Local Government in Pakistan is Failure or

successful?
Given Pakistan’s huge development deficit, its
development “problems” will not go away in many years to
come. There will always be a shortfall of targets and
aspirations, the demand for services will always outstrip
supply. Governments will continue to be criticized for not
doing enough, and perhaps local governments more than
any other tier, since the work – or lack of it – which they are
supposed to do, is more visible. This makes assessment of
the output/work of local government difficult, yet something
that cannot be avoided.

Lest it be misunderstood that these examples from the

immediate past are either infrequent or very recent, related
only to the current electioneering phase and the public
debate, some examples from the past will only help
highlight some of the many issues that exist around the
process and system of local government in Pakistan. In
March 2004, the International Crisis Group (ICG) launched its
Devolution in Pakistan Report and stated: “While the
ostensible aim of Musharraf’s devolution scheme may be the
transfer of administrative, political and financial authority to
the lower tiers of government, the reality is starkly
different. Local governments in fact exercise only nominal
autonomy with respect to administrative and financial
matters in their respective jurisdictions.” The report adds,
that:
“Local governments have proved to be the key
instruments in the military’s manipulation of the Pakistani
polity to ensure regime survival. District nazims used public
funds and other state resources to stage pro-Musharraf
rallies during the April 2002 presidential referendum and to
support the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam)
parliamentary candidates in the 2002 national polls. Local
governments have also had significant utility for the
military’s divide-and-rule tactics. By juxtaposing more than
a 100 new local governments between it and the provinces,
the centre, where the military continues to maintain its grip
on the levers of state power, has been strengthened at the
cost of Pakistan’s four federating units.
“If Pakistan’s chequered political history is any
barometer, the question of devolution cannot be addressed
in isolation from the larger issue of provincial autonomy …
Pakistan’s civil-military ruling elite … has often used the
administrative and coercive powers at its disposal to extend
the centre’s control over the provinces. Since military-
inspired devolution is directed to local levels, it enhances
tensions betweens between the centre and the provinces.”