Dependency Structures as the Dominant Pattern in World Society

Author(s): Klaus Jürgen Gantzel

Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 10, No. 3, Special Issue: Peace Research in the Federal
Republic of Germany (1973), pp. 203-215
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422772
Accessed: 11/06/2010 17:47

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Peace
Research.

http://www.jstor.org
DependencyStructuresas the Dominant Pattern
in World Society
KLAUS JtRGEN GANTZEL
Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktsforschung,Frankfurt
1. Introduction
International society is shaped at a global level
by conflicts which are commonly, though mis-
leadingly, described as the 'East-West conflict'
and the 'North-South conflict'. Both conflicts
are historically intermeshed. In several waves,
taking various forms (the colonialism of plun-
dering, expulsion, and settlement; agrarian and
commercial capitalism; the capitalism of indus-
try and finance oligopoly; neo-mercantilism)
European, especially the West European, socie-
ties have dispersed themselves - not without
violent warlike conflict amongst themselves -
over the greater portion of the globe, employ-
ing overt violence as well as subtle means of
suppression and exploitation. They have force-
fully imposed their own law upon the other
societies. thus systematically creating the
'North-South conflict' over the last centuries
(Appendix, no. 1) (cf. Krippendorff 1973, in
particular the introduction).
This conflict is both the genetic and also the
functional predecessor; the 'East-West
conflict' has evolved from it insofar as the
founding of the Soviet Union in 1917/22 can
be considered the first counter-strategy orga-
nized at the state level for emancipation from
the dominance of the capitalist industrial sys-
tem. In world politics both conflicts affect one
another - of course, in varying manners and
degrees of intensity. Moreover, considering the
predominantly economic and technical, and
also military, superiority of the capitalist over
the socialist societies, the conflicts resemble
one another in many aspects: the compulsion
to react to the external threats, embargos, etc.,
leads to retardation in development and in
part even to structural or tactical adoptation,
the results of which are similar to the effects
of capitalist exploitation in the 'Third World'.'
Due to its tremendous growth dynamics -
bought at the price of turning humans into
objects - capitalism still remains the driving
force behind the system, despite all its crises.
Yet, for precisely this reason, the controversy
between capitalism and socialism gains its deci-
sive importance. The outcome of this competi-
tion between systemnls(cf. Schmiederer 1973)
will essentially determine whether the interna-
tional and intranational groups at the peri-
phery of world society will have realistic
chances for liberation and autonomous devel-
opment.
An adequate analysis of the structure and
tendencies of the present world society, its re-
gional, national or functional sub-systems as
well as international politics - indeed, of in-
tranational structures and processes as well -
must take into consideration the interconnec-
tion of both conflicts. Yet the differences, gra-
dations, overlapping, and reciprocal penetra-
tion in both conflict constellations cannot be
comprehended in one dimension (or even dual-
istically), but only through sufficiently differ-
entiated, multidimensional analysis. Likewise,
efficient strategies for change can be developed
only on the basis of such analyses.
The differences between the two global con-
flicts can be discovered through analysis of
their main areas of conflict, the structural
mode of their dominance, and their subsequent
strategies either for exercising power or for
emancipation. The most important goal of the
present project of the Section for International
Politics of the Germran Political Science Asso-
ciation is to decipher such strategies and their
structural preconditions - which vary in each
society according to the different historical
origins - through a series of monographs. We
204 Klaus Jurgen Gantzel
hope, in this manner, to make an initial at-
tempt at theoretically and critically compre- more detailed treatment of intranationalstruc-
hending the concept of 'world society', and to ture, although it representsa necessaryprecon-
methods.2
define it with the help of emnpirical dition of internationalrelationshipsof depend-
ence. It can, however, be transferredby way
2. Center and periphery
Every society has a national center, formed by
a power elite which determinesthe intranation-
al and international relations of the society.
The national periphery of the society consists
of those sectors of the population which inter-
act through division of labor with the center,3
although under asymmetrical conditions, due
to a relatively stable unequal distribution of
chances to dispose of material and non-mate-
rial resources.Such a vertical structurecan be
observed, in varying degrees, in all existing
societies.4 In addition a process of marginali-
zation of particular groups can be observed.
This means that the prerequisites for life,
work, socio-political articulation, and social
integration are confiscated from, or denied,
these groups because they are of no direct
'use' in realizing profits, accumulatingcapital,
or supporting oppositional elites, etc. Rather,
they present an obstacle to these goals; in fact
the exclusion of these groups secures the ad-
vantages of the 'center' (or the peripherynear
the center). No interaction exists with these
segments of the population: they are ignored,
expelled to illegitimacy, condemned to apathy,
treated by the integrated lower and middle
classes with enmity, etc. The process of intra-
national marginalizationcan extend to specific
groups, for example, non-whites, old or sick
people, the unemployed. It can also include
entire regions like Mezzogiorno (App. no. 8)
Scotland (App. no. 9), the south of France,
Northeastern Brazil, or, in part, the southern
states in the USA.
A more far-reachinganalysis would, in addi-
tion, require a subdivision of center and peri-
phery, according to functional sectors (econo-
my and technology, politics, military matters,
communication,culture) in order to determine
the interconnections,mobility or structuralos-
sifications in or between sectors, and in order
to ascertain concord and discord over rank
amongstthe elites.
In this essay, we will have to do without a
of analogy to the international level.5 Here we
again encounter the same 'feudal pattern'
(Galtung)if we look at national entities. More-
over, the power elites in all levels of the
'world of nations', form, in themselves, an
independent center, hierarchically stratified
and differentiated, and yet integrated on the
basis of common interests. It is not yet clear,
however, to what extent this is valid at a glob-
al level, or to what extent one must differenti-
ate betweenthe feudal-capitalistand the social-
ist contingentsin world society. In any case, it
is undeniable that the socialist centers often
come to terms or are forced to come to terms
with the capitalist centers. The global centers
are naturally not free of subjective interest
clashes. It is decisive that the non-elites, the
respective national peripheries, are not inte-
grated on the internationallevel, that they can
hardly pursue autonomous exchange, and that
in many cases their intranationalsolidarization
is completely cut off. Yet precisely such soli-
darity would be more in their objective inter-
est.6 For this reason, the analysis of world so-
ciety as well as the analysis of its several sub-
systems should be established from the point
of view of the non-elites.
Figure 1 and the explanationsand examples
pertainingto it are intended as an aid in local-
izing the typical predominantrelationshipsof
dependenceor conflict potential in the interna-
tional system; they can do no more than pro-
vide a general survey.The large square field in
the Figure defines the symbolic borders of
world society which is today practicallyidenti-
cal with the world population.The positions of
nations on the field of world society are deter-
mined according to their relation to the two
axes which intersect the fields, or to their dis-
tances from them.lhe criterion for the vertical
coordinate is the power basis, the resourcepo-
tential of the individual societies.7The greater
the economic, technical, military, intellectual,
or communicationsresources of a nation, the

more can it be expected to participate inten-
sively in the international system and to exer-
cise influence.8 In other words, power deter-
mines the rank of a society in the international
stratification.9 The poor underdeveloped socie-
ties are to be placed in the lower portion of
the vertical axis which form the periphery of
the world society (P,). The highly developed
industrial societies, the international centers
(Ci), are localized along the upper section of
the axis. Between these two extremes are the
advanced developing nations. For a more exact
gradation one could differentiate between cen-
ter nations of first, second, and third rank;
and peripheries of first, second, and third rank.
This axis (Ci- Pi) implies the 'North-South
conflict', above all the forms of dominance
which Galtung defines as imperialistic. Along
the horizontal axis (Cap-Soc), societies are
ordered according to their societal system with
the degree of capitalism (Cap) increasing as
one proceeds left, and of socialism (Soc) as
one proceeds right, while in the middle regions
one finds the transitional forms and combina-
tions as they can often be observed in the
Third World.'0 This dimension of Fig. 1 refers
to the 'East-West conflict', to the controversy
over an adequate societal order between socie-
ties with antagonistic ideologies and organiza-
tions.'1
Characteristic relations exists between the
four fields thus formed, or rather between the
nations located in them, the relations being
sketched with lines or arrows. The framework
Capitalist
Societies
f/ l \ c
o |lSA | ?+0
M-4 I I \
H \ v
iL
S Eu-
cCI) ^r^^
ca
g Qz(B.I... ) E
-t 1 1
_ ?
Capitalist
Societies
Dependency Structuresas Dominant Pattern 205
is still rough. It should at least be supplement-
ed by two further dimensions not graphically
plotted here: first, the dimension of 'time' in
order to demonstrate the changes in positions
and in the structure as a whole; second, the
'sector' dimension (economy, technology, poli-
tics, etc.). Yet even in its simple form the dia-
gram illustrates the hierarchical structure of
world society that can be deciphered in terms
of a sociology of dominance (Herrschaft) in
order to reveal the structural inequalities which
(re-)produce violence and thus represent im-
portant parameters for analysis, determining as
well the specific relevance of individual stud-
ies. The methodological decision as to the ap-
propriate level of analysis already necessitates
consideration of the background of global
structure. With regard to content, such reflec-
tion is even more necessary: neither voting
behavior nor monetary crises, neither the ter-
ror of the suppressors nor the terror of the
suppressed, neither underdevelopment nor the
wasting absorption of surplus, neither the
domestic nor foreign policy of a given country
- none of these cart be satisfactorily explained
without this reflection.
3. Types of dominance
In the following research note we shall sketch
briefly, in thesis form, typical dominance rela-
tionships with selected examples. In the limited
space available we can neither produce a suffi-
ciently precise description nor include the mul-
titude of variants (and exceptions).
Ci
Socialist
Societies
lr Field I. Relations between capitalist center
nations
(1P
The relations in Field I of the diagram are
shaped by the dominance of the USA as a
- P
center nation of first rank over the West Euro-
B Soc pean industrial states (and similarly over Ja-
' pan) as centers of second rank. In the most
J * o
W) \ F
important sector, the economic sector, asym-
*
(Cba) metrical conditions of exchange'2 persist. This
F'
applies not so much to the pattern or sub-
t) 4 3n C
p)
k, stance of trade itself, as to the fact that the
Socialist
Societies Europeans are much more dependent on ex-
Fig. 1. port of goods than is the USA, which exports
206 Klaus JuiirgenGantzel
much more capital. The superior financial
power of the USA has formed the basis, first
for the penetration3 of Europe by US corpo-
rations and banks; and secondly for the func-
tion of the US dollar as the leading currency,
which has contributed considerably to the de-
pendency on US budgetary, economic, and
foreign policy (App. no. 4). These dependen-
cies have a far-reaching effect on inner-Euro-
pean political, economic, and social processes,
and even on areas of personal life. In addition,
there is the US dominance in technological
and scientific know-how, especially in the most
modern realms of technology. These asymme-
tries are supplemented by the braindrain and
- as we must emphasize in particular -
through the intensive demonstration effect of
the middle and upper class standards of living
in the USA. The economic-technological pene-
tration which already indirectly strongly limits
the Europeans' margn of manoeuver is arched
over by the (mostly disguised) direct assertion
of political influence by the USA: at any rate,
no fundamental changes of the system or of
political strategy are possible in Europe with-
out the consent of the USA. The one-sided
military protective relationship was founded by
the USA, but the European elites quickly and
gladly adopted it as a mechanism insuring
their power status; they internalized (and ex-
ploited) it. This relationship, ilong with the
military-strategic decisionmaking monopoly of
the USA, mainly concerning nuclear weapons,
secures the entire constellation of dependence.
Insofar as horizontal symmetrical cooperation
takes place at all in this network of relations,
it serves the purposes of economic and military
crisis management.
However, in one aspect this system differs
fundamentally from the center nations' typical
imperialism against the Third World:14 the
intensive, relatively symmetrical interaction
between the West European industrial socie-
ties.15 The interaction and association between
Europeans which has progressed to varying
degrees in the different sectors must, however,
be seen from three points of view. On the one
hand, such interaction and association mitigate
the dependency on the USA by enlarging the
European power-basis and making it more ef-
ficient, thus tending to make a US 'Divide et
impera' policy more difficult.16 On the other
hand, one must ask whether precisely Euro-
pean unification - which the US has always
welcomed, at most occasionally criticized -
does not stabilize this dependency, whether the
establishment of a large market - pre-shaped
by the Marshall Plan - with its external tariff
barriers perhaps first created the incentive for
US penetration. In this connection, one would
have to analyze mere closely the change in the
function of the European Community (App.
no. 10). The EEC can also be seen from a
third perspective as an instrument of exploita-
tion vis-a-vis the Third World (with the USA
naturally participating) through protectionist
encapsulation in agriculture as well as through
penetration of the poor countries of Europe
and Africa which are associated to the EEC,
the franc zone etc. This also mirrors the inter-
nal development of West European capitalism
in which, inter alia, France had to allow her
European competitors access to her former
colonies (App. no. 18).
As a whole, the constellation in Field I can
be termed penetration with inherent tendencies
toward rivalry.
Fields I and III. Relations between capitalist
center nations and the periphery
The structure sketched above reproduces itself
here more clearly. Although the capitalist in-
dustrial states, driven by their inner growth
dynamics,'7 compete for influence and oppor-
tunities for exploitation in the Third World, on
the whole they still act in concert. The societies
of the periphery face them, for the most part,
in isolation with interests which can hardly be
solidarized.
The example of the relationship with Brazil
(which, as the most powerful society in South
America, occupies the role of periphery at the
first rank (App. no. 29)) can be presented as
almost an ideal type. Brazil is dependent on
the center nations, primarily the USA, in all
sectors. (The influence of Western Europe is
limited to the economy and some armaments
 Dependency Structures as Dominant Pattern
trade but is weake- than that of the USA.
On a global scale, this difference is partially
evened out; while ILatin America is a domain
of North America, Africa is one of
Western Europe; but since Europe is
in part but a 'subsidiary' of North
America, this geopolitical differentiation
does not adequately reflect the realities.) Bra-
zil's main exports are agricultural products
(primarily coffee) and raw materials, the pro-
duction of which has only minor spin-off and
spill-over effects for autonomous development
in modern economic sectors and other areas.
Brazil imports finished products consisting to a
disproportionate degree of consumer goods:
this not only hinders a systematic industriali-
zation and autonomous capital formation but
also leads to relatively high profits for the
exporting centers. Brazilian and foreign inter-
est groups consciously parade a higher stand-
ard of living and incite consumer 'needs' in-
appropriate for a developing nation. The effect
of exploitation through the unequal terms of
trade, dictated by the industrial nations, is
amplified through the necessarily resulting
concentration of Brazilian foreign trade on the
center nations.
A more important factor in the relation-
ship of dependency, however, is the penetra-
tion of the Brazilian economy by foreign, pri-
marily US, companies. These control large sec-
tors of raw material production and of indus-
tries in Brazil, and have also penetrated com-
mercialized agriculture. After the plundering
colonialism of Portugal, the infiltration first of
Dutch, then English, and finally North Ameri-
can capital, autonomous development in agri-
culture, crafts, and manufacture was unable to
take hold; and wherever the World Wars in
the northern hemisphere had favored autono-
mous Brazilian developments, they were later
repressed. Since the industrial nations at the
same time refuse to give enough untitled devel-
opment aid in the form of grants to any effec-
tual extent (Brazil is one of the highly indebt-
ed developing countries), Brazil must turn to
private capital in order to make any inroads
against the trend towards relative pauperiza-
tion, given its enormous population growth.
4 - J. P. R.
207
The 'dualistic' concept of development (i.e. to
stimulate the backward, traditional sectors
through modernization of partial sectors of the
economy from the outside, and thus to raise
prosperity in general) has proven to be illusion
or propaganda.18 The foreign capital owners
and investors and their allies, the native eco-
nomic oligarchy, are not interested in the long-
term development of a well-balanced econom-
ic, infra- and social structure: They are inter-
ested in the greatest possible profit. Moreover,
in many cases profit returns several times the
amount invested to the donor nations. The re-
sult is a onesided development of high-profit
production. The tremendous private and public
poverty, the unequal access to income, is thus
accentuated and not alleviated. The vicious
circle accelerated by crises of inflation, growth,
and monetary matters ensnares the country more
and more into imperialist dependency.
Such a system favoring the interests of the
industrial center nations can be upheld only
because of the existing close harmony with the
interests of the Brazilian elite. In fact, this elite
has been socialized to a large extent in the cen-
ter nations, or at least according to their stan-
dards. It depends for its own profits on cooper-
ation with external capital interests. Even un-
dertakings in the public infrastructure, like the
construction of cross-country highways, the
development of previously barely used regions,
etc., are directed primarily according to these
interests. Growing underdevelopment and in-
equality in the distribution of income and of
wealth increasingly drives the economic elite
under the wing of the center nations, just as
the foreign capital owners are concerned over
protection of their investments against revolu-
tionary upheaval. This mutual need for protec-
tion among the elites precipitates extensive,
primarily US, military aid, arms trade, counter-
insurgency measures, CIA intervention, etc.
This in turn strengthens the power of the rul-
ing military apparatus and their status inter-
ests, and favors domestic suppression and ter-
ror. In the end, all of Brazilian politics comes
under the control of the center in the USA;
even the intranational periphery in the USA
profits, so that an international solidarization
208 Klaus Jiirgen Gantzel
of the dominated sections of the nations be-
comes impossible.l' Despite all the variations
from case to case, similar relationships and
tendencies can be observed in the remainder of
Latin America (App. nos. 17, 18, 21, 23, 24,
25, 33, 34).
The development of Brazil as a neo-imperi-
alistic satellite does not stop at her borders. As
is suggested in Field III of the diagram, Brazil,
herself periphery, in turn collects international
peripheries or satellites. Due to the general
poverty and unbalanced economic structure,
the national Brazilian market cannot absorb
the entire production of the high-geared mod-
ern industrial branches; some must hence be
exported, primarily into weaker even more
backward surrounding societies like Uruguay
and Bolivia. There exists institutionalized coop-
eration with these countries in the La Plata
subregion of LAFTA which fulfills a function
similar to that of the EEC vis-a-vis its associat-
ed states. Here we find in principle the same
economic penetration followed by Brazilian
political and military support of conservative
oligarchies in the subsatellites. This support
serves at the same time to secure and form al-
liances against revolutionary change in all of
South America; it is promoted by the interests
of the disproportionately large Brazilian mili-
tary apparatus with 'expansion as an end in
itself' (Schumpeter). With this subimperialistic
penetration Brazil plays the role of representa-
tive of the center nations. (Cf. Marini 1972.)
The superimperialism of the USA and West-
ern Europe and the subimperialism of Brazil
together take the form of a 'double-headed
social amoeba'. (Cf. Galtung 1970.) This basic
pattern dominates, to be sure with variations,
the entire capitalist-feudal (and thus the great-
er) portion of the globe. Here are only a few
examples: USA/Mexico/Central America; USA
and Japan/South East Asia; Western
Europe/Portugal/Angola and Mozambique;
EEC/French-speaking Africa; Great Britain!
former British colonies;20 Western Europe
and USA/South Africa/Namibia and Rho-
desia; or USA and Western Europe/former
West Pakistan/East Pakistan (App. no. 31);21
only with regard to the Arab-Israeli Near East
(App. no. 14) and India are the relationships
more differentiated.
Seen in a historical perspective, nothing has
changed either: there have been changes of
power amongst the centers; some societies have
moved up from lower ranks; the strategies of
dominance have changed. Yet the overwhelm-
ing majority of world society has remained
periphery and the basic pattern has hardly
changed.
The proportions which the suprastructure of
the international economic system has taken
on do, however, seem new. Powerful multina-
tional corporations and banks have taken their
place besides the state-apparatus as, to a great
extent, independent actors in this system of
dominance; while numerous international or-
ganizations, predominantly those of economic
importance, represent mere instruments and
not pillars of the system (App. no. 4, 5, 6, 11,
12).
In view of this 'synthesis of dominance'?-
we face the decisive question as to the options
which exist for emancipation from this system,
given simultaneous socio-economic progress in
the peripheries (App. no. 1). If one were to
follow the principle of attacking the problem
at its roots, a realistic strategy could hardly be
developed. The state-protected bastions of cap-
ital in the industrial societies are practically
unassailable. In the centers, at best, very grad-
ual reforms are possible, but no revolutionary
changes in the system. And even gradual but
systemic reform would be possible only under
the precondition that one succeed (without
risking the danger of inducing manifest forms
of fascism) 'in mobilizing the wage-drawing
populace and training them in non-violent
strategies. Neither does an alliance of the peri-
pheral nations from Field III seem very prom-
ising; indeed, in those cases where it has been
attempted, it has often produced exactly the
opposite results (App. no. 22, 26, 27). The in-
tranational centers of the peripheral nations,
the 'bridgeheads', are too tightly intermeshed
with the centers of the international system.
Thus a dissociation of the peripheral societies
from the capitalist world system appears as a
realistic but hard alternative. This requires a
 Dependency Structuresas Dominant Pattern
takeover of state power - as bloodless as possi-
ble - by revolutionary elites (App. no. 30)
supported by a mobilized populace. The func-
tion of nationalism in the Third World must
be analyzed from this perspective; the tradi-
tional, defensive and the modern, offensive
cultural value systemnsas well as the agents of
mobilization or change in norms must be iden-
tified (App. no. 32). Concrete strategies for
revolution and dissociation as well as the sub-
sequent development policy depend decisively
on the specific local or regional conditions, not
lastly on prevailing attitudes and productive
forces (App. nos. 1, 25), yet socialist systems
and their eventual success take on exemplary
importance in this connection.
Fields I - II: Relations between capitalist and
socialist centers
The penetration of Russia and the much more
longstanding penetration of Eastern Europe
were thwarted by the socialist changes of sys-
tem. Transaction and communication barely
occur between the USA and the USSR; those
cases where they do exchange communication
or even partially cooperate are concerned pri-
marily with military crisis management or with
the 'cultivation of East-West conflict' (with
the trend toward global nuclear oligopoly).
This is not to say, however, that no relations
of dependence exist, for the dissociative system
competition is largely assymmetrical. The (indi-
rect) dependency is extorted by the Western
pressure exerted in two ways:
1. The economic technical superiority of the
capitalist center nations, resulting not lastly
from the exploitation of their town national
and the international peripheries, generates a
demonstration effect which could not be en-
tirely blocked out by the socialist elites. As a
result, the level 'of demand rose (a kind of in-
ternalization of Western norms) in the socialist
societies. It was premature, for the nations
involved were developing nations which had
not yet achieved a sufficient degree of industri-
alization (USSR, Poland, Hungary, etc.), or
they were nations where this level of demand
had already been reached, but had been low-
ered for the transition to socialism (Czecho-
209
slovakia, DDR). These increased demands can
no longer be entirely suppressed through force
or propaganda; the political elites must also
legitimize themselves through the economic-
technical capacity of the system, and the so-
cialist model cannot be thrown into question.
2. The second form of pressure that the capi-
talist countries exert (to be sure, also a func-
tion of the enormous economic and technologi-
cal capacity) was and is military. What was
popularly considered deterrence or the balance
of terror was in fact a tremendous superiority
of the USA and NATO over the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact, at least in the decisive
nuclear sector of defense. The USA clearly
functioned as pacemaker in this 'arms race'.
(Cf. Senghaas 1972b; Gantzel forthcoming.)
The USSR was forced to react to this threat
by pushing 'her armnnaments, especially since she
had been on the defensive since 1917. She had
to deprive the civilian sector of so many mate-
rial and intellectual resources that her industri-
alization not only grew imbalanced but was
retarded as a whole (as the West indeed in-
tended). This served to weaken the attraction
of the socialist model of emancipation for the
Third World. Above all, the socialist govern-
ments found themselves caught in a dilemma
between a higher level of demand on the one
hand and retarded development on the other.
In addition the situation was worsened by the
specific difficulties involved in socialist state
economic planning and administration. It is
difficult to judge where attempts at alleviating
the dilemma through political detente and
economic cooperation with capitalist societies
will lead. The military threat to socialist coun-
tries could be decreased; but at the same time
economic cooperation with the West can open
the way for footholds of capitalist exploitation
and penetration against which the long-practiced
encapsulation was meant to protect. In this con-
text we must consider that trade exchange,
above all as it already exists between Western
and Eastern Europe and which is planned to
intensify in the future, will be largely asymmet-
rical: the West delivers more valuable invest-
ment goods - indeed, entire production plants -
while the East delivers primarily raw materials.
210 Klaus JuiirgenGantzel
The trade agreements and business contracts
would have to be exactly analyzed according to
their conditions and consequences (App. no. 35,
36). (Cf. Galtung 1972.) Furthermore we would
have to consider the wider function of the
'East-West conflict' in stabilizing dependency
structures. Inflated to become a worldwide
battle of civilizations, lit serves to repress the
rivalries (or contradictions) between the capi-
talist centers and thus works against a solidari-
zation of the Third World.
Fields II/IV. Relations between socialist
societies
As yet we know but little about these rela-
tions.23 There have been obvious cases of
massively imposed dependence through mili-
tary intervention by the Soviet Union (Hun-
gary 1956; Czechoslovakia 1968);24 there has
been and still is considerable evidence of the
political and military dependence of Eastern
Europe on Moscow and of Soviet penetration
of their state apparatus. With regard to COME-
CON, one can assume that the inherently more
favorable conditions of trade for the more
highly industrialized members, the DDR and
Czechoslovakia, (export of investment goods in
trade for raw materials and agricultural prod-
ucts), are reversed to favor the USSR through
manipulation of prices, under Soviet pressure.
On the other hand, we would also have to
investigate to what extent the integration of
the East European states shows signs of a
counter-integration against Soviet supremacy
(App. no. 38). Peking's break with Moscow
may likewise be a reaction against Soviet
dominance and penetration. It would be dif-
ficult, however, to identify further cases of
dependency comparable in number, type, and
intensity to those in the capitalist camp. While
one can hardly observe a single case there
which does not in any way fit the framework
of the neo-imperialist model, in the socialist
camp dependency is often caused by assis-
tance; yet there is hardly any evidence that the
extensive armament and economic aid from
the socialist centers (which, moreover, is much
more of a burden to them than comparable
aid is to the West) has brought about such in-
tensive penetration, for example in Cuba, that
one could speak of real external dominance.
For example the USSR bought sugar, the main
product of the Cuba, at higher than normed
prices and in quantities completely
'uneconomical' for her. (One would, however,
have to check whether this sugar does not re-
turn to the world market at dumping prices
thus damaging the sugar-exporting developing
nations, including Cuba.) The considerable po-
litical, economic, and military aid to non-so-
cialist, in part even to anti-communist coun-
tries like India or especially Egypt (App. no.
39) does not seem to be accompanied by such
intensive and protracted dependence effects as
can be observed in the capitalist camp. (Other-
wise Egypt's recent distantiation from Mos-
cow would hardly have been possible.) An-
other question which is yet barely answered
is, however, how Moscow deals with its own
intranational peripheries.
The imperialist mechanisms and structures
of dependence have taken shape and consoli-
dated over a long period of time, since the
16th century, while socialist world policy has
existed only since the end of World War II. It
is, thus, possible that in the long run, interna-
tional dominance relationships might develop
under socialist auspices, which are certainly
not identical, but nevertheless effective. How-
ever, caution is advisable in applying Western
or capitalist standards and experiences to ques-
tions and analysis of socialist structures and
processes. A theory of socialist division of la-
bor, solidarity, strategies of defense and eman-
cipation in the context of a theory of the tran-
sition towards socialism would be necessary
(App. no. 37). Yet we barely have the begin-
nings of such a theory, not to speak of suffi-
cient empirical information.
 Dependency Structures as Dominant Pattern
APPENDIX
Section for International Politics of the German
Political Science Association
Survey of the Studies planned for the 1972/73
Project: 'Conflict and Integration: Processes of
Penetration, Structures of Dependency and Coun-
terstrategies in World Society', (working title)
Progress Report as of July 1972
A. General theoretical perspectives
i. Hartmut Elsenhans (Berlin): Waves of Penetra-
tion and the Present Multi-phased International
Division of Labor.
2. Klaus Jurgen Gantzel (Frankfurt): Integration
and Conflict: Global Strategies in World
Politics Since the End of the Second World
War.
B. Monographs
Field I. Relations in and between Capitalist
Center Nations
3. Gerhard Kiersch (Berlin)/BarbaraMettler (Kon-
stanz): The American Penetration of France
After the Second World War.
4. Gerd Junne / Volker Henke / Manfred Horn /
Dieter Schweier (Berlin): The Illusion of Inter-
dependence between Industrial Societies: the
Case of the European Monetary Market (in-
cluding the US Bank System and its Expan-
sion).
5. Bernard Mennis / Karl Sauvant (Philadelphia):
Multinational Corporations, National Identifi-
cation. and European Integration.
6. Friedrich von Krosigk (Hamburg): Multi-
national Corporations in the Decisionmaking
Process of European Integration Policy.
7. Rolf Lindner (Berlin): Endeavors Toward
Federal Integration in Northern Europe from
1948/49 to 1970.
8. Rainer Klaus (Berlin): Mezzogiorno in Italy
as an Intranational and European Periphery.
9. Hans H. Rass (Berlin): Intranational Penetra-
tion: the Case of England vs. Scotland.
10. Albert Statz (Marburg): Change in the Func-
tion of Supranationality in West European
Integration.
11. Volker Bornschier (Zurich): Transnational
Economic Organizations in the World System:
Some Perspectives for the Future.
12. Eva Senghaas-Knobloch (Frankfurt): Inter-
national Organizations as the Agents of Multi-
national Corporations?
13.Heide Dechmann / C. Blickenstorfer I Daniel
Frei (Zurich): Symmetrical and Asymmetrical
Interactions between Highly Developed Na-
tions: the Case of Switzerland.
211
Fields 11111. Relations between capitalist center-
nations and peripheries
14. Hartmut Elsenhans / Manfred Horn / Salua
Nour / Volker Hornung (Berlin): The World
Oil Market: an Example of the Differentiation
of Relations of Dependence and the Eman-
cipatory Strategies which Result.
15. Peter Seibt (Bremen): American - Chinese
Relations.
16. Georg Simonis I Wolfgang Hein I Heinz
Rudolf Sonntag / Konrad Stenzel (Konstanz):
Autonomy and Penetration of Venezuela.
17. Karl Wohlmuth (Bremen): International Pro-
cesses of Concentration and the Creation of
Work and Jobs in the Third World: the Case
of Zambia.
18. Klaus Klatt / Marlies Kufahl / Wolfgang
Mayer / Samir Nuri I Hans J. Truol l Georg
Voget (ErlangenlNurnberg): Imperialism and
Association: the Importance of the Associated
African States for the Industrial Societies of
the EEC.
19. Rajan Malaviya (Starnberg/Frankfurt):Trans-
fer of Scientific Know-How from the Industrial
Societies to the Third World: the Case of
Models for Political Development in the
1960s.
20. Klaus Jurgen Gantzel, et al. (Frankfurt!
Mannheim): Relationships of Power Potential
and Cases of Penetration: Western Industrial
Societies and Latin America.
Field III. Relations in and between peripheries
21. Heide Trader (Berlin): Penetration in French-
Speaking Black Africa and Concepts of
Counter-integration.
22. Obi Okongwu (London): Structure, Functions,
and Problems of the Organization for African
Unity.
23. Werner Ruf (Aix-en-Provence): Integration and
Conflict in Maghreb: the Findings of Content
Analyses and Aggregatedata Based Research.
24. Werner Ruf (Aix-en-Provence): Cultural
Alienation in Maghreb.
25. Hartmut Elsenhans (Berlin): Algerian Devel-
opment until 1954 and the Political Emancipa-
tion of Algeria.
25a. Robert Hoppe / Kurt P. Tudyka (Nijmegen):
Processes of Development in Surinam.
26. Burkhard Luber (Frankfurt): Exchanges in the
Third World: Approaches to a Diachronic
Description of Structures - the Case of Latin
America.
27. Lothar Brock (Berlin): 'Historical Integration'
and 'Counter-intergration'in Latin America:
the Case of the Central American Common
Market.
28. Ernesto Richter (Tubingen): Class Structuresin
212 Klaus Jurgen Gantzel
Underdeveloped Societies: the Case of El Sal-
vador.
29. Ingrid Starke (Berlin): The Consequences of
Brazil's Development into a Privileged Satellite.
30. Jurgen Holscher (Berlin): The Foreign Policy
of the U.P. Chile as a Function of Nationaliza-
tion.
31. Peter Pawelka (TTibingen):The Disintegration
of Pakistan.
32.Benigna Berger (Freiburg): The Function of
the Church in a Peripheral Country in
Throwing into Question the Structures of
Dependency: the Case of Argentina.
33. Gerhard Pfister (Zurich): International Inter-
dependency and National Integration: the Case
of East Africa.
34. Volker Matthies (Hamburg): Border Conflicts
Between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya.
Fields lII. Relations between capitalist and
socialist center-nations
35. L. Brock I N. Hornung l H. Recke J U. Reh-
feldt / I. Rodejohann / C. Wormann / M. Horn
(Berlin): The Structure of Economic and
Technological Exchange between Capitalist
and Socialist States in Europe: Symmetries and
Asymmetries.
36. H. Jacobsen (Berlin): East European Countries
in GAIT: Reduction of Economic Discrimina-
tion and National Emancipation.
Field II. Relations between socialist center nations
37. F. Klinger / P. Schulze / W. Suss (Berlin):
Criticism and Counter-Criticismof the Theory
of Convergence: the Categorial Conceptuali-
zation of the Transitional Society of the Soviet
Model.
38. Th. Weingartner / R. Wiedman (Berlin):
Aspects of Socialist Integration: the Case of
Poland and East Germany.
Fields II and III/IV. Relations between socialist
center nations on the one hand and peripheries on
the other
39. S. Nour et al. (Berlin): The Relationship of
Dominance in Soviet-Arab Relations.
40. P. Stricker I H. Deckmann I D. Frei / D.
Ruloff (Zurich): Preconditions for the Inter-
vention of Third Parties in Conflicts and its
Consequences.
REFERENCES
Cordova, A. & H. Silva-Michelena 1969: Die
wirtschaftliche Struktur Latein-Amerikas - Drei
Studien zur politischen Okonomie der Unterent-
wicklung. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt (originally Cara-
cas 1967).
Czempiel, E. O. (ed.) 1969: Die anachronistische
Souveranitat - Zum Verhaltnis von Innen- und
Aussenpolitik. Sonderheft 1, Politische Viertel-
jahresschrift (PVS), Westdeutscher Verlag,
Cologne-Opladen.
Dencik, L. 1970: Peace research - pacification or
revolution? pp. 74-91 in IPRA Proceedings, 3rd
General Conference, Vol. I. Van Gorcum, Assen.
Galtung, J. 1970: Feudal systems, structural
violence, and the structuraltheory of revolutions,
pp. 110-188 in IPRA Proceedings, 3rd General
Conference, Vol. I. Van Gorcum, Assen.
Galtung, J. 1972: Europe: bipolar, bicentric, or
cooperative? Journal of Peace Research 9, No. 1.
Gantzel, K. J. (ed.) 1973: Internationale Bezieh-
ungen als System. Sonderheft 5, PVS. West-
deutscher Verlag, Cologne/Opladen.
Gantzel, K. J. forthcoming: The armament-
dynamics in the East-West conflict, in Papers of
the Peace Science Society-lnternational, forth-
coming.
Jahn, E. 1973: Das Problem der Identifizierung
von Interessen im internationalenSystem,in Gant-
zel 1973.
Kende, I. 1971: Twenty-five years of local wars,
Journal of Peace Research 8, No. 1.
Krippendorff, E. (ed.) 1973: InternationaleBezieh-
ungen. Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne/Berlin.
Marini, R. M. 1972: Brazilian subimperialism,
Monthly Review 23, No. 9.
Misra, K. P. 1972: Intrastate imperialism: the case
of Pakistan, Journal of Peace Research 9, No. 1.
Schlupp, F., S. Nour & G. Junne 1973: Zur
Theorie und Ideologie der Internationalen Inter-
dependenz, in Gantzel 1973.
Schmiederer, U. 1973: Systemkonkurrenz als
Strukturprinzip der internationalen Politik, in
Gantzel 1973.
Senghaas, D. 1971: Kritische Friedensforschung.
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.
Senghaas, D. (ed.) 1972a: Imperialismus und
strukturelle Gewalt. Frankfurt.
Senghaas, D. 1972b: Rustung und Militarismus.
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.
Sunkel, 0. 1970: Integration capitaliste trans-
national et desintegration national en Amerique
latine, Politique Etrangere 35.
NOTES
* This essay outlines the research project begun
in the fall of 1971 by the Section for International
Politics (SIP) of the German Political Science
Association under the chairmanship of this author
and with the financial support of the Volkswagen
Foundation. The project should be concluded by
the end of 1973. It treats the subject: 'Conflict and
Integration: Processes of Penetration, Structures
of Dependency, and Counterstrategies in World
Society'. The Appendix of the present article
 Dependency Structures as Dominant Pattern
provides a survey of studies as yet planned or in
varying stages of progress within the framework
of the project. The individual studies are referred
to at thematically relevant points in the text
('App.no.. '), although this author does not thus
wish to imply that the various authors present
the same theses as found in this article. The studies
are being prepared at various universities or
institutes either by single members or groups from
the SIP.
It is hoped that, through group discussion at
regularly held conferences as well as cooperation
amongst those handling related themes, the
greatest degree of theoretical homogeneity can be
achieved. The studies will be published in the
SIP series, most likely in several volumes. Earlier
studies under the SIP include: Ernst-OttoCzempiel
(ed.), Die anachronistische Souverinitit - Zum
Vterhaltnis von Innen- und Aussenpolitik (1969);
and Klaus Jiirgen Gantzel (ed.), Internationale
Beziehungen als System (1973).
The present article is meant as a contribution to
the general conception of the SIP project and
represents a slightly revised version of an article
published in Dieter Senghaas (ed), Imperialismus
und strukturelle Gewalt (1972), pp. 104-120. The
author is grateful for helpful comments from dis-
cussion in the section as well as from individual
members. The necessary brevity unfortunately does
not allow mention of each contribution by name.
The bibliography in the References is likewise
limited to the indispensable, in particular with
regard to works of authors sufficiently well-known
to readers of the Journal of Peace Research. The
manuscript of this article was finished in Septem-
ber 1972 and translated by Deborah Kaiser, Saar-
bruccken.
t. The frequent reference to deficiencies of
existing socialist societies, their relatively low
productivity, and their deviation from the ideal
model of socialism etc. in rejecting or defaming
them is due not lastly to an unacceptable conden-
sation of historical functional realities.
2. The analysis of the basic structure of the
international system provided by Schlupp et al.
1973 represents an important step in this direction.
3. In answer to the objection that we are dealing
here with a tautology - center and periphery are
defined through asymmetrical interaction and vice-
versa - we must point out that the constellation
we have described must be understood as a but
one frame in the film of the spiral-shapedprocess
which can be deciphered only historically. Center
and periphery are dependent on one another be-
cause of their needs and roles. The frequent
reference to this interdependence in defense of
the capitalist societal order suppresses the fact that
the center has far greater possibilities for freeing
itself from this interdependence: for example,
213
through technical rationalization, shifting produc-
tion sites into foreign countries, manipulation of
public opinion, or through introduction of forms
of authoritarian or even dictatorial state inter-
vention.
4. Beyond critical description and analysis of the
existing systems of societal division of labor and
its negative consequences, almost no research has
as yet been done on possible solutions to the
problem: how such desirable social differentiation
and economic-technical efficiency can be combined
with a division of labor free of dominance?Neither
does a society exist whose political and socio-
economic constitution could provide an acceptable
alternative model. The existing struture and norms
of the world system are, of course, responsible for
this state of affairs in the social sciences.
5. In this connection, see in particular the theses
on imperialism of Johan Galtung, as well as
Sunkel 1970, who formulates the thesis of 'double
polarization'. Of course, in principle such insights
are not new; they were formulated already long
ago in marxist sociology or political economy.
6. Dencik 1970; Jahn 1973; Senghaas 1971 have
mentioned several important aspects of the concept
of interest in this connection. Nonetheless the dis-
cussion on this problem, especially the empirical
identification of objective interest, is far from
completed.
7. Indicators for measuring the power potential
are primarily data about the GNP per capita
andlor as a percentage of the corresponding value
for the entire world society, also the percentage
share of its working population not employed in
primary sectors of the economy such as agricul-
ture, mining etc. (Cf. among others, Galtung - in
particular his reference to the connection by means
of spin-off effects.) In addition to economic data,
data on military power would have to be in-
cluded. The problem of an adequate standard of
measuring power is, however, not yet solved. The
authors (Karl W. Deutsch, Bruce Russett etc.)
connected with the 'Yale Political Data Program'
and the 'World Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators' offer important suggestions on this
topic. The in part more critical study by Silva-
Michelena 1969 should also be consulted.
8. The nature of participation, i.e. the predomi-
nant behavior pattern of a nation, or of its elite,
in the international system is not determined
solely by its power basis; it is rather a function
of the specific social system and the resulting
interests.
9. One could also say: The standard for place-
ment on the vertical axis is the stage of devel-
opment, i.e. the degree to which the forces of
production have developed.
10. A mere dichotomous classification would not
reflect the realities. However, it is by no means
214 Klaus JuirgenGantzel
clear which indicators could be used in a theoreti-
cally valid manner to measure and rank the
societies along the Cap-Soc axis. The theoretical
criterion should be the system of production with
consideration of its typical developmental stages as
well. In particular among the peripheral societies,
the feudalist systems would in addition have to be
identified. Indicators of distribution of income
should also be included. Valuable reference to the
comparative empirical analysis of social systems
can be found in Cordova & Silva-Michelena 1969.
11. This does not yet describe the manner in
which the conflicts are processed: hostile behavior,
dissociative coexistence, cooperation, etc., can
appear simultaneously or in alternation, depending
on the situation, without touching upon the nature
of the basic conflict.
12. A relationship of exchange exists under the
asymmetrical conditions, according to Galtung
(note 5), when a country regularly has to exchange
a low-value item for one of higher value because
the unequal exchange results in unequal spin-off
effects for further development in the nations
engaged in trade - to the disadvantage of the
nation producing the low-value item. In such cases,
it is not relevant whether the exchange is direct or
by way of third countries. For the center nation
Switzerland as an example see App. no. 13.
13. Penetration is the direct or indirect parti-
cipation of outsiders in the decisionmaking pro-
cesses over the distribution of values and hence
the external control of the development processes
in the whole or in partial sectors of a society,
(whether by means of regulation through manip-
ulation of important factors involved in decision-
making like information, currency flows, etc., or
through the anticipatory adaption of those being
penetrated). The precondition of penetration is a
certain harmony of interests between the intra-
national centers of the penetrating and the pene-
trated societies; the penetrating center requires a
'bridgehead'in the other society. Cf. here Galtung's
definition of imperialism, and Hartmut Elsenhans
(App. no. 1).
14. Interestingly enough, the imperialistic pene-
tration of Europe by the USA has seldom been
articulated by the Europeans, though at most in
France under de Gaulle. Cf. App. no. 3 for the
history of this penetration.
15. To treat 'Western Europe' here as one entity
is, of course, a crude simplification. Yet it seems
admissable by way of illustration since the grada-
tion between the individual West European
societies and their respective dependency on the
USA represents, at most, variants of the same
basic pattern. However, a more detailed analysis
would have to take into consideration the inner-
European vertical relationships of dependency.
For a discussion of the case of Northern Europe
where the centralizing forces (Sweden, West and
East Europe) conflict alternating in various
phases, see App. no. 7.
16. It is often overlooked in this connection
that within and separate from their association,
the European states rival and compete with one
another.
17. It is obvious that this feedback process is
positive. The exploitation of the peripheral
societies promotes the inner dynamics of growth
in the center nations, which in turn presses them
all the more strongly to imperialist penetration.
18. This is related in part to the introduction of
technologies tailored to conditions in highly-indu-
strialized societies and not to those of a developing
nation. The consequence of this situation - here
only briefly sketched - is the 'development of
underdevelopment' (A. G. Frank; Cordova; Sun-
kel; Furtado; Jalee, and others): destruction of
beginnings of autonomous development; neglect
of the cultivation of the main staple food of the
population (manioc), because agricultural profits
shift into more profitable branches; inner-state
imperialism of Brazil's South over the North-
East through inequality in the 'terms of trade'
between the regions, in part existent in domestic
trade, in part passed on through export-import
and state-subventions; etc.
19. The conservatism and 'anti-communist'
stance of the North American trade unions provide
ample evidence.
20. An important aspect of Britain's joining the
EEC which has as yet hardly been mentioned is
the probability that she will bring in her wake the
association of a number of former British colonies
to the EEC, thus making a complete farce of their
sovereignty in terms of international law.
21. Pakistan provided a particularly marked
example of intrastate imperialism: the income and
the imports which resulted from the East-Pakistan
exports of raw materials and agriculturalproducts
flowed into the Western part of the country which
was ruled and exploited by a handful of families.
And at the same time the political, administrative,
and military posts even in East Pakistan were
occupied almost exclusively by West Pakistanis.
Cf. Misra 1972.
22. This heuristic concept is borrowed from
Schlupp et al. 1973.
23. The limitation of access to information about
socialist states can also be considered as an expres-
sion of their reaction to western supremacy and
tendency toward penetration.
24. Even if one includes the cases of the DDR
in 1953 and Poland in 1956. the number of direct
military interventions by the USSR is low com-
pared to the over 50 interventions by the USA,
France, and Great Britain from 1945 to 1969.
(Kende 1971.)
 Dependency Structures as Dominant Pattern 215

SUIMMARY PE3KME
In their work on a series of monographs, the
themes of which follow, a group from the Section B cBoet
pa6oTe Hax cepsHHH MoHorpaHP*, TeMt
for International Politics of the German Political
Science Association posits the following assump- KOTOpHXcAejyrx, rpynnrra HccAeAosareAeIt H3
tions: (a) that international relations and the CeicHH no MeXaYHapoHOftO noJaiHne npH ObuecT-
foreign policies of individual states can be suffi- Be IIonHTwreCKHXzHayS repmaiHH npenxcTalaReT
ciently explained only when considered within the cjeAyrioirte yTsepAezHHHi /aI/ MeDyHapoxHe OT-
hierarchical structure of world society; and (b) HometnH H BHe8maU noAHTHKa oTZeZHbHX rocy-
that this structure, carried by the interests and AapcTB HoryT 6lTb yOBJIeTBOpHTejtbHO o0agcHe-
mechanism of capitalism, represents a system of J TOXtHKOB CB3H C MepapxHecKott CTpyKTypot
dominance ('Herrschaft'). H /6/
MHpOBOrOo6uecTBa, rTO Ora CTpyKTypa,
I) Empirical analysis of penetration processes
%KTyeiaM HHTepecMH H MeXaHH3MOM KanHTanH3-
and dependency structures in various strata of
world society. This includes the global as well as Ma, npe,cTaBjn eT rOonotTByOtgyy o CHCTeMly.
respective national historical conditions, and also 1. 3MnHpHRecKHt aHanjiH3 nporeccoB npoHHKHoBe-
the socio-economic changes in and between the HHJ H CTpyKTyp 3aBHCZHMOCTH B pa3nt.
center nations which generated waves of penetra- cioxxH MHpoBoro of6ecTsa. 3To 3aujixowaeT
tion. rjio6aAiHe TaxcKe H cooTseTTseHHie HaHO-
2) Analysis of the core area of the more or less Haj8bWe HCTOpH'ecKICe ycjioBHst K ToXy xe H
integrated international center, including multi-
COtHaA?-DOHO3OHOHIeCKHeH3MHeHeH$ BHTRH H
national corporations and bank systems; of the
BHe geHTpajbi.ix HazItH, KOTopHe nopopna ne-
effects of the international division of labor with
regard to desintegration and retardation of devel- PHOH npOHHrKHOBeHH.
opment in the international and intranational 2. AHajiH3 rJasBoro pattoua6oaee HJIH Mewee
peripheries of world society. HHTerpHpoBaHHoro MeX,jYHaPo,Horo geHTpa, BHJIO0-
3) Analysis of the role of the state apparatuses Yai MHOrOHaBIHOHaJIaHUeKOPnOPaW&HHH 6aHOBHe
as agents of the national centers as well as of CMCTeMw; aHaH3 9$exKTOB Me%nyHapotHoro pa3-
transnational actors. ^ejieHHJ Tpy,a OTHocHTejAHo ,HCHHTerpanHIHH
4) Analysis of the nature of the competition 3ana3,HBaHHH B pa3BHTHH Me:xyHapO,RHHX H BHy-
between the capitalist and the socialist systems
TpHHagHOHaALHbxneepH$epH1tMHpoBOro o UaecTBa.
and its function in stabilizing or destabilizing the
3. AHaJIH3 POIH rocy)tapCTBeHHoro arnapaTa,
international system of dominance.
5) Examination of the relations between socialist axa areuTypH HaHouHaAbHHx geHTpoB, a Tauuce
societies as to the extent to which they represent H TpaHCHagHOHaJIsbHX ABHZyiIHX CHJI,
reactions to the capitalist environment or 4. AHaAHn3npHpo,Qg KOHKypeHurHHMezy KanHTa-
autonomous transition forms, and as to the con- AIHCTHXreCKOt H COMHaJIHCTH'eCKoll CHCTeM&MH H
clusion to be drawn for emancipating non- ee $yHKHuH cTa6HJiH3Hpyji HJIH ycKopaS BJiHaHMe
socialist peripheries. rocno)GcTByioaeft MeHacyHapo;Hoft CHCTeMHL
6) Estimation of the possibilities for emancipa- 5. licejeIaoBauHe oTHoimeHHzt uesnjsy cogHajiHCTH-
tory strategies of dissociation in the peripheries
tecKHHM o6utecTBaMH no Mepe TOrO, KaK OHH OT-
aiming at nonviolent capital accumulation, divi-
sion of labor, and cultural development, all these paxauoT peaKLHH Ha KanHTaAHcTH^ecKyl cpe,y
free of dominance. HJIH aBToHoMHMe nepetoAHHe 4opMu, a Taxze Yo
xacaeTcS BHBO.gOBOTHoCHTeAuHOOCBO6OS,K,eHHN
HecotHaAncTHgiecKHx nepH$epHtt.
6. OgeHKa BO3Mo0HoCTeII OCBo6OBHTejilHHX CTpa-
TerHXt pa3u?e,uHeuxs B nepH)epHJlx , XoTopiae
CT&BJT gejtLKu HaxonJile KaflTaSaa He npHhMe-
Baa HaCHALCTBeMHbXMeToAOB, pa3geAeuHHe TpyX;a
H KyjiTaypHOe pa3BHTHe. gauaHtue TpH MoiliTa
He JEBJI$I)TCY!
no, KaKOIt-AH6O c0epo0 BJIHmfHJ.