Motion of Dismissal

Municipal Court of Everett Washington
County of Snohomish
In re:
( No. CRP-3735
City of Everett (PetitionforDismissal
V. (of all Charges & Return
Brandia Taamu (of all Seized Property
Brandia Taamu moves the court for an order dismissing this action City of
Everett V. Brandia Taamu for these reasons:
1) It will be shown that my affirmative defense is in fact credible &

that my animals did NOT suffer unjustifiable pain. I got evicted, my
husband ran off with everything & I was out of work
16.52.207 Animal cruelty in the second degree.
(2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if,
under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the owner
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence:
(a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space,
or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable
physical pain as a result of the failure
(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under

subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant's
control.
2) It will be shown that Officer Weaver & Officer Trask conspired to

make false allegations attirbuting statements to a party who did not
make them, taking photos that CLEARLY left out one side of my
vehicle that in particular contained the dog's food & supplies. My vet
is supposed to beconsulting a lawyer as well because of the
statements Officer Weaver made that were untrue. It is also amazing
to me that Prosecutor Fisher even believed he could file a case that
would have any merit, with all the conflicting evidence. He also let
me present my whole case in front of the Commissioner in Superior
Court & neither one let me know I had the right to invoke my 5th
Amendment rights in order not to incriminate myself or give away
my case. If you honestly take a look at my dogs intitial vet exam
records you will see all but George (who was terminally ill)were
"Bright, Alert, & Responsive" all had clean fecals, except for non-
motile bacteria on 2 of them, then the next statement from the same
day they were all "dying", had bloodshot eyes, even their teeth got
worse, oh but most precious of all is my GRAY dog supposedly had
urine stains on her fur, impossible, & my Tri-Colored dog with BLACK
feet also had urine stains supposedly. You will aslo note that Soffie
the dog who had a bladder stone removed... They never even called
the vet in Shelton to confirm she had been seen there & tested, not
did they request her records from our current vet. Shelton said she
had cancer, our new vet said she was just fat (because I thought she
was dying so I spoiled her but after a year of her doing well & just
getting fat I took her to our new vet & he didn't catch anything
about a bladder stone)
RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of
the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important
pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the

defense and to the tribunal all mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by
a protective order of the tribunal;
(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the
nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law
enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have
a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused
and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the
prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the
prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.
Comment
[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and
that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how
far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate
and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the
ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function,
which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by
lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law
may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of

those
obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could
constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.
[2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and
thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause.
Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary

hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused
persons. Paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to an accused appearing pro
se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful
questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to
counsel and silence.
[6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3,
which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work
for or are associated with the lawyer's office. Paragraph (f) reminds the
prosecutor of the importance of these obligations in connection with the
unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In
addition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to
prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making
improper extrajudicial statements, even when such persons are not under the
direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care
standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions
to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.
[Amended effective September 1, 2006.]
CHAPTER 42.52 RCW ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE.
RCW 42.52.010 Definitions. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the
definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter.
(1) "Agency" means any state board, commission, bureau, committee,

department, institution,
division, or tribunal in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of state

government. "Agency"
includes all elective offices, the state legislature, those institutions of higher
education created
and supported by the state government, and those courts that are parts of
state government.
(2) "Head of agency" means the chief executive officer of an agency. In the
case of an agency headed by a commission, board, committee, or other body
consisting of more than one natural person, agency head means the person
or board authorized to appoint agency employees and regulate their conduct.
(3) "Assist" means to act, or offer or agree to act, in such a way as to help,
aid, advise, furnish
information to, or otherwise provide assistance to another person, believing

that the action is of help, aid, advice, or assistance to the person and with
intent so to assist such person.
(6) "Confidential information" means (a) specific information, rather than

generalized knowledge, that is not available to the general public on request
or (b) information made confidential by law.
(8) "Ethics boards" means the commission on judicial conduct, the legislative
ethics board, and the executive ethics board.
(9) "Family" has the same meaning as "immediate family" in RCW 42.17.020.
(12) "Official duty" means those duties within the specific scope of
employment of the state officer or state employee as defined by the officer's
or employee's agency or by statute or the state Constitution.
(13) "Participate" means to participate in state action or a proceeding

personally and substantially as a state officer or state employee, through
approval, disapproval, decision, recommendation, the rendering of advice,
investigation, or otherwise but does not include preparation, consideration, or
enactment of legislation or the performance of legislative duties.
(14) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, corporation,

firm, institution, or other entity, whether or not operated for profit.
(15) "Regulatory agency" means any state board, commission, department,

or officer, except those in the legislative or judicial branches, authorized by
law to conduct adjudicative proceedings, issue permits or licenses, or to
control or affect interests of identified persons.
(16) "Responsibility" in connection with a transaction involving the state,

means the direct administrative or operating authority, whether intermediate
or final, and either exercisable alone or through subordinates, effectively to
approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct state action in respect of such
transaction.
(17) "State action" means any action on the part of an agency, including, but
not limited to:
(a) A decision, determination, finding, ruling, or order; and (b) A grant,

payment, award, license, contract, transaction, sanction, or approval, or the
denial thereof, or failure to act with respect to a decision, determination,
finding, ruling, or order.
(18) "State officer" means every person holding a position of public trust in or
under an executive, legislative, or judicial office of the state. "State officer"
includes judges of the superior court, judges of the court of appeals, justices
of the supreme court, members of the legislature together with the secretary
of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives, holders of
elective offices in the executive branch of state government, chief executive
officers of state agencies, members of boards, commissions, or committees
with authority over one or more state agencies or institutions, and employees
of the state who are engaged in supervisory, policy-making, or policy-
enforcing work. For the purposes of this chapter, "state officer" also includes
any person exercising or undertaking to exercise the powers or functions of a
state officer.
(19) "State employee" means an individual who is employed by an agency in

any branch of state government. For purposes of this chapter, employees of
the superior courts are not state officers or state employees.
(21)(a) "Transaction involving the state" means a proceeding, application,

submission, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, case,
or other similar matter that the state officer, state employee, or former state
officer or state employee in question believes, or has reason to believe:(i) Is,
or will be, the subject of state action; or (ii) Is one to which the state is or will
be a party; or (iii) Is one in which the state has a direct and substantial
proprietary interest.
RCW 42.52.040 Assisting in transactions. (1) Except in the course of official

duties or incident to official duties, no state officer or state employee may
assist another person, directly or indirectly, whether or not for compensation,
in a transaction involving the state:
(4) This chapter does not prevent a state officer or state employee from
assisting, in a transaction involving the state:
RCW 42.52.050 Confidential information--Improperly concealed records. (1)

No state officer or state employee may accept employment or engage in any
business or professional activity that the officer or employee might
reasonably expect would require or induce him or her to make an
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information acquired by the official or
employee by reason of the official's or employee's official position.
(2) No state officer or state employee may make a disclosure of confidential
information gained by reason of the officer's or employee's official position or
otherwise use the information for his or her personal gain or benefit or the
gain or benefit of another, unless the disclosure has been authorized by
statute or by the terms of a contract involving (a) the state officer's or state
employee's agency and (b) the person or persons who have authority to
waive the confidentiality of the information.
(3) No state officer or state employee may disclose confidential information

to any person not entitled or authorized to receive the information.
(4) No state officer or state employee may intentionally conceal a record if

the officer or employee knew the record was required to be released under
chapter 42.17 RCW, was under a personal obligation to release the record,
and failed to do so. This subsection does not apply where the decision to
withhold the record was made in good faith. [1996 c 213 § 4; 1994 c 154 §
105.]
RCW 42.52.060 Testimony of state officers and state employees. This chapter
does not prevent a state officer or state employee from giving testimony
under oath or from making statements required to be made under penalty of
perjury or contempt. [1994 c 154 § 106.]
RCW 42.52.100 Conditions on appearance before state agencies or doing

business with the state-Hearing-Judicial review. (1) The head of an agency,
upon finding that any former state officer or state employee of such agency
or any other person has violated any provision of this chapter or rules
adopted under it, may, in addition to any other powers the head of such
agency may have, bar or impose reasonable conditions upon:
(a) The appearance before such agency of such former state officer or state
employee or other person; and
(b) The conduct of, or negotiation or competition for, business with such
agency by such former state officer or state employee or other person, such
period of time as may reasonably be necessary or appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of this chapter.
(2) Findings of violations referred to in subsection (1)(b) of this section shall

be made on record after notice and hearing, conducted in accordance with
the Washington Administrative Procedure
Act, chapter 34.05 RCW. Such findings and orders are subject to judicial
review.
(3) This section does not apply to the legislative or judicial branches of
government.
[1994 c 154 § 110; 1969 ex.s. c 234 § 27. Formerly RCW 42.18.270.]
RCW 42.52.160 Use of persons, money, or property for private gain. (1) No
state officer or state employee may employ or use any person, money, or
property under the officer's or employee's official control or direction, or in
his or her official custody, for the private benefit or gain of the officer,
employee, or another.
(2) This section does not prohibit the use of public resources to benefit others
as part of a state officer's or state employee's official duties.
(3) The appropriate ethics boards may adopt rules providing exceptions to
this section for occasional use of the state officer or state employee, of de
minimis cost and value, if the activity does not result in interference with the
proper performance of public duties.
[1996 c 213 § 7; 1994 c 154 § 116; 1987 c 426 § 3. Formerly RCW 42.18.217.]
RCW 42.52.360 Authority of executive ethics board. (1) The executive ethics
board shall enforce this chapter and rules adopted under it with respect to
state-wide elected officers and all other officers and employees in the
executive branch, boards and commissions, and institutions of higher
education.
(2) The executive ethics board shall:
(a) Develop educational materials and training;
(b) Adopt rules and policies governing the conduct of business by the board,
and adopt rules defining working hours for purposes of RCW 42.52.180 and
where otherwise authorized under chapter 154,
Laws of 1994;
(c) Issue advisory opinions;
(d) Investigate, hear, and determine complaints by any person or on its own
motion;
(e) Impose sanctions including reprimands and monetary penalties;
(f) Recommend to the appropriate authorities suspension, removal from

position, prosecution, or
other appropriate remedy; and
(g) Establish criteria regarding the levels of civil penalties appropriate for
violations of this chapter and rules adopted under it.
(3) The board may:

(a) Issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of documentary
evidence relating to any matter under examination by the board or involved

in any hearing;
(b) Administer oaths and affirmations;
(c) Examine witnesses; and
(d) Receive evidence.
(4) The executive ethics board may review and approve agency policies as
provided for in this chapter.
(5) This section does not apply to state officers and state employees of the
judicial branch.
[1994 c 154 § 206.]
RCW 42.52.370 Authority of commission on judicial conduct. The commission

on judicial conduct shall enforce this chapter and rules adopted under it with
respect to state officers and employees of the judicial branch and may do so
according to procedures prescribed in Article IV, section 31 of the state
Constitution. In addition to the sanctions authorized in Article IV, section 31 of
the state Constitution, the commission may impose sanctions authorized by
this chapter. [1994 c 154 § 207.]
RCW 42.52.410 Filing complaint. (1) A person may, personally or by his or her
attorney, make, sign, and file with the appropriate ethics board a complaint
on a form provided by the appropriate ethics board. The complaint shall state
the name of the person alleged to have violated this chapter or rules adopted
under it and the particulars thereof, and contain such other information as
may be required by the appropriate ethics board.
(2) If it has reason to believe that any person has been engaged or is
engaging in a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it, an ethics
board may issue a complaint. [1994 c 154 § 211.]
RCW 42.52.420 Investigation. After the filing of any complaint, except as

provided in RCW 42.52.450, the staff of the appropriate ethics board shall
investigate the complaint. The investigation shall be limited to the alleged
facts contained in the complaint. The results of the investigation shall be
reduced to writing and a determination shall be made that there is or that
there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of this chapter or
rules adopted under it has been or is being committed. A copy of the written
determination shall be provided to the complainant and to the person named
in such complaint. [1994 c 154 § 212.]
RCW 42.52.430 Public hearing-Findings. (1) If the ethics board determines

there is reasonable cause under RCW 42.52.420 that a violation of this
chapter or rules adopted under it occurred, a public hearing on the merits of
the complaint shall be held.
(2) The ethics board shall designate the location of the hearing. The case in
support of the complaint shall be presented at the hearing by staff of the
ethics board.
(3) The respondent shall file a written answer to the complaint and appear at
the hearing in person or otherwise, with or without counsel, and submit
testimony and be fully heard. The respondent has the right to cross-examine
witnesses.
(4) Testimony taken at the hearing shall be under oath and recorded.
(5) If, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the ethics board finds
that the respondent has violated this chapter or rules adopted under it, the
board shall file an order stating findings of fact and enforcement action as
authorized under this chapter.
(6) If, upon all the evidence, the ethics board finds that the respondent has
not engaged in an alleged violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it,
the ethics board shall state findings of fact and shall similarly issue and file
an order dismissing the complaint.
(7) If the board makes a determination that there is not reasonable cause to
believe that a violation has been or is being committed or has made a finding
under subsection (6) of this section, the attorney general shall represent the
officer or employee in any action subsequently commenced based on the
alleged facts in the complaint. [1994 c 154 § 213.]
RCW 42.52.440 Review of order. Except as otherwise provided by law,

reconsideration or judicial review of an ethics board's order that a violation of
this chapter or rules adopted under it has occurred shall be governed by the
provisions of chapter 34.05 RCW applicable to review of adjudicative
proceedings. [1994 c 154 § 214.]
RCW 42.52.450 Complaint against legislator or state-wide elected official. (1)

If a complaint alleges a violation of RCW 42.52.180 by a legislator or state-
wide elected official other than the attorney general, the attorney general
shall conduct the investigation under RCW 42.52.420 and recommend action
to the appropriate ethics board.
(2) If a complaint alleges a violation of RCW 42.52.180 by the attorney

general, the state auditor shall conduct the investigation under RCW
42.52.420 and recommend action to the appropriate
ethics board. [1994 c 154 § 215.]
RCW 42.52.460 Citizen actions. Any person who has notified the appropriate
ethics board and the attorney general in writing that there is reason to
believe that RCW 42.52.180 is being or has been violated may, in the name
of the state, bring a citizen action for any of the actions authorized under this
chapter. A citizen action may be brought only if the appropriate ethics board
or the attorney general have failed to commence an action under this chapter
within forty-five days after notice from the person, the person has thereafter
notified the appropriate ethics board and the attorney general that the
person will commence a citizen's action within ten days upon their failure to
commence an action, and the appropriate ethics board and the attorney
general have in fact failed to bring an action within ten days of receipt of the
second notice.
If the person who brings the citizen's action prevails, the judgment awarded
shall escheat to the state, but the person shall be entitled to be reimbursed
by the state of Washington for costs and attorneys' fees incurred. If a
citizen's action that the court finds was brought without reasonable cause is
dismissed, the court may order the person commencing the action to pay all
costs of trial and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the defendant. Upon
commencement of a citizen action under this section, at the request of a
state officer or state employee who is a defendant, the office of the attorney
general shall represent the defendant if the attorney general finds that the
defendant's conduct complied with this chapter and was within the scope of
employment. [1994 c 154 § 216.]
RCW 42.52.470 Referral for enforcement. As appropriate, an ethics board

may refer a complaint:
(1) To an agency for initial investigation and proposed resolution which shall
be referred back to the appropriate ethics board for action; or
(2) To the attorney general's office or prosecutor for appropriate action.

[1994 c 154 § 217.]
RCW 42.52.480 Action by boards. (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, an

ethics board may order payment of the following amounts if it finds a
violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it after a hearing under RCW
42.52.370 or other applicable law:
(a) Any damages sustained by the state that are caused by the conduct
constituting the violation;
(b) From each such person, a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars per
violation or three times the economic value of any thing received or sought in
violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it, whichever is greater; and
(c) Costs, including reasonable investigative costs, which shall be included as

part of the limit under
(b) of this subsection. The costs may not exceed the penalty imposed. The
payment owed on the penalty shall be reduced by the amount of the costs
paid.
(2) Damages under this section may be enforced in the same manner as a
judgment in a civil case. [1994 c 154 § 218.]
RCW 42.52.490 Action by attorney general. (1) Upon a written determination

by the attorney general that the action of an ethics board was clearly
erroneous or if requested by an ethics board, the attorney general may bring
a civil action in the superior court of the county in which the violation is
alleged to have occurred against a state officer, state employee, former state
officer, former state employee, or other person who has violated or knowingly
assisted another person in violating any of the provisions of this chapter or
the rules adopted under it. In such action the attorney general may recover
the following amounts on behalf of the state of Washington:
(a) Any damages sustained by the state that are caused by the conduct
constituting the violation;
(b) From each such person, a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars per
violation or three times the economic value of any thing received or sought in
violation of this chapter or the rules adopted under it, whichever is greater;
and
(c) Costs, including reasonable investigative costs, which shall be included as

part of the limit under
(b) of this subsection. The costs may not exceed the penalty imposed. The
payment owed on the penalty shall be reduced by the amount of the costs
paid.
(2) In any civil action brought by the attorney general upon the basis that the
attorney general has determined that the board's action was clearly
erroneous, the court shall not proceed with the action unless the attorney
general has first shown, and the court has found, that the action of the board
was clearly erroneous. [1994 c 154 § 219.]
RCW 42.52.520 Disciplinary action. (1) A violation of this chapter or rules

adopted under it is grounds for disciplinary action.
(2) The procedures for any such action shall correspond to those applicable
for disciplinary action for employee misconduct generally; for those state
officers and state employees not specifically exempted in chapter 41.06
RCW, the rules set forth in chapter 41.06 RCW shall apply. Any action against
the state officer or state employee shall be subject to judicial review to the
extent provided by law for disciplinary action for misconduct of state officers
and state employees of the same category and grade. [1994 c 154 § 222;
1969 ex.s. c 234 § 26. Formerly RCW 42.18.260.]
RCW 42.52.530 Additional investigative authority. In addition to other

authority under this chapter, the attorney general may investigate persons
not under the jurisdiction of an ethics board whom the attorney general has
reason to believe were involved in transactions in violation of this chapter or
rules adopted under it. [1994 c 154 § 223.]
RCW 42.52.540 Limitations period. Any action taken under this chapter must
be commenced within five years from the date of the violation. However, if it
is shown that the violation was not discovered because of concealment by
the person charged, then the action must be commenced within two years
from the date the violation was discovered or reasonably should have been
discovered:
(1) By any person with direct or indirect supervisory responsibilities over the
person who allegedly committed the violation; or (2) if no person has direct
or indirect supervisory authority over the person who committed the
violation, by the appropriate ethics board. [1994 c 154 § 224.]
RCW 42.52.900 Legislative declaration. Government derives its powers from

the people. Ethics in government are the foundation on which the structure of
government rests. State officials and employees of government hold a public
trust that obligates them, in a special way, to honesty and integrity in
fulfilling the responsibilities to which they are elected and appointed.
Paramount in that trust is the principle that public office, whether elected or
appointed, may not be used for personal gain or private advantage.The
citizens of the state expect all state officials and employees to perform their
public responsibilities in accordance with the highest ethical and moral
standards and to conduct the business of the state only in a manner that
advances the public's interest. State officials and employees are subject to
the sanctions of law and scrutiny of the media; ultimately, however, they are
accountable to the people and must consider this public accountability as a
particular obligation of the public service. Only when affairs of government
are conducted, at all levels, with openness as provided by law and an
unswerving commitment to the public good does government work as it
should.
The obligations of government rest equally on the state's citizenry. The

effectiveness of government depends, fundamentally, on the confidence
citizens can have in the judgments and decisions of their elected
representatives. Citizens, therefore, should honor and respect the principles
and the spirit of representative democracy,recognizing that both elected and
appointed officials, together with state employees, seek to carry out their
public duties with professional skill and dedication to the public interest. Such
service merits public recognition and support. All who have the privilege of
working for the people of Washington state can have but one aim: To give the
highest public service to its citizens. [1994 c 154 § 1.]
3) It can be clearly shown that Officer Trask made NO attempt to
check out the credibility of the witnesses, as evidenced by the fact
that the Landlord made the complaint thinking they were Rose
Adams dogs, & the fact that right in the Washington state court
system is a termination of parental rights for Rose Adams that
clearly states she is mentally deficient& has been for quite some
time, the "nieghbor" staking the complaint did so at the request of
Rose Adams & it should be noted that she is also living with 2 sexual
predators who are currently under supervision & trying to conceive a
child with her current boyfriend who repeatedly raped a 3 yr old
child & stalked a 13 yr old child as well & who by court order is not
even supposed to be around children Just a precusory look at Rose
Adams criminal record should've been enough to give anyone pause.
SNOHOMISH
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div 165176 02-16-1993
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Snohomish Superior 93-2-04928-3 08-31-1993
Adams, Rose M Respondent Snohomish Superior 95-2-05009-1 07-05-1995
Adams, Rose M. Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A95-00268 09-28-1995
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00260 10-16-1996
Adams, Rose Respondent Sno Co-everett Div 97-311AH 08-26-1997
Adams, Rose Respondent Sno Co-everett Div 97-171AH 05-22-1997
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-everett Div 97-207AH 06-16-1997
Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 98-2-09032-2 12-02-1998
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00036999 12-29-1999
Adams, Rose M Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 00-9-03737-0 06-15-

2000

Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 01-2-00338-9 03-12-2001
Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 01-9-01682-6 03-14-2001
Adams, Rose T H/w Defendant Snohomish Superior 02-2-08098-5 07-12-2002
Adams, Rose T H/w Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 02-9-05607-9 07-

15-2002
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div D03-00170 10-24-2003
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-everett Div PC04-2218 08-25-2004
Adams, Rose Marie Respondent Sno Co-everett Div U04-00671 04-22-2004
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Snohomish Superior 05-1-01959-4 07-29-2005
Adams, Rose H/w Defendant Snohomish Superior 07-2-07272-0 09-04-2007
Adams, Rose H/w Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 07-9-08913-0 09-07-

2007
Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div C07-00782 03-09-2007
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div I05420944 12-13-2007

Adams, Rose T And John Doe Defendant Sno Co-south Div C08-01858 06-27-
2008
Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U09-00053 03-18-2009
Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U09-00054 03-19-2009
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-evergreen Div XY0026677 02-01-2010
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-everett Div 1095A10FE 05-07-2010
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U10-00012 01-19-2010
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U10-00011 01-19-2010
EVERETT
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Everett Municipal CR0081455 /04-02-2008
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Everett Municipal IN0128726 /12-01-2010
THURSTON
Adams, Rose Marie Respondent Thurston Superior 07-2-30559-6 08-09-2007
Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30308-7 05-09-2008
Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-00725-4 06-03-2008
Adams, Rose Marie Respondent Thurston Superior 08-2-30502-1 07-29-2008
Adams, Rose Plaintiff Thurston County Dist 27974 07-29-2008
Adams, Rose Defendant Thurston Superior 08-2-01621-5 07-08-2008
Adams, Rose Judgment Creditor Thurston Superior 08-9-01041-7 08-01-2008

Adams, Rose Marie Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-01282-7 10-01-

2008
Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-01567-2 12-05-2008
KING COUNTY
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kcdc-east Div (sho) J00046326 12-12-1989
Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 89-2-13774-7 07-17-1989
Adams, Rose M Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 91-009057 09-06-1991
Adams, Rose Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000843 07-05-1995
Adams, Rose Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 95-2-17127-3 07-07-1995
Adams, Rose M Plaintiff King Co Superior Ct 97-2-16445-1 06-30-1997
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant King County District IT0038177 09-06-2007
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kirkland Municipal XY0073502 01-19-2010
LYNNWOOD
Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Lynnwood Municipal I00168820 01-08-2009

SEATTLE
Adams, Rose M Defendant Seattle Municipal Ct 65919 06-06-1991
APPELANT
Adams, Rose Appellant Coa, Division I 506374 06-19-2002
Adams, Rose Appellant Coa, Division I 506366 06-19-2002
PIERCE COUNTY
Adams, Rose M Petitioner Pierce Co Superior 93-3-01866-4 04-19-1993
Court of Appeals Division I State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet Docket Number: 50636-6-I
Title of Case:
In RE the Dependency Of: J.A.B. (dob 8/20/92)
v.
Rose Adams and George Beutler, App. V. Dshs, Resp.
File Date: 03/03/2003 SOURCE OF APPEAL
Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County Docket No: 017006963
Judgment or order under review Date filed: 06/06/2002
Judge signing: Hon. Richard J. Thorpe
JUDGES
COUNSEL OF RECORD
Counsel for Appellant(s)
Eric Broman Nielsen Broman & Assoc. Pllc
810 3rd Ave Ste 320 Seattle, WA 98104
Oliver R. Davis Washington Appellate Project

Cobb Bldg 1305 4th Ave Ste 802 Seattle, WA 98101
Counsel for Respondent(s)
Scott D. Wessel-Estes 3501 Colby Ave Ste 200 Everett, WA 98201
Counsel for Guardian(s) Ad Litem
Alayne L. Spaulding 1604 Hewitt Ave Ste 401 2910 Colby Ave Everett, WA
98201
Counsel for Minor(s)
Jennifer L. Coombs 2828 Colby Ave Ste 402 Everett, WA 98201
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN RE THE DEPENDENCY OF: No. 50636-6-I
J.A.B., consol. with Cause Nos. DOB: 08/20/92, 50637-4-I, 50739-7-I
C.A., DOB: 05/31/86, DIVISION ONE
Minor Children.
ROSE ADAMS and GEORGE BEUTLER,
Appellants,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES,
Respondent. FILED
Per Curiam. In this consolidated appeal, Rose Adams and George Beutler
challenge the order terminating their parental rights in their son, J.B. Adams
also challenges the termination of her parental rights in C.A., J.B.'s half-sister.
Because the State has satisfied its burden of proving the statutory elements
set forth in RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190, we affirm.
Facts
Adams and Beutler are the biological parents of J.B., who was born on August
20, 1992. Adams is also the biological mother of C.A., who was born on May
31, 1986. Both C.A. and J.B. were removed from the home following the filing
of a dependency petition in February 2000. The dependency petition recited
a lengthy history of referrals and concerns about neglect, anger
management, domestic violence, parenting skills, and mental health issues.
In particular, the petition alleged that Adams had physically and verbally
assaulted both children and expressed concerns about Beutler's ability to
protect the children.
1 In June 2000, C.A. and J.B. were found dependent as to Adams; J.B. was
found dependent as to Beutler. Under the terms of the agreed dependency
order, Adams and Beutler acknowledged that there had been "extreme family
conflict" in the home, including "inappropriate discipline" of the children. The
parents also acknowledged that there had been indications of substance
abuse, including the fact that Beutler had tested positive in February 2000 for
amphetamine/methamphetamine and THC. The agreed disposition plan
provided that both Adams and Beutler were to complete approved substance
abuse evaluations and follow any recommendations for treatment. Both
parents were also required to complete a psychological assessment with a
parenting component and follow all treatment recommendations. An
assessment of Adams found no indication of substance dependency or abuse;
she completed a drug education class in September 2000. After an evaluation
at Pacific Treatment Alternatives, Beutler was diagnosed with a cannabis
dependency and directed to complete outpatient treatment. He tested
positive for marijuana or THC in September 2000. Beutler submitted another
UA specimen in October 2000 that was found to be "adulterated." Dr. Jolynn-
Marie Wagner, a licensed psychologist, completed the court-ordered
psychological assessments of both parents in late 2000. The assessments
were delayed for several months while Dr. Wagner waited for Adams and
Beutler to return questionnaires. Dr. Wagner never received the
questionnaires and issued her report in January 2001. As part of the
evaluation, Dr. Wagner interviewed Adams and Beutler separately and
together and observed Beutler interacting with J.B. and Adams
interactingwith J.B. and C.A. Dr. Wagner diagnosed Adams with antisocial
personality disorder, finding her to be hostile and with little insight into the
events involving her children. Adams also displayed features of narcissistic
personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. Adams generally
blamed "the system" for her children's behavior and emotional difficulties.
According to Dr. Wagner, it is difficult to treat individualswith a similar profile
because they tend to blame others. Dr. Wagner observed little evidence of
bonding between Adams and C.A. or Adams and J.B. and concluded that an
attempt at reunification with their mother was not in the children's best
interest Dr. Wagner diagnosed Beutler with dependent personality disorder,
noting his difficulty in expressing disagreement with others, his excessive
need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas in his life, and
his difficulty in making everyday decisions without advice and reassurance.
Dr. Wagner found Beutler's dependency reflected in his commitment to the
relationship with Adams, which was generally controlled by Adams and in
which Beutler was demoralized and verbally abused. Dr. Wagner observed a
relatively strong bond between Beutler and J.B. Based on Dr. Wagner's
evaluation, the court eventually ordered both Adams and Beutler to
participate in psychotherapy and parenting training. Beutler, who completed
a recommended drug treatment program in March 2001,was directed to
participate in any recommended after-care. In November 2001, both Adams
and Beutler were ordered to undergo a domestic violence assessment.
Beutler was directed to provide a UA sample on November 15, 2001, but it
appeared to be adulterated. Following a review hearing on November 21,
2001, Beutler was ordered to have "hands-on experiential parenting training"
after he completed an approved parenting class and established and
maintained a separate residence. Beutler was also ordered to attend regular
NA or AA meetings and provide documentation to the court and parties.
Beutler moved out of Adams' house shortly after the hearing and obtained a
separate residence. But he went to Adams' house on December 16, 2001, in
violation of a restraining order. After January 2002, Beutler had no further
contact with Theresa Espana, his social worker. No visitation occurred
between Adams and C.A. during the two-year dependency. Visitation would
have been permitted at C.A.'s request, but she never expressed a desire to
see her mother. Adams' visitation with J.B. was suspended in February 2001,
because she was not in compliance with services and was not making
progress. Visitation was never restored. Beutler participated in visitation with
J.B. for most of the dependency period, although the frequency was reduced
After a fact-finding hearing in May 2002, the trial court terminated Adams'
parental rights in C.A. and J.B. Among other things, the trial court found that
despite participating in extensive services for many years, Adams had made
only minimal progress and that no amount of services could correct her
parental deficiencies. The court also terminated Beutler's parental rights in
J.B, finding that he had failed to complete certain court-ordered services,
failed to stay in contact with his social worker, and that he had been unable
to sever his relationship with Adams. The court concluded that even though
there was evidence of a bond between Beutler and J.B., termination was in
J.B.'s best interest.
Decision
Standard of Review An order of permanent termination of the parent-child

relationship may be entered when the statutory elements set forth in RCW
13.34.180(1) through (6)2 are established by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence and the court finds that termination is in the best interests of the
child.3 Deference to the trial court is particularly important in review of
termination decisions.4 An appellate court will not disturb the trial court's
findings "unless clear, cogent and convincing evidence does not exist in the
record."5 Rose Adams Adams first contends that the trial court erroneously
considered the children's hearsay allegations as substantive evidence of
physical abuse. Prior to trial, Adams moved to exclude statements that C.A.
and J.B. had made to various persons alleging that she had physically abused
them. The allegations were then repeated in reports that witnesses prepared
during the course of the dependency. At the termination hearing, Adams
flatly denied ever abusing J.B. or C.A. Beutler denied that he ever saw Adams
abusing the children, but acknowledged that he suspected physical abuse
when he heard yelling and something that sounded like slapping. Several
times during the hearing, the trial court ruled that the hearsay statements
would not be considered as substantive evidence; rather "{w}hatever the
child is reported to have said will not be accepted for the purpose - for the
truth of the matter asserted, simply as information that was gathered by the
witness for the purpose of reaching a conclusion."6 The trial court reiterated
its ruling during the presentation of findings: And I want the Court of Appeals
to understand that I did not take any of that stuff as substantive fact. I was
sustaining - I was in a constant state of sustaining the hearsay.
7 The trial court then entered the following findings of fact: 1.28 J.B. and C.A.
consistently reported ongoing emotional and physical abuse by the biological
mother to the evaluators in this case, the therapists, school personal {sic},
social worker, and guardian ad litem. Any hearsay statements were not proof
of abuse but the fact that J.B. and C.A. made consistent repeated statements
is evidence of abuse. 1.29 The totality of the trial evidence confirms, and this
court finds that the children were physically abused by the mother. The trial
court also found that Beutler's testimony denying knowledge of abuse was
not credible. Adams argues that by considering the hearsay statements
cumulatively, the trial court effectively reversed the ruling that it would not
consider the statements as substantive evidence of abuse. She maintains
that without the hearsay evidence of physical abuse, the evidence of parental
unfitness was insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights.
The State does not assert that the trial court's reasoning is supported by
authority, but argues that the children's statements were nonetheless
admissible as statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment
under ER 803(a)(4), an argument that the trial court rejected in conjunction
with Dr. Wagner's testimony. Because the trial court repeatedly ruled that the
children's statements would not be considered as substantive evidence of
abuse, the parties never fully identified the relevant hearsay statements or
addressed the specific circumstances surrounding the statements. The
findings themselves do not identify the specific nature of the "physical
abuse." Under the circumstances, we decline the State's invitation to review
the record in order to find an alternative basis upon which to sustain the trial
court's finding of physical abuse. But even without the finding of physical
abuse, the record supports the trial court's termination of Adams' parental
rights. Adams does not challenge the trial court's finding that she has been
offered all necessary and reasonable services, and the record demonstrates
that Adams has participated in numerous services, including parenting
classes, anger management classes, domestic violence classes, counseling,
and in-home therapy services. But the State's witnesses clearly established
that Adams had made no significant progress in her ability to parent J.B. or
C.A. Dr. Wagner, who diagnosed Adams with an antisocial personality
disorder, noted that during the psychological evaluation, Adams frequently
became angry and raised her voice, cursing and going off on tangential
topics. Adams dominated the conversation whenever Beutler was present
and frequently abused him verbally. Despite her acknowledgement at the
time of the agreed dependency order that there had been extreme family
conflict and inappropriate discipline, Adams blamed C.A., Beutler, and "the
system" for the family's difficulties, and characterized C.A. as manipulative
and dishonest. The record was also undisputed that J.B. and C.A. suffer from
severe emotional or behavioral problems. J.B. had gone through extensive
counseling, with the recognition that he needed continued social and
emotional development in a structured and safe environment. C.A. told Dr.
Wagner that her greatest fear was that her mother was correct and that she
was a bad child. No evidence indicated that Adams had any insight into the
severity of the children's problems, whatever their source, or that she could
acquire any meaningful ability to respond to the children's needs in the
foreseeable future. Dr. Wagner also observed little evidence of a
psychological bond in the interaction between Adams and J.B. and C.A. J.B.
remained unresponsive to Adams' attempts at affection, and Adams
exhibited little eye contact, smiling, or verbal give and take in her interaction
with both children. Adams did not respond to C.A.'s rudeness and the two
maintained a wide distance between one another. Based on her evaluation,
Adams' inability to control her anger, lack of insight, poor prognosis for
treatment, and failure to benefit from many years of services, C.A.'s strong
desire to remain in her father's home, and J.B.'s expressed fear of Adams, Dr.
Wagner concluded that reunification with their mother was not in the
children's best interest. Other State witnesses reached similar conclusions.
Ellis Amdur, a child mental health specialist, interviewed Adams in
conjunction with an assessment of C.A.'s placement with her father. During
the interview, Adams asserted that all of C.A.'s allegations were false and
blamed C.A. for many of the things that had happened during the
dependency. Adams denied any personal responsibility. Dr. Bramhall
diagnosed Adams with a bipolar II disorder, "characterized by alternating
cycles of hypomania and depression and recently mixed states." During the
interview, Adams insisted that prior CPS referrals had all been based on
deliberate lies. Dr. Bramhall concluded that Adams' inability to control her
anger prevented her from forming significant attachments with her children
and setting appropriate limits.
Leila Copeland testified that she provided in-home parenting services for
Adams for approximately 18 months. Copeland felt that Adams wanted to
make changes in her behavior patterns, that she was resourceful in seeking
out assistance in the community, and that there was improvement in Adams'
ability to control her anger as to the child that remained in her home. But
Copeland also observed that Adams frequently reverted to old habits.
Copeland characterized Adams' overall progress with parenting, anger
management, and communication skills as "minimal." At the end of the
intervention, Copeland c oncluded that Adams had "minimal" insight into the
effect of her actions on others. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
supports the trial court's findings that all necessary and reasonably available
services capable of correcting parental deficiencies have been offered or
provided, that no amount of services will be capable of correcting Adams'
parental deficiencies, and that there is little likelihood that conditions will be
remedied within the foreseeable future. Continuation of the parent-child
relationship clearlydiminishes C.A.'s and J.B.'s prospects for integration into a
stable andpermanent home.8 Substantial evidence also established that
termination of Adams' parental rights is in the best interests of C.A. and J.B.
Even without the finding of physical abuse, the State satisfied its burden
under RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190; substantial evidence supports the
trial court's termination order as to Adams.
George Beutler
Beutler contends that the State failed to prove that all necessary
andreasonably available services were expressly and understandably
offered.9 He argues that Theresa Espana, his social worker, failed to provide
updated and meaningful referral lists and that certain services were either
not available or not provided. Beutler acknowledged that he had a substance
abuse problem and that treatment was instrumental to maintaining his
parental rights. Although he completed ane treatment program in March
2001, the record shows that Beutler delayed significantly in pursuing
recommended self-help meetings. In November 2001, the court ordered him
to attended AA or NA meetings and provide documentation to the court and
parties. At the termination hearing in May 2002, Beutler testified that he had
been attending NA meetings regularly, but acknowledged that he had never
submitted any documentation and that he had stopped all contact with his
social worker after January 2002. Dr. Wagner recommended that Beutler
participate in domestic violence treatment and psychotherapy. In November
2001, the court specifically ordered Beutler to participate in domestic
violence treatment. Beutler apparently contacted Catholic Community
Services, an agency that he was familiar with, but maintained that he could
not afford the $75 assessment fee. Noting the evidence to the contrary, the
trial court rejected this explanation and found that Beutler could afford the
assessment fee. The record supports the trial court's finding. Beutler did not
begin individual counseling until August 2001, and he ended these sessions
in January 2002 when his medical coupons ran out. Beutler testified that he
contacted the social worker once about additional funding, but he admitted
that he never followed up. At the time of the termination hearing, Beutler was
participating only in a monthly group parenting session. He testified that he
did not believe that he had an anger management problem or needed to
participate in domestic violence treatment. The record establishes that the
primary issue was Beutler's apparent unwillingness to participate in or follow
through with the necessary services that were reasonably available. Beutler
also rejected all contact with the social worker after January 2002 and failed
to provide information releases or supply updated contact information. A
parent's unwillingness or inability to use the treatment and evaluation
services provided excuses the State from offering extra services that might
have been helpful.10 Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence established that
all necessary and reasonably available services were expressly and
understandably offered. Beutler next contends that the State failed to prove
that there was little likelihood that conditions would be remedied so that J.B.
could be returned in the future.11 He maintains that he had successfully
participated in nearly all of the required services. But for the reasons set forth
above, we disagree. Moreover, contrary to Beutler's assertion, his separation
from Adams does not suggest that he is now able to provide a safe
environment for J.B. Beutler conceded that his relationship with Adams was
hostile, violent, abusive, and extremely harmful to J.B. and that separation
was necessary to insure J.B.'s safety. Beutler did not establish a separate
residence until the court ordered him to do so in November 2001. Less than
one month later, he violated a court order by going to Adams' residence.
Several witnesses testified that Adams and Beutler were continuing to see
one another shortly before the termination hearing. Substantial evidence
supports the trial court's finding that there is little likelihood Beutler's
deficiencies will be remedied so that J.B. can be returned in the near future.
Continuation of Beutler's parental relationship clearly diminished J.B.'s
prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.12 J.B. had
moved to a pre-adoptive home several months before the termination
hearing and had bonded with the new family. He has severe emotional
problems that must be addressed in a secure and nurturing environment.
Beutler's inability to leave his destructive relationship with Adams makes it
unlikely that he will be able to offer the stable environment that is necessary
for J.B.'s well being in the foreseeable future. Under the circumstances, the
State has established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
continuation of Beutler's parental relationship diminishes J.B.'s prospects for
early integration into a stable and permanent home. Finally, Beutler contends
that termination was not in J.B.'s best interests. This argument rests primarily
on testimony by several witnesses that there was an obvious bond between
Beutler and J.B. In addition, Beutler's testimony reflected a great affection for
his son. But the evidence also established that termination is necessary if J.B.
is to obtain the stability and permanence that he requires. Where the needs
of child and the rights of a parent conflict, the needs of the child must
prevail.13 The record supports the trial court's determination that
termination was in J.B.'s best interests.
Affirmed.
For the court: 1C.A. had been found dependent in 1991 and removed from
the home until1994, when the dependency was dismissed. 2RCW
13.34.180(1) provides in part: (a) That the child has been found to be a
dependent child; (b) That the court has entered a dispositional order
pursuant to RCW 13.34.130; (c) That the child has been removed or will, at
the time of the hearing,have been removed from the custody of the parent
for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency; (d)
That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and
understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably
available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the
foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or
provided; (e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so
that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. A parent's
failure to substantially improve parental deficiencies within twelve months
following entry of the dispositional order shall give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so
that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. The
presumption shall not arise unless the petitioner makes a showing that all
necessary services reasonably capable of correcting the parental deficiencies
within the foreseeable future have been clearly offered or provided. . . . (f)
That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the
child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
3RCW 13.34.190(2). 4In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn. 2d 129, 144, 904
P.2d 1132 (1995). 5In re K.R., 128 Wn.2d at 144.6Report of Proceedings (May
7, 2002), at 84. 7RP (June 6, 2002), at 9. 8See RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), (e), (f).
9RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). 10In re Ramquist, 52 Wn. App. 854, 861, 765 P.2d 30
(1988). 11RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). 12RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). 13In re Aschauer, 93
Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980). 50636-6-I - In RE the Dependency Of:
J.A.B. (dob 8/20/92) v. Rose Adams and George Beutler, App. V. Dshs, Resp.
Spinelli v.United States 393 U.S. 410 (1969)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Spinelli (D) argued that the evidence gathered
was inadmissible having been obtained pursuant to a search warrant
improperly issued on the basis of a confidential informant's tip, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. The warrant lacked probable cause.
PROCEDURE BELOW: The D was convicted of traveling in interstate

commerce with the intention of conducting illegal gambling activities. The
District Court refused to suppress evidence obtained through a search of an
apartment. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: The D was convicted for traveling to Missouri

from Illinois with the intention of gambling. D appealed, challenging the
search warrant obtained by the FBI to obtain evidence. The application on
which the warrant was based included four main parts: 1. The FBI had
tracked D for five days, during four of which he traveled from Illinois to a
certain apartment house in Missouri, and on one day he was further tracked
to a specific apartment in the building; 2. Two phone numbers are associated
with the specific apartment; 3. The government officials stated that this
person was a known bookie; and 4. A reliable informant told the FBI that D
was a bookie and used the two phone numbers associated with the
apartment in Missouri.
LEGAL ISSUE: Does an informant's tip provide probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is
reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known by the
informant?
HOLDING: An informant's tip does not provide probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the
informant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known
by the informant.
OVERVIEW: Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant that

authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) search, which uncovered
the evidence necessary for his conviction. The warrant was granted by a
magistrate judge upon an affidavit stating that the FBI had observed
defendant's travels to and from an apartment and that a confidential reliable
informant had informed the authorities that defendant was operating a
gambling operation. On certiorari, the court found that the application for the
warrant was inadequate because it failed to set forth the underlying
circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate to independently judge
the validity of the informant's information. Also the affiant-officers failed to
support their claim that their informant was "credible" or his information
"reliable." The bald assertion that defendant was "known" as a gambler was
entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision and the Court
rejected as imprecise the "totality of circumstances" approach embraced by
the court of appeals. Thus, the affidavit fell short of providing probable
REASONING: (Harlan, J.) An informant's tip does not provide probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the
informant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known
by the informant IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL SO THAT THE MAGISTRATE MAY
KNOW HE IS RELYING ON SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN A CASUAL
RUMOR. The Aguilar two part test is used: 1. Is the information reliable? 2. Is
the informant reliable? In this case, there are no facts provided in the
informant's tip to explain why the informant thought D was involved in
gambling. The FBI also did not provide any reasons why they thought this
particular informant was reliable. Therefore, there was no probable cause to
issue the warrant. The conviction should be overturned. Reversed, for D.
CONCURRENCE: (White, J.) The Draper approach would justify the issuance of
a warrant in this case; nonetheless, pending a full reconsideration of that
case and the Aguilar-Nathanson cases, a vote to affirm would produce an
equally divided court.
CRITICAL SUMMARY: I agree with the decision; otherwise, the authorities

could fabricate their own tips and have almost unlimited access to our
homes.
AGULARA TEST: [1] RELIABILITY--- IN THIS CASE WE NEED TO KNOW
WHY THE INFORMATN IS RELIABLE, A TRACK RECORD WOULD HELP,
(can be coroberated (helps w/ great details), track reckord, veracity) [2]

BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE ---IN THIS CASE WE DON’T KNOW HOW THE INFORMAT
GOT THE INFO
At no point in her request for a warrant does Officer trask say how or
why she knows the rose adams is a credible witness she just says
she know her to live there
4) It is evident that Officer Trask has an ongoing personal issue with

my body wieght & ethnicity as evidenced in her REPEATED mention
of both in any report she makes about me from the court report, the
warrant report & the incident report, yet the other animal control
officers & the Everett Police Officer can describe me without having
to use those identifiers. In her warrant request, in her statement to
the court & in her incedent report she repeatedly refers to me as a
"Thin Native American Woman" if it was once, I could get that but it
is crystal clear that there is an underlying personal theme in this.
The ACLU & the Department of Justice both, give this merit as well. I
haven't figured it out yet but somewhere in law there has to be
something to do with being a "whistleblower" in regards to my
complaints against the injured dogs I was puling from the shelter,
but don't worry I will figure it out. I would also like to point out no
matter how much good stuff I find I always check for an appellate
ruling on it to make sure I am not just making pointless claims or
statements
9.91.010
Denial of civil rights — Terms defined.
Terms used in this section shall have the following definitions:
(1)(a) "Every person" shall be construed to include any owner, lessee,

proprietor, manager, agent or employee whether one or more natural
persons, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations,
cooperatives, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, of this state and its
political subdivisions, boards and commissions, engaged in or exercising
control over the operation of any place of public resort, accommodation,
assemblage or amusement.
(b) "Deny" is hereby defined to include any act which directly or indirectly, or
by subterfuge, by a person or his agent or employee, results or is intended or
calculated to result in whole or in part in any discrimination, distinction,
restriction, or unequal treatment, or the requiring of any person to pay a
larger sum than the uniform rates charged other persons, or the refusing or
withholding from any person the admission, patronage, custom, presence,
frequenting, dwelling, staying, or lodging in any place of public resort,
accommodation, assemblage, or amusement except for conditions and
limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons, regardless
of race, creed or color.
(c) "Full enjoyment of" shall be construed to include the right to purchase any
service, commodity or article of personal property offered or sold on, or by,
any establishment to the public, and the admission of any person to
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of any place of public
resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement, without acts directly or
indirectly causing persons of any particular race, creed or color, to be treated
as not welcome, accepted, desired or solicited.
(d) "Any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement"

is hereby defined to include, but not to be limited to, any public place,
licensed or unlicensed, kept for gain, hire or reward, or where charges are
made for admission, service, occupancy or use of any property or facilities,
whether conducted for the entertainment, housing or lodging of transient
guests, or for the benefit, use or accommodation of those seeking health,
recreation or rest, or for the sale of goods and merchandise, or for the
rendering of personal services, or for public conveyance or transportation on
land, water or in the air, including the stations and terminals thereof and the
garaging of vehicles, or where food or beverages of any kind are sold for
consumption on the premises, or where public amusement, entertainment,
sports or recreation of any kind is offered with or without charge, or where
medical service or care is made available, or where the public gathers,
congregates, or assembles for amusement, recreation or public purposes, or
public halls, public elevators and public washrooms of buildings and
structures occupied by two or more tenants, or by the owner and one or more
tenants, or any public library or any educational institution wholly or partially
supported by public funds, or schools of special instruction, or nursery
schools, or day care centers or children's camps; nothing herein contained
shall be construed to include, or apply to, any institute, bona fide club, or
place of accommodation, which is by its nature distinctly private provided
that where public use is permitted that use shall be covered by this section;
nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility operated
or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution; and the right of
a natural parent in loco parentis to direct the education and upbringing of a
child under his control is hereby affirmed.
(2) Every person who denies to any other person because of race, creed, or
color, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or
amusement, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.[1953 c 87 § 1; 1909 c 249 §
434; RRS § 2686.]
49.74.005
Legislative findings — Purpose.
Discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, age, sex, marital
status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap is
contrary to the findings of the legislature and public policy. The legislature
finds and declares that racial minorities, women, persons in protected age
groups, persons with disabilities, Vietnam-era veterans, and disabled
veterans are underrepresented in Washington state government
employment.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide for enforcement measures for

affirmative action within Washington state government employment and
institutions of higher education in order to eliminate such
underrepresentation.[1985 c 365 § 7.]
RCW 49.60.030
Freedom from discrimination — Declaration of civil rights.
(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color,
national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual
orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or
the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability
is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but
not be limited to:
(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations,

advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort,
accommodation, assemblage, or amusement;
(f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or
blacklists. Discriminatory boycotts or blacklists for purposes of this section
shall be defined as the formation or execution of any express or implied
agreement, understanding, policy or contractual arrangement for economic
benefit between any persons which is not specifically authorized by the laws
of the United States and which is required or imposed, either directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, by a foreign government or foreign person in
order to restrict, condition, prohibit, or interfere with or in order to exclude
any person or persons from any business relationship on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status,
sexual orientation, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability,
or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a
disability, or national origin or lawful business relationship: PROVIDED
HOWEVER, That nothing herein contained shall prohibit the use of boycotts as
authorized by law pertaining to labor disputes and unfair labor practices; and
(2) Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of
this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to
enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the
person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys'
fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the
United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).
RCW 9.62.010
Malicious prosecution.
Every person who shall, maliciously and without probable cause therefor,
cause or attempt to cause another to be arrested or proceeded against for
any crime of which he or she is innocent:
(1) If such crime be a felony, is guilty of a class C felony and shall be

punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than
five years; and
(2) If such crime be a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, shall be guilty of

a misdemeanor.
[2003 c 53 § 40; 1992 c 7 § 15; 1909 c 249 § 117; Code 1881 § 899; 1873 p
203 § 98; 1854 p 92 § 89; RRS § 2369.]
RCW 9A.36.080
Malicious harassment — Definition and criminal penalty.
(1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and

intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her
perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap:
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or

another person; or
(2) In any prosecution for malicious harassment, unless evidence exists which
explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to
threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person
intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the
person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory
handicap if the person commits one of the following acts:
This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for

evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to
prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a
particular case do not fall within (a) or (b) of this subsection.
(3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a
member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or
sexual orientation, or had a mental, physical, or sensory handicap.
(4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be

introduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specifically
relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of
evidence governing impeachment of a witness.
(b) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened
or to any other person; or
(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a
person threatened or that of any other person.
(7) Malicious harassment is a class C felony.
(8) The penalties provided in this section for malicious harassment do not
preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available
under law.
(9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to
any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or
protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws
of the state of Washington.
[2010 c 119 § 1; 2009 c 180 § 1; 1993 c 127 § 2; 1989 c 95 § 1; 1984 c 268 §

1; 1981 c 267 § 1.]
Notes: Severability -- 1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078.
Construction -- 1989 c 95: "The provisions of this act shall be liberally

construed in order to effectuate its purpose." [1989 c 95 § 3.]
Severability -- 1989 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its application to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the
application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not
affected." [1989 c 95 § 4.]
Harassment: Chapters 9A.46 and 10.14 RCW.
5) It is also clearly evident that someone from the Everett Animal

Shelter has been sharing some true & some false information with
Rose Adams in regards to my private personal information.
6) The person responsible for this personal attack on me has been

given other personal information in regards to my case BY THE
COURTS THEMSELVES, Judge Odell sent them to HER house even
though they knew my address & it was CLEARLY NOT her address
they sent it there anyway, even if it was not malicious in intent it
was lazy & damaging to my own personal safety & reputation.
7) Everett Municipal Code is CLEARLY in conflict with Washington

state's RCW's & contrary to Prosecutor Fisher's assertions that
Everett is a "First Class City" & does not answer to the Constitution
of Washington State or The Constitution of the United States he is
incorrect in his assumptions, Municipal Courts are only granted thier
very right to EXIST by Washington state laws, Constitiions & RCW's.
His statements were recorded in an open Superior court room on my
petition matter, he honestly believes that he is NOTaccountable to
the state of Washington & that the City has free will to make up laws
as they see fit, which is a very dangerous & wreckless attitiude,
leaving the City itself open to many lawsuits
RCW 16.52.085
Removal of animals for feeding — Examination — Notice — Euthanasia.
(3) Any owner whose domestic animal is removed pursuant to this chapter
shall be given written notice of the circumstances of the removal and notice
of legal remedies available to the owner. The notice shall be given by posting
at the place of seizure, by delivery to a person residing at the place of
seizure, or by registered mail if the owner is known. In making the decision to
remove an animal pursuant to this chapter, the officer shall make a good
faith effort to contact the animal's owner before removal.
***I was NEVER given any notice of any legal remedies available to me, I had
to read pretty much the entire state's RCW's WAC's & Everett Municipal
Codes on my own to find out
(4) The agency having custody of the animal may euthanize the animal or
may find a responsible person to adopt the animal not less than fifteen
business days after the animal is taken into custody. A custodial agency may
euthanize severely injured, diseased, or suffering animals at any time. An
owner may prevent the animal's destruction or adoption
by: (a) Petitioning the district court of the county where the animal was
seized for the animal's immediate return subject to court-imposed conditions,
or (b) posting a bond or security in an amount sufficient to provide for the
animal's care for a minimum of thirty days from the seizure date. If the
custodial agency still has custody of the animal when the bond or security
expires, the animal shall become the agency's property unless the court
orders an alternative disposition. If a court order prevents the agency from
assuming ownership and the agency continues to care for the animal, the
court shall order the owner to renew a bond or security for the agency's
continuing costs for the animal's care. When a court has prohibited the owner
from owning or possessing a similar animal under RCW 16.52.200(3), the
agency having custody of the animal may assume ownership upon seizure
and the owner may not prevent the animal's destruction or adoption by
petitioning the court or posting a bond.
*** I am willing to do whatever the court requests to get my babies back
(5) If no criminal case is filed within fourteen business days of the animal's
removal, the owner may petition the district court of the county where the
animal was removed for the animal's return. The petition shall be filed with
the court, with copies served to the law enforcement or animal care and
control agency responsible for removing the animal and to the prosecuting
attorney. if the court grants the petition, the agency which seized the animal
must deliver the animal to the owner at no cost to the owner. If a criminal
action is filed after the petition is filed but before the animal is returned, the
petition shall be joined with the criminal matter.
*** My dogs & cat were seized on January,6th, 2011...
(6) In a motion or petition for the animal's return before a trial, the burden is
on the owner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the animal
will not suffer future neglect or abuse and is not in need of being restored to
health.
***We now have a studio apt & are no longer homeless, all of my own dogs &
foster dogs have vet records & are all fully immunized
[2009 c 287 § 2; 1994 c 261 § 6; 1987 c 335 § 1; 1974 ex.s. c 12 § 2.]
RCW 16.52.207
Animal cruelty in the second degree.
(1) A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under
circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the person
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts unnecessary
suffering or pain upon an animal.
(2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if,
under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the owner
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence:
(a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space,
or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable
physical pain as a result of the failure;
(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under

subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant's
control.
***I believe it was establshed that I was homeless & was doing the best I
could for the animals at that time. Although I realize full well that living in a
car is not a good situation it was only a temporary situation & I would gladly
live under a bridge if it meant keeping my animals with me. They are a
lifetime commitment not something to be taken lightly, I guarentee those
animals would die for me, I was trying to show them the same love & loyalty
that they would freely give to me. It was not their fault we were homeless, it
was mine but I atleast tried to keep up with my responsibility to them to the
best of my abilites
[2007 c 376 § 1; 2005 c 481 § 2; 1994 c 261 § 9.]

Notes:
Finding -- Intent -- 1994 c 261: See note following RCW 16.52.011.
Everett Municipal Codes
6.04.070 Prohibited conduct.
C. Offenses Relating to Cruelty. It shall be unlawful for any person to:
2. Under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty as

defined in RCW 16.52.205, fail to provide an animal with sufficient good and
wholesome food and a constant source of clear potable water, proper shelter
and protection from the weather, veterinary care when needed to prevent
suffering, and with humanecare and treatment;
RCW 16.52.310 Definition
(d) Provide dogs with easy and convenient access to adequate amounts of
clean food and water. Food and water receptacles must be regularly cleaned
and sanitized. All enclosures must contain potable water that is not frozen, is
substantially free from debris, and is readily accessible to all dogs in the
enclosure at all times.
*** The revised code of Washington states the animals must be given access
to ADEQUATE amounts of clear potable water. I was following Washington
state law & common sense in regards to giving them water. I had just given
them water before we all went to bed, several hours earlier, there was a
water container on the hood of my car & if you can view the pictures they
took of a big black pan you could still see a little water at the bottom of the
pan so it didn't have time to dehydrate.
Snohomish County, Washington, Code of Ordinances >> Title 9 - ANIMALS

Chapter 9.12 - 9.12.080 - Cruelty to animals.
The following, singly or together, are deemed to constitute cruel treatment to

animals. Therefore, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to:
(3) Neglect to provide adequate daily rations of food or water to any animal
within his care, custody or control;
West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated Currentness.
Title 35. Cities and Towns. Chapter 35.27. Towns. 35.27.370.
Specific powers enumerated Citation: WA ST 35.27.370

Citation: West's RCWA 35.27.370 Last Checked by Web Center Staff: 09/2010
Summary:
This Washington statute provides that the council of said town shall have
power to pass ordinances NOT IN CONFLICT with the Constitution and laws of
this state, or of the United States. Specifically, the council may regulate,
restrain, or prohibit the running at large of any and all domestic animals
within the city limits, or any part or parts thereof, and to regulate the keeping
of such animals within any part of the city; to establish, maintain and
regulate a common pound for estrays, and to appoint a poundkeeper, who
shall be paid out of the fines and fees imposed on, and collected from, the
owners of any impounded stock.
Statute in Full:
The council of said town shall have power:
(1) To pass ordinances NOT IN CONFLICT with the Constitution and laws of
this state, or of the United States;
(7) To impose and collect an annual license on every dog within the limits of
the town, to prohibit dogs running at large, and to provide for the killing of all
dogs found at large and not duly licensed;
(14) To impose fines, penalties and forfeitures for any and all violations of
ordinances, and for any breach or violation of any ordinance, to fix the
penalty by fine or imprisonment, or both; but no such fine shall exceed five
thousand dollars, nor the term of imprisonment exceed one year, except that
the punishment for any criminal ordinance shall be the same as the
punishment provided in state law for the same crime; or to provide that
violations of ordinances constitute a civil violation subject to a monetary
penalty, but no act which is a state crime may be made a civil violation;
(16) To make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutions
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the state of Washington, as
may be deemed expedient to maintain the peace, good government and
welfare of the town and its trade, commerce and manufacturers, and to do
and perform any and all other acts and things necessary or proper to carry
out the provisions of this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
[2008 c 129 § 3, eff. June 12, 2008; 1993 c 83 § 7; 1986 c 278 § 6; 1984 c 258
§ 805; 1977 ex.s. c 316 § 25; 1965 ex.s. c 116 § 15; 1965 c 127 § 1; 1965 c 7
§ 35.27.370. Prior: 1955 c 378 § 4; 1949 c 151 § 1; 1945 c 214 § 1; 1941 c 74
§ 1; 1927 c 207 § 1; 1925 ex.s. c 159 § 1; 1895 c 32 § 1; 1890 p 201 § 154;
Rem. Supp. 1949 § 9175.]
8) I was never given a copy of my legal remedies, nor was I given a
copy of the warrant, the warrant was handed to me by Officer Trask
who is NOT a lawenforcement officer. The warrant disappeared when
everyone left & I had NO pockets in which to put the warrant in as
asserted by Officer Harmer.
9) I was not given competent counsel, who had ANY experience in

Animal Law or Civil Rightslaw. As a matter of fact I was given an
attorney who had just passed her bar exam 2 yrs ago who could not
& would not produce any experience in my type of criminal case. I
might add that she was a graduate of the Cooley Law School a 4th
tier law school & an online schol at that, where the SAT & GPA
qualifications make it the bottom of the 4th tier plus to make
matters worse the rest of her training was at Gonzaga. I called over
30 law firms & got the same response many times over: When they
see those credentials on an applicant the "can" the resume. I even
had one of them tell to go it alone because it was better to have a
fool for a client (myself) then an idiot for a lawyer. She may turn out
to be an incredible lawyer but I don't want her "practicing" on me
when my dogs lives are at stake. Animal law is a newly emerging
practice which is mixed with procedural, civil & even admiralty laws
regardingsearch & seizure, best left to someone with experience
with all or part of these areas of law.
10) I have already been deprived of my due process & my personal

property permanantly without even being convicted yet, so I would
respectfully request that the court redeem themselves to the extent
they are able & dismiss all charges, expunge this records & all
proceedings within,return my personal property, & refrain from
harassing me any further
Additionally, the practice of seizing the personal property of owners without

following statutory notice requirements, as occurred in this case, is a denial
of procedural due process. No proper notice procedures have been followed
by the City of Everett/animal care and control authorities under animal
seizure statutes, or property forfeiture statutes, to the owners of the pets
setting forth the reason for the seizure and the process whereby the
petitioners may reacquire possession of their property in their pets.
Petitioners have been denied procedural due process by theCity of Everett
and/or (AC) authorities. The pets were seized unlawfully as they were NOT in
a life threatening condition pursuant to RCW 16.52.085. Property owners
have the right to challenge such seizures and, if they "substantially prevail,"
recover their costs and reaasonable attorney fees. RCW 69.50.505(6). (1) The
following are subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right exists in
them (6) In any proceeding to forfeit property under this title, where the
claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to reasonable
attorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant. In addition, in a court
hearing between two or more claimants to the article or articles involved, the
prevailing party is entitled to a judgment for costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees. Washington state's civil forfeiture act was adopted to protect people
from having their property wrongfully seized by the government. In Guillen v.
Contreras (Sup. Ct. En Banc. No. 82531-9 (9/2010), amicus notes that "an
owner has the right to resist the taking of any of his property regardless of
market value." Amicus Br. At 8, cf Guillen v. Contreras, Sup. Ct. En Banc, No.
82531-9 (9/9/2010). A citizen has the right to object to seizure, even if
temporary, of his personal property no matter the market value. Id.
Forfeitures of personal and real property are not favored in the law and very
specific procedures must be followed.by government officials and its agents
when seizing property, including animals. If statutory procedures are not
followed, the property was illegally seized and a person is lawfully entitled to
possession thereof. Unless the seized property is needed for evidence, the
petitioners are not the rightful owners, the property is contraband, or the
property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to statute, the seized property must
be returned. Id. The petitioner is the rightful owners of their dogs and cats,
their property in dogs and cats is not "contraband", statutory procedures for
seizure of property have not been followed, and the seized property in pets
must be returned to the petitioners. If the state argues that the pets are
"derivative contraband" and that petitioner is somehow guilty of a crime, the
government must follow property forfeiture procedures to divest petitioners
of their interest in their property in dogs and cats. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvannia, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305; Farrell, 606 F. 2d
at 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf from State v. Alaway, 64
Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). Washington courts often look to
federal law to determine lawful forfeiture procedures. The State cannot
confiscate property merely because it is "derivative contraband". Instead it
must forfeit it using property forfeiture procedures. Washington has a
statutory forfeiture procedure. . . RCW 69.50.505(a)(2). Notice must be given
within 15 days of seizure. RCW 69.50.505(c). If the property is personal
property, one claming an interest in it then has 45 days to respond, and if a
response is made, a hearing must be held. RCW 69.50.505(d), (e).
Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory
procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must
release the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority to
forfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3
(4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any
time frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. In
the case of the seizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, as
in this matter, the seizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appear
to track Washington State's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. and
federal law notice procedures. RCW 16.52.100 provides that if an animal is
confined without necessary food or water for more than 36 hours, and the
officer finds it extremely difficult to provide the animal with food or water, the
officer may remove the animals to protective custody for that purpose. RCW
16.52.085 sets forth the method whereby an animal may be seized for
protective custody for feeding and care. An animal may be seized by an
officer only with a warrant UNLESS the animal is in an immediate life-
threatening condition. If the officer decides that an animal is in an immediate
life threatening condition to justify summary seizure of the animals, proper
notice must be given to the owner of the animal by (1) posting at the place of
seizure, and (2) personal service to a person residing at the place of seizure,
OR by registered mail to the owner. The Notice must be written notice to the
owner of the circumstances of the removal of the animals (without a warrant)
and the legal remedies available under this chapter to the owner of the
animal(s). The proper procedures by statute are enumerated below.
Petitioners received no lawful notice and their due process rights were
violated.
I have not seen my animals in 80 days, i have not been allowed to

visit them, to call to check on them, I did not even find out the one
was dead til the prosecutor just casually said oh they put that one to
sleep. This is more than cruel & unusal punishment for a crime I
have not even been convicted of yet, I was not even a resident of the
city of Everett, nor would I ever be even if I was paid to be. It should
also be noted that I used to rescue dogs from the Everett Shelter til I
started to realize that EVERY dog I pulled from there was either
injured or maced, sometimes both so it is very evident because of
the prior harassment of Officer trask when I was an Everett citizen
years ago, & the complaints I made about the injured dogs I was
pulling out of there. It is crystal clear that this is malicious, in intent,
& motivated by revenge & prejudice I pray that you & your courts
will no longer be a party to this action. Please also let it be noted
that if you deny this motion that I am willing ready & able to
proceded with the court hearing as it stands. I have 32 reams of
evidence, 42lbs of vet records & I have a witness list of over 148
people so far, still waiting on word from another 78 people. Two of
the 148 are going to fly up from California so I would like to go on
record stating that I will not waive my rights to a speedy trial nor
will I accept any continuances in this matter. I have not recieved full
discovery, nor have I recieved competent counsel, the last attorney
didn't even understand about the concept of Affidavit of Prejudice &
why Judge Odell could not rule on her motion to withdraw the same
day. I also have 14 motions ready for consideration, & want to have
a jury trial of my peers including "Thin Native American Women" the
real kind, not the blond blue eyed ones who's grandmother was a
Cherokee "Princess" or still believe that Pocahontas & John Smith
fell in love & got married & lived happily ever after, the one's who
are college educated, & I would like atleast 1 or 2 people who have
high functioning autism like myself. I am not trying to make you
crazy I just want to make sure that I present every scrap of evidence
as I can so I have something to appeal in case I were to lose. Plus
the prosecutor ATTACKED my character by stating that I kept my
dog with cancer alive to garner donations when I never have asked a
dime for him, he was my boy. I was just trying to get the last few
precious moments with him that I could. The day Mr fisher told me
he was dead I wanted to die myself, to think he died alone, afraid &
thinking I had abandoned him is more than either one of us
deserved. The prosecutor has the responsibility to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that I am guilty, I have the Constitutional right to
prove beyond a doubt that I am not & to defend myself & my
character, this charge could destroy my ability to rescue, my ability
to own my own animals, it could ruin my life which is exactly what it
was intended to do. By taking my animals from me all I have to do is
read & learn for 18 to 20 hours a day, I can't sleep because I have
nightmares that they are killing my animals, they won't even give
me back my dead dog's body because he is "evidence" he WAS a
iving breathing loving sentient being, with feelings, who could love,
feel fear, feel pain, & feel sorrow, & now I don't know where he is or
all of his parts are. He spent 12 yrs in a puppy mill before he was
rescued, I only got less than 2 years of his life to prove to him all
humans weren't bad, I was wrong. Meanwhile my dogs are living in
glass cages barely twice the size of my car, having to eat, sleep, pee
& poop in the same area, they are left alone from 6p.m. to 10a.m. &
their cages are hosed down to be cleaned out. In a shelter that can
not guarantee that they will even be safe from disease or harm as
evidenced by all the cats they killed several months ago because
they have no clear cut methods for quarantining animals. They are
being separated from eachother in a shelter that animals are abused
in, when they are used to sleeping with me, eating with me & being
together. Soffie(my schnauzer)Hoki (my Kelpie) & Taz (my cat) have
never been away from me for more than 46hrs. Dogs are pack
animals by nature, & my poor cat thinks he's a dog because he
actually was nursed by a wolf mother, he fetches, walks on a leash &
the doofus even lifts his leg to pee, he just doesn't know any better.
They are giving my Kelpie 4 times higher doses of Phenobarbitol
then is required, They are seniors dogs & a black cat, they stand no
chance of being adopted. I know for legal purposes they are defined
as "property" & I am going to change that law, but they are not just
property they are my babies, everyone has a story, I found Hoki in a
ditch in Lewis county with his mother & father & most of his
littermates heads bashed in only 3 of them lived, his head was caved
in & I put him in the back of my van with his parents & siblings
bodies til I heard a scream from the back, his sister & brother got
adopted but no one wanted a spaztic siezure dog except for me, & I
was glad, Soffie I got her from the Everett Police Dept she was
covered over 75% of her body in cigarette burns, she was terrified of
everything, pop bottles, cans, lighters, cigarette packs, plastic bags,
grooming, nail clips, the vet estimated that all of her ribs had been
fractured multiple times, she had also been bred atleast 10 times by
the time I got her maybe 11, she had a hernia & an exploded uterus
from giving birth so much, which may be why she had the bladder
stone as well. Taz was no bigger than my hand when he ran out in
front of my van almost 6 yrs ago, on Broadway, I tried to take him to
the Everett Shelter but they were just going to euthanize him so I
became the mother of a snot nosed, bloody eared, green goopy eyed
monster who was nursed by a wolf mother & got a lttle screwy in life
as a result but he a good guy. Misty was taken from a puppy mill,
guarding the skeletal remains of 6 of her puppies, she was taken by
another rescue, adopted out & I got her back pregnant when it turns
out the rescue was breeding those dogs. Libby was literally rotting
away when I pulled her from an Eastern Washington shelter, I kid
you not she was mostly bald & rotting flesh, she had maggots under
the patch of scabs & skin she had left, the shelter manager just
shook her head when I pulled her & put her in my car, she said "You
know that one is going to die too right?" I told her she would die at
home being loved then, those are the kind I take, the kind that break
my heart, but the ones I love the most, Libby didn't die, she thrived,
now she is once again abandoned for all she knows.The people who
brought her in said she was old & they dumped her there to be put
to sleep & adopted another puppy that day, she is only 2 or 3 yrs
old. This is my life's work, my heart & my soul. I have a beat up little
Toyota that stinks to high Heavens because in the little over 15
mnths I have owned it I have put 40,000 miles on it & have
transported, rescued, & pulled somewhere around 1200 dogs, cats,
even a 400lb pig, ferretts, rabbits, birds, raccoons, possoms, a few
old ladies & numerous college kids stranded on old lonely roads in
that car. I am the one who sits up in the woods for days on end
trying to catch an injured feral dog, getting jumped by stupid
bobcats, & the crud kicked out of me by deers, not to mention being
followed around by cougars & bears, or drives over 2 mountian
passes in freezing rain storms & white out blizzards by just letting a
little air out of my bald tires & driving slow,no chains, no snow tires
I'm the one who chases vagrants around uder bridges & over passes
to give their dogs, shots, wormers, dog food & flea meds. When you
see the ads on craigslist offering free flea meds, wormer & shots,
that's me too.This whole fiasco has caused the lives of over 180
animals at last count & I quit counting 3 weeks ago because it hurt
too bad. I'm pretty sure, or atleast I was til this, that is how I'm
gonna die, saving some animal, but that was okay with me. I will go
to court, I will fight & win, even if I have to take this to the Supreme
Court of the United States of America. I don't know what line of
Mitchell's you decend from but I come from West Virginia line & we
don't quit fighting til we're dead & there's even a few folk legends of
us fighting after that. True story, you can look it up on
WVCuture.org just type in Mitchell when you have a couple few free
days I don't know if I did this right or not, I'm pretty sure I have laid
out my whole case here, along with my defense, but it is the best I
can do with what I know so far. Not to mention I have been sleep
deprived for 80 days because i keep having nightmares that that
lady is drowning mydogs & I keep running towards them but they
just keep getting further away no matter how fast i run & I can hear
them screaming for me & she just keeps holding them under & then
brings them up to revive them & then drowns them some moreI
would also like you to take a look at my web pagethe 3rd link is to
do with my court case, it was private but since the prosecutor
already tricked me into presenting my case in front of him at the
Superior Court hearing it's kind of pointless to hide it
anyway.Doesn't seem fair since i oly got some vet reports, & the
warrant request,even though I asked for discovery weeks ago, but if
we go to court I can fie a motion for that too I guess.
Rescue Page
http://www.orgsites.com/wa/finallyhomerescue/
Ministry Page
http://finallyhomerescueministries.yolasite.com/
Court Page
http://taamuvcityofeverettanimalcontrol.yolasite.com/
Signature of moving party Brandia Taamu
Date: March 27th, 2011

Motion of Dismissal

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Motion of Dismissal

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Municipal Court of Everett Washington

City of Everett (PetitionforDismissal

V. (of all Charges & Return

Brandia Taamu (of all Seized Property

1) It will be shown that my affirmative defense is in fact credible &

16.52.207 Animal cruelty in the second degree.

(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under

2) It will be shown that Officer Weaver & Officer Trask conspired to

RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR

supported by probable cause;

(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important

pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;

(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information

mitigates the offense and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the

prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by

a protective order of the tribunal;

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not

simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific

obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and

far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate

and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the

ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function,

which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by

lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law

may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of

obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could

constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.

[2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and

thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause.

Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary

questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to

counsel and silence.

which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work

prosecutor of the importance of these obligations in connection with the

unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In

addition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to

prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making

direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care

standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions

to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

[Amended effective September 1, 2006.]

CHAPTER 42.52 RCW ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE.

(1) "Agency" means any state board, commission, bureau, committee,

division, or tribunal in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of state

information to, or otherwise provide assistance to another person, believing

(6) "Confidential information" means (a) specific information, rather than

(13) "Participate" means to participate in state action or a proceeding

(14) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, corporation,

(15) "Regulatory agency" means any state board, commission, department,

(16) "Responsibility" in connection with a transaction involving the state,

(a) A decision, determination, finding, ruling, or order; and (b) A grant,

(19) "State employee" means an individual who is employed by an agency in

(21)(a) "Transaction involving the state" means a proceeding, application,

RCW 42.52.040 Assisting in transactions. (1) Except in the course of official

RCW 42.52.050 Confidential information--Improperly concealed records. (1)

(3) No state officer or state employee may disclose confidential information

(4) No state officer or state employee may intentionally conceal a record if

RCW 42.52.100 Conditions on appearance before state agencies or doing

(2) Findings of violations referred to in subsection (1)(b) of this section shall

(2) The executive ethics board shall:

(a) Develop educational materials and training;

(c) Issue advisory opinions;

(e) Impose sanctions including reprimands and monetary penalties;

(f) Recommend to the appropriate authorities suspension, removal from