Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
180-194
MARY HOSSAIN
Department of French, The Queen's University of Belfast
that the Prophet of Islam came without miracles and spread his religion
instead through force of arms and through the enticements of a life of
pleasure.* This passage, interestingly enough, is actually supported by
a reference to al-Ghazan", who is quoted as saying that of all men the
Arabs are closest to animals.
Marti thus exemplifies a general trend, discernible from the Middle
Ages onward, in which Muslim philosophers are admired, while the
religion of Islam and the Prophet of Islam, on whom these philosophers
base their lives, are denigrated. In order to make this distinction, it was
often assumed, by Marti and others, that the Muslim philosophers
rejected some aspects of Islam, especially with regard to paradise, and
adopted a spiritual 'Christian' position.7 Dante provides another
example, situating Avicenna, Averroes, and Saladin with virtuous
heathens in the first circle of Hell, while consigning the Prophet to a
dreadful punishment in almost the lowest circle.8 Later, in seventeenth-
century Paris, the Maronites Gabriel Sionita and Abraham Ecchelensis,
while to some extent furthering a factual knowledge of Islam, also
separated the philosophical achievements of the Arabs from a religion
which they detested.' In a parallel development travellers to the Muslim
world admired the Muslims' piety, cleanliness, fasting, and prayers,
while disconnecting these virtues from the life of the Prophet who, up
to the seventeenth century at least, was generally depicted as an immoral
and fraudulent impostor.
Pascal, whose method of persuasion and ideas on belief are so akin
to those of al-GhazaB, and who may have been influenced by them, is
caught in the same paradox.
Pascal's attack on Islam, as L. M. Heller has shown, is influenced by
the general tradition of anti-Islamic polemic and may have drawn on
Grotius in particular; there are also elements of originality in the way
he reworked his material. The main features of the medieval canon as
reused by Pascal are Islam's perceived lack of prophecy, of miracles,
and of mystery, unsatisfactory moral teaching, ridiculous description of
paradise, conversion by force of arms, and prohibition on reading the
' See Oeuvret de Blaise Pascal, ed. L. Brunschvicg, Grands Ecrivaini (Paris, 1925),
XTV (Pensies ID), 39, note 2. The quotation it from Pugio Fidei, pt. D, ch. VIII (not
ch. VII, the reference given by Brunschvicg.) This work has, as I will show, more than
this 'one fleeting reference to Mohammedanism* (L. M. Heller, 'Anti-Islamic Polemic in
Pascal's Pensies with Particular Reference to Grotius' De Veritate Religionis Christianae",
Neo-Philologus, 55 (1971), 246-60, 253).
7
See N. Daniel, Islam and the West, The Making of an Image (Edinburgh, 1960),
149.
1
See E. Said, Orientalism (London, 1978), 68-9.
' See N. Daniel, Islam and the West, 296.
PASCAL AND ISLAM 183
ing his attack on them into an intellectual structure, which will highlight
the uniqueness of Christianity. In this example his argument is that the
Bible has both admirable clarity and obscurity, the obscurity to be
explained symbolically, whereas, since the clear meanings of the Qur'an
are ridiculous (paradise), there is no need to take its obscurities as
mysteries. While not drawn to those who looked for the spiritual
meaning of Qur'anic descriptions of paradise, Pascal was also not
content with the simple vituperation of conventional polemic. Similarly
the antithetical presentation, which is evident in, for example, Grotius,
is integrated into Pascal's overall presentation of Christianity as the
only religion which explains and solves man's dual nature.
In this context it is useful to come back to al-Ghazall and to see how
arguments such as the duality of man, which Pascal sees as unique to
Christianity, are, in fact, also used by the Muslim writer."
It is necessary for him, at the same time that he is conscious of his superiority
as the climax of created things, to learn to know also his helplessness, as that
too is one of the keys to the knowledge of God."
It is dangerous to explain too clearly to man how like he is to the animals
without pointing out his greatness. It is also dangerous to make too much of
his greatness without his vileness. It is still more dangerous to leave him in
ignorance of both, but it is most valuable to represent both to him.27
Attack on reason
Although knowledge of both aspects is necessary, both writers, in order
to counteract the main danger of the age, which came from an excessive
self-confidence and reliance on reason, stress man's weakness more than
his greatness, often using similar examples:
As to his intellect, a slight disarrangement of matter in his brain is sufficient
to destroy or madden him; as to his power, the sting of a wasp is sufficient to
rob him of ease and sleep ... In truth, man in this world is extremely weak
and contemptible."
Pascal has a whole section entitled 'vanitc' in which he lists the
numerous things which destroy the power of reason, including the
following passage:
Everyone knows that the sight of cats, or rats, the crunching of a coal, etc., is
enough to unhinge reason ... We have another principle of error in illnesses,
which impair our judgement and sense."
Reason is unsatisfactory when applied to matters of religion; it 'can
be bent in any direction', 10 and is open to distortion when applied in
an inappropriate field.31 Al-Ghazatf points out that arguments in math-
ematics are demonstrative, as are the arguments of logic, and cannot
be satisfactorily applied to religion:
To be sure, the philosophers themselves are guilty of a kind of injustice in the
case of this science of logic. This is that in logic they bring together, for
apodeictic demonstration, conditions known to lead undoubtedly to sure and
certain knowledge. But when, in metaphysics, they finally come to discuss
questions touching on religion, they cannot satisfy those conditions, but rather
are extremely slipshod in applying them.11
Formal worship, for example, cannot be explained intellectually:
In a similar fashion it became necessarily evident to me that the reason for the
effectiveness of the remedies of the acts of worship, with their prescriptions
u
The Alchemy of Happiness, 32. " L. 121.
" The Alchemy of Happiness, 32. " L. 44. » L. 820.
" Lettres provincides, in Pascal, Oeuvres completes, ed. L. Lafuma (Parii, 1963),
Lcttre 18, 466-7.
" R. J. McCarthy (trani.), Munqidh, 75.
188 MARY HOSSAIN
The heart
Both Pascal and al-Ghazall develop a three-fold division of the senses,
the reason, and the heart. Pascal, in several famous fragments, says that
true belief comes to the heart: 'It is the heart which perceives God and
not the reason. That is what faith is: God perceived by the heart, not
by the reason.'" Al-Ghazall, in a passage which is a remarkable preced-
ent for Pascal's concept of the three orders, each quite separate and
having its own sphere of action, also places faith beyond both reason
and the senses.3'
Given that true faith comes to the heart, both writers appeal predom-
inantly to the heart of the unbeliever, but without neglecting reason
altogether. Al-Ghazall came to a realization of various truths: 'at one
time by fruitional experience, at another time by knowledge based on
apodeictic proof, and again by acceptance founded on faith'.37 Pascal,
in his notes on the organization of the TensSes, thought it important
psychologically to show that religion was both attractive and not con-
trary to reason.3*
cated man of the world who wanted to lead a cultured, civilized, and
moral life, but saw no need to call upon religion other than in the most
conventional way. The end of the wager fragment is clearly aimed at
attracting this sort of person: 'Now what harm will come to you from
choosing this course? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, full
of good works, a sincere, true friend.'41 Al-Ghazall, as part of a similar
plea, appeals to the same desire to be successful in this life.41
One way of attracting an opponent was to agree with him up to a
point. As al-Ghazall writes: 'My aim was to give the fullest account
possible of their specious argumentation and then to prove its error to
the hilt.'43 Pascal repeats the arguments of the sceptics, agreeing with
them until he reaches the point where, having carried them along with
him so far, he can turn round and show them that their scepticism is
one half of the argument only and ultimately wrong. Conversely, he
follows the arguments of the dogmatists until he can show them that
they too have seen only one side of the question. Having accepted the
argument of both sides up to a certain point, he can then show that
truth is indeed accessible, as the dogmatists say, but not by human
reason alone, and that doubt exists, as the sceptics say, but can be
overcome by the knowledge which comes to the heart.44
Al-Ghazall adopts a similar approach to scepticism when he describes
his own descent into doubt and his return to belief in 'the necessary
truths of the intellect*. He regained certainty, not through rational
demonstration but through 'a light which God most high cast into my
breast'.45 The fact that al-Ghazall relates a personal experience, whereas
Pascal outlines the main arguments of sceptics and dogmatists, is per-
haps only a superficial difference. The relation of a personal experience
can also be a rhetorical device and indeed is used quite frequently by
Pascal elsewhere in the Penstes.**
Although true belief comes to the heart, the third category—the
senses—is also important. Both Pascal and al-Ghazall point out the
need for practical observance of religious rituals in order to reinforce
the weak belief which can come from reason:
Then back that up by sampling what he said about the acts of worship and
their effect on the purification of hearts. Consider, for example, how right he
was—God's blessing and peace be upon him!—in his saying: 'Whoever acts
according to what he knows, God will make him heir to what he does not
know.'47
41
L 418.
** See M. Asin Palados, 'Los precedentes musulmanes del "Pan" de Pascal', 196,
quoting from Kitab al-Arbam (Cairo, AH 1328), 213.
•» Mtmqidh, 83. ** L. 131, 110. " Munqidb, 64-7.
** e.g. L. 201: 'The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with dread.'
47
Mwujidb, 99-100.
190 MARY HOSSAIN
Pascal, at the end of the wager fragment, seeing that the unbeliever
is intellectually convinced but still does not truly believe, advises him
to take holy water and have masses said. In this he is asked to follow
'those who were once bound like you and who now wager all they
have'.*1 Al-GhazalT also sees the need for an example to imitate: 'If a
man finds himself sluggish and averse from austerity and self-discipline
he should consort with one who is proficient in such practices so as to
catch the contagion of his enthusiasm.'4'
This psychological approach to the question of conversion would
however be useless without the style of the writers concerned. Here too
we find a similarity between al-Ghazah" and Pascal, which is evident
even in translation. Both are excellent writers, varying their tone from
one of passionate indignation at the thoughtlessness of the world to
amusing examples of folly. Compare, for example, the two extracts:
Shame upon thee, 0 soul, for thy overweening love of the world! If thou dost
not believe in heaven or hell, at any rate thou believest in death, which will
snatch from thee all wordly delights and cause thee to feel the pangs of
separation from them, which will be intenser just in proportion as thou hast
attached thyself to them. Why art thou made after the world? If the whole of
it, from East to West, were thine and worshipped thee, yet it would all, in a
brief space, turn to dust along with thyself, and oblivion would blot out thy
name, as those of ancient kings before thee. But now, seeing thou hast only a
very small fragment of the world, and that a defiled one, wilt thou be so mad
as to barter eternal joy for it, a precious jewel for a broken cup of earthenware,
and make thyself the laughing-stock of all round them?10
Nothing is so important to man as his state: nothing more fearful than eternity.
Thus the fact that there exist men who are indifferent to the loss of their being
and the peril of an eternity of wretchedness is against nature. With everything
else they are quite different; they fear the most trifling things, forsee and feel
them; and the same man who spends so many days and nights in fury and
despair at losing some office or at some imaginary affront to his honour is the
very one who knows that he is going to lose everything through death but feels
neither anxiety nor emotion."
The similarity is even evident in much shorter passages. For example,
al-Ghazab": 'Whoever will seriously contemplate the past eternity during
which the world was not in existence, and the future eternity during
which it will not be in existence ...'" Pascal: 'When I consider the brief
span of my life absorbed into the eternity which comes before and
after ...'" Generally there is the same note of exasperation, and the
same contrast between the way people behave with regard to this life
and to the next. Both use the language of ordinary people and homely
•* L. 418. *' The Alchemy of Happiness, 98. » Ibid. 99-100.
" L. 427. " The Alchemy of Happiness, 52. " L. 68.
PASCAL AND ISLAM IJI
examples taken from everyday life rather than the specialized reasoning
and terminology of the theologians.
In various fragments and opuscules Pascal outlined two different
ways of reaching the truth and then convincing others. The scientific
method—I'esprit gSomitrique—appeals to the reason (entendement)
and works in a straight line, defining its terms and proving its proposi-
tions. The other method (I'esprit de finesse) persuades through the will
(volontS) or the heart (coeur). Since it is important to keep the changing
attitudes of each prospective reader in view, yet impossible to do this
while maintaining the linear reasoning of the 'geometric method', Pas-
cal, deriving his inspiration from religious texts, described a method
which is like a wheel, where each point on the circumference will relate
back like a spoke to the central point that has to be proved.54
This 'convergent proof can be seen in Pascal's projected arrangement
of the fragments of his apology. Various elements of an argument for
the truth of Christianity are brought forward: the grandeur and
wretchedness of the human condition; the vanity of man, the inadequacy
of his reason, his inability to reach by his own efforts either truth or
happiness, his intimation that such absolute truth and happiness do
exist, the greatness of his thinking mind in comparison with the material
world; then proofs from the Bible: miracles, prophecies, figurative
explanations. Instead of each of these aspects leading directly to the
next and ultimately to Christian dogma, each one is related back to the
central point, which, for Pascal, is Jesus: 'Jesus Christ is the object of
all things, the centre to which all things tend. Whoever knows him
knows the reason for everything.'" This 'convergent proof had its
origins in Pascal's response to criticisms of the Bible:
Order. Against the objection that there is no order in Scripture.
The heart has its order, the mind has its own, which uses principles and
demonstrations. The heart has a different one. We do not prove that we ought
to be loved by setting out in order the causes of love; that would be absurd.
Jesus Christ and St Paul possess the order of charity, not of the mind, for
they wished to humble, not to teach.
The same with St Augustine. This order consists mainly in digressions upon
each point which relates to the end, so that this shall be kept always in sight."
Al-Ghazau" seems to have had similar thoughts. His reflections on the
difficulty of relying exclusively on miracles as a proof of prophetic office
point in the same direction:
Furthermore, if your faith were based on a carefully ordered argument about
the way the apologetic miracle affords proof of prophecy, your faith would be
M
De I'Esprit giometrujue et de I'Art de persuader in Pascal, Oeuvret completes, ed.
rit. 348-59 (especially 355-6), and L, 512 and 298.
" L. 449. " L. 298.
192 MARY HOSSAIN