THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY

AND DEVELOPMENT

Daniel Romo Rico, Sergio M. Galina Hidalgo,

and José Cruz Escamilla Casas,

“Mexican Crude Oil Production: Recent

Achievements and Perspectives,”

Volume 34, Number 1

Copyright 2011
 MEXICAN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION: RECENT
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES

Daniel Romo Rico, Sergio M. Galina Hidalgo, and Jose´ Cruz Escamilla Casas*

F rom 2005 to 2010, Mexico’s crude oil production has declined 25 percent from
its historic output, which was reached in 2004. As of 2010, Mexico is facing
a situation where the main productive oil reservoir is in the process of being de-
pleted as reflected in a reduction of the volume of crude oil exports in excess of 40
percent, down from the highest level observed in January 2006. This paper ex-
amines Mexican oil production and the major challenges that Petróleos Mexicanos
(PEMEX), the country’s national oil company, must deal with in order to maintain

*Daniel Romo Rico, Professor at the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) in Mexico, holds
a Ph.D. in energy economics from the National University of Mexico (UNAM), a master’s degree
from LaSalle University, and a bachelor’s degree in economics from Universidad Autonoma
Metropolitana. Specializing in the Mexican oil industry, the author’s areas of academic expertise are
macroeconomics, hydrocarbon economics, and finance of the oil industry; he has previously held
positions with the Mexican Stock Exchange, the Mexican Petroleum Institute (IMP), and Bancrecer
Bank.
Sergio Galina Hidalgo, currently on the Staff of Advisors for the Board of Directors of Petróleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX) and Technical Secretary of the Research and Development Committee, earned
his bachelor’s degree in physics, a master’s in petroleum engineering, and a Ph.D. in energy
economics from UNAM. He has taught at UNAM, IPN, IMP, and the Technological Institute of
Monterrey. The author worked at IMP from 2000 to 2009 in the Strategic Planning Office and the
Research and Graduate Directorate where, in 2009, he was appointed Head of the Graduate Program,
the most important academic program for the oil industry in Mexico.
José C. Escamilla Casas, Professor of Geology at IPN, earned his master’s and Ph.D. degrees in
earth sciences-geology from the University of New Hampshire. The author has acted as director and
collaborator on several research projects on structural geology and global tectonics in Mexico and
internationally. His recent research projects are focused on the structural implications of rock
deformation in the generation and accumulation of hydrocarbons in rocks in northeastern Mexico.
He has taught at the Autonomous University of the State of Hidalgo and at IPN.

The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 34, Nos. 1 and 2

Copyright Ó 2011 by the International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development
(ICEED). All rights reserved.
33
34 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

its production platform. Additionally, this study reviews some of the main factors
that have influenced PEMEX’s decisions and activities from 2009 to 2010. Fi-
nally, we address the complex political, strategic, and technical issues that are
most pertinent in understanding Mexican oil output.
We conclude that Mexico will continue to face significant difficulties in
maintaining its crude oil production because no new fields with large oil reserves
have been found in recent years while the depletion of actual productive fields
continues; this trend has been compounded by the failure of some projects to meet
the expected production outcomes.
The declining oil production in Mexico could have many effects over the total
supply available in the oil markets, particularly in North America, and could
change the role of Mexico as a reliable source of abundant oil for the United
States. In addition, the fall in oil exports has had a deep impact on PEMEX’s
income and, ultimately, on the Mexican economy since the company is re-
sponsible for about one-third of total government revenues.1

Challenges to Mexican Oil Production

In 2000, PEMEX produced 3.012 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil
(historic production peaked in 2004 with 3.38 million b/d).2 However, the total
output of crude declined in subsequent years and settled at 2.602 million b/d in
2009, largely due to the Cantarell macro field that was producing less than half of
its recorded level in 2004. In particular, the main Cantarell project, Akal-Nohoch,
which experienced its highest production of 2.4 million b/d in 2004, saw a sig-
nificant decline in its output to less than 500,000 b/d in November 2009. PEMEX
argued that the reduction in heavy oil production was due to increased gas-oil
contact and oil-water wells.3 PEMEX has relied upon the production from the
giant Cantarell oil field since the early 1980s; however, there are others elements
that help to explain the fall in oil production Mexico is witnessing. Table 1 pro-
vides an overview of key upstream indicators.

Limited Exploration Success: One of PEMEX’s major challenges has been in

trying to replace 100 percent of its hydrocarbon reserves annually. This has been
more significant in the case of proved reserves, which are technically more ac-
cessible. In 2000 the ratio of proved reserves to annual production was equivalent
to 21.3 years. By the end of 2009, this ratio was a little over 10 years.4 Three factors
are responsible for the reduction of hydrocarbon reserves: (1) the decline rate in
annual crude oil and natural gas production, (2) partial exploration results, and (3) the
reclassification of hydrocarbon reserves to which PEMEX has been subjected under
the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission rules.5
 MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION 35

Table 1
PETRÓLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX): UPSTREAM INDICATORS, 2004-2009

Indicators 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Oil and natural gas output (million

barrels of crude oil per day—mbcd) 4.4 4.4 4.43 4.39 3.93 3.78
Crude oil production (mbcd) 3.38 3.33 3.26 3.08 2.79 2.6
Annual variation (%) -1.5% -2.3% -5.5% -9.2% -6.8%
Natural gas production (billion cubic
feet per day—bcfd) 4.57 4.82 5.36 6.06 6.92 7.03
Annual variation (%) 5.4% 11.2% 13.1% 14.2% 1.6%
Oil exports (mbcd) 1.87 1.82 1.79 1.69 1.4 1.23
Annual variation (%) -2.8% -1.3% -5.9% -16.8% -12.7%
Hydrocarbon reserves
Proved reserves (billion barrels of
oil equivalent—bboe) 17.65 16.47 15.51 14.72 14.31 13.99
Annual variation (%) -6.7% -5.8% -5.1% -2.8% -2.2%
Development hydrocarbon
reserves (bboe) 11.35 11.33 10.65 10.01 10.2 9.6
Crude oil reserves (bboe) 12.88 11.81 11.05 10.5 10.4 10.02
Hydrocarbon proved reserves/total
production (years) 11.0 10.3 9.6 9.2 9.9 10.2
Rate replacement of hydrocarbon
a
proved reserves (%) 23.0% 26.0% 41.0% 50.3% 71.8% 77.0%

a
It includes delimitations, developments, and revisions.
Source: Petróleos Mexicanos.

By January 1, 2010, the proved hydrocarbon reserves were evaluated at 14

billion barrels of crude oil equivalent (boe), 59 percent lower than the level
reported in 2000. Of the total proved reserves, 74 percent were crude oil, 10
percent fluids and condensate, and 16 percent dry gas equivalent to liquid. Total
crude oil proved reserves (of which 71 percent are located offshore) consisted of
heavy crude oil (62 percent), light crude oil (29 percent), and the remainder super
light crude oil.

Few New, Large Oil Production Projects: Despite attempts at developing new oil
projects that began in 2000, little success has been achieved. The most prominent
of the new oil production projects since 2000 include Kutz (2001), Sihil (2002),
Sinan (2003), Bolontiku (2004), and Ixtal (2005). All of these new undertakings
combined still only accounted for about 12.8 percent of total oil ouput by March
2010. Moreover, since 2006 PEMEX has not incorporated a significant new crude
field into its production portfolio. The offshore portfolio situation faces a similar
situation. PEMEX has worked since 2004 in expanding its deepwater exploration.
36 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

By 2009, nine zones were under study.6 Nonetheless, by the end of 2009, there is
still no deepwater crude oil production.

Failure to Meet Expectations: Another challenge to PEMEX has been with its
projects not meeting expectations. In particular, the company has sought to find
potential replacements for the country’s oil-producing ‘‘work horse’’—
Cantarell—which is also one of the largest oil fields ever discovered in the world.
One project that was thought to be a contender to offset Cantarell’s declining
production was Chicontepec. Located northeast of Mexico City, Chicontepec
appears promising because an estimated 39 percent of Mexico’s total hydrocarbon
reserves are concentrated in this area. However, Chicontepec’s production in 2008
and 2009 was lower than anticipated despite the cumulative investment of $2.8
billion over this two-year span.7 The most significant obstacle has been that
Chicontepec is technically very challenging because it consists of a highly frac-
tured reservoir with relatively low pressure. This, along with the fact that PEMEX
must develop infrastructure around Chicontepec, makes it a costly project both
financially and from a time perspective. Thus, despite the potential, Chicontepec
will not be a ‘‘quick fix’’ to solving the oil production output issue.

No Additional Oil Production from Mature Fields: PEMEX has 16 projects in

mature fields.8 In these fields, it is necessary to increase oil output through enhanced
recovery techniques requiring specialized knowledge and experience in the field
work of each asset. In some mature fields, PEMEX has chosen to inject nitrogen to
enhance the production (Cantarell, Antonio J. Bermúdez, and Jujo-Tecomiacán); in
the Poza Rica field, water is injected; and in the Bellota-Chinchorro and Cactus-
Sitio Grande fields plunger lifts have been employed. In spite of the enhanced re-
covery techniques employed by PEMEX, between 2003 and 2009 most of the
mature fields have not increased their crude oil production (table 2).

A Shifting Focus toward Natural Gas Production: To support the increased

consumption of natural gas in Mexico, the national energy policy has been pro-
moting greater investment in natural gas instead of crude oil production. Natural
gas increasingly is replacing oil as a feedstock in power generation and thus is
critical for electricity. PEMEX itself is one of the largest consumers of natural gas
in the country. This strategy has been successful in growing natural gas pro-
duction. In 2000, Mexico’s natural gas production was 4,679 million cubic feet per
day (cf/d) by 2009 it had reached 7,030 million cf/d.
Offsetting Production Declines: Besides Cantarell, the other main production
center is Ku-Maloop-Zaap (KMZ). Both Cantarell and KMZ are located in the
Gulf of Campeche—the main producing area for Mexican crude oil. Together,
Cantarell and KMZ accounted for close to 57 percent of Mexico’s total crude oil
output in 2009. KMZ has been critical in offsetting the declining production from
 Table 2
PETRÓLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX): CHANGE IN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION DECEMBER 2000-DECEMBER 2007 COMPARED TO
MARCH 2010

Region/Field Dec. 2000 Dec. 2001 Dec. 2002 Dec. 2003 Dec. 2004 Dec. 2005 Dec. 2006 Dec. 2007

Total PEMEX -447.5 -679.0 -673.6 -859.5 -626.7 -792.3 -382.9 -335.9
Northeast Marine
Region -383.3 -759.6 -859.9 -1,081.3 -859.5 -943.4 -476.1 -457.1
a
Akal-Nohoch - -1,460.6 -1,531.8 -1,721.7 -1,520.9 -1,519.6 -1,020.4 -794.9
a
Chac -10.3 -7.1 -7.1 -12.2 0.3 -2.1 -0.1 -3.2
a
Ixtoc -1.5 3.3 -0.9 -0.5 0.8 -3.4 -3.2 -1.8
a
Sihil n.a. n.a. 60.3 52.8 52.8 39.3 42.5 50.6
a
Kutz n.a. 12.8 13.3 9.2 7.6 8.7 8.7 9.7
b
Ku 147.9 142.6 128.0 137.7 152.0 101.0 69.2 -7.7
b
Zaap 258.8 261.0 258.2 231.7 216.5 207.3 217.3 110.4
b
Maloob 186.2 174.3 157.2 159.8 160.6 155.0 158.5 108.1
Southeast Marine
Region -67.2 48.2 127.4 153.4 160.9 122.1 30.5 41.6
Chuc -65.1 -41.9 -30.2 -24.0 -23.1 -44.1 -26.2 -3.2
Caan -142.7 -102.0 -82.3 -69.6 -63.2 -50.6 -39.3 -31.4
Ixtal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 107.6 53.1 53.4
Sinán n.a. n.a. n.a. 64.1 48.8 33.1 11.9 6.8
MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION

Bolontikú n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 45.8 35.2 19.2 -10.5

South Region -18.5 11.3 30.9 46.4 56.2 14.4 49.4 69.0
c
Samaria -43.7 -36.0 -25.8 -23.5 -15.5 -26.0 -19.3 -17.3
Jujo -34.7 -26.6 -27.1 -19.8 -10.3 -23.8 -25.7 -20.2
c
Iride -23.8 -24.2 -27.1 -27.6 -29.1 -35.0 -30.8 -19.9
Puerto Ceiba 0.5 -10.4 -17.5 -39.8 -53.9 -46.6 -21.7 -19.3
d
Sen 21.9 12.7 27.0 37.3 33.3 29.3 29.6 22.5

(continued)
37
 38

Table 2 (continued)
PETRÓLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX): CHANGE IN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION DECEMBER 2000-DECEMBER 2007 COMPARED TO
MARCH 2010

Region/Field Dec. 2000 Dec. 2001 Dec. 2002 Dec. 2003 Dec. 2004 Dec. 2005 Dec. 2006 Dec. 2007

Tecominoacán -8.3 -5.9 -3.1 -0.3 4.2 -3.2 -2.7 0.7

d
Pijije 40.1 38.8 35.5 33.5 35.7 31.6 31.1 31.7
Cárdenas -7.5 -2.0 -0.2 1.1 4.7 -3.8 0.7 3.1
c
Cunduacán -12.1 -9.4 -10.5 -13.4 -15.6 -12.7 -5.3 -0.9
Mora 1.7 2.6 3.0 5.7 5.5 4.7 -1.7 -1.2
Yagual 5.4 5.5 5.8 5.8 -1.1 -2.1 -1.7 -0.1
c
Oxiacaque -6.1 -4.6 -2.7 -2.4 -2.5 -2.6 -5.3 -6.7
Ogarrio 6.5 6.1 5.3 5.2 4.3 1.9 0.2 1.8
Cactus -2.2 -2.3 -0.1 -3.4 -1.1 1.1 1.2 0.0
Chinchorro -1.4 1.1 -1.4 -1.0 1.0 1.5 0.9 0.5
North Region 21.6 21.0 28.0 22.0 15.7 14.6 13.2 10.5
Poza Rica -5.0 -5.3 -4.3 -5.9 -6.1 -4.8 -4.5 -3.9
Tajı́n 4.9 5.7 5.4 1.2 1.7 1.1 1.8 -0.7
Arenque -2.2 -3.5 -4.9 -3.4 -5.4 -4.3 -3.9 -2.7
Coapechapa 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.7 -0.3 -4.8 -0.9 -0.7
Agua Frı́a 3.8 4.1 4.2 2.4 -1.2 -0.6 0.8 0.3
Constituciones -3.0 -2.4 -0.9 -1.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 -0.9

a
One of the sub-parts of Cantarell.
b
One of the sub-parts of the so-called KMZ.
c
Belongs to Antonio J. Bermúdez project.
d
THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Belongs to Delta del Grijalva project.

n.a. = not applicable.
Source: Constructed with information of the Secretarı́a de Energı́a, Sistema de Información Energética, available at www.energia.gob.mx, accessed
June 12, 2010.
 MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION 39

Cantarell. The production from KMZ increased from 284,600 b/d in 2000 to
800,000 b/d in 2009. In addition, PEMEX has been successful with the use of
a nitrogen re-injection program similar to that used at Cantarell to increase this
area’s output levels.

Changing Crude Mix: One impact of the decline of Cantarell production is that
heavy crude oil as a percentage of the total crude produced has decreased. Most
Mexican reserves historically have consisted of very heavy crude oil varieties
(with a specific gravity of less than 25° API). About 58 percent of the total oil
produced in March 2010 was heavy oil (named Maya); this contrasts with the
heavy oil lifted in 2004 (over 72 percent of the total oil produced). Maya, a heavy
crude that averages 25° API, is generally exported to the U.S. Gulf Coast where it
is refined.

The Performance of PEMEX in Recent Years

Mexico is the only Latin American nation that has a monopoly on oil explo-
ration, production, refining, and basic petrochemicals. These activities are con-
ducted through PEMEX, which was ranked as the eleventh largest oil company
world-wide in 2008. In the same year, PEMEX ranked as the third-largest oil
producer in the world and the eleventh most integrated company; it occupied the
eleventh place in oil reserves, the thirteenth in refining capacity, and the fourteenth
in natural gas production.9 In Mexico, PEMEX is the largest company in terms of
revenues; in 2009 it accounted for 8.8 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP)
and its exports represented 15 percent of the national current account. It is the
main taxpayer, accounting for one-third of total government revenue and, through
its investment and activities, has a huge multiplier effect on the national economy.
However, PEMEX had faced a myriad of challenges arising from more than 70
years of operation that have limited its development in several ways. Most of them
involve factors that affected the performance of PEMEX, particularly as an oil
producer. We will address what these factors have been and what is being done to
remedy the situation.

Investment: From 1982 until the early 2000s, PEMEX ran a deficit in its in-
vestment. The annual capital expenditures averaged U.S. $2 billion between 1982
and 1989 and U.S. $4 billion in the 1990s. During those years, PEMEX concen-
trated its operations in the Gulf of Campeche and in the Southeast Region.
PEMEX investment averaged U.S. $7.6 billion between 2000 and 2002. In re-
sponse to an upswing in international oil prices, PEMEX’s investment was in-
creased to U.S. $18 billion in 2009 (figure 1), which is still far less than the
investments made by the international oil majors.10
40 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Figure 1
FISCAL POLICY AND PETRÓLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX) INVESTMENT, 1980-2009

In 1997 PEMEX adopted the Pidiregas program to finance long-term pro-

ductive infrastructure projects.11 This initiative was created by the government
because it faced severe budgetary constraints in the aftermath of the 1994 eco-
nomic crisis, thus necessitating the development of a deferred financing schedule
that would allow it to show a reduction in the fiscal deficit and to restore the
country’s financial situation. However, this situation resulted in the increase in
PEMEX’s debt. The investment in Pidiregas projects has risen since 2003,
reaching the highest level of U.S. $15.7 billion in 2009 (table 3). PEMEX’s ability
to increase investment levels was aided by the run up of international crude oil
prices from 2003 to July 2008. This translated into the Mexican government re-
ceiving additional revenues that allowed it to strength its financial situation. In
2009 the government cancelled the Pidiregas program in PEMEX; nonetheless,
the company retains the outstanding debt that accompanied these projects.12
PEMEX has channeled its investment resources primarily into upstream ac-
tivities, mainly into oil and natural gas production. In particular, between 1997 to
2009, just four projects represented almost 50 percent of total investment: Can-
tarell and KMZ, which are projects linked to producing oil and associated natural
 Table 3
a
PETRÓLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX): MAIN PROJECTS, 2002-2009

Projects Until 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Accrued

Total 19,457 7,534 9,799 9,703 11,948 13,961 15,698 15,698 103,797
PEP Cantarell (1997) 10,632 2,139 2,413 2,300 2,383 2,661 3,399 3,812 29,737
PEP Prog Estratégico
de Gas (2001) 1,089 1,669 2,075 1,898 2,151 2,143 2,600 2,698 16,322
PEP Burgos (1997) 3,583 1,019 1,449 1,141 1,440 1,338 1,493 1,713 13,177
PEP Integral Ku-Maloob-
Zaap-Pidiregas (2002) 86 284 904 1,509 2,448 3,264 2,325 1,959 12,779
PEP Integral Comp
Antonio J. Bermudez-Pid
(2002) 47 334 555 648 635 777 994 960 4,950
PR Minatitlán (1998) - 0 40 228 719 809 598 382 2,776
PEP Integral Chuc-Pidiregas
(2002) 30 161 367 209 289 339 341 363 2,100
PEP Integral Jujo-
Tecominoacán-Pidiregas
(2002) 28 154 150 216 271 338 571 502 2,231
PR Cadereyta (1997) 1,657 - - - - - 25 1,682
PEP Delta del Grijalva
MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION

(1998) 643 60 64 101 152 169 389 366 1,946

PEP Integral Ama-Prof-
Tzap-Vin-Pid (2002) 1 43 58 27 10 453 897 - 1,488
PEP Integral Bellota-
Chinchorro-Pidiregas
(2002) 24 129 178 143 183 266 399 388 1,709

(continued)
41
 42

Table 3 (continued)
a
PETRÓLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX): MAIN PROJECTS, 2002-2009

Projects Until 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Accrued

PEP Integral
Arenque-Pidiregas
(2002) 18 101 202 216 204 323 194 175 1,432
PEP Integral Caan-Pidiregas
(2002) 38 77 123 166 206 228 294 292 1,425
PEP Integral El Golpe-Puerto
Ceiba-Pidiregas (2002) 40 178 150 195 150 183 220 169 1,286
Remaining Pidiregas projects 1,540 1,186 1,072 708 706 668 984 1,893 8,758

a
This takes into account Pidiregas projects from 1997-2008 and budget projects in 2009; PEP = PEMEX Exploración y Producción, a PEMEX
subsidiary; and PR = PEMEX Refinación.
Source: Treasury Ministry (SHCP), Public Account, various years.
THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT
 MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION 43

Table 4
KEY INDICATORS OF INTERNATIONAL OILS COMPANIES, 2008

Total Total
Total Total Total Assets/Total Revenue / Total
Number Assets Revenue Employees Employees
of Employees (billions of (billons (thousands of (thousands of
Company (in thousands) dollars) of dollars) dollars) dollars)

BP 92 228 367 2.48 3.99

Royal Dutch/Shell 102 282 460 2.76 4.51
ExxonMobil 80 228 459 2.85 5.74
Total 97 165 264 1.70 2.72
Chevron 61.6 161 273 2.61 4.43
Petróleos Mexicanos 143.4 91 265 0.63 1.85

Sources: Individual oil companies, Annual Reports.

gas, and the Strategic Project Gas and Burgos projects, related to nonassociated
natural gas development. Significant obstacles remain for PEMEX, e.g., building
the necessary infrastructure in the newer areas where it is producing oil and natural
gas, increasing preventive maintenance and reducing corrective maintenance, and
employing the underutilized infrastructure in different areas, particularly in
Cantarell, where production has dropped.
High Levels of Leverage: PEMEX’s financial situation has deteriorated over
time—this represents another major challenge. The most pertinent element that
affects the performance of PEMEX is its high leverage rate. The company has paid
its debt service on time and has an acceptable credit rating, primarily because it
has recorded pre-tax profits that are among the most competitive in the in-
ternational oil industry.13 However, PEMEX reported net losses from 1998 to 2009
(with the exception of 2006), in large part due to the high level of taxes its pays,
which are unusual in their magnitude compared to those paid by international oil
companies and by other national companies. For the first decade of the 2000s, total
sales to total taxes paid have averaged 61 percent.
The net losses for PEMEX have negatively impacted its equity and leverage. In
the first case, its equity became negative in 2005—meaning that its liabilities
exceeded its assets. With the 2005 fiscal reform, the company’s equity was again
positive between 2006 and 2008 when the Mexican government transferred more
than U.S. $8 billion to PEMEX in this period.14 Nevertheless, by 2009 the national
oil company’s equity had turned negative once again. The erosion of PEMEX’s
equity originated with its leverage, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets, which reached levels above 100 percent in December 2009; contrast that
with the levels of the integrated oil majors, which averaged 54 percent from 2000
to 2008.15
44 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Increasing Operating Expenses: With the depletion of Cantarell and new oper-
ational challenges, the finding and development costs as well as production costs
have been increasing. In the first instance, the finding of oil fields and development
costs, which are usually calculated based on a three-year moving average, reached
its highest level in 2002-2004 ($11.80 per boe) and $11.20 per boe in 2007-2009. In
the second case, production costs were rising consistently over the past decade
(2000-2010). In 2000 PEMEX’s production costs were $2.97 per barrel; by 2008
they had more than doubled to $6.16 dollars per barrel. In particular, the company
has faced the production costs with the Tertiary Gulf Oil Project (Chicontepec) and
in mature fields, including Cantarell.
Also adding to PEMEX’s operating expenses is its large payroll. The firm’s
productivity level is considered to be uncompetitive stemming, in large part, from
the number of its employees relative to industry average (PEMEX had over
143,000 workers in 2008, compared to BP’s 92,000 and ExxonMobil’s 80,000).
When reflected in performance and productivity ratios—such as total assets to
total employees and total revenue to total employees—the major international oil
companies outperform PEMEX with much higher levels (table 4).
Lower Trade Surplus: The crude oil exports of PEMEX fell to 1.2 million b/d in
2009 from their 2004 peak of 1.8 million b/d. However, because of rising crude oil
prices, the export value increased from 2004 to 2008. Thus, to some extent the
increase in global oil prices has been able to camouflage the situation. Meanwhile,
the import of petroleum products has increased in this decade (2000-2010). The
main imported product was gasoline, which rose from 90,600 b/d in 2000 to
329,000 b/d in 2009; this was due to the lack of processing infrastructure and the
growth of local demand. PEMEX registered a surplus in international trade be-
tween 2000 and 2009; yet, the increase in gasoline imports led to a reduction of
this surplus. For every dollar resulting from the import of petroleum products,
PEMEX exported $4.42 in oil products by 2003. In 2009, this ratio stood at $2.17
of exported products to $1 for imported petroleum products, signaling a significant
deterioration.
Technology: PEMEX had reduced its research and development (R&D) activ-
ities from the mid-1980s until 2006. This was due to the lack of financial resources
directed toward R&D in the government budget and because the company’s
strategy was mainly focused on the production of oil in the Cantarell field. That is
why the relationship between PEMEX and the Mexican Petroleum Institute (IMP),
the research center created in 1965 to scientifically support the Mexican national
oil company, was modified through the years. The IMP was focused mainly in
technical services instead of R&D activities. Additionally, in the second half of the
1990s, PEMEX adopted the ‘‘technology follower’’ strategy. This meant that
PEMEX decided to buy technology in international markets instead of developing
it. This situation resulted in a decoupling of PEMEX’s technical and operational
 MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION 45

needs within R&D development in Mexico, a loss of human skills in exploration

studies, few R&D products, and no connections between the challenges faced by
PEMEX and its technological dependence.
PEMEX was oriented to manage its operations and reduce its technical skills.
Thus, the Mexican oil company increased its purchases from service companies
such as Halliburton, Schlumberger, Weatherford, and Noble Contracting SARL.16
PEMEX established collaboration agreements with international oil firms in order
to obtain some advantages in terms of technology exchange; however, such
measures are limited considering the impact on R&D results and applications
offered by PEMEX and the business profile of such companies.17 On a more
promising note, in 2005 and 2008 the Mexican Congress approved different re-
forms to the fiscal regime of PEMEX that resulted in the creation of two funds
aimed at financing R&D projects for the IMP and other public and private research
institutions though the Energy Ministry. By the end of 2009, both funds have
accumulated around $250 million. The amount of the resources is still less than
necessary to solve the most important R&D challenges of PEMEX, and the results
of most of the projects financed so far are yet to be concluded; nonetheless, there is
no doubt that this unprecedented support is an important step in the right direction
to revitalize the once successful oil R&D sector in Mexico.
Legal Scheme: PEMEX is ruled by a complex legal framework in terms of the
range of processes involved. Its activities are regulated by the legal framework
applied to the energy sector through the Ministries of Finance, Public Function
(formerly Comptroller General of the Federation), and Energy; and also is subject
to the guidelines established by the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) and the
National Hydrocarbons Commission (created in 2009). The state oil company is
further subject to environmental regulations of the Ministry of Environment and
Natural Resources, among others. Despite the Corporative Governance applied
since 2009 with the Energy Reform of October 2008, PEMEX faces numerous
formalities and procedures that do not apply to other oil or private companies,
generating additional costs because of the bureaucracy involved. The 2008 Energy
Reform gave the Mexican national oil company more independence from the
government in terms of financial issues, allowing PEMEX to borrow debt, to
modify its budget, and manage its working capital; however, it depends on the
national budget being approved by the Mexican Congress. If the government does
not have significant revenues, PEMEX could receive fewer resources for its
capital and current spending.
Difficulties in the Decision-Making Process: Petróleos Mexicanos has been
subject to constant changes in management and reorganizations resulting in an
environment that does not allow for an optimal decision-making process.18 The
presence of diverse groups inside the company (both at the corporate as well as the
subsidiary levels) with competing objectives, often not aligned with those of the
46 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Table 5
PETRÓLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX): MAIN CHALLENGES IN UPSTREAM

Field Challenges

Cantarell d Management of wells with high gas-oil ratio and water volumes
d Unconventional application of new technologies in drilling and well
completion to produce in areas of reduced thickness
d Studies and pilot tests for the implementation of enhanced recovery

process
d Study of the gas injection in the zones invaded by water to increase the

recovery factor
d Development of fields adjacent to Cantarell such as Sihil, Kutz,
Kambesah, and Ixtoc to use the available infrastructure
d Implement new technologies for control of gas and water in the wells

Ku-Maloob-Zaap d Develop new fields of extra heavy oil

(KMZ) d Develop infrastructure for the management and distribution of
extra-heavy crude and the incorporation of reserves from the East
Campeche exploratory project
d Construction of infrastructure to meet commercial specifications in heavy
crude oil (dehydration and desalting)

Chicontepec d Continue with the development of infrastructure, in particular drilling

wells and acquisition and/or rental of artificial systems equipment
d Seismic and multi-dimensional acquisition to improve the physical

modeling of rock
d Drilling unconventional wells
d Implementation of artificial production systems and methods for
maintenance pressure

Source: Petróleos Mexicanos, Informe de Avance del PE, 4th quarter of 2009, available at http://
www.PEMEX.com/files/content/Informe_peo_4t_2009.pdf, accessed April 12, 2010.

company, can lead to a major disconnect and dysfunctional outcomes.19 In some

cases, the relationships between the managers of these companies are not clearly
defined, lack transparency, and ‘‘chain-of-command’’ issues can arise. In other
situations, the employees do not have the financial incentives that possibly could
increase their productivity. Adding to the complexity of the situation is that
PEMEX is influenced by various groups linked to political parties, utilities, private
companies,20 and, most notably, with powerful labor unions.21 Furthermore, the
rotation of the PEMEX chairman position has affected the decision-making pro-
cess adversely. There were seven CEOs between 1998 and 2009,22 with the ac-
companying changes and cost of reshuffling old employees and staff members.
Moreover, PEMEX performance has been subject to the oversight of the Ministry
of Finance, which is responsible for government expenditure management. With
the new makeup of the PEMEX Board of Directors, which was restructured with
 MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION 47

the 2008 Energy Reform to incorporate four professional members, it is possible to

partially address this situation.

Crude Oil Production Outlook

PEMEX has a potential in prospective hydrocarbon reserves of over 52 billion

barrels of crude oil equivalent, located primarily in the Gulf of Mexico, where 55
percent of these resources are concentrated. The remaining reserves are situated
mainly in the Southeast and Chicontepec basins.23 The country’s total prospective
hydrocarbon reserves added to the total proven hydrocarbon reserves, illustrate the
high potential reserves in Mexico.
PEMEX faces the challenge of increasing its proved crude oil reserves, which
would necessitate the increased incorporation of oil reserves in shallow waters and
onshore, while intensifying activity in deepwater projects. Undertaking such
projects will result in having to tackle specific technological challenges, including
dealing with geological structures that are located at great depths or in complex
geologic formations. Additionally, the company is dealing with the problems of
availability of drilling equipment, of a loss of exploration skills that PEMEX had
in previous years when it was focusing on production activities, of being able to
apply additional funds for exploration projects (some of which require other in-
centives to encourage a rate of return similar to other projects), and finally, of the
indispensable need to have qualified human resources.
Given the current level of depletion of Cantarell and the downward trend in
other fields, it is difficult to give credence to the view that the crude oil production
will increase if PEMEX cannot incorporate new crude oil developments or if it
does not have successes with its ongoing projects. Within this context, PEMEX
has stated its strategic plan via the following objectives: (1) reach a replacement
rate of 100 percent of proved reserves in 2012; (2) maintain a reserves to pro-
duction ratio above 10 years; (3) have an average annual oil production rate be-
tween 2.5 million and 3 million barrels of crude per day for the period from 2010 to
2024; and (4) support the output of natural gas in the range of 6 billion to 7 billion
cubic feet per day of average annual production for the period from 2010 to 2024.24
In particular, PEMEX will have to exploit the complex fields and those con-
taining heavy oil as well as those in maturation stage. The characterization of such
fields is a central component of their exploitation, which demands technology,
strategic work in the fields, and comprehensive analysis (table 5). Furthermore,
PEMEX needs to develop appropriate systems (platforms and subsea systems) to
meet the operational requirements of fields located offshore, for instance, in
deepwater.
The Chicontepec project has been the most important onshore alternative that
PEMEX has to compensate for falling crude oil output. This project has an
48 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

estimated 40 percent of total Mexican hydrocarbon reserves (possible, probable,

and proven), but it contains just 3.4 percent of total proved reserves. The field has
a low recovery factor (5 percent) and its production costs are higher than either
Cantarell or the Ku-Maloop-Zaap fields. In 2010 the National Hydrocarbons
Commission and the board of directors of PEMEX recommended that this field
should be studied in greater detail before its development.25
A special element in the PEMEX strategy will be to convince the services
companies to produce crude oil and natural gas with the best technology available
and using the best practices. PEMEX will provide cash incentives for their per-
formance based on the 2008 Energy Reform; however, unlike the strictly service
companies, the international oil companies are interested in their own oil and gas
production.
Another critical element in PEMEX’s strategy is improving the company’s
overall skill basis, which involves having both talented and appropriate human
resources and improving its technology situation (either through adapting or de-
veloping technologies). Although PEMEX, as noted earlier, contributes funds in
the SENER-CONACYT Program and resources directly channeled to IMP, this
strategy does not involve an integral program in upstream activities.
Although, PEMEX achieved greater financial independence in decision making
with the 2008 Energy Reform, the tax regime and the availability of resources in
public spending are factors that potentially could limit the growth of its investments.
First, it will be very difficult for the Mexican Congress to pass another fiscal reform
that would reduce the taxes paid by PEMEX because the Mexican political parties
are already gearing up for the 2012 elections. Second, the possibility to direct more
investment into PEMEX will depend on the government’s decision on how to al-
locate resources to other activities of public-sector spending, such as education or
security, rather than channeling it to the national oil company. Through 2011,
PEMEX’s investment level will remain unaffected, reaching around $23 billion,
mainly due to the increase in refinery infrastructure and upstream energy in-
vestment. Finally, PEMEX is confronted with the task of reducing its leverage level
and operating expenses while maintaining an adequate income level. These financial
elements are factors that could limit PEMEX’s investment and operational expenses.

Conclusions

In recent years, Mexican crude oil output has fallen dramatically, a situation
attributable to a number of operational, technological, and financial factors as well
as a number of events outside of the national oil company, some of which are
related to fiscal policy and highly political in nature. PEMEX must confront these
issues in order to maintain its crude oil production and its export platform, which
has significant ramifications for Mexico’s economy. We estimate that crude oil
 MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION 49

output in Mexico will remain at its current level in the medium term because no
new important fields have been found. Cantarell oil production will be able to
maintain close to current levels. Ku-Maloop-Zaap will not show further increases
in production. Efforts to revitalize mature fields and heavy crude fields are in
development, but additional oil production will be insignificant in proportion to
total oil output and the Chicontepec project is not expected to significantly in-
crease its production over the next two or three years (2010-2012) until they have
an adequate and reliable characterization of the oil field (as recommended by
the National Hydrocarbons Commission). An obstacle to increasing PEMEX’s
crude oil production is linked to the political dynamics of the executive and leg-
islative branches, which have the ability to either reduce the tax burden that the
company is under or to generate additional fiscal stimulus to improve its perfor-
mance. If PEMEX is not supported, then the other alternative could be to open the
oil industry to the private sector. However, in a realistic political scenario, it would
be very difficult for the Mexican Congress to approve another reform of PEMEX
because, in 2011, the political parties will kick off the presidential campaign and not
even the right-leaning parties will want to risk their political capital in a country
where nationalism over the oil industry is alive and well after more than 70 years.

NOTES
1
Daniel Romo, Sergio Galina, and Alfonso Pérez, ‘‘Could Mexico Be an Important Source of
Uncertainty for Oil Markets? Recent Trends in PEMEX Investment Projects,’’ The Journal of
Energy and Development, autumn 2005, pp. 125-37, and Sergio Galina, Daniel Romo, and Alfonso
Pérez, ‘‘Mexico in the Context of the 2003 International Energy Crisis,’’ The Journal of Energy and
Development, spring 2004, pp. 159-69.
2
The Cantarell field was discovered in 1976 and was considered the fifth largest in the world. It
consists of the Akal-Nohoch, Chac, Kutz, Ixtoc, and Sihil projects. In 2000 Cantarell provided 48.8
percent of total Mexican oil production and by 2004 it reached a peak of 63.2 percent, in part due to
PEMEX’s enhanced recovery techniques involving nitrogen injection into the field, which began in
2000, through a plant constructed by the Netherland Sewell Company.
3
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Reporte de resultados financieros de PEMEX (PEMEX
Audited Consolidated Financial Report Statements) (Mexico City: PEMEX, 2010), available at
www.pemex.com, accessed on December 2, 2010.
4
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Reservas de hidrocarburos al 1 de enero de 2010 (Hydro-
carbon Reserves Report, January 1, 2010) (Mexico City: PEMEX, 2010).
5
Since 2003, PEMEX has used the definitions of proved reserve issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United States, which has resulted in a reclassification of re-
serves in the Chicontepec area. Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Memoria de Labores (Mexico City:
PEMEX, 2003), p. 21.
50 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT
6
These areas are Perdido folded belt, Oreos, Nancan, Jaca, Nox-Hux, Temoa, Han, Holok, and
Lipax.
7
Mexico, Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (National Hydrocarbons Commission), In-
versión Total de PEMEX PEP por Activo y Proyecto (Total PEMEX PEP Investments: Assets
and Projects) (Mexico City: Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos, 2010), available at
www.cnh.gob.mx, accessed on April 12, 2010.
8
These mature fields are mainly concentrated in the southern region (56 percent). The most
important are the J. Antonio Bermudez field (which includes the Samaria, Iride, Cunduacán,
Oxiacaque, and Ogarrio projects, among others), the Tecomiacán Jujo field, and the El Golpe-
Puerto Ceiba field. Other mature fields are located in Poza Rica, Veracruz, Arenque, and Cantarell.
9
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, PIW 2008 Rankings, November 30, 2009.
10
In 2008 the oil majors’ investments (ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Total and Royal Dutch Shell)
totaled around $27 billion.
11
The Pidiregas initiative consisted of borrowing financial resources for investment projects.
PEMEX recorded the debt in its financial statements, but the government did not do so, considering
it as contingent debt.
12
For budgetary and accounting purposes under the Standards and Government Accounting
Basics, the Mexican government recognized all Pidiregas financing and public debt in PEMEX as
public debt after January 31, 2009. This information is available on the PEMEX website, http://
www.ri.pemex.com/index.cfm?action=content&sectionID=12#Pregunta12, accessed on April 10,
2010.
13
The debt rating of PEMEX is BBB on the Standard & Pooŕs scale, available at http://
www.ri.pemex.com/files/content/PEMEX_RU_1209.pdf, accessed on May 12, 2010.
14
The tax regime for PEMEX was adjusted in 2005, 2008, and 2009. In 2006, the Mexican
Congress approved the most important change in the company’s tax requirements. It reduced
PEMEX’s tax level and created new incentives to promote R&D in the oil industry, improved the
auditing process for the operations of the national oil company, and provided more financial
resources to PEMEX. Centro de Estudias de Las Finanzas Públicas (CEFP), El Re´gimen Fiscal de
PEMEX-2006 (The Fiscal Regime of PEMEX-2006) (Mexico City: CEFP, 2006), available at
http://www.cefp.gob.mx/intr/edocumentos/pdf/cefp/cefp0312006.pdf, accessed on March 12,
2010.
15
Based on information from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
Annual Statistical Bulletin (Vienna: OPEC, various years).
16
Of the total PEMEX exploration and production purchases of materials and services between
2004 and 2009, four companies accounted for 18.9 percent of the total contracts: Schlumberger (8.7
percent), Halliburton (3.9 percent), Weatherford (2.6 percent), and Noble Contracting SARL (3.7
percent). These data were calculated based on information from PEMEX’s Institutional database
available at www.pep.com, accessed on May 13, 2010.
17
PEMEX signed general agreements of cooperation with international oil companies such as
Statoil, BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron Deepwater Mexico, Inc., Petrobras, Total, and Shell Mexique
 MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION 51

Cooperation Technique, among others. These have been signed over the past decade (2000-2010),
with a spike occurring in 2007 and 2008. Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Memorias de Labores
(Mexico City: PEMEX, various years).
18
To conduct their operations PEMEX has its main operating corporation along with four major
subsidiaries: PEMEX Exploration and Production, PEMEX Refining, PEMEX Gas and Basic
Petrochemicals, and PEMEX Petrochemicals. The company has subsidiaries abroad, including
PEMEX PMI, which is dedicated to international marketing of PEMEX’s exported and imported
products, financial companies, aimed primarily at debt issuances backed by PEMEX, and it
maintains shares in firms involved in drilling and refining.
19
Political parties are involved in PEMEX decisions, for example, the case of former PEMEX
Director Rogelio Montemayor, who supported the PRI presidential campaign in 2000.
20
Mejı́a Domı́nguez, ‘‘Contratistas, Amos de PEMEX,’’ Revista Ve´rtigo, February 12, 2010, available
at http://www.periodistasenlinea.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=6181.
21
PEMEX must give financial resources to its labor unions to help subsidize the construction of
houses, stores, schools, and provide other social services. ‘‘Besides PEMEX contracts services with
the Union Labor,’’ Periódico La Jornada, December 16, 2009, p. 22.
22
Between 1998 and 2009, PEMEX went through a number of CEOs, including Adrian Lajous
Vargas, Rogelio Montemayor Seguy, Raul Muñoz Leos, Luis Ramirez Corzo, Jesus Reyes Heroles
González Garza, and Juan José Suárez Coppel.
23
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Las reservas de hidrocarburos de Me´xico. Evaluación al 1 de
enero de 2009 (The Hydrocarbon Reserves of Mexico. Evaluation as of January 1, 2009), (Mexico
City: PEMEX, 2009), available at http://www.ri.pemex.com/index.cfm?action=content&sectionID=
134&catID=12201, accessed on April 12, 2010.
24
Energy Secretary, Estrategia Nacional de Energı´a (National Energy Strategy) (Mexico City:
Energy Secretary, February 2010).
25
Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos (National Hydrocarbons Commission), Proyecto Aceite
Terciario del Golfo. Primera Revisión y Recomendaciones, (Mexico City: Comisión Nacional de
Hidrocarburos, April 2010), and agreements of the board of directors of PEMEX, available at http://
www.pemex.com/files/content/pemex_acuerdos_814.pdf, accessed on October 10, 2010.