ARCHITECTURAL RECORDATION

OF THE
INTEGRATED BINARY PRODUCTION FACILITY,
PINE BLUFF ARSENAL, ARKANSAS

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Fort Worth District
November 2004
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
November 2004 Historical documentation: 1981-2004.

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

ARCHITECTURAL RECORDATION OF THE INTEGRATED BINARY PRODUCTION
FACILITY, PINE BLUFF ARSENAL, ARKANSAS

6. AUTHOR(S)

Joseph Scott Murphey

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District
819 Taylor Street/P.O. Box 17300
Fort Worth, Texas 76102-0300

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
TVA, Attn: Patsy Saisuwan, 3rd and Douglas Streets, Building E4510TA, Aberdeen Proving
Ground-Edgewood, MD 21010
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

See DODD 5230.24

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

A complex of 37 buildings and structures, the Integrated Binary Production Facility (ICBF) is an industrial complex on the grounds
of the U.S. Army’s Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. The ICBF was specifically built to manufacture binary chemical weapons at the
end of the Cold War. Under the terms of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, the entire IBPF will be destroyed by 2007.
This document forms mitigation documentation as stipulated for the loss a property eligible for the National Register of Historic
Places.

Name of Federal Technical Responsible Individual:

Joseph Scott Murphey
Organization: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District, CESWF-PER-EC
Phone #: (817) 886-1722
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES
Cold War; Binary Chemical Weapons; Weapons of Mass Destruction: Historic Buildings; National
Register of Historic Places; Historic District; Cultural Resources; Historic Preservation. 91
16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 20. LIMITATION OF
OF REPORT THIS PAGE ABSTRACT ABSTRACT

Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Same as report

Standard form 298
MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

The Integrated Binary Production Facility (IBPF) is located in an isolated section of the United States
Army’s Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA), near the town of Pine Bluff, Arkansas. PBA's mission is to ensure
the safe storage of its chemical weapon stockpile, located on 436 acres in the northwestern portion of
the arsenal. PBA has stored mustard agent for more than 50 years and nerve agents for more than 30
years. In May of 2004, Pine Bluff stored 12.5 percent of the United States stockpile of chemical
weapons. The stockpile consisted of rockets and landmines containing the agents GB and VX and
ton-containers with mustard. These weapons were scheduled to be eliminated as part of the Army's
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program in compliance with the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) that mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons.

The IBPF was built by the Army over a period of years between 1981-1992 to manufacture key
components of high-technology binary chemical weapons, a new class of a weapon of mass
destruction that was perfected at the ending stages of the Cold War (1946-1989). Heretofore, all
chemical weapons consisted of a unitary lethal chemical agent that was highly dangerous to
manufacture, transport and store. A binary chemical weapon consists of two chemicals that when
combined after firing the weapon, produces chemical agent during delivery that is released at the
target. The two chemicals are not kept in the proximity of each other until the weapon is ready for use
on the battlefield. The strategic military benefit of such a binary weapon is obvious by the safer
manufacture, transport and storage of a highly lethal weapon of mass destruction. However, the
technology required to create a binary weapon is highly sophisticated and the quest represented yet
another dimension in the Cold War arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The IBPF is actually a combination of six industrial plants: the DF (a chemical) and M20 Fill Line
plant, DC (a chemical) plant, QL (a chemical) plant, a projectile canister fill plant BIGEYE (a
chemical weapon bomb) plant, and the MLRS (a chemical weapon rocket) fill plant. They are further
grouped into three distinct production areas: The DC Production Area, The DF Production and Fill
Area (containing the projectile and MLRS plants) and the QL/BIGEYE Production Area. There is
also a storage area. The DC, DF and M20 Fill and MLRS Areas are contiguous. These three plant
areas are located in the west central portion of the installation on the site of a former unitary chemical
(mustard) weapons production site.

The complex contains a total of 37 buildings/structures. The majority of these structures are utilitarian
in the extreme, built to shelter interior production activities or the chemical components themselves.
The primary building materials are sheet metal and concrete block or clay tile. While the exteriors
are unexceptional, the interior workings of these structures are another matter. Many of the vessels
and process piping components within the DF, DC and QL plants are Hastelloy B-2, Hastelloy C-276,
glass lined carbon steel, and 316 stainless steel, and the engineering of these interiors represented
cutting-edge technology at the time of construction.

Under the terms of the CWC, all of the IBPF will be destroyed by 2007. The IBPF at Pine Bluff
Arsenal represents a last vestige of America’s chemical weapons program, a defense strategy that had
been in place for more than 80 years.

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

MANAGEMENT SUMMARY………………………………………………………………………i

TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………………………..ii

PART A: HISTORICAL CONTEXT: CHEMICAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENT

AND THE IBPF………………………………………………………………………………………1
I. Introduction to Chemical Weapons; Definitions, Development, Types, Manufacture, Testing,
Storage and Demilitarization……………………….………………………………….…2
II. The Creation of the IBPF………………………………………………………………………9

PART B: HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IBPF……………………………………………..13

PART C: PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE IBPF………………………………………………16

I. Production Areas of the IBPF and Construction Phasing……………………………………..18
II. The DC Production Area…………………………………………………………………..….20
A. DC Production Area Photographs…………………………………………………………..24
III. The DF Production Area……………………………………………………………………...43
A. DF Production Area Photographs…………………………………………………………...50
IV. The QL/BIGEYE Production Area…………………………………………………………...61
A. QL/BIGEYE Production Area Photographs………………………………………………...68
V. The Binary Storage Area………………………………………………………………………78
A. Binary Storage Area Photographs…………………………………………………………...81

APPENDIX: BIBLIOGRAPHY...……………………………………………………………………84

ii
 PART A:

HISTORICAL CONTEXT:
CHEMICAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENT
AND THE
PINE BLUFF ARSENAL INTEGRATED BINARY
PRODUCTION FACILITY

1
PART A.I: INTRODUCTION TO CHEMICAL
WEAPONS; DEFINITIONS, DEVELOPMENT, TYPES,
MANUFACTURE, TESTING, STORAGE AND
DEMILITARAZATION
When Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) was established, the term “chemical weapon” was more broadly
interpreted to include “tactical weapons using incendiary mixtures, smoking compounds, and
irritating, poisonous, or asphyxiating gases”. However, during the later Cold War years, the phrase
within the U.S. military came to refer to “a chemical compound which, through its chemical
properties, produces lethal or damaging effects on man” and excluded herbicides, defoliants, riot
control agents, and smoke and flame weapons.

Definition of Chemical Weapon Nerve Agents and Their Development

Chemical-weapons agents are broken down into four groups based on the agent’s physiological
effects, which include: choking agents, blister agents, blood agents, and nerve agents. Nerve agents
are considered the most toxic chemical agents because of their ability to attack the nervous system of
the human body by inhibiting the enzyme cholinesterase; as little as one milligram of inhaled nerve
agent can kill a healthy adult. When a nerve receives a stimulus, acetylcholine is released to carry the
impulse to muscles and organs. After the impulse is transmitted, cholinesterase acts to prevent the
accumulation of acetylcholine released in the nervous system . Nerve agents inhibit the functioning of
cholinesterase, which results in the continuation of acetylcholine production and the transmission of
nervous impulses. Similar to common insecticides malathion or diazinon, all nerve agents are
organophosphate compounds. Organophosphate pesticides from the American market were
scheduled for removal due to concerns over brain development. The nerve agents are several
hundred times more potent than these insecticides.

Exposure to nerve agents occurs by inhalation and/or skin absorption. Agents also can be ingested
but this is less usual. Unprotected individuals exposed to small amounts of nerve agent vapor exhibit
symptoms in the eyes and nose. Shortly after exposure miosis (pinpointing of the pupils) occurs.
Symptoms include pain behind the eyes and blurred vision. More exposure causes rhinorrhea (runny
nose) that may be heavy. Prolonged exposure leads to the constriction of the bronchi and bronchioles
of the lungs, which causes tightness in the chest and labored breathing. Continued inhalation of the
agent leads to weakness, vomiting, cramps, and diarrhea. With sufficient exposure, the respiratory
system ceases to function. Death follows. Heavy exposure to agent vapor causes the individual to
rapidly lose consciousness, convulse, stop breathing, and die. Depending on exposure, the effects of
nerve agent through skin absorption may occur within seconds to minutes or may take as long as
several hours. Skin absorption of nerve agents results in sweating and fasciculation (muscle
twitching) at the exposure site. As with vapor inhalation, nausea, vomiting and diarrhea will follow.
If the exposure is great enough, the victim will experience generalized muscular hyperactivity,
difficulty in breathing, increased secretions, convulsion, loss of consciousness, respiratory failure and
death.

2
GB(sarin), GD(soman) and VX are the three primary nerve agents of military importance today.
Developed by the Germans, nerve agents were originally classified under Grün-3. After World War
II, the British coded the three German nerve agents, tabun, sarin, and soman, as GA, GB and GD,
following G-markings found on the outside of the containers holding the nerve agents . The U.S.
Army maintains the designated letter codes for the lethal G-agents.

In 1936, German scientist Dr. Gerhard Schrader discovered the first nerve agent, GA (tabun), while
researching new pesticides. Schrader soon realized the side-effects his new pesticide had on humans.
Though intended for use as a pesticide, GA was used on animals during experiments in the spring of
the following year. In 1938, Schrader discovered a related, yet more toxic, nerve agent GB (sarin).
During World War II, the Germans put considerable effort into the development of chemical weapons
and by the close of the war they had amassed a sizeable arsenal.

Agent GB (sarin, or isopropyl methyl phosphonoflouridate) is a lethal respiratory agent that is the
principal nerve agent in the U.S. chemical arsenal. Characteristic of all G-type agents, GB is a
colorless and odorless liquid that vaporizes readily at ambient temperatures, and the hydrolyzation
rate of GB is dependent on temperature and the pH of the water mixed with the agent. The agent is
non-persistent, and the vapor hazard is short and dependent on weather conditions . GB is extremely
toxic when absorbed through the skin or eyes, but the main route for GB vapor into the body is via the
respiratory system. In addition to being stored at Pine Bluff Arsenal, GB is stockpiled in the United
States at Anniston Army Depot, Blue Grass Army Depot, Tooele Army Depot and Umatilla Chemical
Depot.

Agent GD (soman, or 1,2,2-trimethyethypropyl methylphosphonoflouridate), is a lethal, semi-

persistent, respiratory and skin penetrating agent. The third nerve agent developed by the Germans,
soman was coded GD by the Allies since “GC” was already taken (it was the medical reference for
the disease gonorrhea). GD is more powerful than GA, acts faster and at lower concentrations. This
colorless liquid is rapidly absorbed through the skin and may kill within 15 minutes of exposure. The
United States does not stockpile GD.

Developed in the early 1950s by British chemists, agent VX (O-ethyl-S-diisopropylamino-ethyl

methylphosphonothiolate) is the most lethal of all nerve agents. V-series agents also include VE, VG
and VM. The best known of the series, VX is a very persistent skin-penetrating agent that can also
contaminate terrain, equipment and structures. A slightly oily liquid, VX is clear to amber and has
little to no odor. The vapor hazard of VX also persists. Similar to GB, VX hydrolyzation depends on
temperature and pH. The agent is relatively stable at room temperature. Ten times more poisonous
than GB, VX is extremely toxic when absorbed through the skin or eyes.

At one time, some of the phosphorous compound V-agents was available on the market as pesticides .
Both the United States and the Russian stock VX munitions. In addition to storage at PBA, VX is
stockpiled in the United States at Anniston Army Depot (Alabama), Blue Grass Army Depot
(Kentucky), Newport Army Munition Plant (Indiana), Tooele Army Depot (Utah), and Umatilla
Chemical Depot (Oregon).

3
Two Chemical Weapon Types: Unitary and Binary

Precursor to GB was manufactured at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, and shipped to Rocky Mountain
Arsenal to make GB. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the U.S. military focused on the construction
of chemical weapon production facilities with a high priority placed on the development and research
program for the nerve agent GB. The official exploration of nerve agents in the United States was
initiated in 1952 with the construction of the GB manufacturing and filling plants at Rocky Mountain
Arsenal, Colorado. Early American weapon technology was based on the original German five-step
dimethyl hydrogen phosphite process that produced dichlor in the first three stages through the
reaction of phosphorous trichloride and methyl alcohol .

These unitary chemical weapons contain one pre-mixed, ready-to-use chemical agent, such as GB or
VX. Shells and bombs filled with nerve gas were a potential danger to all individuals involved in
their production, handling, transportation, and use. The damaging effects of nerve agents were a
threat not only to soldiers but to civilians, and Allied governments feared the possible release of toxic
substances on their own soil. To reduce the risk of an accident or leak, these dangerous weapons
were transported in slow moving convoys that were diverted from populated areas. The United States
ceased production of unitary nerve agent weapons in 1968, but has continued to store them until they
are destroyed in compliance with the CWC.

With the desire to create safer chemical munitions, Army engineers at the Chemical Center at
Edgewood Arsenal began researching binary nerve agent munitions in the late 1950s. The binary
concept requires the reliable formation of lethal agent from non-lethal constituents by means of a
chemical reaction occurring only after firing. Binary chemical weapons consist of two less toxic
chemical components in separate containers. The chemicals are combined while en route to their
target and produce a nerve agent. Since the nerve agent is created only after mixing the two
chemicals, the binary chemical weapons concept was adopted to preclude hazards that could be
incurred during manufacture, transportation or storage or as a result of terrorism.

Of all the branches of Armed Services, the U.S. Navy was most interested in the development of
binary chemical munitions for use in chemical air attacks from carrier forces. In order to safely
secure unitary chemical munitions, the Navy would have had to refit carriers at a cost of $10 to $12
million each in 1960 dollars. To avoid such potential costs the Navy sponsored a program to develop
a binary munition for Navy aircraft that would eliminate the logistical problems associated with
shipboard storage of lethal chemical munitions. The Navy contacted Edgewood Arsenal in 1961 with
a request to develop a 500-pound binary VX chemical bomb, later known as the Mark-116 BIGEYE.
Five years later, the Navy initiated a full-scale development program called the BIGEYE project.
Funds for exploratory development of a 500-pound class bomb were received by the U.S. Navy the
following year.

With the success of the Navy’s prove-out tests and experiments for dissemination patterns of the
binary VX chemical bomb, the U.S. Army completed a study entitled “Mandrake Root.” The study
compared the logistical, tactical and budgetary differences between unitary and binary chemical
munitions. General Jim Hebbler, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development at the
Pentagon and author of the report, concluded that binary weapons were more effective than unitary
munitions because of their thin shells. Unitary munitions were designed with thick shells to prevent
leakage, and the thick shells reduced the chamber for the nerve agent. Thinner shells on the binary
munitions allowed for the delivery of a greater amount of nerve agent. More nerve agent per round

4
meant the U.S. Army could fire fewer binary artillery rounds for equivalent coverage. The logistical
advantages of binary munitions also sparked the interest of the U.S. Air Force and additional research
in the ensuing years led to the invention of a more efficient methods of binary munitions production.

In 1967, after a study of requirements for chemical munitions, the Army requested money to produce
binary chemical weapons. Edgewood Arsenal engineers focused their research on the development of
a binary GB-filled 155-mm artillery projectile and a VX-filled 8-inch artillery projectile. By the
following year, funding for the development of the first binary weapon, the M687 Binary GB
projectile, was approved. This initial binary system was selected for its compatibility with the
155mm howitzer, the U.S. Army’s most common artillery piece. In the mid-1970s, binary research
conducted at Edgewood Arsenal focused on the lethal binary agent EA5365 and related compounds.
The binary program received further impetus from public and congressional concern over the
production, storage, transportation and disposal of munitions filled with toxic chemicals. During the
pre-production period of binary weapons, proponents of the new technology capitalized on concerns
generated by the suggestion of an existing deteriorating unitary chemical weapon stockpile. In
pursuit of a better, more efficient chemical weapon, initial designs of a binary GB projectile centered
on lethal agents of intermediate volatility which produced casualties by multiple effects.

Initially designed to carry a unitary agent, the first GB-filled, 155-mm projectile filled with GB binary
reactants was test fired at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, on September 16, 1969. This was the last
open-air test with lethal agents conducted in the United States. In 1970, the decision to use GB as the
nerve agent for the 155-mm binary projectile was finalized. Advances in the binary GB projectile,
formerly identified as the XM687, were made with the modification of the projectile’s base, which
allowed firing at maximum range from a towed howitzer.

Other mixtures of agents for binary utilization were explored in order to devise an agent with
excellent skin penetrating effectiveness . Designers of binary weapons from Edgewood Arsenal
outlined the advantages of the new technology with the primary benefit focusing on safety and ease of
handling . Chemical weapons research rose to $2.19 million in 1974. An intermediate volatility
agent (IVA) was being developed for the MLRS Binary Warhead in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
At that time, only a few members of Congress, mainly those associated with the various Armed
Forces committees, were well informed about the advantages of binaries and the deteriorating
condition of the existing stockpile.

Testing of Binary Chemical Weapons

Simulation tests of binary weapons were limited to computer projection. Knowledge of how binary
weapons would perform under diverse combat conditions was solely theoretical .

Tests and modifications were conducted using simulants, or chemicals with the same physical
properties as the lethal agents. Simulants were loaded into weapons, and these analogous rounds
allowed the modeling of performance in field trials. Troops trained with non-toxic, simulant-filled
inert rounds according to standard training doctrine at appropriate military installations

Simulants were used to study the ballistics of artillery shells. Liquid loads affected ballistics, and
therefore binary weapons with their dual chemical payloads had inherent impacts with trajectory
control. Without field tests it was impossible to determine the extent of these impacts.

5
Simulants were also used to determine dissemination characteristics of actual agents. In 1974, new
simulation techniques were used to simulate mixing and dissemination for the agents in binary
projectiles. GB binary components required ten seconds to react. This limited reaction time affected
the distance from which a round could be fired at a target. If the round traveled less than ten seconds,
the nerve agent would not be completely mixed. If the round traveled too long, it mixed the nerve
agent beyond the required reactant time. The load would decompose into relatively harmless by-
products. By comparison, unitary chemical weapons with pure nerve agent were much more potent.
Moreover, the payload from a binary weapon would be smaller because of the amount of space
required for the by-products and the accessory chemicals. Ultimately, the effectiveness of modern
lethal chemical weapons to injure and/or kill was subject to the degree of protection available to the
potential victims as well as the quality of their training.

Storage of Binary Chemical Weapons

Requirements for the physical security of binary munitions storage sites are the same as those for
Category II ammunition. Originally Binary weapons were to be stored under the surety program as
existing stockpile weapons. An evaluation was made of the costs of storing binary munitions, the
risk, etc. as compared to the existing stockpile decision made to store the components with one
critical component at different locations and the critical per AR 190-11. Safety requirements
depended on both the chemical properties (e.g., corrosiveness) and toxicity of the stored binary
munitions. The long-term storage of 155-mm binary munitions was planned for military installations
other than Pine Bluff Arsenal. During development, surveillance testing was conducted to determine
future impacts for long-term storage. Selected canisters containing DF would be analyzed chemically
during storage to check for degradation. In total, 56,820 DF canisters were produced and stored at
PBA. Shipments of binary munitions would have occurred according to the security requirements for
Category II ammunition under Department of Transportation regulations and permits for domestic
shipment of corrosive chemicals and Class A explosives.

During interim and permanent storage in the United States and in combat zone storage sites, binary
rounds were to be stored in igloos designed to contain explosive munitions. Security measures for
binary weapons were the same as those taken for conventional ammunition. Storage areas were under
access control, and binary munitions within these areas would be under inventory control.

Transportation of Binary Chemical Weapons

Transportation and ultimate disposal of binary chemical weapons is in compliance with the multi-
national Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC treaty mandates the destruction of
chemical weapons, chemical warfare materiel, and chemical weapons production facilities. As part of
treaty compliance, the U.S. is required to destroy all binary M687 projectiles by the year 2007.
Signing the treaty in April 1997, the United States was required to dispose of “excess” binary weapon
components within two years. “Excess” binary weapon components were defined as binary
projectiles for which no DF was produced.

Transport operations for the safe delivery of binary chemical munitions was a complicated procedure
involving secure transportation routes, continuous radio contact between the driver and dispatcher. In
November 1997, the U.S. Army began transporting by truck the first shipment of M687 155mm
binary projectiles stored at the Umatilla Chemical Depot to the Western Area Demilitarization
Facility at Hawthorne Army Depot in Nevada for destruction.

6
Demilitarization of Binary Chemical Weapons

The terrifying physical and physiological effects of chemical warfare agents in World War I led to the
adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of chemical weapons in war. Activities
such as the development, production and stockpiling of toxic agents, however, were not prohibited by
this protocol. Consequently, by the end of World War II, both Allied forces and Germany had
amassed large stockpiles of mustard and nerve agents. Though not used during World War II,
chemical warfare agents continued to be produced and stockpiled throughout the Cold War, often
causing public concern and hostility toward chemical and biological weapons.

In 1969, President Nixon initiated action against chemical and biological warfare by reaffirming the
no-first-use policy for chemical weapons, by resubmitting the Geneva Protocol to the U.S. Senate for
ratification, by renouncing the use of biological weapons and by limiting research to defensive
measures only, thus ending the U.S. program to maintain a biological weapons program.

As early as 1985, the U.S. Congress made the Secretary of Defense responsible for overseeing the
destruction of the U.S. chemical weapon stockpile. In 1990, a Bilateral Destruction Agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union called for the destruction of extant chemical weapons
and an end to the production of additional weapons. The agreement required the reduction of
chemical weapons to a limit of 5,000 metric tons, and the existing binary weapons were to be retained
as part of that quantity. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement preceded ratification of the CWC.
Under the agreement, binary weapons production ceased and all related binary equipment was slated
for destruction.

After two decades of rigorous negotiations, the CWC opened for signature in mid-January 1993. The
CWC is a disarmament treaty prohibiting the development, production, possession, stockpiling,
transfer, and use of chemical weapons. Ultimately, the result of the CWC will be to completely
eliminate the use of chemical weapons as a form of warfare. Effective in 1997 when the 65th country
ratified it, the CWC bans any toxic chemical agent, regardless of origin, that interferes with life
processes and does not have legitimate applications in the quantities in which it is produced. Known
treaty-relevant chemicals range from actual chemical warfare agents to key final state precursors and
more distant precursors. The CWC separates these compounds into three schedules that are
predicated on the compound’s utility for production of chemical weapons and the extent to which
they have legitimate commercial and industrial uses.

Binary weapons are classified in Schedule 1, which covers 12 toxic chemical or groups of chemicals
that have no or low commercial use. These include standard chemical weapon agents and key final
stage precursors used in binary weapons. The CWC prohibits large-scale production of Schedule 1
chemicals and requires destruction of existing stockpiles. Under the treaty, states may maintain a
total of one metric ton of Schedule 1 chemicals for the development of defenses, and for medical,
pharmaceutical, or research purposes.

7
As part of the CWC, 23 items of equipment used to manufacture component parts for chemical
weapons at PBA were destroyed in an industrial furnace. An item of equipment for the manufacture
of a component of the BLU-80 BIGEYE bomb was also destroyed. This binary component
equipment was originally part of the Marquardt Company in Van Nuys, California, which had been
stored at PBA since 1990, the year all DoD/DA binary program production development terminated
PM – binary office disbanded in ceremony based on bilateral agreement at APG-EA. (Wyoming
MSU) . In accord with the CWC, all chemical production facilities at PBA are scheduled to be
demolished by 2007.

8
PART A.II: THE CREATION OF THE INTEGRATED
BINARY PRODUCTION FACILITY AT PBA
The Establishment of the Pine Bluff Arsenal

As war erupted in Europe in the late 1930s, the United States Congress authorized the erection of
additional chemical production plants to supplement the work conducted at Edgewood Arsenal, then
America’s primary military chemical production installation.

The Chemical Warfare Service of the War Department established the Chemical Warfare Arsenal at
Pine Bluff, Arkansas, in November 1941 on approximately 14,454 acres of largely undeveloped
timberland. Its original mission to manufacture, load and assemble incendiary and chemical
munitions was later expanded during World War II to include manufacturing of war gases (e.g.,
mustard, Lewisite, chlorine) and filling chemical bombs, incendiary smoke munitions, and other
chemical-filled munitions. During the war, Pine Bluff Arsenal produced mustard agent (HS),
Lewisite (L), nitrogen mustard agent (HN-1), distilled mustard agent (HD) as well as white
phosphorous (WP) and other smoke munitions.

The first to be constructed, the arsenal was to become one of four government-owned, government-
operated installations involved in the manufacture of incendiary and toxic munitions during the
WWII. Huntsville Arsenal, Alabama; Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado; Edgewood Arsenal,
Maryland; and Newport, Indiana were the others.

Location Map Showing the Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff Arkansas.

9
Binary Chemical Weapons at PBA

In 1973, the Army announced plans for a binary chemical weapon production facility for M687 only
at Pine Bluff Arsenal. Congressman Ichord, chairman of the Research and Development
Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, offered an
amendment to the House military construction appropriations bill, still in subcommittee, which
provided $3.15 million for construction of a facility at PBA. The amendment did not include
equipment or chemicals (Seagrave 1981:241). Despite Congress’s denial of the Army’s request to
build a binary chemical weapons facility at PBA, PBA was designated the U.S. Army’s Integrated
Binary Munitions Production Facility during Fiscal Year (FY) 1978.

Congress opposed the production of binary chemical weapons until 1980, even though the United
States had developed the capability for their production of Classification 155mm of M687 binary
projectile in 1976. The Pine Bluff Amendment was finally approved on June 27, 1980. On
September 16 of that year, the House approved more than $19 million for equipment for the binary
facility to be distributed as follows: $10.6 million to purchase equipment; $6.8 million for
installation; $0.5 million for gear and engineering support services; and $1.12 million for start-up and
running costs. An existing World War II manufacturing building at PBA was selected as the DF
production plant and modifications began in October 1981. DF (methylphosphonic diflouride) was
the critical reactant for the nerve agent GB and a vital component for the M687 binary chemical
projectile for 155 mm howitzers.

In 1985, Congress authorized the Army to begin production of binary chemical weapons. The
authorization also included a two-year mandated delay that allowed NATO to approve a chemical
weapons force goal for the United States. Production of the M687 155-mm projectile began at PBA
in 1987. In 1986, a feasibility study of the production of the XM 135 MLRS (Multiple Launch
Rocket System) Binary Chemical Warhead began. The Chemical Stockpile Modernization Program
(that is, the production of binary chemical weapons) began in FY 1986. The CSMP called for the
replacement of unitary weapons with binary weapons. By the end of 1987, production of the M687
155mm binary projectile began at Pine Bluff Arsenal. Testing of the Army’s MLRS was conducted
at White Sands Missile Range and Dugway Proving Ground in 1987 and 1988.

From the mid-1960s until around 1980, the Department of Defense (DoD) focused on refinement and
improvement of existing technologies instead of exploring new areas. Three types of binary chemical
weapons were in production or in advanced development at the close of the Cold War: the M687
155mm artillery projectile, the BLU-80/B BIGEYE 500-pound Class Aircraft Spray Bomb (also
known simply as the “BIGEYE Bomb”), and the XM135 MLRS.

The Integrated Binary Production Facility

During the 1960s, the military services began to make efforts to handle and store chemical munitions
more safely. In 1967, the Army requested funds for the production of binary chemical weapons.
Despite the reluctance of the Congress to approve such a weapon, the Army announced plans for the
erection of a binary chemical weapons production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal in 1973. Five years
later in 1978, 150 acres at PBA were selected for the U.S. Army’s Integrated Binary Munitions
Production Facility. Congress under President Reagan administration finally appropriated more than
$23 million for the project in 1980. Approximately $3.15 million was appropriated to the Corps of
Engineers for the construction of a facility to produce and load-assemble-pack the binary munitions,

10
and $20 million was provided.

The three nerve agents utilized in American binary weapons are sarin (GB), IVA, and VX. In the
binary process as configured in the late 1980s, GB would be produced in a 155mm M687 munition
that would contain two chemical-filled canisters. One canister (the M20) would contain DF
(methylphosphonic diflouride), the critical reactant, and the other canister (the M21) would hold the
non-critical OPA (a mixture of isopropylamine and isopropyl alcohol). On the other hand, VX would
be produced in the BIGEYE Chemical Bomb (BLU-80/B) in flight from liquid QL (ethyl
diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite) and solid, elemental sulfur (NE).

DF Facility

Ralph M. Parsons Engineering Corporation, Pasadena, California was awarded a contract for the
design of equipment and [fill/close] process systems for the Binary Phase II BIGEYE Bomb Project
in September 1984. “Prove-out of Phase I Binary Facility for production of DF and filling of M20
canisters was accomplished and cleanup was completed on 7 June 1985” (Spencer 1985:10; PMBM
1989a; Nixon 1989). The Charles N. White Construction Company of Clarksdale, Mississippi, was
the construction contractor for the MCA portion of the BIGEYE bomb facility, and the Parsons
Company received the contract for the design of equipment to fill the injector assembly component of
the MLRS.

On 16 January 1987, the contract for the maintenance, facility upgrade and production of binary DF
and M20 canisters was awarded to Lummus-Crest, Inc., Bloomfield, New Jersey. Modernization
began 6 July 1987 with prove-out expected in March 1988. As part of the Integrated Binary
Production Facility (IBPF), located partly in the former Chemical Manufacturing Area, a contract
awarded to Combustion-Engineering Operation and Maintenance Services (C-E O&MS) to design
construct and prove-out a facility for the manufacture of QL and DC (DC, methylphosphonic
dichloride [dichloro], is a precursor chemical to DF). John Brown Construction and Engineering
Company is the subcontractor for the design and construction of QL and DC facilities. Production of
DF began in June 1988, with the M20 canisters scheduled for preparation in November 1988 .

Construction of an Initial Production Facility for loading, closing and repacking the VX-2 Binary
Chemical Bomb (BLU-80/B 500-pound BIGEYE Bomb) continued through 1989. Located on 150
acres, the IBPF was planned to contain six production operations (three chemical plants and three fill
and close facilities) within five plants, designed to produce critical components of three binary
chemical weapons systems:

1) a DC chemical plant;
2) a DF chemical plant
3) M20 fill-and-close plant (located in the same plant);
4) an MLRS fill-and-close plant;
5) a QL chemical plant; and
6) the BIGEYE Bomb fill-and-close plant.

11
During Fiscal Year 1989, the DF chemical plant and M20 fill-and-close facility were operated under
contract by C-E O&MS, which was also under contract for the design, construction, prove-out,
standby and layaway of the two remaining chemical plants. Operational testing and prove-out of the
DF Binary plant was completed in 1985. John Brown Engineering Company, construction sub-
contractor to C-E O&MS continued erection of the DC plant. Construction of the QL plant also
began during this fiscal year. CWR Construction continued construction on the MCA portion of the
XM135 MLRS injector assembly fill-and-close, while Ralph M. Parsons Company continued
installation of equipment in the BIGEYE bomb fill-and-close plant. Parsons also was responsible for
the design of the fill, close and packout equipment for this facility .

Between December 1982 and January 1990, multiple batches of DF were produced, 56,820 M20
canisters were filled, and over 250,000 M21 canisters were produced before the facility was placed in
layaway status . The BIGEYE bomb fill-and-close facility was completed in 1990, with limited
prove-out of the DC facility completed in March 1991. Although the contract for the construction of
the QL production plant had been awarded in 1988, construction of the plant was suspended when it
was approximately 35 percent complete and installation of equipment had begun. Operations ceased
in 1990 and the IBPF was maintained until 1994 .

In April 1990, with construction nearly complete on the Bigeye Fill/Close for loading, closing, and
repacking the VX-2 Binary Chemical Bomb (BIGEYE Bomb), the facility was placed on standby
mode. In addition, the XM277 injector assembly for the Initial Production Facility for MLRS-BCW
XM135 was undergoing test/layaway status. The QL plant project was terminated with materials
undergoing storage and equipment layaway . The DF, M20, BIGEYE, QL and MLRS facilities of the
IBPF were placed in layaway status in 1993.

12
 PART B:

HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTEGRATED

BINARY PRODUCTION FACILITY

13
 Historic Significance of the Integrated Binary Production Facility

The IBPF is historically significant for contributing to the broader understanding of American Cold
War history and the policies surrounding the creation of weapons of mass destruction. It is also
significant for its engineering and as a demonstration of the complex technological achievements of
chemical weapons manufacture. The IBPF are technically not of the Cold War era, but the creation of
the IBPF was funded and designed during the period and was clearly intended to serve the U.S. Cold
War military.

According to U.S. Army Cold War historic assessment guidelines, the IBPF, including all five plants,
is significant because of its association with the broad patterns of Cold War history, particularly as
relates to the use of this property as a production facility for chemical weapons, specifically binary
chemical weapons. Furthermore, it is a property associated with a series of Cold War chemical
agreements and treaties, specifically the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and Wyoming
Memorandum of Understanding, which were directly responsible for the halt of IBPF construction
and Binary weapons production. The foundation for this treaty was laid during the Cold War, and its
ultimate acceptance by the United States should be seen as the fruition of a significant Cold War
policy reevaluation. The IBPF is also significant as a complex engineering facility designed to handle
the creation of the binary chemical weapons required to meet perceived Soviet threats.

Army Cold War properties are divided into three distinct groups: 1) unique, one-of-a-kind properties,
exemplified by highly scientific research, development, and production facilities; 2) properties that fit
a particular type; and, 3) multiple originals of a particular type built from standardized plans. As one-
of-a-kind properties, each of the five IBPF plants falls into the first category. Together they comprise
a unique historic district. The IBPF was the only binary weapon production facility ever built within
the United States, and if the United States continues to be a signatory to the CWC, it will be the only
binary chemical weapon production facility ever built. The equipment used at Pine Bluff was
considered state-of-the-art and was made from only the best materials available, such as Hastelloy B-
2, Hastelloy C-276, glass-lined carbon steel, and 316 stainless steel.

Because it was built late in the Cold War, when Congress was closely scrutinizing all funding for
binary weapons, and because the 1997 treaty followed hard on the heels of the facility’s completion,
the IBPF was not at its full production, and is therefore in a remarkable state of preservation. Unlike
other Cold War production and scientifically related properties, the IBPF did not change over time
since the effect of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the Wyoming Memorandum of
Understanding was to leave the property in place.

Although the IBPF is eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places, the CWC
treaty, which calls for its demolition, precludes a nomination. Most of the material culture built for
and associated with chemical weapons is scheduled for destruction in compliance with the CWC,
thereby leaving a substantial void in the artifactual record of the Cold War. Archival documentation
will be the only evidence of the facility for future study.

The abandonment of chemical weapons as legitimate military tools was a significant policy change
initiated during the Cold War. Although a chemical convention, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which
prevented the use of chemical weapons, had been supported but not signed by the United States. It
was not until 1969 that any real action was taken. American President Richard M. Nixon, after an
exhaustive review of chemical and biological warfare policy, sought the ratification of the Geneva

14
Protocol of 1925 as well as the immediate halt to the production of biological weapons. Biological-
weapon production ceased, but the U.S. continued to produce chemical weapons even as the world
was beginning to reassess their use. Chemical and biological weapons are now lumped together
under the rubric of “weapons of mass destruction.” International treaties and agreements in 1972,
1988, 1990, and 1997 eventually led to the beginning of the ultimate destruction of American
chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. The IBPF at PBA represents the
dying breath of America’s chemical weapons program, a defense strategy that had been in place for
more than 80 years.

Of the 37 IBPF-related structures, only 13 are not earmarked for demolition. These 13 structures
consist of seven warehouses, three guard shacks, a general office building, and two sub-stations.
None of them represent structures where actual production of any kind took place. The CWC is clear:
all equipment and buildings covered by the definition of chemical weapons will be destroyed,
including all specialized and standard equipment; all specialized and standard chemical buildings;
facilities used for producing unfilled chemical weapons and equipment for chemical weapons;
facilities used exclusively for production of non-chemical parts for chemical munitions; all equipment
designed or used exclusively for producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions; and all
buildings and standard equipment used for the production of non-chemical parts, such as molds and
metal-forming dies. Under the terms of this treaty, the majority of the IBPF will be destroyed. A few
buildings currently slated for demolition may be spared, but the actual heart of the complex will be
demolished as early as 2007.

15
 PART C:

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INTEGRATED

BINARY PRODUCTION FACILITY

16
 PART C.I:

PRODUCTION AREAS OF THE IBPF AND

CONSTRUCTION PHASING

17
PART C.I: PRODUCTION AREAS OF THE IBPF AND CONSTRUCTION
PHASING

Located on a 150-acre site of Pine Bluff Arsenal, the Integrated Binary Production Facilities (IBPF)
consists of a complex of five separate plants for six production operations in three production areas:

DC PRODUCTION AREA: The DC Chemical Plant (the key ingredient of DF);

DF PRODUCTION AREA: The DF Chemical Plant (the key ingredient of Agent GB) and the M20
Line and the MLRS Plant that used DF;

QL PRODUCTION AREA: The QL Chemical Plant (the key ingredient of Agent VX) and the
BIGEYE Fill/Close Plant that used QL as the key ingredient of Agent VX.

BINARY STORAGE AREA: The Old Atkisson Road Binary Component Storage Magazines; and
the Bond Road Exclusion Area.

Integrated Binary Production Facility Areas at Pine Bluff Arsenal.

18
The plan for building the IBPF at PBA was conceived in three phases, according to the munition to be
produced.

IBPF Phase I: The M687 Binary Projectile delivering the Agent GB.

In FY 1981, Phase I plans called for the construction of an Initial Production Facility for the GB
M687 155-mm Binary Projectile. The completed items were to be stored in existing installation
igloos. Facility Prove-out at PBA included seven batches of DF and 1,900 M20-filled canisters. The
Phase I DF M20 facility was placed in layaway status from 1985 until January 1987, when
Combustion-Engineering Operation and Maintenance Services (C-E O&MS) was contracted to make
improvements to the DF process and M20 canister-filling equipment . The contract also included
production of DF M20 canisters in May 1988.

IBPF Phase II: The BLU-80/b BIGEYE Bomb delivering the Agent VX.

In FY85, the Ralph M. Parsons Engineering Corporation of Pasadena, California, was awarded the
contract to design equipment and process systems for the Phase II BIGEYE Bomb project. By the
next fiscal year, Phase II provided for an initial facility proveout facility to load, close, and repack the
VX binary chemical bomb, known as the BIGEYE Bomb. Phase II called for the modification of two
existing warehouses for the storage of BIGEYE Bomb bodies and for the improvement of a new
magazine for the interim storage of completed bombs. In FY89, Phase III provided for an Initial
Production Facility for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Binary Chemical Warhead
XM135 .

In 1987, the contract for a Military Construction Army (MCA) Phase II fill/close facility for the
BIGEYE Bomb was awarded to Charles N. White Construction Company of Clarksdale, Mississippi
At that time, engineering efforts included preparation of a scope-of-work and evaluation of proposals
for the BIGEYE fill line, the QL Chemical Plant, and the DC Chemical Plant, as well as preparation
for an FY89 MCA and equipment project to fill the launch rocket system injector assembly
component. In September 1988, the Army reported 85 percent completion for the Phase II IBPF
construction, which included the QL Bomb Fill and Packout Building, the QL Bomb Storage
Magazine (new), Bomb Storage Warehouses (existing), and Support Facilities/Equipment. The
Binary QL facility was authorized in FY88 and a design/construction contract was awarded in March
1988. At the close of the fiscal year, designs for the QL Process Plant and Support
Facilities/Equipment were 16 percent complete. In FY87, the Binary DC Facility was under design.
Between December 1987 and January 1990, DF (methylphosphonic diflouride) and DF-filled M20
canisters were produced at Pine Bluff Arsenal.

Phase III: The MLRS XM277 Injector Assembly for the XM277 warhead delivering Agent
IVA.

The facility would fill, seal, leak-test, package and store the DF XM277 injector assembly. Thirty-
five existing storage igloos would house the completed assemblies.

19
 PART C.II:

DC PRODUCTION AREA

20
The DC Production Process

DC (methyphosphonic dichloride) is a key ingredient in the manufacture of DF, the principal binary
compound in producing agent GB (sarin) through a binary chemical process. DC was manufactured
by combining two commercial chemicals, DMMP (dimethyl methylphosphonate) and TC (Thionyl
Chloride) in the presence of the catalyst pyridine.

The DC production process began with mixing the raw materials, TC and DMMP, in the DC reactor.
From the reactor the mixture was sent to the batch receiver, where it was then transferred into the
pyridine complex. The compound entered the pyridine column and continued into the DC column.
Production waste streams were burned in the plant incinerator, which was designed to Resource
Conservation Recovery Act standards. Dried salts, the end-product of DC waste processing, were
placed in the PBA waste landfill.

Finished DC was either sent to the DF Facility for immediate use or the DC Storage Area.

DC PRODUCTION PROCESS DIAGRAM

21
The DC Production Plant

The DC production plant is wedged between 504th and 506th streets, which are located to the west and
east respectively, and is bounded by the DF plant to the north and 52nd Avenue to the South. 505th
Street, which is now closed, bisects the plant. The plant is composed of 14 structures and one
concrete generator pad. The largest building within the plant is the Control Room (Building 53-120).
The plant features a number of buildings, tanks, concrete pads, and piping. The DC buildings have no
discernable architectural style, are extremely utilitarian and provide few clues to their intended use.
The fence that surrounds the facility is the declared treaty perimeter.

22
Construction of the DC Production Plant in the IBPF began in 1987 and was completed in 1990. The
DC Production Facility was within a Category II IBPF security fence, though DC was not categorized
as a Category II sensitive item. All operations of DC production were directed from the Control
Room (Building 53-120). The Main Process was located in 53-123. Almost all of the DC production
operations were in the open except for the enclosed control room.

The Army always envisioned that the majority of the DC plant would be open with only one major
building—the Control Room (Building 53-120)—under a roof. The Control Room was constructed
ca. 1989 of concrete blocks on a concrete foundation with an asphalt built-up roof. The various other
sheds and buildings have concrete foundations with sheet metal or concrete block walls and metal
roofs. The buildings and structures found in the DC area are:

• Control Room (53-120);

• Utility Bldg. (53-121);
• Process Tank Pad (53-122);
• Process Structure (53-123);
• Waste Treatment (53-124);
• Waste Treatment (53-125);
• Waste Treatment (53-126);
• Waste Treatment (53-127);
• Cooling towers (53-128);
• Caustic storage (53-129);
• Product and Feedstock Storage (53-130);
• Firewater Pumphouse (53-132);

The DC production Facility was demolished in 2004.

CEO&MS designed, constructed, and provided prove-out for the DC plant. The contract was
awarded January 7, 1988, and the plant was completed by 1990. CEO&MS is now in the energy
production business, especially nuclear, as a part of the Alstrom Company. John Brown Construction
and Engineering, Houston, TX, was the sub-contractor.

23
 PART C.II.A:

DC PRODUCTION AREA
PHOTOGRAPHS

24
Photograph DC-1. DC Production Area. Distant View Looking West From 507th Street.

25
Photograph DC-2. 505th Street Entrance Gate to DC Area Looking Northwest.

26
Photograph DC-3. DC Production Area Looking Northwest Along 505th Street. Control Room 53-120 is
Shown at Left.

27
Photograph DC-4. View of DC Production Area from Outside Treaty Fence Looking North.

28
Photograph DC-5. View Looking Northwest From the Corner of 53-132 (Generator).

29
Photograph DC-6. View to the Northeast of Building 53-122, The DC Production Facility.

30
Photograph DC-7. Detail View of the Bottom of 53-123 Looking Northeast. The Reactor in the Center is
Where the Main Chemical Reaction took Place to Create DC.

31
Photograph DC-8. Top of Reactor in DC Production Tower 53-122.

32
Photograph DC-9. Northwest View of Piping Corridor.

33
Photograph DC-10. Northeast View from Building 53-120 Toward Building 53-130 (shown left).

34
Photograph DC-11. Northwest View of 53-130.

35
Photograph DC-12. West View Detail of DMMP at 53-130.

36
Photograph DC-13. East View of Building 53-130.

37
Photograph DC-14. West View of Building Incinerator and Flare Stack.

38
Photograph DC-15. Southeast View of Cooling Water Towers.

39
Photograph DC-16. Northeast View of Caustic Storage.

40
Photograph DC-17. Northwest View of 53-124 (foreground) and 53-125.

41
Photograph DC-18. Distant Southeast View of the DC Facility (right) and the DF Facility (left).

42
 PART C.III:

DF Production
and the
M20 Load-Assemble-Pack Plant

43
DF Production and Fill Facility

The DF Production and Fill Facility is located between the MLRS plant to the southwest and the DC
plant to the southeast. It is sandwiched between 504th Street and 505th Street, and comprises only four
structures: fuel storage tanks (53-300 and 53-301); manufacture and fill plant (53-220); and a small
building attached to 53-220 that served primarily as an instrument air compressor (53-218). The
fence that surrounds the facility is the declared treaty perimeter.

The primary production building (53-220) was originally used as a mustard gas production facility
when it was constructed in 1942. The two storage tanks that were originally built in 1943 were also
used by the mustard production facility. Building 53-220 has undergone a number of renovations and
is now a high bay structure with a steel frame, sheet metal walls, and concrete foundation and floors.
This building contains the equipment to produce DF and fill into M20 canisters, and handle waste
treatment, and also contains the boilers . Building 53-220 was designed to operate under negative
pressure with all air exhausted through a caustic scrubber to preclude DF from escaping to the outside
atmosphere. The air scrubbers are located in the tank farm area. Building 53-218, which is adjacent
to Building 53-220 on its north side, also has a steel frame, sheet metal walls, and concrete foundation
and floors. It contains the instrument air compressor. Building 53-220 has no discernable
architectural style and is extremely utilitarian, offering few outside clues to its intended use.

44
Completed in 1985, the DF Production and Fill Facility was co-located with the M687 DF M20
Canister Fill/Close Facility. The DF facility consisted of a large DF Manufacture and Fill Line
(Building 53-220). Support structures included DF and M20 production instrument air compressor
(Building 53-218) and two fuel oil tanks (Buildings 53-300 and 53-301). All movement of DF and
control of the environmental monitoring equipment area were executed from the DF plant control
room.

The Manufacturing Process of DF

The binary precursor chemical DF is produced through the reaction of DC (methylphosphonic

dichloride) with HF (hydrogen fluoride). From the DC and HF storage tanks, the raw materials
entered the fluorination reactor where they formed DF. The DF was transferred to the the crude DF
tanks. Crude DF was transferred into the distillation unit and then to the cooler. Following cooling,
DF was removed to distilled DF tanks and then to DF storage tanks or to holding tanks for filling into
M20 canisters or MLRS-BCW injector fill operations.

Bulk DF is classified as a Category II AA&E item with exception. Both the DF and M20 Fill
Buildings are designed to be tightly constructed and operate under a negative pressure. All air was
exhausted through a caustic scrubber to preclude DF from escaping to the outside atmosphere.

The M20 Fill/Close facility consisted of two one-story structures with a steel frame, sheet metal and
concrete walls, and concrete floors (Building 53-220). DF was transferred to the M20 Fill/Close line
where it was filled into empty M20 canisters. The empty canisters were not produced on site, but
were supplied under contract by the Marquardt Company. Metal and plastic parts of the M20 were
stored in the IBPF warehouse for contractor storage (Building 53-990). A piping ran from the DF
production area to the DF M20 canister fill section of the facility. The high-density polyethylene
canister was placed on an automatic filling line where the following operations were performed:
purge container with nitrogen; fill container with DF; check height of fill; fill void with helium; and
insert closure plug; seal plug by spin welding; clean flash from the top of the container; and check the
integrity of the seal with a helium leak detector. Once filled and inspected, the DF container was
removed from the machine and transferred to a metal canister assembly station where it would be
inserted into a steel sleeve assembly. A helium overlay was inserted into the containers and a steel
cover welded onto the unit. The assembled canister was then tested for leaks, primed, painted, and
stenciled.

Similar in appearance to a conventional high explosive projectile, the M687 binary chemical
projectile for the 155mm howitzer had a removable base plate for access and upload of reactant
canisters . M687 binary projectiles had a forged steel-walled shell containing two canisters, an
explosive burster containing approximately 1.225 kg of a mixture of Composition B, oxamide and an
aluminum base. The M20 canisters were filled with DF (methylphosphonic diflouride) and the M21
canister contained the non-critical, non-lethal, liquid compound OPA (isopropyl alcohol and
isopropylamine). DF was the critical reactant that was produced and stored separately at PBA. The
M20 canister was uploaded in the projectile prior to release of the weapon on the target. The DF M20
and OPA M21 canisters were designed with facing burst disks. When the disks ruptured, after the
firing of the projectile, the chemicals combined. In-flight spin of the projectile mixed the compounds
to form the nerve agent GB. The agent was released by the point detonating fuze and ogive burster,
which formed a cloud at the target.

45
Cross Section of the M687 Projectile.

The M687 projectile body, ogive, base plate, burster retainer, lifting eye, diflouro (DF) container and
fiberboard spacer were manufactured off-site and delivered to the M687 LAP facility. The Louisiana
Army Ammunition Plant (LAAP) manufactured metal components including the steel projectile
body, the burster ogive, and the steel base . LAAP also produced the Burster Charge. The Marquardt
Company of Van Nuys, California, was contracted to fabricate DF M20 and OPA M21 Canister
Components as well as M21 canister fill. Operations at PBA included DC Feed Stock production, DF
Precursor Production, and DF M20 Canister Fill.

With the fuze, the M687 projectile had a length of 36 inches and weighed 83 lbs. with the M21 OPA
canister. The projectile weighed 93 lbs. with both canisters. The 155mm howitzer diameter was 6.1
inches. The M687 projectile body, ogive, base plate, burster retainer, lifting eye, M21 canister and
fiberboard spacer were delivered to the LAP building. Grommet, base plate, and lifting ring were
removed, and the burster was inserted through the base of the projectile into the ogive. Sealant was
applied to the burster retainer, and the retainer was torqued into place through the base into the ogive.
Sealant was then applied to the fuse well cavity and the fuse cup assembly and torqued into the front
of the ogive. Final assembly operation included inspection for leaks around threaded parts of the
ogive and insertion of the M21 OPA canister and, fiberboard spacer through the rear of the projectile.
The grommet, lifting eye, and base plate were replaced, and the projectile was stenciled, inspected,
and shipped to the storage area.

In FY85, seven batches of DF were produced and 1,900 M20 test canisters were filled at the DF/M20
Production Facility during an Engineering Test of the DF Production Facility. Following equipment
repairs and improvements, the facility was placed in short-term layaway status until actual M687

46
projectile production efforts began in December 1987. Over 50,000 M20 canisters were produced
before the facility was cleaned and again placed in layaway status. The DF Production Facility is
scheduled for demolition beginning in late FY04.

Multiple Launch Rocket System XM 277 Injector Fill/Close Facility (Building 53-210)

The MLRS production facility is a single building (53-210) connected to Building 53-220 by a series
of pipes designed to transfer DF to the MLRS production system. It lies between 504th Street roughly
to the south and the DF plant roughly to the north. To the east is the DC plant and to the west are the
QL and BIGEYE facilities . The fence that surrounds the facility is the declared treaty perimeter.

The MLRS building was designed by the Ralph M. Parsons Company in 1987 and was constructed by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Floor Plan of Building 53120

The MLRS Fill/Close Facility is single-story, steel-framed structure with concrete foundation and
floors, and sheet metal walls and roof. The interior of the facility was to be used for the production
line to fill/close and fuze MLRS injector assemblies. An interior concrete block structure serves as
the fill room . The MLRS facility was completely dependent upon Building 53-220 for its waste
treatment, steam generation, nitrogen supplies, and helium supplies as well as for lab space. Like
Building 53-220, Building 53-210 was designed to operate under negative pressure with all air

47
exhausted through a caustic scrubber to preclude DF from escaping to the outside atmosphere.
Building 53-990 (1942), a large warehouse, was tapped to be utilized for the MLRS operations as
storage for M20 metal and plastic parts and empty MLRS XM-277 injector assemblies.

The MLRS facility never actually produced a finished product. It underwent systemization using a
simulant and was then placed in lay-away status.

The MLRS XM 277 Injector Fill/Close Industrial Process

The key component of the XM135 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Binary Chemical
Warhead (BCW) was the XM277 injector assembly. An injector filled with DF, the critical reactant
of nerve agent GB, was attached to an explosive fuze in the XM277 injector assembly. The injectors
with DF were only loaded immediately prior to use in the theater of battle.

The MLRS Fill/Close facility contained an interior production line to fill, close and fuze injector
assemblies. An interior concrete block structure served as the fill room. MLRS Rocket components
to include the injector assembly was manufactured at the MLRS production facility in Camden
Arkansas. The facility fiulled the alcohol mixture into the warhead and injector parts and components
were shipped to PBA for filling with DF. Processing of MLRS injectors was controlled and
monitored from the control room. The injector processing began by filling empty plastic canisters
with DF, then heat-sealing them with the canister fill/close machine (Station No. 1, Canister
Fill/Close). The heat-sealed canisters were inserted into the injector casing (Station No. 2, Canister
Insertion), which were then sealed with a welder (Station No. 3, Injector Casing Closure). Finally,
the injectors were fuzed (Station No. 4, Injector Fuzing) and painted (Station No. 5, Injector
Painting). Services such as a waste treatment, steam generators, nitrogen supplies, helium supplies,
and laboratory facilities were provided by the DF/M20 facilities.

Operations at PBA for the MLRS XM277 injector assembly for the XM135 MLRS BCW included
DF feed-stock production, DF precursor production, XM277 DF Injector Fill, and XM Map/T Fuze
assembly to the injector. Empty XM277 injector assemblies were stored in the IBPF warehouse for
contractor storage (Building 53-990), and injectors filled with DF were stored separately with their
fuzes attached.

48
The XM135 MLRS Binary Chemical Warhead.

49
 PART C.III.A:

DF PRODUCTION AREA PHOTOGRAPHS

50
Photograph DF-1. Distant South View of 53-220 From Base of Water Tower.

51
Photograph DF-2. Distant View of 53-220 from the DC Production Facility (foreground).

52
Photograph DF-3. Interior of 53-220 DF Production Reactor.

53
Photograph DF-4. Control Room of 53-220.

54
Photograph DF-5. Interior View of 53-220 Showing M20 Canister Seal and Inspect Machine and Weld
Booths.

55
Photograph DF-6. Interior of 53-220 Showing M-20 Canister Fill Area (Fill Machine Shown Right).

56
Photograph DF-7. Northwest View of MLRS Production Facility 53-210.

57
Photograph DF-8. Interior View of 53-210 Showing MLRS Injector Casing Closure Area.

58
Photograph DF-9. Interior View of 53-210 Showing MLRS Canister Fill Close Room.

59
Photograph DF-10. Interior of 53-210 Injector Fill Machine.

60
 PART C.IV:
QL PRODUCTION AREA
AND
BIGEYE BOMB CLOSE/FILL PLANT

61
The QL Production Process

QL, or 2-diisopropyl-aminoethyl methyl-phosphonite, is a non-lethal precursor chemical for the nerve

agent VX. The chemical is a critical component of the VX-2 BLU80/B BIGEYE Bomb. Raw
materials for QL production were purchased commercially and shipped by rail to storage tanks at
PBA.

The QL production process consisted of three steps. Step 0 involved a high temperature (5000C)
vapor-phase reaction between TH (phosphorous trichloride) and LP (methane). The reaction produced
the Step 0 products SW (methyl phosphorous dichloride) and ZT (ammonium chloride). TH and LP
were combined in the reaction furnace and sent to the quench receiver. From this point, the reaction
process was sent to the flash still and then to Fractionator No. 1. The Step 0 product SW was
transferred to Fractionator No. 2 and then into the condenser. ZT was disposed of through the waste
treatment facilities and SW was stored in tanks for utilization in the Step I reaction.

Step 0 Reaction of the QL Production Process.

In Step I the SW reacted with ZS (ethanol) in an isobutane solvent and ammonia (NH3). The reaction
formed the Step I product TR (diethyl methylphosphonite). Step I also produced a by-product, RX
(ammonium chloride). The reactant entered caustic washers, then into the condenser-decanter, and
then into the coalescer, where by-product entered the solvent recovery column or the TR Column.
The Step I product TR was stored in tanks for use in the Step II reaction. From the decanter, caustic
wastewater went to treatment and disposal. ZT and RX were disposed of through waste treatment
facilities.

62
Step I Reaction of the QL Production Process.
During Step II, the last phase of the QL process, raw material KB (2-diisopropylamino-ethanol)
reacted with the Step I product TR in the presence of a glacial acetic acid catalyst to form the product
QL and by-products ZS (ethanol) and LT (Bis methylphosphonite). Step II began with TR, KB and
glacial acetic acid catalyst in a reaction preheater. From that point, the reactant was divided into the
ZS recovery column and the TR recovery column. ZS was recycled to Step I and TR was recycled to
the reaction preheater of Step II. From the recover columns the product entered the flash still, and
from there it went to the QL column. The finished product was placed in storage tanks until it was
required in the adjacent BIGEYE Fill/Close Facility.

Step II of the QL Production Process.

Installation of equipment began for the QL facility, but construction was suspended when the plant
was approximately 35 percent complete.

63
The QL Production Plant

Its eastern and northern boundaries are simply marked by the treaty perimeter fence. Embedded in its
southern end is the BIGEYE fill/close. The QL plant is composed of six structures, a series of pipes
and racks, an incomplete tank farm, and a lay down yard. The QL buildings are of no discernable
architectural style, are extremely utilitarian, and offer few clues as to their intended use. The fence
that surrounds the QL Production facility is the declared treaty perimeter.

The QL Production and Fill Facility at PBA consisted of six structures: a production facility product
storage area, a QL production facility process area, a QL production facility feed stock storage unit, a
QL production facility flare, and a lay down yard.

QL processing operations were to be controlled and monitored from a one-story concrete/masonry

control room building, which also served as the motor control center (Building 54-070). The
office/change facility (Building 54-050), a one-story concrete/ masonry building, was to house the
plant administration offices and a worker change facility. QL production structures were designed as
open-air, multi-tiered steel structures. The facility had a firewater pump house (Building 54-200), and

64
boiler refrigeration unit (Building 54-210), which were pre-engineered steel buildings on concrete
slabs. The pipe rack system was a steel structure that carried process piping and electrical conduit.
The flare is a standard chemical plant flare consisting of a stack with a pilot burner at the top. The
raw material tank farm consisted of steel tanks to store the raw process material and intermediate
chemicals. The QL tank farm consists of four steel tanks to store the QL product while waiting for
consumption.

The Army intended the QL plant to be an open-air chemical plant with only the Control Room
(Building 54-070), the administrative facility (Building 54-050). The QL plant had its own waste
treatment facilities, steam generation, and lab. Buildings 54-070 and 54-050 are concrete/masonry
with built-up asphalt roofs. The rest of the buildings are sheet metal on concrete foundations. While
the bones of the facility are clearly visible, the QL plant was only 35 percent complete when
construction ended. The actual production equipment was never placed in the buildings. Portions of
the equipment meant for installation within the complex were stored in a laydown yard located at the
corner of Avenue 55 and 507th Street.

CEO&MS designed and partially constructed the QL plant. It appears that contracts were let
in 1988. CEO&MS is now part of the Alstrom Company. John Brown Construction and
Engineering, Houston, Texas, was the contractor.

The BIGEYE Process and the Close/Fill Facility

The BIGEYE Fill and Close Facility is bounded to the south and west by the QL Plant, to the east by
Avenue 55, and to the north by an unnamed access road. The BIGEYE facility was originally
composed of two buildings, a utility house (Building 53-910), and the fill/close facility (Building 53-
920). The buildings are of no discernable architectural style and are extremely utilitarian. They offer
no clues as to their intended use. Building 53-920 is the only BIGEYE building included in the treaty
and is therefore the only building within a treaty perimeter fence. A new warehouse (Building 50-
720) was built to hold a Filled Bigeye Bomb, with FMU 139 Fuze, a short distance away on Old
Atkisson Road. Since it is not a declared part of the treaty, it is inferred that it never held BIGEYE
components. Warehouses 50-910, 50-810 and 50-810, all World War II vintage, were for the storage
of empty BIGEYE bombs.

Based on an existing pre-mixed unitary bomb called WETEYE, advanced development of the binary
VX-filled BIGEYE Bomb began in 1966. Unlike the M687 projectile, the BIGEYE Bomb mixed two
binary compounds, sulphur and QL. The 500-pound BIGEYE Bomb consisted of a core of sulphur
separated from the surrounding liquid QL by a steel diaphragm. A motor inside of the bomb’s tail
supported a stainless steel cylinder with mounted blades, which mixed the two components in a
paddling motion to form VX. The bomb was an aerial bomb to be used by the US Navy and Airforce.
The Marquardt Company produced the bomb body assembly and the ballonet sulfur-loaded insert.
The Motorola Company in Scottsdale, Arizona, manufactured government furnished fuse FMU140.
Operations at PBA included production of the QL chemical precursor, BIGEYE Bomb Body QL Fill
and FMU140 Fuse Assembly. Empty BLU-80 BIGEYE Bomb casings were stored at PBA in a
storage magazine (Building 50-910).

65
The BIGEYE fill/close facility is a single-story steel frame structure with concrete foundations and
floors, and sheet metal walls and roof. The interior production line was designed by the Ralph M.
Parsons Co. to fill, close and fuze BIGEYE bombs. A tiered structure serves as the fill and close
room with a chemical day tank and batch weigh tank room located above. The BIGEYE maintenance
house (Building 53-910) is also a single-story steel frame structure with concrete foundations and
floors, and sheet metal walls and roof. The BIGEYE facility shared waste treatment, steam
generators, nitrogen and helium supplies, lab and change house with the QL Plant.

The BIGEYE Fill/Close Facility (Building 53-920) contained an interior production line to fill, close,
and fuse BIGEYE bombs. The fill and close room consisted of a tiered structure with a chemical day
tank and batch weigh tank located above. An adjacent utility building (Building 53-910) supplied
heat, instrument air, and electricity to the BIGEYE Fill/Close Facility. The BIGEYE Fill/Close
Facility also contained a transformer yard. A waste treatment facility treated liquid and gaseous
waste from QL processes and BIGEYE fill buildings.

66
All processes were controlled and monitored from the control room (Station No. 9, Control Room).
The fill and close process for BIGEYE Bombs began with an inspection of an empty bomb (Station
No. 1, Inspection). After inspection the empty bombs were aligned within their weapons carrier prior
to the fill and close operations (Station No. 2, Alignment). Once aligned, the bombs were filled with
QL (Station No. 3, Fill) then closed with a welder (Station No. 4, Close). The fill port surface area of
the bombs was painted at the following station (Station No. 5, Paint). The bombs were then fuzed
(Station No. 6, Fuzing) and repacked into their packout containers (Station No. 7, Packout). Bomb
fuzes were stored in the fuze storage room (Station No. 8, Fuze Storage).

Construction of the BIGEYE facility was completed in 1990. The facility never went into full
production. The fill process and movement of products were tested using simulants.

The QL and Bigeye facility were destroyed in 2004. The OPCW sent a close-out letter on 25 August
2004.

67
 PART C.IV.A:

QL PRODUCTION AREA
AND
BIGEYE BOMB CLOSE/FILL PLANT
PHOTOGRAPHS

68
Photograph QL-1. Northwest View of QL Area from the BIGEYE Fill/Close Facility.

69
Photograph QL-2. QL Facility Control Room 54-070.

70
Photograph QL-3. BIGEYE Change House 54-050.

71
Photograph QL-4. Northwest General View of the QL Production Area.

72
Photograph QL-5. General Southwest View of the QL/BIGEYE Laydown Yard.

73
Photograph QL-6. Northeast View of the BIGEYE Fill/Close Facility 53-920.

74
Photograph QL-6. Interior View of the BIGEYE Facility 53-920.

75
Photograph QL-9. BIGEYE Facility 53-920 Interior Showing Outside of the Fill/Close Room.

76
Photograph QL-10. Interior of BIGYE Fill/Close Room 53-920.

77
 PART C.V:
BINARY STORAGE AREA

78
The Binary Storage Area

Requirements for the physical security of binary munitions storage sites are the same as those for
Category II ammunition. Originally binary weapons were to be stored under the surety program as
existing stockpile weapons. An evaluation was made of the costs of storing binary weapons, the risk,
etc. as compared to the existing stockpile decision made, to store the components with one critical
component at different locations and the critical per AR 190-11. Safety requirements depended on
both the chemical properties (e.g., corrosiveness) and toxicity of the stored binary munitions. The
long-term storage of 155-mm binary munitions was planned for military installations other than Pine
Bluff Arsenal. Selected canisters containing DF would be analyzed chemically during storage to
check for degradation. In total, 56,820 DF canisters were produced and stored at PBA. There is no
data on whether or not the breakdown components of DF are more toxic than the parent compound.
Shipments of binary munitions occurred according to the security requirements for Category II
ammunition under Department of Transportation regulations and permits for domestic shipment of
corrosive chemicals and Class A explosives.

Old Atkisson Road Binary Component Storage Magazines; Magazine 50-340, also called Binary
Storage. Four World War II era above-ground storage magazines were used by the IBPF—Buildings
50-340, 50-510, 50-810, and 50-910. Empty canisters, lids, materials, and miscellaneous items were
stored in Building 50-810 and empty BLU-80 bomb casings were stored in Building 50-910.

Old Atkisson Road Binary Storage Area.

79
During interim and permanent storage in the United States and in combat zone storage sites, binary
rounds were to be stored in igloos designed to contain explosive munitions. Security measures for
binary weapons were the same as those taken for conventional ammunition. Storage areas were under
access control, and binary munitions within these areas would be under inventory control.

80
 PART C.V.A:

BINARY STORAGE AREA PHOTOGRAPHS

81
Photograph BS-1. Old Atkisson Road Binary Storage Area Building 50-810 Looking North.

82
Photograph BS-2. Old Atkisson Road Binary Storage Area Building 50-720 Looking North.

83
APPENDIX: BIBLIOGRAPHY

84
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1981 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Final. ARCSL-EIS-1801. Department of
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Carpenter, Michael E., Treaty Compliance Officer

2000 Personal interview with Kelly Nolte, Senior Architectural Historian, June. PCI at Treaty
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Mauroni, Albert J.
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NSCMP (Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Program)

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1999a Binary Recycling Operation Two-Thirds Complete. (Online) Available http://www.

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87
PBA PAO (Pine Bluff Arsenal Public Affairs Office)
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88
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91