Nature Vol.
265 January 6 1977
Articulating the aims of science
Nicholas Maxwell, of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at
University College, London, offers this comment on the current state of the
art
MODERN science is, I suggest, seriously
harmed by a widespread attempt to make
science conform to a wholly inadequate
philosophy of science—a philosophy of
science which quite grotesquely
misrepresents the basic intellectual aims
of science.
This inadequate philosophy of science
may be called 'standard empiricism'. Itis
carelessly and unthinkingly taken for
granted by the scientific establish m ent
today. It is defended by almost all
contemporary philosophers of science—
from Popper to Kuhn, Lakatos, Hesse and
Grünbaum—as constituting a rigorous,
rational conception of science, even
though elem e nta ry arguments show
decisively that the view fa ils miserably
to exhibit science as a rational enterprise.
The basic idea of this philosophy of
standard empiricism is that the fun - ourselves with a wealth of critically appropriate heuristic rules t h e n being
damental intellectual aim of science is
simply to improve our knowledge of
value-neutral factual truth, scientific
progress being assessed in terms of how
successfully this aim is being realised.A
priori knowledge about matters of fact
being denied, it is held t h a t in science
theories must be assessed, in the end,
solely in terms of empiricalsuccess.
In fact, of course, science does not seek
to improve our knowledge of fac tual
truth as such; rather, quite properly,
science seeks to improve our knowledge
of important factual truth, truth that we
deem to be in some way valuable,
significant, interesting, beautiful,
u se ful , from either a c ult ural or a
practical, technological standpoint.
Progress in science is assessed in terms of
the amount of valuable factual truththat
is being discovered: accumulation of
trivia, however extensive, does not, and
ought not, to be judged to amount to
progress.
Once it is acknowledged that a basic
intellectual aim of science is to discover
valuable t r u t h , it becomes clear that
t h e a im s of science must remain
permanently and profoundly prob - We need to regard o u r scientific What's Wrorig with Science?, Bran's
lematic. What is there to discover t h a t
is, in one way or another,v a lua ble or
useful? In what direction doreally im-
portant, exciting f u t u r e discoveries lie?
What ought to be the generalpriorities
of scientific research? What is at pre-
sent of greatest importance orvalue,
assumption that the domain of our
ignorance will not suddenly intrude upon
the domain of our knowledge in some
violent, unruly fashion, entirely
from a human, social standpoint? disrupting the straightforward predic-
Important to whom? What kinds of things tions of our present day scientific
w il l we most need to know in fifty or theories. Without some vague knowledge
one hundred years' time? These questions of that of which we are ignorant, all
are a ll highly controversial and scientific knowledge would be impossible.
problematic just becausethey concern the All this was well known to Einstein
domain of our ignorance, and difficult (Ideas and Opinions, Souvenir Press,
issues concerning human needs, 1973). He understood clearly that theo -
aspirations andvalues. retical physics is only a worthwhile,
It is of fundamental importance that we ratio n al enterprise when pursued as an
make the best possible choice of aims for attempt to discover a conjectured unified
science; and it is almost ine vitable that harmony in nature, the basic aims of
we will fa il. Here above all, then, we physics thus being permanently and
need to proceed intelligently, critically, profoundly problematic. The suc cess of
imaginatively, wisely. If science is to Einstein's contribution to physics arose
proceed in a t ru ly rigorous and rational in large measure from his ceaseless
fashion it is essential that we articulate, concern to ar ti c u la te and develop the
explore a n d criticise possible and best possible aims for phy sics, taking into
actual aims for science as an integral account both existing knowledge and our
part of scientific enquiry, providing desire to discover u n ity and harmony,
examined alternatives, so that we may formulated as guidelines to the
enhance o u r capacity to choose wisely development of new theories. I suggest
and well. Qu ite generally one can say that this k ind of aim-oriented empiricist
th a t rigour involves making explicita nd methodology, exploited w i th such
so criticisable that which is implicit,
in f l u e n t i a l and problematic. The best success by Einsteinw i t h i n the restricted
aims for science lie in thedirection of field of theoreticalphysics, is of universal
the overlap between that which is relevance to science and technology.
scientifically realisable, and that which is At present aim articulation, as envi
humanly desirable. In order to give saged here, does not proceed as an
ourselves the maximum chances of integral part of scientific enquiry, just
discovering thi s problematic region of because most scientists take standard
ove rla p we need to a r ti c ul a te both that empiricism for granted. Once standard
which we c o nje ct ur e to be empiricism is accepted, scientific rigour
scientifically realisable an d t h a t which and rationality actually seem to require
we conjecture to behum anl y desirable. that a rti c u la tion and discussion of pos-
A tr ul y rigorous, rational sciencewould, sible a n d actua l a im s for science be
then, include three kinds of excluded from the in te lle c tu a l domain
contributions to science. In addition to of science. Thus, as a result of the
contributions at the level of experiment attempt to make science conform to
and theory, we need to include con- the inte llectual ideals of standard
tributions which articulate, explore and empiricism, scientists have served to
criticise possible aims for science. undermine the rigour and rationality
Scientific journals, textbooks, and edu - of science, precisely becauset h e v i t a l
cational courses need to include a dis - task of articula ting and exploring pos-
cussion of all threekinds of contributions. sible aims for science has been some
It ought to be possible to w i n a Nobel what inhibited and repressed. As I
prize by a s u f f i c i e n t l y brillian t have argued in g re a te r d e ta il elsewhere
con trib u tionat any of these th ree levels. (Phil. Sci., 41, 123-53, 247-95 (1974);
knowledge as consisting noto n l y of what Head Books, London, 1976),t h e r e is
we know, but also of our best conjecturesat present an urgent need for t h e s ci en -
about what we do not know, but hope andtific c o m m u n i t y to free science from
desire to discover. We are neverthe i r r a t i o n a l id ea ls of s t a n d a r d empi-
completely i g n o r a n t of that which we do ricism, and to putin to p r a c ti c e the
not know; for if we were, we could have nok i n d of aim-oriented empiricist con-
basis for our ception of science sos u c c e s s f u ll y prac-
tised by E instein .