Pakistan Dives into the Persian Gulf

The always-important Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan visited Pakistan this
weekend to ensure that the country’s major power brokers are behind Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain as the latter faces a possibly Iran-backed domestic uprising
from its Shia native majority.

Bandar, the once long-time ambassador to the United States and now national
security council chief, sought to avoid a replay of the 1990 Gulf War, when Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif supported Saudi Arabia and the United States in Iraq war,
while Chief of Army Staff Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg publicly called for an Iraq-Iran-
Pakistan alliance against the West.

Today, it is the civilian government that is less likely to be on board with Riyadh’s
game plan. Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, is a pragmatic
nationalist aligned with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and China. The
Islamabad coalition government is led by the center-left Pakistan Peoples Party
(PPP), which has historically had poor relations with Riyadh. Its senior brass
consists of many Shia Muslims, the minority Muslim sect hardline Salafis in Saudi
Arabia have deep contempt for. Riyadh has a soft side for the PPP’s rivals: the
various center-right Pakistan Muslim League factions, particularly Sharif’s, as
well as the army and military intelligence services. The Saudi king has even
expressed his personal disdain for President Asif Ali Zardari, describing him as
“rotten” and the major “obstacle” behind Pakistan’s progress, according to State
Department cables released by WikiLeaks. Meanwhile, the PPP has sought to
improve Pakistan-Iran relations, which has not improved its standing in Saudi
eyes.

But the Saudis are in need and seem to be reevaluating their hostility toward the
PPP. Bandar’s visit comes two weeks after the Saudi army chief’s meeting with
Kayani. Riyadh’s concern for the future of Bahrain and potentially even Saudi
Arabia’s predominantly-Shia eastern corridor provides the PPP with an
opportunity to mollify Saudi antagonism, ease domestic pressure, and help its
always-embattled government continue to crawl toward the finish line and
complete its five-year tenure. The Saudis have reportedly offered Islamabad oil
at concessionary rates, which could assist Zardari in maintaining oil prices and
containing public opposition. Inflation is at a seven-month low, but the PPP could
be hit hard by a rise in global oil prices due to the strife in Libya, and the
combination of a traditional summer oil price spike and IMF pressure to reduce
subsidies.

Distrust between the PPP and Riyadh is considerable, but money talks. Riyadh’s
assistance could give the PPP a temporary lifeline. However, it cannot
save the Islamabad government from from self-destruction. Furthermore, Riyadh
is unlikely to let go of an option to support a center-right and Islamist alliance
should Pakistan face early elections late this year or early next year.
One should not overestimate the importance of the civilian government in Saudi
eyes. Most likely, Riyadh simply wants all of Pakistan’s major power brokers to
be on the same page. But the most important player for the Saudis is the
military. The Pakistan Army, as one of the Sunni Muslim world’s most powerful
armies (and because Rawalpindi is more likely than Ankara to play second fiddle
to Riyadh), will become even more critical to Riyadh as the Sudairis doubt
Washington’s intentions and resolve. The Pakistani military — deeply allied to
China, the largest importer of Saudi crude — has historically contributed forces to
Arab Muslim states in times of need. It is an equal opportunity offender, having
shot down Israeli fighter jets and brutally subdued Palestinian militant
organizations. Many of its retired officers have also served in the security
services of Gulf Arab states, including Bahrain. Recently, the Fauji Foundation —
a massive Pakistan Army welfare trust and business conglomerate — put out
advertisements for hundreds of anti-riot instructor and security guard jobs with
Bahrain’s internal security services. Pakistanis have served in the Bahrain
security forces for decades; many have been naturalized to boost the island
nation’s Sunni population.

So the Pakistan Army is not a tangential player when it comes to Gulf security. It
is can potentially serve as a force multiplier for the Saudis. Presumably, Riyadh
is preparing contingencies for worst-case scenarios that might require the direct
support of the Pakistan Army. Bandar’s meetings with the civilians – Prime
Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, as well as Zardari
— are likely aimed at ensuring that they do not serve as a hindrance to such
plans.

Interestingly, Bandar is not the kingdom’s major interlocutor with the Pakistanis.
The kingdom’s Pakistan portfolio is generally handled by the Saudi ambassador,
foreign minister, and intelligence chief. It is possible that in addition to his role as
general secretary of the NSC, Bandar visited Pakistan due to his pragmatist and
pro-US leanings, which might have helped in building confidence with PPP
officials. It also suggests a deficiency in the more regular channels of
communication.

For Pakistan, siding with the conservative Sunni Arabic bloc risks alienating Iran,
with whom there remains the faint hope of a natural gas pipeline for energy-
starved Pakistan. While an Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline seems unlikely in the
present, it would be advantageous for Pakistan to have multiple gas import
options available at least hypothetically so as to reduce its perceived
dependency on a single source. If it became clear that Pakistan’s sole option
was the TAPI pipeline transiting through Afghanistan, then Kabul and ISAF could
use this as leverage vis-a-vis Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Only if the Saudis were
a major exporter of natural gas.