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eHAU A-THAI BINH DUONG

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 r
MI;lC II;lC

1. GS. CarlyleA. Thayer

Vietnam's Relations ~vith China and the 7
United States
2. TS. Gerhard Will
C01?flict and Cooperation in the Mekong region ()7

3. Thieu TU'C1ng, PGs. Ts. Le Van CU'ong

V~ val tro ella Vi?t Naln trang khll V~fC Chdu 133
A- Thai Sinh Duong
4. PGs.Ts. Le Van Sang
Vi th~ dia kinh !~, dia chinh tri cua Viet Nam 14'5
t;ong kizu VllC Chii~ A- Thai Binh DUO~1g:
Lich sit', hi¢n t(Ii va tU071g lai
5. PGs.Ts. VU Van Hit • PGs.Ts. Pham Thi Thanh Binh
Vai tro clla Virt Nam trong khu V~;C Chiiu A- 161
Thai Binh Dllang
6. TS. Ngo Tat To
Vai tro etta Vi?! Nanz if Chdu A- Thai Binh 175
Du'(mg
7. PGs.TsKH. Tran Khanh
Vi th~ eua Virt Nam trong Tr(lt tv mb'i (y 185
Dong A dang hinh thanh
8. Ths. Ph~m Van Min
Tr(l,t tl;l' Dong A tu' $oe nhin eua Chu nghla 199
Cu3n sach dm}'c xu~t ban vOl sl}' titi trQ' clla
Kien tQO va n19t so gfli mit cho Vi?t Nam
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung

9. TsKH. Tran Hi~p

Nhimg net ehinh v~ ti~n trinh Vif}t Nam h(ji 217
nh(lp khu Vl;l'C Chiiu A-Thai Binh Duong
10. PGS. Nguyen Huy Quy
Vi?t N{lm trang n61~l'c dong gO{) vdo hod billh
t(li khu V~l'c ChduA- Thai Binh Duo71g
11. GS. TS. Do Thanh Sinh - TS. Nguyen Thi H~nh
Vai tro CUCl Vit}t Nafn trong vi¢c giai qll.VJt tranh 2~/~ 1
ch(p (J' bidn Dong gilfU ASEAN vel Trung Qu6c
12. PGS.TS. Ph~m Quang Minh
Vai tro an ninh cua Virt Naln 0' khu VIJ'C chau ,,4- 2()3
Thai Binh DLt'ang nhtrng naJn dau the kY XXI
13. TS. Nguyen Thi Thanh Thuy
Vi th~ cria Vi?! Na/11 a Chdu A-Tllai Binh 283
Duang trong m6i lien h? vai chinh sac/l cI~a My
akhu V~fC
14. PGS.TS. Nguyen Thai Yen HU'O'ng
Vi?t Nam trang tinh toan chidn Ill(lC ella M)' a 297
khu Vl!C Dong NamA
15. PGS.TS. Tran Thi Vinh
Dtnh vi Vi?t Nam trong eJzidn llf(lc ella M.f; a 317
ehall A-Thai Binll Dzro'ng: iieh SIt va Hi¢n t(li
16. PGS.TS. Hit My HU'O'ng
Chinh saeh clla Nga d6i vai Chilu A-Thai 33'5
Binh DU'ang va vai Vi¢t Nam thai T6ng th6ng
D. Medvedev
Vietnam's relations
227
with China and The United States
Carlyle A. Thayer
Elneritus Professor,
School of Hun1~lnities and Social Sciences,
'('he l1nivcrsity of Ne\\' South Wales
~lt the Australian J)cfcncc Force Acadcnly, (~anbcrra
Introduction
This paper presents an analysis of Vietnam's two
most important sets of bilateral relations, Vietnam-China
and Vietnam-United States. In recent history Vietnam has
fought successful wars with both major powers and then
proceeded to normalize relations with its former
adversaries. The focus of this paper is on the post­
normalization period in general and defence relations in
particular.
The paper is divided into five parts. Part 1 provides a
general overview of Vietnam's changing worldview and
conceptualization of foreign relations. Part 2 reviews
Vietnam-China relations. This is followed in part 3 by an
analysis of Vietnam-United States relations. Part 4
presents a comparative analysis of defence relations. Part
5 offers some preliminary conclusions.
Vietnam's Changing Worldview
Vietnam has witnessed a remarkable transformation
in its worldview and conceptualisation offoreign relations
7
 when the Cold War era is cOll1pared with the post-Cold
War period. During the Cold War VietnalTI was a Inenlber
of the socialist can1p led by the Soviet Union and adopted
an orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological framework. It
accepted the view that the world was divided into two
camps, social ist and capitalist, on the basis of antagonistic
contradictions. In other words the world was divided
between 'friends and enemies' and the key question was
'who will triumph over whom?'. Global integration was
viewed negatively as a process of assimilation (hoa nhap)
through which socialist states would loose their autonomy
ifnot identity.
Vietnam generally refrained from taking sides in the
Sino-Soviet dispute but adhered to the view that the Soviet
Union was the leader of the socialist world. In the late
1960s, for example, Vietnamese foreign policy
theoreticians propounded the Soviet 'theory of three
revolutionary currents' (ba dong thac cach mang) as a
framework for analysing global political developments.]
Vietnan1 finnly rejected 'Mao's theory of three worlds' in
the 1970s.
The later years of the Cold War witnessed the
beginnings of a change in Vietnam's worldview. Vietnam
was very much influenced by 'new political thinking'
advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev
1 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnamese Perspectives on InternatIonal Security: Three
Revolutionary Currents', in Donald H. McMillen. ed., Asian Perspectives on
International Security. London: Macmillan Press, 19H4, 57-76.
VAI TRO eVA V~T NAM TRONG KHU vue
...
8 cHAu A- TI-rAI BiNH DUONG .
provided a new rationale and framework for viewing
global change.: The stress was now on the role of
economics and science and technology as drivers of
change. Vietnam's own domestic socio-economic crisis in
the mid-1980s also contributed to the process of re­
evaluati11g Vietnam's worldview.
At the el1d of 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev put paid to
the concept of the 'two worlds' in a major address to the
United Nations General Assembly. Gorbachev stressed
that the development of anyone country would be based
'on the interests of all mankind'. He spoke of the
'emergence of a mutually connected and integral world'
and that future progress would only be possible 'through
the search for a consensus of all mankind, in movement
toward a new world order'. Once again, influences from
the Soviet Union impacted on Vietnam.
The process of adapting and then modifying
Vietnam's traditional worldview was a gradual one. It
involved intense internal debate and in some respects the
elements of the old ideological framework have not been
jettisoned completely. Vietnam's new outlook now
perceived the world as increasingly interdependent and
economic integration (hoi nhap) was now viewed a
positive process.
Ran1csh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer. eds., The Soviet Union as an Asian Pac(fic
POVv'er: hnplications (~r Gorhachev'.\' 1986 Vladivostok Initiative. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1987 and Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Indochina', in Desmond Ball and
Cathy Downes, eds., Security and Defence: Pac(jlc and Glohal Perspectives.
Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990.403.
VAI TRO eVA VIt:T NAM 1RONG KHU vt1c 9
CHAu A-THAI BINH DUONG .
 Changes in Vietnanl's worldview can be
documented with reference to eight i111portant conceptual
turning points: Politburo Resolution No. 32 (1986),
Politburo Resolution No.2 (1987), Politburo Resolution
No. 13 (1988), Seventh Party Congress (1991 ), mid-tenn
party conference (1994), the Ninth Party Congress (2001)
and eighth plenum of the party Central Comlnittee
(2003).3
Politburo Resolution No. 32
In July 1986, after a period of intense internal
debate, the Politburo of the Vietnam Communist Party
(VCP) adopted Resolution No. 32 (32/BCT21) on new
opportunities and possibilities to consolidate and develop
the economy. Significantly, this resolution identified
'peace and development' as the highest priority and laid
the basis for 'new thinking' (tu duy moi) in the
conceptualization of VietnalTI'S national security policy.
According to Phan Doan Nam, Resolution 32:
; On the eve ofthe Eighth Congress the VCP was rent by internal diviSIons between
'reformers' and 'conservatives' over ideology, the pace and scope ofreform efforts,
the extent to which Vietnam should open itself to foreign int1uences, and
leadership change. The foreign policy section ofthe Political Report to the Eighth
Congress was amended several times before it was tabled. During this period
there was intense internal party debate over developing diplolnatic relations with
the United States. The Political Report was a status quo document and did not
develop or elaborate any lnajor new policy then1es such as 'renovation' adopted by
the Sixth Congress, or 'industrialization and modernization' endorsed by the
Seventh Congress. See Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Upholding State Sovereignty Through
Global Integration: The Remaking of Vietnamese National Security Policy',
Paper to conference Viet Nanl, East Asia and Beyond, City University of 1long
Kong, Hong Kong, December 11-12,2008,25.
10 VAI mQ eVA VI£T NAM mONG KI-IU vue
CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG .
clearly set out guidelines and revised diplomatic
policies, and moved toward a solution in Cambodia. The
Resolution clearly stated:
- the external mission of Vietnam is to have good
coordination between the strength of the people and the
strength of the era, to take advantage of favourable
international conditions to build socialism and defend the
Fatherland, proactively create a condition for stability and
econolnic construction.
- It is necessary to move proactively to a new stage of
development, and peacefll1 coexistence with China,
ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], and
the United States, and build Southeast Asia into a region of
4
peace, stability and cooperation.
Nonetheless, many in the VCP continued to view the
world divided into friends and enelnies. According to
Interior Minister PhalTI Hung, in the first stage of the
period of transition to socialism, the struggle to defeat the
multi-faceted war of sabotage waged by hegemonists in
collusion with imperialism is closely linked to the struggle
between socialism and capitalism to determine 'who will
triun1ph overwholn'.
Sixth Party Congress
In Decelnber 1986, Vietnaln held its Sixth National
Congress, a meeting that has become synonymous with
4 Phan Doan NmTI, 'Ngoai Giao Viet Nam Sau 20 Nam Doi Moi', Tap Chi CongSan,
no. 14(760), July 2006,26.
VAI mQ ruA VIt:T NAM mONG I<HU VlJe 11
CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
 the expression doi moi or renovation.) r-rhe sixth congress
was mainly concerned with overcoming the crisis in the
domestic econolny. Imlnediate priority was given to
increasing food and grain production, consumer goods
and exports. Secretary General Truong Chinh delivered a
summary of the Central Committee's Political Report. I-Ie
identified several means to achieve these priorities
inclllding 'to expand and heighten the effectiveness of
external econolnic relations'.
Two important points should be noted. First, the
policy of doi lnoi led to the abandonment ofone the central
planks of communist ideology central planning. Second,
in order to overcome its economic crisis, Vietnam would
have to open itself to foreign investment from non­
socialist countries. In order to achieve this objective
Vietnam first had to liquidate the Cambodian problem. b
Politburo Resolution No.2
Politburo Resolution No.2, 'On Strengthening
National Defence in the New Revolutionary Stage', was
Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnaln's Sixth Party Congress: An Overview',
DCInands of New Tasks.' Quan Doi Nhan Dan, July 6. 1989 broadcast by Hanoi
Contemporary Southeast A,)'ia, June 1987, 9: 1, 12-22.
Domestic Service, July 6, 1989; and Senior Lt. Gen. Dang Vu Hiep. 'Some Issues
t> 'The period of struggle ainled at a total victory of the Canlbodian revolution,
under the illusion that the Hsituation is irreversible," had COlne to an end, and we
had to acknowledge the reality of a step by step struggle to achIeve a political
solution for the Cambodian question'; see: Tran Quang Co, floi Ky Tran Quang
C~o, http://www.ykien.net/tqc01.html. See also: Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Kampuchea:
Soviet Initiatives and Regional Responses', in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A.
Thayer, eds., The Soviet Union as an Asian Pae~fie PO}1,)er: Implications (~l
Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok Initiative. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, 171­
200 and Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Prospects for Peace in Kampuchea: Soviet Initiatives
and Indochinese Responses', The Indonesian Quarter~v, 2nd Quarter, 1989, 17:2,
157-172.
VAI TRO eVA V~T NAM TRONG KHU Vlfe
12
...
CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
I
---
adopted sometime between April and June 1987 and was
kept secret. 7 Politburo Resolution No. 2 mandated the
return home of all Vietnamese military forces in
Cambodia and Laos to be followed by a major program of
delnobilization.~
In SepteInber 1989 Viet11am unilaterally withdrew
its anned forces froIn CaInbodia. This set the scene for a
negotiated end to a decade-long conflict that had been
costly in blood and treasure and which had left Vietnam
diplomatically isolated and dependent on the Soviet
Union. Over the next five years Vietnam demobilized
700,000 troops, reducing main force strength from 1.2
million in 1987 to 500,000, thus reducing recurrent costs.
Vietnam's strategic readjustment resulted in the adoption
In September 1987 Nguyen Van Linh addressed a conference of high-level
Inilitary cadres. In the course of his presentation, Linh Inentioned an ilnportant
'Politburo resolution on national defence tasks in the present period' (Nghi quyet
cua Bo chinh tri ve nhieln vu quoe phong trong giai doan hien nay). The speech
was published three years later: Nguyen Van Linh. Ma}' Van De Quan Su Va Quae
Plzong n·ong Su Nghiep Doi !'v1oi (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan.
1990), 721. See also: Editorial, 'Urgently Consolidate and Improve the Quality of
the Reservc Force for Mobilization and Militia and Self-Defense Forces to Meet
Relating to the Policy Aimed at Achieving the Task of Building the Anny and
Consolidating National Defense in the New Situation,' Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan
Dan, July 1989 broadcast by Hanoi Domestic Service, July 9. 1989.
>< Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnam's Strategic Rcadjustment', in Stuart Harris and Gary
Klintworth, eds., China as a Great POH'er: M},ths. Realities and Challenges in the
Asia-Pac{/ic Region. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1995, 185-201 and Carlyle A.
Thayer, 'Demobilization but not DisannamentPersonnel Reduction and Force
Modernization in Vietnam', in Natalie Pauwels, ed., War Force to Work Force:
Glohal Perspectives on Denlohilization and Reintegration. BICC Schriften zu
Abriistung und Konversion. Baden-Baden: NOlnos Verlagsgesellshaft, 2000.
199-219.
VAI TRO ruA VIt:T NAM TRONG KHU vue 13
CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
 of cOIl1prehensive security outlook by depreciating the
relative salience of l11ilitary power and raising the
il11portance of econo1l1ic strength as contributors to
national security.
Politburo Resolution No. 13
On May 20, 1988, Vietnamese party leaders adopted
probably the most important modification of foreign
policy in the contemporary period: Politburo Resolution
No. 13 'On the External Mission and Policy in the New
Situation,.9 Politburo Resolution No. 13 used the tenn
national interest (loi ieh dan toe) for the first time,
unequivocally identified economic development as
Vietnam's main priority, and called for a 'Illulti-directional
foreign policy' orientation. The new emphasis was 'to
maintain peace, take advantage of favorable world
conditions' in order to stabilize the domestic situation and
set the base for economic development over the next ten to
fiI1teenyears.
~ 10
In other words, this resolution marked the beginning
of a shift away from the 'two worlds' view towards the
concept of an interdependent world. Vietnam was now
Gareth Porter, 'The Transfonnatlon ofVietnanl's Worldview: Froln Two CaInps to
Interdependence', C'onlenzporary Southeast Asia, 12: 1, June 1990, 1-19: Chu Van
Chue, 'Qua trinh doi Inoi tu duy doi ngoai va hinh thanh duong 10i doi ngoai doi
moi', Nghien Cuu Quoe Te, 3:58,2004,9; Nguyen Dy Nien, 'Chinh Such Van Hoat
Dong Doi Ngoai TrongThoi Ky Doi Moi', Tap Chi COllgSan, 17(740), September
2005, 30; and Phan Doan Nam, 'Ngoai Giao Viet Nam Sau 20·Nanl Doi Moi', Tap
Chi CungSall, no. 14(760), July 2006,26-30.
\1I Luu Doan Huynh, 'VietnaIn-ASEAN Relations In Retrospect A Few Thoughts',
jJialoglle + Cooperation, 2004,1,23-31.
14 VAI IRa eVA vItT NAM 'IRONG KHU Vlfc
cHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG .
poised to shift froln confrontation to accol11illodation in its
foreign policy. According to one party officiat Politburo
Resolution No. 13 directed that a 'comprehensive and
long-tenn regional policy towards Asia and Southeast
Asia~ be drawn up 'as soon as possible'. 11
Seventh Party Congress (1991)
The next important evolution il1 Vietnam's
worldview was the formal adoption of a 'multi-directional
foreign policy' by the Seventh National Congress in June
1991. 12 As key foreign policy documents tnade clear,
Vietnam would 'diversify (da dang) and multilateralise
(da phuong) economic relations with all countries and
economic organizations... ' In short, 'Vietnam wants to
become the friend of all countries in the world community,
and struggle for peace, independence and development'.
According to the Political Report, 'We stand for equal and
mutually beneficial co-operation with all countries
regardless of different socio-political systems and on the
basis ofthe principle ofpeaceful co-existence,.13
The Political Report, reflecting the anxieties ofparty
conservatives and ideologues following the collapse of
11 Nguyen Huu Cat~ 'Viet Nam Hoi Nhap vao Khu Vue vi Hoa Sinh va Phat Trien',
Nghien Cuu Dong NanIA, February 1996.28-29.
I.' VU Khoan, 'Mot so van de quoc te eua dai hoi VII quan', in 80 Ngoai Giao, Hoi
nhap quoe Ie va giu vung han sac. Hanoi: Nha xuat ban chinh tri quoe te, 1995.75
and CarlyleA. Thayer, 'Indochina', in Ramesh Thakur and Car1y1eA. Thayer, eds.,
Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia-Pactfic and the Fonner Soviet Union.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993,221.
I, Communist Party of Vietnam, 7th National C--'ongress DOCllment8. Hanoi:
VietnaITI Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1991. 134.
V AI 'IRa rnA ~T NAM TRONG KHU VlJe 15
CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
socialislll in Eastern Europe., gave priority to relations
with the Soviet Union, Laos, Calnbodia., China, Cuba,
other 'COlTIlTIUnist and workers' parties', the 'forces
struggling for peace, national independence, delTIOCracy
and social progress', India, and the Non-Aligned
Movelnent. It was only at the end ofthis list that Vietnam's
'new friends' were lTIentioned:
To develop relations of friendship with other
countries in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific
region, and to strive for a South-East Asia of
peace, friendship and co-operation. To expand
equal and mutually beneficial co-operation with
northern and Western European countries, Japan
and other developed countries. To promote the
process of normalization of relations with the
14
United States.
Other residues of old political thinking remained.
The final version of the Pla~form .for National
Constructiofl ifl the Period 0.1' Transition to Soci(zlism.,
chapter two, for example, asserted that 'the contradictions
between socialism and capitalism are unfolding fiercely'
but that 'nlankind will certainly advance to socialism., for
this is the law of evolution of history' .15 For its part,
Vietnam would by-pass the capitalist stage and embark on
a prolonged transition to socialism 'involving many
stages' ofwhich the present was just the 'initial stage'.
I~ Ibid., 135.
Vietnam renounced the use of force or the threat to use force in foreign relations
I~ Ibid.,49-50.
VAI TRO eVA VIt:T NAM TRONG I<HU Vlfe
16 CHAv A-THAI BiNH DUONG . CHAv A-THAI BiNH DUONG
Since the seventh party congress., VietnalTI
succeeded in diversifying its foreign relations by moving
from dependency on the Soviet Union to a more diverse
and balanced set of external relations. Five developtnents
were particularly notable: normalization of diplomatic
relations with all nlembers of ASEAN., nonllalization of
relations with China (November 1991), Vietnam's
accession to the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Alnity and
Cooperation., the restoration of official development
assistance by Japan (November 1992), and establishment
of diplorJ1atic relations with South Korea (December
1992). By 1995 Vietnam established diplomatic
j(1
relations with 163 countries, up frOlTI only twenty-three
non-comrnunist states in 1989.
Mid-Term. Party Conference (1994)
The VCP convened its first mid-term party
conference in Hanoi in January 1994 where, among other
issues, Vietnam's response to the 'threat of peaceful
](, Carlyle A. Thayer. 'Inten1al Southeast Asian Dynamics: Vietnam's Membership in
ASEAN'. in Hadi SOesastro and Anthony Bergin, eds., The Role n.fSecurit)' and
EC0110nzic Cooperatf on Structures in the Asia Pac~ftc Region: Indonesian and
Australian Vie1VS. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996,
78-88; Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnam and ASEAN: A First Anniversary
Assessment', Southeast Asian ~ffairs 1997. Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1997 ~ 364-374 and Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnam. Asia-Australia
Briefing Papers, Syctney: The Asia-Australia Institute, The University of New
South Wales, 1992.55-62. In July 1992, Vietnam attended a meeting of ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting ~s an observer for the first time. By signing the ASEAN TAC
and c0111miHcd itselfto the non-violent resolution ofany conflict that Inight arise.
VAI 'tRo cUA V~T NAM 1RONG I<HU VVe 17
.
 17
evolution' was of Inajor concern. Secretary General Do
Muoi's Political Report reaffirmed Vietnam's
commitlnent to the broad outlines of economic and
political renovation that had emerged following the
seventh congress. IX His report warned about the threat of
peaceful evolution aimed at 'abolishing the party and
socialist reginle'. In the face of this assessment, the
Political Report reaffirmed Vietnam's commitment to
'building a socialist orientated market nlechanism under
state management' and opposition to political pluralism or
any other challenges to socialism.
The major policy theme to emerge from the mid-term
conference, however, was the priority to be given
industrialization and modernization. In order to
industrialize and modernize the Political Report
underscored the crucial importance of mobilizing dOlnestic
and foreign capital. The shift of the economic structure to
support industrialization had been mentioned first in the
Strateg}' of Socio-Economic Stabilisation and
Development Up Until the Year 2000 adopted by the
Seventh Congress. The stress on industrialization and
modernization had been endorsed by the Central
Committee's third plenum in June 1993. Now it was given
higher status by its endorsement by the mid-tenn conference.
17 Prior to the conference delegates were given a required reading list that contained
four works dealing with the threat of peaceful evolution. One afthe books was a
translation of a Chinese account justifying the suppression C)f pro-democracy
demonstrators in Beijing in 1989.
IX Nhan Dan, January 21, 1994.
18 VAI lRO eVA v~r NAM lRONG I<HU vue
CHAu A-THAI BiNH DtfCJNG
After tIle conference the official Vietna111ese media
highlighted what it termed the challenges of'four dangers'
facing Vietnam: the danger of being left behind (tut hall)
econoll1ically by regional countries~ danger of peaceful
evolution against socialisnl~ danger of corruption; and
danger ofthc breakdown ofsocial order and security. FJ
In the period after the 1994 mid-term conference and
the convenillg of the Eighth Congress in mid-1996
Vietnam continued to pursue an open door foreign policy
designed 'to make friends with all countries' in an effort to
diversify and multilateralise its external relations. These
efforts paid handsome dividends. Vietnam continued to
attract increased direct foreign investment mainly in the
form ofjoint ventures. In 1993-94 the United States ended
its long-standing objections to the provision of
developnlental assistance to Vietnam by the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund, and gradually lifted
restrictions on trade and investment with Vietnam.
Vietnam thus became eligible for a variety of aid, credits
and commercial loans to finance its development plans.
In July 1995, Vietnam made a major break though on
the foreign policy front; it nonnalized relations with the
United States, became ASEAN's seventh member, and
signed a framework cooperation agreement with the
European Union. For the first time, Vietnam had
diplomatic relations with all five permanent members of
the United Nations Security Council and, equally
I'J Voice ofYietnam, January 22, 1994.
VAI TRO rnA vItr NAM lRONG I<HU Vl1c 19
. CHAu A-THAI BINH DtfCJNG .
 i111portantly, witl1 the world's t}lree 111ajor eCOn01111C
centres: Europe, North Alnerica and EastAsia.
Ninth Party Congress (2001)
The Ninth Party Congress Inet in April 2001 and
reaffinned that 'Vietnaln wants to be a friend and a reliable
partner to all countries in the world' by diversifying and
multilateralilzing its international relations. 2u Priority was
placed on developillg relations with 'socialist,
neighboring and traditional friendly states,.21
The Ninth Congress set the goals of overcoming
underdevelopment by the year 2010 and accelerating
industrialization and modernization in order to become a
modem industrialized state by 2020. In order to
accomplish these goals Vietnam vigorously stepped up
efforts to integrate itself with the global economy by
pursuing membership in World Trade Organisation
(WTO). This process of integrating Vietnam's economy
with the global economy was popularized by the
expression 'vuon ra bien lon' or 'to plunge into the big
ocean'.
2(1 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnam in 200 I: The Ninth Party Congress and After', Asian
SUITey, 42: I, January/February 2002,81-89.
A Politburo resolution adopted in Novenlber 200 1sketched Vietnatn's diplolnatlc
:'1
strategy as follows: continue to strengthen relations with Vietnam's neighbours
and countries that have been traditional friends; gIve importance to relations with
big countries, developing countries, and the political and econoJnic centers of the
wor1d~ raise the level of solidarity with developing countries and the non-aligned
nl0vement; increase activities in international organizations; and develop
relations with communist and workers' parties, with progressive forces, while at
the same time expanding relations with ruling parties and other parties. Pay
attention to people's diplomacy'~ see: Vu Duong Ninh, editor in chiet~ Ngoai 6'iao
Viet Natl1 Hien Dal~ 1975-2002. Hanoi: Hoc Vien Quan He Quoe Te, 2002, 110.
VAI mQ eVA villr NAM TRONG KHU Vlfe
20 CHAu A-THAI BiNH DTJONG . CHAu A-THAI BWH DTJONG
According to Vu Khoan, the Ninth Congress
resolution identified two main measures to attain this
goal: 'first, perfect the regime of a market economy with
socialist characteristics, and second, integrate deeper and
more fully into the various global economic regimes.""
Integration into the global economy will tie our economy
into the regional and global economies on the basis of
1
comInOll rules of the game'.2 In the following years
Vietnam succeeded in getting the United States Congress
to gra11t it permanent normal trade relations status (PNTR)
as a prerequisite for United States approval of Vietnam's
melnbership in the WTO.
8th Plenum (2003)
The party Central Committee's eighth plenum (ninth
congress) met from July 2-12, 2003. It approved an
important reinterpretation oftwo key ideological concepts
the 'objects of struggle' (doi tuong) and 'partners' (doi tac)
in foreign relations. According to the eighth plenum's
resolution, 'any force that plans and acts against the
objectives we hold in the course of national construction
and defense is the object of struggle'. And, 'anyone who
respects our independence and sovereignty, establishes
and expands friendly, equal, and mutually beneficial
~-) Vu Khoan, 'Tich Cue va Chu Dong Hoi Nhap Kinh Te Quoc Te', Tap Chi Cong
Sail. 119,2006, internet edition.
-'- This was the first time the concept of 'market economy with socialist
characteristics' was endorsed~ Le Xuan Tung, 'Nhung Dot Pha Tu Duy Ly Luan ve
Kinh Te Thi Truong 0 NuocTa', Tap Chi CongSan. 16(715),August 2004,17.
VAI TRO rnA V~T NAM lRONG KHU VVc 21
.
 relations with Vietnam is ourpartner,.~4
The eighth plenum resolution argued for a more
sophisticated dialectical application of these concepts:
'with the objects of struggle, we can find areas for
cooperation; with the partners, there exist interests that are
contradictory and different from those of ours. We sholl1d
be aware of these, thus overcoming the two tendencies,
namely lacking vigilance and showing rigidity in our
perception, design, and implementation of specific
policies'.
The eighth plenum resolution provided the policy
rationale for Vietnam to step up defence relations with the
United States.~5 After the plenum Vietnam advised the
United States that it would accept a long-standing
invitation for its Defence Minister to visit Washington.
Vietnam also approved the first port call by a U:S. Navy
warship since the Vietnam War.
This section has traced the gradual evolution of 'new
thinking' in the conceptualization and implementation of
Vietnam's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The
sections that follow will analyse Vietnaln's two most
:'4 Vietnam ComITIunist Party, Commission on ideology and Cultural Affairs,
DOCUI11ents of'the Eighth C"entral ('onlnzittee 0.1' the Vietnanz C0l11nlllllist Par(v
(Hanoi: The National Politics Publishing House, 2003), quoted in Nguyen Vu
Tung, 'Vietnamese Foreign Policy: At a New Crossroad?,' Paper to Strategic and
Foreign Relations, Vietnam Update 2004, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore, Novell1ber 25-26,2004.
:'~ Carlyle A. Thayer, 'The Prospects for Strategic Dialogue', in Catharin E. Dalpino
editor. Dialogue on U.S.- Vietnanz Relations: Ten Years After Nonnalization. San
Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2005, 26-30.
22 VAI TRO ellA VIf:T NAM TRONG KHU Vl1e
CHAu A-THAI BiNH DVONG . CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG
important sets of bilateral relations, those with China and
the United States.
-vietnam-China RelatiollS
Background
In January 1950, the People's Republic of China
extended diplomatic recognition to Vietnam's fledgling
C01TI1TIUnist regime, the Denlocratic Republic of Vietnam
(later renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam). China
supported the Vietnamese communists in their successful
resistance to French colonialism. Relations were
described 'as close as lips and teeth'. China provided
substantial material and personnel support to communist
Vietnam during the Vietnam War (1965-73).
Relations began to fray in 1972-73 when China
began to urge a diplomatic settlement of the Vietnam War
short of reunification. Hanoi's relations with Beijing
began a downward spiral in 1977-78 over growing
conflict between the Khmer Rouge regime and Vietnaln.
Hostilities erupted in February-March 1979 when China
invaded northern Vietnam to teach Vietnam a lesson for its
invasion of Cambodia. Relations remained strained
throughout the Cambodian conflict as China continued to
support the Khmer Regime and shell Vietnam's northern
provinces.
It was only in September 1990, a year after
Vietnam's unilateral withdrawal of military forces froln
Calnbodia that China and Vietnam agreed to nonnalize
relations at a secret summit in Chengdu. Vietnam and
VAl TRO eVA vltr NAM TRONG KHU VVe 23
.
China fomlally nonnalized relations in Novelllber 1991 opportunity for wide-ranging discussions and an impetus
pointedly only after an international conference in Paris for the resolution of various outstanding issues. Party-to­
reached a cornprehensive political settlen1ent in party relations are cemented by the frequent exchange of
Cambodia the previous October.~() party delegations from Central Committee Departments,
administrative units, and specialists on socialist ideology.
The Structure of Bilateral Relations
The VCP and CCP have also conducted a series of five
This section provides an overview ofthe structure of
seminars on ideology. In sum, party-to-party ties have
bilateral relations involving party-to-party, state-to-state
been used to identify common ground between former
and Inilitary-to-military relations.:?7
antagonists.
In March 1999, a surnn1it meeting of the leaders of
In 2000, a sUlnmit meeting of state presidents from
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Vietnam
China and Vietnam codified their bilateral relations in a
Communist Party adopted a sixteen-character guideline
Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the
calling for 'long-term, stable, future-orientated, good­
New Century. This document has served as the framework
neighborly and all-round cooperative relations'. In June
for long-tenn state-to-state relations up to the present. In
2008, following another summit of party leaders in
2006, in a major development, Vietnam and China set up a
Beijing, bilateral relations were raised to that of 'strategic
Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation at
partners', and a year later this was upgraded to a 'strategic
deputy prime ministerial level to coordinate all aspects of
cooperative partnership'.
their relationship. The Steering Committee meets on an
Vietnam and China hold regular sumlnit meetings of annual basis alternating between capital cities. The first
their party leaders. These meetings provide the meeting was held in November 2006, the second in
January 2008 and the third in March 2009. At the third
meeting of the Joint Steering Committee Vietnam and
2/-> ChIna also tunled down a Vietnanlese proposal to fonn an alliance. replying China set up a hot line to deal with urgent issues, such as
'coInrades but not allies'; see: CarlyleA. Thayer, 'Comrade Plus Brother: The New
Sino-Vietnalnese Relations', The PacUic Revie11', 5(4), September 1992,402-406 clashes in the South China Sea.
and Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Sino- Vietnalnese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology
and National Interest', Asian Surve.v, 34(6), June 1994, 513-52X.
Vietnaln and China initiated their first defence
See: Carlyle A. Thayer, 'The Structure ofYietnam-China Relations. 1991-2008', C011tacts since the 1979 border war in 1992. In April 2005 ,
Journal (~( International Culture [Chosun University, Gwangju]. December
2008. 1(2), 45-98 and Carlyle A. Thayer. 'Vietnam and Rising China: The
they initiated their first annual defence security
Structural Dynalnics of Mature Asynlll1etry', In Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian consultations; and in November 2010 they held their first
A./Tair5; 2010. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 20] 0,392-409.

24 VAI IRQ eVA V~T NAM IRONG I<HU VlJe VAI TRO rnA VItT NAM TRONG KHU VVe 25
eHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG . cHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
Strategic Defence Security Dialogue in Hanoi.~x Military­
to-military relations are discussed in detail in the
following section.
Vietnam pursues three strategies in its relations with
China. First, it utilizes high-level party and state visits as a
diplomatic tool to shape its relations with China. Vietnan1
has negotiated a web ofjoint statements, agreemellts, and
treaties in an effort ·to quarantine contentious issues from
intruding on and negatively affecting other areas of
cooperation and to make Chinese behavior more
predictable and less likely to hann Vietnall1's national
interests.
High-level meetings have resulted in the adoption of
guidelines to regulate bilateral relations and set deadlines
for lower officials to settle particular disputes such as the
land border. A prime example may be found in Vietnam's
approach to managing border disputes with China.
24
Vietnam stresses the legacy of past close relations and
mutual benefit over contemporary differences. Vietnam
obtained Chinese agreement to detach these issues from
high-level consideration and to relegate them to technical
working groups, and to solve the easier probleills before
the more difficult. Vietnam's diplomatic strategy
emphasized common interests, such as making the land
2:< 'China- Vietnam boost defence cooperation.' Voice of Vietnam News, Novelnber
28. 2010; 'Vietnamese party, army senior officIals ITIcet with Chinese 111ilitary
delegation,' Xinhua, November 28,2010; and 'Defence officials Ineet in dialogue
with China,' Viet Nan1 News, November 292010.
.") Brantly Womack, China and ~/7etnam' The Politics qj'A,\)'Inlnctry, New Yotk:
Cmnbridge lJniversity Press, 2006, 5 and 89-90.
VAI TRO eVA V~T NAM TRONG I<HU vue
26 CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG .
border safe and secure so that both sides could benefit
from cross-border trade. As a result a treaty on the land
border and agreement demarcating the Gulf of Tonkin
were reached.
Vietnaln's second strategy is to pronl0te multilateral
efforts to enmesh China is a web of cooperative relations.
Vietnam utilizes regional multilateral institutions such as
ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus
Three, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight
and the East Asia Summit. During 20 10, Vietnam used its
position as Chair of ASEAN effectively to
internationalize the South China Sea issue. China is now
discussing the implementation ofthe 2002 Declaration on
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with ASEAN
counterparts in a joint working group.
Vietnam's third strategy may be characterized as
'self-help' or developing its own sufficient military
capacity to deter China from using force. For example,
Vietnam will take delivery of six Kilo-class submarines
from Russia over a six-year period. This is a defensive
strategy aimed at area denial. Vietnam has also offered
Cam Ranh Bay as a repair facility to all navies in the world
in an effort to encourage the presence of foreign navies in
the South China Sea.
On the other hand, China asserts considerable direct
and indirect influence on Vietnam. Probably no major
decision of any nature is made in Hanoi without taking
Chinese interests and likely responses into account. For
example, Vietnam's 2009 Defense White paper makes no
VAI TRO alA VIDT NAM TRONG I<HU VVe 27
CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
l11ention of the 1979 border war with China so as not to
offend Beijing. The Chinese Embassy regularly
intervenes to protest any publication or action that is seen
as infringing Chinese sovereignty, especially in the South
China Sea. The slow pace of Vietnam-United States
lnilitary-to-lnilitary relations up until recently may be
attributed in part to concerns about China's reaction.
China exerts direct pressure through high-level
meetings by national leaders. Party-to-party relations
represent a special conduit for Chinese influence.
Vietnam's model of econolnic development borrows
heavily but not exclusively from Chinese experience.
Vietnamese foreign policy also mimics Chinese
formulations such as appropriating the expression 'peace,
cooperation and development' to describe general
strategic trends in Asia Pacific. Hanoi also adapts Chinese
ideology to its own needs, such as 'the threat of peaceful
evolution'. In sum, no other foreign state is as assertive or
influential in Hanoi than China.
Economic Relations
When Vietnam nonnalized relations with China two­
way trade grew astronomically. China is now Vietnam's
largest trading partner. China supplies Vietnam with
machinery, refined oil and steel. In return, Vietnam supplies
China with unrefined oil, coal and rubber. The single most
important issue in the trade relationship is the imbalance in
China's favor. In 2008, China exported $15.7 billion worth
ofgoods to Vietnam, while Vietnam managed to export only
$4.6 billion to China, leaving a deficit of$11.1 billion.
VAI TRO eVA V~T NAM TRaNG KHU Vl1e
28 CHAu A-THAI BtNH DUONG .
China's trade surplus has figured at every high-level
summit in recent years. Party and state leaders agree that
efforts should be made to make it more balanced. But
how? The stnlcture of Vietnamese exports had changed
little over the years and no major c}1ange is expected in the
C01l11ng years. Vietnamese domestic Inanufacturers
cannot produce quality goods that are competitive in the
Chinese ll1arket place. Restricting Chinese imports is not
on the cards.
Vietnam's massive trade deficit with China must be
placed in the context of Vietnam's current trade deficit of
$19 billion with the rest of the world (2009). Vietnam
needs continued access to markets in the United States
where it has a $9 billion surplus (2009).
Vietnamese leaders have called for increased
Chinese investment to mitigate the trade imbalance.
Although China has responded, the total amount of
investment ($3 billion) is modest when compared to other
foreign investors. Also, China's investment in bauxite
mining in the Central Highlands has proven to be highly
contentious in Vietnam.
In addition to the economic benefits of trade, there
are also geo-strategic considerations at play. The growth
of trade has been accompanied by a massive upgrading
and construction of infrastructure roads, bridges, railways
much of it funded by the Asian Development Bank and
World Bank as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region.
Increasingly mainland Southeast Asia is being linked to
southwestern China. In addition, Vietnam and China are
VAl TRO eVA vffiT NAM TRaNG KHU vue 29
CHAu A- THAI BlNH DUONG .
pronloting the develc)plnent of the 'two corridors and one 1. China's establishinent of the Sansha
economic beltway' linking southern Cllin a , Hainan island adlninistrative unit on Hqinan Island with
and northern Vietnain. Froin Hanoi's point of view, this responsibility over the Para~el Islands, Spratly
not only serves Vietnam's development needs, but also archipelago and Macclesfielq Bank.
enmeshes China and provides Beijing incentives for 2. The publication of anti- Vietl)amese material on
cooperative behavior. thc Intcrnct such as the Purported Chinsse
The relationship between VietnarI1 and China is a invasion plan of Vietnam, Chinese criticislTI of
highly aSytnmetric one in all dimensions ofpower. Vietnam, Vietnamese sovereignty cl(till1S in the South
with a population of 89 million, rankS as the world's China Sea published on a jOint Vietnaln-China
thirteenth most populous country, yet it is only a middle Trade Ministry website, and the publication of
sized Chinese province by comparison. The major strategic anti-China commentary 01) the Internet by
preoccupation of the Vietnamese leadership is how to use VietnaiTIeSe bloggers.
the levers ofdiplomacy, economic relatioI1S and military ties 3. Chinese pressures on Exx()nMobile, BP and
to maintain their autonomy and independence and prevent others to cease assisting Vi~tnam in exploring
from being pulled into China's orbit. and developing hydrocarbon resources in the
Outstanding Issues South China Sea.
Conflicting claims to sovereignty iI1 the South China ,-1. China's imposition of unilat~ral fishing bans in
Sea have generated a number ofissues that have tIle South China Sea north ()f 12 degrees north
caused friction in bilateral relations. Six
30
latitude annually during th~ months of May­
clusters ofissues lnay be identified: August, and Chinese aggressiveness against
Vietnamese fishing craft in il1)posing these bans.
'0 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Recent Developnlents in the South China Sea: Implications for
Peace, Stability and Coopenltion in the Region'. in Tran Truong Thuy, ed., The South 5. China's protest at submis~ions by Vietnam
China Sea: Cooperation jar Ri!gional Securitv and Di!veloprnent. Hanoi: Nha Xuat
B~n The Gioi, 2010, 125-138; Ian Storey and C'arlyle A. Thayer.. 'The S.outh China Sea
(including ajoint submissiol) with Malaysia) to
DIspute:. A Review of Developments and Their Implicatlo~s ~lnce the 2002 the United Nations Commi~sion on Limits to
Declaratlon on the Conduct ofParties," in K. V. Kesavan and DaDlt SIngh, eds., South
and Southeast Asia: Re.spollding to Changing Ceo-Political and Security Challenges. Continental Shelves in May 2009 and China's
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, 57 -72~ and Carlyle A. Thayer, lodging of a V-shaped map containing nine
'Recent Developlnents in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Peace and
Prosperity', Paper presented to the 2nd International WorkshOP on the South China Sea: dash lines to indicate the ~xtent of Chinese
Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, co_sponsored by the Diplomatic sovereignty claims.
AcadeITIy of VietnmTI and the VietnmTI Lawyers' Association, New World Saigon
Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, VietnmTI, November 12-13,2010.

VAl lRO eVA V~T NAM lRONG KHV Vl/e

VAl lRO alA V$T NAM 1RONG K:Hu vue 31
30 CHAu A- rnAl BlNH DUCJN'C .
CHAu A- rnAl BiNH DUONG
 6. Continued Chinese diploll1atic pressure on
Vietnaln to cease any action, including
blogging and publication that China finds
objectionable., especially in relation to the
South China Sea.
The souring of relations over the South China Sea
has also magnified other issues such as China's Inassive
trade surplus in relation to Vietnam and the paucity of
Chinese investments in Vietnaln; illegal Chinese
workers/migrants in Vietnam; and environmental and
possibly national security concerns over China's bauxite
mining venture in Vietnam's Central Highlands.
Vietnam-United States Relations
Background
The United States withheld diplomatic recognition
from Vietnam for over two decades following the end of
the Vietnam War. The main impediment was the issue of a
full accounting of all U.S. servicemen who went missing
in action or were held as prisoners of war (MIA/POW). In
1994, the U.S. lifted its trade embargo as a result of
progress in addressing this issue by Vietnam. In July 1995
the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the
Socialist Republic ofVietnam.
War Legacy Issues
For the next fifteen year bilateral relations continued
to be weighed down by unsettled legacy issues arising
from the Vietnam War: full accounting for U.S. Prisoners
of War/Missing in Action, Vietnamese refugees and
VAI lRQ eVA V~T NAM lRONG KHU vue
32 CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG . CHAu A-THAI BiNH DVC1NG
Vietnaln's demand tl1at the U.S. address 'the wounds of
war' and stop its support for anti-communist exiles
seeking to overthrow the Hanoi government. It took
VietnalTI and the United States six years before could they
negotiated their first substantive agreement - the Bilateral
~rrade Agreell1ent of200 1.
Legacy issues left by the war still persist today but
are no longer tIle centerpiece of the bilateral relationship.
The U.S. accepts that Vietnam is doing its best in
providing a full accounting [or MIAs. Nevertheless, the
POW/MIA issue still remains one of the U. S.
government's highest priorities with Vietnam. In
reciprocation for Vietnamese humanitarian assistance in
addressing the MIA issue, the U.S. has made cooperation
in health the cornerstone of its assistance program and
directs three-quarters of its funding to addressing
HIV/AIDS and pandemic influenza.
VietnalTI has pressed for reciprocity in addressing
legacy issues and in recent years has asked the United
States for assistance in dealing with Agent Orange hot
spots. Congress has appropriated funds to assist with
dioxin removal and to provide health care facilities in Da
Nang where Agent Orange was once stored. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton promised in Hanoi 'to increase our
cooperation and make even greater progress together' to
31
deal with the legacy ofAgent Orange.
~I Retnarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vietnanl Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khienl. Government Guest
House, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22, 2010, U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Spokesman, July 22, 2010.
VAl TRQ eVA VIDT NAM TRONG KHU VlJe 33
.
 Economic Relations
Econoll1ics took center stage in 2000, a pivotal year,
with the signing of a Bilateral Trade Agreement. In 2007.,
Vietnam and the United States signed a Trade and
Investment Agreement. Two-way trade jumped from $450
Inillion in 1995 to $12.9 billion in 2009. As noted above.,
Vietnam enjoys a hefty $9 billion surplus. Obama
Administration officials support Vietnam's full
participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership to expand
free trade. American companies have invested $9.8 billion
in Vietnam, placing the U.S. sixth on the investnlent
ladder. Economic relations also include a Bilateral Air
Transport Agreement (2003, amended in 2008) and a
Bilateral Maritime Agreement (2007). Over 200
memoranda of understanding have been signed between
universities in both countries.
Political Relations
Political relations have steadily improved since
2000 when Bill Clinton became the first Alnerican
president to visit Hanoi. In 2006 and 2007, the U.S. and
Vietnamese presidents exchanged reciprocal visits. A
major turning point occurred in June 2008 when Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Washington. In ajoint
statement, the United States declared its respect for the
territorial integrity ofVietnam and its opposition to the use
of force to overthrow the Hanoi government, thus
addressing Vietnamese concerns about the activities of
overseas Vietnamese. Prime Minister Dung revisited
VAl TRO eVA VIt:T NAM TRONG I<HU VlJe
3!f CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG . CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG
Washington in April 20 I 0 to attend President Barrack
Obalna's Nuclear Security Sunlmit. At that time the two
countries signed a MOU on cooperation in nuclear power
including access to reliable sources of nuclear fueL'2 The
U.S. Quadrennial De.fense Revie~1; 2010 identified
Vietnam as a potential strategic partner along with
Indonesia and Malaysia.)J
Military Relations
Military-to-military relations developed slowly
after 1995 because Vietnam was concerned that defense
relations might outstrip economic ties. In 2000, the United
States and Vietnam initiated defense ministers' visits, on a
reciprocal basis, every three years. It is significant that
Vietnam agreed to an annual defense dialogue first with
the United States in 2004 prior to commencing bilateral
defense security consultations with China the following
year. In October 2008, U.S.-Vietnaln bilateral defense ties
took a significant step forward with the holding ofthe first
Political, Security and Defense Dialogue in Washington.
The dialogue was convened by the U.S. State Department
and Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and focused on
regional security and strategic issues.
Military relations stepped IIp noticeably in 2009, in
apparent response to Chinese assertiveness in the South
China Sea. In April, Vietnamese military officials visited
'.' This agreement reportedly will open the door for Bechtel and General Electric to
sell nuclear reactors to Vietnam.
United States Departlnent of Defense, Quadrennia! Defense Review Report.
II
February 20 1O.
VAI TRO eVA VIt:T NAM TRONG I<HU VlJe 35
.
 the USS JVhll IJ. S"tenllis, an aircraft can ier operating in
1
the South China Sea. In Decell1ber, Vietnanl's Defence
Minister General Phung Quang Thanh, stopped off in
Hawaii to nleet with U.S. Pacific Comllland officials as
part of his visit to Washington. In Hawaii he was
photographed peering through the periscope of the USS
Florida, a nuclear-powered guided missile sublnarine
(SSGN). In 2009 and 2010, VietnalTI cOlnpleted repairs on
two U.S. Military Sealift Command vessels.
th
On the 15 anniversary of normalization, Vietnam's
deputy ambassador visited the USS George W H. Bush in
Norfolk, Virginia, while half a world away Vietnalnese
local government and military officials flew out to the
USS George Washington in waters off the central coast of
Vietnam. Just prior to the fly out, the U.S. and Vietnam
conducted their first naval engagement activities. In
August 2010, in a significant upgrade of their defence
relationship, Vietnam and the US held their first Defense
Dialogue between senior defence officials. 3-l This meeting
focused on bilateral issues such as MIA accounting,
unexploded wartime ordnance, Agent Orange, and areas
for future cooperation.
th
Also on the occasion of the 15 anniversary of the
normalization of diplomatic relations (July 1995-July
2010), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in
Hanoi that America considers Vietnam 'not only important
;-1 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnaln's Defensive Diploluacy', Op Ed, The Wall Street
Journal, August 20-22,20 10, II.
36 VAITRoeUA VItTNAM1RONGKHUVVe
CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG
on its own 111erits.. but as part of a strategy ainled at
enhancing American engagenlent in the Asia Pacific, and
in particular Southeast Asia'. According to Secretary
Clinton . all the fUlldamentals were in place for the U.S. to
take its relations with Vietnanl 'to the next level of
engagement, cooperation, friendship, and partnership'. 15
Constraints and Difficulties
While there is definitely new momentum in the
bilateral relationship, there are constraints and potential
Jh
difficulties in the path ahead. The first concern is what
Secretary Clinton described as 'profound differences' over
37
human rights and political freedom. Human rights remain
the main point of contentiol1 in bilateral relations. u.S.
Ambassador to Vietnam, Michael Michalak, made clear that
anns sales to VietnalTI are not possible until the human rights
situation improves. In an interview with VietNamNet
Publisher NguyenAnh Tuan, Ambassador Michalak stated,
'We would very much like to expand our military to military
relationship to include the sale ofanns, but until we are more
cOlnfortable with the human rights situation in Vietnam,
that's just not going to be possible'. ~8
I, Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vietnam Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia KhielTI. Government Guest
Ilouse, Hanoi, Vietnan1, July 22, 20 10, U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Spokesman, July 22, 2010.
It> Carlyle A. Thayer, 'US-Vietnam Relations: A Scorecard', Asia Pac~fic Bulletin
(East-West Center, Washington, D.C.), No. 67, September 14,2010,1-2.
17 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at Event Celebrating the
th
15 Anniversary of United States- Vietnam Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22,
20 I0, U.S. Department ofState, ()ffice ofthe Spokesman, July 22, 2010.
II{ Tllan Viet Narll, July 6, 2010 reprinted in 'Vietnam's relations with America are in
fact a strategic connection,' VietNamNet, July 11,20 IO.
.
VAl mo rnA VltT NAM lRONG KHU VUe 37
CHAu A- THAI BlNH DUONG .
 The second constraint arises fronl conservative
elements in vietnaln who still view the United States with
suspicion. They not only characterize religious freedom,
hUll1an rights and delTIOCracy as tools to undennine
Vietnaln's socialist regilne but argue that educational
exchanges are part of the 'plot of peaceful evolution'. The
conservative influence within the vCP is evident in draft
policy docUlnents circulated prior to the Eleventh
Congress in 2011. The draft Political Report is replete
with references to 'hostile forces' and 'peaceful
evolution. ,3lJ VCP conservatives oppose the current
trajectory in defense relations with the U.S. because ofthe
potential friction they may cause with China.
A third constraint lies in different expectations
regarding economic reforms. Vietnam is frustrated by
what it considers politically lllotivated trade barriers such
as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy taxes on Vietnamese
goods as well as U.S. pressures to equitize state-owned
enterprises. The U.S. has offered technical assistance in
trade and investment matters and would like to encourage
good governance. But many obstacles stand in the way.
Corruption is rampant and affects all sectors. Vietnam's
restrictions on access to the Internet has become a
4o
contentious issue. Vietnamese government decision­
,\) 'Du thao [Mat] Bao Cao Chinh Tri tai Dai Hoi XI cua Dang (April 2, 2010),' in
Dang Cong San Viet Nam, Du thao Cae Van Kien Trinh Dai ifoi XI ella Dang (Tai
Lieu Su DungTai Dai Hoi Dang Cap Co So), Luu Hanh Noi BO,Apri1201 O.
40 Ren1arks by Secretary of State Hillary RodhalTI Clinton and Vietnam Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, Goven1ment Guest
House, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22, 2010, U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Spokesman, July 22, 2010.
38 VAI IRQ ellA Vrt:T NAM TRONG I<HU vue
CHAu A-THAI BINH DUONG .
making lacks transparency, such as the recent imposition
of price controls and foot dragging on permission for
Anlcrican universities to operate in Vietnam and the U.S.
Enlbassy to increase its staff. Also, a bilateral investn1ent
treaty has yet to be agreed.
Vietnam's Defence Relations with China and tile US
Background
The first defense contacts between Vietnam and
China since their 1979 border war were initiated thirteen
years later in 1992 and one year after the normalization of
relations. Vietnam and China exchanged delegations from
the External Relations Departments of their respective
defense ministries. Another nine years elapsed before
Vietnam and China fonnally agreed to 'multi-level
military exchanges,.-+l In contrast, it was only in 2003,
thirty years after the end of the Vietnam War and eight
years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, that
Vietnam decided to upgrade its defense relations with the
42
United States. Vietnam's Minister of National Defense
made an historic official visit to Washington late that year.
This section provides a comparative assessment of
Vietnam's military relations with China and the United
States under six headings: high-level exchanges, naval
port visits, professional military education and training,
II Joint Statement on Comprehensive CooperatIon in the New Century, December
2000.
4: Decision of the eighth plenum of the Vietnan1 Comn1unist Party Central
COlTIlTIittec. July 2-12,2003.
VAI TRQ ruA V~T NAM mONG I<HU vue 39
CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
other defense cooperation, arlllS and equipnlent sales and from Vietnam. Eleven high-level Vietnamese delegations
strategic cooperation. visited China, while only four visited the United States.

1. High-Level Visits High-level exchanges between Vietnam and China

The United States and Vietnam have exchanged two
reciprocal visits by defense Ininisters/secretary of
defense. These have been spaced at three-year intervals
(see Table 1 below). In contrast, the patterns of ministerial
level visits betweel1 Vietnam and China has been 1110re
erratic and ·heavily weighted in China's favor. Vietnam's
defense minister has journeyed to China on seven
occasions since 1991. A six-year gap occurred between
the second and third visits and a five-year gap took place
between the fourth and fifth visits. The exchanges are not
reciprocal. China's defense minister has visited Vietnam
may be classified into three broad categories: general
staff, general political department and regional military
commands. There is a rough balance in exchanges at
44
general staff and general political department level.
China has dispatched three delegations of regiOI1al
military commanders to Vietnam and received only one
return visit. Most recently, in a new development, the
Political Commissar of the Vietnam People's Army Navy,
45
Tran Thanh Huyen, visited Beijing.
Table 1
Exchanges of Defense Ministers:

only twice with a thirteen year gap between visits. Vietnam, China and the United States, 1991-2009

Vietnam hosted its most recent ministerial-level visits

from China inApri12006 and the United States in July ofthe
same year. In October 2010, both the Chinese and u.s.
defence ministers attended the ASEAN Defence Ministers 1991 July
1992 December 1993 May
Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM + 8) inaugural meeting in 1998 January
2000 July 2000 March
Hanoi. Vietnam's Defense Minister last visited the United 2005 October 2006 April 2003 November 2006 July
States in November 2009 and China inApril20 10. 2007 August
2008-09 no visits 2008-09 no visits 2009 November 2008-09 no visits
A review of high-level defense exchanges below April 2010

secretary/minister level for the period 2002-mid-2009

reveals that Vietnam has received roughly equal
delegations from China (ten) and the United States
(eleven).-+) But there is a marked imbalance in delegations
-1' Data on exchanges was taken fronl Vietnam's 2004 and 2009 Defense White
Papers. Data for the year 2004 was omitted from these publications.
11 Senior Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, Dcputy Chicf of the People's LiberatIon Army
General Staff, VIsited Vietnam on November 27,2010. His visit is not included in
these figures.
4~ 'ChIna. Victn31TI Necd to Enhance Cooperation: Senior Chinese Military Officer,'
Xinhua. NovcInbcr 23.2010.

VAI TRO eVA V~T NAM TRONG KHU VUe VAI TRO eVA VIt:T NAM TRONG KHU vue 41
40 CHAu A- THAI BiNH DUONG . CHAu A- THAI BINH DUONG .
 Because Victnal11 and China arc both comlTIunist
states and maintain a system of political control over their Pacific (May 2004), 13 Air Force (May 2008), Pacific
anned forces, they have an avenue of defense cooperation
not available to the United States. Also, Vietnalll and
China share a comlllon border and both have put in a major . relatively new feature ofU .S.-Vietnam defense relations.
effort to demine and demarcate their common frontier.
The structure of high-level exchanges between
Vietnam and the United States differ from those between
Vietnam and China because the U.S. Defense Department
and anned forces are not structured the same way as the
Vietnamese and Chinese militaries. For example, Vietnam
has no counterpart to the U.S. system of Combatant
Commanders, such as the Commander of the U.S. Pacific
Command (formerly Commander-in-Chief Pacific
Command or CINCPAC). The United States has no
counterpart to the head of the General Political
Department. U.S. delegations to Vietnam may be grouped
into three categories: (1) visits by the Commander U.S.
Pacific Command; (2) visits at Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense level; and (3) visits by component
commanders, U.S. Pacific Command.
Between 2002 and mid-2009. the United States sent
an equivalent number of high-level delegations to
Vietnam as China (eleven as compared to China's ten).
u.S. delegations reflect a greater diversity of interest and
potential for cooperation. By far the most frequent U.S.
visitor to Vietnam is the Commander of the U.S. Pacific
Command who logged four visits between 2002 and mid­
2009 (and a total of seven visits since 1994). In addition,
42 VAI IRQ eVA V~T NAM IRONG I<HU VVe
CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG .
Vietnam has received the commanders of the U.S. AmlY
th
Fleet (March 2009) and Pacific Air Force (June 2009). It is
110table that visits by component commanders are a
U.S.-Vietnam defense relations are poised to enter a
new phase following the visit of Defense Minister Phung
Quang Thanh to Washington in late 2009 and the holding
of the first direct military-to military talks in 2010. This
may prove to be the venue for advancing concrete
proposals for defense cooperation. 46
. 2. Naval Port Visits
In November 1991, as Vietnam and China were
nonnalizing their political relations, a People's Liberation
Anny-Navy (PLAN) Jiangwei II guided missile frigate
made the first visit by a Chinese warship to a Vietnamese
port since unification in 1975. The frigate visited Ho Chi
Minh City. No further port calls were made until
November 2008 and August 2009.
In 2000, Vietnam and China reached agreement to
delimit the Gulf ofTonkin and on fisheries. In April 2006,
the navies of both countries commenced joint patrols in
the Gulf of Tonkin and nine patrols have been conducted
between then and the June 2010. The last joint patrol also
General George W. Casey. u.s. Army Chief of Staff, paid a working visit to
4/1
Vietnaln on November 22.20 I0 and held discussions with Lt. Gen. Nguyen Quoc
Khanh, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Vietnam People's Anny, on lnilitary
personnel exchanges. 'US Am1Y General Visits Vietnam,' Vietnam News Agency.
November 22.20 10.
VAI TRQ rnA V~T NAM lRONG I<HU vue 43
CHAu A-THAI BINH DUONG .
 included the first Search and Rescue l~xcrcise (Sf\.J~f~X) .. '1

between China and Vietnanl. In June 2009, in an historic 2008 June

USNS Mercy Nha Trang
USNS Bruce Heezen Oa Nang

first, two Vietnanlese naval ships nlade a visit to 2009 June

2009 August-Sept.
USNS Safeguard Ho Chi Minh City

Zhanjiang port in Guangdong province in Southwestern USS Blue Ridge* and USS Lassen Oa Nang

2009 November

China. 2010 Feb.-March

USNS Richard E. Byrd Hon Khoi Port

2010 May
USNS Mercy Qui Nhon

Vietnamese-Chinese naval exchanges pale in USS John S. McCain Oa Nang

2010 August
cOlnparison to the regular annual visits by U.S. Navy *U.S. 7,h Fleet Flag Ship and escort.
warships, supplelnented by a slowly growing number of
non-combatant and humanitarian ships (see Table 2). Finally, the United States has added a new
dimension to naval relations by flying Vietnamese
In addition to the 'show the flag' and protocol nature
military officers out to the USS John D. Stennis and USS
of these visits, the U.S. adds value to port calls by
George Washington to observe flight operations in the
providing humanitarian and medical assistance to the
South China Sea in April 2009 and August 2010,
surrounding community. The visits by the USNS
respectively, and by the holding of their first naval
SC{feguard in 2009 and USNS Byrd in 20 10 for ship repairs
engagement activities.
may be harbingers ofmore permanent arrangements. Now
that the Vietnamese navy has made port visits to Thailand, 3. Professional Military Education and Training
Malaysia and China it is possible Vietnam may agree to Vietnamese-Chinese cooperation in the area of
visita U.S. port such as Guam. profes~ional military education and training is at the
nascent stage. The visits by senior officials from their
Table 2
respective General Political Departments invariably
u.s. Naval Ship Visits to Vietnamese Ports,
2003-2010 include discussions on exchanging experiences in army
building on their agenda. In 2008, Vietnam's Deputy
:"' ~ ' MlofVislt" :'
Defense Minister held discussions in Beijing on
2003 November USS Vandergrift Ho Chi Minh City
2004 July USS Curtis Wilbur
cooperation in personnel training. Both sides also have
Da Nang
2005 March-April USS Gary Ho Chi Minh City discussed Vietnamese participation in courses offered by
2006 July USS Patriot and USS Salvor Ho Chi Minh City China's National Defense University.47
2007 July USS Pe/eJiu Da Nang
2007 October USNS Bruce Heezen Da Nang
2007 November USS Patriot and USS Guardian HaiPhong 17 A Jl1aJor delegation from China's National Defense University first visited Hanoi in
late 2004.

44 VAI TRO eVA V~T NAM TRONG KHU vue VAI TRO ruA V~T NAM TRONG KHU VlJe
CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG 4)
. CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
 Vietnanlese participation in professional Inilitary
education and training with the United States is of longer
standing but involves only limited nunlber of VietnaIllese
personnel. Perhaps the first opportunity for lnilitary
education was offered by the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies in Hawaii in the late 1990s. Incolnplete
data suggests that numbers have slowly risen from two in
1998 to a high of thirteen in 2004. Since 2005, Vietnam
has been eligible for E'xtended International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and later IMET (English
language and medical training). Eight Vietnamese
military personnel participated in FY2005. In 2007 the
United States asked Vietnam to accept U.S. officers and
cadets for training in Vietnamese universities. The statlls
4x
ofthis proposal is uncertain.
4. Other Defense Cooperation
As noted above, defense cooperation between VietnalTI
and China has been mainly of a confidence building nature
involving demining and demarcating their COlllmon land
border and joint naval patrols in the GulfofTokin.
By contrast, Vietnanl's other defense cooperation
relations with the United States have been and continue to
be more extensive. Obviously MIA-POW full accounting
has been the main focal point for decades. But Vietnam
and the United States also cooperate in other programs
4X For comparison. Australia has hosted more than 80 senior Vietnamese Defense
visitors and over ISO Vietnamese Defense students since February 1999. During
the saIne period over 900 Australian Defence officiab have visited VictnaITI.
46 VAI 1RO eVA vItr NAM 1RONG I<HU vue
CHAu A- THAI BiNH DUONG .
designed to address the legacies of the Vietnam War such
as demining and unexploded ordnance removal and joint
research into Agent Orange. Other areas of
defense/security cooperation include: nlilitary medical
research (HIV/AIDS)., hUll1anitarian assistance and
disaster relief (flood control)., counter-terroriSlTI
(including infonnation sharing), and counter drug
trafficking.
Since 2007-08, the United States has funded
Vietnamese participation at a nUlnber of defense-related
seminars and exercises in the region such as COBRA
GOLD, Western Pacific Naval Symposium and U.S.­
Southeast Asia bilateral joint exercises. In the past,
Vietnam has turned down a number of requests for small
joint exercises. In 1997, for example, the U.S.
unsuccessfully proposed tactical discussions and joint
training exchanges in jungle warfare. More recently
(2009), the United States has invited Vietnam to
participate in search and rescue exercises.
5. Arms Sales and National De.fense Industry
In 2005, Vietnam and China initiated discussions at
ministerial level on cooperation between their respective
national defense industries. That year a delegation from
China's Commission for Science, Technology and
Industry visited Vietnam. It was later reported that
NORINCO (China North Industries Corporation), a
Chinese state-owned arms manufacturer, agreed to sell
ammunition for small arms, artillery and military vehicles
VAl TRO alA vrnT NAM TRONG I<HU VVe
CHAu A-lHAI BlNH DUONG .
47
to VietnalTI. NORINCO was also reported to be discussing
co-productiOrl arrangements for heavy machine guns and
alTItl1unition with a Vietnan1ese counterpart. In 2008,
Vietnanl's Deputy Defense Minister held discussions with
China's COlrlmission for Science, Technology and
Industry in Beijing. No doubt the prospects for Chinese
defense induGtry cooperation with VietnalTI have been
limited by recent anns and servicing agreements between
Vietnam and tpe Russian Federation.
Military equipment sales between the United States
and Vietnam llave been raised over a number of years. In
1994, for eXilmple, the Commander in Chief Pacific
Command proposed equipment exchanges and sales
while on a visit to Vietnam. In 2005, the U.S. Ambassador
to Vietnam raised the possibility of joint cooperation in
repair and maintenance and the purchase of supplies by
the U.S. Navy, The following year, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, while on a visit to Hanoi, suggested
that Vietnam wight buy military spare parts.
All of these proposals were subject to legal
restrictions. In 2006, the Secretary of State approved the
sale, lease, export and/or transfer of non-lethal defense
articles and oefense services to Vietnam. This was
followed by (l Presidential Memorandum establishing
Vietnam's eligibility under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 to make certain purchases. Vietnam was excluded,
however, fron1 lethal end items or their components
including non--Iethal crowd control and night vision
devices. In 2007, the International Trafficking in Arms
v AllRa ellA V$T NAM lRONG KHU VlJe
48 CHAu A- THAI BiNH DUONG
Regulations were amended to allow sales to Vietnam on
case-by-case basis.
--rhe U.S. would like to see VietnalTI take part in the
Foreign Military Sales process. U.S. officials have already
explained the process involved and how to submit a Letter
of Request for Price and Availability. Vietnam could seek
approval to acquire spare parts for its stock of captured
U.S. Annored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and UH-I
(Huey) helicopters which are presently inoperable. In
I' 2009, the head of the Pentagon's Defense Cooperation
Agency singled out maritime patrol craft and coastal radar
as possible items for sale. But U.S. officials have made
clear that non-lethal anns sales are contingent upon
Vietnam engaging more fully with tIle United Sates.
As early 2003, U.S. private sector defense industry
sources began to identify Vietnam as a potentially
attractive anns market. In 2007, the U.S.-ASEAN
Business Council opened an office in Hanoi and hosted a
visit by a U.S. Defense and Security Corporate Executive
Delegation representing ITT Corporation, Aerospace,
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Oracle.
6. Strategic Cooperation
The United States has engaged with Vietnam more
49
fully to promote strategic cooperation than China.
Vietnam conducts strategic cooperation with its northern
l() Carlyle A. Thayer. Sou.theast Asia: Patterns of'Security Cooperation. ASPI
Strategy Report. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010,41-55.
VAI IRa ruA V~T NAM lRONG KHU Vlle 49
CHAu A- THAI BlNH DUONG .
neighbor mainly through 111ultilateral channels such as
ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forull1. Vietnaln is keen to
promote what is known as the ADMM + 8 process
involving ASEAN Defense Ministers and their dialogue
partners (Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, New
Zealand, South Korea, and the United States). Vietnam
held the first ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi in October
and hosted the first Ineeting of the ASEAN Defence
Senior Officials Meeting Plus Eight in December 2010.
Vietnam's strategic cooperation with the United
States includes more channels for cooperation than the
ASEAN process. In 2004, Vietnam attended the Asia­
Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) meeting held in Tokyo
for the first time. A Vietnamese observer reportedly
attended a meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative
held in New Zealand. Vietnam has also discussed - btlt
remained noncommittal on - its participation in the U.S.
Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In June 2008, Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, announced plans for
Vietnam's participation in the Global Peace Operations
Initiative. Vietnam continues to send defense officials to
the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. In 2008, the
Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staffmet with Vietnamese
representatives for the first time.
China is relatively new to the defense cooperation
game. The scope of what China can offer is limited in
comparison to long-established programs in the U.S.
China and Vietnam share a special political-ideological
conduit for relations between their armed forces that is
)0 VAl TRO eVA vIf:T NAM TRONG KHU Vl.1e
CHAu A-TIw: BiNH DUONG .
closed to the United States. This conduit provides China a
means to influence Vietnam but the extent of China's
ability to do so in practice appears quite limited. Vietnam
and China have 111ade concrete progress in addressing land
and 111aritill1e (Gulf of Tonkin) border issues. In October
2010, at the inaugurallneeting of the ADMM + 8, China
agreed to join VietnalTI as co-chair of the Expert Working
Group on l-1ul11anitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.
The United States engages in defense cooperation on
a global scale. It can offer an extraordinarily wide scope of
programs that are of long-standing. The unique role of
Combatant COlnlnanders in the U.S. system gives the U.S.
Pacific Command a special edge in offering opportunities
for cooperation with Vietnam. Although Vietnam has sent
nearly three times as many high-level defense delegations
to China (eleven) as the United States (four) from 2002 to
mid-2009 that has not resulted in greater Chinese
influence or defense cooperation.
ln summary, bilateral defense cooperation between
Vietnam and China and Vietnam and the United States are
heavily tinged by political considerations. No doubt
defense officials in both Beijing and Washington would
like to see an increase in bilateral military-to-military
cooperation with Vietnam. Vietnam moves slowly and
deliberately and generally sets the pace. When Vietnam
decides to move forward, its policies towards China and
the United States appear to move in tandem. The initiation
of defense dialogues with the U.S. and China is 2004-05 is
an example. Vietnam also maintains a rough equivalency
VAl TRO eVA VIt:T NAM TRONG KHU V1fe 51
CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .
in the nUlnber of high-level exchanges it receives from
both countries.
Conclusion
This paper has reviewed four major topics:
Vietnam's changing worldview in the post-Cold War era,
Vietnam-China relations, Vietnam-United States relations
and Vietnam's defence relations with China and the
United States in comparative perspective.
Vietnam has completely altered its worldview from
the orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological view of the
world riven by antagonistic contradictions between the
socialist and capitalist states to a world that is
economically and technologically interdependent.
Vietnam's new world view embraces the concept of
national interest in which sustainable economic
development leading to industrialization and
modernization has top priority. Therefore, Vietnam has
sought both international and regional integration through
an open door policy that welcomes foreign direct
investment and promotes trade.
Vietnam has adopted a comprehensive view of
security that depreciates (but does not jettison) the role of
military power and emphasizes the importance of
economics. In the post-Cold War era Vietnam has sought
peaceful coexistence with its former adversaries China
and the United States. Vietnam has also adopted policies
to tum Southeast Asia into a 'region of peace, stability and
cooperation'.
')2 VAI TRO eVA VIt:T NAM TRONG KHU vue
CHAu A-THAI BiNH DVONG . CHAu A-THAI BINH DVONG
And VietnalTI has adopted a multi-directional
foreign policy that stresses diversification and
nlultilateralization of its external relations. This new
approach is encapsulated in the expression that Vietnam
seeks 'to be a friend and reliable partner with all countries'.
In short, Vietnanl eschews classical balance of power
politics in its relations with China and the United States.
By way of conclllsion, this section will attenlpt to
answer three Inajor questions:
I. HOM) is Vietnam responding to the rise o.fChina?
Vietnaln suffers frotTI the 'tyranny of geography' in
that it is located next to China and has one of the most
asymmetric bilateral relationships in the world. Brantly
Womack characterizes the current relationship as one of
mature asymmetry through which China seeks
acknowledgetnent of its primacy and Vietnam seek
recognitivn ofits autonomy. 50
Vietnanl has sought to enmesh China in a web of
bilateral ties in order to make China's behaviour more
predictable. Vietnam has structured its bilateral relations
with China through a series of agreements that stress
comprehensive cooperation through party-to-party, state­
to-state and tnilitary-to-military ties. Vietnam has also
sought to enmesh China in a web of multilateral ties
through ASEAN-centric regional institutions.
~() Brantly Wonlack, 2006. China and Vietn(un: The Politics 0.( A.\)'Jnnletry. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 235-237.
VAl IRQ eVA VItT NAM TRONG KHU VVe 53
.
 Vietnall1 faces two Il1ajor obstacles in Il1aintaining a
nlature aSyll1111etric relationship with CIlina: a huge and
nl0unting trade deficit and conflicting sovereignty claims
in the South China Sea. Vietnam's policy of enmeshnlent
Ilas not been entirely successful. In light of Chinese,
assertiveness in the South China Sea, dating froln 2007 to
the present, Vietnam has sought to enhance its position
vis-a-vis Cllina through defence self-help Ineasures and
by cultivating defence ties with the United States.
2. Why'is Vietnam recalibrating its relations with the
United States?
Vietnam's pursuit of global economic integration has
meant that it has had to develop good political and economic
relations with the United States despite the legacy of issues
left over from the Vietnam War. Vietnam is dependent on
trade with the U.S. (and the European Union, Japan and
South Korea) to counterbalance its huge trade deficit with
China. Even further, it is in Vietnam's interest to encourage
U.S. investment in Vietnam to give Washington a stake in
Vietnam's stability and development.
Vietnam's bilateral relations with the United States
are bedevilled by Washington's promotion of human
rights and religious freedom. This gives rise to concerns
by party conservatives that the United States seeks to
overturn Vietnam's socialist regime through peaceful
evolution.
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has led
Hanoi to recalibrate its relations with the United States by
54 VAI me) eVA V~T NAM mONG KHU vue
CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG . CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG
ur ing Washington to oppose China's ambit claims to the
S;uth China Sea.'l Therefore, Vietnam has responded to
U.S. overtures by taking gradual mainly symbolic - steps
to develop more robust defence relations to insulate itself
from Chinese pressures.
3. What is Vietnanl ~)"future strategic sign(jicance in
the Asia-Pac?'fic?
Vietnam today is widely viewed as an important
strategic player in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.
This is based on the size of its population and economic
performance. Vietnam is an emerging middle-income
country.
Vietnam is also a key player in ASEAN and in
ASEAN-centric regional architecture. Vietnam has a
proven diplomatic track record of contributing positively
to regional security through ASEAN-centred institutions
and as a recent non-permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council where it had to address global
Issues.
Finally, and of strategic significance, Vietnam is a
littoral state on tIle South China Sea through which pass
vital sea lines of communication. For a number of years
Vietnam has been gradually modernizing its anned
52
forces. When Vietnam fully absorbs new guided missile
'I Carlyle 1\. Thayer. 'The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South
China Sea'. Securif) "Challenges [Kokoda Foundation], 6(2). Winter 201 0.69-84.
<:' Carlyle A. Thayer, Vletnam People's Army: Development and Modernization.
A~cd Forces Lecture Paper Series Paper No.4. Bandar Seri Begawan: Sultan
HaJI Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2009.
VAI TRO rnA VillT NAM mONG KHU vue 55
.
frigates and Kilo-class sublnarines into its anned forces,
Vietnanl will be a position to contribute Inore positively to
regional l11aritime security in partnership with Asia­
Pacific's major power.
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