Esler C. Silver’s counterclaim, (3). Attorneys purporting to represent Discover Bank
27have failed or refused to furnish proof of authority to act for Discover Bank, and (4).
28Discover Bank has failed or refused to deny being part of a nationwide racket.
29
30Response to requests number 3, 5, & 9: Objection: items 3, 5, & 9 are plaintiff’s burden
31to prove – not defendants’ burden to disprove.
32
33Response to request number 6: Evidence is available and shall be tendered to the
34authorized representative of Discover Bank.
35

1Response to request number 7: Objection: Violation of the Fair Debt Collections
2Practices Act is denial of due process.
3
4Response to request number 8: Objection: the request is nonsensical. There is no such
5thing as subject matter jurisdiction over a person. Subject matter jurisdiction applies to
6the person in the sense that the court either has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not.
7Where due process is denied, the court is said to want subject matter jurisdiction.
8Prepared and submitted by: ___________________________________________
9 Angie G. Silver Esler C. Silver
10
11 Certificate of mailing
12 I, Esler C. Silver, certify that October ____, 2003, I mailed a true and correct copy
13 of the above and foregoing responses to requests for production to:
14
15 Elizabeth C. Whealler & J. Curtis Tottle, Jr.
16 1655 Enterprise Way
17 Marietta, Georgia 30067
18
19 _________________________________
20 Esler C. Silver
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

1
2
3
4Can you ask for discovery? Yes, ask them as follows and make them suffer!
5
6
7
8STATE OF WISCONSIN * CIRCUIT COURT * DANE COUNTY
9
10Hsbc Bank Usa Formerly Marine Midland Bank,
11a foreign corporation,
12P.O. Box 2103
13Buffalo, NY 14240
14 Plaintiff,
15
16Vs. Case No. : 02-CV0081
17
18William D. Ozgood
1960 South CT
21
22 Defendant.
23
24 Defendant’s request for admissions to plaintiff Hsbc Bank Usa
25
26To: Hsbc Bank Usa (please note: where discovery requests are directed to a corporation,
27counsel for the corporation is required to nominate officers of the corporation to answer).
28
29 Defendant, William D. Ozgood, submits the following request for admissions to
30defendant Hsbc Bank Usa. You are required to answer each request for admissions
31separately and fully, in writing, under oath, and to serve a copy of the responses upon
32William D. Ozgood within (30) days after service of these requests for admissions.
33 Instructions
35available to Hsbc Bank Usa including information contained in the records and
36documents in Hsbc Bank Usa’s custody or control or available to Hsbc Bank Usa upon
37reasonable inquiry. Where requests for admissions cannot be answered in full, they shall
38be answered as completely as possible and incomplete answers shall be accompanied by

1a specification of the reasons for the incompleteness of the answer and of whatever actual
2knowledge is possessed with respect to each unanswered or incompletely answered
3request for admission.
10to the court.
11 Definitions
12 a. “You” and “your” include Hsbc Bank Usa and any and all persons acting for or
13in concert with Hsbc Bank Usa.
15by you.
17First admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa is not licensed to do business in
18Wisconsin by virtue of being registered with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
19State of Banking and nominating an agent for service of process.
20Admitted____
21Denied____
22Second admission: Admit or deny that officers of Hsbc Bank Usa has no regular,
23systematic way of doing business in Wisconsin, also known as “minimum contacts.”
24Admitted____
25Denied____
26Third admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa’s charter does not authorize Hsbc
27Bank Usa to engage in consumer lending.
28Admitted____
29Denied____
30Fourth admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa’s charter does not authorize Hsbc
31Bank Usa to bring suits in foreclosure of consumer debts.

1Admitted____
2Denied____
3Fifth admission: Admit or deny that Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa’s is not the
4present holder of a contract with William D. Ozgood.
5Admitted____
6Denied____
7Sixth admission: Admit or deny that Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa sold the contract
8which Hsbc Bank Usa William D. Ozgood.
9Admitted____
10Denied____
11Seventh admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa has been informed by counsel
12that a credit card contract is a continuing series of offers to contract and as such is not
13transferable.
14Admitted____
15Denied____
16Eighth admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa never had anything at risk in the
17contract with William D. Ozgood.
18Admitted____
19Denied____
20Ninth admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa possess no account and general
21ledger statement verifying that William D. Ozgood presently owes Hsbc Bank Usa
22money.
23Admitted____
24Denied____
25Tenth admission: Admit or deny that officers of Hsbc Bank Usa know and understand
26that after a credit card is charged off, it is common practice to sell the charged off debt to
27lawyers in the debt collection business for deep discounts.
28Admitted____
29Denied____

1Eleventh admission: Admit or deny that officers of Hsbc Bank Usa know and understand
2that attorneys who purchase evidence of debt and then file lawsuits in the name of the
3original maker of the debt are committing felony fraud.
4Admitted____
5Denied____
6
7Twelfth admission: Admit or deny that officers of Hsbc Bank Usa know and understand
8that RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C. routinely purchases evidence of
9debt from Hsbc Bank Usa, then relies on Hsbc Bank Usa to aid and abet felony fraud.
10Admitted____
11Denied____
12Thirteenth admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa cannot be affected financially
13by the outcome of litigation against William D. Ozgood as if the suit is lost, it is
14RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C.’s loss and if the suit is won, it is
15RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C.’s win.
16Admitted____
17Denied____
18
19____________________ _________
20__________________________________________
21 Print name title Officer of Hsbc Bank Usa
22 State of __________________
23 County of __________________
24
28 _____________________________
29 Notary
31 William D. Ozgood

1
3I, William D. Ozgood, certify that ___________ ____, 2004, I mailed a true and correct
4copy of the above and foregoing request for admissions via certified mail, return receipt
5requested to:
6Julie A. Rausch
72448 South 102nd Street, Suite 210
9 _______________________
12
15P.O. Box 2103
16Buffalo, NY 14240
17 Plaintiff,
18
19Vs. Case No. : 02-CV0081
20
21William D. Ozgood
226011 South CT
24
25 Defendant
26
27
28 Defendant’s request for production of documents to plaintiff Hsbc Bank Usa
29
30To: Hsbc Bank Usa
31
32 Defendant, William D. Ozgood, submits the following request for production of
33documents to defendant Hsbc Bank Usa. You are required to inform William D. Ozgood
34of the date, place, and time that William D. Ozgood can view the documents (in
35Milwaukee, Wisconsin) and make copies. Alternately, you can furnish William D.
36Ozgood with verified copies of all documents. If the document does not exist, you are
37required to state that it does not exist. Failure to comply fully or partially with this
38request within thirty days of receipt of service shall be deemed a confession that the
39document does not exist or that Hsbc Bank Usa is committing fraud by concealment.
40 Instructions

2known or available to Hsbc Bank Usa including information contained in the records and
4reasonable inquiry.
9
10 Definitions
14by you.
15 Requests for production of documents
16First document: All pages, front and back of Hsbc Bank Usa’s corporate charter.
17
18Second document: The account and general ledger of each and every contract Hsbc Bank
19Usa alleges William D. Ozgood has with Hsbc Bank Usa showing all receipts and
20disbursements.
21
22Third document: The copy, front and back, of the contract Hsbc Bank Usa alleges
23William D. Ozgood has with Hsbc Bank Usa showing any and all assignments or
24allonges.
25
26Fourth document: The copy, front and back, of the contract for services which Hsbc Bank
27has with RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C.
28
31

1
4copy of the above and foregoing request for production of documents via certified mail,
5return receipt requested to:
6
7Julie A. Rausch
10 ___________________________
12
13What are they evasive in response to your discovery? File a motion to compel!
14
16
19P.O. Box 2103
20Buffalo, NY 14240
21 Plaintiff,
22
23Vs. Case No. : 02-CV0081
24
25William D. Ozgood
2660 South CT
28
29 Defendant
30
31
32 Defendant’s motion to compel compliance with defendant’s
33 request for admissions to plaintiff Hsbc Bank Usa
34
35Defendant, William D. Ozgood requested the following admissions. The significance of
36each admission is articulated relative to each admission.
37
38To: Hsbc Bank Usa (please note: where discovery requests are directed to a corporation,
39counsel for the corporation is required to nominate officers of the corporation to answer).
40
41 Defendant, William D. Ozgood, submits the following request for admissions to
42defendant Hsbc Bank Usa. You are required to answer each request for admissions
43separately and fully, in writing, under oath, and to serve a copy of the responses upon
44William D. Ozgood within (30) days after service of these requests for admissions.

1 Instructions
3available to Hsbc Bank Usa including information contained in the records and
5reasonable inquiry. Where requests for admissions cannot be answered in full, they shall
6be answered as completely as possible and incomplete answers shall be accompanied by
7a specification of the reasons for the incompleteness of the answer and of whatever actual
8knowledge is possessed with respect to each unanswered or incompletely answered
9request for admission.
16to the court.
17 Definitions
21by you.
23First admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa is not licensed to do business in
24Wisconsin by virtue of being registered with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
25State of Banking and nominating an agent for service of process. Without proof of being
26licensed to do business in Wisconsin, Hsbc Bank Usa lacks standing to bring suits in
27Wisconsin courts depriving this court of subject matter jurisdiction.
28Admitted____
29Denied____
30Second admission: Admit or deny that officers of Hsbc Bank Usa has no regular,
31systematic way of doing business in Wisconsin, also known as “minimum contacts.” This

1court has knowledge that without a license to do business in Wisconsin, the only other
2way for Hsbc Bank Usa to have standing to avail Hsbc Bank Usa of Wisconsin courts is
3proof of minimum contacts. If Hsbc Bank Usa lacks standing in Wisconsin courts, this
4court is deprived of power to provide Hsbc Bank Usa remedy.
5Admitted____
6Denied____
7Third admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa’s charter does not authorize Hsbc
8Bank Usa to engage in consumer lending. This court has actual knowledge that Hsbc
9Bank Usa is a fiction with no implied powers other than granted by charter. Without
10grant as shown in Hsbc Bank Usa’s charter to engage in consumer lending, Hsbc Bank
11Usa’s making consumer loans is ultra viries depriving this court of subject matter
12jurisdiction to rule favorably for Hsbc Bank Usa.
13Admitted____
14Denied____
15Fourth admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa’s charter does not authorize Hsbc
16Bank Usa to bring suits in foreclosure of consumer debts. This court has actual
17knowledge that Hsbc Bank Usa is a fiction with no implied powers other than granted by
18charter. Without grant as shown in Hsbc Bank Usa’s charter to sue in foreclosure of
19consumer loans, Hsbc Bank Usa’s bringing suit in foreclosure of a consumer loan is ultra
20viries depriving this court of subject matter jurisdiction to rule favorably for Hsbc Bank
21Usa.
22Admitted____
23Denied____
24Fifth admission: Admit or deny that Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa’s is not the
25present holder of a contract with William D. Ozgood. This court has actual knowledge
26that only the party possessing the actual and original debt instrument has standing to sue
27the debtor.
28Admitted____
29Denied____
30Sixth admission: Admit or deny that Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa sold the contract
31which Hsbc Bank Usa William D. Ozgood. This court has actual knowledge that credit

1cards are continuing offers of a series of contracts and as such are non-transferable
2meaning once a credit card is sold, the contract is extinguished.
3Admitted____
4Denied____
5Seventh admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa has been informed by counsel
6that a credit card contract is a continuing series of offers to contract and as such is not
7transferable. This court has knowledge that an attorney, in signing pleadings, is claiming
8that the attorney has made inquiry, reasonable under the circumstances, and that the
9pleading is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. The response to this
10admission is necessary to determind whether attorneys representing Hsbc Bank Usa have
11committed felony fraud by intentionally preparing and submitting a false document to
12this court.
13Admitted____
14Denied____
15Eighth admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa never had anything at risk in the
16contract with William D. Ozgood. This response is necessary to determine whether Hsbc
17Bank Usa has violated truth and lending laws.
18Admitted____
19Denied____
20Ninth admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa possess no account and general
21ledger statement verifying that William D. Ozgood presently owes Hsbc Bank Usa
22money. Without this document, this court has no competent evidence to rely on to
23determine that William D. Ozgood is indebted to Hsbc Bank Usa.
24Admitted____
25Denied____
26Tenth admission: Admit or deny that officers of Hsbc Bank Usa know and understand
27that after a credit card is charged off, it is common practice to sell the charged off debt to
28lawyers in the debt collection business for deep discounts. This admission is necessary to
29show that Hsbc Bank Usa is involved in unlawful activity.
30Admitted____
31Denied____

1Eleventh admission: Admit or deny that officers of Hsbc Bank Usa know and understand
2that attorneys who purchase evidence of debt and then file lawsuits in the name of the
3original maker of the debt are committing felony fraud. This admission is necessary to
4show that Hsbc Bank Usa is involved in racketeering.
5Admitted____
6Denied____
7
8Twelfth admission: Admit or deny that officers of Hsbc Bank Usa know and understand
9that RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C. routinely purchases evidence of
10debt from Hsbc Bank Usa, then relies on Hsbc Bank Usa to aid and abet felony fraud.
11This admission is necessary to determine whether officers of Hsbc Bank Usa are willing
12to perjure themselves in defense of RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C.
13Admitted____
14Denied____
15Thirteenth admission: Admit or deny that Hsbc Bank Usa cannot be affected financially
16by the outcome of litigation against William D. Ozgood as if the suit is lost, it is
17RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C.’s loss and if the suit is won, it is
18RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C.’s win. This admission is necessary to
19reveal that both Hsbc Bank Usa and RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C. are
20involved in racketeering.
21Admitted____
22Denied____
23This court is further noticed: at least one officer from Hsbc Bank Usa must be identified
24as the author of admissions – statements of counsel are not facts before the court.
25
26____________________ _________
27__________________________________________
28 Print name title Officer of Hsbc Bank Usa
29 State of __________________
30 County of __________________
31

4 _____________________________
5 Notary
7 William D. Ozgood
10copy of the above and foregoing request for admissions via certified mail, return receipt
11requested to:
12Julie A. Rausch
15 _______________________
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
15P.O. Box 2103
16Buffalo, NY 14240
17 Plaintiff,
18
19Vs. Case No. : 02-CV0081
20
21William D. Ozgood
226011 South CT
24
25 Defendant
26
27 Defendant.’s motion to compel production of doucments
28
29 Defendant has requested production of documents to plaintiff Hsbc Bank Usa
30
31To: Hsbc Bank Usa
32
33 Defendant, William D. Ozgood, clarified the following request for production of
34documents to defendant Hsbc Bank Usa: You are required to inform William D. Ozgood
35of the date, place, and time that William D. Ozgood can view the documents (in
36Milwaukee, Wisconsin) and make copies. Alternately, you can furnish William D.
37Ozgood with verified copies of all documents. If the document does not exist, you are
38required to state that it does not exist. Failure to comply fully or partially with this
39request within thirty days of receipt of service shall be deemed a confession that the
40document does not exist or that Hsbc Bank Usa is committing fraud by concealment.
41 Instructions

2known or available to Hsbc Bank Usa including information contained in the records and
4reasonable inquiry.
9
10 Definitions
14by you.
15 Plaintiff Hsbc Bank Usa has failed or refused to responds to defendants’
16 requests for production of documents / the necessity of the
17 document is articulated following each request
18
19First document: All pages, front and back of Hsbc Bank Usa’s corporate charter. Without
20this document, the court has nothing to rely on to determine whether Hsbc Bank Usa is
21authorized to engage in consumer lending or bring suit in foreclosure of a consumer loan.
22
23Second document: The account and general ledger of each and every contract Hsbc Bank
24Usa alleges William D. Ozgood has with Hsbc Bank Usa showing all receipts and
25disbursements. Without this document, the court has no competent evidence before it to
26rely on to determine that William D. Ozgood owes Hsbc Bank Usa money.
27
28Third document: The copy, front and back, of the contract Hsbc Bank Usa alleges
29William D. Ozgood has with Hsbc Bank Usa showing any and all assignments or
30allonges. Without submission of the original debt instrument, this court is without
31competent evidence that a contract has been breached or which party has standing to
32bring suit for breach.

1
2Fourth document: The copy, front and back, of the contract for services which Hsbc Bank
3has with RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C. Without this document, this
4court has no competent evidence to determine whether this suit was authorized by Hsbc
5Bank Usa. Without proof of delegation of authority to act, this count has prima facie
6evidence of fraud practiced by RAUSCH, STURM, ISRAEL & HORNIK, S.C.
7
9 William D. Ozgood
10
11
14copy of the above and foregoing request for production of documents via certified mail,
15return receipt requested to:
16
17Julie A. Rausch
20 ___________________________
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

1
2What if they want to depose you? Go to the deposition and have a good time!
3
4
5
6
7
8
9Hogden: I’m Bruce Hogden. I am here for he defendant, Earl White. Mr. Good, I’m an
10attorney and I represent Earl White in connection with a lawsuit you filed against him.
11Do you understand that?
12
13Mike: Perfectly clear to me.
14
15Hogden: All your answers should be yes or no unless I ask you to expound. It that clear
16Mr. Good?
17
18Mike: Gotcha.
19
20Hog: I’m here to take your deposition in connection with that lawsuit. You understand?
21
22Mike: Yes.
23
24Hog: You’ve never had your deposition taken before?
25
26Mike: (answer yes or no).
27
28Hog: Do you understand that your testimony is subject to the penalties of perjury if you
29do not tell the truth?
30
31Mike: Sure, I understand that.
32
33Hog: And the court reporter here is going to take down my questions and your answers,
34and those questions and answers may be used at trial in this matter. Do you understand
35that?
36
37Mike: Yes.
38
39Hog: Are you taking any medication today that might affect how your answers my
40questions?
41
42Mike: No.
43
44Hog: Are you suffering from any mental or emotional conditions that might affect how
45you testify today?
46

1Mike: Now that could be. I’ll try not to let it affect me, but my life has been repeatedly
2threatened.
3
4Hog: How has your life been threatened?
5
6Mike: Well, in example, about three weeks ago, I was pulling a trailer when the wheels
7came loose. Lucky for me I wasn’t going fast down some major highway when it
8happened. I could have been killed and also, I might have hurt someone else. That’s a lot
9to think about, especially when it’s about the fifth or sixth time something like that has
10happened including Earl White trying to run over me.
11
12Hog: Reporter, we need to go off the record here for a minute.
13
14Off the record: Hog. Mr. Good, do you understand the difference between fact and
15speculation? Mike: I know what happened. Hog: Just the same, I am going to ask you not
16to make any further comments about my client, Okay? Mike: I’ll do my best. Hog: If this
17deposition has to be terminated, I’m going to ask the court to sanction you. Mike: You’ll
18have to take that up with the judge.
19
20Hog. I just want to make sure that there is nothing that will affect your memory of the
21events leading up to this suit.
22
23Mike: I’m with you.
24
25Hog: Can you state your full legal name?
26
27Mike: Yes, I can.
28
29Hog: Mr. Good, I’m warning you, if you don’t answer my questions, there are going to be
30serious consequences.
31
32Mike: Are you threatening me?
33
34Hog: Reporter we need to go off record again.
35
36Off the record: Mr. Good, if I report this conduct by you to the judge, you’re definitely
37going to lose your case. So answer my questions and no nonsense, okay? Mike: Just get
38on with it. Ask your questions that you need to ask.
39
40Hog: What is your full name?
41
42Mike: (Answer).
43
44Hog: Spell your name for the record.
45
46Mike: (spell name).

1
2Hog: What is your address?
3
4Mike: (state address).
5
6Hog: Do you do business as Good Farms.
7
8Mike: I don’t know.
9Hog: You don’t know whether you do business as Good Farms or not?
10
11Mike: No, I really don’t. I’ve been through bankruptcy and those proceedings showed
12that I was insolvent. So I really don’t know.
13
14Hog: Okay, have you ever done business as Good Farms?
15
16Mike: Yes.
17
18Hog: From when until when did you do business as Good Farms.
19
20Mike: From about (month and year).
21
22Hog: Till when?
23
25
26Hog: Mr. Good, who has coached you on how to answer today?
27
28Mike: I don’t know what you mean by coach.
29
30Hog: Who has helped you with all these legal matters?
31
32Mike: I object. The
question is not likely to lead to the discovery
33of evidence which would be admissible at trial.
34(memorize this statement and use it often)
35
36Hog: Mr. Good, this is a deposition. You have to answer my questions.
37
38Mike: No I don’t. If there is a valid objection such as the one I’ve just given, I can object.
39
40Hog: I’ll have the judge force you to answer and also punish you for not answering.
41
42Mike: That’s between you and the court.
43
44Hog: So answer the question. Who is helping you.
45

1Mike: I’ve already answered that question, I objected.
2
3Hog: Reporter, enter an exception to that answer. Are you currently married?
4
5Mike: That’s privileged, Mr. Hodgden.
6
7Hog: Are you refusing to answer that question?
8
9Mike: It’s clearly outside the scope of this proceeding. It’s personal information.
10Hog: I’m just asking if you are refusing to answer the question.
11
12Mike: You are harassing me. If this is all you intend to do today, harass me instead of
13asking relevant questions, I’m going to excuse myself. I’ve got things to do.
14
15Hog: Would you feel better if I called the judge?
16
17Mike: If you have some pertinent questions, you had better ask them or I’ll be leaving
18and the only thing the record will show is that you harassed me.
19
20Hog: Do you have any children?
21
22Mike: I object. The question is of no relevance to these proceedings.
23
24Hog: Okay Mr. Good, I’m definitely going to ask the court to sanction you, but before I
25do that, I’m going to get to the heart of the matter.
26
27Mike: Thank you.
28
29Hog: Did you borrow money from the FSA?
30
32
33Hog: You expect the court to believe that you don’t even know whether you took out a
34loan with the FSA or not?
35
36Mike: I wanted to way back years ago, but I’m not sure what happened. All I know for
37sure, is that the FSA tried to take my property away and sell it to Earl White.
38
39Hog: Mr. Good, there is no dispute that you took a loan out with the FSA.
40
41Mike: Why are you testifying?
42
43Hog: I’m not testifying, I’m just stating facts.
44
45Mike: You may not know this but only witnesses can state facts and attorneys are not
46witnesses.

1
2Hog: I’m asking the questions here.
3
4Mike: Then go ahead and ask your questions.
5
6Hog: After you borrowed from the FSA and defaulted on the loan, they foreclosed the
7loan and took the farm. Isn’t that what happened?
8
9Mike: I’m going to object to that question. That’s called leading the witness and I’m not
10going to answer.
11
12Hog: Okay, Did you borrow from the FSA, yes or no?
13
15
16Hog: Why don’t you know?
17
18Mike: I have no record of anything authorizing the FSA to make farm loans. I have no
19record of any promissory note that I signed with FSA where FSA complied with truth in
20lending laws.
21
22Hog: I enter exhibit one. This is a copy of a loan application with FSA. Is that your
23signature on the loan app?
24
26
27Hog: I remind you that you are under oath. I’m going to ask you again. Is that your
28signature?
29
31
32Hog: Why don’t you know?
33
34Mike: Well for one thing, it’s a copy.
35
36Hog: So is it a copy of your signature?
37
38Mike: You’d have to ask the person who made the copy.
39
40Hog: Okay, do you have any reason to believe that this is not your signature?
41
42Mike: That’s not the issue. You see, dishonest people with computers and scanners can
43scan your signature, then paste the image on a document to make it look like you signed
44it.
45
46Hog: Are you saying this document is a forgery?

1
2Mike: I’m just saying that I’m not sure.
3
4Hog: Okay, as the result of this application, you got money and that enabled you to
5operate your farm. Is that correct?
6
7Mike: I have no idea. All I know is that I wanted to get some financing for my farming
8operations and it looks like I wound up without either the financing or the farm.
9Hog: Mr. Good. This isn’t going to look good to the judge. He is going to see that you are
10evading the questions and will punish you. You are an adult. You know that if you
11borrow money and don’t pay if back, then you’re going to lose the collateral to you put
12up for the loan. You understand that don’t you?
13
14Mike: I understand it in principle but what I don’t understand is if I borrowed money and
15didn’t pay it back, where is the evidence of that?
16
17Hog: The judgment of foreclosure was a summary judgment because you didn’t dispute
18the facts that you borrowed money and didn’t pay it back.
19
20Mike: The burden was not on me to disprove their case. The FSA had a burden to prove
21their case. That’s especially true in a summary judgment, cause in a summary judgment
22there are not facts in dispute.
23
24Hog: That’s what the court ruled.
25
26Mike: The court’s ruling is void because no evidence was entered into the record to prove
27that I had a loan with FSA or that FSA was damaged in any way by me.
28
29Hog: I don’t know where you get all this malarkey but it’s wrong.
30
31Mike: Are you going to ask any more questions or just be argumentative?
32
33Hog: Okay, I going to give you the opportunity to avoid being charged with perjury. Are
34you claiming that you never had a loan with FSA?
35
36Mike: I’m not saying that at all. I’m saying that I don’t know.
37
38Hog: I think the prosecutor needs to hear this baloney from you, and I know he’ll indict
39you, so you better answer and answer correctly. Did you take a loan out with FSA?
40
41Mike: Something the prosecutor should be interested in is how it can be that a person’s
42property can be taken away in respect of a loan without verification that the loan ever
43existed.
44
45Hog: Just answer the question. Did you take a loan out with the FSA?
46

1Mike: I don’t think so and I’ll tell you why. Everybody knows that when you borrow on
2a note, when the note is satisfied, the debt is discharged and I’ve never been discharged in
3this alleged loan. I’ve not been tendered the original promissory note marked paid in full.
4
5Hog: Oh, nobody every does that anymore.
6
7Mike: Maybe you could explain that to a grand jury.
8
9Hog: What you’re saying then is that you never borrowed from the FSA?
10
11Mike: No, I’m saying that I don’t know for sure but it kinda looks like I’ve been had in
12the predatory lending racket.
13
14Hog: Answer the question. Did you take out a loan with the FSA?
15
16Mike: What do you want?
17
18Hog: I want you to answer the question.
19
20Mike: I did answer the question. You don’t like my answer, but my answer is still, I don’t
21know.
22
23Hog; Okay. Was there a marshal’s sale on this farm?
24
25Mike: Objection, that calls for a legal opinion.
26
27Hog: What? Just to answer whether you know whether the U.S. Marshal sold your
28property?
29
30Mike: To repeat myself, there was not an offer of presentment of a promissory note that I
31signed. There was no account and general ledger showing that I damaged FSA, and after
32the so-called marshal’s sale was consummated and money was tendered to pay off the
33note, I never got discharged.
34
35Hog: But if they gave you the note marked paid in full or satisfied or something, you
36might destroy the note and then where would they be?
37
38Mike: It wouldn’t create a problem for them. It would create a problem for me.
39Somebody else could come along and claim that I owed on the note and having the note
40marked paid in full would be my defense that the note was not longer owed.
41
42Hog: But somebody else couldn’t sue unless they had the note.
43
44Mike: Mr. Hodgden, thank you for confessing my case. Without the note showing that I
45was indebted to FSA, the thing was a non-suit and taking my property was a fraud. Earl

1White was no innocent purchaser cause if he’s buying property without title insurance or
2a warranty deed he should know that he’s taking a big risk.
3
4Hog: What if he now has a warranty deed?
5
6Mike: Then he needs to claim against the guarantors of the deed? And if he warranteed it
7to himself, he needs to get a new lawyer.
8
9
10What if they move for summary judgment? Submit a brief in opposition and file
11your own summary judgment motion.
12 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF MUSCOGEE
13 STATE OF GEORGIA
14
15Discover Bank, )
16 )
17plaintiff and defendant on counterclaim, )
18 )
19v. ) Civil Action File number 03-CV-2295
20 )
21Angie G. Walker, and )
22Esler C. Walker, Jr. )
23defendants and plaintiffs on counterclaim. )
24
25 Defendants’ brief in opposition to putative plaintiff Discover Bank’s motion for summary
26 judgment / Counterclaimants’ motion for summary judgment
27
28Brief in opposition to putative plaintiff Discover Bank’s motion for summary judgment
29
30 1. This court is reminded: This court has absolutely nothing to rely on to conclude
31that Discover Bank is involved in case number 03-CV-2295 or is even aware of this
32action.
33 2. Elizabeth C. Whealler and J. Curtis Tottle, Jr.’s so-called motion for summary
34judgment is a substantive and procedural nullity – frivolous on it’s face. This court has
35actual knowledge of the law to the effect that this court knows that motion for summary
36judgment is “not a trial based on affidavits” but must consider the factual materials of
37record to determine whether triable issues are disputed, and even if not disputed, whether
38reasonable persons could come to differing conclusions regarding the facts of record.

1 3. This court is noticed: Elizabeth C. Whealler and J. Curtis Tottle, Jr., allegedly
2acting on behalf of Discover Bank have placed no facts in the record for this court’s
3determinations, to wit: The so-called affidavit of Mark Schaffer is facially void for
4reason that Schaffer’s allegations occurring in article 2. of the so-called affidavit (a).
5confess that Shaffer has no actual knowledge of the records maintained by Discover
6Bank, and (b). states a mere conclusory opinion of Shaffer’s, which without
7corroboration, this court cannot notice. Shaffer’s so-called affidavit, at article 3.
84.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.16. & 17, tenders for this court’s consideration of materials
9which are not facts but mere conclusory opinions of Schaffer as all these articles call
10the court’s attention to materials that are NOT OF RECORD BECAUSE THEY
11WHERE EITHER (A). NOT SUBMITTED WITH THE AFFIDAVIT AS
12EXHIBITS, (B). MATERIALS SUBMITTED WERE NOT PREPARED AND
13MAINTAINED BY SHAFFER, AND (C). ALLEGED EVIDENCE IS NOT
14VERIFIED BY BEING SIGNED AND DATED BY A COMPETENT FACT
15WITNESS WHO CAN BE QUESTIONED UNDER OATH.
16
17 Conclusion regarding Elizabeth C. Whealler and J. Curtis Tottle, Jr.r’s so-called
18 motion for summary judgment
19
20 4. Whereas this court has actual knowledge that putative plaintiff has placed
21nothing in the record to verify standing to bring this suit; and whereas, this court has
22actual knowledge that counsel allegedly representing Discover Bank have placed not one
23single shred of evidence into the record which would be admissible at trial, Discover
24Bank’s motion for summary judgment must be denied as a matter of law.
25
26 Brief in support of counterclaimant’s motion for summary judgment
27
28 5. This court is reminded: Discover Bank, with notice and opportunity to answer
29and defend on the counterclaim, failed to answer or otherwise defend.
30 6. This court is noticed of the following triable issues of fact which are not in
31dispute:

1 Discover Bank lacks standing to bring suit in Georgia courts.
2 This court has jurisdiction to consider the counterclaim against Discover Bank by
3virtue of the fact that Discover Bank has committed fraud in Georgia.
4 Discover Bank fraudulently alleged that Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Jr.
5have a contract with Discover Bank. This allegation made by and through Elizabeth C.
6Whealler and J. Curtis Tottle, Jr., rose to the level of fraud for reason that Discover
7demanded a sum form Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Jr. based on a contract
8which Whealler and Tottle allege the Walkers have with Discover Bank, but Whealler
9and Tottle have failed or refused to produce the de facto contract.
10 Discover Bank fraudulently alleged that Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Jr.
11owe money to Discover Bank, but Whealler and Tottle have failed or refused to
12produce a verified accounting (not mere conclusory statements) that the Walker’s
13owe Discover Bank money.
14
15Conclusion regarding the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim
16
17 Whereas this court has actual knowledge, that Discover Bank failed to prove
18standing to bring suit in Georgia; and whereas, this court has actual knowledge that
19Discover Bank committed fraud in Georgia by presenting a patently false claim to this
20court with the intention that this court willfully accede to the fraud to the detriment of
21Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Jr.; and whereas, federal law occurring at 18 USC
221961, 1962, & 1964(a), (fraud, extortion, and civil racketeering) preempts state law
23calling for treble damages for fraud, Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Jr. are
24entitled to $18,365.49 as a matter of law. This court’s swift response to: (1). Enter
25judgment for and in favor of Angie G. Walker and Esler C. Walker, Jr. and (2). Remand
26Elizabeth C. Whealler, J. Curtis Tottle, Jr., and Mark Schaffer to other authority for
27considered prosecution for the criminal acts of fraud and extortion avoids the conclusion
28that this court is willfully aiding and abetting the violation of malum in se offenses
29including but not limited to 18 USC 1341, 1510, 1951, 1961 & 1962.
30

1 Angie G. Walker Esler C. Walker, Jr.
2
3
4
5
6
7
9I, Esler C. Walker, certify that _________________, 2004, I mailed a true and correct
10copy of the above and foregoing brief in opposition and motion for summary judgment
11via certified mail, return receipt requested to:
12
13Elizabeth C. Whealler and J. Curtis Tottle, Jr.
141655 Enterprise Way
15Marietta, Georgia 30067
16
17 __________________________
18 Esler C. Walker
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

1
2
3
4How do you handle yourself in open court arguing against an attorney and a hostile
5judge?
6
7
8
9
10
11
12 First and likely scenario: no witness – just attorney
13
14COURT: Let’s see we’re hearing a motion for judgment by default as the defendant has failed
15to answer and defend?
16
17Dave: Objection: Your honor, I have moved for a summary judgment and the plaintiff has not
18entered any facts on the record – there is nothing in dispute. (or alternately, I’ve moved to
19dismiss, I’ve filed a counterclaim, etc.).
20
21COURT: Let me explain something here. They sued you. This is their case against you. I’m
22going to listen to their argument, then you’ll get to talk.
23
24Atty: Mr. Goodguy borrowed money and hasn’t paid it back. My client is entitled to judgment.
25
26Dave: Objection: Your honor, counsel is attempting to testify for a witness who is not in
27appearance. Attorneys can’t testify.
28
29COURT: I’m not going to repeat myself Mr. Goodguy. I’m going to allow plaintiff’s attorney
30to present his case, then you’ll get to talk. If you interrupt again, I’ll expel you from this
31courtroom. Is that clear?
32
33Dave: Yes, your honor.
34

1Atty: Mr. Goodguy signed up for a credit card, used the card to make purchases, and now wants
2to get something for nothing by not paying the money back. My client is entitled to recover.
3
4COURT: Now you can talk Mr. Goodguy.
5Dave: Thank you, your honor. Your honor, this court has nothing to rely on, no evidence
6whatsoever that Citibank of South Dakota has standing to sue in Connecticut courts.
7
8Atty: objection, Your honor Citibank is a national banking institution and doesn’t need to
9register with the secretary of state to have standing to sue.
10
11Dave: Objection: Your honor you said the attorney would talk and then I’d get a chance to talk.
12He’s interrupting me.
13
14COURT: He’s raising a point of law which is different from testimony. He can do that.
15
16Dave: A fundamental issue here is whether Citibank of South Dakota can sue in the courts of
17Connecticut and since Citibank of South Dakota has neither registered with the secretary of
18state nor shown a regular, systematic way of doing business here, Citibank of South Dakota
19lacks standing to sue.
20
21COURT: Well of course they have standing to sue here.
22
23Dave: Sir, why are you arguing for the plaintiff?
24
25COURT: Mr. Goodguy, the court can ask you questions and also make comments in the
26interest of justice.
27
28Dave: Can the court be argumentative?
29
30COURT: I can’t give you legal advice.
31

1Dave: I’m not asking for legal advise. I’m asking for a judicial ruling.
2
3
4COURT: Mr. Goodguy, complete your argument or I’m going to terminate this hearing. Really,
5this is why you need an attorney. You see, when you don’t have an attorney, things just don’t
6go well for you.
7
8Dave: Not only does Citibank of South Dakota not have standing to sue
9
10COURT: I’ll make the determinations here and I’m not going to tolerate anymore of your
11conclusory arguments.
12
13Dave: Nothing has been entered on the record to show that Citibank has standing to sue.
14Nothing has been entered on the record to show that I have a contract with Citibank. Nothing
15has been entered on the record to show that I owe Citibank money. Nothing has been entered
16on the record to show that Citibank authorized this suit or even knows about it.
17
18Atty: Your honor, Mr. Goodguy is turning this into a circus. My client does have standing to
19sue because my client is a national banking institution. Mr. Goodguy signed a contract with my
20client and used it and you have a copy of that contract. I’ve also submitted some billings and an
21affidavit from the billing department. Besides all that you know that I come in here every week
22on behalf of Citibank.
23
24Dave: None of what the attorney has just said proves anything. Only the original contract and
25not a copy proves standing to sue me and only the original can discharge the obligation. Also,
26only the account and general ledger signed and dated by the person responsible for the
27bookkeeping is proof of damages.
28
29COURT: Mr. Goodguy, I’ve already heard your argument. The conclusions are mine.
30
31

1
2 Second scenario: witness in appearance – happens only about 1% of the time.
3
4COURT: Let’s see we’re hearing a motion for judgment by default as the defendant has failed
5to answer and defend?
6Dave: Objection: Your honor, I have moved for a summary judgment and the plaintiff has not
7entered any facts on the record – there is nothing in dispute. (or alternately, I’ve move to
8dismiss, I’ve filed a counterclaim, etc.).
9
10COURT: Let me explain something here. They sued you. This is their case against you. I’m
11going to listen to their argument, then you’ll get to talk.
12
13Atty: Mr. Goodguy borrowed money and hasn’t paid it back. My client is entitled to judgment.
14Sally Smith is here in appearance today to testify to the facts of the case.
15
16COURT: All right, everyone who is going to testify today, please raise your hand. I’ve gotta’
17swear you in.
18
19Witness – Sally Smith or whoever: My name is Sally Smith. I am familiar with the
20bookkeeping procedures of Citibank. Mr. Goodguy opened an account with Citibank in
21November of 1999. Mr. Goodguy has used his account to make purchases and ceased to make
22payments in October of 2002, leaving an outstanding balance of six thousand and eighty-four
23dollars. We’ve contacted him, but he refuses to pay and that’s why we’re here.
24
25COURT: Mr. Goodguy, you may question the witness.
26
27Dave: Ms. Smith, how long have you been employed by Citibank?
28
29Smith: I’ve been familiar with their bookkeeping procedures for about five years.
30
31Dave: So you’re not an employee of Citibank?

1
2Smith: I just said that I know all about their procedures and everything they do.
3
4Dave: Let the record show that no witness is in appearance to testify on behalf of Citibank.
5
6Atty: Objection. You honor, Sally Smith is competent to testify on behalf of Citibank.
7
8COURT: I’ll allow.
9
10Dave: Ms. Smith, were you present when I signed a contract with Citibank?
11
12Atty: Objection. That Mr. Goodguy has contracted with Citibank is not at issue here.
13
14COURT: Sustained.
15
16Dave: Ms. Smith, do I have a contract with Citibank today?
17
18Smith: Well, the procedure is that once you fall into arrears on a credit card, the card is charged
19off, but you still owe the debt.
20
21Dave: Am I indebted to Citibank today?
22Smith: You are still indebted under the contract.
23
24Dave: Am I indebted to Citibank.
25
26Atty: Your honor, I must object to this line of questioning. This is harassment.
27
28COURT: You just heard that you are still indebted under the contract.
29
30Dave: Ms. Smith, did you maintain the account and general ledger on my account?
31

1Smith: I am familiar with the bookkeeping procedures of Citibank.
2
3Dave: But do you have knowledge of my account?
4
5Smith: Yes I do. I know how much you owe, your outstanding balance.
6Dave: I have no further questions.
7
8Atty: I have some questions for Mr. Goodguy. Did you make application for a credit card with
9Citibank?
10
11Dave: I don’t know? To my recollection, I’ve applied for Visa cards, Mastercards, and other
12cards, but I don’t specifically recall Citibank.
13
14Atty: Is this your signature on this billing?
15
16Dave: I don’t know.
17
18Atty: Does it look like your signature?
19
20Dave: I don’t understand the question.
21Atty: Do you have any reason to believe that this is not your signature?
22
23Dave: Yes, I do.
24
25Atty: Why would you say that this is not your signature?
26
27Dave: because it is a copy. Anyone who knows about computers knows that computers and
28scanners can be used to piece together documents. If you had the original, I might be able to
29tell.
30

1Atty: Your honor, please make the witness answer yes or no. Is this your signature Mr.
2Goodguy?
3
4Dave: I don’t know.
5
6COURT: Mr. Goodguy, answer yes or no to the question.
7
8Dave: No that is not my signature. (it’s a copy!)
9Atty: Your honor this is outrageous, he knows very well that is his signature.
10
11Dave: objection – counsel is attempting to testify for me.
12
13COURT: Mr. Goodguy, you are under oath and can be charged with perjury. That is a very
14serous crime, so what is your answer?
15
16Dave: No, that is not my signature. (it is a copy)
17
18Atty: Your honor, he should be charged with perjury.
19
20Dave: That is not my signature. It might be a copy, but it is not my signature.
21
22Atty: Then is it a copy of your signature?
23
24Dave: for that, you’d have to ask the person who made the copy of the document.
25
26COURT: we’re going to have to pass on the question. Do you have anything further counselor?
27
28Atty: Your honor, the record shows that Mr. Goodguy contracted with Citibank, used the card,
29and hasn’t paid the balance due and owing my client. My client is entitled to judgment and Mr.
30Goodguy should be sanctioned for his frivolous arguments.
31

1COURT: anything else Mr. Goodguy? And before you answer, this court will not tolerate
2nonsense.
3
4Dave: Your honor, it is true is it not that a credit card is a continuing series of offers to contract
5and as such is non-transferable?
6
7COURT: I can’t give you legal advice.
8
9Dave: I’m not asking for legal advise. I’m asking for a judicial determination.
10COURT: What’s your point?
11
12Dave: If a credit card contract is non-transferable, and Citibank charged of the card and sold it,
13that would be a fraudulent transfer and Mr. Attorney here and also Ms. Smith would be
14committing fraud would they not?
15
16COURT: I’ll take that in counsel, now wind this up before I terminate this hearing to the
17plaintiff’s favor.
18
19Dave: the record does not, repeat, does not show that Citibank has standing to due in this state’s
20courts; does not show that Citibank has standing to sue me by virtue of actual possession of the
21only article which can discharge the obligation, the original contract; does not show that I owe
22Citibank money; and, does not show that Citibank authorized this action or is even aware of it.
23The record does show, repeat does show, that Mr. Atty has committed felony fraud by making
24material representations to this court, which Mr. Atty knows are false with the intention that I
25and this court rely on the false representations to my detriment of loosing money and property.
26You have a duty judge, to dismiss this case with prejudice and remand Mr. Atty to other
27authority for considered prosecution.
28 NOTES
29It is a good idea to have a court reporter present at these hearings so there is a complete record
30of the proceedings. When a court reporter is present, the judge tends to behave himself.
31

1Also, at anytime, other than when testifying under oath, if you feel like you’re over your head,
2you can elect at that moment to stand on your pleadings by saying, “I elect to stand on my
3pleadings.”
4
5
6
7
8
9What if they don’t answer your counterclaim? You file a motion for judgment by
10default and present the court with an order to sign giving you the victory.
11 In the District Court in and for Osage County
12 State of Oklahoma
13
14
15Delbert Diamond, )
16 )
17 Plaintiff, )
18 )
19vs. ) No. Cv-2003-583
20 )
21State of Oklahoma, )
22Ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, )
23 )
24 defendant. )
25
26
27
28
29Plaintiff’s motion to enter default judgment and 12, O.S. § 688 hearing for determination
30of damages
31 Brief in support of motion to enter default judgment
32
33 Delbert Diamond moves this court under authority of the rules for local courts
34rule 4(7) for entry of judgment by default against the Oklahoma Tax Commission. The
35Oklahoma Tax Commission, in receipt of notice and having had opportunity in this
36instant case, has failed or refused to enter an appearance and answer or otherwise defend.
37 Conclusion

1 This court’s swift response to: (1). Ratify Delbert Diamond’s proposed order of
2default and (2). Set the matter for hearing under authority of 12, O.S. § 688 to determine
3the sum of damages due and owing Delbert Diamond avoids the conclusion that this court
4is willfully in violation of 18 USC §§ 1961, 1962 & 1964(a).
5
7 Delbert Diamond
8
9
10
11 Certificate of mailing
12I, Delbert Diamond, certify that on December ____, 2003, I mailed a true and correct
13copy of the above and foregoing motion for judgment by default to:
14
15Oklahoma Tax Commission
16___________________
17___________________
18
19 ___________________________
20 Delbert Diamond
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

1
2
3
4Prepare an order for the court to sign. Take it the judge’s office and tell the judge’s
5clerk that you’ll wait while the order is being signed.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16 In the District Court of Caddo County
18
19Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank, )
20 )
21 Plaintiff, )
22 )
23vs. ) No. CS-2002-116
24 )
25Diane Summers, )
26 )
27 defendant. )
28 )
29 )
30
31 Order
32
33 Whereas this court has knowledge that Diane Summers moved for summary
34judgment and pleaded matters not of record supporting with affidavit; and whereas, this
35court has knowledge that counsel for putative plaintiff is in receipt of the motion and
36having had opportunity has failed to dispute the claims of Diane Summers; and whereas,
37this court finds the following triable issues of fact are not in dispute: Direct Merchants
38Credit Card Bank lacks standing to sue in Oklahoma courts, Diane Summers does not
39have a contract with Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank, Diane Summers does not owe
40Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank money, and Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank did
41not authorize this action, summary is granted in favor of Diane Summers and against

1Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank. Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank’s claims against
2Diane Summers are denied with prejudice.
3 Diane Summers is hereby ordered to submit a bill of costs for defending in this
4action exclusive of attorney fees.
5
6
7____________ __________________________________
8 date Judge of the District Court
9
10
11What if the judge won’t sign your default? You file a notice and demand.
12 Rocky River Municipal Court
13 21012 Hilliard Blvd., Rocky River, Ohio 44116-3398
14 440,333,2003
15
16 September 16th 2003
17
18Discover Bank
19 Plaintiff,
20
21Vs.
22
23Naomi R. Sweet,
24P.O. Box 451187
25Westlake, Ohio 44145
26 Defendant.
27
28 Notice and demand
29
30 Judicial notice
31
32 This court is noticed: (1). Party moving to vacate judgments is proceeding via
33direct attack; (2). Party attacking void judgment is invoking the ministerial side of the
34court – the court is deprived of judicial discretion; (3). Party asserting that the court had
35jurisdiction has the burden of proof to show on the record that the court had jurisdiction;
36and (4). Where the face of the record verifies jurisdictional failings, the court has a non-
37discretionary duty to vacate the void judgment.

1 Defendant, Naomi R. Sweet, moved this court under authority of Oxley v. Zacks
2(Sept. 29, 2000), for vacation of this court’s order granting judgment as void for reason
3total lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Discover Bank, in receipt of notice and having
4had opportunity has failed or refused to rebut the following facts: corporations lack
5standing to sue in the municipal courts of Ohio; Discover Bank lacks standing to sue in
6any Ohio court; Ohio municipal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to litigate breach
7of contract cases; Ohio municipal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to litigate civil
8cases involving controversy amounts exceeding fourteen thousand dollars; Naomi R.
9Sweet does not have a contract with Discover Bank; Naomi R. Sweet does not owe
10Discover Bank money; Discover Bank did not authorized this action; as a result of the
11harassment of business entity known as Thomas & Thomas, Naomi R. Sweet has been
12damaged financially, socially, and emotionally.
13 This court is especially noticed: The alleged debt that Thomas & Thomas falsely
14urge that Naomi R. Sweet owes Discover Bank is for a lost credit card – see attached
15exhibit. This leads to the ready conclusion that Thomas & Thomas, in addition to
16running the debt collection fraud racket, have also engaged in identity theft.
17
18 Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that party seeking to vacate
19 a void judgment is invoking the ministerial powers of the court
20 / courts lack judicial discretion when it comes to vacating void judgments
21
22 When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is
23not discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo.
241994). See also, Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262 (holding that trial court has not only
25power but duty to vacate a void judgment). For other authorities concurring, see Allied
26Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Ruth, 57 Wash. App. 783, 790, 790 P.2d 206 (1990),Bd. of Revision
27(2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 368, Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998),
28Chavez v. County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974), Cincinnati School
29Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company v.
30Finesilver, No. 69363 (Ohio App. Dist.8 04/25/1996), In re Marriage of Brighterowski,
3150 Wash. App. 633, 635, 749 P.2d 754 (1988); Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46
32Wash. App. 517, 520, 731 P.2d 533 (1987), In re: Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262, In re:

1Weaver Constr., 190 Colo. at 232, 545 P.2d at 1045, Leen, 62 Wash. App. at 478, Lubben
2v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649, (1st Cir. 1972),Good v.
3Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177, 180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990), Love v. Packer, 174
4N.C. 665, 94 S.E. 449, 450, Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68 Roller v. Holly,
5176 U.S. 398, 409, Small v. Batista, 22 F. Supp.2d 230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), Wright &
6A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, (1973), Civil § 2862.
7 Demand
8 This court’s swift response to vacate this court’s order granting judgment to
9Discover Bank avoids the conclusion that this court is willfully in violation of 18 USC §
10§ 1916,1962 & 1964(a).
11 Prepared and submitted by:_____________________________
12 Naomi R. Sweet
14
I,15
Naomi R. Sweet, certify that October_____, 2003, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above
16 and foregoing notice and demand to:
17
__________________
18
__________________
19
__________________
20
21 ___________________________
22 Naomi R. Sweet
23
24
25And to: (attorney general)
26Jim Petro
27State Office Tower
2830 East Broad Street, 17th Floor
29Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9What if the judge does not respond after the notice and demand? You petition for a
10writ of mandamus.
11
12 In the Ohio Supreme Court
13
14 Naomi R. Sweet,
15 Petitioner
16
17 Vs.
18
19 (name of judge – not magistrate goes here)
20 Respondent.
21
22
23
24 Petition for a writ of mandamus authorized by the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, § 2
25
26 Naomi R. Sweet, an aggrieved party, petitions this court under authority of the
27Ohio Constitution for relief of a void judgment order depriving Naomi R. Sweet of
28money and property without due process of law and subjecting Naomi R. Sweet to fraud
29aided and abetted by (name of judge – not magistrate goes here). Naomi R. Sweet moved
30the court of (name of judge – not magistrate goes here) for vacation of a void judgment
31and noticed the plaintiff and putative counsel of the motion. See exhibit “A.” In receipt
32of notice and opportunity, neither the plaintiff nor putative counsel answered the
33jurisdictional challenge. (date) Naomi R. Sweet responded to the improper magistrate’s
34report and recommendation. See exhibit “B.” This court is noticed: neither the magistrate
35or the plaintiff controverted Naomi R. Sweet’ objection to the magistrate’s report and
36recommendation. (date) Naomi R. Sweet filed a notice and demand and proposed order.

1See exhibits “C” and “D.” This court is noticed: the court failed or refused to rule on
2Naomi R. Sweet’ objection. (date) Naomi R. Sweet filed and objection and noticed the
3court that the court’s taking money from Naomi R. Sweet would reduce Naomi R. Sweet
4to a status of peonage. This court is noticed: (magistrate’s name) exhibited contempt for
5Constitutionally protected rights of Naomi R. Sweet and proceeded to reduce Naomi R.
6Sweet to poverty.
7 (name of judge – not magistrate goes here) is in direct breach of duty found
8at CJC Canon 3(c).
9 Conclusion
10 Whereas this court has knowledge of the law, this court has knowledge that a
11jurisdictional challenge is an administrative proceeding, the court in which jurisdiction is
12challenged lacking judicial discretion; that when jurisdiction is challenged, it is
13incumbent on the party asserting that the court had jurisdiction to show on the record
14that jurisdiction was perfected; and, where a jurisdictional failing appears on the face of
15the record, the court has a non-discretionary duty to vacate the void judgment and order
16reparations. Whereas this court is noticed: Naomi R. Sweet clearly and logically
17challenged the jurisdiction of the Rocky River Municipal court in the matter of Discover
18Bank versus Naomi R. Sweet, case number 02-CVF 1514 and neither Discover Bank nor
19attorneys alleging to represent Discover Bank showed wherein the record did not have
20the many jurisdictional defects cited by Naomi R. Sweet, the so-called judgment in case
21number 02-CVF 1514 is utterly void, a nullity, grounding no rights and conveying no
22interest.
23
24 Remedy sought
25 The cause of justice and proper administration of law require this court’s
26supervision of (name of judge – not magistrate goes here) including entering an order
27vacating the void judgment in case number 02-CVF 1514, ordering attorneys allegedly
28representing Discover Bank to cease and desist all collection activity against Naomi R.
29Sweet, ordering attorneys allegedly representing Discover Bank to return all sums taken
30from Naomi R. Sweet together with statutory interest from the date of the taking, and any

1other penalty applied to the attorneys allegedly representing Discover Bank which this
2court, within its equitable discretion, may find reasonable, lawful, and just.
4 Naomi R. Sweet
6I, Naomi R. Sweet, certify that _________________, 2003, I hand delivered a true and
7correct copy of the above and foregoing petition for a writ of mandamus to the clerk of
8courts for Rocky River Municipal Court.
9 ______________________________
10 Naomi R. Sweet
11
12What if you are mistreated regarding your petition for a writ of mandamus?
13 In the Oklahoma Supreme Court
14
15 Dwayne Marvin Coinage
16 Petitioner
17
18 Vs.
19
20 The district court for the County of Washington County, Oklahoma
21 Ex rel. David Gambill
22 Respondent.
23
24
25 Petitioner’s objection and notice to the Oklahoma Supreme Court regarding the meeting
26 with the referee which was held January 7th 2004
27
28 Grounds for objection
29
30 The meeting on the above styled matter, occurring on January 7th 2004, monitored
31by Gregory W. Albert, was conducted in a manner prejudicial to the rights of Dwayne
32Marvin Coinage and also in a manner likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice.
33 Mr. Albert advised Dwayne Marvin Coinage, hereinafter, “Dwayne Coinage,”
34that Judge Gambill had a duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing based on Dwayne
35Coinage’s motion to dismiss filed in the underlying case. When Dwayne Coinage
36informed Mr. Albert that Judge Gambill had refused to notice the evidence Dwayne
37Coinage entered into the record and threatened to have Dwayne Coinage arrested for

1even trying to present evidence in support of his claims, Mr. Albert examined the file and
2advocated that Gambill was within his authority because Gambill had recast the motion
3to dismiss as an answer. When asked what authority Gambill had to convert a motion to
4dismiss to an answer, Mr. Albert responded that Gambill had not converted the motion
5but had recast it as if there was a difference. When asked what authority Gambill had to
6recast the motion, Mr. Albert claimed that an Oklahoma District Court Judge has
7authority to examine any paper filed in that judge’s court and identify it for what it really
8is. When Dwayne Coinage asked where an Oklahoma District Court Judge gets such
9authority, Mr. Albert replied, “I think he gets it from the people. I think they give him
10that mantle of authority,” or words to that effect. This court needs to supervise Gregory
11W. Albert including instruction on Oklahoma District Court Judge’s authority, to wit: We
12recognize the district court, in our unified court system, is a court of general jurisdiction
13and is constitutionally endowed with "unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable
14matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article,". Article 7, Section 7, Oklahoma
15Constitution. However, this "unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters" can
16only be exercised by the district court through the filing of pleadings which are sufficient
17to invoke the power of the court to act. See Chandler v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 344, 255 P.2d
18299, 301-2 (1953), Smith v. State, 152 P.2d 279, 281 (Okl.Cr. 1944); City of Tulsa, 554
19P.2d at 103; Nickell v. State, 562 P.2d 151 (Okl.Cr. 1977); Short v. State, 634 P.2d 755,
20757 (Okl.Cr. 1981); Byrne v. State, 620 P.2d 1328 (Okl.Cr. 1980); Laughton v. State, 558
21P.2d 1171 (Okl.Cr. 1977)., and Buis v. State, 792 P.2d 427, 1990 OK CR 28
22(Okla.Crim.App. 05/14/1990). Beyond Mr. Albert’s advocacy that Oklahoma District
23Court Judge’s have inherent judicial power because they are chosen by the people,
24Albert advocates that questions of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statutory
25limitations are questions of fact reserved for a jury and that Dwayne Coinage would have
26a chance to raise these issues at trial. One can only imagine what Albert’s jury
27instruction would be regarding statutory limitation. Perhaps Albert would instruct the
28jurors, “Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, if you see evidence that this action was
29brought after the statute of limitations had run, it is your duty to inform this court that this
30trial was not necessary and then you can all get up and leave and go home.” Albert also
31wants an explanation of how the statutory requirement that once the statute of limitations

1has run, there is no cause of action nor defense there of could be an affirmative
2defense. When Dwayne Coinage further corrected Mr. Albert that the so-called order of
3Gambill was a minute order and not an order of the court and supported the contention
4with the docket sheet showing no order, Albert, nonetheless considered the minute order
5to be an order. When Dwayne Coinage informed Mr. Albert that he was not in receipt of
6the so-called order “recasting” the motion to dismiss as an answer allegedly reserving
7issues of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statutory limitations as questions of fact to
8be resolved by the jury, counsel for Gambill “chimed in” and stated that it was the state’s
9position that Gambill didn’t have to notice a pro se litigant of the changing of their
10motion. This court is advised to consult Castro v. United States, Argued October 15th
112003, decided October 15th 2003 by the United States Supreme Court wherein that
12honorable court ruled that the court re-characterizing a pro se litigant’s motion has not
13only a duty to notice the pro se litigant but also to instruct the pro se litigant of the
14meaning and effect of the “recasting” of the pro se litigant’s motion. The meeting
15conducted in a general tone of acrimony revealed that Gregory W. Albert is neither a
16student of the law nor a respectful of the United States Supreme Court’s Doctrines, to
17wit: Albert repeatedly ridiculed Dwayne Coinage for not being able to cite the statute or
18rule for his points of law, but when counsel for Gambill averred that Gambill had no duty
19to notice Dwayne Coinage on the putative order of the court, Albert willfully acceded to
20the erroneous point of law without query of Gambill’s counsel’s authority. It is also true
21that Albert was particularly contumacious regarding who may assist the pro se litigant
22during an administrative hearing. Albert and this court are noticed of United States
23Supreme Court Doctrine established in Sperry v. State of Florida, ex rel. the Florida Bar
24373 U.S. 379, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 10 L. Ed.2d 428 (1963). Reinforced in Keller v. Wisconsin
25Ex Rel. State Bar of Wisconsin, - The pro se litigant preparing for and participating in an
26administrative proceeding can have assistance of counsel without having to patronize so-
27called licensed bar associates. This court is also noticed of recent authority in Washington
28State which subsidizes the public’s knowledge that employing a bar-licensed attorney is
29not a guarantee of competency and honesty, rather, it is an almost air-tight guarantee of
30dishonesty and incompetence. Even where the actions of non-bar attorneys constitute the
31practice of law, the parties can continue the practice as long as they provide the same

1standard of care as a practicing attorney. See Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co. 146 Wash. 2d
2291, 45 P.3d 1068 (Wash. 05/09/2002). Given Albert’s opinions, it is likely that Albert
3would defend his blatant interference with Dwayne Coinage’s right to assistance of
4counsel by claiming that he (Albert) was acting in a judicial capacity conducting a
5judicial hearing. This court is reminded: Only Constitutionally created, or Article III
6judges can conduct judicial proceedings. See Northern Pipe Line Co. v. Marathon
7Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1982). Again, this court has
8means to know that Albert contravenes United States Supreme Court Authority in support
9of his contention, “I’ve been doing this for thirty years, so I know what I’m doing.”
10
11
12
13 Notice
14 This court is noticed: no respondent was in appearance at the meeting held by
15Gregory W. Albert, suggesting that the respondents presumed that “the fix was in.”
16Albert should be asked why he presumed to speak for Gambill who was not in
17appearance. This court is further noticed: in the underlying case, Dwayne Coinage
18entered evidence that his adversary had testified under oath as to having no interest in the
19property which is the res of the non-suit in the lower court and evidence that the matter
20had also been lost in an adversary proceeding as well. Thus, this court as well as Gregory
21W. Albert have knowledge of violation of Oklahoma Statutes Title 21. Crimes and
22Punishments, Chapter 13, Section 453 and that Judge Gambill has aided and abetted
23this felony.
24
25 Conclusion
26 Respect for the rule of law requires this court disregarding the report and
27recommendation of Gregory W. Albert and assuming original jurisdiction.
28 Affidavit
29 I, Dwayne Coinage, of lawful age and competent to testify, state as follows based

1 I certify that the factual representations in the above and foregoing petition for a
2writ of mandamus are truthful and accurate to the best of my knowledge.
3 ________________________________
4 Dwayne Coinage
5
7COUNTY OF _____________
14 ________________ Notary Public
15
17 Dwayne Coinage
19I, Dwayne Coinage, certify that _________________, 2004, I hand delivered a true and
20correct copy of the above and foregoing objection and notice to Gregory W. Albert, and
21mailed a copy to counsel for Judge Gambill.
22And also
23
24Edwin L. Worthington
25U.S. Department of Justice
26Southern District of Mississippi
27100 West Capital, Suite 1553
28Jackson, Mississippi 39269
29
30Noel Hillman
31U. S. Department of Justice
32950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
33Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
34
35 ______________________________
36 Dwayne Coinage
37
38
39

1In the above mailing, a copy was sent to Worthington and Hillman. This pair teamed up
2to indict Oliver Diaz, Jr. (justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court), two former
3Mississippi Supreme Court Justices, and a private attorney. Worthington has made the
4public statement, “people are not treated fairly in courts” – no kidding! A number of
5people who copied to Hillman and Worthington have been invited to make a statement
6for use in a possible FBI/DOJ investigation.
7
8
9
10
11
12What if they already have a judgment against you? You move to vacate the
13judgment as void.
14 In the District Court of Caddo County
16
17Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank, )
18 )
19 Plaintiff, )
20 )
21vs. ) No. CS-2002-111
22 )
23Diane Summers, )
24 )
25 defendant. )
26 )
27 )
28
29 Defendant’s motion to vacate a void judgment under authority of
30 Oklahoma Statute Title 12, Sections 1038 / judicial notice
31
32 Brief in support of motion to vacate
33
34 Diane Summers, an aggrieved party, moves this court under authority of O.S. 12,
35§ 1038 for vacation of a void judgment attached. Love, Beal & Nixon, practicing
36subterfuge and acting in a purely criminal mode, obtained judgment in this instant case.
37Diane Summers did not receive notice and have opportunity on a motion for either
38default or summary judgment. Even if Love, Beal & Nixon had properly noticed Diane

1Summers, the record does not reveal that Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank proved
2standing to bring this action and Love, Beal & Nixon failed to prove up the claim of
3damages.
4
7
8 Love, Beal, & Nixon failed or refused to produce the actual notes which Direct
9Merchants Credit Card Bank alleges Diane Summers owes. Where the complaining party
10can not prove the existence of the note, then there is no note. To recover on a promissory

8
11
12 Trial court could not award damages to plaintiff, following default judgment,
13without requiring evidence of damages. Razorsoft, Inc. v. Maktal, Inc., Okla.App. Div. 1,
14907 P.2d 1102 (1995), rehearing denied. A party is not in default so long as he has a
15pleading on file which makes an issue in the case that requires proof on the part of the
16opposite party in order to entitle him to recover. Millikan v. Booth, Okla., 4 Okla. 713, 46
17P. 489 (1896). Proof of or assessment of damages upon petition claiming damages, it is
18error to pronounce judgment without hearing proof or assessing damages. Atchison, T. &
19S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 31 Okla. 300, 121 P. 654, Ann.Cas.1913E, 329 (1912); City of
20Guthrie v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co., 5 Okla. 774, 50 P. 84 (1897). In the assessment of
21damages following entry of default judgment, a defaulting party has a statutory right to a
22hearing on the extent of unliquidated damage, and encompassed within this right is the
23opportunity to a fair post-default inquest at which both the plaintiff and the defendant can
24participate in the proceedings by cross-examining witnesses and introducing evidence on
25their own behalf. Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999). A default declaration,
26imposed as a discovery sanction against a defendant, cannot extend beyond saddling
27defendant with liability for the harm occasioned and for imposition of punitive damages,
28and the trial court must leave to a meaningful inquiry the quantum of actual and punitive
29damages, without stripping defendant of basic forensic devices to test the truth of
30plaintiff's evidence. Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999). Fracture of two toes
31required expert medical testimony as to whether such injury was permanent so as to allow

1damages for permanent injury, future pain, and future medical treatment on default
2judgment, and such testimony was not within competency of plaintiff who had no
3medical expertise. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R.5th 913 (1991).
4Rendition of default judgment requires production of proof as to amount of unliquidated
5damages. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R.5th 913 (1991). When face of
6judgment roll shows judgment on pleadings without evidence as to amount of
7unliquidated damages then judgment is void. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20
8A.L.R.5th 913 (1991). In a tort action founded on an unliquidated claim for damages, a
9defaulting party is deemed to have admitted only plaintiff's right to recover, so that the
10court is without authority or power to enter a judgment fixing the amount of recovery in
11the absence of the introduction of evidence. Graves v. Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702
12(1975). Presumptions which ordinarily shield judgments from collateral attacks were not
13applicable on motion to vacate a small claim default judgment on ground that court
14assessed damages on an unliquidated tort claim without first hearing any supporting
15evidence. Graves v. Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975). Rule that default judgment
16fixing the amount of recovery in absence of introduction of supporting evidence is void
17and not merely erroneous or voidable obtains with regard to exemplary as well as
18compensatory damages. Graves v. Walters, Okla.App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975). Where
19liability of father for support of minor daughter and extent of such liability and amount of
20attorney's fees to be allowed was dependent on facts, rendering of final judgment by trial
21court requiring father to pay $25 monthly for support of minor until minor should reach
22age 18 and $100 attorney's fees without having heard proof thereof in support of
23allegations in petition was error. Ross v. Ross, Okla., 201 Okla. 174, 203 P.2d 702
24(1949). Refusal to render default judgment against codefendant for want of answer was
25not error, since defendants and court treated answer of defendant on file as having been
26filed on behalf of both defendants, and since plaintiff could not recover without offering
27proof of damages and offered no such proof. Thomas v. Sweet, Okla., 173 Okla. 601, 49
28P.2d 557 (1935). Under R.L.1910, §§ 4779, 5130 (see, now, this section and § 2007 of
29this title), allegation of value, or amount of damages stated in petition, were not
30considered true by failure to controvert. Cudd v. Farmers' Exch. Bank of Lindsay, Okla.,
3176 Okla. 317, 185 P. 521 (1919). Hearing Trial court's discovery sanction barring

1defendant from using cross-examination and other truth-testing devices at post-default
2non-jury hearing on plaintiff's damages violated due process. Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995
3P.2d 1088 (1999).
4
8
18
20
21 The general rule is that a void judgment is no judgment at all. Where judgments
22are void, as was the judgment originally rendered by the trial court here, any subsequent
23proceedings based upon the void judgment are themselves void. In essence, no judgment
24existed from which the trial court could adopt either findings of fact or conclusions of
25law. Valley Vista Development Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow, 766 P.2d 344, 1988 OK
26140 (Okla. 12/06/1988); A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no
27rights are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless, in itself, all
28proceedings founded upon it are necessarily equally worthless, and have no effect
29whatever upon the parties or matters in question. A void judgment neither binds nor bars
30anyone. All acts performed under it, and all claims flowing out of it, are absolutely void.
31The parties attempting to enforce it are trespassers." High v. Southwestern Insurance

1Company, 520 P.2d 662, 1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974); and, A void judgment cannot
2constitute res judicata. Denial of previous motions to vacate a void judgment could not
3validate the judgment or constitute res judicata, for the reason that the lack of judicial
4power inheres in every stage of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered.
5Bruce v. Miller, 360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960).
6
9
12St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941.
13
17
21to vacate a void judgment).
22
23 Judicial notice
24 This court is noticed: As soon as practical and reasonable, Love, Beal, and Nixon,
25the private business organizations to which they belong, and all who aid and abet Love,
26Beal, and Nixon shall be sued under authority of 18 USC 1964(a). See O.S. Title 21,
27Chapter 19, § 554, “Attorney Buying Evidence of Debt-Misleading Court. Every attorney
28who either directly or indirectly buys or is interested in buying any evidence of debt or
29thing in action with intent to bring suit thereon is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any attorney
30who in any proceeding before any court of a justice of the peace or police judge or other
31inferior court in which he appears as attorney, willfully misstates any proposition or seeks

1to mislead the court in any matter of law is guilty of a misdemeanor and on any trial
2therefore the state shall only be held to prove to the court that the cause was pending, that
3the defendant appeared as an attorney in the action, and showing what the legal statement
4was, wherein it is not the law. If the defense be that the act was not willful the burden
5shall be on the defendant to prove that he did not know that there was error in his
6statement of law.” Any person guilty of falsely preparing any book, paper,
7[({ record, })], instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or
8allow it to be produced as genuine upon any [({ trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, })]
9authorized by law, SHALL BE GUILTY OF A FELONY. See Oklahoma Statutes Title
1021. Crimes and Punishments, Chapter 13, Section 453.
11
12
13
14 Memorandum of law in support of judicial notice
15 The federal district courts have jurisdiction under Civil Rico to order any person
16to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable
17restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not
18limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the
19enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
20ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise. Any person injured in his
21business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
22therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
23damages he sustains and the cost of the suit. Because the language of Racketeer
24Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act authorizing suit by any person injured in his
25business or property by reason of violation of Act tracks section 4 of the Clayton Act,
26rules established in antitrust cases for identifying proper complaints should be applied to
27RICO, too. Both requirements of Rule mandating particularity in pleading of fraud and
28liberal notice pleading philosophy of federal rules apply to RICO claims based upon
29fraud. Congress intended RICO. In order to state claim for treble damages as result of
30injury to business or property, plaintiff in RICO action must (1) prove RICO violation,
31(2) prove injury to business or property, and (3) that the violation caused the injury.

1Additionally, plaintiff must prove (1) existence of enterprise which affects interstate
2commerce, (2) that defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise, (3) that
3defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs, and (4) that the
4participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity. Elements essential to CR are
5(1) existence of RICO enterprise, (2) existence of pattern of racketeering activity, (3)
6nexus between defendant, pattern of RICO activity or RICO enterprise, and (4) resulting
7injury to plaintiff in his business or property. Plaintiff must demonstrate that he sustained
8injury as proximate result of one or more predicate acts constituting pattern. Plaintiff
9must allege that defendant, through commission of two or more acts, constituting pattern
10of racketeering activity, directly or indirectly invested in, or maintained an interest in, or
11participated in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Plaintiff must allege injury
12flowing from commission of predicate acts which means that recovery must show some
13injury flowing from one or more predicate acts. Plaintiff must show how violation
14caused injury and in conjunction with RICO prohibitions stated in 18 USC 1962 (which
15centers on actions conducted through pattern of RICO activity by reason of requirement
16effectively forces civil RICO plaintiff to demonstrate that predicate act alleged for
17purposes of making out violation of 1962 resulted in direct harm). Causal connection
18between injury and alleged acts of RICO activity is requirement of standing under RICO.
19Injury must be caused by a pattern of RICO activity or by individual RICO predicate
20acts. Pattern or acts must proximately cause the injury. There must be a direct
21relationship between plaintiff’s injury and plaintiff’s conduct (as in plaintiff relying on).
22The test for proximate cause is reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as natural
23consequence. Civil Rico cause of action does not require prior criminal conviction,
24relationship to organized crime, or proof of injuries outside those caused by the predicate
25acts. To prove that enterprise existed within meaning of RICO plaintiffs must present
26evidence of ongoing organization and evidence that various associates functioned as
27continuing unit. RICO plaintiff must establish that defendant has received money from
28pattern of RICO activity and has invested that money in enterprise affecting interstate
29commerce. Showing injury requires proof of concrete financial loss. Loss cannot be
30intangible. Lost profit is an injury cognizable within Civil Rico. No particular RICO
31injury need be proven to maintain a Civil Rico. Plaintiffs must prove criminal conduct in

1violation of RICO injured business or property. Liability attaches where injury is direct or
2indirect result; however, standing requires direct injury. Lost opportunity must be
3concrete injury meaning not speculative. Civil Rico does not apply to personal injuries.
4Plaintiff need only establish that predicate acts were proximate cause of injury. Plaintiffs
5are not required to show nexus between defendants and organized crime. Plaintiffs must
6show (1) at least two predicate acts, (2) that predicates were related, and (3) that
7defendants pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Cardinal question is whether
8defendants have committed one of enumerated acts under 18 USC 1961. Relying on a
9fraud to one’s detriment and resulting injury to property or business is injury
10cognizable within Civil Rico. Communicating misrepresentations to the effect that
11the party relying on the misrepresentations loses money or property is injury.
12Injury caused by reliance on fraud is injury. Standard of proof is preponderance of
13the evidence. Question of whether plaintiff’s business or property was injured is question
14of law for the court taking into consideration such factors as foreseeability of particular
15injury, intervention of independent causes and factual directness of causal connection.
16There are elements that must be pled before plaintiff may avail himself of enhanced
17damages, (1) two predicate acts, (2) which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity,
18(3) directly participating in the conduct of an enterprise of (4) activities that affect
19interstate commerce, and (5) that plaintiff was injured in business or property. There is
20no right of contribution under civil liability provision of RICO Act. Each element of
21RICO violation and its predicate acts must be alleged with particularity. To state a claim
22under CR there must be a person, enterprise, and pattern of racketeering activity.
23Plaintiffs must show a nexus between control of enterprise, RICO activity, and injury.
24Complaint must allege (1) existence of enterprise affecting interstate commerce, (2) that
25defendant participated directly or indirectly in the conduct or affairs of the enterprise,
26and (3) defendant participated through a pattern of racketeering activity that must include
27the allegation of at least two racketeering acts. A necessary ingredient of every successful
28Civil Rico claim is an element of criminal activity. Civil Rico claim must adequately
29allege that scheme of fraud would have foreseeable result and continuity or threat of
30continuing racketeering acts. Enterprise as defined in Civil Rico is (1) identified
31formally or informally, and (2) common purpose of making money from fraud schemes.

1Referring to entity as both enterprises and person does not defeat Civil Rico in spite of
2requirement of (1) identifying a persons and a (2) separate enterprise. Enterprise can be
3association-in-fact. Plaintiff must show how person’s criminal conduct enables obtaining
4an interest or control of the enterprise. Failing to allege that defendant was affiliated with
5or engaged in organized crime is not fatal to Civil Rico claim. Sufficiency of pleading of
6RICO conspiracy claim is not subject to higher pleading standard of civil rule for fraud
7claims. In order to sufficiently allege a conspiracy, a party must allege two acts of
8racketeering with enough specificity to show there is probable cause to believe that
9crimes were committed. Although rule that fraud must be pled with particularity requires
10that plaintiff in a suit brought under RICO provide only a general outline of the alleged
11fraud scheme, sufficient to reasonably notify the defendants of their purported role in the
12scheme, the complaint must, at minimum, (1) describe the predicate acts with some
13specificity and (2) state the time, (3) place, (4) content of the alleged communications
14perpetrating the fraud and (5) identity of party perpetrating a fraud. Fraud allegations are
15sufficient for purpose of stating Civil Rico claim if the place the defendant on notice of
16precise misconduct Claim must be made that defendant actually made false statements.
17To state a claim the “continuity plus relationship standard” must be met. Pattern of
18racketeering activity means a nexus between the affairs of the enterprise and the RICO
19activity. There must be a threat of future activity. Continuity means “regular way of
20doing business.” To satisfy the “pattern prong” requires that acts be related. Actual fraud
21and not constructive fraud must be shown. See Attick v. Valeria Associates, L.P., S.D.
22N.Y. 1992, 835 F. Supp. 103., Avirgan v. Hull, C.A. 11 (Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572.,
23Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, C.A.D.C.
241990, 913 F.2d 948, 286 U.S. App. D.C. 182, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S.
251222, 115 L.Ed. 2d 1007, Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc. C.A. 2 (N.Y.) 1990,
26897 F.2d 21, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 655., Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi,
27D.Del. 1992, 821 F. Supp. 232., Jordan v. Herman, F.D. Pa. 1992, 792 F. Supp. 380,
28Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc. S.D.N.Y. 1987, 114 F.R.D.
29684., Polletier v. Zweifel, C.A. 11 (Ga.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1465, rehearing denied 931 F.2d
30901, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 167, 502 U.S. 855, 116 L.Ed. 131, Khurana v. Innovative
31Heath Care Systems, Inc. , C.A. 5 (La.) 1997, 130 F.3d 143, vacated 119 S.Ct. 442, 525

1U.S. 979, 142 L.Ed. 2d 397, on remand 164 F.3d 900, In re American Honda Motor Co.,
2Inc. Dealership Relations Litigation, D.Md. 1996, 941 F.Supp. 528., Red Ball Interior
3Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, S.D.N.Y. 1995, 908 F.Supp. 1226., Protter v. Nathan’s
4Famous Systems, Inc. E.D. N.Y. 1995, 904 F.Supp. 101, Prudential Ins. Co. of America
5v. U.S. Gypsum Co. D.N.J. 1993, 828 F.Supp. 287, Compagnie de Reassuarance D’lle de
6France v. New England Reinsurance Corp. D. Mass. 1993, 825 F.Supp. 370., Grand
7Cent. Sanitation, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Palmerton, M.D.Pa. 1992, 816 F.Supp. 299,
8Randolph County Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Sutliffe S.D. Ohio 1991, 775 F. Supp.
91113, Venzor v. Gonzalez, N.D. Ill. 1996, 936 F. Supp. 445, Miller v. Affiliated
10Financial Corp. N.D. Ill. 1984, 600 F.Supp. 987, Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc. F.D.
11Pa. 1983, 581 F.Supp. 88, Gitterman v. Vitoulis S.D. N.Y. 1982, 564 F.Supp. 46,.
12Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, S.D.N.Y. 1989, 718 F.Supp. 168, Florida Dept. Ins. V. Debenture
13Guar. M.D. Fla. 1996, 921 F.Supp. 750, In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Securities
14Litigation, S.D. Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342, Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Workers of
15America, S.D. Ind. 1995, 917 F.Supp. 601, In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation,
16W.D. Pa. 1994, 900 F.Supp. 777, Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers C.A. 7 (Ill.) 1987, 834 F.2d
171297., Poeter v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc. S.D. Tex. 1992, 802 F.Supp. 41, Guiliano
18v. Everything Yogert, Inc. E.D. N.Y. 1993, 819 F.Supp. 626., Babst v. Morgan Keegan &
19Co. E.D. La. 1988, 687 F.Supp. 255, U.S. v. Gigante, D.N.J. 1990, 737 F.Supp. 292,
20Frank E. Basil, Inc. v. Leidesdorf, N.D.Ill. 1989, 713 F.Supp. 1194, In re Crazy Eddie
21Securities Litigation, E.D. N.Y. 1990, 747 F.Supp. 850, and O’Rourke v. Crosley, D.N.J.
221994, 847 F.Supp. 1208.
23 Affidavit
24 I, Diane Summers, of lawful age and competent to testify state as follows based
26 1. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Direct Merchants Credit
27Card Bank has standing to sue in Oklahoma courts.
28 2. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I have a contract with
29Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank
30 3. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I owe Direct Merchants
31Credit Card Bank money.
32 4. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that Direct Merchants Credit
33Card Bank authorized suit against me or is even aware of it.

1 5. I am not in receipt of a motion for judgment by default or motion for summary
2judgment on behalf of Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank.
3 6. As the result of Love, Beal & Nixon, P.C.’s pattern of acts against me, I have
4been damaged financially, socially, and emotionally.
5
6 ___________________________
7 Diane Summers
8STATE OF OKLAHOMA INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
9COUNTY OF _____________ Oklahoma Form
16
17 ________________ Notary Public
18 Declaration
19 Fifteen days from the verifiable receipt of this motion to vacate a void judgment,
20an order shall be prepared and submitted to the court for ratification unless prior to that
21time, Love, Beal & Nixon, P.C. rebut all articles - one through five - of my affidavit by
22and through a competent fact witness making their statement under penalty of perjury,
23supporting all the rebutted articles with evidence which would be admissible at trial, and
24sets the matter for hearing.
25
27 Diane Summers
28
30I, Diane Summers, certify that July___, 2003, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
31above and foregoing motion to vacate via certified mail, return receipt requested to:
32
33Love, Beal & Nixon
34P.O. Box 32738

1
2
3 __________________________
4 Diane Summers
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13What if you just can’t win? You appeal! Two variations follow
14
15 No. DF-999999
16
17
18 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
19
20
21 Diane Summers
22 Appellant,
23
24 Vs.
25
26 Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank
27 appellee
28
29
30 On appeal from the lower court’s refusal to vacate a void judgment
31 Caddo County, Oklahoma
32 District Court Number CS-2002-111
33
34
35 Appellants’ brief-in-chief
36
37
38
39

1
2
3 Diane Summers
4 P. O. Box 1454
5 Anadarko, Oklahoma 73005
6 No phone number at this time
7
8
9
10
11
12
13November 28th 2003
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 Table of contents
23
24
25Table of authorities . . . . . . . . 3-5
26
27History . . . . . . . . . 5,6
28
29Questions presented . . . . . . . . 7
30
31First proposition: Where the record shows absolutely no evidence, no
32 prove up of the claim, no contract, no nothing, absolutely
33 no evidence entered on the record in support of the claim,
34 the judgment is void, a nullity, conveying no interest, and
35 grounding no rights.
36
37Second proposition: Attorneys who purchase evidence of debt, then prosecute
38 an action in the name of the original maker of the loan are
39 engaging in criminal activity and attorneys who prepare
40 and submit false documents to a court are committing
41 felonies.

1
2Third proposition: Oklahoma courts lack judicial power to review
3 a void judgment. Where the judgment is void on the
4 face of the record, Oklahoma courts have a
5 non-discretionary duty to vacate the void judgment,
6 order repair of all damages caused by the void judgment,
7 and duty to remand those who have committed criminal
8 acts to other authority for considered prosecution.
9
10Fourth proposition: When the court’s jurisdiction is challenged, it is incumbent
11 on the party asserting that the court had jurisdiction to show,
12 on the record, that the court had jurisdiction: where parties,
13 including judges enforce a judgment the record shows is
14 void, all actors are trespassers on the law.
15
16Argument and authorities . . . . . . . . 7-13
17
18Conclusion . . . . . . . . . 13
19
20Certificate of service . . . . . . . . 14
21
22 Table of authorities
23
24Federal Statutes:
25
2615 USC 1601 . . . . . . . . . . 5
2718 USC 4 . . . . . . . . . . 6
2818 USC 1961 . . . . . . . . . . 6,7
2918 USC 1962 . . . . . . . . . . 6,7
30
31Oklahoma State Statutes and rules:

1
2Oklahoma rules for local courts, rule 4(7) . . . . . . 6
3O.S. Title 21. Crimes and Punishments, Chapter 13, Section 453 . . . 10
4O.S. Title 21, Chapter 19, § 554 . . . . . . . 10
5
6
7Federal authorities:
8
9American Red Cross v. Community Blood Center of the Ozarks,
10 257 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 07/25/2001) . . . . . . 7
11
12Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) . . . . 11
13Elliott v Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828) . . . . 12
14In Re Investors & Lenders, Ltd. 165 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994) . . . 9
15In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes, Inc. No.98-50117 February 18,
16 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.) . . . . . 9
17Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649, (1st Cir. 1972) 11
18Matter of Staff Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977) . . . 9
19Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994) . . . . . 11
20Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 . . . . . . . 11
21Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) . . . 13
22Small v. Batista, 22 F. Supp.2d 230
23 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) . . . . . . . . 11
24Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) . 13
25
26Oklahoma authorities:
27Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 31 Okla. 300, 121 P. 654,
28 Ann. Cas. 1912 E, 329 (1912) . . . . . 8
30Bruce v. Miller, 360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960). .. . . 8

31City of Guthrie v. T.W. Harvey Lumber Co., 5 Okla. 774, 50 P. 84 (1897) . 11

1Cudd v. Farmers’ Exch. Bank of Lindsay, 76 Okla. 317, 185 P. 521 (1919). 8
2Graves v. Walters, Okla. App. 534 P.2d 702 (1975) . . . 8
3High v. Southwestern Insurance Company, 520 P.2d 662,
4 1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974) . . . . . 8
6Millikan v. Booth, Okla. 713, 46 P. 489 (1896) . . . . . 8

7Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999) . . . . 8
8Razorsoft Inc. v. Maktal, Inc., Okla. App. Div. 1, 907 P.2d 1102 (1995) . 7
9Reed v. Scott, Okla. 820 P.2d 445, 20 A.L.R. 5th 913 (1991) . . 8
10Ross v. Ross, Okla. 201 Okla. 174, 203 P.2d 702 (1949) . . . 8
11Thomas c. Sweet, Okla. 173 Okla. 601, 49 P.2d 557 (1935) . . 8
12Valley Vista Development Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow, 766 P.2d 344,
13 1988 OK 140 (Okla. 12/06/1988) . .. . . 8
14
15Persuasive authorities:
16
17Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Ruth, 57 Wash. App. 783, 790, 790 P.2d 206 (1990) . 11
18Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) . 11
19Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46 Wash. App. 517, 520, 731 P.2d 533 (1987) 11
20Carnegie Bank v Shalleck 256 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div 1992) . . . 09
21Chavez v. County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974) . . 11
22Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty, Cleveland Electric
23 Illuminating Company v. Finesilver, No. 69363 (Ohio App. Dist.8 04/25/1996) 11
24
25GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001) 8
26Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000) . 10
27In re:Bd. of Revision (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 368 . . . . 11
28In re Marriage of Brighterowski, 50 Wash. App. 633, 635, 749 P.2d 754 (1988) . 11
29In re TIP-PA-HANS enterprises, Inc., 27 B.R. 780, 783 (1983) . . . 12
30In re: Leen, 62 Wash. App. at 478 . . . . . . . 11
31In re: Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262 . . . . . . . 11

1In re: Weaver Constr., 190 Colo. at 232, 545 P.2d at 1045 . . . . 12
2Loos v American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841(1988) . 12
3Mendoza v City of Corpus Christi, Tex. App. 13 Dist., 700 S.W.2d 652, 654. . 11
4Good v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177, 180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990) . 11
5Love v. Packer, 174 N.C. 665, 94 S.E. 449, 450 . . . . . 11
6Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68 . . . . . . 11
7Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980) . . 10
8Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Il. . . . . . 10
9The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) . . . . . 12
10Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc. 513 A.2d 1218,
11 201 Conn.1 (1986) . . . . . . . . 10
12Von Kettler et.al. v Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870) . . . . . 12
13
14Other publications:
15
16Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 1504 . . . . . 12
17N.J.S. 12A:3-104 . . . . . . . . . 9
18N.J.S. 12A:3-302 . . . . . . . . . 9
19New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code (NJUCC) . . . . . 9
20Restatement, Contracts S 170(3), (4) (1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469 . . 9
21Volume 29 of the New Jersey Practice Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566 . 9
22Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, (1973) ,Civil § 2862 11
23
24 History
25 The record made in Caddo County case number CS-2002-116 verifies that third
26party debt collector, Love, Beal, & Nixon, violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices
27Act, 15 USC 1601 et seq., by failing to notice Diane Summers that Love, Beal, & Nixon
28was a debt collector attempting to collect a debt, by failing to validate the alleged debt,
29and then, by misrepresenting the character and amount of the debt Diane Summers
30allegedly owed. The matter languished without rising to a justiciable controversy until
31Daine Summers called the question by filing a motion for summary judgment and

1noticing the court of the debt collection fraud racket. The court rushed to judgment sua
2sponte without being moved under authority of the rules for local courts, rule 4(7) with
3the obvious result of obstructing justice, illegally saving Love, Beal, & Nixon from
4having to answer the motion for summary judgment and blatantly depriving Diane
5Summers of important substantive and procedural due process rights. Diane Summers
6moved for vacation of the void judgment, challenging Love, Beal, & Nixon to show, on
7the record, that Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank: (1). has standing to sue in Oklahoma
8courts, (2). has a contract with Diane Summers, (3). has been damaged by Diane
9Summers, and, (4). that Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank had authorized suit with
10delegated authority to Love, Beal, & Nixon. Establishing that Love, Beal, & Nixon is a
11racketeer influenced corrupt business organization which routinely relies on Oklahoma
12district court judges to aid and abet violation of 18 USC 1961 & 1962, the court below,
13presumed jurisdiction to make a judicial determination that the void judgment was valid.
14It is from this criminal misconduct that Diane Summers appeals, and the standard of
15review is, of course, gross abuse of discretion as the court lacked judicial power to refuse
16to vacate a judgment the record verifies obtained without: (1). Verification that Direct
17Merchants Credit Card Bank has standing to sue in Oklahoma courts, (2). Verification
18that Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank has a contract with Diane Summers, (3).
19Verification that Diane Summers damaged Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank, (4).
20Verification that Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank authorized suit against Diane
21Summers with authority delegated to Love, Beal, and Nixon, or, (5). That Love, Beal, &
22Nixon moved the court for judgment by default and set the matter for hearing with notice
23to Diane Summers. The trial court judge, John E. Herndon, should be compelled to
24appear and testify before a federal grand jury and explain exactly what article, absent a
25contract, the debtor can ask for or demand as evidence that the alleged debt has been
26discharged. See judge’s duty found at 18 USC 4.
27
28 Questions presented:
29
30 Whether the Oklahoma supreme court was correct to rule and determine that even
31a default judgment must be proved and absent evidence entered on the record with notice

1to the opposing party for opportunity to use basic forensic devises to the test the
2sufficiency of the evidence, the judgment is utterly void?
3
4 Whether the Oklahoma supreme court was correct to rule and determine that a
5void judgment is no judgment at all?
6
7 Whether the Oklahoma Legislature intended to protect consumers from the debt
8collections racket?
9
10 Whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court, by and through its appellate tribunals,
11openly and willfully participates in aiding and abetting violation of law including 18 USC
121961 & 1962?
13
14
15
16
17 Argument and authorities
18
19First proposition: Where the record shows absolutely no evidence, no
20 prove up of the claim, no contract, no nothing, absolutely
21 no evidence entered on the record in support of the claim,
22 the judgment is void, a nullity, conveying no interest, and
23 grounding no rights.
24
25
26 This court is noticed: the court below awarded a judgment by default sua
27sponte without any evidence whatsoever being entered on the record. Even a default
28judgment must be proved and without evidence entered on the record with notice and
29opportunity to the opposing party to use basic forensic devises to test the sufficiency of
30the evidence, the judgment is void. See American Red Cross v. Community Blood Center
31of the Ozarks, 257 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 07/25/2001), Razorsoft Inc. v. Maktal, Inc., Okla.

1App. Div. 1, 907 P.2d 1102 (1995), Millikan v. Booth, Okla. 713, 46 P. 489 (1896),
2Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 31 Okla. 300, 121 P. 654, Ann. Cas. 1912 E, 329
3(1912), City of Guthrie v. T.W. Harvey Lumber Co., 5 Okla. 774, 50 P. 84 (1897),
4Payne v. Dewitt, Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999), Reed v. Scott, Okla. 820 P.2d 445, 20
5A.L.R. 5th 913 (1991), Graves v. Walters, Okla. App. 534 P.2d 702 (1975), Ross v. Ross,
6Okla. 201 Okla. 174, 203 P.2d 702 (1949), Thomas c. Sweet, Okla. 173 Okla. 601, 49
7P.2d 557 (1935), and Cudd v. Farmers’ Exch. Bank of Lindsay, Okla., 76 Okla. 317, 185
8P. 521 (1919). The general rule is that a void judgment is no judgment at all. Where
9judgments are void, as was the judgment originally rendered by the trial court here, any
10subsequent proceedings based upon the void judgment are themselves void. In essence,
11no judgment existed from which the trial court could adopt either findings of fact or
12conclusions of law. Valley Vista Development Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow, 766 P.2d
13344, 1988 OK 140 (Okla. 12/06/1988); A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment
14at all. By it no rights are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless, in
15itself, all proceedings founded upon it are necessarily equally worthless, and have no
16effect whatever upon the parties or matters in question. A void judgment neither binds
17nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it, and all claims flowing out of it, are
18absolutely void. The parties attempting to enforce it are trespassers." High v.
19Southwestern Insurance Company, 520 P.2d 662, 1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974); and,
20A void judgment cannot constitute res judicata. Denial of previous motions to vacate a
21void judgment could not validate the judgment or constitute res judicata, for the reason
22that the lack of judicial power inheres in every stage of the proceedings in which the
23judgment was rendered. Bruce v. Miller, 360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960).
24
25Second proposition: Attorneys who purchase evidence of debt, then prosecute
26 an action in the name of the original maker of the loan are
27 engaging in criminal activity and attorneys who prepare
28 and submit false documents to a court are committing
29 felonies
30

1 Where the complaining party can not prove the existence of the note, then there is
2no note. To recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of
3the note in question; (2) that the party sued signed the note; (3) that the plaintiff is the
4owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing on the note.
5See In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes, Inc. No.98-50117 February 18, 1999 (5th
6Circuit Court of Appeals.) Volume 29 of the New Jersey Practice Series, Chapter 10
7Section 123, page 566, emphatically states, “...; and no part payments should be made on
8the bond or note unless the person to whom payment is made is able to produce the bond
9or note and the part payments are endorsed thereon. It would seem that the mortgagor
10would normally have a Common law right to demand production or surrender of the
11bond or note and mortgage, as the case may be. See Restatement, Contracts S 170(3), (4)
12(1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469 in Carnegie Bank v Shalleck 256 N.J. Super 23 (App.
13Div 1992), the Appellate Division held, “When the underlying mortgage is evidenced by
14an instrument meeting the criteria for negotiability set forth in N.J.S. 12A:3-104, the
15holder of the instrument shall be afforded all the rights and protections provided a holder
16in due course pursuant to N.J.S. 12A:3-302." Since no one is able to produce the
17“instrument” there is no competent evidence before the Court that any party is the holder
18of the alleged note or the true holder in due course. New Jersey common law dictates that
19the plaintiff prove the existence of the alleged note in question, prove that the party sued
20signed the alleged note, prove that the plaintiff is the owner and holder of the alleged
21note, and prove that certain balance is due and owing on any alleged note. Federal
22Circuit Courts have ruled that the only way to prove the perfection of any security is by
23actual possession of the security. See Matter of Staff Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 550 F.2d 1228
24(9th Cir 1977), “Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the only notice sufficient to
25inform all interested parties that a security interest in instruments has been perfected is
26actual possession by the secured party, his agent or bailee.” Bankruptcy Courts have
27followed the Uniform Commercial Code. In Re Investors & Lenders, Ltd. 165 B.R. 389
28(Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994), “Under the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code (NJUCC),
29promissory note is “instrument,” security interest in which must be perfected by
30possession ...” To prove up claim of damages, foreclosing party must enter evidence

8See O.S. Title 21, Chapter 19, § 554, “Attorney Buying Evidence of Debt-Misleading
9Court. Every attorney who either directly or indirectly buys or is interested in buying any
10evidence of debt or thing in action with intent to bring suit thereon is guilty of a
11misdemeanor. Any attorney who in any proceeding before any court of a justice of the
12peace or police judge or other inferior court in which he appears as attorney, willfully
13misstates any proposition or seeks to mislead the court in any matter of law is guilty of a
14misdemeanor and on any trial therefore the state shall only be held to prove to the court
15that the cause was pending, that the defendant appeared as an attorney in the action, and
16showing what the legal statement was, wherein it is not the law. If the defense be that the
17act was not willful the burden shall be on the defendant to prove that he did not know that
18there was error in his statement of law.” Any person guilty of falsely preparing any book,
19paper, [({ record, })], instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to
20produce it, or allow it to be produced as genuine upon any [({ trial, proceeding or inquiry
21whatever, })] authorized by law, SHALL BE GUILTY OF A FELONY. See Oklahoma
22Statutes Title 21. Crimes and Punishments, Chapter 13, Section 453. See also, 18 USC
231961 & 1962.
24
25Third proposition: Oklahoma courts lack judicial power to review
26 a void judgment. Where the judgment is void on the
27 face of the record, Oklahoma courts have a
28 non-discretionary duty to vacate the void judgment,
29 order repair of all damages caused by the void judgment,
30 and duty to remand those who have committed criminal
31 acts to other authority for considered prosecution.

1
5to vacate a void judgment). For other authorities concurring, see Allied Fidelity Ins. Co.
6v. Ruth, 57 Wash. App. 783, 790, 790 P.2d 206 (1990), In re: Bd. of Revision (2000), 87
7Ohio St.3d 363, 368, Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998), Chavez v.
8County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974), Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of
9Edn. v. Hamilton Cty, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company v. Finesilver, No. 69363
10(Ohio App. Dist.8 04/25/1996), In re Marriage of Brighterowski, 50 Wash. App. 633,
11635, 749 P.2d 754 (1988); Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46 Wash. App. 517, 520,
12731 P.2d 533 (1987), In re: Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262, In re: Weaver Constr., 190
13Colo. at 232, 545 P.2d at 1045, Leen, 62 Wash. App. at 478, Lubben v. Selective Serv.
14Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649, (1st Cir. 1972),Good v. Kitsap County, 59
15Wash. App. 177, 180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990), Love v. Packer, 174 N.C. 665, 94 S.E.
16449, 450, Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68 Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409,
17Small v. Batista, 22 F. Supp.2d 230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), Wright & Miller, FEDERAL
18PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, (1973) ,Civil § 2862. See also 18 USC 4.
19
20
21Fourth proposition: When the court’s jurisdiction is challenged, it is incumbent
22 on the party asserting that the court had jurisdiction to show,
23 on the record, that the court had jurisdiction: where parties,
24 including judges enforce a judgment the record shows is
25 void, all actors are trespassers on the law.
26

8immediately lost subject-matter jurisdiction. Should the judge not have subject-matter
9jurisdiction, then the law states that the judge has not only violated the law, but is also a
10trespasser of the law. Von Kettler et.al. v Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870) ("if the magistrate
11has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his
12process, are trespassers."); Elliott v Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
13("without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not
14voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal
15in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in
16executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers. This
17distinction runs through all the cases on the subject; and it proves, that the jurisdiction of
18any court exercising authority over a subject, may be inquired into in every court, when
19the proceedings of the former are relied on and ought before the latter, by the party
20claiming the benefit of such proceedings."); In re TIP-PA-HANS enterprises, Inc., 27
21B.R. 780, 783 (1983) (a judge "lacks jurisdiction in a particular case until it has been
22demonstrated that jurisdiction over the subject matter exists") (when a judge acts "outside
23the limits of his jurisdiction, he becomes a trespasser ... ".) (" ... courts have held that
24where courts of special or limited jurisdiction exceed their rightful powers, the whole
25proceeding is coram non judice ... "). Trespasser - "One who enters upon property of
26another without any right, lawful authority, or express or implied invitation, permission,
27or license, not in performance of any duties to owner, but merely for his own purpose,
28pleasure or convenience. Mendoza v City of Corpus Christi, Tex. App. 13 Dist., 700
29S.W.2d 652, 654." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 1504. The Illinois Supreme
30Court held that if a court "could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper
31presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, - it had no

1authority to make that finding." The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928). When
2judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an
3order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are
4engaged in treason. The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.
5Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his
6judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort
7even though the tort occurs in the courthouse." When a judge acts as a trespasser of the
8law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and
9the judges' orders are void, of no legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court, in
10Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state
11officer acts under a state law in a manner voilative of the Federal constitution, he "comes
12into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
13stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the
14consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any
15immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." By law, a
16judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in
17his person).
18 Conclusion
19 Whereas this court has actual knowledge, that like the court below, this court and
20all courts lack judicial discretion to review a void judgment; and whereas this court has
21actual knowledge that the record made in the court below verifies that the judgment in
22Caddo County case number CS-2002-116 is facially void; this court’s non-discretionary
23duty is to vacate the void judgment, remand CS-2002-116 with instruction to the Caddo
24County court to repair Diane Summers, and remand all culpable actors to other authority
25for considered prosecution.
26
27
28Prepared and submitted by: ______________________________________
29 Diane Summers
30
31
32
33
34

1
2
3 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
4 I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of appellant’s opening brief
5on the _____ day of November, 2003 to:
6
7Love, Beal & Nixon
8P.O. Box 32738
10
11
12
13
14 ___________________________
15 Diane Summers
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 STATE OF WISCONSIN
23 COURT OF APPEALS
24 DISTRICT IV
25
26
27 People’s Bank
28 Plaintiff-respondent,
29
30 Vs.
31
32 William D. King,
33 Defendant-appellant.
34
35
36 Appellant’s opening brief
37 Appeal number 03 - 2222
38 Dane County Case number 03-CV000
39
40
41 Appeal from order granting summary judgment
42 Dane County Circuit Court, Branch 13
43 Michael Nowakowski, presiding
44
45

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 William King
10 South Ct.
11 McFarland, Wisconsin 55555
12 (608)658-4444
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20December 29th 2003
21
22
23
24 Table of Contents
25
26 Table of cases 1,2
27
28 Statement of the issues presented for review 2
29
30 Statement regarding oral argument 2,3
31
32 Statement regarding whether the decision should
33 Be published 3
34
35 Statement of the case 3,4
36
37 Argument 4-9
38
39 Conclusion and remedy sought 9
40
41 Certificate of mailing 10
42
43 Certificate of compliance 11
44
45
46 Table of cases
47

1 15 USC 1692g (5)
2 15 USC 1692g(a)(3) (5)
3 15 USC 1692G(b) (5)
4 American Red Cross v. Community Blood Center of
5 the Ozarks, 257 F.3d 859 (8th Cir.
6 07/25/2001) (8)
7 Carnegie Bank v, Shalleck 256 N.J. Super 23
8 (App. Div 1992) (7)
9 GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka 25
10 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001) (9)
11 George W. Heintz v. Darlene Jenkins, 514 U.S.
12 291, 115 S.Ct. 1489 (5)
13 In Re Investors & Lenders, Ltd. 165
14 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994) (8)
15 In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes, Inc.
16 No.98-50117 (02/18/99) (5th Cir.) (7)
17 Matter of Staff Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 550
18 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977) (8)
19 Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw.
20 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980) (9)
21 Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Ill.
22 Dec. 890, 516 N. E.2d 1045 (3Dist. 1987) (9)
23
24 Statement of the issues (submitted: it is not at issue
25 whether a summary judgment is inappropriate where the
26 plaintiff enters no facts on the record in support of
27 their claim – that summary judgment is inherently void
28 where the plaintiff’s totally insufficient pleadings
29 pose only conclusory and theoretical matters absent
30 any facts is not in controversy).
31
32 1. Whether the circuit court has discretion to forward
33 in a case where the record of the case shows lack of
34 jurisdiction?

1 2. Whether violation of the Fair Debt Collections
2 Practices Act deprives the alleged debtor of due
3 process rights depriving the court of subject matter
4 jurisdiction?
5 3. Whether a summary judgment is void where party
6 fails to prove standing?
7 4. Whether a summary judgment is void where party
8 fails to prove up claim?
9
10 Statement regarding oral argument
11 This court is noticed: In the court below the
12 oral argument was between appellant and judge in the
13 judge’s office – not in open court. As no transcript
14 of any hearing was made and the resolve of those
15 jurisdictional failings posited by William King must
16 rest on the record made or the total lack thereof,
17 oral argument would not likely benefit this tribunal
18 in its determinations.
19
20 Statement regarding whether
21 the decision should be published
22
23 In as much as rulings of compelling public
24 interest such as whether Wisconsin residents are
25 subjected to sham legal process for reason that
26 “judgments” are being rendered against parties without

1 any evidentiary support whatsoever – merely the
2 warrants of attorneys, the decision of this court
3 should be in publication.
5 Statement of the case
6 People’s Bank, alleging indebtedness, without
7 prior notice required under the Fair Debt Collections
8 Practices Act, sued consumer William D. King and
9 allegedly obtained a summary judgment. This court is
10 noticed: People’s Bank did not show that William D.
11 King had a contract with People’s Bank. People’s Bank
12 did not show that William D. King had damaged People’s
13 Bank in any way. The court below had nothing to rely
14 on to know that People’s Bank has standing to sue in
15 Wisconsin court’s or that People’s Bank’s charter
16 authorizes People’s Bank to enter into consumer debt
17 contracts. The court below disregarded the record
18 which contained only hypothetical and theoretical
19 conclusions and no fact whatsoever and entered summary
20 judgment for People’s Bank and against William D.
21 King. It is from this miscarriage of justice that
22 William D. King appeals.
23
24 Argument

1 The circuit court lacks discretion to proceed
2 where the record shows matters before the court do not
3 rise to a justiciable controversy. Where there are no
4 affidavits, depositions, admissions, or
5 interrogatories, the court is without factual basis to
6 rule judicially for the plaintiff. Wisconsin summary
7 judgment statute § 802.08 requires showing of
8 evidentiary facts.
10 Violation of the Fair Debt Collections Practices
11 Act deprives the alleged debtor of due process rights
12 depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
13 The Act applies to third party debt collectors. Third
14 party debt collectors includes lawyers and law firms
15 who are attempting to collect any alleged. George W.
16 Heintz v. Darlene Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 115 S.Ct.
17 1489. When a third party debt collector contacts an
18 alleged debtor, the collector must in the first
19 communication or within five (5) days thereafter
20 furnish the alleged debtor with a “dunning letter.”
21 The dunning letter must inform the alleged debtor that
22 the collector is attempting to collect a debt and
23 inform the alleged debtor that they have thirty (30)
24 days to dispute the debt. 15 USC 1692g, 1692g(a)(3).

1 The alleged debtor has thirty (30) days to dispute the
2 debt requiring the collectors to furnish validation of
3 the debt. 15 USC 1692G(b). Debt collection activity
4 must cease if the debt is disputed. Failure to notice
5 the alleged debtor of their due process rights or
6 failure to cease collection activity until timely
7 validation voids any legal proceedings. As a matter of
8 law, a creditor violating the WCA must suffer the
9 consequences of its wrongful repossession and
10 prohibited debt collection practices. The WCA plainly
11 treats venue as a jurisdictional issue. Therefore, the
12 failure to have proper venue means the judgment is
13 void. Void judgments can always be challenged.
14 Moreover, there is no need for a trial in any of the
15 three instances. As a matter of law, the creditor
16 violated the WCA and must suffer the consequences of
17 its wrongful repossession and prohibited debt
18 collection practices. This court is noticed: the
19 court below failed to require counsel for People’s
20 Bank to show that the Fair Debt Collections Practices
21 Act and the WCA had been complied with.
22
23 A summary judgment is void where party fails to
24 prove standing. To have standing, party suing in

1 foreclosure of debt must produce the original
2 promissory note. Complaining party must (1). Prove
3 standing by possession of the original promissory
4 note, and (2). Must prove damages by appearance of a
5 competent fact witness: Where the complaining party
6 cannot prove the existence of the note, then there is
7 no note. To recover on a promissory note, the
8 plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of the note in
9 question; (2) that the party sued signed the note; (3)
10 that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the note;
11 and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing on the
12 note. See In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes,
13 Inc. No.98-50117 February 18, 1999 (5th Circuit Court
14 of Appeals.), Volume 29 of the New Jersey Practice
15 Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically
16 states, “...; and no part payments should be made on
17 the bond or note unless the person to whom payment is
18 made is able to produce the bond or note and the part
19 payments are endorsed thereon. It would seem that the
20 mortgagor would normally have a Common law right to
21 demand production or surrender of the bond or note
22 and mortgage, as the case may be. Carnegie Bank v,
23 Shalleck 256 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div 1992), the
24 Appellate Division held, “When the underlying mortgage

1 is evidenced by an instrument meeting the criteria for
2 negotiability. Since no one is able to produce the
3 “instrument” there is no competent evidence before the
4 Court that any party is the holder of the alleged note
5 or the true holder in due course. New Jersey common
6 law dictates that the plaintiff prove the existence of
7 the alleged note in question, prove that the party
8 sued signed the alleged note, prove that the plaintiff
9 is the owner and holder of the alleged note, and prove
10 that certain balance is due and owing on any alleged
11 note. Federal Circuit Courts have ruled that the only
12 way to prove the perfection of any security is by
13 actual possession of the security. See Matter of Staff
14 Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977).
15 “Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the only notice
16 sufficient to inform all interested parties that a
17 security interest in instruments has been perfected is
18 actual possession by the secured party, his agent or
19 bailee.” Bankruptcy Courts have followed the Uniform
20 Commercial Code. In Re Investors & Lenders, Ltd. 165
21 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994), “Under the New Jersey
22 Uniform Commercial Code (NJUCC), promissory note is
23 “instrument,” security interest in which must be
24 perfected by possession ...” Unequivocally the Court’s

1 rule is that in order to prove the “instrument”,
2 possession is mandatory. This court is noticed: the
3 record in the court below does not show that People’s
4 Bank had standing in the underlying case.
6 Summary judgment is void where party fails to
7 prove up claim. Prevailing party in civil action must
8 damages. For example, see American Red Cross v.
9 Community Blood Center of the Ozarks, 257 F.3d 859 (8th
10 Cir. 07/25/2001). Claim of damages, to be admissible
11 as evidence, must incorporate records such as a
12 general ledger and accounting of an alleged unpaid
13 promissory note, the person responsible for preparing
14 and maintaining the account general ledger must
15 provide a complete accounting which must be sworn to
16 and dated by the person who maintained the ledger.
17 See Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334,
18 614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v.
19 Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App
20 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority 28 Conn. L.
21 Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000), and Town of Brookfield
22 v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc. 513 A.2d 1218, 201
23 Conn.1 (1986). See also Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill.

1 App. 3d 845, 114 Ill. Dec. 890, 516 N. E.2d 1045
2 (3Dist. 1987).
4 Conclusion and remedy sought
6 Determination by this court that the record in
7 the court below does not verify compliance with
8 consumer debtor law, does not verify standing on the
9 part of People’s Bank, and does not verify damages in
10 the form of verified sums due and owing People’s Bank,
11 requires vacating the lower court’s order of summary
12 judgment and remand to the court below with
13 instruction to repair William D. King.
14
15 Prepared and submitted by: ______________________
16 William D. King.
17
18 Certificate of Mailing
19 I certify that this brief was deposited in the United
20 States mail for delivery to the Clerk to the Court of
21 Appeals by first-class mail. I further certify that
22 the brief was correctly addressed and postage was pre-
23 paid.
24 _________ _____________________

1 date William D. King.
2 Form and Length Certification
3 I certify that this brief conforms to the rules
4 contained in Wis. Stat. Section (Rule) 809.19(8)(b)
5 and (c) for a brief produced using the following font:
6 Mono-spaced font: 10 characters per inch; double
7 spaced; 1.5 inch margin on left side and 1 inch
8 margins on the other 3 sides. The length of this brief
9 is 10 pages.
10 ____________ ________________________
11 date William D. King
12
13And after they file an aswer brief, you file a reply brief
14 No. DF-99999
15
16
17 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
18
19
20 Diane Sommers
21 Appellant,
22
23 Vs.
24
25 Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank
26 appellee
27
28
29 On appeal from the lower court’s refusal to vacate a void judgment
30 Caddo County, Oklahoma
31 District Court Number CS-2002-0000
32
33

1 Appellants’ reply brief
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 Diane Sommers
9 P. O. Box 549
10 Indian City, Oklahoma 730050
11 No phone number at this time
12
13
14
15
16
17
18January 28th 2004
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 Table of contents
28
29
30Table of authorities . . . . . . . . 2
31
32Reply to William L. Nixon, Jr.’s “INTRODUCTION”. . . 3
33
34Reply to William L. Nixon’s “SUMMARY OF THE RECORD” . 3
35
36Reply to William L. Nixon’s “ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES” . 4
37
38Conclusion . . . . . . . . . 4,5
39
40 Table of authorities
41
42Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Ruth, 57 Wash. App. 783, 790, 790 P.2d 206 (1990) . 3
43Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46 Wash. App. 517, 520, 731 P.2d 533 (1987) 3
44Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) . . . . 3

1Chavez v. County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974) . . 3
2Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty, Cleveland Electric Illuminating
3 Company v. Finesilver, No. 69363 (Ohio App. Dist.8 04/25/1996) 3
4
5 High v. Southwestern Insurance Company, 520 P.2d 662,
6 1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974) . .. . . . . 4

7
8In re Marriage of Markowski, 50 Wash. App. 633, 635, 749 P.2d 754 (1988) . 3
9In re: Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262 . . . . . . . 3
10In re: Weaver Constr., 190 Colo. at 232, 545 P.2d at 1045 . . . . 3
11In re:Bd. of Revision (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 368 . . . . .3
12Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649, (1st Cir. 1972) 3
13Mitchell v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177, 180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990) . 3
14Moore v. Packer, 174 N.C. 665, 94 S.E. 449, 450 . . . . . 3
15Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994) . . . . . 3
16Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68 . . . . . . 3
17Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 . . . . . . . 3
18Small v. Batista, 22 F. Supp.2d 230
19 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) . . . . . . . . 3
20
21Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, (1973) ,Civil § 2862 3
22 Reply to William L. Nixon, Jr.’s “INTRODUCTION”
23 William L. Nixon’s so-called introduction verifies that Mr. Nixon expects this
24Court to proceed extra-legally. The standard of review when court denies a motion to
25vacate is GROSS abuse of discretion - Where party challenges the jurisdiction of
26the court, the court is deprived of judicial discretion. When rule providing for
27relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is
28mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994). See also, Thomas, 906 S.W.2d
29at 262 (holding that trial court has not only power but duty to vacate a void judgment).
30For other authorities concurring, see Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Ruth, 57 Wash. App. 783,
31790, 790 P.2d 206 (1990), In re: Bd. of Revision (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 363, 368, Carter

1v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998), Chavez v. County of Valencia, 86 N.M.
2205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974), Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty,
3Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company v. Finesilver, No. 69363 (Ohio App. Dist.8
404/25/1996), In re Marriage of Markowski, 50 Wash. App. 633, 635, 749 P.2d 754
5(1988); Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46 Wash. App. 517, 520, 731 P.2d 533
6(1987), In re: Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262, In re: Weaver Constr., 190 Colo. at 232, 545
7P.2d at 1045, Leen, 62 Wash. App. at 478, Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No.
827, 453 F.2d 645, 649, (1st Cir. 1972),Mitchell v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177,
9180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990), Moore v. Packer, 174 N.C. 665, 94 S.E. 449, 450, Patton
10v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68 Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409, Small v. Batista,
1122 F. Supp.2d 230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
12PROCEDURE, (1973) ,Civil § 2862.
13 This court has knowledge: no judge has discretion when it comes to vacating a
14void judgment. On Simplest of terms, John E. Herndon had no discretion to abuse.
15
16
17
18
19 Reply to William L. Nixon’s “SUMMARY OF THE RECORD”
20 William L. Nixon, in Nixon’s article 5 of Nixon’s summary of the record, falsely
21alleges that a motion for summary judgment requires leave of the court. Nixon also
22feigns insult by claiming that Nixon’s firm is falsely accused of purchasing the debt.
23This court is noticed: Nixon has not denied purchasing evidence under penalty of perjury.
24 Reply to William L. Nixon’s “ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES”
25 Nixon attempts to trick, deceive and mislead this court with the lie that Diane
26Sommers did not state the proper Statutory authority for the vacation of the Default
27Judgment. The record reveals that Diane Sommers relied on 12, O. S. Section 1038 –
28lack of subject matter jurisdiction and correctly pled that Nixon had circumvented local
29rules for district courts in applying for a default judgment (which in actuality was
30backdated to avoid having to answer on the motion for summary judgment). This court is
31noticed: Diane Sommers established that Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank lacks

1standing to sue in Oklahoma Courts, that Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank lacked
2standing to sue Diane Sommers, that Diane Sommers had not damaged Direct Merchants
3Credit Card Bank, and that Love, Beal, and Nixon did not have delegated authority to
4represent Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank. All of these jurisdictional failings spell
5“VOID JUDGMENT” and Nixon taking money in respect of the void judgment spells
6“SWINDLE.” See High v. Southwestern Insurance Company, 520 P.2d 662, 1974 OK
735 (Okla. 03/19/1974) wherein the Oklahoma appellate court ruled that a void judgment
8is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested; from it no rights can be
9obtained. Being worthless, in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are necessarily
10equally worthless, and have no effect whatever upon the parties or matters in question. A
11void judgment neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it, and all claims
12flowing out of it, are absolutely void. The parties attempting to enforce it are
13trespassers."
14
15 Conclusion
16 Whereas this court shall notice: Diane Sommers, in the court below, challenged
17whether the court below was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction for reason that
18Diane Sommers was deprived of due process right to be noticed on a motion for
19judgment by default as required by the Oklahoma Court Rules For Local Courts. Nixon,
20not John E. Herdon, had the burden of showing on the record that Nixon had respected
21Diane Sommers’s due process rights by noticing Diane Sommers on the motion for
22default. Not only does Nixon not have a clue of what is meant by “jurisdictional
23challenge,” Nixon failed to show that the record verified the notice. The court was
24undeniably deprived of subject matter jurisdiction for reason that the court conscienced
25the violation of Diane Sommers’s due process rights. As Diane Sommers has illustrated
26supra, Diane Sommers also challenged whether Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank had
27standing to sue in Oklahoma Courts, whether Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank had
28standing to sue Diane Sommers by reason of actual possession of the debt instrument,
29whether the record contained any evidence whatsoever that Diane Sommers had damaged
30Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank, and whether Love, Beal & Nixon had authority to
31act for Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank. Nixon was not responsive to any of these

1challenges and the court, John E. Herndon, breached non-discretionary, non-judicial
2duty to vacate the void judgment.
3
4
5
6Prepared and submitted by: ______________________________________
7 Diane Sommers
8
9
10 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
11 I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of appellant’s opening brief
12on the _____ day of January, 2004 to:
13
14Love, Beal & Nixon
15P.O. Box 32738
17
18
19 __________________________________
20 Diane Sommers
21
22
23 What if you don’t win on appeal? Sue in federal court.
24 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

25 FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
26
27
28Joyce H. Rhino, )
29 And )
30Joseph W. Rhino, )
31 Plaintiffs, )
32 )
33v. ) Number ___________________
34 )
35SN SERVICING CORPORATION, )
36NATIONS CREDIT HOME EQUITY )
37 SERVICES CORPORATION, )
38Jonathan D. McCollister, an individual )
39 And )
40Maryann Sumi, an individual, )
41 Defendants. )

1
2
3 Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino’s petition, complaint,
4 and claim under authority of 42 USC 1983
5
6 Jurisdictional statement
7
8 This court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider this claim. Although this
9claim tenders for review of a state court judgment, this court is noticed: the state court
10judgment is void as articulated infra. There are exceptions to the Rooker/Fedlman
11doctrine when the state court judgment was procured through fraud, deception, accident,
12or mistake Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc. 801 F.2d 186, 189(6th
13Cir. 1985)(quoting Resolute Ins. Co. v. North Carolina 397 F.2d 586, 589 (4th Cir.
141968)). Rooker/Feldman will not apply when the party had no reasonable opportunity to
15raise his federal claim in state proceedings, Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543,
161547 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. Denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S. Ct. 2398, 81 L. Ed. 2d 355
17(1984). If the state court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the prior action, its
18orders would be void ab initio and subject to attack notwithstanding Rooker/Feldman,
19James v. Draper (In re. Lake), 202 B.R. 754, 758 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996). A state court
20judgment is subject to collateral attack if the state court lacked jurisdiction over the
21subject matter or the parties, or the judgment was procured through extrinsic fraud.
22Exception to the Rooker/Feldman rule comes into play when the state proceedings are
23considered a legal nullity, and thus, are void ab intio. See Kalb v. Fuerstein, 308 U.S.
24433, 438-40 (1940). Where specific federal statue (such as 18 USC 1964(a)) specifically
25authorizes review, the Rooker/Feldman doctrine is inapplicable. See Plyer v. Love, 129 F.
263d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1997), Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1992), and In re:
27Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000).
28
29 SN SERVICING CORPORATION & NATIONS CREDIT HOME EQUITY
30SERVICES CORPORATION, by and through, Jonathan D. McCollister conspired with
31state actor Maryann Sumi under color of law to deprive Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W.
32Rhino of Federally Protected Rights reserved under The Fifth Amendment of The United
33States Constitution, specifically applying to the color of law actions of Jonathan D.

1McCollister and Maryann Sumi under authority of The Fourteenth Amendment of The
2United States Constitution.
3
4 CAUSE OF ACTION: McCollister and Maryann Sumi conspired to deprive and
5did deprive Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino of property without due process of law.
6As a result of the damage to the rights of Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino, the
7Rhinos have damages in fact exceeding two hundred eighty-nine thousand, six hundred
8twenty-one dollars. McCollister practiced intrinsic fraud by falsely claiming that SN
9SERVICING CORPORATION had a claim against the Rhinos. Sumi compounded the
10fraud by claiming all the material allegations of SN SERVICING CORPORATION’s
11complaint were proven and true. The record made in case number 02-CV-3461, Dane
12County, does not verify: That SN SERVICING CORPORATION had standing to bring
13suit against the Rhinos and SN SERVICING CORPORATION did not prove damages by
14the Rhinos.
15
16
17
18(in this area, tell why the judgment is void – lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to notice
19under the fair debt collections practices act when domesticating judgment0
20
23
24 Even with a default judgment, DAMAGES MUST BE PROVED BY
25EVIDENCE ENTERED ON THE RECORD. For example, see American Red Cross
26v. Community Blood Center of the Ozarks, 257 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 07/25/2001).
27
29
30 Void judgments are those rendered by a court which lacked jurisdiction, either of
31the subject matter or the parties, Wahl v. Round Valley Bank 38 Ariz. 411, 300 P. 955
32(1931); Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 P. 203 (1914);

1and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 2d 278 (1940). A void
2judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the
3parties or the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or
4an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or
5collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court, Long v. Shorebank
6Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999). A void judgment is one which,
7from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect, Lubben v. Selevtive
8Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298 (C.A. 1 Mass. 1972).
9A void judgment is one which from the beginning was complete nullity and without any
10legal effect, Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla.
111980). Void judgment is one that, from its inception, is complete nullity and without legal
12effect, Holstein v. City of Chicago, 803 F.Supp. 205, reconsideration denied 149 F.R.D.
13147, affirmed 29 F.3d 1145 (N.D. Ill 1992). Void judgment is one where court lacked
14personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry of order violated due process, U.S.C.A.
15Const. Amend. 5 – Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
16Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the
17subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed.
18Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 – Klugh v. U.S.,
19620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985). A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was,
20was a complete nullity and without legal effect, Rubin v. Johns, 109 F.R.D. 174 (D.
21Virgin Islands 1985). A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever
22continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to
23support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of enforcement in
24any manner or to any degree – Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So. 2d 577
25(Ala. Civ. App. 1985). A judgment shown by evidence to be invalid for want of
26jurisdiction is a void judgment or at all events has all attributes of a void judgment, City
27of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951). Void judgment which
28is subject to collateral attack, is simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of
29jurisdictional defects, Ward v. Terriere, 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963). A void judgment is
30a simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects only, in the
31court rendering it and defect of jurisdiction may relate to a party or parties, the subject

1matter, the cause of action, the question to be determined, or relief to be granted,
2Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116, certiorari denied
379 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958). Void judgment is one entered
4by court without jurisdiction of parties or subject matter or that lacks inherent power to
5make or enter particular order involved and such a judgment may be attacked at any time,
6either directly or collaterally, People v. Wade, 506 N.W.2d 954 (Ill. 1987). Void
7judgment may be defined as one in which rendering court lacked subject matter
8jurisdiction, lacked personal jurisdiction or acted in manner inconsistent with due process
9of law Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E. 2d 741 (Ill. App. Dist. 1993). Void judgment is one
10entered by court without jurisdiction of parties or subject matter or that lacks inherent
11power to make or enter particular order involved; such judgment may be attacked at any
12time, either directly or collaterally People v. Sales, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 2 Dist.
131990). Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment which is one
14which, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect, Allcock v.
15Allcock 437 N.E. 2d 392 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1982). Void judgment is one which, from its
16inception is complete nullity and without legal effect In re Marriage of Parks, 630 N.E.
172d 509 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1994). Void judgment is one entered by court that lacks the
18inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, and it may be attacked at
19any time, either directly or collaterally; such a judgment would be a nullity People v.
20Rolland 581 N.E.2d 907, (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1991). Void judgment under federal law is one
21in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over dispute or jurisdiction
22over parties, or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted
23unconstitutionally in entering judgment, U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana
24Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983). A void judgment has no effect
25whatsoever and is incapable of confirmation or ratification, Lucas v. Estate of Stavos,
26609 N. E. 2d 1114, rehearing denied, and transfer denied (Ind. App. 1 dist. 1993). Void
27judgment is one that from its inception is a complete nullity and without legal effect
28Stidham V. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. 1998). Relief form void judgment is
29available when trial court lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction,
30Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E. 2d 458 (Ind.App. 1 Dist. 1993). Void judgment is
31one rendered by court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in

1manner inconsistent with due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14 Matter of
2Marriage of Hampshire, 869 P.2d 58 ( Kan. 1997). Judgment is void if court that
3rendered it lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction; void judgment is nullity and
4may be vacated at any time, Matter of Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1994).
5A void judgment is one rendered by a court which lacked personal or subject matter
6jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process In re Estate of Wells, 983
7P.2d 279, (Kan. App. 1999). Void judgment is one rendered in absence of jurisdiction
8over subject matter or parties 310 N.W. 2d 502, (Minn. 1981). A void judgment is one
9rendered in absence of jurisdiction over subject matter or parties, Lange v. Johnson, 204
10N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1973). A void judgment is one which has merely semblance, without
11some essential element, as when court purporting to render is has no jurisdiction, Mills v.
12Richardson, 81 S.E. 2d 409, (N.C. 1954). A void judgment is one which has a mere
13semblance, but is lacking in some of the essential elements which would authorize the
14court to proceed to judgment, Henderson v. Henderson, 59 S.E. 2d 227, (N.C. 1950).
15Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction to enter such judgment, State
16v. Blankenship 675 N.E. 2d 1303, (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1996). Void judgment, such as may
17be vacated at any time is one whose invalidity appears on face of judgment roll, Graff v.
18Kelly, 814 P.2d 489 (Okl. 1991). A void judgment is one that is void on face of judgment
19roll, Capital Federal Savings Bank v. Bewley, 795 P.2d 1051 (Okl. 1990). Where
20condition of bail bond was that defendant would appear at present term of court,
21judgment forfeiting bond for defendant’s bail to appear at subsequent term was a void
22judgment within rule that laches does not run against a void judgment Com. V. Miller,
23150 A.2d 585 (Pa. Super. 1959). A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially
24invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment, State v.
25Richie, 20 S.W.3d 624 (Tenn. 2000). Void judgment is one which shows upon face of
26record want of jurisdiction in court assuming to render judgment, and want of jurisdiction
27may be either of person, subject matter generally, particular question to be decided or
28relief assumed to be given, State ex rel. Dawson v. Bomar, 354 S.W. 2d 763, certiorari
29denied, (Tenn. 1962). A void judgment is one which shows upon face of record a want of
30jurisdiction in court assuming to render the judgment, Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.
312d 168 (Tenn. 1951). A void judgment is one which shows on face of record the want of

1jurisdiction in court assuming to render judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be
2either of the person, or of the subject matter generally, or of the particular question
3attempted to decided or relief assumed to be given, Richardson v. Good, 237 S.W. 2d
4577, (Tenn.Ct. App. 1950). Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect
5whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity may be asserted by any person whose
6rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need not be attacked directly but
7may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed, City of Lufkin v.
8McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1973). A void judgment,
9insofar as it purports to be pronouncement of court, is an absolute nullity, Thompson v.
10Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. – Waco 1951). A void judgment is one that
11has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud, or entered by court that did to have
12jurisdiction over subject matter or the parties, Rook v. Rook, 353 S.E. 2d 756, (Va. 1987).
13A void judgment is a judgment, decree, or order entered by a court which lacks
14jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to
15make or enter the particular order involved, State ex rel. Turner v. Briggs, 971 P.2d 581
16(Wash. App. Div. 1999). A void judgment or order is one that is entered by a court
17lacking jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacking the inherent power to
18enter the particular order or judgment, or where the order was procured by fraud, In re
19Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2000). Void judgments are those
20rendered by court which lacked jurisdiction, either of subject matter or parties,
21Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1980). Void judgments generally fall into
22two classifications, that is, judgments where there is want of jurisdiction of person or
23subject matter, and judgments procured through fraud, and such judgments may be
24attacked directly or collaterally, Irving v. Rodriquez, 169 N.E.2d 145, (Ill.app. 2 Dist.
251960). Invalidity need to appear on face of judgment alone that judgment or order may be
26said to be intrinsically void or void on its face, if lack of jurisdiction appears from the
27record, Crockett Oil Co. v. Effie, 374 S.W.2d 154 ( Mo.App. 1964). Decision is void on
28the face of the judgment roll when from four corners of that roll, it may be determined
29that at least one of three elements of jurisdiction was absent: (1) jurisdiction over parties,
30(2) jurisdiction over subject matter, or (3) jurisdictional power to pronounce particular
31judgment hat was rendered, B & C Investments, Inc. v. F & M Nat. Bank & Trust, 903

1P.2d 339 (Okla. App. Div. 3, 1995). Void order may be attacked, either directly or
2collaterally, at any time, In re Estate of Steinfield, 630 N.E.2d 801, certiorari denied, See
3also Steinfeld v. Hoddick, 513 U.S. 809, (Ill. 1994). Void order which is one entered by
4court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to
5enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court,
6either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court, People ex rel.
7Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994). While
8voidable orders are readily appealable and must be attacked directly, void order may be
9circumvented by collateral attack or remedied by mandamus, Sanchez v. Hester, 911
10S.W.2d 173, (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 1995). Arizona courts give great weight to
11federal courts’ interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing motion for
12relief from judgment in interpreting identical text of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure,
13Estate of Page v. Litzenburg, 852 P.2d 128, review denied (Ariz.App. Div. 1, 1998).
14When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not
16Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or
17that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside, Jaffe
18and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278. A “void judgment” as we all
19know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken there under, and is vulnerable
20to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by ). No statute of limitations or repose runs
21on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years
22later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested,
23any disgruntled litigant may reopen the old wound and once more probe its depths. And it
24is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. 10/13/58 FRITTS v. KRUGH.
25SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97.On certiorari this
26Court may not review questions of fact. Brown v. Blanchard, 39 Mich 790. It is not
27at liberty to determine disputed facts (Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich 353), nor to review
28the weight of the evidence. Linn v. Roberts, 15 Mich 443; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich
29472. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to get rid of a void judgment, one which there
30is no evidence to sustain. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Hunt, 39
31Mich 469.

1
4
7St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941.
8
12
16to vacate a void judgment). For other authorities concurring, see Allied Fidelity Ins. Co.
17v. Ruth, 57 Wash. App. 783, 790, 790 P.2d 206 (1990),Bd. of Revision (2000), 87 Ohio
18St.3d 363, 368, Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998), Chavez v. County
19of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974), Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v.
20Hamilton Cty, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company v. Finesilver, No. 69363 (Ohio
21App. Dist.8 04/25/1996), In re Marriage of Brighterowski, 50 Wash. App. 633, 635, 749
22P.2d 754 (1988); Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46 Wash. App. 517, 520, 731 P.2d
23533 (1987), In re: Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262, In re: Weaver Constr., 190 Colo. at 232,
24545 P.2d at 1045, Leen, 62 Wash. App. at 478, Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd.
25No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649, (1st Cir. 1972),Good v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177,
26180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990), Love v. Packer, 174 N.C. 665, 94 S.E. 449, 450, Patton v.
27Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68 Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409, Small v. Batista, 22
28F. Supp.2d 230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
29PROCEDURE, (1973) ,Civil § 2862.
30
31 Memorandum in support of the point of law that when jurisdiction is challenged, the
32 party claiming that the court has jurisdiction has the legal burden to prove that
33 jurisdiction was conferred upon the court through the proper procedure.
34 Otherwise, the court is without jurisdiction.

1
14immediately lost subject-matter jurisdiction.
15
16
17
18
19 Conclusion and remedy sought
20 Determination by this court that Jonathan D. McCollister cannot produce from the
21record made in case number 02-CV-3461, Dane County, Wisconsin, both the offer of
22presentment of the original promissory note giving rise to the Rhinos’ obligation to SN
23SERVICING CORPORATION and the account and general ledger statement showing all
24receipts and disbursement on the alleged defaulted loan signed and dated by the auditor
25who prepared the account and general ledger statement requires vacation of the void
26judgment in case number 02-CV-3461, Dane County, Wisconsin as a matter of law
27together with whatever other damages and relief this court may find reasonable, lawful,
28and just.
29
30 Prepared and submitted by: ________________________________________________
31 Joyce H. Rhino Joseph W. Rhino

1
2
3
4
10
11
12
13File for injunctive relief too
14
15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

16 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
17
18
19Joyce H. Rhino, )
20 And )
21Joseph W. Rhino, )
22 Plaintiffs, )
23 )
24v. ) Number ___________________
25 )
26SN SERVICING CORPORATION, )
27NATIONS CREDIT HOME EQUITY )
28 SERVICES CORPORATION, )
29Jonathan D. McCollister, an individual )
30 And )
31Maryann Sumi, an individual, )
32 Defendants. )
33
34

1 Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino’s motion for a preliminary injunction
2
3 Brief in support of a preliminary injunction
4 Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino, will suffer irreparable harm by denial of
5this preliminary injunction. Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino have lived at 1779
6Norman Way in Madison, Wisconsin for many years. Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W.
7Rhino will lose abode and suffer irreparable harm by denial of this preliminary
8injunction. Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino will suffer insult, degradation, and
9deprivation of personhood by denial of this preliminary injunction.
10 Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino are likely to prevail in this instant petition.
11The record in the underlying case makes Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino's
12averments undeniable.
13
14 Public interest will not be impaired by granting this preliminary injunction.
15
16 Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino have no other remedy at law for protection
17from parties records show have conspired to deprive the Rhinos of their most
18fundamental rights.
19 Denial of Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino's preliminary injunction will
20cause Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino to bear a greatly unbalanced harm. SN
21SERVICING CORPORATION’S's harm would be delayed possession. Joyce H. Rhino
22and Joseph W. Rhino's harm will be loss of abode, damage to reputation and character,
23and assault on personhood.
24 Denial of Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino’s preliminary injunction goes
25beyond economic injury.
26 The cost to the court on error later corrected to the favor of SN SERVICING
27CORPORATION is not as great as the cost to the Court for error later corrected to Joyce
28H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino's favor.
29 Granting Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino's Motion for Preliminary
30Injunction conserves the property no matter who prevails. Denial of Joyce H. Rhino and

1Joseph W. Rhino's Motion for Preliminary Injunction directly effects the property by
2reducing it to a status of a bell which can't be “unrung.”
3
4 Conclusion and remedies sought
5 This court’s swift response to enjoin SN SERVICING CORPORATION or any
6agent for SN SERVICING CORPORATION from taking possession of the property in
7question until all of Joyce H. Rhino and Joseph W. Rhino's claims have been litigated
8will serve the cause of justice.
9
10
11 Prepared and submitted by: ________________________________________________
12 Joyce H. Rhino Joseph W. Rhino
13
14
15Can you go to bankruptcy court for protection? Yes, but remember to file a chapter
1613 – download the forms from the Internet and be sure to submit a plan. At the
17same time, file under authority of 11 USC 9014 – to challenge the validity of the
18creditor’s claims.
19 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

20 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
21
22In re: )
23 )
24Rosalie McNamara, ) Case No. 02-B-444
25 ) Chapter 13
26 Debtor ) 11 USC 9014 motion to
27 ) contest creditor
28 ) Banco Popular’s claim
29 vs. ) as falsely asserted
30 )
31Banco Popular, )
32 )
33 Creditor )
34____________________________________)
35

1
2
3 Brief in support
4
5 1. Banco Popular’s putative judgment against Rosalie McNamara, case number 98
6CH 0000, Dupage County, Illinois is facially void. Banco Popular alleges valid judgment
7against Rosalie McNamara in a sum of $204,946.12.
8 2. The record made in the Dupage County Illinois case reveals the so-called
9judgment to be bogus for three reasons. One, Banco Popular’s “judgment” was obtained
10by debt collector Robert Rappe, Jr. Rappe failed to notice Rosalie McNamara via a
11dunning letter. The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act requires that prior to collection
12activity or within five days of initial contact, the collector must communicate specific,
13unambiguous information to the consumer including statement of the amount of debt; the
14name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; a statement that unless the consumer,
15within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any
16portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; a statement
17that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that
18the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of
19the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or
20judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and a statement that, upon
21the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will
22provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from
23the current creditor. See 15 USC 1692g(a). Notification under authority of the Act is a
24due process right. When a party’s due process rights are violated, the court in which the
25action is brought is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus Banco Popular’s
26judgment obtained by Rappe is facially void for reason that Rappe violated Rosalie
27McNamara’s due process rights under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. Secondly,
28Banco Popular’s so-called judgment was via summary judgment where only Rosalie
29McNamara submitted an affidavit. Claim of damages, to be admissible as evidence, must
30incorporate records such as a general ledger and accounting of an alleged unpaid

5A.2d 1218, 201 Conn.1 (1986). See also Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Ill.
6Dec. 890, 516 N. E.2d 1045 (3Dist. 1987). Banco Popular, in alleged foreclosure suit,
7failed or refused to produce the actual note which Banco Popular alleges Rosalie
8McNamara owes. Where the complaining party can not prove the existence of the note,
9then there is no note. To recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the
10existence of the note in question; (2) that the party sued signed the note; (3) that the
11plaintiff is the owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing
12on the note. See In Re: SMS Financial LLc. v. Abco Homes, Inc. No.98-50117 February
1318, 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.), Volume 29 of the New Jersey Practice Series,
14Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically states, “...; and no part payments should
15be made on the bond or note unless the person to whom payment is made is able to
16produce the bond or note and the part payments are endorsed thereon. It would seem that
17the mortgagor would normally have a Common law right to demand production or
18surrender of the bond or note and mortgage, as the case may be. See Restatement,
19Contracts S 170(3), (4) (1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469, in Carnegie Bank v, Shalleck
20256 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div 1992), the Appellate Division held, “When the underlying
21mortgage is evidenced by an instrument meeting the criteria for negotiability set forth in
22N.J.S. 12A:3-104, the holder of the instrument shall be afforded all the rights and
23protections provided a holder in due course pursuant to N.J.S. 12A:3-302" Since no one
24is able to produce the “instrument” there is no competent evidence before the Court that
25any party is the holder of the alleged note or the true holder in due course. New Jersey
26common law dictates that the plaintiff prove the existence of the alleged note in question,
27prove that the party sued signed the alleged note, prove that the plaintiff is the owner and
28holder of the alleged note, and prove that certain balance is due and owing on any alleged
29note. Federal Circuit Courts have ruled that the only way to prove the perfection of any
30security is by actual possession of the security. See Matter of Staff Mortg. & Inv. Corp.,
31550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977). “Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the only notice

1sufficient to inform all interested parties that a security interest in instruments has been
2perfected is actual possession by the secured party, his agent or bailee.” Bankruptcy
3Courts have followed the Uniform Commercial Code. In Re Investors & Lenders, Ltd.
4165 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994), “Under the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code
5(NJUCC), promissory note is “instrument,” security interest in which must be perfected
6by possession ...” Unequivocally the Court’s rule is that in order to prove the
7“instrument”, possession is mandatory. Thirdly, Banco Popular lacks standing in this
8court. A check of the records of the Secretary of State of Finance for the State of Illinois
9shows Banco Popular is operating without authorization.
10
11 3. Determination by this court, Banco Popular cannot show that debt collector
12Robert Rappe, Jr. notified Rosalie McNamara via a dunning letter compliant with the Fair
13Debt Collections Practices Act prior to foreclosure suit and/or Banco Popular cannot
14show by certified copies from the record made in 98 CH 0913 Dupage County, Illinois,
15that Banco proved up the claim by submitting an affidavit verifying the account general
16ledger signed and dated under penalty of perjury by the person who maintained the ledger
17wherein is verified that Rosalie McNamara is indebted to Banco Popular and/or that
18Banco Popular lacks standing in this court, justly requires denying Banco Popular’s
19claims as falsely asserted and invoking this Court’s non-discretionary duty to vacate the
20“judgment” as void.
21
22 Prepared and submitted by:__________________________________
23 Rosalie McNamara
24 57 Briarwood Lane
25 Oak Brook, Illinois 60523-8706
26
27
29
30I, Rosalie McNamara, certify that January ____, 2003, I mailed a true and correct copy of
31the above and foregoing motion to contest a matter via first class mail or hand delivered
32to:
33
34Banco Popular at

1_______________________________________________________________________
2_______________________________________________________________________
3_______________________________________________________________________
4_______________________________________________________________________
5____
6
7 - and -
8
9Glenn B. Stearns, Standing Chapter 13 Trustee
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19What if all that doesn’t work? File a RICO suit! Just the threat of filing a RICO
20can make any sttorney cry and wet his pants!
21
22 In The District Court of The United States
23 For the XXXX District of XXXX
24
25
26Abner Doubleday, an individual )
27 and all others similarly situated, )
28 )
29 Plaintiffs, )
30 )
31v. ) Number ___________________
32 )
33Worldwide Asst. Purchasing, an enterprise )
34 affecting interstate commerce, )
35Worldwide Asst. Management, L.L.C, a )

1 an enterprise affecting inter- )
2 state commerce, )
3C. T. Corporation System, an enterprise )
4 affecting interstate commerce, )
5Phlem Snopes, an individual predicate )
6 actor in schemes violating )
7 federal laws providing that fraud )
8 and extortion are malum in se )
9 offenses, )
10Lucretia Borgia, a public officer )
11 using public office to aid and abet )
12 fraud and extortion, )
13 )
14 Defendants. )
15
16
17 Petition, complaint, and claim under authority of 18 USC 1964(a)
18
19 Subject matter jurisdictional statement
20
21 FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION: 28 USC § 13331: The federal district
22court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider this claim under authority of 18 USC
231964(a) and by virtue of sufficient pleadings clearly articulating violations of 18 USC
241961 & 1962. The violations are pled with particularity infra. Furthermore, the clear
25face of this record shows the claims of Abner Doubleday in harmony with Attick v.
26Valeria Associates, L.P., S.D. N.Y. 1992, 835 F. Supp. 103, Avirgan v. Hull, C.A. 11
27(Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572, Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers
28Local Union 639, C.A.D.C. 1990, 913 F.2d 948, 286 U.S. App. D.C. 182, certiorari
29denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed. 2d 1007, Hecht v. Commerce Clearing
30House, Inc. C.A. 2 (N.Y.) 1990, 897 F.2d 21, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 655, Standard Chlorine of
31Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del. 1992, 821 F. Supp. 232, Jordan v. Herman, F.D. Pa.
321992, 792 F. Supp. 380, Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc.
33S.D.N.Y. 1987, 114 F.R.D. 684, Polletier v. Zweifel, C.A. 11 (Ga.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1465,
34rehearing denied 931 F.2d 901, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 167, 502 U.S. 855, 116 L.Ed.
35131, Khurana v. Innovative Heath Care Systems, Inc. , C.A. 5 (La.) 1997, 130 F.3d 143,
36vacated 119 S.Ct. 442, 525 U.S. 979, 142 L.Ed. 2d 397, on remand 164 F.3d 900, In re
37American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealership Relations Litigation, D.Md. 1996, 941

1F.Supp. 528, Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, S.D.N.Y. 1995, 908
2F.Supp. 1226, Protter v. Nathan’s Famous Systems, Inc. E.D. N.Y. 1995, 904 F.Supp.
3101, Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum Co. D.N.J. 1993, 828 F.Supp. 287,
4and Compagnie de Reassuarance D’lle de France v. New England Reinsurance Corp. D.
5Mass. 1993, 825 F.Supp. 370.
6
7 Statement of in personum jurisdiction
8 Worldwide Asst. Purchasing, also known as Worldwide Asset. Management,
9L.L.C. is an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Worldwide Asst. Purchasing, also
10known as Worldwide Asset. Management, L.L.C. operates from xxxxx, xxxxx in
11Atlanta, Georgia. C. T. Corporation System, located at xxxxx, in Memphis, Tennessee is
12a local facilitator of fraud and extortion for Worldwide. Phlem Snopes is a member of the
13enterprise, Worldwide Asst. Purchasing, also known as Worldwide Asset. Management,
14L.L.C. Lucretia Borgia aided and abetted Phlem Snopes in Phlem Snopes’s violations of
1518 USC 1961 & 1962.
16
17 Statement of venue
18 Venue is appropriate in the xxxx, District of Tennessee as the predicate acts of
19fraud and extortion committed by Phlem Snopes occurred in the xxxx, District of
20Tennessee.
21
22
23 Theory of the case
24 Phlem Snopes is engaged in the debt collection fraud racket. HOW THE DEBT
25COLLECTION FRAUD RACKET WORKS: Worldwide Asset Purchasing, also known
26as Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C. is a subset of the debt collection racket, a
27wide-spread, far-reaching scam composed of artists such as Phlem Snopes. How the
28scam works: In a back room of the Chicago Board of Trade or simply from one of many
29Internet hosts, worthless bundles of commercial paper in the form of copies of charged
30off debt are sold at auction. The typical face value of the bundles often amounts to tens of
31millions of dollars. The original makers of the loans including mortgagees are often not

2up line from such artists as Phlem Snopes then break apart the bundles and resell the
3worthless commercial paper in clusters based on who the original mortgagee is and what
4the geographic location of the origin of the individual copies. Artists such as Phlem
5Snopes are the actual “end user” holders in due course although typically in the scam,
6artists such as Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C., invest as little as 75 cents on the
7hundred face amount for the worthless commercial paper, then allege they are third party
8debt collectors attempting to collect for the original maker of the loan. Enterprises such
9as Worldwide Asset Purchasing, in turn marks up the worthless commercial paper and
10resells to artists such as Phlem Snopes who, for a very small investment use threat,
11coercion, intimidation, and deception to defraud and extort money and property from
12parties such as Abner Doubleday. Whenever necessary, scam artists such as Phlem
13Snopes, subject parties such as Abner Doubleday to shame legal proceedings where: (1).
14Standing to sue in the respective state court is never proved, (2). Standing to sue as a
15bona fide holder-in-due-course is never proved, (3). Corporate charter authority to make
16consumer loans is never proved, (4). Corporate charter authority to sue for damages on
17consumer loans is never proved, (5). Damages in fact are never proved, and (6).
18Delegation of authority from enterprises such as Worldwide Asset Purchasing to
19predicate actors such as Paul Phlem Snopes is never proved. When defendants raise any
20defense whatsoever, thugs such as Bettyer Thomas Moore, either are or pretend to, be
21absolutely “clueless.” In this instant case, Moore is either “on the take” receiving
22kickbacks and bribes from Phlem Snopes, or Moore lacks the character and intellect to
23make decisions affecting other people’s lives. This racket is particularly heinous in the
24case of credit card contracts, which as a continuing series of offers to contract, are non-
25transferable. The scam is complete when artists such as Phlem Snopes, with the
26cooperation of thugs like Lucretia Borgia, defraud parties such as Abner Doubleday.
27
28 FIRST PREDICATE ACT IN VIOLATION OF 18 USC 1961 & 1962: (Month
29day and year), predicate actor Phlem Snopes filed a fraudulent security instrument in the
30district court of xxxxx County, Tennessee. Phlem Snopes fraudulently claimed that
31Abner Doubleday was indebted to Worldwide Asset Purchasing in a sum in excess of

1xxxxx thousand dollars. Concisely, Phlem Snopes advanced a writing which Phlem
2Snopes knew was false, with the intention that Abner Doubleday rely on the fraud to
3Abner Doubleday’s detriment. Phlem Snopes’s fraudulent claim was urged under color of
4an official right. A jury shall determine that Phlem Snopes absolutely violated 18 USC
51961 & 1962 by the fraud and extortion which occurred on July 29th 2003.
6
7 SECOND PREDICATE ACT IN VIOLATION OF 18 USC 1961 & 1962:
8(Month day and year), predicate actor Phlem Snopes again filed a fraudulent security
9instrument in the district court of xxxxx County, Tennessee. Phlem Snopes fraudulently
10claimed that Abner Doubleday was indebted to Worldwide Asset Purchasing in a sum in
11excess of xxxxx thousand dollars. Concisely, Phlem Snopes advanced a writing which
12Phlem Snopes knew was false, with the intention that Abner Doubleday rely on the fraud
13to Abner Doubleday’s detriment. Phlem Snopes’s fraudulent claim was urged under color
14of an official right. A jury shall determine that Phlem Snopes absolutely violated 18 USC
16
17
18 THIRD PREDICATE ACT IN VIOLATION OF 18 USC 1961 & 1962: (Month
27
28 FOURTH PREDICATE ACT IN VIOLATION OF 18 USC 1961 & 1962:
29(Month day and year), predicate actor Phlem Snopes filed a fraudulent security
30instrument in the district court of xxxxx County, Tennessee. Phlem Snopes fraudulently
31claimed that Abner Doubleday was indebted to Worldwide Asset Purchasing in a sum in

1excess of xxxxx thousand dollars. Concisely, Phlem Snopes advanced a writing which
2Phlem Snopes knew was false, with the intention that Abner Doubleday rely on the fraud
3to Abner Doubleday’s detriment. Phlem Snopes’s fraudulent claim was urged under color
4of an official right. A jury shall determine that Phlem Snopes absolutely violated 18 USC
6
7 FIFTH PREDICATE ACT IN VIOLATION OF 18 USC 1961 & 1962: (Month
151961 & 1962 by the fraud and extortion which occurred on July 29 th 2003. In this
16episode of mischief, Phlem Snopes secured Lucretia Borgia’s sworn agreement to aide
17and abet in the defrauding of Abner Doubleday.
18 Affidavit
19I, Abner Doubleday, of age and competent to testify, state as follows based on my own
21 1. I was contacted by Phlem Snopes about (month day and year). Phlem Snopes
22 alleged that I owed him a large sum of money, but in the time since, has refused
23 to document and verify that I owe him, Worldwide Asset Purchasing, or
24 Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C. money.
25 2. Month day, year, Phlem Snopes falsely alleged that Worldwide Asset Purchasing
26 had a claim against me and had authority to sue in Tennessee courts.
27 3. Month day, year, Phlem Snopes falsely alleged that although he was attorney of
28 record for Worldwide Asset Purchasing, he was not their agent for service of
29 process.
30 4. Month day, year, Phlem Snopes falsely alleged that although he was attorney of
31 record for Worldwide Asset Purchasing, he was not their agent for service of
32 process.
33 5. Month day, year, Phlem Snopes falsely alleged that a party who had no personal
34 knowledge of the business records of (name of bank) could testify competently
35 about (name of bank’s) records.
36 6. Month day, year, Phlem Snopes secured agreement from Lucretia Borgia that
37 Moore would help Phlem Snopes defraud me.

1 7. Month day, year, Phlem Snopes made thinly veiled threats to the effect that he
2 was out to get me.
3 8. As a result of the harassment of Phlem Snopes and Phlem Snopes’s repeated
4 attempts to extort money and property from me and because of Phlem Snopes’s
5 dissemination of false information about my finances, I have been deprived of
6 business opportunities and been damaged in my business enterprises.
7
8
9 ________________________________
10 Abner Doubleday
11
13COUNTY OF _____________
20
21 ________________ Notary Public
22
23 Plaintiffs’ RICO case statement detailing the racketeering enterprise,
24 the predicate acts of racketeering, and the economic purpose
25
26 Worldwide Asset Purchasing, also known as Worldwide Asset Management,
27L.L.C. is running a racket by taking money and property from parties situated similarly
28to Abner Doubleday to satisfy a nonexistent “debts.” This court shall notice that Abner
29Doubleday, in this complaint, has testified of injury to property and business by reason of
30acts which violate section 4 of the Clayton Act. See Attick v. Valeria Associates, L.P.,
31S.D. N.Y. 1992, 835 F. Supp. 103. Abner Doubleday has articulated violation of
32racketeering laws, testified that the violation injured both business and property
33warranting treble damages. See Avirgan v. Hull, C.A. 11 (Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572. In
34naming Worldwide Asset Purchasing, also known as Worldwide Asset Management,
35L.L.C., an enterprise to which Phlem Snopes belongs, Abner Doubleday has established
36that an enterprise exists which undeniably affects interstate commerce. See Yellow Bus

1Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, C.A.D.C. 1990, 913 F.2d
2948, 286 U.S. App. D.C. 182, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.
32d 1007. Abner Doubleday has standing to sue under RICO as Abner Doubleday has
4shown violation of RICO, injury to business and property, and causation of the injury by
5the violation. See Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc. C.A. 2 (N.Y.) 1990, 897 F.2d
621, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 655. Abner Doubleday has perfected a RICO claim by showing the
7existence of a RICO enterprise, showing a pattern of racketeering activity: fraud, shown
8nexus between the defendents and the pattern of frauds, and shown resulting injury to
9business and property. See Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.
101992, 821 F. Supp. 232. Abner Doubleday has demonstrated that Abner Doubleday
11sustained injury as proximate result of the pattern of frauds by the defendants. See
12Jordan v. Herman, F.D. Pa. 1992, 792 F. Supp. 380. Phlem Snopes’s membership in the
13enterprise, Worldwide Asset Purchasing, also known as Worldwide Asset Management,
14L.L.C., empowers Mendelson to do illicit business benefiting Worldwide Asset
15Purchasing, also known as Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C. directly and
16indirectly. Worldwide Asset Purchasing, also known as Worldwide Asset Management,
17L.L.C. is able to recoup and profit by Worldwide Asset Purchasing, also known as
18Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C.’s investment affecting interstate commerce. See
19Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc. S.D.N.Y. 1987, 114 F.R.D.
20684. Abner Doubleday clearly articulated being Mendelson’s target of extortion and
21resulting business loses. See Polletier v. Zweifel, C.A. 11 (Ga.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1465,
22rehearing denied 931 F.2d 901, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 167, 502 U.S. 855, 116 L.Ed.
23131. The cause-in-fact that but-for the chicanery of the enterprise member, Phlem
24Snopes, Abner Doubleday would have his money and his business would not have
25incurred tangible losses is sufficient to state factual causation for provision of RICO act
26providing for treble damages. See Khurana v. Innovative Heath Care Systems, Inc. ,
27C.A. 5 (La.) 1997, 130 F.3d 143, vacated 119 S.Ct. 442, 525 U.S. 979, 142 L.Ed. 2d 397,
28on remand 164 F.3d 900. Abner Doubleday’s reliance on traditional principles of
29proximate causation applying to RICO cases is illustrated in the well pleaded, testimony
30that Abner Doubleday was the target of extortion and his business interfered with by
31predicate acts of the defendants. See In re American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealership

1Relations Litigation, D.Md. 1996, 941 F.Supp. 528. There exists an undeniable
2relationship between the acts of the defendants and the damage to property and business
3interests of Abner Doubleday. See Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa,
4S.D.N.Y. 1995, 908 F.Supp. 1226. The damage caused by the defendants was the natural
5and reasonably foreseeable consequence of the frauds promulgated by the defendants.
6See Protter v. Nathan’s Famous Systems, Inc. E.D. N.Y. 1995, 904 F.Supp. 101. The
7fraud by the defendants was the legal cause of Abner Doubleday being the target of
8extortion, his business interests being interfered with, and related damages. See
9Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum Co. D.N.J. 1993, 828 F.Supp. 287. The
10enterprise, Worldwide Asset Purchasing also known as Worldwide Asset Management,
11L.L.C. is evident to a high degree and it is also evident to a high degree that associates
12such as Phlem Snopes act as a continuing unit. See Compagnie de Reassuarance D’lle de
13France v. New England Reinsurance Corp. D. Mass. 1993, 825 F.Supp. 370. It is
14undeniable that Worldwide Asset Purchasing also known as Worldwide Asset
15Management, L.L.C receives money for defrauding parties such as Abner Doubleday
16and Worldwide Asset Purchasing also known as Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C.’s
17receipts and compensation to collateral enterprises represents their necessary investment
18in the class of business to which Worldwide Asset Purchasing also known as Worldwide
19Asset Management, L.L.C. belongs for the continuing privilege of, in the vernacular,
20continuing to rip people off in phony, sham proceedings. See Grand Cent. Sanitation,
21Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Palmerton, M.D.Pa. 1992, 816 F.Supp. 299. Undeniably, the
22defendants have used the courts for purposes of fraud and extortion. Mendelson’s attacks
23on Abner Doubleday is but one of many of examples of fraud by Worldwide Asset
24Purchasing also known as Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C. and other enterprises
25similarly constituted.
26
27 Remedy sought and prayer for relief
28 The Federal District Court has a duty to order the dissolution of Worldwide Asset
29Purchasing also known as Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C. and C.T. Corporation
30System under authority of 18 USC 1964(a). The Federal District Court is empowered to
31order treble damages as remedial to the racketeering activities of “RICO” enterprises and

1their constituent members. A jury’s determination that Worldwide Asset Purchasing also
2known as Worldwide Asset Management, L.L.C by and through Phlem Snopes and
3Lucretia Borgia has engaged in a pattern of frauds rising to a level of racketeering
4requires this court’s order to Worldwide Asset Purchasing also known as Worldwide
5Asset Management, L.L.C and C.T. Corporation System to dissolve and cease operations.
6A jury’s determination that Worldwide Asset Purchasing also known as Worldwide Asset
7Management, L.L.C by and through Phlem Snopes and Lucretia Borgia committed or
8aided and abetted two or more predicate acts of fraud resulting in defrauding Abner
9Doubleday and others similarly situated of property and business interests justly requires
10ordering Worldwide Asset Purchasing also known as Worldwide Asset Management,
11L.L.C., C.T. Corporation System, and Phlem Snopes and Lucretia Borgia to compensate
12all parties in a sum not less than three times the collective sums of property and losses to
13businesses of all who are similarly situated
14TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED
15
16 Prepared and submitted by:
17 ____________________
18 Abner Doubleday
19
20
21

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1

1Beating up on Debt Collectors 2

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16 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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25 Respondents motion to strike the so called affidavits of Bruce Buttkiss, Jr.

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25 1. Please furnish a copy of the original promissory note redacting my social

32 3. Please identify by name and address all persons, corporations, associations, or

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18Disputing the “debt”

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26 1. Please furnish a copy of the original contract redacting my social security

32 3. Please identify by name and address all persons, corporations, associations, or

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15Disputing the “debt”

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27Disputing the “debt”

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23 ________________ Notary Public

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29 Mbna America Bank NA is a subset of the debt collection racket, a wide-spread,

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20 ________________ Notary Public

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21 Mbna America Bank NA is a subset of the debt collection racket, a wide-spread,

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19 ________________ Notary Public

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7 Mandatory judicial notice

8 Discover Bank is a subset of the debt collection racket, a wide-spread, far-

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5Oklahoma. This court’s inquiry, reasonable under the circumstances, establishes a

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