Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES
FORT L ENWORTH, KANSAS
DO NT NO. 2146 *12 COPY NO. 1
. ... BY
1951 -1952
May 1952
) ('S< Fl^,^
II B~
TABLE OF COTTNTS
Chapter Page
INTRODUCTION
since the founding of our country, has, with few exceptions, been
one of peace. America has rarely been the aggressor. Rather, the
aggressors of the world have come to us. This policy has put us
industry became geared to war and our civilian armies were mobil-
which later we must retake, Herein lies the basis of our study -
our necessity for retaking the ground we have lost in the initial
stages of our wars - ground that must be lost because of our be-
r ' } ' T r r
77~"O~&
assault force.. This same omission is apparent in the doctrine
existent.
armor, the above only being mentioned to show the need that exists
force.
our study. From here then, let us move to the specialized field
2
are the questions we shall attempt to answer,
Scope
First we shall go. into the history of World War II and look at
4. shipping requirements;
landing force,
The only document directly concerned with the subject, other than
3
historical examples, that came to light during our research was
cerned.
many landings, but the complete armored divisions was never used.
and landing craft for use in future wars are still in the research
Definition of Terms
this study. Most of them are military. Even among the military,
below:
landing move from either one shore to the next or from the ship
to the shore.
operations." 3
ing attack." 4
ment and supplies embarked on the same ship but without regard
6
of the main landing. 't 9
"
on completion of the assigned mission. l0
enemy, 11
amphibious tank,
Methods of Research
7
we realized that many factors under consideration could con-
chapters which became his specific project. This step was neces-
ual sufficient time to dig as deeply as time would permit into any
particular phase.
chapters.
Outline of Study
8
current armored division organization; vehicular developments
_. ^13 _ _ ~_
21 February 45).
2
FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington: 1951), 1.
3
FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington; 1951), 329.
7
FM 100-5, Department of the Army (Washingtor 1949), , 233,
8 > 233,
FM 100-5, Department of the Army (ashingtor L: 1941),
9
FM 17-34, Department of the Army (Washington 1: 1950), p 71.
10
FLl 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington: 1951), 4.
So, the lessons for us, are few, Nevertheless, our study would
are few, many are the lessons concerning armor. It would appear
seizing the objective. For this reason, the sum total of the
10
experiences of separate tank battalions operating with infantry
are subjects for complete studies, Accounts of the last two have
the Army, in lengthy volumes. Three years was spent in the prepa-
1
ration of "Cross Channel Attack" by Dr. G.A. Harrison, Many other
shall touch each briefly to show the part played by armor, and in
Here, we will state facts - the plans and what actually happened.
only four landings, and why, after choosing but four landings,
four landings were chosen because time, space, and the purpose
of the study did not permit more. In answer to the second question,
the four landings selected were chosen because (1) both the North
theaters during World War II- We could have picked many others,
within the time available and the scope of our study, these four
levels. 2 The main issue concerned whether we should put all effort
The next day the information was cabled to General Eisenhower, then
The Western Task Force, under the command of Major General George
one armored combat command and one armored combat team. The
L, R. Fredendall, sailed from the United Kingdom and had the mis-
Combat Teams (all from the lst Infantry Division), one combat
command from the lst Armored Division, and the 1st Ranger Bat -
tank landing ships, one gun landing ship, and twenty-three motor
sailed from the United Kingdom, and had the mission of seizing
the armor of the Western and Center Task Forces, Before going
in all cases, the enemy who would oppose our landings would be
the left (West) flank of the Center Task Force, and to capture
Oran. The assault at Les Andalouses was made by the 26th RCT,
F .
$
§
2{
:
- ;
Bou Zedjar was made by elements of CCB.10 This landing shall
divided into two columns. The East column was under the command
General CCB, and was to land at Arzew Bay after the beach had
troop list): Task Force Red was ordered to land at Arzew Bay
1.
All in all, CCB, in Field Order #1 dated 11 October 1942, gave
for the column to land as soon as the beach was secured, assemble
column also had the mission of covering the assembly area of the
12
and 0ran.
of w- ter. 13
Zebra Beach. The landing was unopposed, and at 0221 hours the
The column departed from Tafaraoui at 0835, and, around 1100, after
ing the airport and also preventing the escape of the airport
17
garrison. At 1112 the attack was launched and by 1215, the
airport and 300 prisoners were in the hands of the "Flying Column" 14
18
guards enroute to Tafaraoui from Oran. The road blocks es-
18
necessity for the guarding of prisoners of war and captured
15
Command Post of CCB was established in the Post Office of St Leu.
see Annex II): Task Force Green, under Brigidier General (then
21
ing General, CCB.
080100 November 1942 with one company on X-ray Green beach and one
or La Senia airfields. 2 1
6th Armored Infantry Regiment radioed the Task F:orce Command .Post
his entire unit was ashore and was proceeding to their final
beachhead.2 4
20.
encountered which slowed down the unloading considerably.
ing Column" toward Lourmel. This unit met the first resistance
one mile west of Bou Telis at .1408. This roadblock was destroyed
vehicle was lost to the column during this attack - a half track-
day horWver, and the column bivouced for the night in Sabkra, 2 5
fthei
Summarys. :In- thi.s short review.:t- a.t.ion.t ;,Q.CB:lt Armored
Division, during the TORCH Operation, we have seen haov one major
combat command landed after the beach had been secured and,
21
after landing, advanced rapidly to seize an objective deep
manad was making its own assault landing, and, after securing
gardless of this fact, the operation does point out several poss-
and seize the principal port and city of Casablanca. This in-
Force. 2 6
This study will primarily concern itself with the land-
ings at Safi, for it was here that the greatest amount of armor
was involved.
Harmon was given the following missions: (a) to secure Safi and
the airport East of the town; (b) to insure the unloading of the
battalion (both from the 2nd armored division), and two platoons
of AAA; and (c) the 'Sea Train LAKEHURST carrying a tank battalion
from the 67th Armored Regiment, a detachment from the 56th Med-
ical Battalion and a platoon from Company "B", 443rd AAA Battalion.2 7
Task Force. It was given to General Harmon since the overall plan
envisoned his force moving the 150 miles up the coast to Casablanca
an armistice with the French made this plan, in the and,, unnecessary.
23
The Safi garrison, 450 effectives, received an invasion
ine gun and rifle fire., The destroyer IMERVINE, covering the
BERNADOU, countered this fire and within six minutes, all enemy
Company over the side. This was done, and that part of the port
the dock after which K Company moved to the South of Safi where
2 8
they established a roadblock.
main harbor area on Green Beach and the 1st Battalion landed on
Blue Beach, about 2000 yards to the North. Immediately after land-
ing the 1st Battalion began to move South toward Safi. At dawn,
just North of the town, the column received machine gun and rifle
fire from French in position on the high ground just East of the
road. This was the initial baptism of fire for these troops, and
28
head - was secured by 1600 hours.
28
board had been unloaded.
Yellow Beach, eight miles south of Safi, Here, the surf condi-
tions were bad and not until 1400 hours was the entire team on
and were occupying the south portion of the 10,000 yard beach-
head, An armored team was sent twelve miles east along the road
night from French troops stationed there. This force occupied its
deceived the French as to his intentions and was well on his way
25
LE SHIMA
THE PLAN OF ATTACK
AFLD
5 0 5
MILES
XXV J d^36Z
CORPS
CORPS RES
KERAMA IS
L 6
[X77t-
2 MAR
SOURCE: DEMOS1TRATION
MAP NR 6, THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC, OKINAWA,
THE LAST BATTLE BY APPLEMAN, BURNS, GUGELER, AND STEVENS,
PUBLISHED BY THE HISTORIC DIV, DA, 1948.
1~ 4::~~
&I~I
K } Kr k
41; f ~Tt~
~1 1 ,, ;~ (J
;~
9 All) ~
K 1~ ~
K. ~ ~. I hi
[PPKAThL~]; :~5
~I 4 p
j ~ I~
'C: ~
L"~ 2
<2L4'
zTh ii~ I
~4~V1 ji
]~ ~~ h ZIP
jjp~j s 66J
~jH
- ~ jQj(§J:
N _ _
0 -
~ ~1' iJj~ ~ I
!JK I Ill ~ 1:
~II
~KJ~ ~ ]~ I _ I QThi~
~(
~k ~~ ~ 1.
~j I >] i~j7 : K ;~. K I ~
3i<i'#IN 71 :N~j~ ~. F
'!~j I p
P K
J:<~ I'
might be used as an assault landing force - to land on a
lightly held beach several miles from the main landing, and
were being made at both Port Lyautey and Fedalah. Both were
For our purpose, they have little application and will not
be studied,
Sicilian Invasion
2nd U.S. Armored Division was one of major United States units
practice was conducted from the LST's during the practice land-
30
ings.
and the deeper draft of the LST. Both FATIC and naval personnel
time was lost while this difficulty was under study, a complete-
be split into two separate forces. CCA was attached to the 3rd
division, less CCA but with the 18th RCT attached was to be the
ing troops. 33
The missions of this force were to land in the
LICATA area, capture and secure the port and airfield
by dark
of D day, extend the beachhead, and protect the left flank of
30
the operation against interference from the northwest. On its
109ts bombed the harbor at Licata. Two LST's were sunk, one of
The entire invasion was nearly disrupted and serious damage was
31
Shortly after daybreak, three companies from the battalion were
command had debrked and at 0630, the advanced guard passed through
38
main body in company sized groups immediately after debarking.
hours 'The command echelon went ashore at. 1700 and made arrange-
ments for assembly areas. 4 0 and at .1900, the 18th RCT and the
were available for combat and in position .to fire on the entire
them to take up positions from which they could c over the CCB
42
command post and the troops in the assembly area.
43
completed by early morning of 12 June 1943,
the following:
and Infantry cannon; This action lasted about two hours when
tanks while the losses to our own tankers consisted of four men
Division anti-tank guns had been lost when the LST on which they
4 6
would have come of this attack.
are:
become operations.47
take but a few short paragraphs to see what armor was used and
did not call for the tanks to make any exploitation off beaches.
armored gun would have any change for survival on the beach. In
the tanks not leaving the beach during threassault phase, but,
water. 51
JN o
L-
I f
9
I
0
1~
I
.4-h
4. i
I
>1
7 (0
(/,z
Fu
w
010
w
z C-)r
OM'
r4
-J W
O -' IJ bJ
w
E-a
-J
U)
I-
W xx
N 0
Q0
04
F_j
-
I0
=
c
C) C.
o -0
C/)
Id W ' M N i
Q zQ
U
La-
Id W
z0
UU
With this concept in mind then; a tank battalion was
to lead the attack. They were to get ashore in one of two ways.
Some would be carried a the beach on LCT's and land with the
placed in two armored groups - the 3rd and 6th. These groups
Armored Group) for the landing on OMAHA Beach and the 4th Infantry
Division (6th Armored Group) for the UTAH Beach landings. The
3rd Armored group consisted of the 741st, 743rd, and 745th Tank
Battalions while the 70th and 746th Tank Battalions made up the
but did have a Tank Dozer Platoon attached. The support echelon
38
LANDING DIAGRAM, OMAHA BEACH
(SECTOR OF 1I6th RCT)
Co A 743 Th Bn Co A 743 Tk an
H!O 46 £r Cl ooC
04 Demolitipon 146 Engr CT
ControlSoat 146 Enyr CT C
AAWBr 1 n AAAW
Str I lot 1-
AWt HQ-JA
COGtrLll1t
C(i)
AAAWStry _..-1161 ARAW..
St
112Engr n Co 81ml
SI Wpng o 149 Enr 141 Engr 121EnopSO 1st SpntnolI 1ot
BeachBeach
8n an 5
141Bac Bn 121
i ngr C 1 n
8450 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 (30 0 @
CotL 1610n* Colto 11l6n Co 0t00 12nLf 0o0
H+57
OOQ~on9 0 M n 6 1 n
®
G 30l
HQ C 1n on
llnp H121qn llEogr~n CoAsSB
- 2EdRanger o
H"65
a Lg;
u2S~i~ on Alt IHOs H0 Go 6 lot 21 Eog, on 5~t Ranger on
H"906
66
5 PA Sn Armd
two companies each from the 70th, 741st, and 743rd Tank
52
June. Everyone was ready for the big show.
off the operation for that day. By now, the entire wold is
on 6 June even though the weather was not promising. But this
struck a mine. But the opposition was so light that there was
tanks got ashore safely - the four being lost when the LST
most of D day, the German LXXIV Corps believed they had stopped
40 -
OPERATIONS OVERLAY
PORT LYAUTEY OPERATIONS
OVERLAY
OPERATION MAP
1
50,000
TO ACCOMPANY FO NR 1
+72 BY COMMAND OF BRIG GEN L K TRUSCOTT
DON E CARLSTON
COLONEL,CAVALRY
RESERVE CHIEF OF STAFF
II OFFICIAL:
DAN H BOND
MAJ, INF
ASST C/S G3
SREIN
H 3 60 (+DE TS)
TO THIS LINE
LURE
MY NORTH
THIS LINE
H -- 2:15
BROWN 2
SEIZE HOLDBRIOGE
NAVAL GUNFIRE
/'
-Sd A-B- BOMBARDMENT ON CALL AFTER
0615
C-O- INTERDICTIONS
E- SCHEDULED FIRES AFTER 0615
SOURCE: US LANDINGS IN FRENCH
MOROCCO, THE ARMORED (de,
FORCE SCHOOL, APRIL 1943
HC'LDE EPI
RFC O THIS' t
*am"mI
ER TO '°'° LN
--- 33
RED CC"B"
OR AN
LES ANDALOUSES
ST.
*
GREEN I CCB
BON THELIS
MILES 5 4 3 2 I; 0 5
• I I 1 I I
were launched 6000 yards off shore. Almost immediately they
began to have difficulty with the sea. Only five of the thirty-
56
the sea was to rough to launch them.
t
On the left flank of the 116th Regiment s sector, the
the DD tanks were swamped and lost. One tank company was
was stiff, most of the tanks were lost to the surf. In con-
cluding its report on the D-day landings, the 1st Army Armored
study.
World War II, There were, however, many tank and amphibious
to this study. Here we have tim~e for but one landing. Thus,
ed.
Background.. Operation ICEBERG, the plan for the
was under our control, Japan had but two choices: (1) surren-
62
der or (2) prepare for an all out defense of their home islands.
Attached to the XXIV Corps were two army divisions - the 7th
Army control were the 2nd Marine Division, 27th Army Division
cerned.
FEDALA- BEACHHEAD(DALEPANOATCK
(DETAILED PLA N OF ATTACK)
MANSOURI A
SOURCE: f
US LANDINGS IN FRENCH MOROCCO, THE ARMORED FORCE SCHOOL, APRIL 1943
In January 1945, XXIV1, Corps was engaged in the final
ing them to 10th Army for the Okinawa campaign. At this time,
group remained with the divisions with whon they had operated
coordination with XXIV Corps special staff. nijor items for the
6 6
part in the operation.
follows 67
77th Division
called for XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps to land with
(See Chart 7)68 Units were loaded and the assaults made as
49
was the largest pre-invasion concentration of naval gunfire
with napalm. 70
wave and at 0800 they were flagged across the line of departure,
4000 yards from the beach. Behind them, five to seven waves
the reef, these gunboats turned aside and the amphibious tanks
71
and tractors continued to the beach.
During the entire move the the beach, the only sign of
all tn tin. ,7 1
The entire landing was unbelieveably easy. There
had been but little artillery fire, no enemy on the beach, and
5 April 1945 that stiff enemy resistance was finally met. The
winning of the island was still a long way off. But a very
deviiite foothold had been secured.
Conclusion
assault Landing.
Harrison, p 11
4
Harrison,,p.31
5Harrison,,p
31
6
Harrison, p 32
7
General of the Army D,D. Eisenhower, Commander in
Chief's Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1V43, p 6
.. . .= ,, -- -- -- . ,-
8
General of the Army DD. Eisenhower, Crusade In
Europe (New York:1948), p 83
9Major General J. C, haydon, DSO,, OBE, Impressions
Gained from the Assault Phase of the Operations in North Africa
between 6 November and 23 November 1942, p 1
17
A Brief History of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored
Infantry Regiment from October 11, 1942 to 1ay 12, 1943,
author unknown, ;p2 (hereinafter referred to as 2nd Bn,
6th AIR.)
20
2nd Bn, 6th AIR, p 3
22
0perations Report, TF Green, 2347 hours, 7 November
1942 to 1625 hours, 10 November 42.
2
30perations Joura, 13th Armored Regiment, 0400 hours,
8 November 1 9 4 2 , p 1
242 perations Report, 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry
Regiment, 8 %ovember 1942.
25
Operations Journal, Green Force "Flying Column"
2
General of the Army DD, Eisenhower, Commander
in Chief 's Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1943, p 12.
2 7
U.S. Landings in Morocco, Tactics Department, The
Armored School (Fort Knox: 1943) p8
40
Committee 4, Advanced Class, 49-50, 20
41
Committee #4, Advance d Class, 49-50, 21
50
Harrision, p 3 1
5
1Hrrrision, p 192
52
1st US Army Report of Operations 20 Oct 13 to 1
August 1944, by Staff 1st US Army, p 195 (annex 9 to report).
53 Harrision, p 304
5 4 Harrison,
P 305
5 5
Harrison, p 309
56
Harrision, p 315
575
1st US Army, Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43 to
1 August 1944, by Staff, 1st US Army, p 201 (Annex 9 to report).
58
Appleman, Burns,Gugelor and Stevens, The War in the
Pacific, OkinJaJa: The Last Battle, (Washington: Historical
Division, DA, 1948) (hereinafter referred to as Appleman, Burns,
Gugeler, and,. tevenst. p 69
59
Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 36
60
Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 17
61
° Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 4
62
Applemnan, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 1
6363
Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 25
6 9
Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Chart IV,
opposite p 43,
54
7 1 Appleman,
Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p 70
landing forces changed with each operation but one thing became
why was the armored division not used as an assault landing force
during World War II, and second- is the armored division now suit-
upon the size of the operation, For example, the planning staff
the actual invasion, Even before the end of 1941 British joint
operation.
are unloaded.
follows:
space.
and aviation. The use of naval gunfire and close air support
58
shoreline to permit rapid debarkation, and advance inland of
supplies.
after landing the assault troops but before supplies and equip-
ment can be. landed., Underwater conditions and strong defenses may
be considered here,
choice of time and place lies with the attacking force and
require the defender to dissipate his forces in order to defend
relatively unprotected.
addition to the above that must be planned for but will not be
discussed here.
employed during World War II but only one will be discussed, the
Armored Force Field Manual 17-10, which stated: "The role of the
power."
to the division.
was gained at this time and some craft are now available. Research-
ified by the War Department for a new type armored division based
Other units added are the heavy tank battalion and an antiaircraft
to 15,973.
amphibious operations.
and tank soldi rs of the division are trained from the beginning
Figure 2
the landing would enable the division to quickly expand the beach-
66
vehicles when combat 'loading and in addition, armored infantry
of the unit ashore if carriers did not follow closely and the
degree.
Figure 3
Infantry
Division 2334 259 1514
Armored
Division 2165 1241* 1358
future.
2 p,151
:Ibid,
3
FM 60-5, (Department of the Army, February 1951),p 227
5
Ibid
area over the last three to six thousand yards of water from
the various methods and materiel used in the past, that present-
landing.
less shipping space than when tanks are equipped to float and
69
hand use of our present landing Ships limits almost entirely
a ship of the LSD type to carry the loaded landing Ship to the
assault area.
gun during the assault. Upon reaching shore the vehicle must be
capable of immediate combat and should be able to discard in a
just above the tracks, Propellers were geared to the engine and
ing the tank was able to float and propel itself through deep
water until the tracks contacted the ground. Upon reaching shore
the propellers were disengaged and the canvas wall was collapsed,
the surf as the tracks make cn.tact with the beach, Due to the
71
tp
Y:
b
while the tanks is in the water. The canvas is also highly
flotation device for the M4 medium tank, known as the T-6 was
Ing kit) when prepared for launching: The front and rear out-
the TS swimming device for the M-26 Tank, This model could
tank.
DESCRIPTION:
The Deive, T8 provides the means for floating the
....
Medium Tank, M26 as a self-propelled unit. It consists of
metal floats in four jettisonable assemblies with propulsion
furnished by the vehicle tracks; steering is accomplished
with two rudders....The rudders are manually operated by a
crank handle in the driver's compartment which connect to
the rudders by chain and cable. The vehicle is equipped
with a standard fording kit...
PURPOSE :
To provide flotation equipment which will permit the
Medium Tank, N26 to negotiate, under its own power, deep
rivers and expanses of ocean.
HISTORY:
The first test of the equipment was made at APG
(Aberdeen Proving Ground,) 25 April 1946,..(The size
and weight of the device poses a problem in logistics.
Assembly under field.caditions would be a major problem.
It was recommended.. "No further development work should
be carreid on with floating devices of this type for the
Medium Tank 1.26,
or tther vehicles of equal or greater
5
weight except as an expedient ..
f T
+44
f
3
launching from the landing Ships impossible. They can only
the tank inside the ship allowing it to move out under its own
power.
the initial assault and used until the standard tanks can come
4s and 5s are the only type in use by the Army at present. The
latter.
~ : 04 d
V7
LVT(A)'s need no special preparation for swimming.
persornnel carriers and have the same suspension system and engine
nor the two Cadillac engines give enough power for the weight
of the tanks and tractors and the loads they carry. 'The
Vehicles cannot be steered at low speeds in the water due to the
World War II. Haoever, the Army has one regular battalion and
are equipped with the LVT(A)4 and LVT(A)5 in the tank companies
Marines in the Inchon Landing and for two crossings of the Han
fording kits. Such kits are available for all armored vehicles
80
top of the turret if so desired4 Those portions of the kit
able to make them capable of moving under their own power through
the water between the landing craft ramp and the beach.
Also many beaches which might otherwise make good landing areas
lems which would arise are air for the crew, underwater navi-
and lowering the vehicle from the ship to the ocean floor. How-
for 1949 states in effect that for the present the British will
the United States will continue to develop the rigid type like
more powerful gun, more armor, and a bigger engine, but this
1
Report of Operations, 1st U.S. Army, 20 Octcter 1943 to
1 August 1944, a report prepared by the Armored Sction lst U.S.
Army, P 194.
2
Report of Combined Conference on. Armor 17-24 March 1949
3
Amphibious Operations Empleyment of Tanks, Marine Corps
Schools, Quantico, Virginia, PHIB-18, pp 27, 28, 29.
4
Report of Subcommittee on Automotive Equipment to
Ordnance Technical Committees, 5 MJ 194h
6
NAVAL REQUIREMENTS
against the German; from Guadalcanal almost tlo the main islands
where the weight of the medium tanks of its main striking force
the rated capacities of most of the World War I.I landing craft.
land and move directly to the beach past control vessels act-
Landing Craft, 3
Mechanized (LSM-8)
series of LCM-8's known as "H1", " and "U". The most radical
and the one showing the most promise is the LCM (8H). It is a scow-
bowed craft with a ramp; very similar in appearance to the LCMi-6 but
load at a speed of 10,7 knots. It can carry two TD-24 angle dozers
or two M-4A3E8 medium tanks, or one M-26 medium tank. These loads
have actually been carried in test. Two M-4A3E8 medium tanks are
it to crawl over bars and land high up on the beach. Its speed
using these traction units is 65 feet per minute. The ramps of all
the "8" series of LCM's are fixed so that embarked tanks can fire
their main armament to the front and flanks. Although not proven
LCM (8H)Is.
The LCM (8W) and LCM (8V) are similar in that they are
WINCH
."0
ORE W
(9
V-'--J fT ~ \ . - 00
yL.J IPOR'TABLtE
E AVIT
DO
-I - ,/f)SN/PS SEC/ON I RO
STERN SEC/LWN-
HArCH
COCKPITP
77E RINGS ---
0' tO'
and lifting weights (56 tons for the "V" and '"W" and 110,5 tons
doctrine prefers the use of these craft rather than dealing with
that LCM-6 and LCM-8 will land the tanks and reconnaissance
losses.
vehicles. Under the most ideal beach and surf conditions and
Tank by lashing the LSU to the open ramp of the TST and open-
ing its stern gate. Thus, any vehicle aboard the LST can be
driven aboard the LSU and taken to the beach. This technique
6
LANDING SHIP, I DIUi (LSM)
beach and land tanks over a bow ramp. Its enclosed tank
purposes. Total pay load is 1,900 tons, but the draft with
40 MM 20 MM 40 MM 20 MM 20 MM
~o 20 MM
/ OFF E PS MESS 0 p
0 0 0 0
o Q 0 0
O 0
C7 CP_ Y O F O o N. C o a
00
c o o E
"; OFF/ ERs c o_ O in o 0 0 c1 c a 0 ra o -0
O
40 MM 20 MA/ 0 VV 20 MM
20 MM
20 MM
-s-STORESY -. -GALLEY---
8
Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP)
1 3/4-ton Truck
deck on the same transports (APAts and AKAts) that carry the
infantry and are loaded in the transport area off shore from
DUiKWXs are preloaded with towed artillery pieces and are launch-
Is
Pi; Ii> 8~ Li11i
BEAC~I
Thiff' iL9Lli
LP -
Fes,' M°-I1
ill7~ '
TisTI
jpiLCV?
6LCM6
Is iS S
}LCM8H
LLTL
t IL
SLST
Chart 2
94
ad winh. on the DUTWat. The Armored Field Artillery of the
and 4.2 mortars will provide sufficient fire support until the
which will carry 115 troops, an' LVT, and eight 10-man rubber
EXPLANATION OF CHART 2
and two medium tank platoons. This represents the assault rifle
3. The third wave contains the other two rifle companies, 8mm
up to now are the command half track and two 4-ton trucks. This
wave is composed of 18 LCVP's and one LCM-6,
tank battalion that provided the tank company. The -ton trucks
tanks and half track are in 6 LCM-6's. There are also seven LSM
ing Officer. These last three waves are all aboard LSTts carry-
to be:
NOTES CHAPTER 5
4
Peatross, Oscar F., 4Lt Col., MS.M.C., Amphibious
Instructor, The Armored School, Interviewed at Fort Knox,
Kentucky, December, 1951,
5
Bridwell, ,"i, LCDR,, U.S.N,, Member of Joint
Amphibious Board, Interviewed at Naval Amphibious Base,
Little Creek; Virginia, February, .1952,
5
U.S. Army, FM 605 Amphibious Operations,Battalion
in assault Lanin Washington 25 , Appenix
i ,
6
7 1bid
Ibid
7I' id
97.
9 Ib id.
CHAPTER 6
in which the individual members kniow not only their own jobs
but also how to function with other members of the team. These
ashore.
board training.
to fire its 1
main armament while afloat. To date no major
present equipment was used. In the event more modern and larger
100
become much more acute and individual and unit training time
2
units of the division would include;
1. Technique of embarkation
naval customs
3. Survival at sea
4. Technique of debarkation
101
the Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic and Pacific
schedule are:
c. Boat:team organization
102
2,. ST'IP-TO.'SHORE MOVEM4ENT OF TANKS
g. Navigation on water
ably put forth in this extract from the Report by the Supreme
craft and a beach area are available near the home station.
include-2
103
1.. The formation and tactics of assault waves
2. Boat drills
4, Air support
3
echelon or wedge formation , Platoon and company training should
the situation on the hostile shore and the surf would make it
craft with suitable radios could conduct the phase and through
part of unit training and emphasis must be. placed on the in-
104
participating and supporting elements. The tank-infantry
available landing craft and naval ships may affect the comp-
arms team to the continual hazards until each can overcome the
should include :
1, Operation orders
2. Administrative orders
3. Embarkation orders
4. Debarkation orders
105
5. Approach schedules
6, Loading diagrams
1. Loading diagrams
1.06
3. Assembly and organization of landing waves in the
4. Assault landing
7, Final ocitique
to-shore movement.
ing courses for navy, air forces and army personnel. To attend
107
include ship-to-shore phases, familiarization with tactical
108
In the event an armored division was selected to engage
space, material and equipment involved from both the army and
Conclusion
109
hands of the troops, there is no doubt at all that training
education of troops.
110
CHAPTER 7
CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
of war have not changed, however, and can provide the basis
distance from the beach than has been possible in past oper-
of control for the landing force both afloat and ashore. The
be disastrous.
113
perform the following functions:
ing:
Quartermaster detachment
FOR AT ION
115
that a greater period of time would be required to land the
CO1NCLUSION
116
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7
117
APPENDIX I
8 November 1942
Headquarters CCB
118
APPENDIX II
8 .November 1942
Operation HUSKY
10 June 1943
120
APPENDIX IV
Medium (3)----------
Band ----------------------------------------- 70
Mortars, 60 mm - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - 51
Mortars, 81 mm - - --- - - - -. -
- . - -. - 20
Rifle, 75 m - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
Carriage, motor:
105 rmiHowitzer- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 54
155 mm Howitzer - -- - - - - - - - - - - 18
122
BIBLIOGRAPHY
123
Crowl, Philip A and Isly, Jeter A, The U.S. Marines in
Amphibious War. Prineeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey, 1951.
124
Headquarter, V Corps,- "V Corps Operations In E.TO," 1945.
125
Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment,
1st Armored Division, "A Short Histroy of the 3rd
Battali n, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment," (Available
at Documents Section, The Armored School, MF 169).
12 6
U.S. A.-my. FM 315, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores.
Washington, U.S. Printing Office, November 1944.
127