Heg DA

They don’t spec a branch of the USFG – that’s a voter for fairness and education – we lose
agent-specific disads and counterplans and specific education is predicated off of the agent

-30
 T
Interpretation: The word ‘in’ means throughout
Words and Phrases, 8 (Permanent Edition, vol. 20a, p. 207)

Colo. 1887. In the Act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction
“in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, the word “in” should be
construed to mean “throughout” such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14, p. 114, 117, 10 Colo.
126.

Violation: the aff only removes military presence from Okinawa

Reasons to prefer:
Limits – their interpretation justifies affs that remove one base or presence from
one area of a country

Ground – kills link to core disads like deterrence and alliance – neg ground is vital
to preserve on such a large topic
-69
 CP
TEXT: The United States Congress should end all funding for
troops and bases in Okinawa.

It competes, only the president has the power to withdraw

military forces, the counterplan just ends funding which
solves
Jeffrey Rosen, author, 3/4/07, “In Wartime, Who Has the Power?”, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/weekinreview/04rosen.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1, umn-rks

Legal scholars — both critics and supporters of the Iraq war — say that if Congress tries to manage
the deployment and withdrawal of troops without cutting funds, the president’s
powers as commander in chief would be encroached, perhaps leading to a constitutional
confrontation of historic proportions. “If there were to be a binding resolution that said troops had to go from 120,000 to
80,000 by April 15, Congress would be, in my view, transgressing on the conduct of a
military campaign,” says Samuel Issacharoff, a law professor at New York University. “Congress can’t tell
the president to charge up the east side of the hill rather than the west, which is the definition of the president’s military
authority.” So how, exactly, can Congress assert power over the war, beyond its ability simply to pull the plug on its financing? History
suggests that Congress has found ways of checking the president in the past without
encroaching on his power as commander in chief. And, history suggests, as well, that neither side is that eager for a constitutional
showdown. There is little dispute that Congress
could, if it had the political will, end the war in Iraq tomorrow by
using its power over appropriations to cut off funds to the troops. “Congress
could easily check the president,” says W. Taylor Reveley III, the dean of William and Mary School of Law and
author of “War Powers of the President and Congress.” “If Iraq continues to go badly or if it looks like the president might actually use
force in Iran, I
can easily see Congress passing something like the Cambodian or
Vietnam spending cutoffs, which would force the setting of a timetable for
withdrawal that was pretty brisk,” he said. If Congress used its appropriations power in this way,
even the most vigorous defenders of executive power agree, President Bush would have to acquiesce. “He would
have to comply, and he would comply,” says John Yoo, the University of California at Berkeley law professor who, as a Bush
administration official, defended the president’s authority to act unilaterally. According to Professor Yoo, Congress could
immediately cut funds, or could order a phased withdrawal by authorizing a fixed
amount of money each month for specified numbers of troops.

Now is key – the counterplan checks a unilateral executive

Maya Schenwar, executive director, 2/14/09, “Congress Aims to Take Back Constitutional War Powers”,
truthout, a non-profit organization, http://www.truth-out.org/011409J, umn-rks

Congress took little initiative to rein in Bush's excesses throughout his administration, and now,
some members worry that his vast expansion of executive powers could set a dangerous
precedent for generations to come. Unless Congress formally rejects Bush's
generous interpretation of the role of the president, they say, the system of checks
and balances could be permanently disrupted. Foremost on the list is one of Bush's most blatant unilateral
actions: his recent signing, with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, of the US-Iraq security pact without consulting Congress. The pact
could keep US troops in Iraq until the end of 2011. Rep. Barbara Lee (D-California) has introduced - and soon plans to reintroduce -
a resolution that would delegitimize the Bush-Maliki security agreement in the eyes of Congress, according to a spokeswoman for Lee's
office. It would also reaffirm Congress's role in the formation of war policy. "[The security pact] is a seriously flawed agreement which
illustrates perfectly the necessity of Congressional review and approval of any agreement concerning the United States Armed Forces
 and the security of Iraq," said Lee in a statement on the resolution. "An agreement to commit American troops to the defense and
security of another country is a major commitment that must have the support of the American people, which can only be reflected by
the Congress of the United States." Bush presented the US-Iraq pact as a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which does not
need the approval of Congress. However, this "SOFA" goes beyond the scope of all previous SOFAs, in that it authorizes military
operations. Under the Constitution, Congress has the sole power to wage war. Lee points
out that the "SOFA" also subjects US military operations to the "approval of the Iraqi government" and places US contractors under the
jurisdiction of Iraqi courts. Historically, the president has needed the Senate's ratification to place US troops under foreign control;
Bush's action is a major breach, according to Lee. Several bills have been introduced in Congress to address Bush's overstep in
signing the pact, and a notable set of hearings in the House Foreign Affairs Committee investigated the topic. Yet, responding as it did
to most of the Bush administration's power grabs, Congress ultimately let the "SOFA" designation get by. "Congress and the media
have generally accepted the Bush administration's categorizing of [the pact] as a SOFA," Steve Fox, director of the nonpartisan
American Freedom Campaign, told Truthout. "To me, it demonstrates a complete failure on the part of Congress as an institution to
defend its constitutional powers." This complacency could cost future Congresses - and
future generations of American people - quite a bit of leverage, according to Fox. "A
failure by Congress to signal its objection to this agreement will create a
potentially irreversible shift in the balance of power to the executive branch," Fox
said. "This lack of action will set a precedent with respect to what terms are allowed under
a SOFA and, therefore, do not require Congressional approval. Perhaps, the Supreme Court might
someday rule that the executive branch's power is not so extensive, but Congress should not create a
precedent on its own that it someday needs the court to reverse. Congress
must exert its power now." Lee's resolution does not officially negate the Bush-Maliki pact. Even if it passed, the
agreement would still be legally binding under international law, Berkeley Law Professor Oona Hathaway, who has testified at several
However, the bill would advocate that Congress use the
hearings regarding the pact, told Truthout.
legal means in its power to resist fulfilling the demands of the agreement, and to
prevent the executive branch from sealing similarly broad-ranging agreements in the future without consulting Congress. Lee's
resolution refers specifically to Congress's power of the purse, stating that "is neither
legally nor morally bound or obligated to appropriate any of the funds
necessary to carry out the terms of the agreement."

Unilateral executive risks interventionist wars and kills the

constitution
Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Pulitzer prize winning historian, 2004, “The imperial presidency “, p. 497-498,
google books, umn-rks

There is little more typically American than to despair of the republic. As early as 1802, Hamilton pronounced the Constitution a "frail
and worthless fabric." 148 Seventy years later Henry Adams declared that "the system of 1789" had "broken down." 149 The
dirges of our own day are hardly novel. But the constitutional strain imposed
by chronic international crisis is new. Tocqueville's warning lingers. International crisis has
given American Presidents the opportunity to exercise almost royal
prerogatives. Some Presidents have exercised these prerogatives with circumspection. Others have
succumbed to the delusion that America has been charged by the Almighty
with a global mission to redeem fallen humanity. In The Imperial Presidency I doubted that a
messianic foreign policy, America as world savior, was reconcilable with the American Constitution (seepages 163-166, 206-208, 298).
When an American President conceives
Nearly two decades later, I conclude with the same question.
himself the appointed guardian of a world in which an eternal foreign threat
requires a rapid and incessant deployment of men, weapons and decisions behind a wall of secrecy,
the result can only be a radical disruption of the balance of the American
Constitution. It is hard to reconcile the separation of powers with a foreign
policy driven by an indignant ideology and disposed to intervene unilaterally and
secretly everywhere around the planet. The Constitution must buckle under the weight of a
vainglorious policy, aiming at the redemption of lesser breeds without the law, relying on secret actions and duplicitous methods,
involving the United States in useless wars and grandiose dreams.

Global nuclear war

Jorge Hirsch, 11/1/05, “The Real Reason for Nuking Iran”, Antiwar.com,
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=7861, umn-rks
 Yes, you read it right: The U.S. is prepared to break a 60-year-old taboo on the use of
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries – not because the survival of the country is at stake, not because the lives
of many Americans or allies are at stake – just to demonstrate that it can do it. The U.S. has
maintained for some time now that it reserves the right to respond with nuclear
weapons to attacks or intended attacks with WMD, and that it intends to use nuclear weapons to destroy underground enemy
facilities. It is argued that such statements have deterrent value, and that maintaining ambiguity as to what might trigger a U.S. nuclear
attack deters countries from pursuing military initiatives that are contrary to U.S. interests. Nonsense. Those statements have no
deterrent value because no one in his or her right mind would believe that the greatest democracy in the world would do such a thing.
Unless the U.S. demonstrates, by actually doing it once, that it is indeed prepared to do so. How do you create the conditions to
perform such a demonstration and avoid immediate universal condemnation? You declare Iran to be the second member of the "axis of
evil." You start a "global war on terror." You invade the first member of the axis (Iraq) and put 150,000 U.S. troops at the doorstep of the
second member, in harm's way – not enough troops to invade Iran, nor to prevent an Iranian invasion of Iraq after Iran is attacked. You
strike Iran's facilities, using conventional and nuclear bombs, to deter Iran from retaliating with missiles with chemical warheads and
from invading Iraq, thereby saving the lives of 150,000 American soldiers. You argue that Iran's chemical and nuclear facilities had to
be destroyed to prevent terrorists using weapons from those facilities to attack the U.S. (Never mind that the nuclear facilities were just
nuclear reactors, not nuclear weapons). You get Israel to pull the trigger, i.e., bomb some Iranian installations (as it did in Iraq at Osirak)
to provoke an Iranian response. Now enter the world after the U.S. "demo," according to U.S. planners: There will be no doubt that
U.S. statements on the use of nuclear weapons will have deterrent value. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty will be amended to
prohibit uranium-enrichment for all countries that do not do it already; violators will be nuked. North Korea will be forced to disarm under
the now real and credible threat of massive U.S. nuclear attack. Any
country suspected of pursuing
nuclear weapons or any other military capability that could threaten the U.S. or
its allies will be nuked. Russia, China, and all other nuclear countries will eventually be forced to disarm under the threat
of massive U.S. nuclear attack. However, the real world does not always follow the script envisioned by U.S. planners, as the Iraq
experience illustrates. So here is a more likely "post-demo" scenario: Many non-nuclear countries, including those
currently friendly to the U.S., willrush to develop a nuclear deterrent, and many will
succeed. Terrorist groups sympathetic to Iran will do their utmost to retaliate in-kind against the
U.S., and eventually will succeed. With the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons broken, use of them by other countries will
follow in various regional conflicts, and subsequent escalation will lead to
global nuclear war.

~300? Word count fucked up

 K
The Aff represents the Socratic Will to Order in its attempt to control the world.
This manifests in our attempts to resolve the chaotic aspects of life and avoid
suffering. This requires the construction of an ideal real world toward which our
apparent world aspires, creating life as negative vis-à-vis our internalization of
ressentiment
Paul Saurette, 1996, “I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and
the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory.” Millenium Journal of
International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6]
The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order: ‘I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack of integrity.’ According to
Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural
framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular
community. Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the
origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception
Nietzsche claims that pre-
of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought.
Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured
tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and
ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as
inescapable aspects of human existence. However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to
sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social
order. ‘Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstruin in animo was a universal danger’.
No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek
thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of
life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates’ thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his
aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere
silently preparing itself the old Athens was coming to an end And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his
personal art of self-preservation.
Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning
for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that
promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the
instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to
renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche’s
words, ‘[r]ationality was divined as a saviour... it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality
Socrates codified
betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational...’ Thus,
the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework.
The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by
renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is
inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through
Socratic reason is only possible by creating a ‘Real World’ of eternal and meaningful forms,
in opposition to an ‘Apparent World’ of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is
contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the
ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of
Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model
led to the emergence of a uniquely ‘modern” understanding of life which could only view
suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World, This outlook created a modem notion of
responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame.
Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment, and argues that it signaled a
potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic
resolution.
This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche,
ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment
of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the
Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite
so my sheep someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,—you alone are to blame for
yourself—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered.’Faced with the collapse of the Socratic
resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, ‘one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....” The
genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic
division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a
transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory
experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action.
This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order
as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian
suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for
‘the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of
suffering’.’3 According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the
Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World, The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive
need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of
the Real World. The ressentiment, of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment
engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of
the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a ‘truer’, more complete
knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self- perpetuating movement
creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered
in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests,
“[t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human
existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with
a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies,
affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.’

The desire for mastery and control the affirmative replicates only creates ressentiment for
our current existence. Such hatred and search for a new life makes life laughable and makes
extinction desirable.
Friedrich Nietzsche, German Philosopher, 1886, “Beyond Good and Evil”, p. 342
Whether hedonism, or pessimism, or utilitarianism, or eudaimonianism (6)—all these ways of thinking, which measure the value of things according to
pleasure and pain, that is, according to contingent circumstances and secondary issues, are ways of thinking in the foreground and naïveté, which
everyone who knows about creative forces and an artistic conscience will look down on, not without ridicule and not without compassion. Compassion for
yourself—that is, of course, not compassion the way you mean the term: it's not pity for social "needs,"
for "society" and its sick and unlucky people, with those depraved and broken down from the start, and with the way they
lie on the ground all around us—even less is it compassion for the grumbling oppressed, the rebellious
slave classes, who strive for mastery—they call it "Freedom."
Our compassion is a higher compassion which sees further—we see how man is making
himself smaller, how you make him smaller—and there are moments when we look at your
compassion with an indescribable anxiety, where we defend ourselves against this
compassion—where we find your seriousness more dangerous than any carelessness. You want, if possible—and there is no wilder "if
possible"—to do away with suffering. What about us? It does seem that we would prefer it to be higher
and worse than it ever was! Well being, the way you understand it, that's no goal. To us that
looks like an end, a condition which immediately makes human beings laughable and
contemptible, something which makes their destruction desirable!
The culture of suffering, of great suffering, don't you realize that up to this point it is only this suffering which has created all
the things which raise man up? That tension of a soul in misery which develops its strength,
its trembling when confronted with the great destruction, its inventiveness and courage in
bearing, holding out against, interpreting, and using unhappiness, and whatever has been
conferred upon it by way of profundity, secrecy, masks, spirit, cunning, and greatness—has
that not been given to it through suffering, through the cultivation of great suffering?

The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s association of pain with the suffering
of the Okinawans by actively forgetting about their impacts. Divorcing pain and
suffering through the act of forgetting is a way of refusing to allow suffering to
affect us and opens up possibilities for true action.
Zupančič 3 (Alenka, researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovenian Academy of Science and Arts,
visiting professor at the European Graduate School, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two” pg
54-61, dml)

On the other hand, guilt (the invention of guilt) is of a quite different origin: it arises not from the logic of
(possible) equivalence and measurability, but from the logic of immeasurability. The presupposition of guilt
is that enjoyment as such is not measurable (which could also mean that it is infinite or unattainable), that it has no
equivalent. Accordingly, the debt opened up by “evil” deeds is not measurable either. The more we pay,
the more remains to be paid. In this sense, the notions of guilt and surplus-enjoyment emerge
together.Yet—and again—not in the sense that guilt refers to enjoyment, that enjoyment causes guilt, but, rather,
in the sense that guilt is itself an articulation of enjoyment (just as the law can be the articulation of pure
sensuality); it is a means by which the infinite can inscribe itself in the finite, or the beyond can
inscribe itself in the body. Guilt is thus not a consequence of punishment. Rather than stemming from hard-
hearted indifference, or even cruelty, it stems from love and sacrifice. This is, according to Nietzsche, “the stroke of genius on the part of Christianity”:
“God himself sacrifices himself for the guilt of mankind, God himself makes payment to himself, God as the only being who can redeem man from what
has become unredeemable for man himself—the creditor sacrifices himself for his debtor, out of love (can one credit that?), out of love for his debtor!
—”22 God pays the debts of His debtors with His own pound of flesh. This solution is simultaneously both a stroke of genius and a sure path to
catastrophe. It repays the debt (thus giving hope for a new start), but, simultaneously, it gives it an image that is precisely the image of the Infinite. And it
is this payment of our debt that has the perverse effect of involving us in a new, eternal debt, bringing about the most terrible sickness of mankind:
There resides a madness of the will which is absolutely unexampled: the will of man to find himself guilty and
reprehensible to a degree that can never be atoned for; his will to think himself punished without any possibility of
the punishment becoming equal to the guilt; his will to infect and poison the fundamental ground of things with the problem of punishment and
his will to erect an ideal—that of the “holy God”—and in the face of it to feel the palpable
guilt . . . ;
certainty of his own absolute unworthiness. . . .Here is sickness, beyond any doubt, the most
terrible sickness that has ever raged in man; and whoever can still bear to hear . . . how in this night of torment and absurdity there has resounded the cry
oflove, the cry of the most nostalgic rapture, of redemption through love, will turn away, seized by invincible horror.23 It is true that there is
also a rather different notion present in Christianity, a notion much closer to Nietzsche’s own position—namely, the
notion of mercy as situated “beyond law” (Jenseits des Rechts). Nietzsche links to this notion nothing less
than the possibility of an escape from the vicious circle of punishment and guilt. But his notion of
mercy is not simply that of an act of forgiveness; it can spring only from a surplus of “power” and “richness.” Illustrating this with the example of actual
wealth, Nietzsche writes that the creditor becomes more human to the extent that he has grown richer: so that, finally, how much injury he can endure
without suffering from it becomes the actual measure of his wealth.24 Such a creditor can now allow himself the noblest luxury possible: letting those who
harm him go unpunished. In this way, the justice which began with “everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged” ends by winking, and
letting those who are incapable of discharging their debt go free. This “self-overcoming of justice” is called mercy, and remains the privilege of the most
“powerful.”25 We should be careful here not to believe that the terms “rich” and “powerful” refer simply to those who have a lot of money, and hold this
it is the capacity not to be injured, and not to suffer
or that position of power.As Nietzsche points out,
because of an injustice, that constitutes the measure of one’s richness and power—not
the capacity to endure suffering and injury, to bear pain, but the capacity not to let this
suffering as suffering enter the constitution of one’s subjectivity (which also means the capacity not to let
oneself be subjectivized in the figure of the “subject of injury,” the figure of the victim). Those who can manage this are “rich” and “powerful” because
they can manage it, not the other way around. There is also an important difference between forgiving and
(what Nietzsche calls) forgetting. Forgiveness has a perverse way of involving us even further in debt. To forgive
somehow always implies to pay for the other, and thus to use the very occurrence of injury and
its forgiveness as a new “engagement ring.” Nietzsche makes this very point in relation to Christianity:
the way God has forgiven our sins has been to pay for them, to pay for them with His own “flesh.” This is the
fundamental perversity of Christianity: while forgiving, it simultaneously brandishes at us the
cross, the instrument of torture, the memory of the one who suffered and died so that we could be
forgiven, the memory of the one who paid for us. Christianity forgives, but does not forget. One could say that, with
the eyes of the sinner fixed on the cross, forgiving creates a new debt in the very process of this act. It
forgives what was done, but it does not forgive the act of forgiving itself. On the contrary, the latter
establishes a new bond and a new debt. It is now infinite mercy (as the capacity of forgiving) that sustains the infinite debt, the debt as infinite. The debt
is no longer brought about by our actions; it is brought about by the act of forgiving us these actions. We are indebted for forgiveness. The infinite
This is why Nietzsche counters
capacity to forgive might well become the infernal flame in which we “temper” our debt and guilt.
the concept of forgiving with the concept of forgetting (“a good example of this in modern times is
Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was unable to forgive simply because he—forgot”).26 This is perhaps the
moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”?
memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes
Nietzsche claims that
as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be
burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory.”27 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche
claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as
forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to
trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then
nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of
our actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain”
that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some
traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure. In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event,
but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation
of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”),
Forgetting, oblivion, is
Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act.
the very condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word. Memory (the
“historical”) is eternal sleeplessness and alert insomnia, a state in which no great thing can
happen, and which could even be said to serve this very purpose. Considering the common conception according to which memory is something
 It is precisely as
monumental that “fixes” certain events, and closes us within their horizon, Nietzsche proposes a significantly different notion.
an eternal openness, an unceasing stream, that memory can immobilize us, mortify us, make us
incapable of action. Nietzsche invites us to imagine the extreme example of a human being who does not
possess the power to forget. Such a human being would be condemned to see becoming
everywhere: he would no longer believe in his own being, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, and would lose himself in this
stream of becoming. He would be like the true student of Heraclitus. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly historical manner
Memory holds us in eternal motion—it keeps opening numerous
would be like someone forced to go without sleep.28
horizons, and this is precisely how it immobilizes us, forcing us into frenetic activity.
Hence, Nietzsche advances a thesis that is as out of tune with our time as it was with his own: “every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful
only within a defined horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and too selfish, in turn, to enclose its own perspective within an alien
horizon, then it will feebly waste away or hasten to its timely end.”29 Of course, Nietzsche’s aim here is not to preach narrow-mindedness and pettiness,
nor is it simply to affirm the ahistorical against history and memory. On the contrary, he clearly states that it is only by thinking, reflecting, comparing,
analyzing, and synthesizing (i.e. only by means of the power to utilize the past for life, and to reshape past events into history) that the human being
becomes properly human.Yet, in the excess of history, the human being ceases to be human once again, no longer able to create or invent. This is why
Nietzsche insists that “every great historical event” is born in the “ahistorical atmosphere,” that is to say, in conditions of oblivion and closure: Imagine a
man seized and carried away by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea; how his world changes! Looking backward he feels he is blind,
listening around he hears what is unfamiliar as a dull, insignificant sound; and those things that he perceives at all he never before perceived in this way;
so palpable and near, colorful, resonant, illuminated, as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All his valuations are changed and
devalued; . . . It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings; a tiny whirlpool of life in a
dead sea of night and oblivion; and yet this condition—ahistorical, antihistorical through and through—is not only womb of the unjust deed, but of every
just deed as well; and no artist will create a picture, no general win a victory, and no people gain its freedom without their having previously desired and
striven to accomplish these deeds in just such an ahistorical condition. . . . Thus, everyone who acts loves his action infinitely more than it deserves to be
loved, and the best deeds occur in such an exuberance of love that, no matter what, they must be unworthy of this love, even if their worth were
otherwise incalculably great.30 If we read this passage carefully,we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to
forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure
surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In
other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to
accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman
or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,”
instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite
common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion,we tend to forget
and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those
who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not,
if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and
mortify our (new) passion. It could also be interesting to relate Nietzsche’s reflections from the quoted passage to the story of Hamlet, in
which the imperative to remember, uttered by Hamlet’s father’s Ghost, plays a very prominent role. Remember me! Remember me!, the Ghost repeats to
Hamlet, thus engaging him in the singular rhythm that characterizes the hero of this play—that of the alternation between resigned apathy and frenetic
activity or precipitate actions (his killing of Polonius, as well as that of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern; his engagement in the duel with Laertes . . .). This
movement prevents Hamlet from carrying out the very deed his father’s Ghost charges him with. Many things have been said and written about the
relationship between action and knowledge in this play, and about how knowledge prevents Hamlet from acting. Although the two notions are not
unrelated, it might be interesting to consider this also in terms of memory (not only in terms of knowledge). It could be worthwhile to contemplate the role
played by the imperative of memory. Could we not say that one of the fundamental reasons for the difficulty of Hamlet’s position is precisely the structural
incompatibility of memory and action— that is to say, the fact that action ultimately always “betrays” memory? And do we not encounter something
similar in the wider phenomenon of melancholy (in the play, Hamlet is actually said to be “melancholic”) as a never-ending grief that keeps alive, through
pain, the memory of what was lost? Additionally, although we can recognize in this kind of melancholy a form of fidelity (for
this kind of fidelity, bound to
instance— to use Nietzsche’s words—fidelity to “a woman or a great idea”),
memory, should be distinguished from fidelity to the very event of the encounter with this
woman or idea. Contrary to the first form, this second form of fidelity implies and presupposes the
power to forget. Of course, this does not mean to forget in the banal sense of no longer
remembering the person or the idea in question, but in the sense that forgetting liberates the
potential of the encounter itself, and opens up—precisely through its “closure”—the
possibility of a new one. If we return to the question of the ascetic ideal,we can easily see its link
to the imperative of memory: the “sleeplessness” it generates is very closely related to the state
of being “everlastingly awake” that Nietzsche identifies as one of the essential features of
the ascetic ideal. The same is true of frenetic activity as the very impossibility of
actually acting and of the obsession with the fact that everything that happens to us, or everything we do,
has to be registered somewhere.

423
 DA
China’s trying to expand now – maintaining presence is the key internal link to
check expansion
Payne 10 (Matt, junior majoring in Chinese and Economics at University of Wisconsin Madison, “Obama, it’s time
to sink their battleships,” accessed at http://www.dailycardinal.com/opinion/obama-it-s-time-to-sink-their-
battleships-1.1640268 on 9/23/10, dml)

In recent months, tensions between the United States and China have been flaring up due to a variety of
disputes concerning everything from joint naval maneuvers with South Korea to monetary disputes regarding the undervalued Yuan.
The most recent disagreement comes on the eve of a meeting between President Obama and leaders of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) over a territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The Chinese government has become more
and more brazen in drawing territorial lines in areas of the South China Sea that ASEAN nations
currently lay claim to. In July, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton enraged Beijing as she addressed the issue by encouraging member
states of ASEAN to unite against China's increased naval presence in the disputed region.
The Chinese government wants the United States to stay out of the dispute, saying that the
intervention of the U.S. by Hillary Clinton was virtually an attack on China. Yet the United States
must stand firm with ASEAN on this issue and not allow China to further its influence in the
region. Allowing China to expand southward unimpeded not only threatens ASEAN interests in
the region, but also those of Taiwan, Japan, Korea and the United States. The area that China is currently
trying to lay claim to is vital to the economic development of Southeast Asia. The waters are not only home to valuable fishing areas,
but also oil, which developing nations such as Vietnam wish to sell in the global market.
The administration has thus far taken the right approach when it comes to this issue. It is important that the United
States not back down now. Any sign of weakness on behalf of the administration will
unquestionably harm America's image abroad and will undoubtedly be taken advantage of by the
People's Republic of China. President Obama has a history of backing down to other nations on matters of national security, namely
the missile defense system in Eastern Europe last fall.
The Eastern European missile defense system, of which Poland and the Czech Republic were extremely supportive because it acted
as a deterrent to Iran and North Korea's missile programs, was thrown out by the administration, largely due to pressure from
Russia. Polish officials called the capitulation "catastrophic for Poland" and the Czech Republic was none too pleased as well. The
United States must never again abandon its allies due to pressure from other nations. This is
especially true in the case of China, since their foreign policy has been known to take advantage
of perceived weaknesses from other counties for its own developmental benefits.
Despite the recent lapse by the Obama administration, America has always defended its allies throughout the
world, including the Pacific. Since World War II, the United States has maintained a forward-
operating naval presence in the Pacific region, and must continue to do so. China has no interest
in attacking Taiwan so long as American aircraft carriers and nuclear ballistic submarines are
parked nearby. The same goes for North Korea with regard to South Korea.
To this end, the Obama administration has succeeded. Over the summer, the United States and South Korea
staged joint naval exercises in response to the sinking of a South Korean ship by a North Korean torpedo. Although
China took the maneuvers as a direct threat to its own security and was strongly opposed to
them, the United States stood firm and went ahead with the exercises. The story, which was in the
headlines for weeks in China, got little play in Western press. All China could do in response was stage its own
military drills, and as a result the United States was successful in accomplishing the mission it had originally intended.
America must again stand up to China when it comes to these territorial disputes throughout
Southeast Asia.
While China will no doubt continue to try to extend its influence throughout Asia, the Obama
administration must remain dedicated to supporting our allies in the ASEAN countries. It is imperative
that our nation remains resolute in confronting and combating threats to our interests both at
home and abroad, especially when it comes to maintaining freedom of the seas.
Specifically, the base in Okinawa is key to deter invasion of Taiwan
Chaffin 10/5 (Greg, intern with Foreign Policy in Focus, “Okinawa and the Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance,”
http://www.fpif.org/articles/okinawa_and_the_changing_us-japan_alliance, dml)

China has made huge strides in increasing its military power, which worries Japan. China has
invested heavily in developing its own blue water navy as well as weapons systems such as its
anti-carrier missile, the Dong Feng 21D, that challenge the alliance’s regional military supremacy.
The lack of transparency that has accompanied China’s military advancement has worried both U.S.
and Japanese policymakers. Japan has limited hard-power options to respond to potential Chinese
aggression and relies heavily on American deterrence to forestall major conflict. The III Marine
Expeditionary Force stationed on Okinawa makes up a core pillar of the American strategy of
deterrence. Similar to the “Berlin tripwire” during the Cold War, the III Marine Expeditionary Force constitutes a
credible U.S. commitment to Japanese security.
The possibility of China aggressively absorbing Taiwan is of chief concern to Japanese national
security. Taiwan, after all, is close to important shipping lanes vital to Japanese trade. All the cargo entering and
exiting southern Japan traverses these lanes. The repossession of Taiwan would put China in a
position to blockade southern Japan. Such a hostile repossession would also seriously
damage U.S. commitment to extended deterrence since it would demonstrate that the United States
didn’t want to or couldn’t defend Taiwan. Japanese security, and to a large extent, regional stability is
built on the foundation of this notion of extended deterrence. The United States also has an
interest in an autonomous Taiwan as a balance against China in order to maintain the
regional status quo. The relationship between Taiwan and the United States has been a major source of tension between the United States
and China, which has been exacerbated by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas also complicate relations among China, Japan, and the United States. Both the Chinese and Japanese
governments dispute the demarcation of international boundaries in the East China Sea, with each claiming the other is infringing on its territorial
sovereignty. The United States, meanwhile, considers the South China Sea to be international waters, while the Chinese consider it an area subject to their
national sovereignty.
The most important role of U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa is to deter Chinese aggression
toward Taiwan as well as in the East and South China Seas. The III Marine Expeditionary Force is the most
immediate U.S. force, which could respond to a crisis as a result of conflict over Taiwan. It is
also ideally positioned to help resolve potential flash points between China and Japan
resulting from sovereignty issues over disputed territories such as the Senkaku Islands, near Okinawa.

Nuclear war
Hunkovic, American Military University, 9 [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a
Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, http://www.lamp-
method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a
nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors
could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India
and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world
that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two
most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists
that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in
East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an
international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if
China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world
that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are
the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries
will not be considered in this study.

-367
 K2
Their theoretical demands are dangerous – critiquing America’s dominance can
only fracture us from within and open us up to attack from true enemies
Nyquist 5 (Jeffrey R., former Russia analyst for the DOD and all-American man, 6/17, “National Security vs
Special Interests,” http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2005/0617.html, dml)

After the response from last week’s column, Feminism and the Defense of the West, it is obvious that some
Americans are unable to identify with general concerns. That is to say, unless something
obviously touches them (or their interests), they entirely miss the point of concepts related
to
national grand strategy. The idea that the nation’s survival is important in the larger scheme
of things somehow escapes notice. Those who champion a special interest subgroup
sometimes prefer their race, theology or gender to the nation. Far too often, the subgroup’s
agenda effectively cancels out any thought of national security as an unreal sphere of
interest where threats are imaginary and strategy itself is a pretext for self-aggrandizement.
They seem to believe the United States has no real enemies, and they dismiss the dangers
that we face as if such things only occur to paranoid mentalities.
If you listen to late-night radio you may have stumbled across a self-described “scientist” whose obsession is an alleged “face on Mars.” To support his bizarre thesis regarding the Red
Planet, he alleges that the Cold War was a fiction. The nuclear arms race between Soviet Russia and the United States was a pretense. His special agenda is Mars, and nothing that
stands above his hobbyhorse is allowed any reality, even the threat of thermonuclear war.

Today’s political grievance groups, conspiracy theorists and factionalists are unconcerned with the
fate of a real country (their own country). They are more concerned with an idea that fixates
them. To be concerned with the nation, to love one’s country, doesn’t come naturally to everyone.
What the individual derives from the nation is no longer given in today’s discourse as positive. So-called
“progressives” have long derided nationalism, fancying themselves as “citizens of the
planet.” In reality, there are no such citizens. A “citizen of the planet” who is not the citizen
of a particular country is a stateless person; that is to say, a person with no recognized right
to live anywhere (let alone everywhere). As Hannah Arendt pointed out in her analysis of the Holocaust, a
stateless person is outside the protection of the law and may be subjected to expulsion,
robbery and liquidation. Furthermore, if a nation state turns to aggressive war and totalitarianism, it
will only be defeated or restrained by another nation state.
Despite the black marks against it, nationalism has been the progressive political form of the
modern era. Machiavelli’s literary mission reflects this understanding, and by the time of Clausewitz the
advantages of nationalism were universally understood and assumed. Anything threatening the nation,
threatens the citizen of the nation. An economic threat, a military threat or a diplomatic maneuver can
bring a nation to ruin. In most cases the individual’s quality of life depends to some extent on the
quality of his nation. A defect in the nation state will, in time, hurt the individual’s position.
Anarchists will not acknowledge the truth of this observation, arguing that the state is evil in itself. But there is no
territory on earth, excepting the uninhabitable wastes of Antarctica, free of state control. It might be said that the
state is like the atomic bomb. We cannot un-invent it.
Grand strategy in the present era is a nationalist enterprise. The practical internationalists of modernity (i.e., the Marxist Leninists who presently govern
There is no
China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, etc.) have been forced to rely on nationalism to advance their revolutionary agenda.
escaping the logic of nationalism, not even for feminists and international socialists. The
nation is the ultimate international actor. Readers often ask what I think of the United Nations. Well, how many nuclear missiles
does the United Nations have? How many divisions? How many carrier battle groups? Who enforces the agenda of the United Nations? The fact is, the
United Nations is nothing more than a meeting place for diplomats to work on specific problems.
The passion of America’s chief Founding Father, George Washington, is best found in his Farewell Address. Washington worried about his country’s future.
He anticipated the threat of civil war, the threat of regional factions, and the dangers inherent in foreign entanglements. The wise statesmen of every
The factionalists who preach racial hatred or gender hatred or class
country are worth studying.
conflict, play a divide and conquer game. The true patriot seeks national unity on the firmest
possible foundation. Freedom is important. Justice is preferable to injustice. But some politicians use
legitimate grievances to divide a country and thereby elevate themselves. Radicals of all
types, including radical feminists, are dangerous because they are divisive and prefer to
wage a kind of civil “cold war.” This may be a war of woman against man, black against
white or poor against rich. However the arrangement is devised, the result must be negative. There
are reasonable grievances and reasonable ways to frame them.
In the political world today we find a host of “single issues” that eclipse national concern with something of a more particular nature. The Right as well as
the Left is guilty of setting national concerns aside. For example, a conservative businessman wants to trade with China. He wants to start up relations
with Russian or Vietnamese or Cuban companies. Economically, trade is good. But when viewed from the standpoint of national security, trade with
certain countries is dangerous. One might then ask the question: what stands higher: economic liberty or national security?
If the security of a free nation is undermined, then liberty is undermined. If we order our
society in such a way that national security finds itself subordinated to dozens of special concerns
– to the demands of capitalists, free thinkers, liberals, feminists, homosexuals, anarchists or
ethnic minorities – then national security will be subverted. Prosperity, freedom and social
justice are good things (to be sure), but we must not pursue these objects by sacrificing the
nation’s strategic position.
My concern with America’s direction is precisely this: America has moved toward prosperity, freedom and social justice in a way that sets particular interests so high upon a pedestal as

we often find the national

to cancel (to some degree or another) the very idea of a coherent national interest. In the rhetoric of today’s demagogues,

interest identified negatively with the rich white male exploiter. Here, the rhetoric of divide
and conquer is clearly at work.

Russia isn’t going to back down – if we were to “contest dominant security logic”
shit would hit the fan – we have to maintain our efforts at dominance to avoid all-
out Russian war
Nyquist 10 (J.R., former Russia analyst for the DOD and all-American man, “The Implacable Enemy,”
http://financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nyquist/the-implacable-enemy, dml)

We don't want to believe in enemies, and if we grudgingly allow that they exist, we certainly will not
admit they are implacable. It is odd, perhaps, but we live at a time in history when people believe
in solutions to everything. In fact, men have solved so many problems in the last 200 years that we imagine
all problems have solutions. Unfortunately, this is an error we must guard against. It is, in fact, an all-
pervasive error which has serious consequences for our time.
Related to this subject, the Jerusalem Post recently published a column titled Editor's Notes: The Bleak Logic of Bennie Begin. The piece includes an
interview with an Israeli politician who is unwilling to delude himself about Israel's present situation. The peace process is not going to work, Begin says. It
does not take proper account of the Palestinian leadership. These sorry folk want to eradicate Israel, and the peace process is merely a cynical ploy on the
part of a cynical foe. Grasping these fundamental points, Begin is a man of logic, a man of simple truth. He is not an ideologue, because ideology properly
belongs to those who believe in dangerous fairy tales.
A few structural points stand out in Begin's discourse. First, people don't usually change, and that
includes enemies; second, a peaceful solution is not always workable; and third, the aim of an
implacable enemy is to eliminate you, and this is not merely a "problem" open to endless discussion.
War is a reality, and you simply have to fight. In this situation talking to your enemy is
always an exercise in self-deception. This last point has come to be universally rejected by Western
politicians. They do not see how discussions of this kind effectively hypnotize the masses, and
fill people's heads with false expectations. In reality, the only solution is the military
solution. But those who dream of peace see military conflict as the problem.
It is no wonder that Begin was against the Oslo peace process, saying that the PLO leadership "will never change." In fact, they never have. The
Palestinian leaders are implacable enemies of Israel. This is not so difficult to see, though it is difficult to admit for those who believe in peace. It is sad to
say, but there cannot be a successful peace process with such an enemy. For such an enemy, peace is merely an interlude of talking, useful for setting up
a future attack. And what makes the PLO implacable? The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by a body of Palestinian
representatives handpicked by the Soviet KGB. The first PLO chairman, Ahmad Shukeiri, was a KGB agent. The Soviet Bloc trained the PLO cadre,
providing them with weapons and strategic guidance. The current head of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, received his Ph.D. from Patrice Lumumba University
in Moscow.
The PLO was an offspring of the KGB, which was an offspring of the Soviet Union, which was
founded by Vladimir Lenin. This man was the enemy of bourgeois civilization, capitalism and
religion. If we look around the world today, we find that regimes influenced by Leninism share an
implacable aspect. Consider the following examples: Venezuela under Chavez (a Leninist) has
threatened to make war on Colombia while allying itself with Iran; North Korea, a Leninist regime,
constantly threatens South Korea; Leninist China presently occupies Tibet, while threatening
Taiwan. According to U.S. State Department cables published by WikiLeaks, Australian Foreign Minister Kevin
Rudd warned U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that America must be ready for war with China. The
Australian statesman did not warn about Japan or India or Indonesia. He warned the United States about
Communist China. And he had good reason. While Leninist regimes frequently advocate "peaceful
coexistence," or detente, or perestroika, they inevitably prepare for a future war against
capitalism. This is what they do, even as they embrace capitalism. And this is what they do because Lenin
taught them to do it, with his famous New Economic Policy (i.e., a retreat into capitalism).
There are enemies out there, and we are quite obviously embarrassed to admit that these
enemies are Communist. One might even think, with such an admission, that we didn't win the Cold
War; that Reagan failed to bring down the Evil Empire. I cannot resist pointing out, once again, that the
Russian government hasn't buried Lenin; and they had a perfectly good opportunity to bury him when
they buried Czar Nicholas II on 17 July 1998. Far from seeking peace, even now, the Russian government has
announced its readiness to deploy a new generation of nuclear warheads and missiles; in fact,
I received a report last week about a Third World businessman who recently traveled to a secret city in Russia
where they were making strategic weapons, and where the KGB was alive and well, and where Russian
military officers heaped scorn upon United States.
Of course, we don't want to acknowledge any of this. As America has grown more prosperous,
more comfortable, and better entertained, we fortuitously made our enemies disappear. In 1991 our
main enemy (the USSR) promptly vanished -- on Christmas Day, no less. The hammer and sickle came down, and
the Russian flag went up. Such was the grounds for declaring a "New World Order." Then we began to build a
global utopia. But there is no such a thing as utopia, and the Communists in Russia and China
were not utopians (contrary to the misrepresentations of those who never understood Communism). "We are
not utopians," wrote Lenin in The State and Revolution. The founders of modern Communism were clear
on this point. And they were also clear on another point, which Lenin was apt to make: "One man with a gun can
control 100 without one."
Here we stand on the edge of an abyss. War may break out tomorrow in the Middle East, Korea, or
the Taiwan Strait. As nuclear weapons spread to South America, the situation in Venezuela is going to
become dangerous. A terrorist attack may disrupt our country at any moment. Have we
understood the underlying theme of implacable enmity running throughout? I submit, as well,
that this is not a "problem" open to endless discussion. It is an explosion that one day will
shatter the world, and potentially cripple our civilization.
So what are we doing about it? Are we continuing to delude ourselves, or are we going to
face the truth?

We control the only risk of extinction

Bostrom, 02 -Ph.D. and Professor at Oxford University (Nick, March,
www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the
USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with
consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal.
There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear
Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy
human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a
future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day
build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and
Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart
humankind’s potential permanently.

The alternative is to reject their anti-American rhetoric – that’s the first

consideration
Nyquist 10 (J.R., former Russia analyst for the DOD and all-American man, “Poisonous Ideas,”
http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2010/0618.html)

Suppose you were tasked with bringing down a civilization, and your only weapon
was language. Could you accomplish your goal? Quite clearly, the answer is yes. To defeat a
civilization language suffices if it can be used to divide man from women, parent from child,
the owners of businesses from the employees, the state from the citizens, and God from the Church.
This, of course, has been the pattern of Communist subversion for the better part of a
century. And even though people imagine that Communism is dead, it is very much alive.
Last week I wrote about Communism on the march. It is impossible to understand the Left without understanding
the role of the Communist Party. It is difficult to write about this subject, as most readers are not educated in
the history or theory of Communism. They do not know Communist tactics, which rely on the
use of language to distort meanings, to confuse and stupefy political speech and
thought. As Communist generals have attested, the various "active measures" initiated by the Communist Party
Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s, were not simply disinformation programs. The primary task was
to plant ideas that would corrupt people's thinking, leading them down a variety
of false paths.
-647
 Patriarchy
No impact to patriarchy – he doesn’t read one?

Patriarchy inevitable
Goldberg 96 [Steven Goldberg, President of Department of Sociology at City College of New York, National
Review, “Is patriarchy inevitable? Men rule not because they are told to, but because it is their nature to do so”]

Men rule not because they are told to, but because it is their nature to do so. IN five hundred
years the world, in all likelihood, will have become homogenized. The thousands of varied societies and their
dramatically differing methods of socialization, cohesion, family, religion, economy, and politics will have given way
to a universal culture. Fortunately, cultural anthropologists have preserved much of our present diversity, which
may keep our descendants from too hastily allowing their natural human ego- and ethno-centricity to conclude that
theirs is the only way to manage a society. However, the anthropological sword is two-edged. While diversity is
certainly apparent from anthropological investigations, it is also clear that there are realities
which manifest themselves no matter what the varied forms of the aforementioned
institutions. Because these universal realities cut across cultural lines, they are crucial to our
understanding of what society by its nature is and, perhaps, of what human beings are. It is
important, then, that we ask why, when societies differ as much as do those of the Ituri Pygmy, the Jivaro, the
American, the Japanese, and a thousand others, some institutions are universal. It is always the case that the
universal institution serves some need rooted in the deepest nature of human beings. In
some cases the explanation of universality is obvious (e.g., why every society has methods of food gathering). But
there are other universalities which are apparent, though without any obvious explanation. Of the thousands of
societies on which we have any evidence stronger than myth (a form of evidence that would have us believe in
cyclopes), there is no evidence that there has ever been a society failing to exhibit three institutions: 1. Primary
hierarchies always filled primarily by men. A Queen Victoria or a Golda Meir is always an
exception and is always surrounded by a government of men. Indeed, the constraints of royal
lineage may produce more female societal leaders than does democracy -- there were more female heads of state
in the first two-thirds of the sixteenth century than there were in the first two-thirds of the twentieth. 2. The
highest status roles are male. There are societies in which the women do most of the important economic
work and rear the children, while the men seem mostly to hang loose. But, in such societies, hanging loose is
given higher status than any non-maternal role primarily served by women. No doubt this is
partly due to the fact that the males hold the positions of power. However, it is also likely that high-status roles are
male not primarily because they are male (ditch-digging is male and low status), but because they are high status.
The high status roles are male because they possess -- for whatever socially determined reason in
whichever specific society -- high status. This high status exerts a more powerful influence on
males than it does on females. As a result, males are more willing to sacrifice life's other
rewards for status dominance than are females. In their Not in Our Genes, Richard Lewontin, Leon
Kamin, and Stephen Rose -- who, along with Stephen Jay Gould are the best-known defenders of the view that
emphasizes the role of environment and de-emphasizes that of heredity -- attempt to find fault with my work by
pointing out that most family doctors in the Soviet Union are women. However, they acknowledge that in the Soviet
Union "family doctoring [had] lower status than in the United States." Which is precisely the point. No one doubts
that women can be doctors. The question is why doctors (or weavers, or load bearers, etc.) are
primarily women only when being a doctor is given lower status than are certain roles
played mostly by men -- and furthermore, why, even when this is the case (as in Russia) the upper
hierarchical positions relevant to that specific area are held by men. 3. Dominance in male - female
relationships is always associated with males. "Male dominance" refers to the feeling, of both
men and women, that the male is dominant and that the woman must "get around" the male to
attain power. Social attitudes may be concordant or discordant with the reality of male
dominance. In our own society there was a time when the man's "taking the lead" was positively valued by most
women (as 30s' movies attest); today such a view is purportedly detested by many. But attitudes toward
male-dominance behavior are causally unimportant to the reality they judge -- and are not much
more likely to eliminate the reality than would a social dislike of men's being taller be able to eliminate men's being
taller. Over the past twenty years, I have consulted every original ethnographic work invoked to demonstrate an
exception to these societal universalities. Twenty years ago many textbooks spoke cavalierly of
"matriarchies" and "Amazons" and pretended that Margaret Mead had claimed to find a
society in which sex roles were reversed. Today no serious anthropologist is willing to claim
that any specific society has ever been an exception.
Feminist issues cannot be resolved within masculinised structures- they
don’t provide an alternative
J. Ann Tickner (professor of international relations at USC) 2001, Gendering World Politics. Pp. 119-
120.
The tensions and contradictions to which Stienstra has pointed are evident in the successes and failures of
women's organizing. While the internationalization of feminism has been very successful in raising issues
of discrimination and has made considerable strides in getting gender issues recognized by international
organizations, in concrete terms women are doing less well than men in all societies. There was a
recognition at the Beijing Conference that, in spite of the attention to these issues over the twenty years
since the beginning of the UN Decade for Women women’s global status was not improving significantly.
A significant reason for these inequalities, which continue, is that women must operate within
"masculinized" organizations and structures.76 Since global organizing is far removed from the realities of
many women's lives, there is a sense that although social movements are used to promote solutions that
criticize' the state, a return to the state is probably necessary to meet the dislocations and poverty
generated by the economic globalization of the late twentieth century."

-172
 Biopolitics
No impact – democracy checks
Dickinson 04 (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of California-Davis, “ Biopolitics, Fascism,
Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity"”, in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004), pg 18-19.)
Foucault's ideas have
In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that
"fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of
government and the state ... and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its
'microphysics.'"48 The "broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus" on "technocratic reason and the ethical
unboundedness of science" was the focus of his interest.49 But the "power-producing effects in Foucault's
'microphysical' sense" (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of "an entire institutional
apparatus and system of practice" (Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive
dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a
particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical
was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the
principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In
National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of
In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a
the volkisch state.
rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is
that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point.
Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s. Indeed, individual states in the United
States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by
National Socialism, mass sterilization, mass "eugenic" abortion and murder of the
"defective." Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of
democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such poli? cies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of
forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not
in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant
horrible; but
radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

Liberal institutions solve genocide

O’Kane, 97 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society,
February, Ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power)
in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of
genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to
terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest
part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a
system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies,
as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those
chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The
choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the
history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal
governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps
towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it
is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern
society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also
economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and
where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in
competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism
both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the
capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or
social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly
modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand
in the way of modern genocides.

173
 Environment
Relocation not happening to Nago now – new mayor election – takes out literally all their
offense because it’s all predicated off of relocation
Yoshimura and Funatsuki 10 (Ryuhei and Kakuchi, writers for the Daily Yomiuri, “Nakaima win
brings Futenma solution no closer”, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T101129005049.htm, dml)

NAHA--Okinawa Gov. HirokazuNakaima's reelection Sunday leaves the Democratic Party of Japan-led
administration with many issues still to resolve to realize the transfer of a U.S. base within
the prefecture, as agreed by Japan and the United States. Nakaima made clear during the gubernatorial
election campaign that he wants the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan to be relocated
outside Okinawa Prefecture.
The government intends to hold talks with Nakaima with the aim of transferring the base's
functions to Nago in the prefecture, as per the agreement reached with the United States in
May, but the governor remains cautious about the plan as he prepares for his second term.
In the final tally, Nakaima garnered 335,708 votes, while former Ginowan Mayor Yoichi Iha collected 297,082 votes,
according to the election administration committee. Tatsuro Kinjo received 13,116 votes. Voter turnout was 60.88
percent, down 3.66 points from the previous election in 2006.
Attempting the impossible
"The bilateral agreement is quite regrettable. [Transferring the base] within the prefecture is
difficult. Speaking practically, it's impossible," Nakaima said during the election campaign.
The bilateral agreement stipulates the transfer of the Futenma base functions to a
replacement facility, to be constructed at Camp Schwab in the Henoko area of Nago and adjacent
waters.
Immediately after a round of banzai cheers celebrating the election victory, Nakaima, 71, who defeated Iha, 58,
reiterated his request that the central government transfer the Futenma functions outside the prefecture.
"The U.S. forces [stationed in Japan] are not only for Okinawa, but for all of Japan. Realistically,
it's become quite difficult to find a transfer location within the prefecture. I ask the central
government once again to find [a relocation site] by considering the whole of Japan,"
Nakaima said.
"I've demanded the central government review the Japan-U.S. agreement and transfer the
base outside the prefecture. I'll wait to see how the government deals with that," he said.
Just before the official start of the election campaign on Nov. 11, Nakaima pledged to "relocate the
Futenma functions outside the prefecture," an expectation held by a majority of residents in
the prefecture. Okinawan locals' opposition to the plan to transfer the Futenma base functions
to the Henoko district was stoked by the DPJ after it took the reigns of government last year.
Nakaima stressed repeatedly during the campaign that such a plan would be impossible. He said he
would ask the central government to consider relocating the facility outside the prefecture, since security
should be considered an issue that involves all Japan, although he would listen to the government's
position.
During the campaign's final stages, however, Nakaima's public speeches often did not include even a word on the base transfer issue. Instead, he talked
about economic and social welfare issues, such as promotion of regional economies, health care and nursing care.
Nakaima, an independent, was recommended by New Komeito and Your Party, both opposition parties, while Iha was backed by the Japanese Communist
Party, the Social Democratic Party, the People's New Party and New Party Nippon. The PNP is a coalition partner of the DPJ.
Tatsuro Kinjo, 46, of the minor Happiness Realization Party, also contested the gubernatorial race, but the election was essentially a one-on-one battle
between Nakaima and Iha.
Candidates supported by conservative parties have triumphed in four consecutive Okinawa gubernatorial elections since 1998.
The DPJ did not field its own candidate, so party members were permitted to vote according to personal preference. The Liberal Democratic Party
supported neither Nakaima nor Iha, but its Okinawa prefectural chapter recommended Nakaima.
Constructing the replacement facility in the Henoko district will require reclamation of land,
for which the permission of the prefectural governor is needed.
The dominant opinion within the government and ruling coalition parties is that the Futenma issue will continue to drag on for
some time before a final solution is reached.
While Nakaima called for transferring the base outside the prefecture, Iha pushed for the idea of moving it out of the country.
Nakaima expanded his support among voters by campaigning on more than just the base issue, touting income increases for prefectural residents and
revitalization of the tourism industry.
Also thought to have helped Nakaima is the positive consideration he paid to the Japan-U.S. alliance, which was brought into focus by North Korea's
artillery attack on a South Korean island last week as well as the collisions between a Chinese fishing boat and Japan Coast Guard patrol ships in
September, in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture.
Iha specifically called for the base functions to be transferred to the U.S. territory of Guam and for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to be reviewed. Such a
radical stance is believed to have alarmed some voters.
Nakaima had in the past approved of the base transfer to Nago. Of his change in stance, he said: "[Transfer within
the prefecture] was inevitable so that the danger [to residents around the Futenma base] could be removed as
 if the Nago municipal government doesn't
soon as possible--that was my thinking at that time. However,
accept [the transfer], then there's no relocation site in Okinawa."
The Futenma base is surrounded by densely populated residential areas.
Those remarks have been interpreted as a message to the central government, suggesting it should talk directly
with the Nago municipal government to persuade it to cooperate on the transfer plan.
Central government's interests
Before Sunday's election, the government and the DPJ thought a win for Nakaima would be the only
result that might leave some possibility of transferring the base within the prefecture.
"To be honest, we want Mr. Nakaima to win the election," a senior Defense Ministry official said before Sunday's vote.
After Nakaima's reelection became certain Sunday night, however, comments from government and DPJ officials had a mostly careful tone, simply
expressing their intention to discuss the base issue with the governor and the prefecture's residents.
"If they made comments rejoicing in Nakaima's reelection, it would anger the residents," a government official said.
Nago Mayor Susumu Inamine, who supported Iha in the election, warned Nakaima to live up to his campaign pledge.
"Mr.Nakaima promised to 'demand the transfer to outside the prefecture.' He ought to fulfill
that promise," Inamine said.
LDP Secretary General Nobuteru Ishihara said the spotlight would now be back on the DPJ-led central government's
handling of the issue.
"The administration is responsible for finding a way to resolve the base issue to remove the
dangers of Futenma Air Station as soon as possible...We'll watch the administration closely to see whether it
can do that," Ishihara said.
New Komeito leader Natsuo Yamaguchi said the base relocation issue could distract the central
government from other important issues: "The DPJ invited this confusion. [Nakaima's reelection] could
affect the administration's steering of the government."
For the time being, the central government intends to prioritize improving Okinawa Prefecture's
economy and lessening the burden that hosting U.S. bases places on it--and, in doing so, develop an
understanding of what might persuade the prefecture to agree to a relocation plan.
Nakaima, formerly a bureaucrat in the International Trade and Industry Ministry (now the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry), has said there is no need
to cut ties with the central government. In fact, he has been asking the central government to extend and upscale a 10-year Okinawa Prefecture economic
promotion plan that will expire in fiscal 2011.
Transport minister Sumio Mabuchi, who also serves as the minister in charge of Okinawa Prefecture affairs, said Sunday night, "While closely
communicating with the prefectural government, we'll work on measures to realize self-reliance and sustainable development of the prefectural
economy."
it will be difficult for
No matter what develops between the central and prefectural governments, however,
Nakaima to disregard the Nago municipal government and suddenly approve the transfer.
The government has been studying the option of Prime Minister Naoto Kan visiting the prefecture to build a relationship of trust with Nakaima, but many
insiders are cautious about such a plan.
"It'll be meaningless if the prime minister just makes a visit to say hello to Nakaima," a central government official said.
A sobering prospect was offered by a senior Okinawa Prefecture official, who reflected the dominant opinion within the prefectural government by saying
progress on the issue is still very much a long-term prospect.
"The Futenma issue won't move forward until the next Nago mayoral election three years
from now," the official said.

149

Extinction is empirically denied and there’s multiple alt causes

Bruno, associate professor UNC Chapel Hill, 10 [John F., May 3, “Biodiversity Loss Continues Unabated
Despite International Efforts”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-f-bruno/biodiversity-loss-continu_b_561699.html]
Betting on biodiversity loss is a pretty sure thing. The earth's plant and animal species are disappearing
at a sobering rate due to pressures including habitat loss, climate change, pollution and
over-harvesting. Despite a few success stories and steps in the right direction, we are falling far short of
stemming these losses. Biodiversity is the entire range of biological variety in the world, including the
diversity of genotypes, species and ecosystems. It can be measured on levels from DNA molecules all the way up to
broad taxonomic categories such as families and phyla. Monitoring the fate of any of these aspects of biodiversity
at a global scale is a daunting task. Thus, we know little about the rates and patterns of biodiversity loss or the
effectiveness of global mitigation plans such as the 2002 Convention on Biological Diversity. Dr. Stuart Butchart
of the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre and BirdLife International tackled the problem by
assembling an international team of conservation scientists (that I was part of) to calculate trends
in global biodiversity. The idea was to assemble several dozen indices that we had sound, long term data for
including population trends for birds and other vertebrates and the loss of habitats such as forests, seagrass beds
and coral reefs. As we recently reported in Science magazine, our analysis indicates that biodiversity
has continued to decline over the past four decades with no detectable abatement for
most indices. This is largely due to increased pressures resulting from human population
growth, economic development and globalization but it also seems clear that our international
response to the biodiversity crisis has been inadequate. Every aspect of biodiversity on earth is unique. The species
that we have already driven extinct, from the Dodo to the Tasmanian Tiger, can never be resurrected or replaced.
As a field ecologist, I have been lucky to experience and work on some truly wondrous examples of the earth's
biodiversity from the tide pools of the Pacific Northwest to rainforests in Costa Rica to alpine habitats in the Rocky
Mountains. The downside of my otherwise fantastic job is that I witness the degradation of nature firsthand. The
coral reefs of the Florida Keys of today bear little resemblance to the underwater jungles patrolled by large sharks
that I snorkeled over as a kid 35 years ago. Over the last two decades I have observed and
documented striking biodiversity losses even on isolated and seemingly untouched reefs.

38
 Solvency
‘
Every life is an end in and of itself – All lives are infinitely valuable, the only
ethical option is to maximize the number saved

Cummisky 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, “Kantian Consequentialism”, p.

131)

even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and
Finally,
compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point
still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one
person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the
priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two
compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill's example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I
cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed.
Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I
should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss
of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how
the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity
who are saved, the better.8

Exclusion is a reason to vote neg – They advocate that the group they save is
more important than the rest of humanity – Since all lives are equal, you should
treat them that way by protecting the greatest number

Dworkin 77 (Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University (Ronald

1977, “Taking Rights Seriously” pg 274-5)
The liberal conception of equality sharply limits the extent to which ideal arguments of policy may be used to justify any constraint on liberty. Such arguments
cannot be used if the idea in question is itself controversial within the community. Constraints cannot be defended, for example, directly on the ground that they contribute to
a culturally sophisticated community, whether the community wants the sophistication or not, because that argument would violate the canon of the liberal
conception of equality that prohibits a government from relying on the claim that certain forms of life are inherently more valuable than others.
Utilitarian argument of policy, however, would seem secure from that objection. They do not suppose that any form of
life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead base· their claim, that constraints on liberty are
necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, just on the fact that that goal happens to be
desired more widely or more deeply than any other. Utilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the
contrary to embody the fundamental right of equal concern and respect, because they treat the
wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no
bonus or discount reflecting the view that that member is more or less worthy of concern, or his views
more or less worthy of respect, than any other. This appearance of egalitarianism has, I think, been the principal source of the great appeal that utilitarianism has had, as a general
political philosophy, over the last century. In Chapter 9, however, I pointed out that the egalitarian character of a utilitarian argument is often an illusion. I will not repeat, but only summarize, my
argument here. Utilitarian arguments fix on the fact that a particular constraint on liberty will make more people happier, or satisfy more of their preferences,
depending upon whether psychological or preference utilitarianism is in play. But people's overall preference for one policy rather than another may be seen to include, on
further analysis, both preference that are personal, because they state a preference for the assignment of one set of goods or opportunities to him and preferences that are external, because they
state a preference for one assignment of goods or opportunities to others. But a utilitarian argument that assigns critical weight to the external preferences of members of
the community will not be egalitarian in the sense under consideration. It will not respect the right of everyone to be treated with equal concern and
respect.

Their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize
Issac 2 (Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of
Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends,
Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked.
"aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a
response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the
Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to
 Calls for
respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice?
diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But
they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how
diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand campus left offers no such account. To do
so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of
power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves
To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend
contests over the distribution and use of power.
to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to
say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah
an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern
Arendt have taught,
the purity of one's intention does not ensure
may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that
the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties
may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view
them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see
that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of
complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In
categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much
about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the
alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be
sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically
contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines
political effectiveness.

Utilitarianism is inevitable

Green 2 – Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, November 2002 "The
Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314)
Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are

Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex

wise to shun this sort of talk.

deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same.
However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and

obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of
deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you
can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights,
Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and
absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of
children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself
balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one
is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day
one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the
deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really
are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or
covertly consequentialist.