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HILITARY ASSL3TANCE ADVLSORY GROUP , V.L.I!.1'lW 'I )

APO 143, San Franc i sc o, Ca liforn i a
SORili:i7Sfi ...
HAGAR-OT (OF) Le CLASS rFI EL
I 11\, 1 '/ •
bi{JAY i .; t' ~
SUBJ ECT: "Les s on s aYJ,l4
v U' ~ lS . M~UcV-"1 A~-L1 ,Q ~~
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TO : See Distribut ion

1. Attached for your information are c op i es of "Less ons Lear ned"

1 thru 12.

2. The information cont a ined in "Lessons Learned" was obta ined through
After Action Rep orts on operat i ons in South Viet.nam and by p ersonal ob-
s ervat.ions of HAAG Advi sor s .

3. A copy of all future "Lessons Learned" will al s o be furn i shed y our

headquarters .

FOR TEE CHI EF :

,.
i~ . ..,r; 1" '1- , ~. ;2(
i; . .' .r,>~. .(r "'·< ---"'--· . ,/ " .. 71 ~
Inel: DAVID PENS Ol( ' /
;l 1-12 "Les s ons Learned" Lt Col, AGe
Adjut.ant General
1-"--'-- DISTRI BUT ION :
See Att.ached

I
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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

DECLASSia:W Ad i:K 12 'fURS.
DOD .DIR 5200.10

~ '~'F1ED~
l \;;.." ,

cOPY ff, OF ho C01':r

 ...
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION Foa. "LESSONS LEAREED"

IIIJ-GuulJTRY
cnp['f"'·~NQ.J
-
SPECIAL DISTRTIlUTIOli ("LESSOl-:S LEAi1IiBDiI)

OUT-COUN?RY

liO. COPIZS ACTIVITY NO. COPIES

CINCPAC 5 l';ilitar.r Asst. Institute 5
cn~CUSAilP AC S CG, COI:ARC 5
CINCPACFLT 5 COHD1', Harine Corps 5
CllTCPACAF 5 COI1DT, Ha1'ine Corps Schs 5
CD!CPACREP, Ryukus 1 CaID1' , Army Har College 5
cmcp ACREP, Philippines 1 COlIDT, C&GSC 5
C01'iUS, Korea 1 CONDT, USARHJ\ 2
COMUS, Japan 1 COLDT, USNA 2
CHJUSl1AAG, Philippine Islands 1 COEDT, USAF A 2
CHJUSl1AAG, Thailand 1 COHDT, US Army Inf Seh 5
CHJUSHAAG, (Prov) Kore", 1 COI"IDT, rs Arm:/" Arty 0.. 1'181 Seh 5
CHMAAG, Cambodia 1 COl'fiT, US Army Armor Seh 5
CElillG, Laos 1 COHm, US Army Avn Seh 5
CHMAAG, RepUblic of ChinE, 1 COHDT, US j,rmy Sig Sch 2
CSMAA G, Japan 1 CO>IDT, US Army Eng Sch 2
CHlVIIITAG, Indonesia 1 Calm, US Army T1'"ns Seh 2
CI·il1EDT, Bum.a 1 CGIIDT, US Arnry QH Seh 2
CG, Flt l1a1'ine Force, PAC CmInI', US Army Ord Seh 2
CG, Fl t llarine Force, ATL 5 COeDl, Civil Affairs Seh oc-
eG, 3rd I1arine Division 5 CC/lDT, Spec 'ilarfare Seh 5
CG, R;yukus Islands/IX Corps CO;mT, Jun;levJarfare Seh 5
Comma.'rlder Task Unit 79.3.5 2 CONDT, Intel Seh 5
CO, 1st spec Forces Gp, OkinaHa 5 COHDT, US PAC Intel Seh 5
ACSI, DA s GOJviDT, Info Sch 2
DCSOPS, Dil (Remote Area Conflict Off) 5 CO;lDT, Log l-ianaeement Ctr 2
OCR&]), D.A (US Army Limited 'far 1ab)
, r\
CLASSIFIED
" ) HEAD~A.liTTIRS , U. S . m!Y SEDTION
MI LI'lA:lY ASSIS TANCS ADVISORY GROUP , VI;;TNfJl
Saig on} Vietnam

MAGA." -oT (Op) 30 }larch 1 962

SUBJECT : Lessons Learned Number 1.

TO: Se e Dis t r i but.ion

1. Gener al: A helib orne oper,gt.ion Ha s ccnducted in Cai Ngay (1;IG 203797) ,
An Xuyen Province, 33d DTA , III CTZ on B Harch 1 962.

2. Partic ipating Units: The un its lJ1 ich participated in t he operation

were an Inf Bn, Recon Co , Renger ' Co, and a Ha rine Bn in reserve suppm'ted
by 1 4 H- 21 helic optel"S , 5 AD- 6 Is , 1 L -.1 9, 1 LeN, 2 LeVI' Is a nd 2 wooden boats .

3. IUs si.on : The mis s ion of the operat.ion Has to conduct a he1iborne
assault Of' the villa ge of Cai Ngay containing an e st.irnst.ed 200 VC , to kill
or capture all VC p ers onnel, and destroy all VC inst.a l lat ion s.

4 . Concept: lhe concept of the opera ti on \-JaS to utilize four heliborne

company task forces in two lifts with an init. ial encir cl ement and gradual
r eduction of th e obj ec tive ar ea . Th e t,p sle for ce Has to land in four separate
ar eas and drive the ve toward the center. Air strikes ,,'ere to be delivered
on the objective ar ea and in g"ps bet,me11 un it s. River forc es were to prote "t
the fl .i_ght roote of the helicopters .
i
5. Results: he operEtion Nas cons i der e d success ful Hith 38 VC killed,
la rge quant;ities of 'VC materiel destroye d or captured, and numero us VC ins-
t alla tions destroyed.

6. Les s ons Lea rned :

a. The proper ut ilization of cl ose a ir supp ort p rov i des an a dditicn -

al means to the commander in accompl ishing his miss !.(m . The 5 AD6 1s a ss i s t ed
by the L-19 spot t.er pl ane ccnta ining a VN p ilot. and US observer beg an t heir
air s trike immediately after t he landing of the fir st lift. The ir target
ar e;·~ s l J8: e t.IlO r8:::r of the 1Z" Zl anlcs, and objective area.
ro
Tile slJ otting and
obs ervat, ion by the L--19 plus. t he accura cy and effectivenes s of the a ir s trike
produced excellent results .

b. The fi r st lift of hel iborne forces s ho uld be of suf..' i cient

s i ze to enc i rcle the obj ecti ve area if p DSS ible. Th e first lift Ha s composed
of two companies "hich landed in tl'lO diff erent zones leaving a l arge part
of the objective ar ea unobser ved and unprot.ected, ther eby, allowi.'lg large
/
n umbers of ve t o escape.

NCLASSIFIED
MAGA.ll. -aT (OP )
"':"UNCLI\SS\f\ED
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 1.

c. Aggressive and farceful offens ive action by helibome forces

linmdiately upon landing will eJ..1l1oit tho surprise and shock created by use
of helicopters. The first lift of heliborne forces into the obj ective area
were very SIOH to react and take advantage of only llinited and spasmodic
enemy resistance. The lack of agGressive offensive action allo;red the VC
to organize and part of the VCforce to escape.

;:-~ ~.:

DISTRIBUTION: H. K. EGGIES],ON
B Brigadier Gener81, USA
Less: Comptroller Di'T Acting Ch ief
MAP Div
Hq Comd
Trans Br
Civ Pars
USARYIS Spt Gp
Cis 114CV (8)

NCLl\~S\f\ED
)