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Muslim states show much diversity in the entire spectrum of social, economic, ideological,

institutional, and political expressions are represented in these states. From the Islamic Republic

of Iran to secular republics in the Arab world or Indonesia, from monarchies in the Arab world,

Nigeria (where monarchies rule over provinces), and Brunei, to democracies in Turkey, Pakistan,

Bangladesh, and Malaysia, Muslim states include great diversity in politics and the workings of

governments.

But despite this diversity, a common thread also exists in the politics of Muslim states. The most

obvious is Islam, not only as a faith but also as a source of identity and an important factor in

social relations and politics. Islam has long been important to Muslim politics. It has played a

role in the struggles for liberation from colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast

Asia, and the Middle East. In various stages of the colonial era Islamic forces, thinkers, and
political leaders have played an important part in shaping Muslim politics.These movements and

thinkers were among the first to organize an indigenous ant colonial movement.1

The Muslim response to European colonialism took many forms. In the case of the Ottoman

Empire, it was Tanzimat, a total modernization of society.

Another response took the form of nationalism. The nationalist movement in the Muslim world

led the nation in a struggle against colonialism and led to the creation of several nation-states in

the Muslim world. In Indonesia, Sukarno; in Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah; in Turkey, Kemal

Ataturk; in Egypt, Jamal Abdul Nasser. Most of these figures were highly charismatic figures,

figures who fought for their political independence, but people who were, at the same time, very

impressed with the Western notions of democracy, civil society, modernity, etc. Although they

fought the political domination of the West, they opted to model their societies according to the

Western philosophy of life. The third major response was Islamic revivalism. One has to

consider three types of Islamic revival: Pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial.

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Ñater, Islam influenced the values and the goals of politics, and in recent years Islamist

movements have redefined the nature of politics and laid claim to control of the state. The

continued political importance of Islam, its relevance to the struggle against colonialism in

particular, has prevented secular nationalism from completely dominating politics in the Muslim

world. This has in turn made state formation and its relation to pre-colonial and colonial eras,

complex and at times problematic. Another feature that Muslim states share is the fact that

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1
The Oxford History of Islam , Includes in-depth topical chapters by leading scholars, examining the origins and
historical development of Islam.
without exception, they are developing states; namely, for the most part they have emerged

during the course of the twentieth century and have been closely tied to the efforts of their

societies to advance and industrialize. In so doing, they share in the historical legacy, cultural

milieu, and often the political and social problems that confront development in the Third World.

Muslim states have responded to the challenges before them differently, just as size, geographic

location, and economic endowment have also meant different patterns of development.

The legacy of colonialism is key in explaining both the diversity and the unity of different

experiments with state formation in the Muslim world. Just as Islam, ethnic identity, social

characteristics, and other indigenous religious and cultural factors can explain the commonalities

between Muslim states²and conversely, economics, ideology, and leadership can explain

divergences²colonialism too can explain the points of convergence and divergence in

experiences with state formation across the Muslim world. Muslim have lived with nearly all the

colonial powers. The only exceptions to this general rule have been the ideologies of Arab

nationalism and Islamism. Arab nationalism, which was a widely popular political ideal in the

1960s and has been a general political and cultural thrust since then, has in principle questioned

the division of the Arab world into twenty-two states.

To analyze the relation of Islam and politics in the Muslim societies I have picked two countries

Egypt and indonesia.The rational behind picking these two countries as a case study is potent

integration of Islam and modernity in the societies of these countries. Although both of these

countries a have a lot of differences in terms of their location and level of acceptance of Islam, as

Egypt belongs to core of Islam while Indonesia has a peripheral status. But significant thing

regarding the role of Islam in politics and society overall is the contribution of social movements
working in both of these countries. These social movements directly and indirectly are a major

source of proliferation of Islam in social circles as well as in politics. This aspect of Islamic

organizations is very positive particularly against the activities of militant Islam.

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The affiliation with the Islam among the Muslim communities, particularly in Egypt and the post

colonial resurgence of Islam is mostly considered as the legacy of humiliation of µMuslim

Ummah¶. ³The death of Nasserism« in the Six-Day War of 1967´, one analyst observes,

³brought Islamism as the alternative ideology in the Muslim World.´ 2

The postcolonial ascendancy of the Pax Americana, which coincided with the beginning of the

Cold War, divided the Muslim World between pro-American and pro-Russian camps. However,

the end of the Cold War signaled the beginning of another between the Muslim World and the

West. In the wake of the Cold War, the overwhelming Muslim majorities globally turned anti-

Western in general and anti-American in particular. They were disillusioned with the West for its

continued support for Israel and regimes hostile to their interests in the Muslim World.

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2
Towards Understanding Islam in the Postcolonial World Order. By Taj Hashmi, Honolulu, Hawaii
We must contextualize Islamic reforms, resurgence and Islamist militancy and terrorism to the

dilemma of postcolonial Muslim community. They can neither forget their pre-colonial and

colonial pasts, nor can they fully integrate themselves into the modern world due to various

cultural and economic constraints. 3

Egypt was not sharply polarized between Western and Vernacular elites, as the titular heads of

state or the khedives (later glorified as kings up to 1952) ran the administration with both

Western and Arabic elites. By gagging the freedom of expression, proscribing all opposition

parties and even executing dissenting politicians, postcolonial rulers have left no space for

constitutional politics either in Egypt.

The experience that Egypt went through can be taken as an example of this flexibility. The

nineteenth century was a period of cultural, social and political development in Egypt. This

period of development was begun by Muhammad Ali Pasha and was continued by the Khedive

Ismail who attempted to build a modern state. This meant a reformulation of Islamic law, but not

a rewriting of it, nor an abandoning of previous elements of Islamic law. Many people are under

the impression that Egypt adopted French law wholesale. This is not the case. It must be

understood clearly that the advent of modernity in Egypt was never accompanied by the

supposedly inevitable retreat of religious sentiment. Rather, religious sentiment continued to

flourish even as the nation modernized.4

Egypt¶s political scene is marked by three often competing forces ± autocracy, democratization,

and Islamist resurgence. Past behavior is an indicator of future action. In modern times, a new

wave of revival was initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the main grassroots
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3
ibid
4

 



  Islam and modernity 
movement that emerged in response to the modern crisis in the Arab world. At a time when

Egypt faced the challenges of colonialism, economic and cultural dependence, rapid

industrialization and urbanization, and a massive population explosion, the Muslim Brotherhood

called for a return to the original fundamentals of Islam. Suppressed by Nasser in the mid-1950s

after Egypt¶s revolution evoked nationalism rather than Islam as Egypt¶s main identity .The

Muslim Brotherhood reemerged during the Sadat era (1970-1981) as a movement committed to

non-violent participation in the political process. 5

Dissident Muslim Brotherhood and others also face persecution on a regular basis. This has

paved the way for clandestine organizations, especially the Jihadists. It is noteworthy that Pan-

Islamist thinker Jamal al-Din Afghani¶s Egyptian ³great-grand-disciple´, Hassan al-Banna was

the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood; and Banna¶s disciple, Sayyid Qutb directly inspired
6
Ayman al-Zawahiri ³who in 1967 established the first jihadist cell in the Arab world´.

The first liberal constitution in the country was promulgated in 1971 and the first experiment

with a multi party system took place at the beginning of the 20th century. These achievements

were an indivisible part of the intellectual, reformist project to modernize the state and society.

The first issue involves the decline, around the beginning of the 20th century, of the reformist

school, which had taken a liberal path and served as a basis for modernization at the beginning of

the 20th century. Its leading symbol in Egypt was Rifaa al-Tahtawi

As of 1990, Egyptian Islam was a complex and diverse religion. Today devout Muslims believe

that Islam defines one's relationship to God, to other Muslims, and to non-Muslims. They also

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5
Radical Islam In Egypt: A Comparison Of Two Groups
By David Zeidan*
6
Opcit.Towards Understanding Islam in the Postcolonial World Order.
believe that there can be no dichotomy between the sacred and the secular. Many Muslims say

that Egypt's governments have been secularist and even anti-religious since the early

1920s.Politically organized Muslims who seek to clean the country of its secular policies are

referred to as "Islamists."

As of 1989, the Islamists sought to make Egypt a community of the faithful based on their vision

of an Islamic social order. They rejected conventional, secularist social analyses of Egypt's

socioeconomic problems. They maintained, for example, that the causes of poverty were not

overpopulation or high defense expenditures but the populace's spiritual failures--laxness,

secularism, and corruption. The solution was a return to the simplicity, hard work, and self-

reliance of earlier Muslim life. The Islamists created their own alternative network of social and

economic institutions through which members could work, study, and receive medical treatment

in an Islamic environment. The influence of the Islamists temporarily waned in the aftermath of

Sadat's assassination in 1981, but the election of nine members of the Muslim Brotherhood to the

People's Assembly in 1984 revived Islamists' prospects. In 1985 the People's Assembly voted to

initiate a procedure for the gradual application of the Shari'a, beginning with an indefinite

education period to prepare the population for the legal changes; the next step would be to amend

all existing laws to exclude any provisions that conflict with the Shari'a. Moves to reform the

legal code received support from many Muslims who wanted to purify society and reject

Western legal codes forced on Egypt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

According to the Constitution, Islam is the official state religion, and Shari'a is the primary

source of legislation; religious practices that conflict with the official interpretation of Shari'a are

prohibited.
According to a 1995 law, the application of family law, including marriage, divorce, alimony,

child custody, inheritance, and burial, is based on an individual's religion. In the practice of

family law, the State recognizes only the three heavenly religions: Islam, Christianity, and

Judaism. Muslim families are subject to the Personal Status Ñaw, which draws

on Shari'a (Islamic law). Christian families are subject to canon law, and Jewish families are

subject to Jewish law. In cases of family law disputes involving a marriage between a Christian

woman and a Muslim man, the courts apply the Personal Status Ñaw.7

In Egypt, overall, Islamic solidarity has been strengthened through the works of the Islamic

organizations like Muslim Brotherhood. Based on the Islamic principles of social welfare and

following the line of the Islamic reformers like Jamal ud din Afghani, Muhammad Abduh,Rashid

Rida who was more successful in constructing ideas for the development of Egyptian society,

especially in spreading a political consciousness among the middle and lower classes. The

objectives of Muslim brotherhood clearly demonstrate that Islamic solidarity is possible through

dedication, social welfare, national prosperity, social reform, and political stability to promote

universal peace and humanitarian civilization based on Islamic awakening.

At the same time, the political leaders in the Arab world were mostly corrupted and followed the

West. In this process, the society lost its moral strength and religious values. Hasan al-Banna

observed that the materialistic way of life which had been adopted by the Western world could

not bring spiritual comfort; instead it led to the degradation of moral status, egotism, class

conflict, and the disintegration of the social system. As a response, the Muslim Brotherhood

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7
Helen Chapin Metz, ed.   . Washington: GPO for the Ñibrary of Congress, 1990.
insisted that Islam is the only religion which can solve the spiritual and moral problems in a

society. Overall, Islamic awakening promoted solidarity and welfare in the pluralistic society of

Egypt, where social works are conducted mostly by the Islamic movements, and therefore they

are more popular and influential among the masses. In addition, the individual commitment is

strong among the members of Islamic movements in Egypt. However, the challenges in dealing

with the government are acute in Egypt due to more political scrutiny of the government; and as

such, Islamic awakening is promoted through private funding. Finally, Islamic movements in

Egypt are socially oriented8

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Islamic social movements have proved a solace for the faith of Egyptian Muslims. Because

the Islamic movement not only answered their spiritual and emotional needs, but also their

physical needs. Using their network of mosques, Islamists established hospitals, clinics, day-care

centers, youth clubs, legal aid societies, foreign language schools, banks, publishing houses, and
15
drug rehabilitation programs. They provided responsive relief to socioeconomic problems that

the government could not, or would not, provide. These Islamic organizations are effective

agents of social and political change. They continue to develop alternative socioeconomic

institutions and to participate in the political process, thereby demonstrating their strength in

institution-building and popular mobilization.´9

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8
Islamic Awakening and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity in Egypt:
Contribution of the Muslim Brotherhood
Saodah Abd. Rahman_Abu Sadat Nurullah__ 
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, Vol. 7, No. 1July 2010
9
Adel Guindy, The Middle East Review of International affairs. THE ISÑAMIZATION OF EGYPT
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Regarding Indonesian¶s unique culture, it is said that it is the counter thesis of Huntington¶s

thesis of the µclash of civilization¶, which states the reasons of different conflicts as lying in

historical and cultural differences. It has absorbed different cultures so successfully that it gives

rise to a synthesis of cultures. The same phenomena was observed by Clifford Greetz . Islam in

Indonesia generally and in Java particularly is µdynamic, adaptable, receptive and pragmatic

religion that moves slowly¶.10

For the same reasons, different reformist organizations emerged to purify Islam from all such un-

Islamic impurities. Generally speaking, it can be said that the un-Islamic rituals can be a part of

Islamic aspect of life while on the other hand some scholars like Ñ. F. Brakel say that Islam is the

partial part of their Javanese traditions and cultures.11

According to Brakel, in discussion of Indonesian synthesis certain things should be kept in mind.

One of those things is the peaceful and the gradual process of the arrival of Islam in Indonesia.12

And this process of the arrival of Islam took a long way to come into a political force.13After

this, the European culture influenced the existing culture of Indonesia in the 16th century, which

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10
Ibid.
11
Brakel, Ñ. F. ³Islam and local traditions: Syncretic ideas and practices´, 10-14.
12
ibid
13
ibid
13
Ibid.,8.
led to the emergence of a new culture, a modern culture with its increasing influence on

education initially, and later in the name of ethical awareness.14The Modernity with its secular

impact started to make the Indonesian intellectuals realize about the modern culture, which gave

them more individual liberty as compared to the traditional pattern of living.

In the modern form of synthesis, Muhammadiyah can be taken as a good account because it is

proliferating true religious beliefs but at the same time is promoting modern values and shares

the Protestant, European, and American work ethics. While the NU is also considered a

traditionalist party with modern views, which was formulated to be the guardian of the four

schools of thoughts of Ahl e Sunnah along with to conserve old Indonesian traditions. It also has

a broad approach towards rationality and the value of Ijtehad. Tolerance and synthesis in the

words of an Indonesian are;³Tolerance is the characteristic of the Indonesian outlook. As a

people, we are very receptive to new ideas...We are open minded, and do not reject new ideas

through fear or lack of under-standing. Rather, they are examined and tested and those concepts

which are acceptable to us become a part of our traditions and life.´15

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In the case of Indonesia, the trajectory of political Islam must be understood in relation to a

number of factors. The first of these is the legacy of the fluctuating relationship between the state

and the highly varied representatives of political Islam, especially during the long rule of

Soeharto¶s µNew Order¶ (1966-1998). The second is the de facto role played by political Islam as

a major articulator of social justice issues in relation to many of the social contradictions
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14
S.Takdir Alisjahbana, !  #"
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15
³Resolving the Russian-American Deadlock´, 
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associated with rapid capitalist development in the late twentieth century, and in lieu of a

coherent Ñeftist, social democratic or liberal response. The third factor, which is closely related

to the second, concerns the way in which the character of political Islam has been forged: as in

many parts of the world, this has been linked to the outcomes and imperatives of Cold War

politics. The kinds of Islamic groups and organizations that can be broadly classifieds being

µradical¶ remain, for the most part, on the fringes of post-authoritarian Indonesian state and

society and are relative political outsiders. This is the case even today, notwithstanding the close

connections which they have forged with some factions of the political and military elites, often

for reasons of exigency. In this sense, Sidel (2006) is correct when he concludes that violent

radicalism coming from within sections of political Islam shows weakness and desperation,

rather than strength and confidence. This marginalization is indicated in the disgust often

expressed by the social agents of radical Islam with the obvious failure of ostensibly Islamic

political parties to articulate what they consider to be the common interest of the Muslim

community.16

Presently, in Indonesia, there are three schools of thought on µIslam¶s relation with politics¶.

First, have a strong belief that Islam and politics cannot be separated as both are interlinked.

Islam as a complete code of life not only regulates the religious affairs but political affairs of the

state as well. Other schools of thought assert that religion and politics are completely separated

things, as both have to deal with different aspects of life. Religion is a personal choice and it has

to provide people with social ethics to achieve high morals in the society; and religion has

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16
Political Islam in PostAuthoritarian Indonesia
Vedi R. Hadiz
CRISE WORKING PAPER No. 74
February 2010,CRISE
nothing to do with politics. While the third school of thought holds that the Islam and religion

both overlap each other so cannot be separated or distinguished.

In the case of democracy, there are divergent views regarding the relation between Islam and

democracy. Some hold a view that democracy is not compatible with Islam while others hold the

rationale and the principles of consultations, justice and accountability on which the first city

state was established, are the same on which modern democracy is based.

In the case of the practice of democracy in Indonesia as a Muslim state, the µview of

compatibility¶ of democracy with Islam has been testified because Islam played a significant role

in the independence of Indonesia in creating a nation to put on a test for democracy.

After independence, the Indonesian political elite decided to run the state not on a theocratic

pattern but on the basis of humanitarian, patriotic and religious values in the context of

Indonesian ethnic and geographical composition. So, to overcome all the ethnic, cultural and

geographical differences, Panacasila was adopted as an ideology not as a religion. The status of

Islam in Indonesia is the µpeoples movement¶ but most of the time it has been exploited by

authorities to achieve their own goals.17

With the growing trends in economy and modernity, certain organizations with an Islamic

orientation initiated their programs for Islamic teachings, which focused on secularism vs

modernity and Islam. Its quick outcomes were increased Islamic symbols, mosque, and training

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17
Wahid, Abdurrahman, ³Indonesia's Mild Secularism´ !#%#* + (Summer-Fall 2001): 25-28.
institute. This Islamic trend was very vivid at the social front with an increased number of

Islamic values.18

On the 6th March 1990, Suharto announced an association based on Muslim intellectuals (ICMI),

it was a very bold step in the New Order in favor of the Muslims, which replaced the army-

webbed grip of Suharto in 1997. This association emerged from the conception of five students

from Universitas Brawijaya in Malang, East Java.

According to analysts, this Islamic card was used to meet ground realities and was used against

the rivals in the military and pro-democratic circles who were a threat to his rule. This

association was criticized by many progressive minded intellectuals like Abdurrahman Wahid.19

Further, Habibie¶s mounting eminence in national politics posed new troubles for ICMI

independents because of his attitude towards ICMI as a µSuharto¶s Buddy¶.20

After the realization of the whole scenario of unwillingness to support Suharto, it showed its

decline because the only way to flourish was to support the existing rule of Suharto. During that

time, growing concerns for democracy were also very significant. This major trend led to the

step down of Suharto because the call for stepping down of Suharto was the aim of all social

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18
Achmad Munjid, ³Militant and Ñiberal Islam: The Unwanted Twin Children of Modernization - Indonesia, a Case
th
Study´ Paper Presented at AMSS 34 Annual Conference ³Muslims and Islam in the Chaotic Modern World:
elations of Muslims among Themselves and with Others´, (September 30 ± October 2, 2005):16(accessed on June
2010).see also ³Indonesia: the first fifty years´, the #
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437.
19
Robert W. Hefner, % !"

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(New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2000), 129.
20
Ibid., 232.
activists including the intellectuals like Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman

Wahid who focused on peaceful reformation ³Reformasi Damai´.21

In May 1998, over whelming repercussions of economic crisis forced Suharto to resign in favor

of Mr. Habibie the vice president. He lifted bans on the public and gave the freedom of

expression.22 Thus, they found the right of expression to speak against the exploitations done in

Suharto¶s period. They fought against their competitors who turned thousands of Indonesians

into refugees.23The New Order government has been considered as the most significant in the

development of the neo-modernist intellectual discourse as it provided an atmosphere, which was

taken favorably in the growth of the new intellectual discourse.

During a seminar on ³religion and the problem of leadership´ held on 17 to 23 September 1990,

Abdurrahman Wahid stated, that Prophet Muhammad¶s (P.B.UH.) Statement, µreligion is

politics¶, can be taken in the view of political tact, the attitude, the political culture and not the

political power. Madjid¶s stance towards Islam and politics can be well understood by his most

analyzed and criticized slogan of ³Islam yes, Islamic party no´. In addition, Madjid justifies this

argument that when there would be no Islamic political party then Islam would be observed with

its historical context along with its cultural approach. This would become a source of national

unity. Thus Madjid gives an approach of substantial Islam which does not confine Islam to a

certain ³symbolism´24.

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21
Ibid., 208.
22
³Indonesia: The First Fifty Years´, The
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440.
23
Ibid., 431-440.
24
Ibid.,252-3.
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Islam¶s positive role is high in demand as it was during the time of the independence.25 Post

independence secularists like Sukarno and Hatta made efforts to declare Indonesia as a secular

state but their efforts were met with an extreme reaction by Kartosuwiryo and his followers from

the 1940s to the 1960s in the form of a violent attempt to formulate Indonesia as an Islamic state

µDarul Islam¶. It was also represented by the political aspirations of Masyumi.26 After Sukarno,

Suharto¶s New Order also promoted this concept of modernization and the adoption of

Panacasila as a state ideology in response to the µvoices for Islam¶27. Due to the adoption of the

Panacasila, certain people love to call it secular but in fact, Indonesia is neither a secular nor a

theocratic state.28Therefore, in the present case, the acceptance of the Panacasila is highly in

demand, which fulfills the demand of the Muslims and the non-Muslims as well. Many scholars

have analyzed that the µPanacasila state¶ is secular as well as a non-secular state at the same

time; Mujiburrahman quotes an argument by N. Driyarkara: ³Panacasila state is secular because

it has no promotion of any religion; it is non secular as well because it has no opposition for any

religion´.29

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25
Abdurrahman Wahid, ³Indonesia¶s Mild Secularism´!#%#*, no.2 (Summer-Fall 2001):25-28.
26
R. E. Elson, ³Nationalism, Islam, 'secularism' and the state in contemporary Indonesia´, 
 ! #



" (2010):329.
27
Indonesia: Essay: "Is secularism a choice?" 

    #*" #%$#, 23 October 2007(accessed on

December 2009).
28
Azyumardi Azra, ³Indonesian Islam, Mainstream Muslims and Politics´ Paper presented at Taiwanese and
Indonesian Islamic Ñeaders Exchange Project The Asia Foundation in Taiwan Taipei, October 26-31, 2006.p.2
29
Mujiburrahman, -##   #
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Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 121.
Both organizations, like the independent individuals, hold a similar view, which is deeply

observed by the Protestant theologian Immanuel Tanja that ³Indonesia is not an Islamic state,

because the organizations like Muhammadiyah and NU and the others are not going to establish

an Islamic state as their key goal. Therefore, it is ³impossible to establish an Islamic state in

Indonesia´. Thus, the dynamics of the Islam should be understood as the development of the

values that is a demand by all the fractions of the Indonesian society rather than to establish an

Islamic state. Further, he states, such a behavior is the outcome of different efforts to eliminate

the religious labels to promote the national integration. Thus, now religion is emerging with new

ambitions of unity, tolerance and pluralism.30 The Indonesians¶ rejection of Islam as political

force and acceptance of the Panacasila as a sole ideology is not predicting Indonesia as a future

Islamic state with Islam its state religion. There can be many Islamic influences on the

Indonesian society but not of Indonesia as an Islamic state.31 Thus, Indonesia provides a good

example of creative synthesis of different cultures. This can be a trendsetter attitude in the future

history of the worlds. 32

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Acceptance of democratic values, form of education and the role played by the civil society

particularly by the social organizations is a great success of modernity. This is not the case of

these two countries but more or less same trend is ongoing in other Muslim countries.

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30
Darul Aqsha,Dick van der Meij,Johan Hendrik Meuleman, !"

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  "%#  #%# "

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011 
$ 00((Jakarta :Seri INIS XXVI, 1995),478.
31
Paul Bayliss , ³Islam in Indonesia Could Indonesia Become an Islamic state´,"#Jan 13, 2008. (accessed on
October 2009)

http://indonesia.suite101.com/article.cfm/islam_in_indonesiaJan 13, 20082

32
Ali Noer Zaman, ³Clash or synthesis of civilizations?´
Resent public trends in polls also show that majority of Muslim countries want Islam in their

politics even they favor the militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. In a survey of a poll from

the Pew Research Center, Muslims in Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria and Jordan were among the

most enthusiastic, with more than three-quarters of poll respondents in those countries reporting

positive views of Islam's influence in politics: either that Islam had a large role in politics, and

that was a good thing, or that it played a small role, and that was bad.33

Islamists vigorously seek an Islamic solution to what they perceive to be the existing

problems in government and society. In all cases, their solutions call for Islam¶s influence to be

central to both politics and the private sector. As Ghadbian explains, Islamists ³want to shift the

frame of reference in the public realm to one in which Islam, in its various interpretations, is a

major shaping force.´34 Overall, the resent emerging trends in Muslim counties emerging out of

great complication and clashes suggest their global approach towards modernity and acceptance

of Islam as a religion.

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33
Meris Ñutz, Ños Angeles Times, Majority of Muslims want Islam in politics, poll says
They have mixed feelings about the militant groups Hamas and Hezbollah, the survey shows.
December 06, 2010

()
0Gregory S. Tate, DEMOCRATIZATION AND ISÑAMIZATION IN EGYPT: COUNTERBAÑANCING
FORCES FOR AUTOCRACY, A Research Report, April 1998