Susan Hamilton shamilt@fas.harvard.

edu

Posen, Barry R. 1993. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”. Survival 35
(1):27-47.

Abstract
This article applies the realist concept of the “security dilemma” to the special conditions
of ethnic conflict, particularly as they arise when these ethnic groups suddenly find
themselves responsible for their own security (such as after the break up of the Soviet
Union).

Summary
The Security Dilemma
The security dilemma can be applied usefully to collapsing imperial regimes because they
can best be described as “emerging anarchy” and the security dilemma in realist theory
relies upon the condition of anarchy in order to claim that security is the first concern of
states. There will be competition for the key to security—power—until some states have
amassed enough power to begin to threaten others. Thus relative power is the key. This
causes the security dilemma: “what one does to enhance one’s own security causes a
reaction that, in the end, can make one less secure.”

The security dilemma is particularly intense when: 1) defensive forces cannot be

distinguished from offensive forces, 2) offensive forces are superior to defensive forces;
this leads to a greater likelihood of preventative war or aggression. These two conditions
are often present in emerging states.
1) The “groupness” of the ethnic groups creates highly motivated infantry which thus
make good offensive , as opposed to what they are traditionally viewed as, defensive
forces. Thus, the main mechanism by which each side will assess the offensive intentions
of the other side will have to be history. The result will be that each side will assume that
the other’s group identity poses a threat. In sum, the military capabilities o f a group will
be judged bases on the group’s sense of identity rather than their military assets which are
usually limited.
2) Two factors influence the superiority of offensive to defensive capabilities equation:
technology and geography. Technology only really matters in the case of nuclear
weapons. If both ethnic groups have nuclear weapons then nationalism will play less of a
role in the security dilemma. Political geography is what matters most, particularly
islands of population of one ethnic group in another ethnic group’s territory. Whether or
not to wage preventative war to protect these islands of population is a variable that
changes in each situation. The vulnerability of civilians “makes it possible for small
bands of fanatics to initiate conflicts,” by practicing “ethnic cleansing”. The UN’s
typical behavior adds incentives to waging a preventative war since the UN just
negotiates cease fires. The advantage thus usually goes to the group which initiated the
conflict.
Susan Hamilton shamilt@fas.harvard.edu

“The relative rate of state formation strongly influences the incentives for preventative
war.”(9). Those states which coalesce earliest will have a window of opportunity in
which to wage a successful war.

Posen then applies this version of the security dilemma to two test cases: Croats and
Serbs, and

Croats and Serbs: Posen finds that the likelihood of conflict is high due to the following
factors: 1) both parties identified the others as offensive threats due to their previous
history, 2) the offensive appeared to have the advantage for both sides, largely due to
islands of Serbs in Croat territory, 3) preventative war incentives were high because the
two sides were not equally strong, 4) small bands of fanatics appeared on the scene.

Russia and Ukraine: Posen finds the potential for conflict was not as great due to the
following reasons: 1) Neither views the other ‘s cohesion and group identity as a serious
threat, due in part to the fact that both had nuclear weapons and thus effective deterrents;
2) each side’s “conception of the other’s identity is comparatively benign.” 3) there are
no significant “islands” of population to cause pressure for a preventative war.

Posen’s Conclusions
1) The security dilemma has “considerable ability to explain and predict the probability
and intensity of military conflict” among groups emerging from collapsing empires. 2)
“The risks associated with these conflicts are quite high.”3). “If outsiders which to
understand and perhaps reduce the odds of conflict, they must assess the local group’s
strategic view of their situation.”