"ENGAGING MYANMAR IN ASEAN"

Address by Mr. Sukhumbhand Paribatra

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand at the, Conference on

"Engaging Myanmar in East Asia", organised by Institute of Strategic and Development
Studies, Inc., The Republic of the Philippines, and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, On 29
November 1998, At the Shangri-La EDSA Plaza Hotel, Manila

For the past several years the policy of "Constructive Engagement" has guided ASEAN's
approach towards Myanmar. As a matter of historical record, the policy was initiated in
1991- by Thailand's Anand Panyarachun government and later "regionalised" as an
ASEAN policy. The basic questions concerning the pursuit of the policy were why and
how?

For Thailand, the reasoning that led to the formulation of the "Constructive Engagement"
policy, was based upon both realities and aspirations.

The old adage, "Where you stand depends on where you sit", provides a clear reflection
of the realities that led Thailand to engage Myanmar.

The two countries are permanent neighbours, sharing a 2,400 kilometer long border.
Most of this border has not been demarcated and passes through difficult mountainous
and jungle terrain, inhabited by common ethnic groups, which historically both
governments have not found it easy to rule. At the same time, the border is porous, with
more than 70 passes, mostly in remote areas. Therefore events in Myanmar often have
repercussions on Thailand.

For over 40 years after the emergence of modern Myanmar in the aftermath of the
Second World War, politics within Myanmar was dominated by ongoing conflicts
between the core and the peripheries, with various ethnic groups engaged in armed
struggles against the central government in Yangon. In the 1980s and the early 1990s,
one side effect of these struggles was the spill-over of displaced persons and migrants
into Thailand. Over a million economic migrants and over hundred thousand ethnic
displaced persons crossed over from Myanmar into Thailand. In the face of such realities,
it was, and continues to be, in the interest of both countries to have a good working
relationship at the governmental level, so that when problems arise, they can be quickly
contained, reduced or resolved.

Furthermore, as Thailand was one of the founding members of ASEAN, aspirations

related to regionalism also guided our country's perspective and policy towards Myanmar.

One aspiration was the extension of the association's membership to all the ten countries
of Southeast Asia so as to further the cause of regional co-operation. Another was the
hope that all regional states can make their full contributions to the progress of the region.
These aspirations meant that Thailand would like to promote Myanmar's active
participation in the region's affairs, her integration with ASEAN, and the realisation of
her potential as both a regional partner and a member of the international community.

Such were the genesis and rationale of "Constructive Engagement". In implementing the
policy after 1991, emphasis was placed on quiet diplomacy and confidence-building
measures, aimed towards encouraging the Myanmar government to see the benefit of
integrating the country into the region and the mainstream of the international community.
After the introduction and the subsequent regionalisation of the policy, relations between
our two countries improved steadily, with the scope of co-operation being extended to
include a broad spectrum of issue-areas. Last year, Myanmar accepted ASEAN
membership in spite of misgivings on the part of some members of the Myanmar
leadership that Myanmar's membership would make it easier for Western countries
to put pressure on Myanmar through the association.

When the Chuan Leekpai government took office in November 1997, the policy of
"Constructive Engagement" had been in place for over six years. Looking back to this
period, we felt that, while Thailand could point to various achievements of engagement,
including the ending of Myanmar's isolationism and increased linkages between her and
her neighbours in the region, we also had to acknowledge the policy's limitations.

The process of reintegration remained uneven. All too often there was an asymmetry
between the cordial and co-operative state of governmental relations, on the one hand,
and the frequency of incidents in border areas, on the other. In the minds of critics, the
term "constructive" amounted to no more than tacit consent with everything that has been
going on in Myanmar, and the term "engagement", a justification for efforts to seek
economic benefits in the resource-rich country. For these critics, the policy's positive
results are not sufficient to compensate for its perceived role in sustaining the ruling
regime and helping to prolong political impasse within Myanmar at the expense of the
aspirations of the people of Myanmar.

But, despite these limitations, we believe that the original rationale underlying
engagement was sound and relevant and remains so today.

It remains so because the realities and aspirations have not changed.

It remains so because other options are much less viable.

More sanctions are unlikely to be effective.

In general, economic sanctions against a foreign country can be useful as a means of

responding to domestic constituencies' sentiments and interests. Here, decision is but a
matter of moral conscience or domestic political exigency. But economic sanctions as an
instrument of foreign policy seldom work. Their success depends upon the existence of a
consensus, not only among all the target country's neighbours, but also among great
powers concerned.
On the contrary, more sanctions on Myanmar are likely to be counterproductive.

They will increase her isolation, thereby increasing the suffering of the ordinary people
and making them innocent, helpless victims of the policy that is supposed to be helping
them. Furthermore, while "acclimatisation" to the kind of norms that the international
community holds dear can not and will not take place overnight, isolation of Myanmar
will simply take away all the conditions conducive to such a process, reinforce the
political status quo, and serve to heighten sensitivity towards and mistrust of the
international community.

We firmly believe quiet diplomacy to be the only way to deal with Myanmar.

Our long history of interaction with the Burmese has taught us that the Burmese are
proud people, and when confronted with threats, they are unlikely to compromise and
most likely to resist to the end.

When both Siam and Burma were faced with the expansion of western colonialism in the
nineteenth century, the differences in response by the two neighbouring societies were
most revealing. We opened up the country and reached out to the outside world, thereby
maintaining our independence with the sacrifice of some peripheral areas. Burma on the
other hand fiercely fought three wars to defend her sovereignty until she lost her
independence. Given this national character of the Burmese, we believe that political
pressures against Myanmar will not bring about desired changes in the Myanmar
government's position and policy.

For these reasons the Chuan Leekpai Government continues to endorse "Constructive
Engagement" as the policy for the conduct of relations with Myanmar.

Nor can we do otherwise in a unilateral manner, given the priority we attach to ASEAN.

Myanmar is now an ASEAN member. The clock can not be turned back, even if anyone
so wishes. Moreover, midst severe financial crises and sharp economic downturns, there
may be a natural, and perfectly understandable, tendency for the regional states to seek
individual salvation. This in turn raises questions concerning the future of regional co-
operation, particularly in the areas of trade and investment. Thailand initiated
"Constructive Engagement", but because it became an established regional policy based
upon regional consensus, we can only change or reject it upon the basis of regional
consensus, lest differences in this issue put further strains upon ASEAN unity at this
critical juncture of Southeast Asia's history.

But believing in the continued validity of the rationale underlying "Constructive

Engagement" is one thing, not being prepared to do something to improve it, to fine-tune
it, is quite another.
When we took office last year, we were determined to place greater emphasis than before
on the word "Constructive", to invigorate and put new life into the policy as best as we
can.

Since then, we have endeavoured to translate our commitment into action by pursuing
various approaches for enhancing our interactions with Myanmar.

We have striven for more extensive cooperation in preventing and suppressing trade in
narcotics; We have drawn up frameworks for surveying and demarcating the land
boundary between the two countries; We have tried to address the dilemma posed by the
influx of displaced persons and migrants, by allowing the UNHCR to have a greater role
in the management of displaced persons on the Thai side of the border and by
encouraging the Myanmar government to do likewise on its own side of the border;
We are working to strengthen our cross border ties through discussions concerning ways
and means of increasing economic activities in border areas, including investment in
manufacturing and agricultural projects on Myanmar's side of the border to provide more
employment to local workers and to generate greater income for these relatively poor and
remote areas; At the regional level, we have supported the extension of membership of
BISTEC to Myanmar and encouraged the implementation of a variety of projects planned
for the group, now renamed BIMSTEC, in collaboration with the other three members,
Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka.

The task of engaging Myanmar has been rendered more urgent by two factors. One is her
deeply troubled economy, with World Bank loan repayments in arrears and sharp decline
in both foreign exchange reserves and the value of the currency. The second is the
political tension and impasse in Yangon between the government and the NLD of Aung
San Suu Kyi, brought about by the NLD's setting up of a committee to represent the
National Assembly from the election of l990. These developments suggest that a great
deal of uncertainty lies ahead.

As a close neighbour and a fellow ASEAN member country, Thailand is naturally

concerned. For uncertainty or, worse, instability, in neighbouring countries sooner or
later have a way of affecting us, not least of all through border incidents and large
influxes of displaced persons. Already faced with enormous financial and economic
problems, our country can scarcely afford to bear additional security burdens or
undertake more humanitarian responsibilities.

Moreover, we firmly believe that, for ASEAN to make significant progress in the years
ahead, all members not only must engage in increasingly close co-operation among one
another, but must also contribute to the processes of regional co-operation to the limit of
their respective capabilities. To make this possible, all societies in Southeast Asia must
fulfill their own potentials, particularly where the most precious resources - their own
peoples - are concerned.

To be able to do so over the longer term, they must seek to develop along the line which
their governments endorsed in "ASEAN : Vision 2020" statement at the Kuala Lumpur
informal summit in December 1997, that is, becoming more caring, more open, more
generous of opportunities for all their citizens, and more protective of the welfare and
dignity of the individual.

There is an old Chinese proverb that says "let us light a candle instead of cursing the
darkness."

Instead of abandoning, isolating, pressuring or only condemning Myanmar during these

troubled times, efforts should be intensified to engage her. Myanmar is now an ASEAN
member, with corresponding access to ASEAN's various venues of co-operation and
conflict resolution. By becoming a member of ASEAN, Myanmar has tacitly accepted the
ASEAN tradition of conflict management and resolution through dialogue and
consensus-building. ASEAN member countries should encourage Myanmar to apply
ASEAN norms to their own domestic situation. We, on our part, have been encouraging
all parties in Myanmar to engage in a sustained dialogue without preconditions, with a
view towards bringing about national reconciliation and re-consolidation in the country.

Greater time and efforts should be invested in using ASEAN or ASEAN-related regional
co-operation as both a framework and a mechanism for reintegrating Myanmar into the
mainstream of international society. One venue of great potential importance, now that
Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The purpose of the ARF is to enhance mutual confidence and understanding through
frank exchanges of views. The underlying assumption is that greater mutual confidence
and understanding should help to lessen tension and to encourage the countries concerned
to resolve their differences through peaceful means. The ARF is now the most
comprehensive framework for promoting political and security co-operation in the Asia-
Pacific region.

Myanmar began participating in the ARF in l996 after it obtained observer status in
ASEAN. After her entry into ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar has attend ARF meetings and
participated in ARF inter-sessional activities such as, the state of confidence building,
search and rescue, disaster relief, etc. The range of these activities should be expanded to
encompass other issues, especially where such transnational crimes as drug-trafficking,
migration and illicit trade in small arms are concerned, and Myanmar's active
participation in both the ARF meetings and the ARF inter-sessional activities must be
encouraged.

Despite the wishful thinking of many, democracy does not develop overnight. While the
various efforts to spread democracy throughout the region are, of course, laudable,
democracy can not be transplanted in its entirety from one environment to another.
Without appropriate domestic conditions it is unlikely to take root and grow to full flower.
It can do so, if and only if a number of domestically evolved social, economic, and
political norms, institutions and processes, are already in place.
Since our Government took office last year, the international community has increasingly
expressed concerns with the political situation in Myanmar.

Thailand, as a close neighbour of Myanmar's and a country irrevocably committed to the

causes of democracy and human rights, shares these concerns.

Where we differ is perspectives regarding the best ways and means of improving the
situation to the benefit of the people of Myanmar.

Some, exasperated by the lack of progress, call for stronger pressures against Myanmar.
Others, Thailand among them, are of the view that such measures are likely to be both
ineffective and counterproductive and that other approaches should be pursued.

There is no question right or wrong in this debate on approaches, not when such
approaches are all well-intentioned and based upon the desire for the betterment of
Myanmar and her people. Rather, the question is about appropriateness. As I have
explained before, Thailand essentially believes that engagement through quiet diplomacy
is likely to be more productive than the adversarial approach.

This is why a recent initiative - a new phase of engagement, if you will - undertaken by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations is of profound significance.

At the behest of the UNSG, Mr. Alvaro de Soto, the Assistant Secretary-General,
Department of Political Affairs, visited Myanmar at the end of October 1998. He
informed all the parties concerned in Yangon, government and opposition alike, that the
UNSG is willing to consult with international financial institutions such as the World
Bank on the possibility of their providing technical assistance to the Myanmar
Government for the social and economic development of the country. The responses to
this proposal from all parties on the Myanmar side were positive, and it is expected that a
UN/WB survey team will be visiting Myanmar in the very near future.

This initiative will not bring about apocalyptic changes in Myanmar. Nor will it break the
political deadlock overnight. But it has been made possible by an unprecedented
convergence of minds among the protagonists. And it does provide a window of
opportunity for the world's premier multilateral organisations, not only to help the
ordinary people of Myanmar directly, but also to build upon this newly emerged
convergence of minds and to help end the impasse. If all parties in Myanmar continue to
be positive and are prepared to demonstrate their commitment by engaging with one
another in a sustained dialogue, these institutions can mobilise further developmental
resources, both to strengthen the process of convergence and to foster the kind of social
and economic conditions which over the longer term are supportive of a more open and
pluralistic political system. In the months ahead, these institutions must be allowed, nay
encouraged, to find and to use this window of opportunity on a sustained basis.

In the past, Myanmar has strongly resisted pressure from foreign countries. There is no
reason yet to suppose that this stance will change. While the leadership in Myanmar
remains wary of "interference" by external forces, multilateral institutions such as the UN
and the World Bank can play a valuable role. For the Myanmar authorities might view
multilateral institutions with greater equanimity than individual countries.

I firmly believe that all friends of the Myanmar people should lend support to the
UNSG's praiseworthy initiative in whatever way they can, including by encouraging or
engaging in "Track II" activities. Non-governmental organisations and the private sector
in different countries can contribute to the laying of the groundwork for a modern
Myanmar by helping to promote human resources development in that country in
particular. In this connection, I have suggested to a number of foreign companies doing
business with or in Myanmar that they consider establishing an HRD fund to provide
scholarships to Myanmar students, who in the future will be able to assist in the task of
their county's development and to help take Myanmar into the mainstream of the
international society and into the twenty-first century. The response is very positive.

Let each of us do what we can to help the people of Myanmar.

Diplomacy, conducted with patience and sensitivity, diplomacy, guided by a sense of

enlightened, rather than emotional, idealism, is needed to convince the Myanmar
government that it would be in its best interests to be more open-minded on issues of
concern to the international community.

The task of conducting the diplomacy is far more complex and less ideologically
appealing than implementing pressure policies such as economic sanctions.

For many of our friends and partners, the question is whether it will be worthwhile to
tackle such as complicated task.

For close neighbours of Myanmar's like ourselves, such a question is superfluous. We

already know what is at stake.

It is the future of the Myanmar people, it is the future of Thai-Myanmar relations, and
perhaps it is the future of the whole region as well.