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The Mind/Body Problem

Materialism = the view that all mental processes are simply brain
processes or states. In short, the mind is the brain.

Substance Dualism = the view that the mind and the body are distinct
substances, and that the mind is a nonphysical substance.

Preliminary Arguments for Materialism:

(1) Only materialism makes sense in the context of evolution. It seems

strange that we would be the only creatures to have developed
nonphysical minds, while other creatures have minds that are physical.

(2) If materialism is true, then we can explain mental functioning in

terms of brain processes, which can be scientifically investigated. If
substance dualism is true, then we would have no way of scientifically
investigating mental processes since they would be nonphysical.

(3) The principle of simplicity says that if we have two theories that
explain some phenomena equally well, we should accept the theory that
posits the fewest objects or entities (Ockham’s Razor). Materialism
posits only one kind of object (the physical kind) while substance
dualism posits two kinds (the physical and the nonphysical kinds).

Preliminary Arguments for Substance Dualism:

(1) The Divisibility Argument relies on Leibniz’s Law which says that if
an object or event x is identical with an object or event y, then x and y
have all the same properties. That means that if there is a single property
that the two objects or events do not share in common, then the two
objects or events are not identical.
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So, the Divisibility Argument reads as follows:

1. My body, which includes my brain, is divisible.

2. I cannot conceive of my mind as divisible.
Therefore, 3. My mind is distinct from any part of my body.

(2) The Argument from Introspection also relies on Leibniz’s Law, but
uses a different property. It reads:

1. Mental states are knowable through introspection.

2. Brain states are not knowable through introspection.
Therefore, 3. Mental states are not brain states.

Objection to the Argument from Introspection:

Leibniz’s Law does not work in intensional contexts.

Intensional contexts are cases in which replacing one co-referring term

with another changes the truth value of a statement because the
statement contains something about the awareness of a person that the
two terms refer to the same thing.

Example:
The statement “Water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit” is true.

If we replace the term “water” with a co-referring term such as “H2O,”

the truth value of the statement stays the same.

The statement “H2O freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit” is also true.

But if we worded the statement differently by talking about someone’s

knowledge, we can end up with two different truth values.
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Let’s says that Adam does not know that water and H2O are the same
thing, but that he knows that water freezes at 32 degress Fahrenheit.
He has never heard of H2O and so he does not know what it is.

The statement “Adam knows that water freezes at 32 degrees

Fahrenheit” would be true.

But, the statement “Adam knows that H2O freezes at 32 degrees

Fahrenheit” would be false.

Leibniz’s Law says that if two objects or events are identical, they will
have all the exact same properties. So we should be able to replace co-
referring terms without changing the truth value of a statement.

But in intensional contexts, Leibniz’s Law does not work.

The Argument from Introspection is one of these intensional contexts

since it appeals to what we know.

Other Serious Objections to Substance Dualism:

Substance dualism seems to rely on some kind of interaction between

the physical brain and the nonphysical mind (Interactionism).

Materialism will have a much easier time explaining how the mind and
brain interact since they are the same thing. All materialism needs to
explain is how the physical processes work that produce mental states.
We have not been able to explain this completely yet, but we know
where to look.

Two Major Objections to Interactionism:

(1) How can physical events cause nonphysical events, and vice versa?
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Physical objects interact with one another through motion. But how is
the physical brain going to interact with the nonphysical mind if motion
has no effect on the nonphysical mind?

One the other side, if the nonphysical mind is somehow interacting with
the physical brain, we should be able to find neural firings that have no
observable cause, since they are caused by the nonphysical mind.

As far as we currently know, this does not happen.

(2) Interaction between the mind and brain would violate the Principle of
the Conservation of Energy.

The Principle of the Conservation of Energy says that the amount of

energy in the universe remains constant.

If the nonphysical mind and the physical brain were interacting, there
would be constant gains and losses of energy.

The Brain Damage Argument:

Damage to certain parts of the brain will result in mental problems.

This seems to support materialism since according to materialism the

mind just is the brain. So, any damage to the brain will also be damage
to the mind.

But the substance dualist can use this argument also. Since the mind and
brain interact in both directions, damage to the brain will result in
problems with the interaction of the two.

Therefore, the brain damage argument does not seem to support one of
the views more than the other.
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Parallelism:

An alternative to the version of substance dualism called interactionism

is the view known as parallelism.

Parallelism says that the mind and brain do not actually interact causally.
Instead, mind events and brain events are simply correlated.

This view is sometimes called occasionalism because instead of brain

events causing mind events, or mind events causing brain events, on the
occasion that a certain brain event takes place, a certain correlated mind
event takes place. But the two are not causally connected.

This also happens in the other direction. On the occasion that a certain
mind event takes place, a certain correlated brain event also takes place.

One of the main problems with parallelism is that it seems to contradict

the way that we talk. We talk as if there were causal relationships
between mind and brain events. Parallelism would make all of that talk
false.

It seems that the only way that parallelism could work is if we insert
God into the equation. God would be the one that is seeing to it that
these events are correlated. Many people have problems with this part of
the view.

Type-Type Materialism:

This view says that since a specific mental state can be reduced to a
certain brain state, there is one and only one brain state that can be
responsible for a certain mental state.

If we said that the mental state of feeling hungry is caused by brain state
X, then the only way any creature could experience the sensation of
feeling hungry is if brain state X existed in its brain.
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Token-Token Materialism:

This view disagrees with type-type materialism and says that there may
be many different possible brain states that could be responsible for the
mental state of feeling hungry.

In other words, when an animal feels hungry, it may not have the same
brain state as I do when I feel hungry.

The Materialist Problem of Consciousness:

Philosophers have recognized two separate problems where

consciousness is concerned. One of them has been characterized as the
“easy problem” and the other as the “hard problem” of consciousness.

The easy problem is the problem of figuring out which brain state is
responsible for each awareness that we experience. So, we would need
to explain the brain state responsible for hunger, for thirst, for sadness,
for anger, for vision, etc.

Neuroscientists are currently working on this problem and seem to be

doing a pretty good job.

The hard problem of consciousness, or what your Mind and Brain book
calls the Materialist Problem of Consciousness, has to do with what it is
like to have a particular consciousness.

Even if we know all of the brain states that are responsible for all of the
possible mental states of another creature, we still are unable to know
what it is like to be conscious the way that creature is.

Our science does not give us access to the subjective perspective of the
creature.
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A related problem is: how or why is it that there is consciousness at all?

Objection to the Materialist Problem of Consciousness:

The Materialist Problem of Consciousness conflates (combines into one

whole) factual knowledge (knowing that) and knowledge by
acquaintance.

When the materialist claims that all mental states can be reduced to brain
events, she is talking about factual knowledge or knowing that
something is the case.

We can know that it is the case that a particular mental state is reducible
to a particular brain event.

But knowing what it is like to have experience from some subjective

perspective is an example of knowing by acquaintance.

Therefore, saying that the materialist fails to live up to her own claim of
knowledge is false.

The materialist only claims that we can have factual knowledge

concerning which mental states are reducible to which brain events.

The Problem of Other Minds:

Descartes argued quite well that I am certain that I exist as a thinking

thing, i.e., as a consciousness.

But a problem for philosophers is how can I be certain that you exist as a
consciousness?

This is known as the Problem of Other Minds.

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It actually includes two separate problems:

(1) How do I know that other humans (or creatures) have conscious
minds?

(2) How do I know that I and other humans (or creatures) have the same
experiences or mental states?

The only argument we seem to have for (1) is an inductive argument.

A deductive argument argues that something is necessarily the case.

An inductive argument argues that something is probably or most likely

the case.

Example of a deductive argument:

All men are mortal.

Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.

The conclusion follows necessarily from the premises.

Example of an inductive argument:

Every swan that we have ever observed is white.

Every swan is white.

The conclusion follows probably from the premises.

It is likely that all swans are white given the fact that all of the swans we
have observed have been white.

This form of argumentation does not give us certainty, but only

probability.
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In other words, we have reason to believe the conclusion, even though it

is logically possible that the conclusion is false.

We could argue inductively for the existence of other minds in the

following ways:

I have a human brain and have a conscious mind.

Other beings with human brains also have conscious
minds.

The conclusion is likely true, but not necessarily.

I have a conscious mind and as a result behave in certain

observable ways (response to stimuli, bodily
movements, language and communication, ability to
learn).
Other beings that behave in these observable ways also
have conscious minds.

Again, the conclusion is likely true, but not necessarily.

Four Conditions for Thinking another Creature has a Conscious Mind:

(1) Brain Structure

(2) Nonverbal or Nonvocal Behavioral Evidence
(3) Ability to Use Language and/or Communicate
(4) Ability to Learn, Ability to Solve Problems, and/or
Creativity

The first half of the Problem of Other Minds asked how I know that
there other conscious minds. We have answered that question
preliminarily with an inductive argument.
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The second half of the problem asks how I know that other conscious
minds are having the same experiences or mental states that I am having.

Another way to express this is through the Inverted Spectrum Problem,

which says:

How do I know that your color experiences are not the opposite of mine?

In other words, how do I know that when we are looking at something

(e.g., a tomato) that we both call red, that you are experiencing the same
color as I am?

Maybe what you call red is what I call yellow, and that you call the
tomato red because you are seeing it in a way that I would call yellow.

Every time you see a tomato, you call it red because you have been
taught that tomatoes are red. Every time I see a tomato, I also call it red
because I have been taught that tomatoes are red.

But what if we are seeing two different colors?

Another way to look at this problem is to think about getting inside

someone else’s experiences. It is possible that if I were somehow able to
get inside your experiences that I would find you seeing what to me is
yellow every time you experience a tomato.

The problem boils down to the following: how do I know that when you
are looking at a tomato you do not see the color that I see when I am
looking at a lemon, and vice versa?

Possible Solutions to the Inverted Spectrum Problem:

(1) Maybe we could use other terms to describe the colors. Sometimes
we refer to certain colors as bright or dark or warm, etc.
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Maybe we could talk about our experience of a color with these terms in
order to see if we are having the same experience.

The problem with this is that we were taught to associate those

properties with certain colors. So, even if you see what I call yellow
when you look at a tomato, you would have been taught that that
particular color is bright or dark or warm, etc.

(2) Maybe we could look at the brain functions during those experiences
and see if the same things are happenings in both of our brains.

The problem with this is that it is possible that our brains our working
differently. Maybe our brain functions are inverted.