Research Foundation of SUNY

The Nation Form: History and Ideology

Author(s): Etienne Balibar
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 329-361
Published by: Research Foundation of SUNY for and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel Center
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The Nation Form
Historyand Ideology*

Etienne Balibar

a "past" that has never been present, and

which will never be
(Jacques Derrida, 1982: 21).

PART I: TERMINOLOGY

theoryofthe nationwillbe discussedhere not foritsown sake,

but to clarifyanotherquestion,thatofthecauses and "deep"struc-
tures of contemporaryracism. Thinking about racism led us back to
nationalism, and nationalism to uncertaintyabout the historicalre-
alities and categorizationof the nation.
This uncertaintyis of course the resultof modern historiography
because its designation of its "objects" of study, its temporal period-
izations and choice of spatial boundaries has constitutedthe basis of
the dominant discourse about the nation- of certain nations in par-
ticular. In the strongversion, it considers that nations alone have a
history,thatis have had processesor transformations thatcan be given
a "meaning"- nations,or other"particularities" thatmay be constructed
analogously. We could show that this remains true even when con-
temporaryhistoriography,breakingwiththe "historicism"or "positiv-
ism" of earlier periods, opts to center its research on socio-economic
transformations duréewhichhave the appearance ofbeing prior
oflongue
♦Translatedby ImmanuelWallerstein(Part I) and ChrisTurner(Part II). PartII will
appearas chapterfivein EtienneBalibar& ImmanuelWallerstein,
Race,Nation,Class(Lon-
don: Verso, 1990).
REVIEW,XIII, 3, SUMMERI99O, 329-61 329
330 EtienneBalibar

(endeçà)to nationaldifferentiations. But thisis also truewhenit pre-

fersto concentrate on "cultural" phenomenonor thestudyof"mental-
ities"whichhave the appearanceof goingbeyond(au delà)themby
utilizinglargeranthropological complexesthatare less tiedto "polit-
ical"boundaries.(Whatis the"West," whoseideas aboutdeathor mar-
riagepatternswe study,otherthanthe outerwrappingof a specific
set of nations?)
I shallcomein a momenttotheparticular problemsposedbyMarx-
isthistoriography, but it does not fundamentally changeanything in
thisregard,giventhe factthatit was builtfromthe verybeginning
on itsturningeach conceptupsidedown.Still,whata criticalreading
of our inheritedhistoricaldiscourseshouldsuggest,it seemsto me,
is nottheUtopiaofa "non-national" history. It is ratherthatwe should
beginto delineatehowtheobject"nation"was constructed in thefirst
place(and to start
with, to discuss in detail the circumstances and mo-
dalitiesof its institutional definition); therebyhistoricalsciencecan
beginthe analysisof its own nationalism.
Let us begin- as wemust-withtheconceptofthestate.Twocontra-
dictory"truths" are asserted.On theone hand,itis said thatthemod-
ern stateis a nation-state, or a nationalstate.On the otherhand, it
is said thatthereis a persistent imperfect matchbetween"state"and
"nation,"in varyingdegreesto be sure, but nevertotallyabsent.In
short,thestatestendtobecomenations,butthenationsdo notalways
formstates,or at least the statesdo not coverall their"sociological"
aspects.
It seemsclearthattheperception ofthedegreeoffitdependsupon
the historicalera, the social or politicalviewpoint,the role a given
nation'sconstruction playsin theinternational arena,and so on. But
bothtruthsare alwaysvalid to some extent.They refer,it seemsto
me, to thesame reality.In our modernusage (whichwas crystallized
or labeledin theperiodofthebourgeoisrevolutions, beginningat the
end of the eighteenth century), the rise of the nations in historyis
presentedas a successionof stateformations or of attemptsat state
formation. Correlatively,it was bybecoming "national" thatthestates
transformed themselves, moreor lesscompletely, intowhatwe call the
modernstate,withitsideologyand collectivesovereignty; itsjuridical
and administrative rationality;itsparticularmodeofregulating social
conflicts,especially class and
conflicts; its "strategic" objective man-
of
THE NATION FORM 331

agingitsterritorial resourcesand populationto enhanceitseconomic

and military power.It is thisverycorrelation whichcontainsthegerms
oftheambivalencein theconcept"nation-state," whichmeansthatits
unityis constantly splitintotwoopposingaspects.
Thus, in the end, the historicalnationsare societieswhichtake
the politicalformof a statethatis "national."Eitherthe statescame
intoexistence "endogenously," seemingly autonomously, in tandemwith
a processof nationalizingthe statethatwas alreadylocatedin that
territory,ortheycameintoexistencevia "nationalist" (or "nationallib-
eration")movements, bystruggling againstnationalstatesthatalready
existedorwerebeingcreated,or against"non-national" sovereign states
(such as "multinational" empires,whichthereby came to seemanach-
In
ronistic). reality, the idea ofnationswithout a state,ornations"before"
the state,is thusa contradiction in terms,because a statealwaysis
implied in the historic framework ofa nationalformation (evenifnot
necessarily withinthelimitsofitsterritory). But thiscontradiction is
maskedby the factthatnationalstates,whoseintegrity suffers from
internalconflicts thatthreaten itssurvival(regionalconflicts, and espe-
ciallyclass conflicts), project beneath their politicalexistence to a pre-
existing"ethnic"or "popular"unity(intothe past,intothedepthsof
"civil"society).Or suchhistoricalcollectivities struggling againstna-
tionalstatesjustifytheirclaimsto autonomybydrawingan ideal tra-
jectorygoingfroma moreorlessmythical origin(linguistic, religious,
cultural,racial) towardan end consideredto be the onlyhistorically
normalpossibility, thecreationofitsownnationalstatestructure. In
otherwords,no matterwhether theconstruction ofa nation-state "suc-
ceeds"or whetherit"fails," or whetherit is heldin check(fora period
thatmaybe quitelong),thereis assertedto be a preestablished har-
mony between a "national" society and a "modern" state and yetsi-
multaneously the relativeautonomyof each of these.Furthermore,
each ofthese(thestate,thenation)can servetheotheras theopposite
poleoftheunitywhichsocietyneedstoovercomeitsownantagonisms.
These symmetrical divisionsnecessarilykeep the questionof or-
iginsunresolved, is, whichcame first,
that thenationthatcreatedthe
stateor thestatethatcreatedthenation.As thoughone or theother
ofthesetwoconcepts,emergingmiraculously out ofthepast withits
ownidentity ("French," "German," "Algerian"),had tobe themodeland
cause of the other. A dilemma in
which, turn,induceshistoriansand
332 EtienneBalibar

sociologists to intrudeotherconcepts:forexample,thenationalidea
(or consciousness, or ideology,or culture),or at theotherextremethe
nationaleconomy(or market,or divisionoflabor,or unequal devel-
opments).It is quite remarkablehow such conceptsmaybe used to
supporteitherone of the two standardresponsesto the questionof
origins:The statecreatesthenationout ofan idea, or in responseto
economicconstraints, or thenationbuildsthestateas a wayoffulfil-
lingtheneedsofitscollectiveconsciousness, or ofpursuingitsmater-
ial interests,in each case one of these"reflecting" the other.
In thisregardMarxisthistoriography has founditselfin a difficult
paradox. We might have expected it could finda wayoutofthiscircle
(theback-and-forth gameoflocatingthe"origins" ofthenationin the
stateand vice versa)forat least tworeasons:
(1) The keyexplanatory variableofMarxismis theclass struggle,
whichis a typeofhistoricalconflict orthogonal to theidea ofnational
unity(and whosefunction, it is not difficultto see, is always,in one
way or another,to relativizethe importanceof class conflict, if not
to denyits veryexistence);
(2) Its theoretical projectis to reconstruct the genesisof political
formson thebasisoftheirmaterialcauses,locatedin thefinalanalysis
in the dynamicof the relationsof production.
In fact,theend resultofclassicalMarxistanalyseshas been to re-
producein different languagethestandardalternatives of"bourgeois"
historiography. They oscillate between a functionalist argument(the
nationas the expressionof the capitalistdivisionof labor,a specific
stagein thedevelopment ofproductive forces,an instrument ofbour-
geoishegemony) and a historicist argument (thenationas an anthropo-
logicalunity whose verystability has the effectofoverdetermining the
classstruggle, byproviding forita "natural"framework or,on thecon-
trary,by adding into it the disturbingimpact of these "survivals").
Undertheconstantpressureofimmediateevents,and rarelyable
to taketimeforobjectiveanalysis,Marxistdebatesabout thenation
have repeatedlycome to thelogicalimpasseofall or nothing.Some-
timestheyreintroduced thehistoricalphenomenonof nationality or
ethnicity as the"real"substratum forwhichthecategoriesof capital-
ism or socialismwouldhave substituted abstractions (but this"read"
was thendefinedin themosttraditional ofways).And sometimes they
to
sought encompass these phenomena within the of
concept "ideology,"
THE NATION FORM 333

but at thepriceofreducingthemto thefleeting statusofa discourse,

a formofconsciousness, evenan illusion.Similarly, withtheexception
ofsomeremarkable briefdiscussions, inparticular byGramsci,Marx-
istshave waveredbetweentwoequallyabstractpositionson therela-
tionshipbetweennationalconstruction and theclass struggle.Either
theyattributed theroleof"natural" national-builder to a class,endowed
withan autonomoushistorical identity (usually bourgeoisie,more
the
recently thepeasantryor eventheproletariat);or theydescribedna-
tionalconstruction as the historicalformwithinwhich,figuratively
or literally,theclassstruggle fadesawayin theconstitution ofa "whole
people," whose unity of interestsand culture wins out over its social
divisions.1 Rarelywastheanalysisable to go beyondthesealternatives
and studynationalunityas an historical realityin factdividedbecause
ofantagonistic class strategies,or evenas thelong-term consequence
of a continuoustransformation of "class"identitiesand the unstable
equilibriaestablishedbetweenopposinginterests.
No doubtwe can thinkofseveralreasonswhythisepistemological
obstacleshouldhavebeen so persistent. The foremost reasonwas that
Marxismemergedin a politicalsituation - thatofthefirst halfofthe
nineteenth century-in whichthe"socialquestion," renderedacuteby
theindustrial revolution, was debated in terms of twodirectly opposite
conceptsofuniversalhistory, one theheirofrevolutionary cosmopol-
italismand theothera synthesis of sociologicalconservatism and na-
tionalism, suchthat"class"and "nation" wereputforward as competing
candidatesforthe postof "historicalsubject,"and one was required
tochoosebetweenthem.Furthermore, therewasthefactthatthestrug-
gle between an organizedrevolutionary proletariatand thedominant
classescontrolling a statethathad nowbecomeconstituted in theform
ofa nationalstatevirtually required the historicalconfusion ofnation
and state.Thereupon,Marxismhad no choicebutto identify thepros-
pect of the "end" of the national state with the "end" of the statetout
court.Thus thestagewasunknowingly setwithinitselfforthe"return"-
boththeoretically and politically-ofthestateand thenation,always
indissolubly linked.Having firstrejectedthe categoryof the nation
(even ifit was alwayslatentin theanalysesof"socialformations" and
in itsrevolutionary programs),it thenwas forcedto reorganizeit, in
a noncritical way,as a so-calledunbudgeable"reality," bynationalizing
successively the proletariat, the party,and the socialiststate.
334 EtienneBalibar

Nonetheless,amid the misadventures of Marxismin itsconfron-

tationwiththe "nationalquestion"overtwolong centuriesof social
history,duringwhichMarxismsuccumbedto nationalism to thepoint
of transforming itselfintoits oppositeas the efficacious languageof
revolutionary nationalism, there exists the extraordinary possibility
of rethinking our historiographie categories.This mustbe a critical
rethinking whichimpliesthatwe mustdeconstruct radicallythecon-
ceptof"historicalnationalism"2 as thedenigration oftheclassstruggle
(indeed as theprime instanceof such denigration)as wellas thecon-
cept of "historicalmaterialism" in its reductionof social relationsto
an abstractrepresentationofeconomicantagonisms. This is thedirec-
tionin whichI intendto go,concentrating analysison whathas been
the blind spotof theirconfrontation.

SocialFormation,NationForm,States System
Threegeneralconcepts - provisional abstractions- seemindispens-
able as a startingpoint.The firstis socialformation. In thelanguage
inherited fromMarx, thisis buta scholarlytwinoftheconceptofso-
ciety,or ofcivilsociety.That is to say,it ignoresthenatureofthepo-
liticalinstitutions,
thereuponconferring on themthe derivedstatus
ofa superstructure. It remainsimpregnated bythedualismofliberal
theoreticians,who contrast the social and the political.And beyond
Marx, it containsanothermeaning,thatof historicalspecificity, but
at thepriceofacceptingpurelyand simplytheideal entitiesproposed
by stateideologies.When one speaksof a "Russian"or "French"or
"Chinese"socialformation as thoughtheyweregivenin nature,what
thatmeansis thatone has straightforwardly incorporated the postu-
late of thetranshistoricalexistenceofnations,turningthemintothe
framework withinwhichoccursthehistory ofthemodesofproduction.
We oughtto use socialformation to meanrathera construction whose
unityremainsproblematic, a configuration ofantagonistic socialclasses
thatis notentirely autonomous,onlybecomingrelatively specificin its
oppositionto othersand via thepowerstruggles, theconflicting inter-
est groupsand ideologieswhichare developedoverthelongue durée by
thisveryantagonism.
The problemposed by the existenceof social formations is not
merelythatoftheirbeginningor theirend,butprimarily thatoftheir
reproduction, thatis, the conditionsunderwhichtheycan maintain
THE NATION FORM 335

thisconflictual unitywhichcreatestheirautonomyoverlonghistorical
periods.It is also thequestionoftheconditionsunderwhich,despite
the incessantdisplacementand "denaturing" of the class structures,
suchentitiesremainboundedby"frontiers" suchthatwe can continue
to call thembythesamename,and therefore claimfortheman "iden-
tity."Now suchnames("France," "Germany," "U.S.A.")are political.In
thiscase, theconceptof socialformations wouldnotlead to a fetish-
izationofthestateor of nationalidentity, sinceit wouldhave us ask
why, and within what space-time boundaries, thepropernamesofstates
wereinvestedwitha social identity. Historyis one giganticcemetery
ofnamesofstatesand nationswhichneverattainedautonomy, orwhich
lostit. But thisapproachrequiresus to analyzethe"centrality" ofthe
statein thehistory ofsocialrelations,thatis, to considerthetransfor-
mationofthestatenot as an epiphenomenon but as the"distillation"
of all the varioussocial antagonisms.
Is theneverysocial formation "national"as, once again,previous
conceptualizations might lead one to think?Obviouslynot. Firstof
all because, quite aside fromthe old questionof "statelesssocieties,"
it seemsclearthatnumerouspoliticalformsexistedhistorically, suc-
cessivelyor in competition witheach other,beforetheformofthena-
tionalstatecrystallized and spreadfromone entityto theother,which
led in turnto theemergenceof"nationalist" or "subnationalist"collec-
tivemovements. And thenbecause,rightup to todayor at leastuntil
veryrecently, the formof thenationalstatewas not theonlyone in
existence.Unless we keep thatin mind,we can comprehendneither
its unequal development (which,afterthe fact,we recordby saying
thatsomestatesare more"advanced"and othersmore"backward" in
nation-building) norabove all the resistancesand the extraordinarily
violentconflicts thatsurroundsuchnation-building. (Colonizationand
decolonization constitutesuchconflicts, provokethem,buttheyare
or
not the onlysuch instances,despitetheirunusualvisibility.) Finally,
it is by no meansout ofthe question thattoday, under our veryeyes,
we areobserving thecreationof"postnational" socialformations whose
future weare seekingtopredict and whose forms (transnational?supra-
national?) we are to
trying identify.
To makemoreconcretetheverygeneralidea of socialformation,
we needa secondconcept,thatofthenationform.We needto ponder
the progressive emergenceof the nationformin history:its "place"
336 EtienneBalibar

and the conditions under which it emerges, the causes of its spread
and of its variations.As alwaysin questions of historicalcategorizing,
we are navigatinghere between the shoals of essentialismand form-
alism. The nation formcertainlydid not appear out of nowhere,per-
fectlyformed(even if there were in some sense prototypes,some of
which played the decisive role of givingit its name). But neitherwas
it infinitelyplastic (even if, aftera certain point in time- a relatively
recentone - the rapport deforcesin the worldbecame such that a model
of"internationalrelations"took over and required the universalization
of state-construction and the autonomization of social formations).I
believe that a reasonable middle way between these shoals will have
been found if the idea of the "nation form"lets us articulate:
-
(1) analyses of domination understandingwhy certain political
formshave come to dominate others,eliminate them or make them
subject to their own reproduction;
-
(2) analysis of the trends in transformation understandingwhy
thehistoricalidentitiesofmodernsocial formations,althoughtheyhave
moved in the directionof resemblingeach other,have not converged
entirelyintoa singlehomogeneous"world"space, even thoughthe main
thrustof the capitalist economy,the principal forcein destructuring
existingsocial relations,has been to organize itselfas a transnational
economy;
(3) analyses of transition- by which I mean (to be discussed be-
low) the need to understand not only in what way the nation form
has "stabilized"certainsocial changes (which explains the aura of per-
manence, partiallyillusory,that it conferson the historyof human
collectivities)but also in what way it ensures the passage fromone
historicalworldto another,fromthe worldbeforenations to the world
afterthem,while not tryingto impose upon this evolutionsome pre-
established model.
When I speak of the nation formbeing the dominant formof the
so-called "modernization"of social formations,and of its being a form
of historicaltransition,once again I am not thinkingof a set of char-
acteristicsof the nation formbut ratherof the questions we need to
answer to give theoreticalconsistencyto this concept. But these ques-
tions are linked to a thirdconcept, that of the states system,or to be
more exact the systemof competing states, which is an unstable re-
lationship of conflictualequilibrium.
THE NATION FORM 337

If we need proofof the inescapable impact of this system,we find

it in the formof warfarethathas become typicalin the era of national
states,both in termsof territorialwars and in termsof economic and
culturalwars,thatis as "total"wars in whichall the materialand moral
resourcesup to and including the whole of the population are com-
mitted,withitsreboundeffectupon thecreationofpoliticalunity.This
kind of warfarewas unknown not only in the cities of Antiquitybut
in the empiresor the politicalentitiesunifiedby "universaliséreligions
in the Middle Ages (lineage wars,dynasticwars,holywars). This form
ofwarfareis probablyreachingitshistoricallimitstoday,but not with-
out endless "survivals"(Balibar, 1983).
What this permitsus to see is firstof all that the nation formis
realized only withina pluralityof nations. And then that the corres-
pondence between the nation formand all other phenomena toward
which it tends has as its prerequisitea complete (no "omissions")and
nonoverlappingdivisioning of the world's territoryand populations
(and thereforeresources)among the politicalentities,such thatno so-
cial "property"-materialor in the realm ofideas - can escape national
determinationnor can any be nationallyoverdetermined.To each in-
dividual a nation, and to each nation its "nationals."The principleof
cuiusregioeiusregiowas already a step in this direction,to be replaced
by the "principleof nationalities"based on the ideal correspondence
of peoples, states,languages, currency,and so on. Finally,it was the
factthatsuch a precisedivisioningwas historicallyimpossible- because
ofthe interweavingoflinguisticfrontiers, migrations,dynasticclaims,
conflictsover colonies, revolutions,wars of religion,and so on - that
the general formof the historyof national states has been the insta-
bilityof frontiersand theirconstant"redefinition," with its direct im-
pact on the externaland internalperception of "national identity."In
the citiesofAntiquity,frontiers wereunchangeable."Colonization"was
carried out by creatinga new city.And in the ancient empireswhich,
quite the opposite, extended theirhegemonyover heterogeneouster-
ritoriesand populations, the idea of a frontierremained fundamen-
tally imprecise,linked to a continuum of degrees of allegiance and
tribute,repeatedlyundone and reconstitutedalong totallynew lines,
sometimesover centuries,sometimesin a day. (In this way Egypt, af-
ter the destructionof its own empire, could pass fromthe hand of the
Persiansto the Greeks,and fromthe Greeksto the Romans, the Arabs,
338 EtienneBalibar

and theTurks.)The era ofnationalstates(withtheirownimperialism)

was the era of the"partition"of theworldamongcompetingcenters
ofthe"nationalization"of society(thatis, oftheindividualsin them)
whichweresimultaneously centersof exploitationof the workforce
and the "commodification" werela-
of social relations.The frontiers
beled "natural"frontiers
(Bazin & Terray,1982;Joxe, 1979).
All theseterminologicalconsiderations havebeen meantto setthe
stageforthediscussion.To formulate moreprecisepropositions,we
have to turnto the historyof the nationform.

PART II: HISTORY

The historyofnations,beginningwithour own,is alwaysalready
presentedto us in the formof a narrativewhichattributes to these
entitiesthecontinuity of a subject.The formation ofthenationthus
appearsas the fulfillment of a "project"stretching overcenturies,in
which thereare different stages and momentsof comingto self-
awareness,whichtheprejudicesofthevarioushistorianswillportray
as moreor lessdecisive(whereare we to situatetheoriginsofFrance?
withour ancestorstheGauls? theCapetianmonarchy? therevolution
of 1789?)but which,in anycase, all fitintoan identicalpattern:that
oftheself-manifestation ofthenationalpersonality. Such a represen-
tationclearlyconstitutes a retrospective illusion,but it also expresses
constraining institutionalrealities.
The illusion is twofold.It consists
in believingthatthegenerations whichsucceedone anotherovercen-
turieson an approximately stableterritory, underan approximately
univocaldesignation,have handed downto each otheran invariant
substance.And itconsistsin believingthattheprocessofdevelopment
fromwhichwe selectaspectsretrospectively, so as to see ourselvesas
theculmination ofthatprocess,was theonlyone possible,thatit rep-
resenteda destiny.Projectand destinyare thetwosymmetrical figures
oftheillusionofnationalidentity. The "French"of 1988- one in three
of whomhas at least one "foreign" (see Noiriel,1988) ancestor-are
collectivelyconnectedto the subjectsofKing Louis XIV (notto speak
oftheGauls) onlyby a successionofcontingent eventsthecauses of
whichhavenothingto do eitherwiththedestinyof"France," theproj-
ect of "itskings"or the aspirationsof"itspeople."
This critiqueshouldnot,however, be allowedto preventour per-
THE NATION FORM 339

ceivingthe effectivity-as feltin the present- of mythsof national or-

igins.A singleperfectly conclusiveexample ofthiswould be the French
Revolution,by the veryfactofthecontradictory appropriationsto which
it is continuallysubjected. It is possible to suggest(with Hegel and
Marx) that, in the historyof everymodern nation, whereverthe ar-
gumentcan apply,thereis never more than one single foundingrev-
olutionaryevent(whichwould explain both the permanenttemptation
to repeatitsforms,to imitateitsepisodes and characters,and the temp-
tationfoundamong the"extreme"partiesto suppressit,eitherby prov-
ing that national identityderives frombefore the revolutionor by
awaiting the realization of that identityfroma newrevolutionwhich
would completetheworkofthefirst).The mythoforiginsand national
continuity,which we can easily see being set in place in the contem-
poraryhistoryof the "young"nations which emerged with the end of
colonialism (like India or Algeria), but which we have a tendencyto
forgethas also been created over recent centuriesin the case of the
"old" nations, is thereforean effectiveideological formin which the
imaginarysingularityof national formationsis constructeddaily by
moving back fromthe present into the past.
Stateto theNation-State
From the "Prenational"
How are we to take thisdistortionintoaccount? The "origins"ofthe
national formationgo back to a multiplicityofinstitutionsdatingfrom
widelydiffering periods. Some are in factveryold: The institutionof
statelanguages thatweredistinctboth fromthe sacred languages ofthe
-
clergyand from"local"idioms initiallyforpurelyadministrativepur-
-
poses, but subsequentlyas aristocraticlanguages goes back in Europe
to theearlyMiddle Ages. It is connectedwiththeprocessby whichmo-
narchicalpowerbecame autonomousand sacred. Similarly,theprogres-
siveformationofabsolutemonarchybroughtwithiteffects ofmonetary
monopoly,administrativeand fiscalcentralization,and a relativede-
gree of standardizationof the legal systemand internal"pacification."
It thusrevolutionizedthe institutionsofthefrontier The
and the territory.
Reformation and Counter- Reformation precipitateda transitionfrom
a situationin whichchurchand statecompeted(rivalrybetweentheec-
clesiasticaland the lay state) to one in whichthe two were complemen-
tary(in the extremecase in a state religion).
All these structuresappear retrospectively to us as prenational,
be-
340 EtienneBalibar

causetheymadepossiblecertainfeatures ofthenation-state, intowhich

theywereultimately to be incorporated withvaryingdegreesofmod-
ification.
We can therefore acknowledge thefactthatthenationalfor-
mationis theproductofa long"prehistory." However,thisprehistory
differsin essentialfeaturesfromthenationalistmythof a lineardes-
tiny.First,it consistsof a multiplicity of qualitatively distinctevents
spread out over time, none of which impliesany subsequentevent.
Secondly,theseeventsdo notoftheirnaturebelongto thehistoryof
onedeterminate nation.They have occurredwithintheframework of
otherpoliticalunitsfromthosewhichseemto us todayendowedwith
an originalethicalpersonality (thus,just as in thetwentieth century
the stateapparatusesof the "youngnations"wereprefigured in the
apparatusesofthecolonialperiod,so theEuropeanMiddle Agessaw
theoutlinesofthemodernstateemergewithintheframework of"Sic-
"Catalonia,"
ily," or "Burgundy"). And they do not even belongbyna-
turetothehistory ofthenation-state, buttootherrivalforms (forexample
the"imperial" form). It is not a line ofnecessary evolution buta series
ofconjunctural relations which has inscribed them after the eventinto
the prehistory of the nationform.It is the characteristic featureof
statesofall typestorepresent theordertheyinstitute as eternal,though
practiceshowsthatmoreor less the oppositeis the case.
The factremainsthatall theseevents,on conditionthattheybe
repeatedor integratedintonew politicalstructures, have effectively
played a role in the genesis of national formations. This has precisely
todo withtheirinstitutional character and withthefactthattheycause
thestateto intervene in theformwhichitassumedat a particularmo-
ment.In otherwords,non-national stateapparatusesaimingat quite
other(forexample,dynastic)objectiveshave progressively produced
theelementsofthenation-state, or,ifone prefers, theyhavebeen in-
voluntarily "nationalized" and havebegunto nationalizesociety-the
resurrection of Roman law,mercantilism, and the domestication of
thefeudalaristocracies are all examplesofthis.Andthecloserwe come
to the modernperiod,the greatertheconstraint imposedby the ac-
cumulationof theseelementsseemsto be. Whichraisesthe crucial
questionof the threshold of irreversibility.
At what momentand forwhat reasonshas thisthresholdbeen
crossed,which,on theone hand,caused theconfiguration ofa system
ofsovereignstatesto emergeand, on theother,imposedtheprogrès-
THE NATION FORM 341

sive diffusionof the nation formto almost all human societies over
two centuriesof violent conflict?I admit that this threshold(which
it is obviouslyimpossible to identifywith a single date3) corresponds
to the developmentofthe marketstructuresand class relationsspecific
to moderncapitalism(in particular,the proletarianizationof the labor
force,a processwhich graduallyextractsits membersfromfeudal and
corporatistrelations). However,this commonlyaccepted thesisneeds
qualifyingin several ways.
It is quite impossible to "deduce" the nation formfromcapitalist
relationsof production.Monetary circulationand the exploitationof
wage labor do not logicallyentail onedeterminateformof state. More-
over,therealizationspace whichis impliedby accumulation- theworld
capitalistmarket- has withinit an intrinsictendencyto transcendany
national limitationsthat mightbe institutedby determinatefractions
of social capital or imposed by "extra-economic"means. May we, in
theseconditions,continueto see the formationofthe nation as a "bour-
-
geois project"? It seems likely that this formulation taken over by
Marxism fromliberal philosophiesof history- constitutesin its turn
a historical myth. However, it seems that we might overcome the
difficulty if we take up the point of view of Braudel and Wallerstein
which sees thisconstitutionof nations as being bound up not withthe
abstractionofthecapitalistmarket,but withitsconcretehistoricalform:
thatof a "world-economy" whichis alwaysalready organized and hier-
archized into a "center"and a "periphery," each ofwhichhave different
methodsofaccumulation and exploitationoflabor powerand between
which relationsof unequal exchange and domination are established
(Braudel, 1982; 1984; Wallerstein,1974; 1980).
Beginning fromthe center,national units formout of the overall
structureof the world-economyas a functionof the role theyplay in
that structurein a given period. More exactly,theyformagainst one
another as competinginstrumentsin the service of the center'sdom-
inationofthe periphery.This firstqualificationis a crucial one because
it substitutesfor the "ideal" capitalism of Marx and, particularly,of
the Marxist economists,an "historicalcapitalism"in which a decisive
role is played by the precocious phenomena of imperialism and the
articulationof wars with colonization. In a sense, everymodern na-
tion is a product of colonization: it has always been to some degree
colonized or colonizing, and sometimesboth at the same time.
342 EtienneBalibar

However,a second qualificationis necessary.One of the most im-

portantofBraudel and Wallerstein'scontributionsconsistsin theirhav-
ing shownthat,in the historyof capitalism,other state
forms thanthenation
haveemerged and have fora certaintimemaintained themselvesin com-
petitionwith it,beforeultimatelybeing repressedor instrumentalized:
The formof empire and, most importantly,that of the transnational
politico-commercialcomplex, centeredupon one or several cities(Brau-
del, 1984; Wallerstein,1974). This formshows us that there was not
a singleinherently"bourgeois"politicalform,but several (we mighttake
the Hanseatic League as an example; however,thehistoryoftheUnited
Provinces in the seventeenthcenturyis closelydeterminedby this al-
ternativewhich echoes throughthe whole of its social life,including
religious and intellectuallife). In other words, the nascent capitalist
-
bourgeoisieseemsto have "hesitated"-dependingupon circumstances
between several formsof hegemony.Or let us rather say that there
existeddifferent each connectedto different
bourgeoisies, sectorsof exploi-
tation of the resources of the world-economy.If the "national bour-
geoisies"finallywon out, even beforethe industrialrevolution(though
at the cost of "time-lags"and "compromises"and thereforeof fusions
withotherdominantclasses), thisis probablybothbecause theyneeded
to use the armed forcesof the existingstatesexternallyand internally,
and because they had to subject the peasantryto the new economic
order and penetratethe countrysidesto turntheminto marketswhere
there were consumers of manufacturedgoods and reservesof "free"
labor power. In the last analysis it is thereforethe concrete configu-
rations of the class struggleand not "pure" economic logic which ex-
plain the constitutionof nation-states,each with its own history,and
the correspondingtransformationof social formationsinto national
formations.

The Nationalizationof Society

The world-economyis not a self-regulating, globallyinvariantsys-
tem, whose social formationscan merelybe regarded as local effects:
it is a systemof constraints,subject to the unforeseeabledialectic of
its internalcontradictions.It is globally necessarythat controlof the
capitals circulatingin the whole accumulation space should be exer-
cised fromthe center;but therehas alwaysbeen struggleover theform
in which this concentrationhas been effected.The privilegedstatus
THE NATION FORM 343

ofthenationformderivesfromthefactthat,locally,thatformmade
itpossible(at leastforan entirehistorical period)forstruggles between
heterogeneous classes to be controlled and not only fora "capitalist
class"butalso forbourgeoisies properly so-called to emerge from these-
statebourgeoisies bothcapableofpolitical,economic,and culturalhe-
gemonyandproduced bythathegemony. The dominantbourgeoisieand
thebourgeoissocial formations formedone anotherreciprocally in a
"processwithouta subject," by restructuring the statein thenational
formand bymodifying thestatusofall theotherclasses:This explains
the simultaneousgenesisof nationalismand cosmopolitanism.
Howeversimplified thishypothesis maybe, ithas one essentialcon-
sequencefortheanalysisofthenationas a historicalform:We have
to renouncelineardevelopmental schémasonce and forall, notonly
wheremodesofproductionare concerned,but also in respectofpo-
liticalforms.There is, then,nothingto preventus fromexamining
whether, in a new phase of theworld-economy, rivalstatestructures
to thatofthenation-state are nottendingto formonce again. In re-
ality,thereis a closeimplicitconnection betweentheillusionofa nec-
essary unilinear evolution of social formations and the uncritical
acceptanceofthenation-state as the"ultimateform"ofpoliticalinsti-
tution, destined to be perpetuatedforever (havingfailedto giveway
to a hypothetical "endof the State").4
To bringout therelativeindeterminacy oftheprocessofconstitu-
tionand development ofthenationform,letus approachmattersfrom
the perspective of a consciouslyprovocative question:Forwhom today
is it toolate?In otherwords,whichare the social formations which,
in spiteoftheglobalconstraint oftheworld-economy and ofthesys-
temof statesto whichit has givenrise,can nolonger completelyeffect
theirtransformation into nations,exceptin a purelyjuridicalsense
and at thecostof interminable conflictsthatproduceno decisivere-
sult?An a priorianswer,and evena generalanswer,is doubtlessim-
possible,but it is obviousthatthequestionarisesnotonlyin respect
of the"newnations"createdafterdecolonization, thetransnationali-
zationofcapitaland communications, thecreationofplanetarywar-
machinesand so on, but also in respectof"oldnations"whichare to-
day affected by thesamephenomena.
One mightbe temptedto saythatit is too late forthoseindepen-
dentstateswhichareformally equal and represented in theinstitutions
344 EtienneBalibar

which are preciselystyled"international,"all to become self-centered

nations, each withits national language(s) of culture,administration,
and commerce,withitsindependentmilitaryforces,itsprotectedinter-
nal market,its currencyand its enterprisescompetingon a worldscale
and, particularly,with its rulingbourgeoisie (whetherit be a private
capitalistbourgeoisie or a State nomenklatura), since in one way or an-
other everybourgeoisie is a state bourgeoisie. Yet one mightalso be
temptedto say the opposite: The fieldof the reproductionof nations,
of the deploymentof the nation formis no longer open today except
in the old peripheriesand semiperipheries;so far as the old "center"
is concerned, it has, to varyingdegrees, enteredthe phase of the de-
compositionof national structureswhich were connectedwiththe old
formsof its domination,even ifthe outcome of such a decomposition
is both distantand uncertain.It clearlyseems, however,ifone accepts
this hypothesis,that the nations of the futurewill not be like those
of the past. The fact that we are today seeing a general upsurge of
nationalismeverywhere(northand south,east and west) does not en-
able us to resolve this kind of dilemma: it is part of the formaluni-
versality of the international system of states. Contemporary
nationalism,whateverits language, tells us nothingof the real age of
the nation formin relation to "world time."
In reality,if we are to cast a littlemore lighton this question, we
musttakeinto account a furthercharacteristicofthehistoryofnational
formations.This is what I shall call the delayed nationalization
ofsociety,
which firstof all concernsthe old nations themselvesand is so delayed
that it ultimatelyappears as an endless task. An historianlike Eugen
Weber has shown (as have other subsequent studies) that in the case
of France, universalschoolingand the unificationof customs and be-
liefsby interregionallabor migrationand militaryserviceand the sub-
ordinationof political and religiousconflictsto patrioticideology did
not come about until the early years of the twentiethcentury(Weber,
1976). His demonstrationsuggeststhatthe Frenchpeasantrywas only
finally"nationalized" at the point when it was about to disappear as
the majorityclass (though this disappearance, as we know,was itself
retardedby the protectionismthat is an essentialcharacteristicof na-
tional politics). The more recentwork of Gérard Noiriel shows in its
turn that since the end of the nineteenthcentury,"French identity"
has continuallybeen dependent upon the capacity to integrateim-
THE NATION FORM 345

migrantpopulations. The question arises as to whetherthat capacity

is today reachingits limitor whetherit can in factcontinue to be ex-
ercised in the same form(Noiriel, 1984; 1988).
In ordercompletelyto identifythe reasons forthe relativestability
of the national formation,it is not sufficient merelyto referto the in-
itial thresholdof its emergence. We must also ask how the problems
of unequal development of town and countryside,colonization and
decolonization, wars and the revolutionswhich theyhave sometimes
sparked,theconstitutionofsupranationalblocs and so on have in prac-
tice been surmounted,since these are all events and processes which
involvedat least a riskofclass conflictsdrifting beyondthelimitswithin
which theyhad been more or less easily confinedby the "consensus"
of the national state. We may say thatin France as, mutatismutandis
in the otherold bourgeois formations,what made it possible to resolve
the contradictionscapitalism broughtwith it and to begin to remake
the nation format a point when it was not even completed(or to pre-
ventit fromcoming apart beforeit was completed) was the institution
state,that is, of a state"intervening"in the veryre-
of the national-social
production of the economy and particularlyin the formationof indi-
viduals, in familystructures,the structuresofpublic health,and, more
generally,in the whole space of "privatelife."This is a tendencythat
was presentfromthe beginningof the nation form- a point to which
I shall returnbelow- but one whichhas become dominantduringthe
nineteenthand twentiethcenturies,the resultof which is entirelyto
subordinatethe existenceofthe individualsof all classes to theirstatus
as citizens of the nation-state,that is, to the fact of theirbeing "na-
tionals."5

ProducingthePeople
A social formationonly reproducesitselfas a nation to the extent
that, througha networkof apparatuses and daily practices,the indi-
fromcradle to grave,at the same
vidual is institutedas homonationalis
politicus,religiosus.. . .
time as he/she is instituted as homooeconomicus,
That is whythe question ofthe nation form,ifit is henceforthan open
one, is, at bottom,the question of knowingin what historicalcondi-
tions it is possible to institutesuch a thing:by virtueof what internal
and externalrelationsof force- and also by virtue of what symbolic
formsinvestedin elementarymaterial practices?Asking this question
346 EtienneBalibar

is anotherway of asking oneselfwhat transitionin civilizationthe na-

tionalization of societies correspondsto, and what are the figuresof
individualitybetween which nationalitymoves.
The crucial point is this: what makes the nation a "community"?
Or ratherin what way is the formof communityinstitutedby the na-
tion distinguishedspecificallyfromother historicalcommunities?
Let us dispenserightawaywiththe antithesestraditionallyattached
to that notion, the firstof which is the antithesisbetween the "read"
and the "imaginary"community.Everysocialcommunity reproducedbythe
ofinstitutions
functioning that is, it is based on the projection
is imaginary,
of individual existence into the weftof a collectivenarrative,on the
recognitionof a common nameand on traditionslived as the trace of
an immemorialpast (even when theyhave been created and inculcated
in the recentpast). But this comes down to accepting that,in certain
are real.
conditions, onlyimaginarycommunities
In the case of national formations,the imaginarywhich inscribes
itselfin the real in this way is that of the "people."It is that of a com-
munitywhichrecognizesitselfin advance in the institutionofthe state,
which recognizes that state as "its own" in opposition to other states,
and, in particular,inscribesits political struggleswithinthe horizon
of that state: For example by formulatingits aspirations for reform
and social revolutionas projectsforthe transformation of"itsnational
state."Without this,there can be neither"monopolyof organized vi-
olence" (Max Weber), nor "national-popularwill"(Gramsci). But such
a people does not existnaturally,and even when it is tendentiallycon-
stituted,it does not exist forall time. No modern nation possesses a
given"ethnic"basis, even when it arises out ofa national independence
struggle.And, moreover,no modern nation, however"egalitarian"it
may be, fulfillsthe mode of the extinctionof class conflicts.The fun-
damental problem is thereforeto produce the people. More exactly,
it is to make the people produce ^^continually as national community.
Or again, it is to produce the effectof unity by virtue of which the
people will appear, in everyone'seyes,"as a people,"thatis, as the basis
and origin of political power.
Rousseau was the firstto explicitlyconceive the question in these
terms:"What makes a people a people"? Deep down, this question is
no different fromthe one which arose a moment ago: How are indi-
viduals nationalized,or in otherwords,socialized in thedominantform
THE NATION FORM 347

ofnationalbelonging?Whichenablesus to put aside fromtheoutset

anotherartificial dilemma:it is not a questionof settinga collective
identity againstindividual identities.All identityis individual,but there
is no individualidentity thatis nothistorical, or,in otherwords,con-
structed withina fieldofsocialvalues,normsofbehavior,and collec-
tivesymbols.Individualsneveridentify withone another(not even
in the"fusional" practices of mass movements orthe"intimacy" ofaffec-
tiverelations),nor,however, do theyeveracquirean isolatedidentity,
whichis an intrinsically contradictory notion.The readquestionis how
thedominantreference pointsofindividualidentity changeovertime
and withthe changinginstitutional environment.
To the questionof the historicalproductionof the people (or of
nationalindividuality) we cannotmerelybe contentto replywitha
description of conquests,populationmovements, and administrative
practices of "territorialization."The individuals destined to perceive
themselves as themembersof a singlenationare eithergatheredto-
getherexternally fromdiversegeographicalorigins,as in thenations
formedbyimmigration (France,U.S.A.) or else are broughtmutually
to recognizeone anotherwithina historicalfrontier whichcontained
themall. The peopleis constituted out ofvariouspopulationssubject
to a commonlaw.However,in everycase, a modeloftheirunitymust
"anticipate" thatconstitution: The processofunification (theeffective-
nessofwhichcan be measured,forexample,in collectivemobilization
in wartime, thatis, thecapacityto confront deathcollectively) presup-
poses the constitution of a ideological
specific form. It must at one and
thesame timebe a massphenomenonand a phenomenonofindivid-
uation;itmusteffect an "interpellation ofindividualsas subjects"(Al-
thusser) whichis muchmorepotentthanthemereinculcation ofpolitical
valuesor ratherone thatintegrates thisinculcationintoa moreele-
mentary process(whichwemayterm"primary") offixation oftheaffects
ofloveand hate,and representation ofthe"self." That ideologicalform
mustbecomean a prioriconditionof communication betweenindi-
viduals(the"citizens") -
and betweensocialgroups notbysuppressing
all differences, but by relativizing themand subordinating themto
itselfin sucha waythatitis thesymbolic difference between"ourselves"
and "foreigners" which wins out and which is lived as irreducible.In
otherwords,to use theterminology proposedby Fichtein his Redean
dieDeutsche Nationof 1808, the "external frontiers" ofthe Statehave to
348 EtienneBalibar

become "internalfrontiers"or- which amounts to the same thing-

externalfrontiershave to be imagined constantlyas a projectionand
protectionof an internalcollectivepersonality,whicheach person car-
ries within him/herselfand enables him/herto inhabit the space of
the stateas a place where one has alwaysbeen - and whereone always
will be - at "home."
What mightthatideological formbe? Depending upon the partic-
ular circumstances,it will be called patriotismor nationalism: The
events which promote its formationor which reveal its potencywill
be recorded and its origin will be traced back to political methods-
the combinationof"force"and "education"(as Machiavelli and Gram-
sci put it)- whichenable the stateto some extentto create public con-
sciousness. But this creation is merely an external aspect. To grasp
the deepest reasons for its effectiveness, attentionwill turn then, as
theattentionofpoliticalphilosophyand sociologyhave turnedforthree
centuries,towardthe analogy of religion, making nationalism and pa-
triotismout to be a religion ifnotindeedthereligion- ofmoderntimes.
-
Inevitably,thereis some truthin this response. Not only because,
formally,religionsalso instituteformsof communityby startingout
from"souls"and individual identitiesand because theyprescribea so-
cial "morality,"but also because theologicaldiscoursehas providedmod-
els forthe idealization of the nation and the sacralization of the state,
which make it possible for a bond of sacrificeto be created between
individuals,and forthe stampof"truth"and "law"to be conferredupon
the rules of the legal system.6Every national communitymust have
been representedat some point or anotheras a "chosenpeople."How-
ever,the political philosophiesof the classical age had already recog-
nized the inadequacy of this analogy, which is equally clearly
demonstratedby the failureof attemptsmade to constitute"civil re-
ligions,"by the factthatthe "statereligion"ultimatelyonly constituted
a transitoryformofnational ideology(even when thistransitionlasted
fora long time and produced importanteffectsby superimposingre-
ligious upon national struggles),and by the interminableconflictbe-
tween theological universalityand the universalityof nationalism.
In reality,the opposite argumentis correct:Incontestably,national
ideology involvesideal signifiers(firstand foremostthe very nameof
the nation or "fatherland")on to which may be transferredthe sense
of the sacred and the affectsof love, respect,sacrifice,and fearwhich
THE NATION FORM 349

havecementedreligious communities, butthattransferonlytakesplace

becauseanothertypeofcommunity is involvedhere.The analogyis itself
based on a deeperdifference; if it werenot, it would be impossible
to understand whynationalidentity, moreor lesscompletely integrat-
ing the forms of religiousidentity, up tendingto replaceit, and
ends
forcingitselfto become"nationalized."
and Ideal Nation
FictiveEthnicity
I applytheterm"fictive ethnicity"to thecommunity instituted by
thenation-state. This is an intentionallycomplexexpressionin which
thetermfiction, in keepingwithmyremarksabove,mustnotbe taken
in the sense of a pure and simpleillusionwithouthistoricaleffects,
but on thecontrary understoodby analogywiththepersona jictaofthe
juridicaltraditionin the senseof an institutional effect,a "creation."
No nationpossessesan ethnicbase naturally, but as socialformations
are nationalized,the populationsincludedwithinthem,dividedup
amongthemor dominatedbythemare ethnicized, thatis,represented
in the past or in the futureas iftheyformeda naturalcommunity,
possessingofitselfan identity oforigins,culture,and interests which
transcendindividualsand social conditions.7
Fictiveethnicity is not purelyand simplyidenticalwiththe ideal
nation whichis theobjectofpatriotism, but is notindispensableto it,
forwithoutit the nationwould appear preciselyonlyas an idea or
an arbitrary abstraction: patriotism'sappeal wouldbe addressedto no
one. It is fictiveethnicity whichmakesit possibleforthe expression
ofa preexisting unityto be seen in thestateand continually to mea-
surethestateagainstits"historic mission"in theserviceofthenation
and, as a fictively ethnicunityagainstthebackgroundofa universal-
isticrepresentation whichattributes to each individualone- and only
one- ethnicidentity and whichthusdividesup thewholeofhumanity
betweendifferent ethnicgroupscorresponding potentiallyto so many
nations,nationalideology does much more than the
justify strategies
employed by the stateto controlpopulations. It inscribestheirdemands
in advanceto a sense of belonging in the double sense of the term:
thatis, bothwhatit is thatmakesone belongto oneselfand also what
makesone belongto otherfellowhumanbeings.Whichmeans that
one can be interpellated, as an individual,inthenameofthecollectivity
whosenameprecisely bears.The naturalization
one ofbelongingand
350 EtienneBalibar

the sublimationofthe ideal nation are twoaspects ofthe same process.

How can ethnicitybe produced? And how can it be produced in
such a way thatit preciselydoes not appear as fiction,but as the most
natural of origins?History showsus thatthereare two greatcompet-
ing routesto this:language and race.Most oftenthetwooperatetogether,
for only their complementaritymakes it possible for the "people" to
be representedas an absolutely autonomous unit. Both express the
idea that the national character (which might also be called its soul
or its spirit)is imminentin the people. But both offera means of tran-
scendingactual individualsand politicalrelations.They constitutetwo
ways of rootinghistoricalpopulations in a factof "nature"(the diver-
sity of languages and the diversityof races appearing predestined),
but also two ways of giving a meaning to theircontinued existence,
of transcendingits contingency.By force of circumstance,however,
at times one or the other is dominant, fortheyare not based on the
developmentof that same institutionsand do not appeal to the same
symbols or the same idealizations of the national identity The fact
of these differentarticulationsof, on the one hand, a predominantly
linguisticethnicityand, on theother,an ethnicitythatis predominantly
racial has obvious political consequences. For this reason, and forthe
sake of clarityof analysis, we must begin by examining the two sep-
arately.
The language communityseems the more abstractnotion,but in
realityit is the more concrete since it connects individuals with an
origin which may at any moment be actualized and which has as its
contentthe common actof theirown exchanges,of theirdiscursivecom-
munication,using the instrumentsof spoken language and the whole
constantlyself-renewingmass of writtenand recorded texts. This is
not to say that the communityis an immediate one, withoutinternal
limits,any more than communicationis in reality"transparent"be-
tween all individuals. But these limits are always relative: Even if it
were the case that individuals whose social conditionswere verydis-
tant fromone anotherwere never in directcommunication,theyare
bound togetherby an uninterruptedchain of intermediatediscourses.
They are not isolated- eitherde jure or de facto.
However, we should certainlynot allow ourselves to believe that
this situation is as old as the world itself.It is, on the contrary,re-
markablyrecent. The old empires and the Ancien Régime societies
THE NATION FORM 351

werestillbased on thejuxtapositionoflinguistically separatepopula-

tions,on the superimposition of mutuallyincompatible"languages"
forthedominantand thedominated,and forthesacredand profane
spheres.Betweenthesetherehad tobe a wholesystemoftranslations.8
In modernnationalformations thetranslators are writers, journalists,
and politicians,social actorswho speakthelanguageofthe"people"
in a waythatseemsall the morenaturalfortheverydegreeof dis-
tinctiontheythereby bringto it. The translation processhas become
primarily one of internal translation between different "levelsoflan-
guage."Socialdifferences areexpressed and relativized as different ways
ofspeakingthenationallanguage,whichsupposea commoncode and
evena commonnorm(see Balibar,1985).This latteris, as we know,
inculcatedbyuniversalschooling, whoseprimaryfunction it is to per-
formpreciselythistask.
That is whythereis a closehistoricalcorrelation betweenthena-
tionalformation and thedevelopment ofschoolsas "popular"institu-
tions, notlimited to specializedtrainingor to eliteculture,butserving
to underpinthewholeprocessofthesocializationofindividuals.That
the schoolshouldalso be the site of the inculcationof a nationalist
ideology-and sometimes also theplacewhereitis contested - is a sec-
ondaryphenomenon, and is, strictlyspeaking,a lessindispensable as-
pect.Let us simplysaythatschoolingis theprincipalinstitution which
as
producesethnicity linguistic community. It is not, however, the only
one: The state,economicexchange,and familylifeare also schools
in a sense,organsoftheideal nationrecognizableby a commonlan-
guagewhichbelongsto them"as theirown."Forwhatis decisivehere
is notonlythatthenationallanguageshouldbe recognized as theofficial
language,but, much more fundamentally, that it should be able to
appearas theveryelementofthelifeofa people,thereality whicheach
personmayappropriate hisorin her own way without thereby destroy-
its
ing identity. There is no contradiction between the instituting of
one national language and the dailydiscrepancy between - and clash
of-"classlanguages"whichare preciselynot different languages.In
fact,the twothings complementary. linguisticpracticesfeed
are All
intoa single"loveofthelanguage"whichis addressednotto thetext-
book normnor to particularusage,but to the"mothertongue,"that
is, to the ideal of a commonoriginprojectedback beyondlearning
processesand specialistformsof usage and whichby thatveryfact
352 EtienneBalibar

becomes the metaphorforthe love the nationals feelforone another.9

One mightthen ask oneself,quite apart fromthe precisehistorical
questions which the historyof national languages poses- from the
difficultiesof theirunificationor imposition,and fromtheirelabora-
tion into an idiom that is both "popular" and "cultivated"(a process
which we know is farfrombeing completed today in all nation-states
in spite of the labors oftheirintellectualswiththe aid of various inter-
national bodies) - whythelanguagecommunity to pro-
is notalonesufficient
duce ethnicity.
Perhaps this has to do with the paradoxical propertieswhich, by
virtueof its very structure,the linguisticsignifierconferson individ-
ual identity.In a sense, it is always in the element of language that
individuals are interpellatedas subjects, foreveryinterpellationis of
the order of discourse. Every "personality"is constructedwith words
in which law, genealogy,history,political choices, professionalqual-
ifications,and psychologyare set forth.But the linguisticconstruction
ofidentityis by definitionopen.No individual"chooses"his/hermother
tongue or can "change"it at will. However,it is always possible to ap-
propriate several languages and to turn oneselfinto a differentkind
of bearer of discourse and of the transformationsof language. The
linguisticcommunityinduces a terriblyconstrainingethnic memory
(Roland Barthes once went so far as to call it "fascist"),but it is one
whichnonethelesspossessesa strangeplasticity:it immediatelynatural-
izes new acquisitions. It does so tooquickly in a sense. It is a collective
memorywhichperpetuatesitselfat the cost of an individual forgetting
of "origins."The "second generation"immigrant- a notion which in
this contextacquires a structuredsignificance- inhabits the national
language (and throughit the nation itself)in a manner as spontane-
and as imperiousso faras affectivity
ous, as "hereditary," and the imag-
inary are concerned, as the son of those native heaths which we think
of as so veryFrench (and most of which not so long ago did not even
have the national language as their daily parlance). One's "mother"
tongue is not necessarilythe language of one's "real"mother.The lan-
guage communityis a communityinthepresent whichproduces the feel-
ing that it has always existed,but which lays down no destinyforthe
successive generations. Ideally, it "assimilates"anyone, but holds no
one. Lastly, it affectsall individuals in their innermostbeing (in the
way in which theyconstitutethemselvesas subjects), but its historical
THE NATION FORM 353

particularityis only bound to interchangeableinstitutions.When cir-

cumstances permit,it may serve different nations (as English, Span-
ish, and even French do) or survive the "physical"disappearance of
the peoples who used it (like "ancient"Greek and Latin or "literary"
Arabic). For it to be tied down to the frontiersof a particularpeople,
it thereforeneeds an extra degree (un supplément) of particularity,or
a principle of closure, of exclusion.
This principle is that of being part of a common race. But here
we mustbe verycarefulnot to giveriseto misunderstandings.All kinds
of somatic or psychologicalfeatures,both visible and invisible,may
lend themselvesto creatingthe fictionofa racial identityand therefore
to representingnaturaland hereditarydifferences betweensocial groups
eitherwithinthe same nation or outside its frontiers.I have discussed
elsewhere, as have others before me, the development of the marks
ofrace and the relationtheybear to different historicalfiguresof social
conflict.What I am solelyconcerned withhere is the symbolickernel
which makes it possible to equate race and ethnicityideally, and to
representunityof race to oneselfas the originor cause ofthe historical
unityof a people. Now, unlikewhat applied in the case ofthelinguistic
community,it cannot be a question here of a practice which is really
common to all the individuals who forma political unit. We are not
dealingwithanythingequivalentto communication.What we are speak-
ing of is thereforea second-degreefiction.However, this fictionalso
derives its effectivenessfromeverydaypractices, relationswhich im-
mediately structure the "life"of individuals. And, most importantly,
whereas the language communitycan only create equality between
individuals by simultaneously"naturalizing"the social inequality of
linguisticpractices, the race communitydissolves social inequalities
in an even more ambivalent"similarity";it ethnicizesthe social differ-
ence which is an expressionof irreconcilableantagonismsby lending
it the formof a division between the "genuinely"and the "falsely"na-
tional.
I thinkwe may cast some light on this paradox in the following
way. The symbolickernelof the idea of race (and of its demographic
and culturalequivalents) is the schema of genealogy,thatis, quite sim-
ply the idea thatthe filiationof individuals transmitsfromgeneration
to generation a substance both biological and spiritual and thereby
inscribesthem in a temporal communityknown as "kinship."That is
354 EtienneBalibar

whyas soonas nationalideologyenunciatesthe propositionthatthe

individualsbelongingto the same people are interrelated (or, in the
prescriptive mode, that they should constitute a circleof extended kin-
ship),we are in the presenceof the secondmode of ethnicization.
The objectionwillno doubtbe raisedherethatsuch a represen-
tationcharacterizes societiesand communities whichhavenothingna-
tional about them. However,it is preciselyon this point that the
particularinnovationhingesby whichthe nationformis articulated
to themodernidea ofrace. This idea is correlative withthetendency
for"private" genealogies,as (still)codifiedbytraditional systems pref-
erentialmarriageand lineage,to disappear.Theideaofa racialcommunity
makes itsappearancewhenthe frontiers
ofkinship at theleveloftheclan,
dissolve
theneighborhood
community, at
and,theoretically the
least, class,tobeimag-
social
inarily tothethreshold
transferred That is, whennothingpre-
ofnationality:
ventsalliancewithanyof one's"fellowcitizens"whatever, and when,
on thecontrary, suchan allianceseemstheonlyone "normal"or "nat-
ural."The racialcommunity has a tendencyto represent itselfas one
big familyor as the commonenvelopeof familyrelations(the com-
munityof "French," "American" or "Algerian" families).10 From that
pointonward,each individualhas his/her family,whatever his/her so-
cial condition,but the family-like property-becomesa contingent
relationbetweenindividuals.In ordertoconsiderthisquestionfurther,
we oughttherefore to turnto a discussionofthehistoryofthefamily,
an institutionwhichhereplaysa roleeverybitas centralas thatplayed
bytheschoolinthediscussion immediately above,and onethatis omni-
present in the discourse of race.
TheFamily andtheSchool
We here run up againstthe lacunae in familyhistory, a subject
whichremainspreyto the dominantperspective of laws relatingto
marriageon theone hand,and on theother,of"privatelife"as a lit-
eraryand anthropological subject.The greatthemeoftherecenthis-
toryof the familyis the emergenceof the "nuclear"or small family
(constitutedby theparentalcouple and theirchildren)and heredis-
cussionis focusedon whetherit is a specifically
"modern"phenome-
non(eighteenth-nineteenth connected
centuries) withbourgeoisforms
ofsociality(thethesisofAriesand Shorter)or whetherit is theresult
ofa development thebasis ofwhichwas laid downa longtimebefore
THE NATION FORM 355

byecclesiasticallaw and thecontrolofmarriagebytheChristianau-

thorities(Goody'sthesis)(Aries, 1975; Shorter,1975; Goody,1983).
In fact,thesepositionsare not incompatible.But, mostimportantly,
theytendto pushintotheshadewhatis forus themostcrucialques-
tion:Whatis thecorrelation whichhas gradually beenestablished since
theinstitution ofpublicregistration and thecodification ofthefamily
(of which the Code Napoléon was the prototype) between the disso-
lutionofrelationsof"extended" kinshipand thepenetration offamily
relationsbytheintervention ofthenation-state whichrunsfromleg-
islationin respectofinheritance to theorganizationofbirthcontrol?
Let us notehere thatin contemporary nationalsocieties,exceptfor
a fewgenealogy"fanatics" and a fewwho are "nostalgic" forthedays
ofthearistocracy, genealogy is no longer either a body theoretical
of
knowledgenor an objectoforal memory, nor is it recordedand con-
servedprivately:Today it is thestate which drawsup andstores thearchive
of
andalliances.
filiations
Here againwe haveto distinguish betweena deep and a superficial
level.The superficiallevelis familialist discourse(constitutive ofcon-
servative nationalism)which at a veryearlystage became linked with
-
nationalismin politicaltradition particularly withintheFrenchtra-
dition.The deep levelis thesimultaneousemergenceof"privatelife,"
the"intimate(small) familycircle"andthe familypolicyof the state,
whichprojectsintothe public spherethe new notionof population
and thedemographictechniquesformeasuringit, ofthesupervision
of its healthand morals,and of its reproduction. The resultis that
themodernfamily circleis quitetheoppositeofan autonomoussphere
at the frontiersof whichthe structures of the statewouldhalt. It is
thespherein whichtherelationsbetweenindividualsare immediately
chargedwitha "civic"functionand made possibleby constantstate
assistancebeginning withrelations betweenthesexeswhichare aligned
to procreation.This is also whatenablesus to understandthe anar-
chistictonethatsexually"deviant" behavioreasilytakeson in modern
nationalformations, whereasin earliersocietiesit moreusuallytook
on a tone of religiousheresy.Public healthand social securityhave
replacedthefatherconfessor, not termforterm,but by introducing
botha new"freedom" and newassistance,a newmissionand there-
a
forealso a new demand.Thus, as lineal kinship,solidarity between
generations,and theeconomicfunctions of the extendedfamilydis-
356 EtienneBalibar

solve, what takes their place is neither a natural microsocietynor a

purely "individualistic"contractualrelation,but a nationalization of
thefamilywhichhas as itscounterpartthe identification ofthe national
communitywitha symbolickinshipcircumscribedby rulesof pseudo-
endogamyand witha tendencyless to projectitselfinto a sense ofhav-
ing common antecedents as a feelingof having common descendants.
That is whythe idea of eugenics is always latent in the reciprocal
relationbetween the "bourgeois"familyand a societywhich takes the
nation form.That is why nationalism also has a secret affinity with
sexism: Not so much as a manifestationof the same authoritariantra-
ditionbut insofaras the inequalityof sexual roles in conjugal love and
child-rearing constitutestheanchoringpointforthejuridical,economic,
educational, and medical mediation of the state. Lastly, that is why
therepresentation ofnationalismas a "tribalism"-the sociologists'grand
alternativeto representingit as a religion- is both mystificatory and
revealing. Mystificatory a
because it imagines nationalism as regres-
sion to archaic formsof communitywhich are in realityincompatible
withthe nation-state(this can be clearlyseen fromthe incompleteness
of the formationof a nation whereverpowerfullineal or tribal soli-
darities still exist). But it is also revealing of the substitutionof one
imaginaryofkinshipforanother,a substitutionwhichthe nationeffects
and which underpinsthe transformation of the familyitself.It is also
what forcesus to ask ourselvesto what extentthe nation formcan con-
tinue to reproduce itselfindefinitely(at least as the dominant form)
once the transformationof the familyis "completed,"that is, once re-
lations of sex and procreationare completelyremoved fromthe ge-
nealogical order. We would then reach the limit of the material
possibilitiesofconceivingwhat human "races"are and ofinvestingthat
particular representationin the process of producing ethnicity.But
undoubtedly we have not reached that point yet.
Althusserwas not wrong in his outline definitionof the "Ideolog-
ical State Apparatuses"to suggestthatthe kernelofthe dominantideo-
logy of bourgeois societieshas passed fromthe family-Churchcouple
to the family-schoolcouple (Althusser,1971). I am, however,tempted
to introducetwo correctivesto that formulation.First,I shall not say
that a particularinstitutionof this kind in itselfconstitutesan "Ideo-
logical State Apparatus": What such a formulationadequately desig-
natesis ratherthecombinedfunctioning ofseveraldominantinstitutions.
THE NATION FORM 357

I shall furtherpropose thatthe contemporaryimportanceof schooling

and the familyunit does not derive solely fromthe functionalplace
they take in the reproductionof labor power, but fromthe fact that
theysubordinatethatreproductionto the constitutionof a fictiveeth-
nicity,thatis, to the articulationof a linguisticcommunityand a com-
munityof race implicitin population policies (what Foucault called
by a suggestivebut ambiguous termthe systemof"bio-powers")(Fou-
cault, 1977). School and familyperhaps have otheraspects or deserve
to be analyzed fromother points of view. Their historybegins well
before the appearance of the nation formand may continue beyond
it. But what makes them togetherconstitutethe dominant ideological
apparatus in bourgeois societies- which is expressedin theirgrowing
interdependenceand in theirtendencyto divide up the time devoted
to the trainingof individuals exhaustivelybetween them is their na-
tional importance,thatis, theirimmediateimportanceforthe produc-
tion of ethnicity.In this sense, thereis only onedominant "Ideological
State Apparatus" in bourgeois social formationsusing the school and
-
familyinstitutionsforits own ends togetherwith other institutions
graftedon to the school and the family- and the existenceof that ap-
paratus is at the root of the hegemonyof nationalism.
I must add one remark in conclusion to this hypothesis.
Articulation- even complementarity-does not mean harmony.Lin-
guisticethnicityand racial (or hereditary)ethnicityare in a sense mut-
uallyexclusive.I suggestedabove thatthelinguisticcommunityis open,
whereastherace communityappears in principleclosed(since itleads -
theoretically-to maintaining indefinitely, until the end of the gen-
erations, outside the community or its"inferior""foreign"marginsthose
who, by itscriteria,are not authenticallynational). Both are ideal rep-
resentations.Doubtless race symbolismcombines the element of an-
thropologicaluniversality on whichit is based (the chain ofgenerations,
the absolute of kinship extended to the whole of humanity) with an
imaginaryof segregationand prohibitions.But in practice migration
and intermarriageare constantlytransgressingthe limits which are
thus projected (even where coercive policies criminalize "interbreed-
ing").The real obstacleto themixingofpopulationsis constitutedrather
by class differences which tend to reconstitutecaste phenomena. The
hereditarysubstance of ethnicityconstantlyhas to be redefined:Yes-
terdayit was "German-ness,""the French,"or "Anglo-Saxon"race, to-
358 EtienneBalibar

day it is "European-ness"or "Western-ness," tomorrowperhapsthe

"Mediterranean race."Conversely, theopennessofthelinguistic com-
munity is an ideal openness, even though ithas as itsmaterial support
thepossibility oftranslating fromone languageto anotherand there-
forethecapacityofindividualsto increasetherangeoftheirlinguistic
competence.
Though formally egalitarian, belonging to the linguistic
community-chieflybecause of the factthatit is mediatizedby the
institution oftheschool- immediately re-creates divisions,differential
normswhichalso overlapwithclassdifferences to a verygreatdegree.
The greaterthe role takenon by theeducationsystemwithinbour-
geoissocieties,themoredifferences in linguistic(and therefore liter-
ary, "cultural," and technological)competence function as caste
differences, assigningdifferent "socialdestinies" toindividuals.In these
circumstances, it is not surprising that they should be immediately
associatedwithformsofcorporalhabitus (to use PierreBourdieu'ster-
minology) which confer on the act of speakingin its personal,non-
universalizable traitsthefunction ofa racialor quasiracialmark(and
whichstilloccupya veryimportant place in theformulation of"class
racism"):"foreign" or "regional"accent,"popular"styleofspeech,lan-
guage "errors" or, conversely, ostentatious "correctness" immediately
designating a speaker'sbelongingto a particularpopulationand spon-
taneouslyinterpreted as reflectinga specificfamilyoriginand an he-
reditarydisposition.11 The productionof ethnicityis also the
racializationof languageand the verbalizationof race.
It is notan irrelevant matter-eitherfromtheimmediatepolitical
pointofviewor fromthepointofviewofthedevelopment ofthena-
tionformor its futurerolein theinstituting of social relations- that
a particularrepresentation of ethnicity shouldbe dominantsince it
leads to tworadicallydifferent attitudesto theproblemofintegration
and assimilation,twowaysof groundingthejuridicalorderand na-
tionalizinginstitutions.12
The French"revolutionary nation"accordeda privilegedplace to
thesymboloflanguagein itsowninitialprocessofformation: It bound
politicalunitycloselyto linguisticuniformity, thedemocratization of
the stateto the coerciverepressionof cultural"particularisms," local
patoisbeing the objecton whichit became fixated.For its part,the
American"revolutionary nation"builtits originalideals on a double
THE NATION FORM 359

repression: thatoftheextermination oftheAmerindian"natives"and

thatof the difference betweenfree"White"men and "Black"slaves.
The linguisticcommunity inheritedfromthe Anglo-Saxon"mother
country" did notpose a problem- at leastapparently-untilHispanic
immigration conferred upon it the signification of class symboland
racial feature."Nativism"has alwaysbeen implicitin the historyof
Frenchnationalideologyuntil,at theend ofthenineteenth century,
colonizationon theone hand, and an intensification of theimporta-
tionoflaborand thesegregation ofmanualworkers bymeansoftheir
ethnicoriginon theother,led to theconstitution of thephantasmof
the"Frenchrace."It was, by contrast,veryquicklymade explicitin
thehistoryoftheAmericannationalideology,whichrepresented the
formation of the Americanpeople not onlyas the meltingpot of a
newrace,butalso as thehierarchical combination ofthedifferent eth-
nic contributions at the costof difficult
analogies between European
or Asian immigration and thesocial inequalitiesinheritedfromslav-
eryand reinforced by the economicexploitation of the Blacks.13
These historicaldifferences in no sense impose any necessary
outcome-theyarerather thestuff ofpoliticalstruggles-buttheydeeply
modifytheconditionsin whichproblemsof assimilation, equalityof
rights,citizenship, nationalism, and internationalism are posed. One
mightseriouslywonderwhetherin regardto theproductionoffictive
ethnicity, the "buildingof Europe"-to the extentthatit will seek to
transfer tothe"Community" levelfunctionsand symbolsofthenation-
state- willorientateitselfpredominantlytowardtheinstitution ofa "Eu-
ropeanco-lingualism" (and ifso, adoptingwhichlanguage)orpredom-
inantlyin the direction of the idealizationof "Europeandemographic
identity" conceivedmainlyin oppositionto the"southern populations"
(Turks,Arabs,Blacks).14Every"people," which is the productofa na-
tionalprocessof ethnicization, is forcedtodayto findits own means
of goingbeyondexclusivism or identitarian ideologyin theworldof
transnationalcommunications and planetaryrelationsof force.Or
rather:everyindividualis compelledto findin thetransformation of
the imaginaryof "his/her" people the means to leave it, in orderto
communicate withtheindividualsofotherpeopleswithwhichhe/she
sharesthe same interests and, to some extent,the same future.
360 EtienneBalibar

NOTES
1. These twopossibilities
maybe combinedbypresenting a givenclass as theonly"na-
tional"class,one whichundercertainconditionsexpressestheinterests ofthewholepeople,
or one whichis able to imposeon the othersa statewhichis apparently"aboveclass."
2. A phraseI have takenfromRené Gallisot.
3. Ifone did,however, one mightpointtothemiddle
haveto choosea datesymbolically,
ofthesixteenth century:thecompletion oftheSpanishconquestoftheNewWorld,thebreak-
up of the HabsburgEmpire,the end of the dynasticwars in England,and the beginning
of the Dutch War of Independence.
4. Fromthispointofview,thereis nothingsurprising aboutthefactthatthe"orthodox"
Marxisttheoryof thelinearsuccessionof modesof productionbecame theofficial doctrine
in theSovietUnion at thepointwhennationalismtriumphed there,particularly as it made
as the new universalnation.
it possibleforthe"firstsocialiststate"to be represented
5. Forsome further remarkson thissame point,see mystudy,Propositions surla ci-
toyenneté" (Balibar,1988).
b. On all thesepoints,the workot Kantorowiczis clearlyof crucialsignificance: see
Mourirpour la patrieet autrestextes
(1985).
7. I say"includedwithinthem,"but I shouldalso add "orexcludedby them,"sincethe
ethnicization of the"others"occurssimultaneously withthatof the"nationals":thereare no
longeranyhistorical differences otherthanethnicones(thustheJewsalso haveto be a "peo-
ple").On theethnicization ofcolonizedpopulations, seeJ.-L.Amselleand E. M'Bokolo(1985).
8. ErnestGellner(1983) and BenedictAnderson(1983),whoseanalysesare as opposed
as "materialism" and "idealism," bothrightlystressthispoint.
9. Jean-ClaudeMilneroffers someverystimulating suggestions on thispoint,though
more in Les Nomsindistincts (1983: 43ff.)than in LAmour de la langue(1978). On the "class
struggle"/"language struggle" in theU.S.S.R. at thepointwhenthepolicyof"so-
alternative
cialismin one country" becamedominant,see F. Gadet,J.-M.Gaymann,Y. Mignot,E. Rou-
dinesco, Les Maîtresde la langue(1979).
10. Let us add thatwe haveherea surecriterion
ofthecommutation betweenracismand
nationalism:Everydiscourseon thefatherlandor nationwhichassociatesthesenotionswith
the"defenceofthefamily"-not to speakof thebirthrate- is alreadyensconcedin theuni-
verseof racism.
11. See P. Bourdieu, Distinction
(1984), and Ce queparlerveutdire:L'économie lin-
deséchanges
(1982),and thecritiqueby the"Révolteslogiques"collectivein L'Empire
guistiques dusociologue
(1984), whichbears essentiallyon thewaythatBourdieufixessocial rolesas "destinies" and
immediately to the antagonismbetweenthema functionof reproducing
attributes the"to-
tality"(the chapteron languageis by FrançoiseKerleroux).
12. See some mostvaluableremarkson thispointin Gadet & Pecheux(1981:38tt.).
13. On American"nativism," see R. Ertel,G. Fabre,& E. Marienstras(1974: 25ff.)and
Michael Omi & HowardWinant(1986: 120). It is interesting to see a movement developing
todayin theUnitedStates(directedagainstLatinAmericanimmigration) callingforEnglish
to be made the official
nationallanguage.
14. Rightat the heartof thisalternativelies the followingtrulycrucialquestion:will
theadministrative and educationalinstitutionsofthefuture"UnitedEurope"acceptArabic,
Turkish,or evencertainAsian or Africanlanguageson equal footingwithFrench,German,
and Portuguese,or willthoselanguagesbe regardedas "foreign"?

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