Academic Capital or Scientific Progress?

A Critique of Studies of Kibbutz Stratification

Author(s): Reuven Shapira
Source: Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Autumn, 2005), pp. 357-380
Published by: University of New Mexico
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 ACADEMICCAPITALOR SCIENTIFICPROGRESS?
A Critiqueof Studiesof KibbutzStratification

ReuvenShapira,Ph.D.
WesternGalileeAcademicCollege,Israel,KibbutzGanShmuel,
MobilePostHefer,Israel38810,shapira@gan.org.il

Whydid six decades ofkibbutzstudies not discover the existenceof complexsocial

stratification?Thiscurious blindnessis explainedby the dominanceofa coalition
in the study of this complex social field, which includes both kibbutzimand
federative organizations. The uniqueness of kibbutzimenabled this coalition to
perpetuate a series ofpartial truisms,includinga supposed lack ofstratification.
Criticshave exposedsome degree of status differentiationbutignoredtheprimary
evidence ofstratificationand missed its trueextent.Theauthor'sdesire to address
his own society's problems led him to engage in a "long effortapplied to oneself
which [converted] . . . one's whole view of. .. the social world" (Bourdieu
1990:16), and this view exposed the trueextentofstratificationin thissocialfield.
Thus, the motivationto reformthe kibbutzled to a level of understandingwhich
traditional academic research had not achieved, supporting Whyte's (1992)
assertion that social scientists must seek social theoriesfor action, notfor pure
knowledge,and Wallerstein's (2004) thesis thatdivisionof the social sciences and
humanitiesinto separate disciplines hindersscientificprogress.

. one cannot be satisfied with an explanatory model incapable of

differentiatingpeople whom ordinaryintuitionin the specific universetells
us are quite different(Bourdieu,in Wacqaunt1989:7-8).

THEKIBBUTZ IS WIDELYRECOGNIZED as Israel's most interesting social creation.1

Interestin it has indeed lessened significantlyof late, however, owing to the debt
crisis into which the kibbutzmovement sank and from which it was rescued by
massive public financialassistance,leadingto a mass exodus and adoptionfor the
most part of capitalistic norms which transformedthe communal culture (Ben-
Rafael 1997;Rosolio 1999). Nevertheless,this relativelysmall segmentof modern
Israeli society-270 kibbutzimtotaling some 125,000 inhabitants-has served as
a subject of thousandsof studies by hundredsof students for some sixty years.
Facedwith this huge researcheffort,it is naturalto expect thatkibbutzimwould be
a well-understoodsocial field (sensu Bourdieu 1977). And since the kibbutz is
supposedly egalitarian,what should be more studied and understoodthan the
extent of its egalitarianismand the lack of stratification?How is it that some
scholars (e.g., Rosner 1991; Shur 1987; Talmon 1972) have not recognized the
tangible evidence of stratification,while others (Ben-Rafael and Yaar 1992;

JournalofAnthropological
Research,vol. 61, 2005
Copyright? by TheUniversityof New Mexico
357
358 JOURNAL
OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
Bowes 1989; Fadida 1972; Kressel 1974; Shapira1987, 1990, 1992; Topel 1979)
have detected three, four, or even more strata?Historianshave depicted lifelong
heads of main kibbutzfederations-termed "theMovements"-as very powerful
andprestigiousfigures,seemingly a top social stratum(Beilin 1984;Kafkafi 1992,
1998; Kanari2003; Kynan 1989; Near 1997; Tzachor 1997, 2004), but only one
ethnographer,Rosenfeld(1951), depictedMovementofficials as constitutinga top
stratumin a kibbutz.Her anthropologicalcolleagues have depictedthe top stratum
as the 12-15 memberswho rotatedmain local offices among themselves (Spiro
1955), a kibbutz'schief economic officers (Schwartz1955;Vallier 1962), the four
memberswho circulatedbetween main local offices and Movementjobs (Fadida
1972), the three managersof a kibbutz'splants (Kressel 1974), the three patrons
whose clients managed a kibbutz (Topel 1979), a few veteran officers (Bowes
1989), or the head of the ruling economic clique (Schwartzand Naor 2000). For
sociologists, the top stratumwas eitherthe mainofficers of each kibbutz(Landshut
1944); the 20% of members with the greatest authority,prestige, and influence
(Ben-Rafaeland Yaar 1992); the technocratswho managedthe main branchesof
a kibbutz(Ben-Rafael 1996); or the local oligarchs (Rosolio 1999:29).
Ordinaryintuition rejects these views in favor of histories and deputies'
testimonies (Cohen 2000; Shem-Tov 1997; Shure2001; Vilan 1993) whereinthe
top stratumwas said to be composedof the headsof the largestMovements:Itzhak
Tabenkinof the KibbutzMeuchad(hereafterKM), and Me'ir Yaari and Yaakov
Hazan of the KibbutzArtzi (KA). These Movements represented75-80% of all
kibbutzmembersup to 1952, and some two-thirdsafterwards.For half a century,
they also dominated as unquestionedleaders of affiliated national parties and
Knesset (parliament)memberswho made all political decisions on behalf of the
partiesandchose deputiesto be cabinetministers.They also chose hundredsof KM
and KA functionariesto become Movement staff membersand decided policies
and actions, acting as heads of Hasidic courtsknown as Admors.'Commonsense
tells us thatany analysisof stratificationis flawed if it ignoresthe outwardsigns of
these leaders' guru-likesuperiority(see Tzachor2004). Admorswere known not
only to every kibbutzmember,butalso to most Israelisvia the news media,andvia
their keynote addressesat KM, KA, and partyconventions, executive meetings,
and cadreseminars.They wrote ideological books, censoredMovementandparty
publications, hobnobbed with national leaders, and rode in chauffeured,
ministerial-stylecars (Aharoni2000; Beilin 1984; Halamish2003; Kanari2003;
Keshet 1995; Shure2001; Tzachor 1997, 2004; Vilan 1993).
The inadequacyof the analysis is also clear fromthe varietyof etiologies that
have been proposedfor kibbutzstratification,which are as follows: The power of
kibbutz chief officers is a result of access to better information (Landshut
1944:87);differentialprestigeis due to the leadershiproles held by veteransof the
kibbutz movement (Rosenfeld 1951); control of the kibbutz economy made
economic officers dominant (Vallier 1962); acquiring higher education and
circulatingbetween main local offices, emissaries abroad,and Movementjobs
(Fadida 1972), continuousmanagementof a kibbutz's plants (Kressel 1974), or
patronageof clients who held main local offices (Topel 1979) bred dominance;
 ACADEMIC
CAPITALORSCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS? 359
differentiallongevity among membersled to control by veterans (Bowes 1989);
differentialauthority,prestige, and influence of roles createdstratification(Ben-
Rafael and Yaar 1992); technocracy led to power differentiation(Ben-Rafael
1996); rotation of main offices among a few members bred oligarchy (Rosolio
1999:29);andheadingof a power clique withinthe kibbutz'seconomic committee
bred supremacy(Schwartzand Naor 2000).
How can one account for such a variety of explanations?Researcherswere
apparentlyblindto the existence of stratificationcreatedby the steephierarchiesof
thousandsof functionariescalledpe 'ilim(meaning"activists";singular:pa 'il)who
administered the Movements and hundreds of other regional and national
federative organizations(FOs), dozens of equal partnershipsof some or many
kibbutzim and many other inter-kibbutzorganizationsthrough which relations
with the encompassingsociety were managed.Therewere some 250-300 FOs in
which some 4,500-5,000 pe'ilim administeredalmost twenty thousand hired
employees (Shapira2001, n.d.a: chap. 5). The researcherslooked for evidence of
stratificationonly in the flat organizationalstructuresof democratickibbutzim,
with short-termofficers of relatively low power and prestige, no privileges, and
limited authority, while ignoring hierarchic and autocratic FOs whose pe 'ilim
were clearly stratifiedby differentialpower, authority,prestige, privileges, and
job tenure.
My conclusionis thatpreviousresearcherswere indeedblind to reality.In this
paper I will outline the main facts and factors of stratification,supportedby
ethnographicexamples, but I will not attempta full analysis, which will be found
in a forthcomingbook. The academic blindness to the existence of stratification
raises troublingquestions:How did it come about,and why did such a substantial
body of researchfail to expose it? Was an inadequateparadigmused because it
served a dominantcoalition's interestin academiccapitaland epistemic authority
(Bourdieu1988;Collins 1975:chap.9; Gieryn1999)?Did communitarian epistemic
cultures(Knorr-Cetina1999) cause conformityto this paradigm?Did the failureto
integratefindings by different disciplines cause the myopia, and if so, why did
ethnographersnot integratethem?Whatlessons can this add to recentcritiquesof
ethnography(Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Hammersley 1992; Van Maanen
1995)?Does this case supportWallerstein's(2004) thesis thatthe division of social
sciences and the humanitiesinto separatedisciplines hindersscientific progress?
This paper is divided into three parts. In the first, the mistaken image of
kibbutzimis exposed and the main errorsof the customaryview are clarified.The
second part explains the origins and longevity of the blindness, and the third
explores its exposure, in particularthe "long effort applied to oneself which
[converted]... one's whole view of... the social world"(Bourdieu 1990:16), a
view which exposed the true extent of stratification.The conclusions call for the
shapingof new types of academiccareersthatincludeperiodsof social actionand
involve various researchersin each other's fieldwork and analysis, as well as
adequate support for the huge research investment required for preventing or
overcoming such blindness, and a revision of decision-making norms for
publicationthat currentlysuppressradicalthinkers.
360 JOURNAL RESEARCH
OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
THE BLINDNESS TO KIBBUTZ STRATIFICATION

... modernismprivileges understandingat the expense of seeing. In effect,

explanations and interpretativeschemes inculcate blindness to concrete
existence (Linsteadet al. 1996:7,discussingthe chapterby Hugo Letichein
the same volume).

In order to explain the kibbutz phenomenon, researchershave followed the

paradigmused for studyingcommunalsocieties thatisolatedthemselves from the
outside world (Oved 1988; Pitzer 1997), but kibbutzim, as pioneers of Israeli
society, were heavily involved in "theoutsideworld"bothdirectlyandthroughthe
Movements and many other FOs. They belonged "to a Kibbutz Movement, the
Histadrutand the LaborMovement"(Rosner 1991:1),3and therefore"cannotbe
understoodoutside this context"(Rosolio 1993:10). For this reasonthe use of the
communalsocieties paradigmled to academicmyopiasince, unlike in the cases of
other communal societies, the encompassing FOs and Israeli society impacted
social organization within kibbutzim. Researchers found stratification to be
primarilyan outcome of amassingpower, and tangible and intangiblecapitalby
which privileges that furtheredpower and capitalwere obtained(Bourdieu 1977;
Collins 1975; Harris 1990:357-86; Lenski 1966; Michels 1959 [1911]; Weber
1946). Hence, when a Movement amassed power over its kibbutzim,its pe 'ilim
could enjoy advantagesrarelyfoundin local kibbutzoffices (except for a minority
of capitalist-like kibbutzim with mass hired labor and permanent,privileged
autocraticmanagers[Kressel 1974, 1983]). At their peak, in the mid-1980s, the
two main Movements, which representedalmost all the kibbutzim, comprised
dozens of subsidiaries, including a national party and a major stake in one of
Israel'stwo rulingparties,youthorganizationswith hundredsof branchesin Israel
and abroad,daily and weekly newspapers,quarterlyjournals,publishinghouses,
printing plants, research institutes, colleges, seminaries, museums, psychology
clinics, choirs, orchestras,theatergroups, a dance company, an art gallery, and
firms engaged in architectureand planning,building, finance, insurance,supply,
marketing,import,export, shipping,and economic consulting,among others.4In
accord with scale and power advantages, almost a thousand of some 2,400
Movementpe'ilim enjoyed company cars, while in each kibbutz, hundredsof
memberssharedonly a few cars (Adar 1975; Gilbo'a 1991;IlanaandAvner 1977;
Lifshitz 1990; Shapira1979; Yadlin 1989).1
In additionto the Movements, hundredsof otherFOs were administeredby
some two thousandadditionalpe 'ilim(Shapiran.d.a). If the privilege of company
cars signaled Movementpower, a higher percentageof pe 'ilimhaving cars must
signal a more powerful federative organization.A case in point is the eleven
commercial-industrialconglomerate organizations called regional enterprises,
with some 110 processingplantsand farmingservice facilities, employing 8,000-
10,000 hired workers (some 2,000 of them seasonal) and administeredby some
1,200pe 'ilim(Brum 1986;Niv andBar-On1992). Since 1970, the largest,Milu'ot,
 CAPITALORSCIENTIFIC
ACADEMIC PROGRESS? 361
has proven to be more powerful than the Movements themselves (Ginat 1979a,
1979b; Lifshitz 1983, 1986; Rosolio 1975). Accordingly, more than 90% of
Milu'otpe 'ilimhad companycars at theirdisposal,comparedwith only some 40%
of Movementpe 'ilim,andthe situationwas quitesimilarin otherpowerfulregional
enterprises(Arieli 1986; Shapira1978, 1987; Tzur 1980). Yet anotherinfluential
organization category is composed of dozens of national economic FOs with
thousandsof hired employees managedby a small numberof pe 'ilim, each one
with a car (Anonymous 1979, 1983; Arad 1995; Halevi 1990; Shteinberg 1974;
Tzimchi 1999; Tzur 1996). In contrast,in more than a hundredweaker regional
organizations, such as elementary and high schools, colleges, heavy transport
federations,and local governmentfirms, only few seniorpe 'ilimhad cars (Adar
1975; Gelb 2001:112; Niv and Bar-On 1992; Shepher 1980:165-70).
A federative organizationcar was a prime status symbol since kibbutz cars
were rare; mostly trucks, vans, and jeeps were used, and drivers changed
frequently,while a pa 'il consistently drove a specific car, which testified to his
status. Car sizes, models, and age were finely graded according to rank in a
federativeorganizationhierarchy,as well as being emblematicof each FO's power
andprestige(Adar1975; Shapira1979, 1987;Tzur 1980), analogousto Bourdieu's
(1977, 1984, 1996) findings for Frenchsociety. At the top were the Admors,with
the largest,chauffeuredcars, andat the bottomwere humblepe 'ilimof lesser FOs,
who used public transportor were transportedcollectively in vans. Lesserpe 'ilim
of powerful regional enterprises-storekeepers, technicians, office workers,
etc.-were rankeda little higher: Five would share a small, Israeli-made,Susita
fiberglass car with an 1100 cc engine (Shapira1978).
Length of job tenure served to stratifype 'ilim less clearly, as some top jobs
were short-term,for political or other reasons. If, however, one analyzed career
success and continuityinsteadof job tenure,the most successful, life-long careers
in top-leveljobs beneaththe level of the Admorswere powerfulFO heads,Knesset
members,and executives of the Histadrut,the JewishAgency,6the government,or
otherbureaucracieson behalf of FOs, who neverreturnedto the ranks(Arieli 1986;
Gelb 2001; Halevi 1990; Lifshitz 1983, 1986; Near 1997:161, 180-82, 257;
Rosenhak 1988; Shapira 1990, 1992, 2001; Shure 2001; Tzimchi 1999; Vilan
1993). Thenormof periodicjob rotation,termedrotatzia,meantthattenureof mid-
levelpe 'ilimwas usually shorter;they typicallycirculatedbetweenFO andkibbutz
offices, sometimes returningto minor jobs or even to the ranks (Fadida 1972;
Helman 1987; Leshem 1969; Shapira1978, 1987, 1992). Lesserpe 'ilim usually
served a single three-to five-yeartermandreturnedto minorkibbutzoffices or the
ranks;even this term,however, was longer thanthatof most kibbutzofficers, and
many of these pe 'ilim managed hired employees and had privileges and status
symbols unavailableto kibbutzofficers (Fadida 1972; Gelb 2001; Shapira1978,
1987; Topel 1979), except for the few managers of capitalist-like kibbutzim
mentionedabove. A clear sign ofpe 'ilim supremacywas the common failureby
kibbutzimto shortentheirjob tenure (Shapira1995a; Shepher 1980:168-72).
362 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
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ResearchersIgnored FOs, Pe 'ilim,and Other OutsideOfficeholders

The kibbutzis not as we imagine, an isolated community.We belong very

much to the outside, but since membersdon't want to sit and discuss our
relationswith the entities [on the outside] to which we belong, we are not
coping with the problem.In orderto explainit, we mustrecognizeit. Maybe
we do not want to do that ... (KibbutzKochav member).7

Accordingto Bourdieu's(1977) conceptualization,the hundredsof kibbutzimand

hundredsof FOs constitutea single social field. Yet kibbutzmembersexternalized
and ignored the impact of FOs for an obvious reason: Stratified,hierarchicFOs
were diametricallyopposedto the egalitariankibbutzethos. Almost all researchers
followed suit, avoidingthe studyof FOs, andthus, these facts were neglected.For
instance, Ben-Rafael and Yaar's (1992:83) list of roles which defined kibbutz
members'statusdid not includemembers'high-statusroles on the outside,as later
noticedby Ben-Rafaelhimself (1997:141). Likewise, Evens's (1995) ethnography
of Kibbutz Merhaviadid not mentionpe 'ilim or outside officeholders, although
KA Admor Yaari, pe'ilim Tilman (1990) and Tzur (1996), and other outside
officeholders such as tenured university professors Grol and Yasoor were
Merhaviamembers.Accordingly,most researchersignoredtheir status symbols:
cars, "dress" clothes,8 briefcases, home phones, travel abroad, etc. (with the
exception of Rosenfeld 1957; Kressel 1974; Shapira1979, 1987; Topel 1979; and
Shepher 1980).
Scholarsevadedthe studyof FOs, which resultedin missing the trueextentof
stratificationof the social field as a whole andalso causederroneousdepictionsof
local stratification.Ben-RafaelandYaarstatedthatthe upperstratumof a kibbutz
comprises 20% of its members(1992:30), but among the some 500 membersof
KibbutzMishmarHa'emek,nobodycame close to KA headHazan'sAdmorstatus
(Argaman 1997; Tzachor 1997). KM head Tabenkinand KA head Yaari exhibit
similarlyhigh statusin theirrespectivekibbutzim(Argaman1997), as had Pinhas
Lavon in KibbutzHulda(Kafkafi 1998), KadishLuz in Degania (Near 1997:182,
251-54), and many others whose local prominence disproved Ben-Rafael and
Yaar's thesis (1992). The Admors' superioritywas explained by their charisma
(Ben-Rafael 1997:45;Rosolio 1999:23),buttheiruse of undemocratic,"IronLaw"
power since the 1930s negates this explanationand calls to mind otherautocratic
commune leaders (Brumann2000): centralization,conservatism,censorship of
publications, repression of innovators, and privileging themselves and their
loyalistpe 'ilim (Aharoni2000; Beilin 1984; Cohen 2000; Kafkafi 1992; Keshet
1995; Kynan 1989; Shapira2001; Shure2001; Tzur1981). OtherFO headsdid the
same,butwhile hundredsof studentscarriedout thousandsof studiesof kibbutzim,
only fourhave studiedFOs (Avrahami1993; Hermesh 1975;Rosolio 1975, 1999;
Shapira 1978, 1987), and only one (myself) has alluded to the Iron Law of
Oligarchy.9This avoidancewas less significantbefore 1948, as manype 'ilimwere
ascetic andwere motivatedby Zionist ideals,butit becameuntenableas asceticism
diminished(Talmon 1972), stratificationseeped from FOs into the kibbutzim,and
 ACADEMIC
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PROGRESS? 363
the field became oligarchic owing in partto the norm of rotatzia.
Because they did not study FOs, researchersmissed the fact that periodic
rotatziaof officers, supposedlyaimedat preventingoligarchy,actuallyfailed in its
mission and enhanced oligarchization.As there were thousandsof jobs in FOs,
officers who were rotated from kibbutz offices mostly gained FO offices, only
sometimesreturningto local positions (Fadida1972; Helman 1987; Leshem 1969;
Shapira 1992; Topel 1979). Since rotatzia was formally incorporatedinto FOs,
most pe 'ilimhad to circulatefrom one short-termoffice to anotherand therefore
needed a new job every few years, while FO heads and executives controlledjobs
or obtainedthem for clients throughold-boy networksof seniorpe 'ilim.In accord
with Hirschman's(1970) conceptualization,FO heads placed loyalists in deputy
jobs; thus,being the client of a federativeorganizationheadwas the best guarantee
for retaining managerial status (Shapira 1987, 1995a). Clients' dependency
enhancedFO heads' powerandoligarchicrule,andhelpedexplainthe half-century
hegemony of Admors despite their dysfunctionalleadershipsince the 1940s, in
accordwith studies by Hirschman(1970, 1982), Hambrickand Fukutomi(1991),
and Brumann(2000)-a trulyMichelsiannightmare(Shapira2001, n.d.a, n.d.b).
Because they ignored FOs, scholarsmissed the fact that thepe 'ilim violated
the principleof egalitarianism,andthe factthatthis violationencouragedcareerists
and other outside officeholders to do the same. Since these privileges negated
egalitarianism,they were not mentioned in print until the mid-1970s and only
rarely afterward,but their existence was later acknowledged in interviews with
kibbutz veterans. For instance, in 1990, David Kahana, a veteran member of
KibbutzBeit Alfa, statedthatin 1930 he hadbeen apa 'ilof theAgriculturalCenter,
a Histadrutsubsidiary,andwas able to put aside money for a privateradiofromthe
weekly expense allowance given for five-day accommodationsin Tel Aviv, while
the other hundredor so kibbutz memberswere served by a radio located in the
dining hall. Biographies of outside careerists, professionals, authors, editors,
artists, and senior army officers, among others, made it clear that having jobs
outside the kibbutzelevated their status (Aharoni2000; Cohen 2000; Dagan and
Yakir 1995; Gelb 2001; Rosenhak 1988; Tzimchi 1999; Vilan 1993),10but unlike
my ethnographiesthey never disclosed the fact that careers were boosted by
ignoringrotatziaandviolated the principlesof egalitarianism,as didpe 'ilim(also
see Kressel 1974; Shepher1980). Moreover,when KibbutzRama(fictitiousname
of a veterankibbutzwith 400 adultsand 250 youngsters)decided in the late 1970s
thatpe 'ilimhad to sharetheircarswith othermemberson weekends, somepe 'ilim
ignored the decision, as did outside careeristswho had company cars. Likewise,
threesuch careeristsforwhom Ramahadboughtcarswhich were essentialfor their
jobs justified ignoring the decision by alluding to the violation by the pe 'ilim.
Later,some kibbutzofficers with carsdid the same;thus,most cars in Ramaended
up symbolizingthe drivers'high status,all as a consequenceof a few pe 'ilimwho
violated an egalitariandecision.
The impactof FOs andpe 'ilimon kibbutzstratificationwas profound.I have
providedhere a few conspicuousexamples of the many thatexist (Shapiran.d.a).
Now let us see how kibbutzresearchmissed the existence of stratification.
364 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH
CREATING AND MAINTAINING THE BLINDNESS

An Economist-Sociologistand AnthropologistsProvided the Foundation

The economist-sociologistLandshut(1944) conductedresearchon kibbutzim
in 1939-1940. His study,which was, in the main,valid and illuminating,included
analysis of the Movements' ideological impact on kibbutzim,but it missed the
impact on social stratificationand ignored the dominanceof Admors and senior
pe 'ilim,designatinglocal main officers as the supremekibbutzstratum(1944:88).
The work of three American anthropologistswho researchedkibbutzimin
1949-1951 can be criticizedas realist,naive, ahistoricethnography(see Comaroff
andComaroff1992; Hammersley1992;Van Maanen1995). They, too, missed the
impactofpe 'ilimandFOs, butthe differencesamongthemarequiterevealing:two
are men with prospects for academic careersat Ivy League universities, and the
thirdis a womanwith lesserprospects,fromthe JewishBoardof Guardiansin New
York.Only the latter,Eva Rosenfeld(1951, 1957), saw some of this impactandthe
existence of real stratification,by discerningthata few seniorpe 'ilimwere looked
up to as the main kibbutz figures, and she correctly designatedthem as the top
stratum,although she missed recognizing their status symbols, privileges, and
power. "Thesociologist's misfortuneis that ... the people who have the technical
means of appropriatingwhat he says, have no wish to appropriateit ... whereas
those who would have an interestin appropriatingit do not have the instrumentsfor
appropriation"said Bourdieu (1993:23). The two Ivy League faculty members
could have made use of her findingsand exposed the existence of stratificationby
asking questions about prominentmembers such as which Movementjobs they
held, what advantagesthey received, how long andhow exactly did it impacttheir
local superiority,etc., but they missed herperceptions.Spiro's Harvard-published
ethnography(1955) noted the existence of 12-15 memberswho kept rotatingthe
main kibbutz offices among themselves (p. 25), but though he mentioned the
Movementmanytimes (calling it "TheFederation"),he did not explain thatthese
members kept their status even when out of these particularleadershipjobs by
circulatingto other Movementjobs or other career-enhancingpositions (Fadida
1972; Helman 1987; Shapira1995a). He also missed the fact that those who did
rotateamong variouspositions were juniors vis-a-vis two veteran,seniorpe 'ilim
who retainedtheirpositionsthroughout:one was the Movement'smaineconomist,
and the other headed Tnuva's main division, with over a thousandemployees."
Schwartz(1955:427) recognized "10-15" ex-kibbutz officers who held outside
"decision-makingpositions"(i.e.,pe 'ilim),buthe saw none of theiraccruedstatus,
power, and privileges.
By not probingthe impactof the FOs on kibbutzim,the fourresearchpioneers
missed how different outside careers led to differential stratification within
kibbutzim.For instance, the very successful kibbutzI have called Kochav (with
almosta thousandinhabitants)was moreclearly stratifiedthanSpiro's (1955) Beit
Alfa, since Kochav's two seniormostpe 'ilim held higher FO offices than Beit
Alfa's: one was the veteran head of a very large FO, and the other edited the
Movement's daily newspaper,then spent decades in the Knesset and became a
 PROGRESS?
CAPITALORSCIENTIFIC
ACADEMIC 365
governmentminister.In contrast,in KibbutzRama, superiorityof veteransenior
pe 'ilim declined early as they lost high-level FO jobs, and as new power elites
became dominant,one composedof economicpe 'ilimand ex-pe 'ilim,andanother
of successful outside careerists(Shapira2001).

SurveysMissed Social Action But WereLegitimizedAcademically

In the mid-1950s, Hebrew University sociologists entered the scene and
dominatedkibbutzstudiesfor decades,headedby the renownedfunctionalistS. N.
Eisenstadt(Ram 1995). Theirsurveys enhancedthe blindness,being "disengaged
from any concrete situation, .. . record[ing]responses induced by the abstract
stimuli of the survey situationas if they were authenticproductsof the habitus"
(Bourdieu 1990:294). Survey biases remainunknown until they are exposed by
nonreactivemeasuresusing datacollection methodsthatrequireno reactionfrom
the individualsbeing studied (Yankelovich 1991). This requiresextra fieldwork,
but seniorscholarsaredetachedfromthe fieldworkcarriedout by theirjuniors;are
busy with analyses, writing, and publication,which lead to fame and academic
capital;andthereforeusually ignorethis requirement(Platt 1976). Alas, becauseof
this division of laborthe seniorslack "theprofoundintuitionsgainedfrompersonal
familiarity"(Bourdieu 1988:3), do not meet "individuals... who . .. have been
waitingthere... notjust to answerquestionsbutto instruct[them]as to which ones
to ask"(Geertz1995:61;also see Williams2000). Bourdieu,for instance,didmuch
of his fieldwork himself (Collins 1989; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:29), but
kibbutz sociologists rarely do that, following the dominant Anglo-American
sociologists who sent junior sociologists to the field (Platt 1976), as I personally
experiencedas apa 'il of the KibbutzResearchInstitute.They used "technological
wizardry"(Bourdieuand Wacquant1992:33)-complex statisticalanalyses that
gave their findings an appearanceof objectivity, althoughthese were often "tape
spinning"that explained nothing (Whyte 1992:9; also Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992:31). Surveys enhanced the dominance of theoreticists over empiricists
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992): Senior theoreticistschose a communal society
paradigm,andjuniorempiricistsfollowed suit;theirsurveyquestionsandanalyses
ignoredFOs andpe 'ilim, and the copious evidence of stratificationwas missed.

ReviewersMissed CardinalErrors, Sanctionedthe WronglyUsed Paradigm

Earlykibbutzstudiesgainedacademicrecognition:workswere sanctionedby
the scientific community and published by prestigiousjournals and publishing
houses. One might ask:Why didreviewersnot call into questionthe designationof
local officers as constitutingthe top stratum,especially after Rosenfeld (1951)
pointed out the superiority of members who belonged to kibbutz movement
leadership,and Landshut(1944) and Spiro (1955) both showed the power of the
Movementsover kibbutzim?Why did reviewersapproveanalysesof such a highly
organizednationalsocial movementwith so many large,hierarchicand oligarchic
FOs, with no reference to large organization classics and theories of social
movements, political parties,and power elites?
Thougha full answerto this questionmustawaitfurtherstudy,its contoursare
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quite clear: Reviewers approved inadequate ethnographies and surveys that
excluded FOs because of their remoteness from the field and the dominanceof
Anglo-Americanfunctionalistsociology. Lacking"theprofoundintuitionsgained
from personal familiarity"(Bourdieu 1988:3; also see Shokeid 2001), reviewers
eitherdid not suspectthatinvolvementof the kibbutzin the largersociety impacted
stratification,or they missed the differencebetween the social field of the kibbutz
and othercommunalsocieties and did not reconsidertheirparadigm.As students
who ignoredFOs gainedepistemicauthority(Gieryn 1999), this paradigmbecame
more entrenched,all the more so since no one studiedFOs untilthe 1970s andthen
only four social scientists did such research.
Since the 1960s, however, some researchersand reviewers have themselves
been kibbutzmemberswho were intimatelyfamiliarwith the field. Why were they
also blind? One answer is the above-mentioned dominance of functional
sociologists, whose communitarian epistemic culture (Knorr-Cetina 1999)
enhancedconformity,and who nurturedor sponsoredalmost all kibbutz-member
students up to the 1970s, when critics appearedat Tel Aviv University. Their
criticism,however,hadlittleeffect on functionalists'dominance,since few studied
FOs or managedto publish findings in respected,English-languageoutlets. The
few who did publisheithermissed FOs (e.g., Evens 1995), or theirfull impact(e.g.,
Shepher 1980). Shepher (1980) was close to exposing the connection when he
consideredthe problemscaused by outside office-holding and its negative impact
on egalitarianismanddemocracy.However,as discussedbelow, it is very difficult
to introducea new paradigmin ethnography(Hammersley1992), and without it,
he largely missed FOs' impacton stratification.
A second answer is the closely knit networksof the small countryin which
kibbutzresearchersand memberswere enmeshed.Kibbutzmembersexternalized
FOs and ignoredtheirimpact,as notedabove; the egalitarianimage helpedjustify
theirown choice of kibbutzlife. By following suit, an academicenmeshedin their
networkexpressedhis/her sympathyfor them and theircause. This explanationis
supportedby the fact that the few studies of FOs were made solely by kibbutz
members;they did not have to prove such sympathy,and hence could study FOs
relativelyfreely,unlikeoutsiders,whose interestin stratifiedFOs was suspiciously
perceived as aimed at ruiningkibbutzim'segalitarianimage.
A third answer is that even erroneousparadigmsserve scientists' needs. A
paradigm provides a discipline with an organization that is basically social,
unifying members arounda common enterpriseof dominatinga field of study
(Collins 1975:493-96). Bourdieu pointed out that "intellectualshave a much
greaterthan average capacity to transformtheir spontaneoussociology, that is,
their self-interestedvision of the social world, into the appearanceof a scientific
sociology" (quotedin Wacquant1989:4).Kibbutzmemberresearchershada self-
interestedvision of the kibbutzas egalitarian,andtheirfirstcohortwas nurturedby
dominantfunctionalistswho held this vision. Throughthe capacitymentionedby
Bourdieu, they used the wrong paradigm,turnedtheir spontaneousegalitarian
view of the kibbutzsocial field into an appearanceof scientific sociology, and the
dominantscientific coalition rewardedthem by having their writings published
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and promoting them to respected professorships. As reviewers, they then
suppressed critical scholars from Tel Aviv. A good example is the vehement
rejection of Kressel's excellent ethnography(1974, 1983) by kibbutz-member
sociologists of the dominantcoalition (Ben-David 1975; Shepher1975); hence, it
was not publishedin English and was mostly neglected.

KibbutzPrestige, Academic Capital Seeking, and FO Heads' Power

Academicians and intellectuals, like other social agents, seek cultural and
social capital inter alia by attachingthemselves to prestigious sectors of society
(Bourdieu 1988; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:108-9). This was also true of
kibbutzresearchersand helps explain the lack of considerationof impactsof FOs
on kibbutzim:federativeorganizationswere oligarchic;theirinclusionwould have
largelyruinedthe kibbutzimage of egalitariansociety, whereasexclusionkeptthis
image intact.The structuringofpe 'ilut(being apa 'il) as an egalitarianrole helped
maintainthe wrongimage:no differencesin salaries,androtatziaof mostpe 'ilim,12
which supposedly prevented oligarchy. Federative organization heads with
lengthy tenures were relatively few and easily overlooked by scholars, and
omission of FOs from researchmasked their dominance and the way in which
circulationofmostpe 'ilimamongvariouspositions enhancedstratificationinstead
of curbingit.
A complementary explanation for excluding the study and evading the
impact of FOs was the power of local leaders,who could baraccess to kibbutzim.
Indeed,with accumulationof power andoligarchization,controlof access became
stricter(Kressel2000:31). I learnedof this both frommy own experienceandfrom
that of fellow graduate students who wanted to study FOs but could not gain
access. This is supportedby the fact that, until the 1990s, only the regional
enterpriseshad been studied;they arethe FOs closest to kibbutzimand arevisited
daily by a host of membersfor a varietyof purposes,so thatbarringentranceonly
to kibbutz-memberresearcherswas not easy, and either was not attemptedor
failed, as in my case.
Seniorsocial scientistshave greatsymbolic powerandmanyresourcesat their
disposal. But the fact that the subject of the first large-scale sociological study
(Talmon 1972) was the Ihud Movement, which lacks a powerful leadershiplike
thatof Admors(Near 1997), supportsthe explanationthatresearchcan be stymied
by powerful leaders. Senior researcherssurely knew of or could feel FO leaders'
interest in excluding themselves from study and the leverage of their power in
terms of control of funds for researchand publications;controlover lecturingin
kibbutzim,theircolleges, seminars,andculturalclubs;andcontrolover publishing
outlets (Aharoni2000; Keshet 1995; Shure2001; Tzachor 1997). In orderto see
that the study of FOs was essential and worth entering into conflict with such
powerful leaders, it was necessary to connect FOs etiologically to kibbutz
processes. But members masked this connection, aimed at maintaining an
egalitarianimage, andtheirradicalyoung leadersignoredFO heads' hegemonyfor
otherreasons.Ethnographersmighthave exposed this hegemony,andsome indeed
partiallydid (e.g., Fadida 1972; Kressel 1974; Shepher 1980; Topel 1979), but in
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the absence of a new paradigmthat includedFOs as partof the social field, their
evasion did not cease.

WithoutSociological Theory,HistoriansFailed to Recognize Oligarchic Change

The historian'stask is to study societal changes and their causes. Emmanuel
Marx (1985:141) pointed out "an irony in that the historianis used to following
processes, although the data flow to him is usually not abundant,while the
anthropologist,who has rich data about changes, does not always bother to
describe them." Furthermore,"The separation of sociology and history is a
disastrous division, and one totally devoid of epistemological justification"
(Bourdieuand Wacquant1992:90). Sociologists and anthropologistswho studied
kibbutzimlackeda historicalperspectiveof FOs' oligarchization,while historians
could have discernedthis change had they used sociological theoriesto integrate
their observations. Near (1997:329) discerned the Admors' lack of political
success datingfrom 1936, and Kafkafi (1992:125) found thatKM head Tabenkin
had initiated"cadreseminars"to enhancehis power as earlyas 1937. However,in
orderto expose oligarchicrulethey would have hadto combinethese findingswith
the Admors' other failures and power perpetuationefforts, the centralizationof
Movement control, censorship of publications,granting of privileges to assure
conformity of pe 'ilim, conservatism,promotionof loyalists and suppressionof
innovators,as well as myopic leftism, such as admirationof Stalin's dictatorship,
which legitimized autocracy. Alas, without sociological theories applied to
leaders' dysfunction and the oligarchic shift to consolidate personal gains,
historiansfailed to recognize that this leftism was aimed at self-perpetuationof
power. Ratherit was viewed as a political error(Near 1997:70), althoughit would
have been inconceivable for very experienced leaders to commit such an error
(Shapiran.d.b).

THE LONG ROAD TO EXPOSING THE BLINDNESS

Ethnographyhas a hardtime when a new theory is required(Hammersley1992).

Ethnographers'mainproblemis "Findingourfeet ...; tryingto formulatethe basis
on which one imagines ... one has found them in what anthropologicalwriting
consists of as a scientific endeavor"(Geertz 1973:13).In orderto find the basis for
a properinterpretationof cultures,ethnographersmustchoose the most significant
facts and activities from among the huge variety they observe. The difficulty in
choosing results from the fact that every culture "is a multiplicity of complex
conceptual structures,many of them superimposedupon or knotted into one
another,which areat once strange,irregular,andinexplicit,and [theethnographer]
must contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render them" (1973:10). A
"cultureconsists of socially establishedstructuresof meaning in terms of which
people do" things (1973:12); these structuresare createdby behaviorsinfluenced
by a variety of factors and the "superimposedupon or knotted"collection of
complex conceptual structures. Only with a firm basis for their separation,
identification,and grasping of their intertwiningcan one understandhow these
 ACADEMIC
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meaning structureswere created, influenced actors' views and actions, and how
actions strengthenedor subvertedthese structures.
Finding one's feet in the kibbutz social field was difficult because its two
cultural types, kibbutzim and FOs, have contradictorymeaning structuresand
norms that subvert one another. According to Bourdieu (1990:86), "symbolic
systems owe their practicalcoherence-that is, on the one hand, their unity and
their regularities,and on the other, their 'fuzziness' and their irregularitiesand
even incoherences. . -to the fact that they are the productof practicesthat can
fulfill theirpracticalfunctionsonly in so far as they implement... principlesthat
are not only... coherentand compatiblewith the objective conditions-but also
practical, .. . easy to master and use." Federativelyorganized, egalitarian,and
democraticcommunes were a practical solution for the harsh conditions of the
Jewish nation'srebuildingeffort.Norms thatwould ensuredemocraticsuccession
of FO heads, however, were not practiced, as in other Zionist organs. An
egalitarianimage was maintainedbype 'ilimbeing unpaidor paid equally,and by
rotatzia. Exclusion of FOs from the kibbutz discourse masked their oligarchic
stratification.Withoutpenetratingthis mask, one could not "findone's feet"in the
mix of contradictoryethos types and cultures.
Tel Aviv University students served as critics of Hebrew University's
dominant coalition. The epistemic cultures of the critics were individualistic,
whereas those of the dominant coalition were communitarian(Knorr-Cetina
1999). Communitariancultures enhance conformity, while individualisticones
promote critical thinking.The success of a new paradigm,however, requiresan
epistemologicalrobustnesshardlyachievableby a lone researcher(Bourdieuand
Wacquant1992:187-97). The works of the criticswere crucialfor the exposureof
the blindness,but while some studiedonly FOs (e.g., Rosolio 1975; Shapira1978,
1987; Beilin 1984; Kanari1989; Kynan 1989; Kafkafi 1992; Keshet 1995), others
studied only kibbutzim(e.g., Fadida 1972; Kressel 1974; Topel 1979; Shepher
1980). Marx(1985:147) has written:"Thehardestpartof [ethnographic]research
is discerningthe context of phenomena."Both groupsmissed this partor did not
integrate contexts with texts and their syntax (Hazan 1995), and as explained
above, otheracademicsand kibbutzmembersdid not alertthem to this oversight.
Upon reflection,I concludethatI overcamethis oversightby raisingquestions
not previouslyexploredandby being motivatedto persevereover the long process
involved in overcomingthe existing paradigm.My aim was to solve problemsin
my own kibbutz,ratherthanto obtainan academiccareer.I held public offices in
my kibbutz and managerialjobs in its factory, and I perceived grave problems
associated with a lack of egalitarianismand democracy. Sociological education
seemed the best path for coping with them, so I finished a BA at Tel Aviv
University,but additionalexecutive experienceprovedthatfurthereducationwas
required. I performed ethnographicresearch for my MA thesis at a regional
enterprisesFO and one of its plants.As a fellow of the KibbutzResearchInstitute,
I foundits surveysto be of no help, in contrastto the above-mentionedethnography
and other studies I had done at kibbutzplants on behalf of the KibbutzIndustry
Association(Shapira1980). However,the Instituterejectedmy studyofFOs as not
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being partof its mission, so I left to investigatethe regionalenterpriseson my own
accordto pursuea Ph.D.
Even though my investigationexposed many secrets of mismanagement,I
missed the main context: older, larger,oligarchic nationaleconomic FOs which
shapedtheircapitalistculture.I erredin blamingthe managersfor this cultureand
triedto alertkibbutzimto the high pricethey were paying for it, but this was futile:
Admorshad reconciledthemselves to this cultureand the Movementsused many
of its norms,while the dependencyof kibbutzofficers on the regionalenterprises'
heads for futurejobs deterredthem fromjoining my critique(althoughin private
they mostly agreedwith me). These heads, for theirpart,saw to it thatmy findings
received minimalpublicity.Withoutpublicity,I hadno feedbackto alertme to the
above-mentionedcontext, and I missed anothercrucial point: namely, that the
normof rotatziaactuallyenhancedFO heads' power andthe oligarchicprocessby
enhancingpatronageof the rotatingofficeholders.

Essential ManagerialHabitus Lengthenedthe Road to Exposure

My managerialhabitusled me to searchfor effectiveness andefficiency in the
regional enterprises,but instead I foundpe 'ilimwho were mostly ignoringthese
aims, seeking image-creationand careeradvancement.This has been common in
states and armiesthat use rotatzia and "parachuting"-appointmentof outsiders
who lack essential local knowledge. It was explicable given their short terms,
vulnerable status, and limited power in contrastto entrenchedinsiders (Chow
1966; Gabrieland Savage 1981; Ho 1962; Shapira1987; Vald 1987).
My analysispointedto a plausiblealternativethatwould have made officers'
status less vulnerable without encouraging oligarchy, but this did not interest
kibbutzmovement leaders,who were conservativeloyalists of the old guardand
lacking in criticalthinking,in accordwith Hirschman(1970; see Avrahami1993);
nor did it interest academics who did not like the applied notion of seeking
solutions. Onejournalreviewer criticizedone of my articles,claiming that it was
illegitimate to both analyze a problemand suggest a solution. Otherreasons for
rejections seemed to be sociologists' and behaviorists'neglect of organizational
anthropology(Bate 1997) and the dominance of functionalist sociology (Ram
1995). However, a few anthropologistmentors and kibbutz-membercolleagues
strengthenedmy belief in my findings and urgedme to continue.
I decided to study rotatzia inside a kibbutzin an effort to pinpointits effects
withoutthe confoundingeffect of "parachuting." This studyrequiredonly modest
fundsandan abundanceof time, which I obtainedby minimizingeffortsto publish
(although this questionable move prevented academic advancement and thus
limited the time available for research).For a year and a half I studied Kibbutz
Kochav,visiting two days a week, interviewed123 membersandex-members,and
studiedits archivalrecords.I was able to documentthe fact thatuse of the rotatzia
was problematic, that it enhanced patrons' power; promoted conservative,
ineffective loyalists; and demoted, sidetracked,or caused the exit of effective,
creative radicalswhose innovations,such as the sharingof cars and plant shift-
work, enhancedboth egalitarianismand economic success (Shapira1990). Later
 PROGRESS?
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ethnographiessubstantiatedthis finding:the early adoptionof the rotatziaby two
younger kibbutzimmade them ultra-conservativeand less efficient and effective
thanKochav,which adoptedthe normmuchlaterin its development.Theirpatrons
obstructeddemocracyby means unknownin Kochav, causing a mass exodus and
a brain-drainthat enhancedpatrons'rule but crippledthe kibbutzim.
This self-serving rule alertedme to powerholders'morality.A fourthcase of
a veteran,conservative,mediocre kibbutzfurtherproved that powerholderswith
low moralityruinedtrust,democracy,effectiveness, andprogress,as in Banfield's
(1958) "backward"Italianvillage, andthis pointedto the moralityside of the Iron
Law of Oligarchy,power self-perpetuationbeing a self-serving behavior.Then I
discerned that Kochav patrons were highly moral as local leaders, advanced
kibbutz interests ratherthan their own, and even as veteran FO oligarchs, they
never used undemocraticmeans to thwartyoung radicals'solutions for promoting
egalitarianism,in contrastto the patronsI had documentedin othercases. This was
explicableby the fact thatKochav's patronshad attainedtheirhigh rankowing to
radicalism,ratherthanby conservativeloyalty to FO heads, the means by which
otherpatronsadvanced.Then I realizedhow fatal the omission of FO studieswas
for understandingkibbutzim, and discerned scholars' blindness to stratification
(Shapira2001).

TheLong Road's Lessons: Habitus and Motivationas CriticalFactors

The long roadto exposureemphasizesthe importanceof continuousfieldwork
by the social scientist (Collins 1989:461; Shokeid2001), and the criticalfactorof
propermotivationfor overcomingthe frustrationsof a long, lonelyjourneytoward
"finding one's feet" and properly interpretingthe complex mix of a system's
cultures.Mistakes arising from working alone and the biases of one's habitusare
inevitable; thus, unprejudicedrecording of social facts, analysis of subtleties,
adherenceto primarymaterial,anddigging for actors'deepermotives areessential
(Kressel 1996). This methodologymay not unravelthe complexity of conflicting
cultures,though it helps to preventmistakes. One must find the "gravity"of the
field (Bourdieuand Wacquant1992:17), but in my case therewere two opposing
"gravities":the socialist one of the kibbutz'sideas, ethos, and communalculture,
andthe capitalistone of Israelisociety, economic FOs, andmanykibbutzfactories
(Cohen 1978; Kressel 1974). The latter explains, for instance, why, from their
beginningsin the early 1940s, kibbutzplantsused hiredlabordespitethe Admors'
objections.The contextof a particularsocial field may reversea factor'simpact:A
managercoming fromthe outside in a typical organizationtendsto innovatemore
than a loyalist who was promoted from the inside, but not in a context where
rotatzia and "parachutings"reign. In such a field, new managerstend towards
conservatismas, like paratroopersin alien lands,they are aiming at survivalin the
face of meagerknowledge and otherintangiblecapital,and receive little trustand
help fromknowledgeable,but entrenched,insiders(Chow 1966;Ho 1962; Shapira
1987, 1995b).
Furtherproblemsof interpretationstem fromthe fact thatthe boundariesof a
field are "always at stake in the field itself' (Bourdieuand Wacquant1992:100),
372 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
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and its discourse excludes elements unfavorable to leaders. Exposure of this
exclusion is not simple, as it requiresidentifyingthe contexts of a field's cultures
andtheirincoherences(Bourdieu1990:86).One mustanalyzethe existentialneeds
each of the field's culturesmet (Vaughan1996:64);theirproblems,technological
alternatives,and plausible alternativesolutions (Perrow 1970; Hawthorn1991);
the concepts and meaning structuresthat supportor subverta chosen alternative;
andthe power structuresandactors'intereststhatexplainthe choice. How thehigh
moralityof Kochav's patronsexplainsits creativitywas discernedonly againstthe
backgroundof low-morality,conservative,capitalistimitatorsin the three other
kibbutzim.My fourethnographicstudieswere groundbreakingafterso manyprior
works aimed at "understandingat the expense of seeing" (Linsteadet al. 1996:7).
Bourdieu(1990:16) wrote:

scientificpracticenevertakestheformof aninevitablesequenceof miraculous

intellectualacts .... It is not easy . .. to describethe long effort appliedto
oneself, which little by little leads to the conversionof one whole view of
actionandthe social worldthatis presupposedby 'observation'of factsthat
are totally new, because they were totally invisible to the previousview.

A different habitus might have enabled a shorter route to exposure, but

additionalsupportfor the hypothesis that even this route would have been very
long stems fromWhyte's (1992) claim thatmotivationfor social actionis essential
for generating good social theory. Such a motivation is often born in a non-
academicsetting, involving the searchfor a deeperunderstandingof problemsin
order to find radicallybetter solutions, ratherthan academic capital that can be
gainedby othermeans(Bourdieu1988). As a latecomer,I hadto invest muchwork
to catch up and to overcome predecessors' mistakes by integratingmy findings
with those of criticallymindedstudentsof all disciplines.Furthermore,this habitus
did not prevent costly mistakes, but ratherprovided a differentperspective and
motivation to continue, despite failures and little support from academic
institutions.
Nobel laureateHerbertSimon (1992) supportsthis assertion from another
angle: The great complexity of modem organizationsrequireslengthy research,
like zoologists who have studiedthe complexityof animalsfor centuries.Lengthy
investment is also needed because of the reflexivity and epistemological
robustnessrequired:Science is a collective enterprise;criticismof one's work by
colleagues is essential for making the researcherreflexive to the social and
intellectual unconscious embedded in one's analytical tools (Bourdieu and
Wacquant1992), yet critiquemay inducedefensiveness.Anthropologyis capable
of overcomingthese impediments,providedone is motivatedto completethe many
ethnographiesof various organizational"species"of a complex field, as well as
extensive learningof findingsby all social sciences andthe humanities,in orderto
find a new theory which overcomes gross mistakes embedded in an older one,
leading to a social action theory hithertodeemed implausible(Whyte 1992).
 CAPITALORSCIENTIFIC
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CONCLUSIONS

"Nothingis more practicalin science than a good theory,"statedthe psychologist

Kurt Lewin. A good theory of stratificationwould be especially relevant for
explainingthe kibbutz,the productof a social movementthat seeks both equality
and growth,which tends to inequality.In every known society, careersare chosen
in orderto gain prestige and status (Goldschmidt 1990), but kibbutzresearchers
missed elite members' careers by avoiding study of FOs and other outside
hierarchies,throughwhich their careerswere advanced.Evasion maintainedthe
communalsociety paradigmat the expenseof a social movementparadigm,andthe
neglect of theories of large organizations and elites. Also missed were the
surrenderof kibbutz egalitarianismto FO stratification;rotatzia's turning into
circulation and enhancing oligarchy; the corrosion of trust and democracy by
power and by tangible and intangible capital accumulated in outside jobs;
continuity of leaders owing to the Iron Law engendering capitalist norms,
conservatism, and autocracy (Brumann 2000); leftist reverence of Stalin's
dictatorship enhancing autocracy; rotatzia discouraging promotion and
encouragingdemotion of radicals via negative selection (Hirschman1970), and
"parachutings" that inhibitedthe creativeinnovationso vital for democraticwork
organizations (Stryjan 1989). Without a paradigm suited to this complex
organizationalfield, each studyfounda differenttype of stratificationexplainedby
a differentetiology, and none trieda comprehensivecomparisonof all findings in
their search for an overall explanation.
The significanceof this cannotbe exaggerated.Stratificationwas soughtin the
flat organizationalstructuresof kibbutzim with short-termoffice tenure, while
ignoringthe oligarchicFOs andotherbureaucracieswhich stratifiedkibbutzelites.
The dynamics of the kibbutz social field and its various cultures were wrongly
explained, its strata and their interests misconstrued, as were patronage and
cliques, the brain-drainand the decline in trust, egalitarianism,and democracy.
Researchersdid not connect the lowering of leaders' moralitywith extendedjob
tenure owing to the Iron Law of Oligarchy, ineffectiveness, loss of faith in the
kibbutzethos, and introductionof capitalistelements. The sociologists' task is to
penetrateformaldefinitions and probe what is hiddenbehind frontspresentedby
social entities (Berger 1966: chap. 2), but kibbutz sociologists evaded this task.
Instead of problematizingthe conflicting cultures of FOs and kibbutzim, and
asking how pe'ilim worked within these two separatecultures simultaneously,
scholarsevadedthese problemdomainsby adheringto the formalstatusof FOs as
externalto kibbutzim.Withoutpenetratingthis formality,researchwent astray,the
debt crisis was not anticipated,nor was the adoptionof capitalistnormsit caused.
I did not anticipateits scope and exact timing, but I conclude I have correctly
identifiedthe process and its rate.
The predictivecapacity of this theoryhas resultedfrom the study of my own
society, by methods that have proved capable of penetratingthe problems that
intriguedme owing to my executive habitus,enablingme to combine"information
gatheredby... scientific inquirywith the profoundintuitionsgainedfrompersonal
374 JOURNAL
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familiarity"(Bourdieu1988:3). I studieda heretoforeignoredpartof the field, and
thus cultural differences between FOs and kibbutzimbroughtnew insights (in
accord with Hazan 1995). These insights caused my marginalizationand fewer
researchopportunities,yet they encouragedfurtherfieldwork (at the expense of
publishing), out of my interest in an action theory. Continued fieldwork
triangulatedcritical questions, made possible an integrative view of the field,
exposed its contradictinggravities,andenabledinterpretationof its cultures.Thus,
a new paradigmemerged and exposed blindnessto stratification.
This ability to uncoveris thus explainedby aiming at the bettermentof one's
own society, ratherthanaiming for academiccapitalwhich can be gainedby other
means (Bourdieu 1988), and by analyses that expose various effects, without an
integrativetheoryof a field and its embeddednessin societal contexts(Marx 1985;
Wallerstein2004). The eminentscholarWhyte (1992) is right:creationof such a
theory requiresresearchstriving for the type of explanationsthatpromoteaction
(e.g., Hammersley 1992). It means integrationof the many factors playing in a
complex field, andaccountingfor coherences,incoherences,andnegationswithin
and among its cultures' various practices.Exposing the dynamics of its cultures
requires more than interpretationof a set of structuresof meaning, which are
"controlmechanisms... for the governingof behavior"(Geertz 1973:44);each of
its cultureshas anotherset of structures,owing to differentpracticalneeds and
different collections of solutions engendered by different histories and
contingencies, but the control mechanism used by leaders, whether trust or
coercion,is indeedthe decisive factor(DePree 1990; Dore 1973; Fox 1974; Guest
1962; Shapira1987). Trustis expectedof leadersin democracies,buteconomies of
scale engenderbureaucracy,where coercion is mostly camouflaged:managers'
self-serving decisions are masked as serving public aims and explained by
objective requirements (Dalton 1959), while unwanted, yet more plausible
solutionsareconcealedor rejectedas unrealistic(Hawthorn1991). Bringingthese
solutions to light, with their advantagesfor the public comparedto managers'
choices, exposes the reason for coercion:distrustof andresistanceto self-serving
managers'solutions.
Managers who seek personal interests tend to hierarchy and coercion, to
conservatism or imitation, while seekers of effectiveness, efficiency, and
advancementof public aims by new solutionstend to lead by trust,egalitarianism,
sincerity, and openness toward subordinates (DePree 1990; Graham 1991;
O'Toole 1999; Shapira 1987, 1995b; Sieff 1988). In a complex organizational
field, one muststudysocial actionby the mainactorsin depth-heads, officers, and
experts, whose power creates obstacles to research (Dalton 1964), but such
research is essential since they make critical decisions, create, imitate or bar
solutions,dominatediscourses,andshapea field's cultures.Theirrealaims,hopes,
and fears are crucial (Maccoby 1976), and exposing them requiresviewing the
world throughtheir eyes. As the sages of old said: "Do not judge othersuntil you
are in theirposition."Ethnographerscannottake the place of leaders,but they can
come close, and may penetratetheir secrets if enough culturesin a complex field
are studied. Since professionalismleads to restrictedvision and a rigid paradigm
 ACADEMIC
CAPITALORSCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS? 375
(Kuhn 1962:64), one must extensively consult otherdisciplines in both the social
sciences and the humanities(Wallerstein2004), aiming at epistemic reflexivity
and robustness (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Even then he may not gain a
predictivecapacity,but only a properclinical inference(Geertz 1973:26), but this
will preventmasterblindness to reality as that of kibbutzresearch.
Bate (1997) is right: the cultural "polyphony"of organizations must be
unraveled,but it is the powerholderswho orchestratethe "polyphonies"thatmust
be understood.Without penetratingtheir secrets one cannot fully understanda
"polyphony,"while theirpower andcapitalaremajorobstaclesfor penetrationand
requirea much greatereffort thanusual ethnography.As shown here, explaining
the variety of cultures in a complex organizationalfield of large and powerful
social movements can requirean even greaterinvestmentthan the twenty years
investedby Van Wolferen(1989) in exposing power in Japanesesociety. As fields
of organizations,social movements,andpower elites arebecomingmoreand more
complex, and the danger of blindness is only but growing, avoiding blindness
requires new measures for encouraging and rewardingsuch huge investments.
Scholarly careers must be viewed differently, seeking new career types that
encourage periods of social action in which collaborationwith non-academic
innovators is enhanced (Whyte 1992). My findings support a critique of
anthropology(see ComaroffandComaroff1992; Hammersley1992;Van Maanen
1995), and Wallerstein's (2004) critique of disciplinarydivisions among social
sciences and the humanities. These divisions in the study of the kibbutz have
hindered scientific progress, enhanced continued dominance of functionalists
despite ample findings by critical studentswho disproved them, and helped to
preventpublicationof critical works by respectableoutlets. Hence, a revision of
the practicesof publicationdecision-makingto diminishthe suppressionof radical
criticalthinkersby dominantscientific coalitions is needed.

NOTES

1. Earlierversionsof this articlewerepresentedat the IsraeliSociologicalSociety

Annual Conference,the Conference of Kibbutz Researchers,and the Israeli
Anthropological AssociationAnnualConference. I wishto thankEmanuelMarx,Gideon
M.Kressel,OfraGreenberg, DanielDe-Mal'ach, YossiShavit,EstherHertzog,EfratNoni-
Weiss,MotiRegev,DanielBerslau,VictorFridman, MartinKatt,Barbara Doron,andtwo
anonymous JARreviewersfortheirhelpfulcommentsonearlierversionsof thispaper.This
versionwasheavilyeditedby L. G. StrausandtheJARcopyeditor.
2. Admoris theHebrewacronymfor"ourlord,teacherandrabbi"(Jewishreligious
master).Thecourtsarebasedon EasternEuropean Jewish(Hasidic)models.
3. The GeneralLabourFederation,the umbrellaorganization of socialistZionist
movementsandlaborunions.
4. Thefull list is muchlonger;Sack1999alonementionsover50 KMsubsidiaries.
5. Numbersareimpreciseowingto thelackof availabledata.
6. TheJewishAgencyis theoperativebureaucracy of theWorldZionistOrganization.
7. Kochavis a fictitiousnameI gaveto a largeandsuccessfulveterankibbutz(Shapira
1990,2001).
376 JOURNALOF ANTHROPOLOGICALRESEARCH
8. Betterclothes were worn by ordinarymembersonly afterwork (Spiro 1955:163).
9. Firstelucidatedby the GermansociologistRobertMichels,the IronLaw of Oligarchy
states that large, complex organizationseventuallydevelop a leadershipthattends toward
oligarchyas it becomes more interestedin preservingits own power than in furtheringthe
goals of the group.Michels says that this tendency is supportedby the fact that delegation
of authorityand decision-makingis necessary in any organization,but that it leads to the
developmentof bases of knowledge,skills, andresourceswithinthe leadershipwhich serves
to entrench the leaders in office. He sees an inherent tension between the equality of
democracyand the specializationof bureaucracy.
10. EmanuelMarx had to remindme of the significance of this category of kibbutz
members.
11. Tnuvawas the nationalagriculturalproductsmarketingFO ownedby all kibbutzim
and moshavim (agriculturalcooperatives).
12. Salariesof cabinetministers,Knessetmembers,Histadrutofficials, etc., were paid
to Movements' coffers; seniorpe 'ilimdid not enjoy them personally.

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