Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Linda B.Miller
Wellesley College/Brown University/USA
E-mail Linda_Miller@brown.edu
The Opportunity
Richard Haass
New York: Public Affairs, 2005, 242 pp.
$25.00 hardcover
Introduction
In the long run, will the Iraq war, regardless of its outcome, lead to
more opportunities for the U.S. to exercise its unprecedented power
at home and abroad? Or will the protracted war lead to a set of a more
modest foreign policy goals for Washington, one more in keeping with
the domestic roots of isolationism in American political history? These
are among the provocative questions several new books on U.S.
foreign policy pose as the war grinds on with no exit strategy evident.
For those who see “opportunity”, the fact that the U.S. is “the
sole remaining superpower”, a “benevolent hegemon”, one destined
to exert control in all spheres of global politics, economics, culture and
military affairs remains valid for the forseeable future. “Opportunity”
exists for institutionalizing American advantages with proper
leadership. For those who see Iraq as constituting enduring
constraints on American power, the insurgent phase of the war has put
paid to extravangant notions of “empire”. No amount of sustained
nuanced diplomatic practice now can rescue Washington from facing
the international consequences of having embarked on the ill fated war
of choice in the first place. Damage control has replaced more
innovative postures, at least for now.
This debate plays out with authors producing some of the same
evidence to reach opposite conclusions. Rarely do writers confront
each other directly, so that obervers must be the ones to point out
their differences and possible agreement, as I will do in this essay.
For optimists who think that the Iraq war will not detract from
American power and influence globally in the long term, Haass’s sense
of opportunity makes considerable sense. For pessimists who think the
Iraq war is the culmination of decades of U.S. arrogance and
ignorance, reinforced by the Vietnam residue, Bacevich’s warnings
speak volumes.
Iraq is a key example throughout the book which ranges far and
wide over familiar terrain. Well-written and researched, Walt’s analysis
never veers far from his central concern which is the lack of connection
between ends and means. For this critical failing, he blames U.S.
political leaders primarily but not exclusively, as he depicts the often
clumsy yet successful efforts of other leaders who try to exploit U.S.
preferences, especially successive Israeli governments. Walt is
skeptical of the assertion that the U.S. in an empire, formal or
informal, because that formulation obscures the ways in which
resistance to Washington’s suggestions or dictates develops and
metasizes with advanced communications. (2)
Conclusion
What the end of the cold war and 9/11 has permitted is a more
expansive canvas on which to paint the light and shadow of
globalization and terrorism as they affect different players differently.
These four authors offer important guideposts, if not roadmaps, in
these interesting times. Wisely, they avoid the trap of “empire versus
republic” as a starting point for their critiques, one that has attracted
many writers since 1989. Even more sagely, they realize that this
discussion has led to dead ends analytically. Facile but misleading
comparisons with Britain and Rome have obscured the more important
demographic and technological advantages that give the U.S. its
stature but also perhaps its vulnerability. As a result, Gulliver remains
Goliath for now.In Iraq, though, Samson is still a possible fate.
Notes
1. See, for a revised estimation, John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War,
New York, The Penguin Press, 2005. See also Tony Judt, “A Story Still
To Be Told”, The New York Review of Books, March 23, 2006, pp.11-
15.
4. John Gray, “The Mirage of Empire”, The New York Review of Books,
January 12, 2006, pp. 4-8.
References