THE IMPERATIVE OF VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A NEW

SOCIETY

BY

NWANGUMA OKENNA MICHAEL DI/342

BEING AN ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

PHILOSOPHY, DOMINICAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
AND THEOLOGY IBADAN, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF BARCHELOR
OF ARTS DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY

IBADAN

JUNE 2010.
 ATTESTATION

This is to certify that the long essay titled: THE IMPERATIVE OF

VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A NEW SOCIETY, submitted to the
department of Philosophy, Dominican Institute of Philosophy and
Theology, Ibadan, for the award of the degree of Bachelor of Arts in
Philosophy of the University of Ibadan, is an original and insightful
research work undertaken by Nwanguma Okenna Michael and was
supervised and approved by Rev. Fr. (Dr.) Ben Faneye, O. P.

MODERATOR:

Date……………………. Sign…………………….

Rev. Fr. Faneye, Benedict, O. P.

Head of Philosophy Department,

Dominican Institute of Philosophy

and Theology, Ibadan, Nigeria.

II
 DEDICATION

This project is fondly dedicated to my parents, Mr. Bartholomew

Duru Nwanguma and Mrs. Grace Chinyere Nwanguama. It is also
dedicated to you, the reader – I hope you will find it an insightful
introduction to contemporary virtue ethics and the need to learn and
grow in the virtues.

III
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Thanks to the Triune God for bestowing on me undeserved love, wisdom

and strength to accomplish this project. I remain ever grateful to my dearest

mother, Mother Thrice Admirable, Queen and Victress of Schoenstatt, for guiding

me through the difficult moments of the execution of this project.

The stimulus to write this work came from Rev. Fr. Alfred Kistler. I am

much indebted to him for his encouragement at every stage. Especially, I must

thank Rev. Fr. Ben Fanaye, my moderator, for reading the entire manuscript in

draft, and for taking the time to make many characteristically insightful

comments. I am also most grateful to Anthony Onyeuwaoma, Rev. Fr. Magnus

Ifedikwa Charles Agboeze, Cajetan Okeke, Lazarus Illigh and Stanley Obijiaku

for being willing to take the trouble to read some of the more awkward bits and let

me know whether people coming to virtue ethics for the first time would find it

relevant.

I remain grateful other friends who in one way or another contributed to

the success of this project. Worthy of mention are my Schoenstatt Fathers’ group

brothers, Chukwuwike Enekwechi, Ekenedilichukwu Uchenu, Victory Oforka,

Raymond Gbadamosi and Damian Chilobe. I also remember profoundly the

contributions of my dear father, Bartholomew Nwanguma, my good friend

Oluwaseun Opeyemi Oni and other friends whose name I cannot mention here for

want of space. I have you all in my mind for the good impact you have made in

my life.

IV
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Attestation…………………………………………………………………. II

Dedication...………………………………………………………………. III

Acknowledgement………………………………………………………… IV

Table of Contents………………………………………………………….. V

INTRODUCTION

I. Statement of the problem…………………………………………. 1

II. Aim and scope of the work……………………………………….. 2

III. Methodology……………………………………………………… 2

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORY OF VIRTUE ETHICS

1.1 What is Ethics?............................................................................... 4

1.2 Division of Ethical Theories…………………..…………………. 5

1.2.1 Normative Ethics…………………………..…………….. 5

1.2.2 Descriptive Ethics………………………..………………. 6

1.2.3 Metaethics……………..…………………………………. 6

1.3 Historical development of Virtue Ethics………………………..... 7

1.3.1 Greco-Roman Ethics- Aristotle’s Ethics………………….. 8

V
 1.3.2 Medieval Period- Aquinas’ Ethics…………………………. 11

1.3.3 Modern Period- Deontology and Utilitarianism…………….14

1.3.4 20th Century- Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”….. 19

CHAPTER TWO

KEY CONCEPTS IN VIRTUE ETHICS

2.1 Human Flourishing……….…………………………………………23

2.2 Moral Education and Character Formation………………………... 28

2.3 Types of Virtues……………………………………………………. 34

2.4 Uncodifiability of Ethics………...…………………………………. 40

CHAPTER THREE

IMPERATIVE OF VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A NEW SOCIETY

3.1 Moral dilemma of our society today………………………………. 43

3.2 Virtue and social life………………………….……………………. 56

3.3 The imperative of Virtue Ethics…………………….………………63

3.4 Conclusion…………………….…………………………………… 65

3.5 Bibliography………………………………………………………. 67

VI
 INTRODUCTION

I. Statement of the Problem

Aristotle in propagating virtue ethics focuses on the inherent character of

a person rather than on the specific actions the person performs. This approach

to normative ethics which was the prevailing approach to ethical thinking in the

ancient Greek and Medieval periods of philosophy, faded out during the early

Modern period where virtue ethics was practically jettisoned and replaced by

utilitarianism and deontology. It re-emerged in the late twentieth century

heralded by Anscombe's famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe

1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with deontology and

utilitarianism as the paradigm for normative ethical theories.

Virtue ethics suffered rejection on the accusation that it lacked absolute

moral rules which can give clear guidance on how to act in specific

circumstances such as abortion, digital crimes, euthanasia and so on. Also some

others reject virtue ethics because they believe different people, cultures, and

societies often have vastly different perspectives on what constitutes a virtue.

Since it is difficult to establish the nature of the virtues especially across

different cultures and societies, it is erroneously held that virtue ethics can no

longer hold true in many modern societies.

1
 II. Aim and Scope of the Work

This work aims to argue, in the line drawn by Elizabeth Anscombe, that a return

to virtue ethics is not only relevant but also desirable to help modern society out

of its plunge into moral decadence. In response to its critics, we shall show how

virtue ethics is able to resolve specific moral dilemmas and establish that there is

a necessary interplay between social life and the virtues. Consequently, this

essay shall argue that virtue ethics can serve as paradigm for reconstructing our

present morally decaying society in order to create a better one.

III. Methodology

To achieve the set aim, in chapter one, we shall trace the history of virtue ethics

from the period of Greco-Roman philosophy and the Medieval era of philosophy

to the era of its decline in the early Modern period. We shall then discuss how

Anscombe was able to revive virtue ethics by showing dissatisfaction with the

then prevailing deontology and utilitarianism.

In the second chapter, we shall expose the key concepts of virtue ethics. Usually,

concepts like eudaimonia, habit, character, types of virtues and the doctrine of

the mean are either misunderstood or misapplied and so our aim shall be, as

much as possible, to place this understanding in the right perspective.

2
Finally, in the last chapter, we shall show how consequentialism and deontology

have failed to meet new moral challenges of our modern society. In this place,

we shall argue that virtue ethics is able to meet these challenges. To meet

modern society’s moral and social challenge, there should be interplay between

virtue and social life in order to facilitate the possible attainment of the goal of

having a society with virtuous personalities promoting common good. This can

be done without virtue ethics necessarily falling into moral relativism as its

critics claim. Duty based moral thinking has failed to lead man to its promised

ideal of a morally upright world. Virtue ethics is the viable alternative ethical

theory that can lead us to the Promised Land – the evolving of a virtuous man in

a new society!

3
 CHAPTER ONE

HISTORY OF VIRTUE ETHICS

1.1 What is Ethics?

Etymologically, ethics derives from the Greek word ethika, which

designates “character,” “custom”, principles or standards of human conduct. It is

sometimes called “morals” from Latin mores, meaning “customs”, and, by

extension, the study of such principles, sometimes called moral philosophy. 1 To

attempt a more technical definition, we can say ethics is the science of human

conduct. There are two important elements of this definition, science and human

conduct, which both require explanations. The sense of science used in the

definition is not the same as the physical experimental science that rely on fixed

empirical principles but it involves a broad sense of the word, which designates

an intellectual enterprise that uses scientific methodology for its rational inquiry

to attain truth.2 Human conducts, on the other hand, pertains to the ability of

man to make voluntary choices between alternative courses of action because

they have decided that they ought to choose one alternative rather than the
1
Cf. "Ethics." Microsoft® Encarta® 2009 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008.
Microsoft ® Encarta ® 2009. © 1993-2008 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
2
Cf. Oliver Johnson, Ethics: Selection from Classical and Contemporary Writers (Fort Worth:
Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data, 1989), p.2.
4
other.3 Ethics thus sets out to address the problem of how humans ought to act

which is different from how they indeed act.

1.2 Division of Ethical Theories

There are generally three divisions or approaches to ethical theories;

although the conclusions arrived using one approach may bear on those of other

approaches. It is thus useful that we distinguish between the three before we

fully delve into the area that largely concerns us in this work.

1.2.1 Normative Ethics

Normative Ethics prescribes how we should act. This level of theorizing

includes sets of principles that can be used to decide what ought to be done.

Normative ethical theories are concerned with the discovering of the things that

are intrinsically good, and which principles of obligation are the true

fundamental principles of morality. The basic assumption in normative ethics is

that there is only one ultimate criterion of moral conduct. There are three

dominant approaches to seeking out the foundational principle of moral conduct

in normative ethics and they are deontological theories, consequentialist theories

and virtue theories. Deontological theories reject the idea that rightness or

3
Cf. Oliver Johnson, Ethics: Selection from Classical and Contemporary Writers. Ibid.
5
wrongness of an act depends on its consequences, instead they posit that

morality is duty based. Consequentialism argues that an action is morally right if

the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable. Virtue

ethics holds that the cultivation of moral character and embodiment of virtues is

the essential issue in ethics, rather than the establishment of rules based on

duties or consequences.

1.2.2 Descriptive Ethics

Descriptive ethics is sometimes referred to as comparative ethics because it

derives from observation of choices made by moral agents. It is a form of

empirical research into the attitudes or ethical actions of people.4 It tries to

answer the question: “What do people believe is right?” Through comparative

studies of actions that different societies recommend, we are able to know how

better it is to live. Consequently, descriptive theories are not about what one

thinks but a description of what is. Example of this approach is Kohlberg’s

theory of moral development which describes the different stages of moral

reasoning in a person.

4
James Feiser (2006), “Ethics” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/ethics.htm (Oct, 2009)
6
 1.2.3 Meta-ethics

Meta-ethics can be defined as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical

concepts and it is concerned with analyzing moral concepts. Geoff Sayre-

McCord defines metaethics as an “…attempt to understand the metaphysical,

epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments

of moral thought, talk, and practice”.5 We enter into the sphere of metaethics

when we attempt to answer questions like: Is morality more a matter of taste

than truth? Are there moral facts? How do we learn about the moral facts, if

there are any? Do moral concepts have any meaning? We do metaethics when

we reflect about what we are doing when we make a moral judgment; whether

we are simply expressing our emotion or enforcing what is willed by God and so

on. There is a close relationship between metaethics and normative ethics.

Metaethics primarily does the work of conceptual analysis of moral concepts

while normative ethics has the task of prescribing how one ought to act.

1.3 Historical development of Virtue Ethics

I shall discuss the development of virtue ethics in the history of ethics. In the

overall development of virtue ethics from the Greco-Roman era to the

5
Geoff Sayre-McCord (Jan 23, 2007), “Metaethics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/ (10 August, 2009)
7
contemporary period of the history of philosophy, thinkers like Aristotle,

Aquinas and Elizabeth Anscombe occupy a central place. It was in Aristotle that

Greek philosophy; most especially ethics reached its full and perfect maturity. In

the medieval period, Thomas Aquinas is prominent among the philosophers that

led the revival of the study of Aristotle and thus the continuation of his system

of ethics. Virtue ethics in the modern and enlightenment era experienced great

decline due to the rise of Kantian deontologism and consequentialism. The

relevance of these ethical theories born of the enlightenment project was

questioned by Anscombe in the 20th century and she consequently proposed a

return to virtue ethics. We shall treat in details the contribution of these

outstanding philosophers in the history of virtue ethics.

1.3.1 Greco- Roman Ethics

Aristotle

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was born at Stagira, in Macedonia. His father,

Nicomachus, was the physician of Amyntas III (reigned c. 393–c. 370 BC), king

of Macedonia and grandfather of Alexander the Great (reigned 336–323 BC).

He is said to be the founder of the Lyceum, an academy where lectures were

given for free to the public. Aristotle wrote three major works in ethics:

Nichomacean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics and Magna Moralia. Many scholars

8
agree that the earliest and most influential systematic account of virtue ethics

appears in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

Aristotle divides the sciences into three groups: Theoretical Science,

Practical Science and Poetical Science. He insists that ethics is a Practical

Science and thus when we ask the question — what is good? — we are not

simply asking because we want to have knowledge, but because we will be

better able to achieve our good if we develop a fuller understanding of what it is

to flourish. His ethics is teleological in the sense that it starts by asking the

question what is the “end” of human life? He answers that the goal is the

attainment of the highest good, which according to him has three characteristics:

it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good, and

all other goods are desirable for its sake. Aristotle uses the term “eudaimonia” to

designate the highest good of human life. Eudaimonia is commonly translated as

“happiness” but Aristotle means little more than the ordinary understanding of

happiness, he regards “eudaimon” as a substitute for “human flourishing” or

“well-being”. Consequently, all man’s actions are for the purpose of human

flourishing which is the highest good or end, and all subordinate goals —health,

wealth, and other such resources — are sought because they promote well-

being, not because they are what well-being consists in.

9
 The question usually raised from this point concerns “how” one can

reach this highest good. To answer this question, Aristotle develops the concept

arête (virtue) which designates excellence in fulfillment of a particular

function.6 He argues that it is the “function” (ergon) of man to reach the highest

goal and it belongs to the proper activity of the rational part of the human soul in

accordance with virtue to move for the good. Henry Sidgwick explains that:

The term [virtue] cannot denote a mere natural feeling or

susceptibility to feeling, such as anger, fear, pity, — as
these, considered merely as such, are not objects of
praise and blame: it denotes a settled habit, formed by a
course of actions under rule and discipline in which
vicious excess and defect have been avoided, of
experiencing the natural emotions just mentioned in a
duly limited and regulated manner; so that the virtuous
man, without internal conflict, wills actions that hit the
happy mean in their effect.7

From Sidgwick’s explanation, we can understand that Aristotle’s concept

of virtue contains the idea of the golden “mean” which is a state or reasonable

midpoint between two vices, namely, excess and defect towards which our

actions should aim. Also, Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a “hexis”, “habit”

or better translated “settled disposition” by which one holds himself in a stable

6
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk II, Chap I. (Based on the translation by W.D. Ross, with
emendations by Daniel Kolak. Electronic HyperText Markup Language Version Copyright 
1999)
7
Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1931), P. 59
10
equilibrium of the soul, in order to choose the action knowingly and for its own

sake. To buttress these points Richard Kraut writes:

In this respect, Aristotle says, the virtues are no different

from technical skills: every skilled worker knows how to
avoid excess and deficiency, and is in a condition
intermediate between two extremes…. The arithmetic mean
between 10 and 2 is 6, and this is so invariably, whatever is
being counted. But the intermediate point that is chosen by
an expert in any of the crafts will vary from one situation to
another. There is no universal rule, for example, about how
much food an athlete should eat, and it would be absurd to
infer from the fact that 10 lbs. is too much and 2 lbs. too
little for me that I should eat 6 lbs. Finding the mean in any
given situation is not a mechanical or thoughtless
procedure, but requires a full and detailed acquaintance
with the circumstances.8

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue:

intellectual virtues - those that pertain to the part of the soul that engages

in reasoning, and moral virtues- those pertaining to the part of the soul

that cannot itself reason but is however capable of following reason. He

first discusses ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of

particular ethical virtues (temperance, courage, generosity, pride, good

temper, modesty, friendliness, wittiness, and righteous indignation), and

8
Richard Kraut (July, 2007), “Aristotle's Ethics” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/ (October, 2009)

11
finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues

(practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, deliberation, understanding,

judgment, intellection, and so on).

1.3.2 Medieval Ethics

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was born in the Castle of Roccasecca near

Naples. He was of the family of the count of Aquino and his father had hoped

that Thomas would one day enjoy high ecclesiastical position. He first studied at

the Benedictine Abbey of Monte Cassino for nine years and at the age of

fourteen, he entered the University of Naples to study the seven liberal arts.9 It

was in Naples in 1244 that he joined the Dominican friars. Aquinas taught

theology at the University of Paris.

We find Aquinas’ account on virtue in the Summa Theologiae, Disputed

Questions on the Virtues and his Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics.

Aquinas holds that all actions or movements of all things irrational and rational

are directed towards some end. There are many ends actually sought like riches,

honour, and pleasure, but none of these satisfies and gives complete beatitudo or

9
The seven liberal arts include the trivium (grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and the quadrivium
(arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music)
12
felicitas. He argues that only through an uninterruptible vision of God, the

ground and first cause of all being, that man can reach complete happiness. It is

towards God that all things are surely, though unconsciously striving in their

pursuit of good; but this universal striving after God, since he is essentially

intelligible, exhibits itself in its highest form in rational beings.10 God is thus the

intrinsically desirable end of all rational beings.

Aquinas’ argument is thoroughly systematic in that it proceeds from his

natural law doctrine to his doctrine of virtues. Natural law consist of those

universal principles in practical reason that function in a way analogous to

principles in speculative reason. Speculative reason is that reasoning which

begins from propositions in first principles, proceeds by way of theoretical

arguments till it reaches a conclusion. In the practical realm, the first principle is

that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided”11. The intellect

is able to apprehend this simply through Synderesis that unerringly prompts to

the realization of the first principles in conduct. It is the disposition containing

the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human acts.12

Consequently, the most general precepts of the natural law will be more

substantive if it points out specific goods that are to be pursued. We have

10
Cf. Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, P. 141
11
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 94, a.2
12
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 94. a.1
13
pointed out that the good of the human being is, in a sense, rational activity

itself. Here is where we can conveniently locate the importance of virtues which

are dispositions by which we appropriate our specific good effectively.

According to Aquinas, virtue is a habit that disposes an agent to perform

its proper operation or movement.13 Knowing that reason is the proper operation

of human beings, it follows that a virtue is a habit that disposes us to reason

well. Virtues can be acquired naturally through training and practice. Aquinas,

like Aristotle, divides virtues into intellectual and moral. However, unlike

Aristotle, he adds theological virtues. Concerning moral virtue which he

describes as a “good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously”14,

Aquinas accepts the Platonic-Aristotelian thesis that there are four moral virtues

which are cardinal. These virtues are prudence, justice, courage, and

temperance. Prudence pertains to the good of practical reasonableness of one's

deliberations, choices and execution of choices. Justice is the steady and lasting

willingness to give to others what they are entitled to. The virtue of temperance

is that which “integrates one's desires, particularly but not only for sexual

pleasure, with reason, lest reason be enslaved by passion and becomes its

ingenious servant, as it readily can. Temperantia [temperance] is the mean, for

13
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue, a.1, translated by Ralph McInerny
(Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999), Pp. 3-4
14
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q.55, a.4
14
example, between lust and frigidity or apathy….”15 And fortitude is the mean

between recklessness or over-boldness and cowardice. The summary of Aquinas

virtue ethics can be put as an effort to show precisely how prudence, justice,

courage, and temperance are necessary for human flourishing.

1.3.3 Modern Ethics: The rise of Kantian Deontology and Mill’s

Utilitarianism

Thomas Aquinas seems to be the loudest herald of virtue ethics in the

history of medieval philosophy. From the Enlightenment to the Modern era, the

prominence of Aristotelian-Aquinas virtue ethics was replaced by the

ascendancy of utilitarianism and deontology, and with that virtue theory moved

to the margins of Western philosophy. In the light of the history of virtue ethics,

this section would have been named: the decline of virtue ethics, but I take it to

mean the rise of utilitarianism and deontology. Consequently, I shall briefly

discuss these approaches that overshadowed virtue ethics in the modern era.

Generally, the reason for the apparent death of virtue ethics in this era can be

given as the fact that 1.) The largely theocentric interpretation of reality of the

15
John Finnis (Dec., 2005), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Aquinas' Moral, Political,
and Legal Philosophy”, http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas-moral-political/ (Nov.,
2009)
15
medieval era was replaced with a more humanistic view. 2.) The various

advancements in science, technology and arts, necessitated that the scholastic

definition of man on which virtue ethics stands be questioned. Consequently, the

modern man revisited and reconstructed the traditional understanding of man.

3.) The other reasons will be found in the ethical thesis of Immanuel Kant and

John Stuart Mill.

Utilitarianism

This is the idea that the moral worth of an action is to be judged solely by its

contribution to overall utility: that is, its contribution to happiness or pleasure as

summed among all people.16 It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that

the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome. The typical

proponents were Jeremy Bentham (1789) and John Stuart Mill (1861). They

claimed that “an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good,

that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of

bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to

the agent on that occasion.”17

16
“Utilitarianism” From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarian_ethics (Nov., 2009)
17
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Feb., 2006), “Consequentialism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ (Nov., 2009)
16
 In his book, Utilitarianism, Mill argues that people desire happiness (the

intrinsic good and the utilitarian end) and the overall happiness is a good to the

aggregate of all persons. It thus follows that for one to determine what is good,

the amount of pleasure derived has to be weighed against the pain it produces,

and if pleasure overweighs pain, the action is judged to be praise-worth. Suffice

to note that Mill, unlike Aristotle, equates happiness with pleasure. He also

argues that “cultural, intellectual and spiritual pleasures are of greater value than

mere physical pleasure because the former would be valued higher than the

latter by competent judges. A competent judge, according to Mill, is one who

has experienced both the lower pleasures and the higher.”18

There are two types of utilitarianism: Act Utilitarianism says that an act

is right insofar as its consequences for the general happiness are at least as good

as any alternative available to the agent19 while Rule Utilitarianism says that an

act is right insofar as it conforms to a rule whose acceptance value for the

general happiness is at least as great as any alternative rule available to the

agent. Summarily, utilitarianism provides a standard of right action which is

that a right action is that in which the pleasure derived is greater than the pain

produced for the greater number of people.

18
“Utilitarianism” From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarian_ethics (Nov., 2009)
19
David Brink (Oct., 2007) "Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy" Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political (Nov, 2009)
17
Deontology

Deontology is from Greek deon, “duty,” and logos, “science”. Consequently, it

focuses on the logic of the relationship between duty and the morality of human

actions. The chief proponent of deontology is Immanuel Kant who died two

years before Mill was born. He is famous for his Copernican Revolution in

philosophy, the theory that in knowledge the mind does not conform to the

world, the world conforms itself to the mind. 20 This in a computer language may

mean: nothing can get into the mind except what has been programmed into it,

and nothing can come out of the mind except what it has been programmed to

deliver.

Kantian ethics is systematic and can be summarized in these five

points: 1.) There is a supreme moral principle and to reach it, the only adequate

method is the a priori method of reasoning 2.) Man's rational will is pure and

autonomous 3.) The human agent has both noumenal and phenomenal aspects

4.) Morality presents itself to human agents as a categorical imperative 5.)

Morality gives rise to a notion of the highest good which consists in a world of

universal, maximal virtue, grounding universal and maximal happiness.

20
Cf. Charles L. Reid, Choice and Action: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), p. 185.
18
 In his most influential work on ethics, The Groundwork of the

Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that the most basic aim of moral philosophy

is to seek out the foundational principle of metaphysics of morals. The second

fundamental aim is to “establish” this foundational moral principle as a demand

of each person's own rational will. Moral philosophy addresses the question:

what ought I to do? To address this question one should draw on a moral

viewpoint that is very widely shared and which contains some general

judgments that are very deeply held. For Kant, this project can be best pursued

through the a priori method, that is, without leaning on observations of human

experience and their behavior. He believes that the only thing good without

qualification is a ‘good will’. Explaining Kant’s idea of good will, Robert

Johnson says that:

The basic idea is that what makes a good person good is his
possession of a will that is in a certain way ‘determined’ by, or
makes its decisions on the basis of, the moral law. The idea of a
good will is supposed to be the idea of one who only makes
decisions that she holds to be morally worthy, taking moral
considerations in themselves to be conclusive reasons for guiding
her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something
we all highly value.21

21
Robert Johnson (2008), "Kant's Moral Philosophy", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/ (Nov, 2009)
19
 Paul Guyer continues that “good will is manifested in the performance of

an action for the sake of fulfilling duty rather than for any other end; and what

duty requires is the performance of an action not for the sake of its consequences

but because of its conformity to law as such; thus the maxim, or subjective

principle, of virtuous action can only be that 'I ought never to act except in such

a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law'.”22

Guyer’s argument reveals that the moral law is vital and we cannot ignore them

no matter how circumstances might conspire against any other consideration.

Kant believes that our moral duty is a “categorical imperative”, an unconditional

command on man’s “free” rational will.

Kant alleges that ordinary moral thought classifies moral duties into

two– toward ourselves as well as toward others. Hence, he recognizes four

categories of duties: perfect duties toward ourselves, perfect duties toward

others, imperfect duties toward ourselves and imperfect duties toward others.

From here, he puts forward the humanity formulation of the categorical

imperative when he stated that “we should never act in such a way that we treat

humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an

22
Paul Guyer (2004), “Kant, Immanuel”. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved March 20, 2009, from
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT
20
end in itself.”23 Generally, deontology holds that at least some acts are morally

obligatory regardless of their consequences for human welfare. Descriptive of

such ethics are such expressions as “duty for duty's sake” and “let justice be

done though the heavens fall.”

1.3.4 20th Century Ethics: Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”

Utilitarianism and deontology continue to be the predominant schools of

thought in normative ethics. The contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics in the

latter half of the twentieth century is often traced to the seminal paper of

Elizabeth Anscombe titled, “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958). Some

philosophers took up Anscombe's call for a return to virtue as a new way of

thinking about normative theories. Prominent among these scholars are Philippa

Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, Paul Ricoeur, Michael Slote,

Rosalind Hursthouse and Martha Nussbaum.

Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (18 March, 1919 – 5 January,

2001) was an original and formidable British analytic philosopher in her own

right. She is widely recognized as the most brilliant of Wittgenstein’s students,

23
Robert Johnson (2008), "Kant's Moral Philosophy", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/ (Nov, 2009)
21
his closest friends, as well as the unsurpassed translator and interpreter of his

works.

Anscombe critiqued modern moral philosophy's pre-occupation with a

law conception of ethics, which deals solely with obligation and duty. She says:

… the concepts of obligation, and duty – moral obligation and

moral duty, that is to say – and of what is morally right and
wrong, and of the moral sense of "ought," ought to be jettisoned
if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or
derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics
which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without
it.24

To justify her charge, she started by criticizing Mill's greatest happiness

principle and Kant's categorical imperative. In Aristotle's sense, the term

"moral" is used in connection with a moral subject-matter: namely that of human

passions. But it has now acquired a special so-called "moral" sense, that is, a

sense in which they imply some absolute verdict (like one of guilty / not guilty

on a man) on what is described in the "ought" sentences used in certain types of

context: not merely the contexts that Aristotle would call "moral"-passions and

actions-but also some of the contexts that he would call “intellectual”.25 The

ordinary terms like "should," "needs," "ought," "must" acquired this special

24
G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy” in Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 124 (Jan.,
1958), Published by: Cambridge University Press, p. 1
25
Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 7
22
sense by being paralleled in the relevant contexts with "is obliged," or "is

bound".

The cause of this change is found in history when religion (especially

Judaism and Christianity) introduced a law conception of ethics. She argued that

naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God

as a law-giver and if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, and then

is given up, it is a natural result that the concept of "obligation" be given up. “It

is as if the notion "criminal" were to remain when criminal law and criminal

courts had been abolished and forgotten”26, she argued. It is within the

framework of Judeo-Christian ethics that Mill and Kant found their

consequentialism and deontology respectively. She thus claims that the “major

mistake made by modern moral philosophers is that they try to provide an

account of ‘morally right or morally wrong’ that really has no content outside of

the legislative arena provided by the divine.”27 Anscombe writes:

It would be most reasonable to drop it [that is the concept of

obligation]. It has no reasonable sense outside a law conception
of ethics; they are not going to maintain such a conception; and
you can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of
Aristotle. It would be great improvement if, instead of ‘morally

26
Ibid. p. 8
27
Julia Driver (July, 2009), "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe", Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/anscombe/ (Nov, 2009)
23
 wrong,’ one always named a genus such as ‘untruthful’,
‘unchaste’, ‘unjust’.28

It is from here that Anscombe called for a return to an alternative way of

doing philosophy. Taking her inspiration from Aristotle, she called for a return

to concepts such as character, virtue and flourishing, that is virtue ethics. Julia

Driver summarizes her argument in simple modus ponens form:

(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral
philosophy ought to be developed.

(2) Religious based ethics is false.

(3) Therefore, virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy should be developed. 29

Anscombe's suggestion that we place virtue more central in our

understanding of morality was taken serious by a number of philosophers. This

has resulted in a body of theories and ideas that is known as virtue ethics.

28
Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 9
29
Cf. Julia Driver (July, 2009), "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe", Op.Cit.
24
 CHAPTER TWO

KEY CONCEPTS IN VIRTUE ETHICS

2.1 Human flourishing

To better understand virtue ethics, we need to look at the key concepts

associated with it. Aristotle opines that to deal with the problem of ethics

adequately, we have to ask the fundamental question: why do we do anything at

all?30 Every action aims at some good. Sometimes we do things for their own

sake; sometimes we do things for the sake of another end and other times we do

things both for their own sake and because they are means to achieving

something else. The end of human life and the greatest good is eudaimonia-

good done for its own sake. The proper human end, eudaimonia is loosely

translated as happiness, where “happiness” is understood in terms of completion,

perfection, or well-being. The way in which Aristotle arrives at this conclusion

is quite brief; man naturally wants to live a fulfilled life and this is necessarily

connected to how we should morally live. What makes life worth living is

eudaimonia; and to live a life which can be characterized by eudaimonia is

30
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I, Chap. 1, 1094a, 1-3, translated by Roger Crisp
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
25
precisely the aim of morality. The difficulty with this claim concerns the proper

sense in which the concept eudaimonia is used.

Eudaimonia is usually translated in English as happiness. I call this

translation loose because it can easily give a misleading impression. This is

because happiness suggests a feeling of contentment or pleasure. In Book X of

the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle warns that eudaimonia is not a feeling but it

is achieving one’s full potential.31 Gerard J. Hughes proposes to translate the

noun eudaimonia as “the fulfilled life” or simply “fulfillment” because it makes

more sense of many of Aristotle’s questions and argument. He says that a

fulfilled life is “enjoyable, and well regarded by good people; but its point

consists in the living of it, and doing so precisely because it is worthwhile.”32

The problem with fulfillment is its vagueness. If our ultimate aim is fulfillment,

it may seem that what is one man’s fulfillment may differ from what is another

man’s fulfillment.

Is there only one supreme end for all men or is eudaimonia relative from

man to man? There has been heated debate concerning this question by some

neo-Aristotelians. Aristotle defines the supreme good as "an end of action which

31
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk X, Chap. 1, 1173a, 34-36
32
Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics (London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p.22
26
is desired for its own sake, while everything else is desired for the sake of it."33

Anthony Kenny puts the question that springs from this definition thus: “Is the

"single end" in question an end which is, or ought to be, common to every

choice of every man? Or is it merely an end which governs every choice of each

particular man, but which perhaps differs from man to man?”34 To clarify the

foreseen problem Aristotle adds: “If, then, there is some end of the things we

do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake

of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at

that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty

and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good.”35 Peter Geach

argues that the claim of a single supreme end is fallacious because the fact that

every road leads somewhere does not mean that there is somewhere to which all

roads lead.36 Georg Henrik von Wright, acquits Aristotle of the seeming fallacy

in his The Varieties of Goodness, where he points out that Aristotle does not

accept the conclusion that there is one and only one end of all chains of practical

reasoning. If he does then he contradicts himself.37 Clearly, eudaimonia, for

Aristotle, is at least one supreme end but he also admits that there are ends, other

33
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I, Chap. 2, 1094a, 21-22
34
Anthony Kenny, “Happiness”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 66
(1965 - 1966), p. 93
35
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I, Chap 2, 1094a, 21-26
36
Cf. Peter Geach, "Good and Evil", Analysis Vol. 17 (1956), p.34
37
Cf. Georg Henrik von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (1963) quoted in Anthony Kenny,
“Happiness”, p. 93
27
than it, which we pursue for their own sake. 38 Von Wright mentions pleasure

and honour among them. Consequently, Kenny explains that when Aristotle says

that eudaimonia is never chosen for anything but itself, whereas other things are

chosen for its sake, he does not mean that on some particular occasion honour

and pleasure are chosen both for their own sakes and for the sake of happiness,

but that on some occasions they are chosen for their own sakes, and on other

occasions for the sake of happiness.39

W. F. R. Hardie answers this question by making the distinction between

dominant and inclusive end. In his seminal work “The Final Good in Aristotle's

Ethics” (1965), Hardie explains dominant end as the object of a single prime

desire while inclusive end is the orderly and harmonious fulfillment of a number

of independent desires.40 In other words, a dominant view about eudaimonia

claims that in the end there is just one ultimate answer to the chain of ‘Why do

we do X?’ On the other hand, the inclusive view maintains that there are in fact

many answers, all equally ultimate; or, slightly different, that the ultimate

answer is a package of activities, rather than just one single kind of activity.41

For instance, the desire for money is a dominant desire but the life of man

38
Cf. Anthony Kenny, “Happiness”, p. 94
39
Cf. Anthony Kenny, “Happiness”, p. 97
40
Cf. W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics", Philosophy, Vol. 40, No. 154
(Oct., 1965), p. 279
41
Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics ( London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p.27
28
consists in the successive pursuit of a number of unrelated aims. So if happiness

is considered as a dominant end, it seems not to be true that all men seek

happiness. Anthony Kenny rejects the claim made by some scholars that

happiness should be considered as an inclusive end in all cases. He rejects the

claim because it is possible that happiness is renounced in favour of some other

goals. He cites the example of a daughter who from the first moment at which

she is of age to manage her own life, decides to forgo the prospect of marriage

and creative work in order to nurse her parents that are confined to bed. It is

unconvincing to say that such person is seeking her own happiness in so far as

she is doing what she wants to do. Kenny thus concludes that not every long-

term goal consistently pursued is capable of constituting an ideal of happiness.

Aristotle considers eudaimonia only as a dominant end and he attributes to

it characteristics which make it peculiarly a human thing. He beliefs that

eudaimonia must be perfect (which mainly distinguishes it from pleasure) and

self-sufficient (which by itself, and without anything else, makes life choice-

worthy and complete). Aristotle beliefs that eudaimonia is identical with

philosophical contemplation. This claim about contemplation has been rejected

by many scholars because it limits to a few (most probably philosophers) those

who are able to reach the ultimate end. Aquinas moves to correct the apparent

ambiguity found in Aristotle’s nature of the ultimate end by arguing that the

29
ultimate end of man can only consist in that which is perfectly good, which is

God.42

Many virtue ethicists prefer to translate eudaimonia as “human

flourishing”. “Eudaimonia in this sense is not a subjective, but an objective,

state. It characterizes the well-lived life, irrespective of the emotional state of the

person experiencing it…. It consists of exercising the characteristic human

quality -- reason -- as the soul's most proper and nourishing activity. Aristotle,

like Plato before him, argued that the pursuit of eudaimonia was an activity that

could only properly be exercised in the characteristic human community-- the

polis or city-state.”43 In this context the proper goal of human life is living-well

by practicing the virtues within the human community.

2.2 Moral Education and Character Formation

The next problem we need to resolve is what consist in “living well” and

what is the general method for discovering what human flourishing consists in?

Aristotle in answering these questions employed what has come to be called the

function argument. He asks ‘what is the proper function (ergon) of human

42
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae 1.8
43
“Virtue Ethics” (June 2008), Wikipedia online encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.ord/wiki/virtue_ethics (April, 2009)
30
being?’ Hughes explains that “humans are organisms, and hence they too will

have an inbuilt function (ergon) and an inbuilt goal (telos) which is achieved

when they function properly. Humans will live fulfilled lives if they function

properly. To function properly is to exercise the capacities to be found in the

human soul, and to exercise them well.”44 In Aristotle’s anthropology, the soul

is analyzed into a related series of capacities: the nutritive soul is responsible for

growth and reproduction, the locomotive soul for motion, the perceptive soul for

perception, and so on. The proper ergon of man consists in activity of the

rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue.45 The good of man is that

which sets him off from other species; this precisely is man’s capacity to guide

his actions using reason in order to live a better life. If we reason well, we will

live well and living well is what eudaimonia is about. For Aristotle, doing

anything well requires virtue, and hence living well consists in activities caused

by the rational soul in accordance with virtue.

The function argument brings us to a fundamental question ‘what is

virtue?’ This question becomes important because granted that doing anything

well consists in exercising certain skills which are called virtues; it does not by

itself allow us to conclude that such qualities as courage, temperance, justice, as

44
Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics (London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p.37
45
Cf. Richard Kraut (July 2007), “Aristotle’s Ethics”, Stanford Online Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotleiethics/ (April 2009)
31
they are normally understood, are virtues. This can only be true if we can argue

that actualizing precisely these skills is what eudaimonia consists in. "Virtue"

(arete) can be simply defined as excellence in fulfillment of a particular

function. Aristotle speaks in particular of two kinds of arête, distinguished by

the fact that some belong to one’s moral character (for example, courage, or

generosity), and others to one’s skill at thinking (such as being good at planning,

or quick to grasp the point of something).46 Moral virtue has to do with the non-

rational part of the soul which has more in common with reason (capable of

either obeying it or opposing it); and these virtues of character arise through

habituation.

The sense of the use of habit (hexis) has to be properly understood. Bill

Pollard in an essay “Can Virtuous Actions be both Habitual and Rational?”

outlined three features of habit as actions that are repeated, automatic (that is,

does not involve deliberation) and responsible (that is, the agent has particular

control over).47 Such understanding of habit can be misleading. Hexis, for

Aristotle is no mindless routine but a settled disposition – an active condition in

which one holds oneself in a stable equilibrium of the soul when acting. Habit

(hexis) has a basis in human nature, in that we are naturally capable of

46
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Bk II, Chap. 1, 1103a, 13-17
47
Bill Pollard, “Can Virtuous Actions be both Habitual and Rational?” Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), p. 415
32
developing it. But although we are by nature capable of acquiring such habits,

we do not develop them automatically. The development of a hexis comes about

only by some form of training which produces good character.

Modern virtue ethics takes its insight from the Aristotelian understanding

of character and virtue. Character is also about doing and character traits are

stable, fixed, and reliable dispositions. In other words, if an agent possesses the

character trait of kindness, he or she is expected to act kindly in all sorts of

situations, towards all kinds of people, and over a long period of time, even

when it is difficult to do so. Moral education and development are very

important to the acquisition of good moral character which develops over a long

period of time. To be virtuous does not just consist in studying textbooks of

ethics and morality (acquisition of knowledge) but in performing just acts

because by this way we become good. True virtue requires choice,

understanding, and knowledge; that is, a virtuous agent has to put all these to

bear when performing an act.

Aristotle faces a little difficulty when he tries to modify Plato’s view that

virtue is knowledge. It seems what Plato means by knowledge here is the faculty

to make right moral judgment. If this is the case, it appears to be unclear what

Aristotle considers as the prerequisites of moral training, which must be met by

any of his students. What exactly does he expect his students to have before they
33
start, and what is it that they still have to get out of their course? In

Nicomachean Ethics (X, 9) Aristotle gives answer to the question when he

suggests that parental guidance and instruction; the threat of punishment, the

force of argument, and the sense of shame helps to form children to be noble in

character.48 This does not work in the same way with all children but generally

has far reaching effect. Aristotle thinks that children are more inclined to

obedience, praise and scolding for wrong doing when it comes to their relation

with authority figures like their parents. When parental guidance is insufficient,

the young is trained to get accustomed to the framework of legal sanctions

which express what the society admires and condemns. Hughes writes that the

young requires "learning to use the concepts of morality with increasing

sophistication, to esteem morally admirable behaviour, and to feel shame when

they fail to live up to the standards proposed to them. Their more nuanced moral

vocabulary goes hand in hand with more discriminating affective responses to

situations, and together these add up to a gradually improving ability to make

good moral judgments.”49

I find Alasdair Macintyre’s model of moral education most admirable, he

was critical of the moral education born out of the Enlightenment project,

particularly favouring virtue ethics among the "three rival versions of moral

48
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk X, Chap. 9, 1179b
49
Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics ( London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p.73
34
inquiry" in modern moral philosophy.50 In his magna opus “After Virtue”,

MacIntyre tried to explicate virtues in terms of social “practices”. For him, the

task of philosophy is primarily to study the actual world in which man lives – its

politics, traditions, social organization, families and so on – and try to find the

ideas and values that must bring about those institutions and practices, even if

the members of the society cannot articulate them, or cannot articulate them

fully. “When the philosophers have done their work correctly, the philosophy

they articulate will reflect their society; and because philosophers are uniquely

suited to see the society as a whole they will be in a unique position to point out

inconsistencies, propose new ideas consistent with the old ones that are

nevertheless improvements on those ideas, and show why things that seem

trivial are actually crucial to the society, and vice versa.”51

Moral education is thus the acquisition of virtue fostered by practices,

which stem from the proper understanding of human flourishing in terms of

social networks and common good.52 There are two kinds of practices: external

goods which are attached to the practice by the accidents of social circumstance

and internal goods which are the goods that can only be achieved by

50
Cf. Phillip L. Engle, Worldviews, Xlibris Corporation, 1-888-7-XLIBRIS, www.Xlibris.com,
p. 58
51
Ted Clayton (2006), "Political Philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre", Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/p-macint/ (April 2009)
52
Cf. J.L. A. Gracia, “Modern(ist) Moral Philosophy and MacIntyrean Critique" in Alasdair
MacIntyre edited by Mark C. Murphy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 103
35
participating in the practice itself. He further distinguishes between external

goods which are someone's property (goods of effectiveness) and the more one

person has of any of them the less there is for anyone else (money, power, and

fame are often of this nature) and internal goods (goods of excellence) which are

also competed for, "but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a

good for the whole community who participate in the practice".53 MacIntyre

notes that when individuals first start to engage in a practice, they have no

choice but to agree to accept external standards for the evaluation of their

performance and to agree to follow the rules set out for the practice: "A practice

involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the

achievement of goods."54 As one grows in talent, experience, and knowledge,

one can begin to have input into the standards themselves and then proceeds in

self-education and development. Moral education is thus a two way thing: the

community’s responsibility towards the student and the student’s personal effort

in education in the virtue. Virtue is thus fully realized in the community among

people who share the same practices. He writes:

53
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd Ed. (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 191.
54
Ibid., p. 190.

36
 A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and the
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods
which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively
prevents us from achieving any such goods….we have to accept
as necessary components of any practice with internal goods and
standards of excellence the virtues of justice, courage, and
honesty.55

2.3 Types of Virtues

2.3.1 Intellectual Virtues

Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of virtue56: that of the intellect

and that of character. Intellectual virtues pertain to the part of the soul that

engages in reasoning while moral virtues or virtues of character apply to the part

of the soul that cannot itself reason but is nonetheless capable of following

reason. Intellectual virtues are divided into two kinds: those that pertain to

theoretical reasoning, and those that pertain to practical thinking or wisdom

55
Ibid., p. 191.
56
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk II, Chap. 1, 1103a
37
(phronêsis).57 Aristotle in Book VI classifies the intellectual virtues; the first

five capacities of the soul: “states by which the soul grasps truth.”58

1. Scientific knowledge (episteme) - Studies things of which the origins "do not

admit of being otherwise" (VI.3, 1139a 6-7; 1139b 20)

2. Art or craft (techne) - Concerned with the production of things that "admit of

being otherwise." (VI.4).

3. Prudence (phronesis) This pertains to the regulation of action. (VI.5, VI.8).

There are different aspects to prudence:

3.1. "Prudence" proper- concerned with individual's good

3.2. Political science (politike)- concerned with the good of a city or

"state". This also is subdivided into the "ruling" part (sovereignity) of
politike or "legislative science", the deliberative part of politike or
statesmanship, and the juridical aspect of politike (VI.8)

3.3. The "economic" aspect of prudence (translated by Crisp as

"household management") (1141b 32).

4. Intellection or intuitive understanding (nous) -The source of our

understanding of both the first principles of knowledge, of which no

57
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk IV, Chap. 1, 1139a, 3-8
58
Ibid., Bk VI, Chap. 2, 1139b, 15
38
demonstration is possible (for instance, the principle of contradiction), and of

our knowledge of particular facts (for example, "this is a book”) (VI.6).

5. Wisdom (sophia) (VI.7): scientific knowledge of "the most honorable things"

combined with nous regarding "the truth about origins" (1141a17-19). He

distinguishes between wisdom and prudence. Prudence is said to serve wisdom

or facilitate its attainment (Cf. VI.13, 1145a, 6-12).

6. Deliberation: enables one to identify "what is expedient for promoting the end

about which prudence is true supposition" (VI.9, 1142b, 32ff).

7. Understanding (sunesis): concerned with the same objects as prudence, i.e.,

variable things concerning which we "might be puzzled about and might

deliberate about" (VI.10).

8. Judgment (gnome): the characteristic of a good judge, one who discerns the

equitable (VI.11).

39
 2.3.2 Virtues of Character

Moral virtue is a habitual disposition connected with choice, lying in a mean

relative to us, a mean which is determined by reason, by which the person of

practical wisdom would determine it.59 The various types of moral virtues are:

1. Courage: the mean between the extremes of cowardice and foolhardiness with

respect to the emotion of fear (III.6).

2. Temperence (moderation): the mean between the extremes of self-indulgence

and insensibility with respect to the desire for pleasures of the body like: eating,

drinking and sex (III.10).

3. Liberality or generosity (the virtue with regard to financial expenditures): the

mean between the extremes of extravagance and stinginess with respect to the

giving away and taking in of money. An extravagant person is excessive in

giving away, but defective in taking in money; a stingy person is defective in

giving away money, but excessive in taking in it. (IV.1)

4. Magnificence or pride: the mean between the extremes of vanity and

excessive humility with respect to ones desire to receive great honors (IV.2).

59
Cf. Ibid., Bk II, Chap. 6, 1106b36–1107a2
40
5. Great-souledness or magnanimity: It is concerned with honour and dishonour

in the right way. A person is thought to be great-souled if he thinks himself

worthy of great things and not foolishness. It is an extreme with regard to

grandness of claim and in the mean with regard to their correctness. (IV.3).

6. Gentleness or good temper: the mean between the extremes of irascibility (or

irritability) and apathy with respect to ones proneness to anger (IV.5).

7. Friendliness: the mean between obsequiousness, that is, being overly

deferential/groveling and unpleasantness with respect to the desire to please

others (IV.6).

8. Truthfulness or Veracity (straightforwardness) of speech: the mean between

the extremes of boastfulness and self-deprecation with respect to the way one

presents oneself to others (IV.7).

10. Wittiness: the mean between the buffoonery and boorishness with respect to

ones desire to amuse others. (IV.8)

11. Justice (Book V): there are two senses of justice- the complete virtue

corresponding to law-abidingness and as a particular virtue equivalent to

fairness or equity. Justice serves as a sort of link or "in-between" quality lying

between the moral and intellectual virtues.

41
 Aristotle refutes the claim that the virtues are separate from each other; he

argues that they are all united. In fact possessing one means possessing all. He

differentiates natural virtue from real virtue. To explain the former, someone can

be good in mathematics, for instance, without being good in athletics. Real

virtue on the other hand concerns moral decision making which stems from the

settled disposition of an agent with well formed character. A virtuous person

normally acts out of accurate understanding with practical reason and hence

decides out of right reason. The decision evokes each of the moral virtues

appropriately. Courage, for example, should lead someone to feel afraid when

fear is appropriate and soldiers that fight at war are not foolhardy but noble

because they fight to save their companions. However, to fight in normal

circumstances would simply be foolhardy but in this circumstance, it is not

foolhardy, but generous and noble. We should bear in mind when seeking to

understand the notion of real virtue that it corresponds to the relevant mean

which is relative to us.

42
2.4 Uncodifiability of Ethics

The “uncodifiability of ethics thesis” is the idea that ethics cannot be

captured in one rule or principle. In book I of the Nicomachean Ethics,

Aristotle warns us that unlike mathematical science, the science of ethics is

inexact. Virtue ethicists have challenged consequentialist and deontological

theories because they fail to accommodate this insight rather they rely on one

rule or principle that is expected to apply to all situations. In our day to day

experience of moral acts, we discover that rules may be true for the most part,

but may not always be the appropriate response. Consequently, since moral

problems are varied, we should not expect to find their solution in one rigid and

inflexible rule that does not admit of variable alternatives. The doctrine of the

mean captures exactly this idea.

Aristotle states that virtue of character consists in the mean between two

opposed human tendencies, excess and deficiency; for example, bravery is the

true mean between cowardice and rashness and temperance is the mean

between the extremes of self-indulgence and insensibility. The doctrine of the

mean is often misunderstood. When Aristotle says virtue is the relevant mean

which is relative to us, some have been tempted to think that he is here

allowing the character we already have to influence what virtue requires of us.

43
 What Aristotle means is that what is morally required is what the virtuous

person would do in our circumstances. Hughes argues against those who say

that the virtuous person is one who is by character disposed to have only

moderate emotional responses. For him, the mean is not about moderation but

more about appropriateness of our moral actions. Hughes says: “the appropriate

response patterns can be contrasted both with over- and under-reacting. To say

that virtues lie in the mean says no more than that appropriate patterns of

response is in line with what right reason dictates as per the situation. The

person with the virtue of moderation does not desire when he should not, no

more than he should, nor in a way that he should not. But ‘should’ and ‘should

not’ can be defined only relatively to individuals in each set of

circumstances.”60

Rosalind Hursthouse in an essay "The Central Doctrine of the Mean"

(2006) argues against the ordinary understanding of the doctrine of the mean.

Ordinary understanding refers to the interpretation of “the mean” when taken

out of its context of use in Aristotle’s ethics. The ordinary or quantitative

interpretation takes the mean as a mathematical mean and it is sometimes

employed in the field of modern science especially medicine to determine the

60
Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics (London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p.73
44
 moral rightness of certain controversial medical practices.61 Hursthouse favours

a qualitative interpretation, that is, “the mean” should not be taken out of

context but interpreted as a central doctrine in Aristotle's ethics and not just a

mean between excess and deficiency of actions. She argues that the phrase

“relative to us” is not a form of moral relativism but tells more of “the

evaluative elements” of the mean as reason dictates. Generally, what Aristotle

simply advocates in the doctrine of the mean is that our moral thinking must

contribute right reason and our appetites must contribute right desire and that

our actions should be born from a settled disposition, if the action is to have

moral stature.62

61
Cf. Rosalind Hursthouse , “The Central Doctrine of the Mean” in The Blackwell guide to
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics edited by Richard Kraut (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
2006), p.111
62
Cf. Joe Sachs (22 July, 2005), "Aristotle: Ethics" Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
www.iep.utm.edu/aris-eth/ (March, 2010)
45
 CHAPTER THREE

IMPERATIVE OF VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A NEW SOCIETY

3.6 Moral dilemma of our society today

Since virtue ethics has been abandoned by the enlightenment project,

modern man and society has been greatly influenced by consequentialism and

deontologism, which is a product of this period. In other words, human beings in

the post-enlightenment era evaluate moral actions mainly from the view point of

the consequence of such action or the fact that one is duty bound. In the first

chapter of this work we have argued that deontologism and consequentialism

have failed as the paradigm theories to evaluate human actions. We went further

following Elizabeth Anscombe to propose a return to virtue ethics. We shall

now apply these ethical principles to Africa, particularly Nigeria, by exposing

the various moral problems facing Nigeria and how the consequentialist,

deontologist and virtue ethics are able to meet Nigeria’s post-colonial moral

challenges. After this we will show how virtue ethics will help our modern

society to come out of moral decadence and lead it to become a “new society”, a

desirable virtuous society.

Nigeria belongs to the category of developing nations in terms of the

viability of its economical and technological advancement. Some of the major

46
social problems of developing nations are poverty, low literacy level, political

instability, display of little homogeneity, that is, division by race, religion,

culture, and geography, as well as frequently differing interests. Contemporary

Nigeria, to a great extent, enjoys great influence of colonialism in terms of

world view and social systems like judicial, banking, political and education

systems. This informs the fact that ethical theories of deontology and

consequentialism which are products of Western civilization (that is, the

enlightenment project) have been dished out to Africa through colonial and post-

colonial encounters and experiences. This is proven by the fact that ethics, as a

branch of philosophy, is taught in most African universities following the

traditional approach (Western approach).63

Apart from inheriting the concept of obligation and case-based reasoning

from the enlightenment project of Western civilization, Nigeria is also a multi-

religious, multi-cultural and highly populous country; these elements help us to

view the moral and social problems from a larger perspective. John Mbiti, an

African scholar, states that “Africans are notoriously religious”. Nigeria is not

an exception to Mbiti’s observation but despite its high religiosity, Nigeria is

63
Cf. John Ayotunde Isola Bewaji, “Ethics and Morality in Yoruba Culture” In A Companion to
African Philosophy, edited by Kwasi Wiredu (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), Pp.397-
398.
47
rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.64 Some of the dominant

moral and social problems of Nigeria are: bribery and corruption, vandalism,

terrorism, robbery, rape, examination and business malpractices, internet scam,

digital crimes, certificate forgery, child abuse, abortion, ritual killing,

promiscuity, capital punishment, tribalism, at-will employment, sexual

harassment, discrimination, environmental pollution, and so on. I shall narrow

down my discussion to how the normative ethical theories are able to address

two of these problems, namely: at-will employment and digital crimes.

At-will employment is a doctrine that defines an employment

relationship in which either the employer or the employee can break the

relationship with no liability, provided there was no express contract for a

definite term governing the employment relationship and that the employer does

not belong to a collective bargain (i.e., has not recognized a union).65 Under this

legal doctrine: “any hiring is presumed to be “at will”; that is, the employer is

free to discharge individuals “for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all,”

and the employee is equally free to quit, strike, or otherwise cease work.66 Many

employers use the at-will rule to threaten or sack employees based on unjust

64
Cf. IRIN humanitarian news and analysis “NIGERIA: Nigeria angry at being rated second
most corrupt” From: www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37128 (9 October 2003)
65
Cf. Alexei Marcoux (April 2008) “Business Ethics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/
66
“At-will employment”(6 March, 2010), Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/At-will_employment
48
reasons like: when an employee refuses to do something illegal or immoral as

ordered by the employer, medical problems (like HIV/AIDS), discrimination on

the basis of sex, colour, religious affiliation, tribe and so on.

In Nigeria, especially in the banking sector, at-will employment and

mass retrenchment has become a burning issue. In the editoral, Newswatch

Magazine of 5th January 2010, it was reported that 7,000 bankers lost their jobs

in the space of 4 months, while another 14,000 were said to have been pencilled

down for retrenchment. This downsizing of 30 percent of the banking sector

work force happened within the 25 accredited Nigeria banks.67 In Kola

Ibrahim’s article titled “Retrenchment”, he decries the Nigeria government’s

unjust retrenchment of thousands of its workers across the several government

ministries. To justify the mass retrenchment, the chairman of the Nigeria Labour

Congress (NLC) argued that workers consume about 80% of the government

funds and thus need to be pruned to allow for other capital projects to be done

by the government.68 Kola’s argument is that just 1% of Nigerians (mainly oil

workers and government top functionaries) control over 80% of the nation’s oil

wealth while over 70% of Nigerians are wallowing in what the International

67
Emmanuel Uffot and Dike Onwuamaeze, “A Matter of Survival” in Newswatch Magazine (5
January, 2010),
http://www.newswatchngr.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1677
68
Kola Ibrahim, “retrenchment” in Online Nigeria,
http://www.onlinenigeria.com/articles/ad.asp?blurb=357 (13 October, 2006)
49
Monetary Funds (IMF) called severe poverty. The retrenchment of workers

based on the ability of the government to execute capital projects is not

justifiable. For Kola, retrenchment contributes to poverty rather than alleviate it.

Scholars in the field of business ethics have raised concern over the

fairness of the at-will doctrine and whether other terms of employment ought to

be substituted for it through public policy initiatives. Deontologists argue that

arbitrary dismissal is incompatible with respecting employees as persons.

Immanuel Kant wants every person to be treated as an end and not a means to an

end. Such treatment demands that employees be given good reasons when

adverse action is to be taken against them. Thus, at-will employment is

incompatible with recognizing and respecting the employee's personhood.

Opponents of the deontological approach respond that the at-will doctrine

supplies a reason when it says that the terms of employer/employee arrangement

are such that either of the party has the option to terminate it at will. In other

words, the at-will decision of either of the party is sufficient reason to terminate

the arrangement. Consequentialists mainly argue in defense of the at-will

doctrine. They claim that the at-will doctrine promotes vibrant labour market by

50
reducing the costs and the stakes of disputes over dismissal and it ensures that

jobs are frequently created and readily available.69

The at-will doctrine works better in developed nations which is highly

industrialized (with reduced rate of unemployment) and where the governments

has put in place measures that protect the interest of the employee against

discrimination and abuse. It is more challenging in developing nations like

Nigeria where the rate of unemployment is alarmingly high and the interest of

the employee is not adequately protected. Consequently, problems which are

ordinarily handled by the government in developed nations like the USA70,

where at-will doctrine is well practiced, are common features of at-will

employment in developing nations. Given this fact the consequentialist approach

is necessary but not adequate.

In his seminal paper titled “Virtue Ethics as a Foundation for Business

Ethics: A "MacIntyre-Based" Critique” (2003), John Dobson argued for a

virtuous corporation. Despite the market driven competition in the business

community, corporations must strive to be virtuous and to reach the ultimate

69
Alexei Marcoux (April 2008) “Business Ethics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/
70
All the U.S. states have a number of statutory protections for employees against wrongful
termination and discrimination at work with regards firing or refusing to hire an employee
because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap status. Read more from:
“At-will employment”(6 March, 2010), Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/At-will_employment
51
goal of economic survival. For Dobson, “corporations are real communities,

neither ideal nor idealized, and therefore the perfect place to start understanding

the nature of the virtues”71 Apart from the aim of profit maximization,

corporations have moral responsibilities. Considered as a community, the

corporation should emphasize sound moral judgments which promote

eudaimonia (human flourishing) and make sure virtues such as justice,

truthfulness, magnanimity, moderation, courage, liberality and friendliness,

inform their moral decision. With this, even though the society in which

corporations exist is developing, a virtuous corporation will neither take undue

advantage of its workers nor be disobedient to the constituted authorities; but

will compete meaningfully in the business arena and at the same time promote

common good.

Digital crimes: Digital crimes are discussed in “Computer and information

ethics”, which is the branch of applied ethics that studies and analyzes the social

and ethical impacts of information and communication technology (ICT). In this

field, professional philosophers use traditional Western theories like

utilitarianism, Kantianism, or virtue ethics. They apply these theories to ethical

cases that significantly involve computers and computer networks especially the
71
John Dobson (2003), “Virtue Ethics as a Foundation for Business Ethics: A "MacIntyre-
Based" Critique”,
http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/conferences/antwerp/papers/Dobson.pdf

52
internet.72 The ethical issues deliberated in this field are broad and they include:

professional ethics, cyber crime, virtual reality, respect and disrespect, role

fulfillment, positive (civic engagement) and negative (deception and plagiarism)

behaviors, privacy and confidentiality, unimpaired services, controlling access

to resources, advance-fee fraud, malicious kinds of software, or “programmed

threats”, embezzlement, planting of logic bombs, and system hacking.

Of all these ethical issues, the most dominant in Nigeria are system

hacking and advance-fee fraud. Advance-fee fraud or “419 fraud” is a

confidence trick in which the target is persuaded to advance sums of money in

the hope of realizing a significantly larger gain which is popularly called

“Yahoo-Yahoo”.73 A “hacker” is one who “breaks into someone's computer

system without permission. Some hackers intentionally steal data or commit

vandalism, while others merely “explore” the system to see how it works and

what files it contains.”74 “Explorers” most times claim to be benevolent

defenders of freedom and fighters against rip-offs by major corporations or

spying by government agents but all acts of spying or hacking in the cyberspace

is harmful, because any known successful penetration of a computer system

72
Cf. Terrell Bynum, “Computer and Information Ethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-computer/ (Oct 23, 2008)
73
“Advance-fee fraud” (3 May 2010), Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advance-fee_fraud
74
Terrell Bynum, “Computer and Information Ethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-computer/ (October, 2008)
53
requires the owner to thoroughly check for damaged or lost data and programs.

Most “hackers” in Nigeria break into the database of Automated Teller

Machines (ATM) and commercial websites; they carry out illegal fund transfer

and steal data of credit cards that are used to transact business on commercial

websites like E-bay. These hackers sell the stolen data to people who use them

to do e-commerce like buying electronics, downloading games and applications,

and booking hotel reservations. This act has become common place in Nigeria

and it informs the listing of Nigeria as one of the leading countries where

internet scams takes place.75 For example, Daily Mail UK on 16 January 2009

reported a postman who sank into depression and debt after losing £130,000 in

an internet scam involving Nigerian fraudsters.76 Also the British Broadcasting

Corporation (BBC) on the 26 November 2003 reported a Nigerian federal

lawmaker who was arrested for alleged involvement in computer fraud. This

advance-fee fraud is said to be the biggest ever “419” swindle, a $180m fraud

that brought down a Brazilian bank.77 Research shows that digital crimes are

most perpetuated by young people.78 Young people may be best prepared to use

75
“Advance-fee fraud” (3 May 2010), Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advance-fee_fraud
76
"Postman loses £130,000 savings to Nigerian internet scam after being duped by a friend he
met on MySpace" from Mail Online (16th January 2009),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1116067/Postman-loses-130-000-savings-Nigerian-
internet-scam-duped-friend-met-MySpace.html
77
"Nigeria to tackle internet fraud", from British Broadcasting Corporation News (26 November
2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3241710.stm
78
Carrie James and Katie Davis et al, Young People, Ethics, and the New Digital Media:
54
new media for good but may also be the most likely perpetrators or victims of

ethical lapses.

In James Moor's classic paper, “What Is Computer Ethics?” (1985), he

recognized that since computers were introduced, human beings have been able

to do things they could not do before, and this creates policy vacuums. Moor

recognized that computers are logically malleable, that is, they can be

manipulated to do any activity that can be characterized in terms of inputs,

outputs, and connecting logical operations.79 Computers are also informationally

enriching. Because of their logical malleability, computers are put to many uses

in diverse activities and can be modified to enhance capabilities and improve

overall performance even further. Often, computerized activities become

informationalized; that is, the processing of information becomes a crucial

ingredient in performing and understanding the activities themselves.80 In other

words, it is done strictly by handling information of all sorts, and by various

people. Based on the logical malleability and informational enriching nature of

computers, Moor rejects the use of cultural relativism in addressing computer

ethical issues in a world which has become a global village. Cultural relativism

A Synthesis from the GoodPlay Project, (London: The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts,
2009), p. 5
79
Cf. James H. Moor, (1985). “What Is Computer Ethics?” In T. W. Bynum (ed.), Computers
and Ethics. Blackwell, (Published as the October 1985 issue of Metaphilosophy.), p. 25
80
James H. Moor, Ibid., p.24
55
is the theory that ethical issues must be decided situationally on the basis of

local customs and laws. To fill the policy vacuums, he argues that computer

users should develop core human values such as: life, health, happiness,

security, resources, opportunities, and knowledge. Though human values are

relative, they are not simply in the shallow sense of Cultural Relativism.81 These

values are so important to the continued survival of any community that

essentially all communities do value them. For Moor, if a community does not

value the “core values”, it would not have lasting existence. Moor uses “core

values” to examine computer ethics topics like privacy and security and to add

an account of justice, which he called “just consequentialism”.82 This “human-

values approach” to computer ethics has gained wide acceptance by many

computer professionals in the computer society and many computer ethicists

after Moor see their task as filling the policy vacuums.

Virtue ethics approach is so far the dominant approach to a wide range of

ethical issues in the field of computer ethics, since the myriad of laws and codes

that prohibit digital crimes has failed to stop or reduce crime rate. Also,

professional hackers83 justify their attacks on computers with persuasive reasons

81
James H. Moor, Ibid., p. 29
82
Cf. Terrell Bynum, “Computer and Information Ethics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-computer/ (Oct 23, 2008)
83
The EC-Council Certified Ethical Hacker, The Comprehensive Guide to Certified Ethical
Hacking, P. 28
56
like: “by writing viruses, I am exercising freedom of speech”, “by penetrating

other information systems, I am increasing my knowledge”, “information wants

to be free, and I am helping in that mission.” The controversial issue with

dealing with the digital crimes hacking and advance-fee fraud is the problem of

Privacy. In an attempt to understand questions like, “what is privacy?” and “why

is privacy of value?” some computer ethicists argue that privacy can be reduced

to other concepts such as property or liberty; some argue that privacy is

something in its own right and that it is intrinsically valuable; yet others argue

that while not intrinsically valuable, privacy has an instrumental value.

Consequentialists, who draw inspiration from Jeremy Bentham, argue that the

concept of privacy may lead to “Panopticon”.84 Computerized information-

gathering is able to produce the panopticon effect. When human behavior is

monitored, recorded, and tracked, individuals could become intent on

conforming to norms for fear of negative consequences. Individuals would know

that most of what they do can be observed and this could influence how they

behave by making them not to act freely.85 Consequently, they suggest that the

84
A panopticon is the effect obtainable from a kind of prison cell which is arranged in a circle
with the inside wall of each cell made of glass so that the guards on duty cannot be seen. In fact,
a prison guard need not be in the guard tower for the panopticon to have its effect; it is enough
that prisoners believe they are being watched. When individuals believe they are being watched,
they adjust their behavior accordingly; they take into account how the watcher will perceive their
behavior.
85
Cf. Deborah G. Johnson, "Computer Ethics" The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of
Computing and Information, edited by Luciano Floridi (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing Ltd, 2004), Pp. 70-71
57
privacy issues around computer technology go to the heart of freedom and

democracy.

Deontologists argue that the panopticon effect will not occur in

information societies because data collection is invisible so that individuals are

unaware they are being watched. If the individual sees privacy as his moral

obligation by observing it, the individual will gradually get accustomed to the

practice which makes part of the information society. This approach has

speedily become less effective outside the realm of professional computer users.

Due to rapid growth of the internet; the rise of the world-wide-web; increasing

“user-friendliness” and decreasing costs of computer technology, there has been

a resurgence of new privacy issues in the information society. Boyd (2007a), for

instance, outlined four distinct properties which the internet bear on privacy in

new ways. These properties include: persistence (what you post persists

indefinitely), searchability, (you can search for anyone and find their digital

“body”), replicability (you can copy and paste information from one context to

another), and invisible audiences (you can never be sure who your audience

is).86 Despite these features, many young people share deeply personal

86
boyd, d. 2007b. “Why Youth (Heart) Social Networking Sites: The Role of Networked
Publics in Teenage Social Life.” In Youth, Identity and Digital Media, ed. D. Buckingham, 119–
142. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, from
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2007/01/08/thecost_of_lyi.html.

58
information with one another on websites such as Twitter, MySpace,

Classmates, LiveJournal, U-tube and Facebook.

James Moor, representing the leading computer virtue theorists, argue

that all interesting human enterprises, including computing, are conducted

within frameworks of values.87 The world has become a global village and the

virtuous agent (computer users), regardless of their location and culture, should

through their ethical decision making give sound moral judgments which

promote eudaimonia (human flourishing of information society). Consequently,

privacy, which is a component of the policy vacuums generated by computing

technology, should be regarded as a value which should be promoted in the

information society. According to Moor, other core values that promote life and

happiness of human beings include ability, freedom, knowledge, resources, and

protection.88 A virtuous agent should use virtues (like moderation, magnificence,

friendliness, veracity and justice), when acting as free agents (as opposed to

panopticon) in obeying the code and laws that guide members of the information

society. I think that computer users in Nigeria can learn a lot from Moor’s

principle. The way forward will be promoting a virtue-based character formation

and moral education.

87
James H. Moor, (1985). “What Is Computer Ethics?” In T. W. Bynum (ed.), Computers and
Ethics. Blackwell, pp. 266–75. (Published as the October 1985 issue of Metaphilosophy.) p.30
88
James H. Moor, (1985). “What Is Computer Ethics?” p. 33.
59
3.2 Virtue and social life

In this part of the work we shall begin to look at how virtue can create a

special mode of social existence. Man is by nature a rational and social animal.

The need for interaction is innate in man and it is through interaction with other

people that man develops his distinct human qualities. Society is usually

defined by taking account of three key concepts: people, institutions and

relationships. This means that society is not only a unit consisting of institutions

and culture which are exclusive to a people; it is also a network of

relationships.89 A close look at Nigeria reveals the defectiveness of its social,

cultural, economic and political institutions. In other words, the relationship that

should exist between people and institutions is faulty. We have already argued

that deontology and consequentialism which responds to the ethical dimension

of the problem of institutional defectiveness are not adequate. The practice of

virtues will be useful for the moral and social reconstruction of Africa and

indeed Nigeria.

We can carry out this reconstruction by going back to develop the idea of

polis in Aristotle. This does not mean that we accept the idea of polis wholesale,

but that we rethink it, thereby; stripping polis of whatever is not helpful for our

89
O. Otite and W. Ogionwo, An Introduction to Sociological Studies (Ibadan: Heinemann
Educational Books, 1990), p. 41
60
modern society. We shall emulate the good qualities of polis while its other

attributes like slavery and subordination of women will be rejected. In books VII

and VIII of Politics, Aristotle discusses his idea of polis or “the ideal city”. To

achieve polis, which is the best form of state, it is necessary to decide first, that

it is the most eligible (choice-worthy or preferable) life for individuals. “The

best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue.90 In Whose Justice?

Which Rationality?, MacIntyre writes that the polis is defined by the fact that it

“was the institution whose concern was, not with this or that particular good, but

with human good as such, and not with desert [that is, reward] or achievement in

respect of particular practices, but with desert and achievement as such. The

constitution of each particular polis could therefore be understood as the

expression of a set of principles about how goods are to be ordered into a way of

life”91 Consequently, the essential characteristics of the polis according to

Aristotle include: individual’s pursuit of the highest good, community that

makes possible the pursuit of the common good and a framework for

determining collective and individual identities and the capacity for acting on

those identities.92

90
Cf. Aristotle, Politics [VII.13]
91
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?(Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1988), Pp. 33-34
92
Edward Clayton, “Alasdair MacIntyre on Aristotle and the Polis” The New England Journal of
Political Science Volume II, Number 1 (2005)
61
 Modern society, such as Nigeria, seems to have lost the “should be” goal

or ideal of society whose feature is mentioned above. If we have virtuous

individuals, we will have virtuous families and consequently virtuous society.

There is a serious need for the rediscovery of an ideal Nigerian society, such that

reflects the good characteristics of the polis. Though, Aristotle does not argue

that all citizens of the polis must be equally rational, his general line is to show

that ethics and politics are based on a metaphysical understanding of what it is to

be a human person; a rational agent with senses and emotions. It should be the

collective responsibility of members of a society, regardless of their disparate

functions and capacities, to safeguard the community. At this point, for

Aristotle, the constitution becomes necessary to guide the traits which are useful

for the end which is the common good. In a good society, the law successfully

promotes moral virtues and the practice of virtues in turn promotes the common

good.

Some have argued that the Aristotelian virtues which promote common

good in the Athenian city state, is such that cannot be applied today because it is

more appropriate for oligarchic, democratic and slave owning kind of society.

Modern society not only surpasses Athenian society by population and

technological advancement, it is also mainly a society built on liberalism and

62
democracy. To explain the viability of virtues in the modern society, MacIntyre

introduces the idea of tradition. He writes:

But it is not just that different individuals live in

different social circumstances; it is also that we all
approach our own circumstances as bearers of a
particular social identity. I am someone's son or
daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a
citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that
guild or profession, I belong to this clan, that tribe,
this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be
the good for one who inhabits these roles. As
such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city,
my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts,
inheritances, rightful expectations and
93
obligations.

He continues:

What I am, therefore, is in key part what I inherit,

a specific past that is present to some degree in my
present. I find myself part of a history and that is
generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I
recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a
tradition.94

93
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd Ed. (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 220
94
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 221
63
Such, tradition has to be a dynamic and living tradition which “is an historically

extended, socially embodied argument, an argument precisely in part about the

goods which constitute that tradition.” 95 Tradition is, in fact, a necessary

condition which makes rational thought possible, for “no human mind can

function without accepting authority, custom, and tradition: it must rely on them

for the mere use of language.”96 If all knowing depends upon an underlying

commitment to a particular tradition, it follows that reason is necessarily

embodied in a particular tradition. That being the case, reason and tradition are

not opposed to each other. Also, MacIntyre believes that man is a dependent

being and needs others to grow in virtues. That is, I can only grow if I can

reason with and learn from others, and this requires certain traits from me: the

virtues (honesty, courage, and justice, for example). Virtues derive their

meaning in particular societies through the underlying tradition and they serve to

promote the common good through the practice of internal and external good.97

Consequently, a good society is that whose traditions and customs exude the

virtues, and man through interrelationship grows in the virtues, which serve to

promote human flourishing.

95
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Pp. 221-222.
96
Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, ed. Marjorie Grene (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1969), p. 41.
97
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, P. 191
64
 Can virtue ethics be applied to the Nigeria situation? I answer in the

affirmative. Some philosophers and educationalists have attempted to apply

virtue theory to education. In “The Central Doctrine of the Mean”, Rosalind

Hurtsthouse, a leading virtue ethicist, proposes that modern societies adopt the

Aristotelian model of moral education.98 She points out, as an example, The

Virtue ProjectTM.99 The United Nations has recognized The Virtue Project TM as a

model program for parents in all cultures. This program is currently operating in

about 100 countries. The virtue program is a very detailed and practical

educational program that is worth giving attention. It shares the Aristotelian

premise that “all children are born with all the virtues”, “in potential”, “waiting

to grow”. This premise greatly shapes the pedagogy that emphasizes praising

virtuous actions of children rather than placing emphasis on actions that can be

condemned.

Another instance of the application of virtue ethics in society is the

educational principle of Joseph Kentenich, a prominent Christian

98
Rosalind Hurtsthouse, “The Central Doctrine of the Mean”, Pp. 112-113
99
The Virtues Project is an initiative which began in 1991 to empower individuals and families
to live by their deepest values. It began with the work The Virtues Guide (by Linda Kavelin
Popov, Dr. Dan Popov and John Kavelin) and the seminal book The Virtues Project. The Virtue
Project is sourced in the simple wisdom of many world religions, all of which describe the
human virtues as the highest aspiration for humanity. For more information on the project visit:
www.virtuesproject.com/ orwww.wisdompage.com/virtuesproject.html
65
educationalist.100 Kentenich’s model of education is active in Nigeria and is

aimed at promoting the moral and religious renewal of the world. In his

Education and the Challenge of Our Times, Kentenich develops the idea of “the

new community”; a society built on the essential structure of man where people

live in love; that is, in cordial relationship with one another and for one another.

He pictures the new society as the society in which the “new man” (or the

virtuous person) strives for great ideal that fosters common good. Such society

is critical of the false images of man, such as, a rationalistic image of man, an

economical image of man and a collectivistic or Bolshevistic image of man. For

him, the right image of the new man is the Ecce-homo image, that is, man as an

image of Christ.101 According to Kentenich, the discovery of Ecce-homo is “a

new and deeper discovery of the ‘I’, the ‘you’, the ‘we’ and ‘God’; an all-

embracing image which reflects the picture of God, the human person and the

community as an organic whole.102 The “new man”, is essentially a free

100
Joseph Kentenich is the founder of the Schoenstatt Movement. He was born on 18th
November, 1885 in Gymnich near Cologne and died 83 years later on 15th September, the Feast
of our Lady of Sorrows. He was as a thinker, theologian, educationalist and pioneer of a Catholic
response to an array of modern issues, whose teachings underwent a series of challenges from
political and ecclesiastical powers. He attempted to teach Christians how to live out their faith in
a changing world. He rejected Communism and Western materialism and called for a return to
virtues in the Christian formation of youths and families. Cf. Wikipedia Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Kentenich and
101
Joseph Kentenich, Education and the Challenge of Our Times: Perspectives for Catholic
Educators, Translated by Ulric J. Proeller (Wisconsin: International Schoenstatt Center, 1971),
p.84
102
Joseph Kentenich, Freely and Wholly Human, edited by Herbert King (Vallendar: Schoenstatt
Press, 1998), p. 80
66
personality who strives to strike a balance between culture and spiritual life; he

freely practices the virtues within his cultural existence with openness to divine

providence. In Kentenich’s model of education, one studies his society’s

traditions and institutions and work out ways in which the virtues can bring out

the best social, religious and cultural practices that promote common good. The

pedagogy aims at forming young people to become free, firm, and virtuous

characters that will in turn become instruments for creating a “new society”. I

appreciate this model of education because of its ability to work out a beautiful

interplay between virtue and social life.

3.3 The Imperative of Virtue Ethics for a New Society

The central points of argument of this essay are the following. First, the

proper focus of ethics should be on people’s characters rather than on their

actions. Second, the best way to know what one should do is to think of how to

behave virtuously, rather than thinking of how to follow a moral principle.

Third, virtue is very important for healthy moral life and consequently a healthy

social life.

On the first account, what is morally important is to be a particular kind

of person, and to have developed the particular traits of character which are the
67
moral virtues. Moral philosophy has been too long preoccupied with ‘issues’ and

moral dilemmas. In other words, its major characteristics has been problem

solving. Though we have, in this work, shown that virtue ethics can be applied

to solving moral dilemmas (and its problem solving capacity is becoming more

popular in the field of applied ethics), our main emphasis is on the character

formation of a virtuous agent. To do this we should begin to think of discovering

what living a good life requires of us. That is, modern man should begin to

decide on what to do by thinking about generosity, or fidelity, or honesty or

fairness rather than, say, by doing a utilitarian calculation, or applying a Kantian

test.103

In many African countries today, more emphasis seems to be placed on

acquiring intellectual knowledge than socio-cultural and moral education. There

is an urgent need to bridge this gap otherwise social ills might escalate in the

future. There is need for moral education that emphasizes character formation.

The socio-economic problems facing Africans have been precipitated, partly

because of the mismanagement of resources by those who are charged with the

responsibility of their management. Consequently, increasing crime rate,

mismanagement, lack of accountability and transparency in Africa, can be

attributed to lack of a solid moral educational background of many Africans. If

103
Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics ( London: Routledge Publications, 2001), p 219
68
we will come out of this misnomer, there is need for better moral education of

the young, the leaders of tomorrow.

It is therefore against this backdrop that I argue that for modern society,

which is ridden with moral decadence, to get liberated from its present social

and moral pitfalls, there is need for moral philosophy to do more than enforcing

duty/obligation or using the effect of conduct to determine morality. In fact,

building up good characters is needed in the task of reconstructing present day

society. Though our culture is different from the Athenian culture in which

Aristotle wrote, the assumptions he makes about the nature, scope and method

of ethics are equally applicable in our present day.

3.4 Conclusion

We set out in this essay to show that virtue ethics is necessary in the

building of an ideal society. Modern society has relied so much on the obligation

based concept of morality. In the first chapter we traced the history of ethics,

with devotion to the development of virtue ethics in Aristotle and Aquinas. We

see its rejection in the enlightenment era, which was much in favor with

deontology and later consequentialism. Elizabeth Anscombe’s insight was

relevant here, for in a paper entitled “Modern Moral Philosophy” she was

critical of a 'law conception of ethics' where the key focus was obligation and

69
duty. She calls for a return to virtue ethics. Many philosophers have heeded

Anscombe’s call, which fact is evident in the increased scholarship in the area of

virtue ethics.

In the second chapter, we examined the key concepts in virtue ethics

such as human flourishing, moral education and character formation. We also

examined the types of virtues and the doctrine of the mean. In the last chapter,

we applied the three major normative theories to resolving the some moral

dilemmas in Nigeria, where we demonstrated the viability of virtue ethics in

resolving moral problems. After these, we showed that there can be an interplay

between virtues and social life. This argues for a virtue based moral education

with its goal – to create a better society.

It is clear that virtue ethics, as a normative ethics, is important in

resolving the various moral problems confronting man in these modern times. It

is more important that modern society should begin to place considerable

emphasis on moral education and the formation of moral character in order to

build a better society. Consequently, I propose that moral education should be

such that emphasizes virtue acquisition given how such virtues are beneficial to

the individual and the community.

70
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