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Weikai Chen

CGW4U

Ms. Crabtree

January 5, 2010

Why We Fight – The War in Afghanistan

Nearly a decade since the start of the conflict, public support over the War in Afghanistan has

reached an all-time low. A decade of fighting a fanatical insurgency, deadly Improvised Explosive

Devices, and seemingly endless ramp ceremonies have added fuel to the debate—why are we still

fighting the war? However, as the conflict approaches its tenth year, the western world must remain

resolute in its mission. The initial cause of the war, the improvements made after overthrowing the

regime, and the positive effect a stable Afghanistan will have on the region, make success in the

conflict an imperative and paramount goal. In a region that's been torn by continuous conflict for nearly

four decades, we as the western world owe it the people of Afghanistan and the victims of terrorism

around the world to bring peace and stability to the region.

In the decade after September 11th, 2001 (9/11), the public has been quick to forget the sheer

devastation the unprecedented attacks by al-Qaida and other militant extremest groups wrought on

the world. The enormity and audacity of the attack alone should justify a response through force.

Comparisons have been drawn between 9/11 and the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour by

the Imperial Japanese Navy. Just as the attack on Pearl Harbour sparked America's entry into WWII,

the attacks on 9/11 marked the start of a new war—The War on Terror. In terms of lives lost, the attack

on 9/11, resulting in 3,300 deaths, was actually greater than the 2,400 lives lost at Pearl Harbour

(Conn, 194). Not only that, but those 3,300 lost at the World Trade Centres were civilians, not

uniformed sailors stationed at an American naval base. In that light, the response to 9/11 should

logically, be far harsher than the American response to the Japanese during WWII. In the pacific

campaign, the public tolerated the sacrifice of 100,000 sailors, airmen, and marines in order to render

justice upon Japan. Comparatively speaking, the 2,200 combat deaths of the current conflict should be

a drop in the bucket when related to the much graver circumstances surrounding the attacks on
September 11th (iCasualties). If the attack on Pearl Harbour warranted the massive American pacific

campaign, 9/11 should warrant a military response just as, if not larger, in scale. The sheer audacity of

the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 will forever mark the date in history and the devastation it

left on the world alone should justify any retaliation through military force.

The successful overthrow of the former Taliban government, and the significant improvements

in the standard of living directly associated, are major reasons why the NATO-led coalition must

solidify their victory for the sake of the Afghan people. Before the invasion, Afghanistan under the

Taliban was a backwards and oppressive state. Wrought with internal disputes throughout its reign,

the Taliban did little in the way of governing. Afghanistan under the Taliban was a country divided. In

the North, the former Islamic State government ousted by the Taliban had formed a so-called

“Northern Alliance”, and had begun to consolidate territory. The Taliban, with the support of Pakistani

troops and Saudi funding, were actively trying to reclaim the territories claimed by the “Northern

Alliance” in what amounted to a bloody civil war. Between the years 1996-2001, when the Taliban was

in power, the people of Afghanistan were left to fend virtually for themselves as their regime chose to

indulge in petty conflict, leading to a virtual collapse of all basic services (National Geographic). The

implementation of a western-backed government in place of the Taliban brought with it many of the

benefits associated with democracy. Free and equal education is continuing to be implemented has

been a keystone in the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) reconstruction strategy; free

education, available to girls as well as boys, has time and again proven its worth in bringing a third-

world country out of poverty with a common trend of birth rate decreases associated with early female

education (Cordesman). As seen in successful former third-world nations, reducing the birth rate frees

up resources allocated for child-centric services to be invested in other areas such as the economy,

effectively improving the overall standard of living within a country. ISAF engineers have also

significantly improved the country's infrastructure (Asian Development Bank). Water sanitation

facilities, and power plants have brought clean water and electricity to more Afghans than ever before.

In addition to the immediate benefits brought about by the newly improved infrastructure, the work of

ISAF engineers is also a critical part of winning over the Afghan people from the clutches of the
Taliban; a “hearts and minds” campaign. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the country's

agricultural industry has been almost entirely converted from the production of opium to more

convention crops (Opioids). Pre-invasion Afghanistan had the dubious honour of accounting for 92%

of all heroin found on the market and accounted for 35% of the country's GDP. Today, Afghan farmers

have started grow wheat, barley and other food crops, allowing the nation to begin feeding itself and

reduce the country's dependence on food-aid (Wiseman). The overthrow of the Taliban regime brought

about many positive effects critical in the rebuilding of Afghanistan, and by bringing the nation to a

productive, and self-sufficient state, ISAF hopes to finally bring stability to the region.

The success of a western force in Afghanistan will pay dividends in the increased peace and

stability it will bring to the region. Possessing one of the worst humanitarian records in the world and

one of the lowest life expectancies, Afghanistan, since the Soviet invasion of the 1970s has been a

drain on international aid. In the period between 2001-2009, donors world-wide donated a total of

US$62 Billion, US$36 Billion of that going to Afghanistan (IRIN). By helping the country finally get back

on its feet, the western forces in Afghanistan would be directly freeing up effectively half of all world

aid donations to be better spent elsewhere. The success of the west in Afghanistan will also provide a

western-allied nation, in the centre of a very volatile region. Sharing boarders with Iran, Pakistan, India

and China, the ability for western forces to be based out of Afghanistan in the foreseeable future could

give forces a decisive edge in any future conflicts in the region. For example, the air bases currently in

Afghanistan provide invaluable air cover for troops in the region, allowing shorter ranged strike aircraft

to be based in theatre and be on station in minutes instead of hours (Morarjee). The alternative, which

was heavily used in the Second Gulf War due to Turkey revoking all flyover rights, is to rely on naval

aviation based off carriers and long-ranged intercontinental bombers based in the United States, both

highly inefficient and expensive options when compared to basing aircraft in the theatre of war. Lastly,

a successful campaign against the Taliban will send a strong message to extremist militant groups

everywhere. Arguably the largest and best organized of the Islamic extremist groups, a convincing

defeat of the Taliban will prove the infeasibility of waging war against a determined western coalition.

Conversely to lose the war to the Taliban will send deadly message to militant groups everywhere; it
would be telling the world that the west can be defeated, all that has to be done is to bloody its

soldiers and sway public opinion. To lose to the Taliban in Afghanistan would mean risking much

deadlier attacks in the future from emboldened extremist militants. The success of the Afghan mission

will play a crucial role in global security for the foreseeable future and to risk defeat, is to jeopardize

global security.

The initial reason for entering the war, the gains made since overthrowing the former regime,

and the positive effect a stable Afghanistan will have on the region make success in the Afghan

mission a goal of the utmost importance. In addition, the success of the NATO mission in Afghanistan

is absolutely essential not only for the stability of the region, but also as a model and message to the

world that our western principles of freedom and democracy will prevail time, and time again, when

faced with oppression and despair. We owe it to the Afghan people, the victims of terrorism, and the

service members who gave the ultimate sacrifice believing in the mission to see this conflict through to

the end. For all of these reasons, we shall prevail.


Works Consulted

Air War Costs NATO Afghan Supporters. Rachel Morarjee. The Christian Science Monitor, 18 December 2006.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1218/p01s02-wosc.html>.

Afghanistan Goal: Supporting Itself. Paul Wiseman. USA Today, 25 May 2006.
<http://usatoday.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=USATODAY.com+-+Afghanistan+goal
%3A+Supporting+itself&expire=&urlID=18358997&fb=Y&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.usatoday.com%2Fmoney
%2Fworld%2F2006-05-25-afghanistan-usat_x.htm&partnerID=1660>.

Afghanistan: Money well spent?. IRIN humanitarian news and analysis, 22 March 2010.
<http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=88502>.

Afghanistan, Opium, and the Taliban. Opioids.com, 15 February, 2001.


<http://www.opioids.com/afghanistan/index.html>.

Afghanistan's Opium Economy. Asian Development Bank. December 2005.


<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADB_Review/2005/vol37-6/opium-economy.asp>.

Canada in Afghanistan. CBC News, 10 February, 2009.


<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/10/f-afghanistan.html>.

Steton, Conn. The Attack on Pearl Harbour. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army

Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Enhanced Base Security Since 9/11, The. Amy Belasco. CRS Report for Congress,
3 October 2005.
<http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0510belasco.pdf>.

Fighting a Hard, Half-Forgotten War. N. C. Aizenman. Washington Post, 22 June 2005.


<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/21/AR2005062101728_pf.html>.

Hunt for Bin Laden, The. National Security Archives, 21 December 2001.
<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/index.html>.

Inside the Taliban. National Geographic. 2007. Video.


<http://youtube.com/watch?v=xpQI6HKV-ZY&feature=related>.

NATO chief bemoans limits on troops in Afghanistan. Reuters, 17 November 2006.


<http://rempost.blogspot.com/2006/11/nato-chief-bemoans-limits-on-troops-in.html>.

NATO's Choice in Afghanistan: Go Big or Go Home. Roland Paris. Policy Options, December 2006-Janurary
2007.
<http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/dec06/paris.pdf>.

OEF: Afghanistan: Fatalities By Year. iCasualties. January 2011.


<http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByYear.aspx>.

One War We Can Still Win. Anthony Cordesman, The New York Times, 13 December 2006.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/13/opinion/13cordesman.1.html?
ei=5090&en=564b63482e2c5361&ex=1323666000&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print>.

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