The Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 202–213 doi:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2010.00676.

RESEARCH AND EVALUATION

Where Have All The Workers Gone? Exploring Public

Sector Workforce Planning

Linda Colley
University of Queensland

Robin Price
Queensland University of Technology

Governments undertake extensive planning of many services and functions, but tend to
neglect planning of public service workforces. Disruptions to public service delivery, such as
shortages of nurses and doctors, have rejuvenated interest in workforce planning, but many
organisations struggle to do it effectively. This historical study examines the capacity of
central personnel agencies to predict workforce risks and support workforce planning, using
a study of the Queensland public service. It identifies lack of workforce data as a barrier
to effective workforce planning, as a result of factors such as changes in the direction of
the central personnel agency, lack of appreciation for the value of comprehensive central
workforce data, and limited agency human resource (HR) skills or capacity.

Key words: public sector, human resources, HR planning

Contemporary workforce problems, such as an
ageing workforce and skills shortages, should
be predictable, but instead have taken the public
sector by surprise. Governments undertake ex-
tensive planning of services and infrastructure
that are essential to the functioning of society,
but this planning often neglects any considera-
tion of public service capacity to deliver. Any
disruption to the continuity of service deliv-
ery and policy capacity – such as ward clo-
sures due to shortages of nurses and doctors,
or shortages of engineers to plan and under-
take major infrastructure projects – can create
significant political fallout. While workforce
planning has been advocated in the strate-
gic human resource (HR) literature for several
decades (Bechet and Maki 1987; Ceriello and
Freeman 1991; Wood and Jones 1993), it was
overlooked in public services preoccupied with
personnel reforms that potentially blurred re-
sponsibility for strategic HR activities. It is only
recently, as new workforce problems emerge,
that the need for workforce planning in pub-
lic service organisations has gained widespread
acceptance (ANAO 2005; Anderson 2004;
Helton and Soubik 2004; MAC 2005; OECD
2007; Pynes 2004).
Workforce planning is part of a bundle of
strategic HR initiatives to enhance productive
capacity within organisations. Workforce plan-
ning is about ‘aligning an organisation’s human
capital – its people – with its business plan to
achieve its mission. It helps ensure that the or-
ganisation has the right people with the right
skills in the right job at the right time’ (Cotten
2007:4). Workforce planning can elevate HR
activities into a more strategic domain and en-
sure its relevance, by providing greater aware-
ness and control over staff numbers and costs,
and better understanding of the required skills
mix to ensure effectively targeted HR strategies
(Marchington and Wilkinson 2002). To achieve
this, organisations need to understand their em-
ployees’ competence and commitment, how


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employees’ goals align with those of the organ-
isation, and how employees can be productively
and cost-effectively utilised (Wood and Jones
1993:27). All models for workforce planning
are based on largely similar elements: define
the organisation’s strategic direction; scan the
internal and external environments; understand
the current workforce; assess future workforce
needs; identify gaps in the required numbers
and capability; develop and implement strate-
gies to close the gaps; and monitor the effec-
tiveness of strategies and revise as required
(Anderson 2004; ANAO 2002; Bechet and
Maki 1987; Cotten 2007; Standards Australia
2008).
The literature identifies that many organi-
sations struggle to undertake effective work-
force planning. Many organisations do not have
sufficient information on workforce numbers,
skills, competencies and roles to support work-
force planning analysis and strategy develop-
ment (Anderson 2004; Ceriello and Freeman
1991). For example, while most HR informa-
tion systems (HRIS) can generate statistics on
the number of employees who are of retirement
age, this does not mean they will retire (Daniel
2005). Even with adequate data, HR profes-
sionals often lack the skills or the organisa-
tional support to actively engage in workforce
planning and decision-making (Pynes 2004).
Our study explores how a lack of workforce
planning has allowed largely predictable work-
force problems to occur in public services.
We examine the capacity of central personnel
agencies to predict workforce risks and sup-
port workforce planning activities across gov-
ernment, and how this has changed in recent
decades. First, we provide a generic outline
of the public sector employment environment.
Then, using the Queensland public service
(QPS) as a revelatory study, we explore its ca-
pacity to plan its human resources by examin-
ing the availability, quality and use of HR data
over time.
The study confirms the findings in the litera-
ture that there was inadequate workforce data to
support workforce planning and thereby iden-
tify and mitigate workforce risks. Our contri-
bution is to link this lack of workforce data
to specific factors in the public sector envi-
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203
ronment, and to trace this over time, thereby
extending earlier work by Alford (1993) and
Nethercote (1989, 1996) on the demise of pub-
lic service boards. We identify that the fac-
tors underpinning inadequate workforce data
include: changes in the direction of the central
personnel agency capacity (often as a result of
changes in government); the lack of appreci-
ation for the value of comprehensive central
workforce data; and limited agency HR skills
or capacity. We argue that governments of all
political persuasions, regardless of their cen-
tralist or devolutionist preferences for the role
of the central personnel agency, should main-
tain central workforce information and provide
support to agencies to facilitate informed deci-
sions about public service workforces.
Public Sector Human Resource Context
Public sector employment relations have tradi-
tionally been different from those in the private
sector. The career service model was devel-
oped more than 150 years ago, with central
tenets of administration by an independent per-
sonnel agency, standardised employment con-
ditions, tenure and recruitment and promotion
based on merit (Colley 2005; Northcote and
Trevelyan 1854). Under this traditional model,
strong central personnel agencies, such as Pub-
lic Service Boards, regulated employment into
a largely internal labour market, where em-
ployees were recruited at base grade level and
promoted through an internal classification
structure (Caiden 1965; Gardner 1993).
Broader reforms to public management (see
Pollitt 1990; Rhodes 1997; Weller 1996) led
to changes to the traditional career service
model through the introduction of private sec-
tor techniques (Corbett 1992; Davis 1998;
O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna and Weller 1999;
Peters and Pierre 2004). The institutions that
governed public sector employment were weak-
ened through the abolition of strong central
personnel agencies and horizontal and verti-
cal distribution of their responsibilities (Alford
1993). Supporters of these reforms consid-
ered devolution of HR decisions to agencies
as a step towards improving HR performance
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204 Where Have All The Workers Gone?
(Teo and Rodwell 2007). Others have identi-
fied how the reforms can lead to coordination
and accountability problems between central
agencies and departments (Alford 1993), with
nobody responsible for central databases to
monitor service-wide trends or the quality, cost
and productivity of labour (Nethercote 1989,
1996). There were also changes to most pro-
cedural and substantive aspects of employ-
ment relations (Colley 2005). Managerial re-
forms sought to break down the traditional
differences by importing private sector HR
practices: traditional recruitment to base grade
levels was replaced with recruitment to all
levels; recruitment activities were devolved to
agencies; tenure was diminished in favour of
contract and less permanent forms of employ-
ment; and standardised conditions were frag-
mented and/or supplemented with merit pay
(Corbett 1992; Peters and Pierre 2004).
These institutional and procedural reforms
had profound implications for managing HR
in the already complex public service environ-
ment (Renfrow 1992). Embedded within the
reforms was an assumption that HR could pro-
vide strategic rather than operational support
to an organisation (Brown 2008; Marching-
ton and Wilkinson 2002; Truss 2008). How-
ever, the capacity for more strategic HR is
constrained by: the complex and sometimes
contradictory environment; the greater ac-
countability to a wider range of stakehold-
ers than the private sector, including the in-
cumbent government; regulation to eliminate
corruption and partisan abuses which creates
inefficient and cumbersome processes; and
government control over priorities, resources
and machinery of government structure
(Coggburn 2001; Harris, Doughty and Kirk
2002; Ring and Perry 1985; Truss 2008). These
contextual factors make workforce planning
more complex within the public sector.
Workforce planning is not an exact science
and is made more complex by the size and
diversity of the public service. For example,
while workforce planning needs to identify the
skills of existing employees (Anderson 2004;
Pynes 2004), the link between the education,
skills and competencies required for a job is
often tenuous and the nature of jobs varies over
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time (Adams, Middleton and Ziderman 1992).
While some planning can be undertaken across
a whole public service, it is also beneficial to
target those positions that are the most difficult
to hire or train for (Anderson 2004; Stubbings
and Scott 2004).
Public sector organisations in many coun-
tries struggle to accurately assess the nature
and composition of their workforces (OECD
2007; Pynes 2004; Rogers and Naeve 1989).
A recent report on the Australian Public Ser-
vice (APS) identified the need for ‘systematic
workforce planning to identify emerging trends
and challenges in relation to the recruitment,
development, advancement and succession of
their employees’ as a result of challenges in at-
tracting and retaining skilled employees (MAC
2005:xiii). Yet, an associated APS audit report
indicates that only 24 agencies of the 86 sur-
veyed had an established workforce planning
process and most only recorded demographic
information on their workforces (ANAO 2005).
There is general agreement in the public ser-
vice HR literature that the ideal is a centralised
whole-of-service database to meet the common
workforce planning needs of agencies (Ander-
son 2004; Handley 2007; Helton and Soubik
2004; MAC 2005). However, establishing such
databases is time consuming and costly, which
limits its appeal to an incumbent government
focused on short term budget and election cy-
cles; hence, it tends to be neglected in favour
of more immediate HR concerns (Helton and
Soubik 2004). Further, electronic data storage
raises additional challenges of data integrity
and privacy issues (Eddy, Stone and Stone-
Romero 1999). Given the ‘unprecedented lev-
els of autonomy’ that public service agencies
currently have (MAC 2005), and their low level
of attention to workforce planning, the devolu-
tion of HR functions to departments has re-
duced the impetus to collect and analyse work-
force information.
This review of the literature has identified
that, in the fast reforming public service em-
ployment environment, there is a lack of com-
mitment to workforce planning. As foreshad-
owed by Alford (1993) and Nethercote (1989,
1996), the demise of public service boards has
led to issues with coordination, capacity and
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 Colley and Price
accountability for strategic HR. Our study ex-
tends their research by asking the following
research questions:
• What has been the capacity of subse-
quent central personnel agencies to pre-
dict workforce risks and support workforce
planning activities?
• How has this capacity changed in recent
decades and in what circumstances?
Method
Using the QPS as a revelatory study, we ex-
plore its capacity to plan its human resources
by examining the availability, quality and use
of HR data over time. We employ an historical-
comparative approach and mix of evidence to
provide a longitudinal perspective (Neumann
2000; Patmore 1998). Information is drawn
from primary documents including: HR poli-
cies; public service personnel agency annual
reports; and public service legislation. This
documentary evidence is triangulated through
discussions with past and present central per-
sonnel agency representatives. This revelatory
approach to our research questions will sup-
port tentative conclusions, which are poten-
tially generalisable across Australian and other
public services.
Traditional Approaches in the Queensland
Public Service
The Public Service Commission (PSC) of 1922
was the first relatively independent central per-
sonnel agency in Queensland, but its mandate
to support the ‘traditionalist’ career service
conventions of merit, tenure and political neu-
trality was at the expense of permanent heads’
control of their own workforces. The PSC
maintained meticulous centralised paper-based
records of employee demographic details and
service records (Colley 2005).
In 1968, the Bjelke-Petersen government re-
placed the PSC with a Public Service Board
(PSB) that focused more on efficiency, and be-
gan to delegate HR functions to departments
(Hughes 1980). New technology provided new
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205
opportunities for personnel data capture and, in
1978, the PSB compiled a computerised data
system of personnel and establishment records
to meet its role in staffing (PSB 1979, 1980,
1986). The low sophistication of HR activi-
ties resulted in only basic forms of information
being stored (PSB 1975, 1987). Given that se-
niority remained a strong consideration in pro-
motions within the largely internal labour mar-
ket, data needs were simple, such as length of
service and experience in previous positions.
In this context, there was little need for cen-
tral or agency level data capability to monitor
workforce skills or labour markets. This period
saw a major focus on development activities,
but no attempt to link this information to the
workforce data set. Mobility between agencies
remained an elusive goal, and no data was re-
quired to support this type of development ac-
tivity (Brennan 2004; PSB 1979, 1981).
The nature of this first electronic data sys-
tem was influenced by two priorities at that
time: containment of staff numbers and wages
during the economic downturn (PSB 1979,
1980, 1982); and better allocation of resources
against departmental priorities through pro-
gram management (PSB 1980). Annual reports
confirm that demographic information was col-
lected. However, it seems that there was little,
if any, analysis of that data to identify the early
signs of an ageing workforce or forecast poten-
tial skills gaps.
1987–1989 Deregulation of HR and a
Central Data Void
In the late 1980s, Queensland faced a series
of dramatic changes including three changes of
premier and establishment of a major corrup-
tion inquiry. New legislation in 1988 replaced
the PSB with the minimalist Office of Pub-
lic Service Personnel Management (OPSPM),
whose charter was to develop HR guide-
lines and provide advice to departments as
required (Ahern 1988; Colley 2005; Nutter
2004; PSME Act 1988). Ministers and chief
executives were empowered to manage person-
nel functions within broad policy and budget
constraints (QPD 1988; Savage 1987). In an
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206 Where Have All The Workers Gone?
environment where budgets reigned, there was
little incentive for departmental heads to invest
in long term workforce planning. The imple-
mentation of this devolution was sudden and,
with hindsight, considered ineffective (Merrell
2004; Roberts 2004). Due to the government
philosophy of agency autonomy and minimal
central intervention, the OPSPM no longer col-
lected workforce information, and did not in-
struct agencies that they should do so (Colley
2005).
1990 – Three Steps Forward Under the
Public Sector Management Commission
The turmoil of the late 1980s led to a change
of government and a watershed for public em-
ployment. The Goss government established
the Public Sector Management Commission
(PSMC), responsible for the overall manage-
ment of the public sector, as part of a ‘tri-
umvirate’ of agencies to monitor and review
electoral, administrative and criminal mat-
ters (Goss 1989). The PSMCs functions in-
cluded: setting human resource management
(HRM) standards and reviewing the HR prac-
tices; reporting to the minister and parlia-
ment on public sector management; establish-
ing the Senior Executive Service; assessing
adherence to equal employment opportunity
principles; and ensuring merit-based appoint-
ment processes and fair treatment processes
(PSMC Act 1990). The PSMCs HR reforms
provided a unified set of policies and
‘standards’ for personnel activities, and re-
centralised many of the HR powers that the
OPSPM had devolved to chief executives in
1988 (Davis 1993; PSMC Act 1990).
The PSMCs tight control, especially over the
size of the public sector, caused ‘grief’ for chief
executives who were unable to create new po-
sitions (Davis 1995). The PSMC Commission-
ers, Coaldrake (2004) and Davis (2004), argued
that central control was warranted at least in the
short term, as the incoming government knew
nothing about the public service it was inher-
iting and there was a ‘general view that the
public service had gotten out of control since
the abolition of the PSB’ (Davis 2004). The
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PSMC was unpopular with many public sec-
tor unions, managers and employees. Wiltshire
(1992) suggested that the PSMC was perceived
as a means of instituting the Australian Labor
Party’s political agenda and were resented for
politicising personnel decisions. Alternatively,
Davis (1995) considered that the resentment
was not due to the objectives of the reforms,
but the consequences for individuals such as
redundancy and removal of seniority processes.
The PSMCs far-reaching reform agenda was
not dependent upon workforce data. Merit
reforms revitalised recruitment and selection
processes, as the internal labour market was
replaced with open opportunity to compete
for positions (Coaldrake 1991; PSMC 1991).
These reforms were important in terms of rein-
stating Westminster principles, but the assess-
ment of skills at the point of recruitment did not
require the support of a sophisticated data sys-
tem. Many other Goss reforms were about re-
establishing standards and principles to ensure
departments managed their people more effec-
tively, but such activities required only limited
information. There was significant organisa-
tional restructuring and downsizing during this
period. In the absence of data on workforce
skills, experience or performance, decisions re-
garding which employees to remove from the
service were made on subjective local knowl-
edge. There was little inclination to establish
a HR information system in order to remove
people from the service.
Goss also created a Senior Executive Service
(SES) and Chief Executive Service (CES) to at-
tract and retain highly skilled senior executives
for deployment across the sector (Public Sector
Legislative Amendment Act 1991). A survey of
senior officers provided information about de-
mographics, qualifications and recent positions
held (Hede and Renfrow 1990). The PSMC es-
tablished a separate HR information database
to manage this elite group, including monitor-
ing the SES profile and movements (PSMC
1995). The scope for external applicants and
the requirement for internal applicants to apply
for positions removed any pressure for a com-
prehensive internal database of existing SES
skill sets. Nonetheless, the database included
more than demographic information: it was
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 Colley and Price
used for workforce planning, and could have
provided a model for a broader QPS workforce
database.
The equity reforms were a driver for better
workforce information when the new Premier
realised that he could not tell how many people
worked in the QPS, let alone what percentage
were women. The 1992 Equal Opportunity in
Public Employment Act mandated that agen-
cies report on target groups and develop plans
to increase target group membership. An Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) census gath-
ered initial data as at June 1994, allowing anal-
ysis of sector wide trends in classifications,
salary, age, length of service, location, sepa-
ration, appointments and promotion rates. The
PSMC actively provided advice and assistance
to agencies on EEO planning and benchmark-
ing (PSMC 1995), and agencies began regular
collection of data on elementary workforce de-
mographics.
The PSMC had many successes in develop-
ing HR standards, advisory services, training,
resource kits and networks (PSMC 1990, 1992,
1993, 1994), but an evaluation of its activi-
ties in 1994 found that it had failed to meet
its legislative obligation to monitor and audit
processes other than for EEO initiatives (Hede
1993; PSMC 1993). To some extent, this was
due to the lack of effective information sys-
tems, given the cessation of central data collec-
tion by the OPSPM. Davis (2004) suggests that
more systematic monitoring of the HR reform
agenda was overshadowed by the compressed
timetable to implement reforms and the general
buzz of activity. The industrial relations depart-
ment had begun developing an integrated HR
system, but there were ongoing delays in its im-
plementation due to changing policy and classi-
fication frameworks (DEVETIR 1991, 1992).
The 1994 evaluation of the PSMC provided
the impetus for better workforce data col-
lection. From 1995, the government required
agencies to report quarterly to the PSMC on the
size and composition of their workforce against
estimated agency profiles and program deliv-
erables (PSMC 1995). This decision heralded a
new era of workforce information and the inten-
tion for more sophisticated data collection. The
SES database was expanded to ‘allow greater
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207
statistical analysis of trends, including pro-
fessional development’ (PSMC 1995:11–12).
The PSMC established a HR development unit,
and a HR development database was mooted.
The PSMC commenced planning around the
abolition of compulsory retirement at age 65
(PSMC 1994). There were also plans to develop
an HRM framework for the sector, to better
integrate HRM within corporate management,
to assist agencies in their strategic planning
activities, and to develop data and workforce
planning models (PSMC 1995). These plans
for more sophisticated workforce datasets,
forecasting capacities and integration with
strategic planning were consistent with the rec-
ommendations in the literature, and the Goss
government’s political philosophy of strong
central guidance on policy and planning mat-
ters. However, these plans were unseated by a
change of government.
1996 – Two Steps Back Under the
Borbidge Government
The Goss government had unsettled the public
service, and a 1996 by-election allowed Bor-
bidge to form a minority conservative gov-
ernment. The PSMC was replaced with the
new Office of the Public Service (OPS), which
had a mandate to remove the perceived pro-
cess burden of the PSMC standards and re-
store workforce discretion to CEOs (QPD
28 March 1996; Wright Consultancy 1996).
The new Public Service Act 1996 reduced the
powers of the central personnel agency to a
supporting role. Chief executives gained con-
trol over the number and classification level
of employees, appointments, and secondments
within or between departments (QPD 25 July
1996). The comprehensive PSMC Standards
were replaced with minimalist directives con-
taining brief principles (OPS 1996).
The OPS continued and consolidated the
quarterly collection of data from agencies that
had been established by the PSMC. The Mini-
mum Obligatory Human Resource Information
(MOHRI) dataset collected EEO and work-
force management baseline data, and stream-
lined data collection at agency level (OPS 1996,
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208 Where Have All The Workers Gone?
1997, 1998). However, the major focus seemed
to be on the technical issues around collec-
tion and distribution of the data and, despite
the sweeping statements in each OPS annual
report, there appeared to be little use of the
data to support workforce planning (OPS 1996,
1997, 1998). The intention to provide a statis-
tical research service to agencies seemed to be
limited to staffing numbers, tenure, and gen-
der issues for EEO reporting (OPS 1996, 1997,
1998). The data collection was not integrated
with other OPS areas of workforce policy or
practice, let alone the broader strategic direc-
tion of agencies or the sector.
In 1996, when external consultants under-
took a HRM benchmarking study, they rec-
ommended repositioning of the HRM func-
tion away from processing roles to value-added
roles, but unfortunately identified the potential
function from a cost perspective (OPS 1997).
The subsequent OPS toolkit (OPS 1998) was
similarly cost-centred, rather than strategic, and
focused on limited benchmarking of elemen-
tary data (such as age and absence rates), rather
than understanding the workforce and link-
ing workforce information to broader organi-
sational information. The OPS dedicated few
resources towards the workforce planning pro-
cess (OPS 1996), and it is unclear whether they
proceeded with intended workshops for agen-
cies to encourage them to adopt ‘best practice’
(OPS 1997), or with a trial of workforce plan-
ning amongst four agencies (OPS 1998).
In this environment, data collection and re-
porting focused on elementary workforce de-
mographics, with the later optional inclusion
of qualification or course of study. EEO re-
mained one of the few well-embedded areas of
data analysis, reporting and planning, due to its
legal mandate. The name of the workforce data
set – Minimum Obligatory Human Resource In-
formation – reflected the government’s broader
desire for the OPS to take a minimalist role in
HR. There seemed to be little understanding of
the benefits of incorporating broader types of
information from emerging OPS activities such
as organisational climate and morale survey
findings, or the renewed focus on leadership
and development. The collection of workforce
skills information for planning purposes may
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June 2010
have appeared unnecessarily complex and ex-
pensive. So by 1998, there was only anecdotal
evidence of the emerging skills shortages in the
information technology, nursing and medical
occupations and that the whole QPS workforce
was ageing. The elementary nature of the data
set, and indeed the government’s HR agenda,
resulted in limited strategic analysis and re-
sponse and limited support to agencies (OPSC
2006a).
1998 Onwards – Beattie and Bligh Labor
Governments
The Beattie government came to power in May
1998 and took a middle road, rejecting some
of the Borbidge government initiatives, but not
prepared to restore the Goss government re-
forms. The new Office of the Public Service
Commissioner (OPSC) operated for two years
until August 2000 (QPD 10 Nov 2000) when
HR functions were split between the Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations (DIR), the De-
partment of Premier and Cabinet (DPC), and
a new Office of Public Service Merit and Eq-
uity (OPSME). This led to confusion for central
agencies and departments, and the loss of any
strategic HR agenda (Colley 2005; Henneken
2004).
The OPSC identified the collection and anal-
ysis of workforce data as a key workforce pri-
ority. It recognised the difficulties caused by
the lack of effective data systems, but its ef-
forts were towards improvements to the quality
of the elementary MOHRI data, and develop-
ment of a new application for benchmarking
across government and across Australian states
(OPSC 1999, 2000, 2006b). Reporting of the
central data seemed to be focused primarily
on internal clients, such as the Public Service
Commissioner and Premier, rather than depart-
ments.
Other sections of the OPSC began collection
of other forms of workforce data. A centrally
developed organisational climate and morale
survey was embraced by agencies from 1998.
A small OPSC team assisted agencies to im-
plement the surveys, strategise to address the
findings, and combine the various data sources
– organisation climate and morale, MOHRI,
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 Colley and Price
HR benchmarking and other organisational
measures – to analyse organisational perfor-
mance and to inform planning (OPSC 1999,
2000). This survey had the potential to ele-
vate HR to a more strategic level, but fol-
lowing the departure of Public Service Com-
missioner Brian Head, shortsighted middle and
senior OPSC managers stifled the project. The
institutional split of HR functions led to the
transfer of the workforce data function to DIR,
which was little interested in strategic HR
(Colley 2005; OPSC 2006a).
The OPSC stated that its workforce prior-
ities were to develop flexible work practices,
review attraction and retention of staff and col-
lect and analyse workforce data. But in prac-
tice it developed best practice frameworks and
hoped that agencies would adopt them. Work-
force planning continued to be an aside, with
no effort to integrate all HR activities under-
taken across the OPSC and DIR, let alone link
this to the strategic direction of government or
departments. While the OPSC did not have the
regulatory powers of previous central person-
nel agencies (OPSC 1999), it erred by failing to
appreciate the value of workforce information
or to monitor departmental activities.
In line with the managerial quest for effi-
ciency, shared service providers (SSPs) were
created to manage operational HR activities
and this fragmented HR responsibilities and
records. SSPs developed separate databases to
record their activities in advertising vacancies,
applicant pools, and job evaluations (OPSC
2006a). The use of different databases meant
that this data could not be linked to the broader
MOHRI database. The MOHRI database was
person-based rather than position-based, so it
could tell you how many people were employed
in an occupation, but not how many vacancies
there were in that occupation. This limited the
capacity to link MOHRI data to the SSP recruit-
ment data, job evaluation data, payroll data, or
any agency-based data on positions.
Throughout this period, the responsible cen-
tral agency highlighted the emerging problem
of the ageing workforce, and provided support
through guidelines, awareness sessions and pi-
lot initiatives (DIR 2002; DEIR 2005). These
initiatives were not integrated into a broader
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209
workforce planning framework, but did lead
the OPSC to address the data analysis skills of
HR personnel in departments.
Since Anna Bligh became Premier in 2007,
there has been a renewed focus on strategic
planning and performance in the QPS, with
the release of Towards Q2:Vision for 2020
(Queensland Government 2008). This vision
identifies some of the generic skills required
of public servants in the future. The OPSC has
been reshaped into a new Public Service Com-
mission, which remains a fledgling institution
at the time of writing, but shows no immediate
signs of addressing the sophistication or inte-
gration of workforce databases.
Discussion
This historical review has traced the capacity
of central personnel agencies to support work-
force planning through centralised workforce
information. In its early years, the PSB used
emerging technology to store elementary work-
force data, in line with the simple needs of
the largely internal labour market. The PSB’s
centralist approach was replaced by the min-
imalist OPSPM, which proceeded to devolve
all HR activity without the compensatory step
of a central HR database to monitor develop-
ments – a pattern that Nethercote (1996) noted
occurred across Australia. The Goss govern-
ment replaced the OPSPM with the centralist
PSMC, which had a political mandate for re-
form through strong central control. The PSMC
implemented data reporting and systems to
capture basic demographic information for the
general workforce and marginally more sophis-
ticated information on its SES workforce. The
PSMC had planned for more sophisticated data
collection, integration and linkage to strategic
direction, but did not get to implement these
plans due to the 1996 change of government.
The Borbidge government’s OPS pursued a de-
centralist agenda, under which it maintained
existing minimal workforce information col-
lection, but abandoned the PSMC’s plans for
more sophisticated data collection and integra-
tion. Under the Beattie government, the subse-
quent split of responsibility for HR functions
C 2010 The Authors
210 Where Have All The Workers Gone?
across DIR and the OPSC/OPSME resulted in
a lack of a clear strategic HR agenda and no
extension to the existing datasets.
This historical review confirmed that the
QPS did not maintain adequate workforce
datasets to support workforce planning and
thereby identify and mitigate workforce risks.
While technology made more sophisticated
data systems possible in each of the time peri-
ods studied, technological possibilities were not
the driver of the nature of the datasets. The ap-
proach to data systems was generally affected
by institutional factors. Changes in government
led to changes in the central personnel agency,
which reflected each government’s philosophy
regarding the importance of central guidance or
workforce data collection. Some governments
preferred limited central intervention and em-
phasised agency autonomy in managing their
own HR which, as flagged by Alford (1993)
and Nethercote (1989, 1996), led to coordina-
tion and accountability problems.
Devolution of HR functions to departments
was unnecessarily combined with limited cen-
tral oversight, and central personnel agencies
not only missed an opportunity, but shirked
their responsibility to monitor service-wide
trends and to engage agencies in addressing
these findings. As noted elsewhere, decentrali-
sation of decision-making does not necessitate
decentralisation of data collection and forecast-
ing (Coggburn 2005). Decentralisation seemed
to work moderately well in earlier times, but
has left the QPS exposed on staffing issues
under current labour market conditions. Ide-
ally, the central personnel agencies would have
approached workforce planning in the same
way that the PSMC approached EEO reforms,
which were a strong example of the combina-
tion of data analysis, policy development, mon-
itoring and culture change, and proper embed-
ding of a skill set.
Most governments did not understand the im-
portance of sophisticated and comprehensive
personnel information systems. Given more
time, the PSMC would have established more
sophisticated and integrated data systems, in
line with their integrated approach to HR. How-
ever, subsequent central agencies failed to iden-
tify or value the need for an integrated data set
Journal compilation 
C 2010 National Council of the Institute of Public Administration Australia
June 2010
that combined the MOHRI data with other in-
ternal sources of workforce information (such
as organisational climate surveys, recruitment
and applicant pools, skills and development)
and external data (such as Australian Bureau
of Statistics data and university enrolments).
The MOHRI dataset remains inadequate due to
its person rather than position focus. A compre-
hensive, centralised dataset would have created
economies of scale, avoided duplication across
the sector, and provided agencies with an infor-
mation base for workforce planning. The OPSC
did not consider it had the responsibility to lead
workforce planning by facilitating this data in-
tegration. Ideally, as Helton and Soubik (2004)
recommended in the case of the Pennsylvania
public service, agencies should be mandated to
access the service-wide database and report on
their workforce planning.
As identified in the literature, the decentrali-
sation of HR functions also meant that agencies
were under greater pressure to find a sufficient
number of experienced strategic HR practition-
ers (Coggburn 2005). Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that departments would have benefited
from leadership from the central agency on con-
temporary HR skills, such as workforce plan-
ning and data analysis, to increase the profes-
sionalism of agency HR units. It is only in very
recent times, as a response to the ageing work-
force issue, that the OPSC took a lead in raising
the general skills of HR staff in data analysis
and then only to a minor extent.
Conclusion
This article examined the capacity of central
personnel agencies to predict workforce risks
and support workforce planning activities. We
identified that changes of government often led
to changes in the direction of the central per-
sonnel agency and its subsequent approach to
HR activities including workforce planning and
data collection. This was exacerbated by lack
of appreciation for the value of comprehen-
sive central workforce data and limited agency
HR skills or capacity. The resulting informa-
tion void has allowed contemporary workforce
challenges, such as ageing and skills shortages,
C 2010 The Authors
 Colley and Price
to emerge. Comprehensive central workforce
data is critical to identify gaps between future
organisational direction and capability require-
ments, to support the apolitical and enduring
need to profile and plan for the future work-
force and to elevate the HR function to a more
strategic level.
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