The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule

Author(s): Wayne S. Vucinich

Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec., 1962), pp. 597-616
Published by: Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
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 Discussion
SLAVIC REVIEW

THE NATURE OF BALKAN SOCIETY

UNDER OTTOMAN RULE
BY WAYNE S. VUCINICH

Never a homogeneous polity, the Ottoman Empire was an enormous

and intricate network of social subsystems. The complex mosaic of
Ottoman society, moreover, changed significantlyfrom one period to
another far more than is generally believed. At any one time the
empire amounted to a vast congeries of discrete cultural and societal
elements,which shiftedand related much like the particles in a kaleido-
scope. Not only did they differ,one from the other, but they often
displayed important variations within themselves. While Arabic
societies of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq showed wide differences,they were
also cut across by the Sunni and Shiah societies. The main Sunni body
found it difficultto incorporate anyone of Shiah sympathies.1 And all
Arabic societies were furthercomplicated by being either nomadic or
sedentary.
Similarly, the sedentary Turks and the Turkoman nomads of Ana-
tolia exhibited major social differences,as did the pastoral people and
the agriculturistsamong the Albanians, Kurds, Maronites, and Serbs.
The procession of varieties seems almost endless. By virtue of their
special religion, the Druze constituted an exclusive society. The
Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Maronite, Coptic, and Armenian societies-
all Christian-each had distinctive characteristics. But individual cul-
turessuch as these differedfromprovince to province within the empire.
Serbian culture, for example, manifested itself differentlyin Mon-
tenegro, Bosnia, Serbia, and Vojvodina. Most of the societies within
the Ottoman Empire were "closed," but none was ever completely
immune to external influences, which, of course, varied greatly in
degree and kind.
These challenging complexities are by no means the only obstacles
confronting the student of Ottoman social history. The study of
Ottoman society is also made difficultby the absence of an adequate
synthesisof the seven centuries of Ottoman history. The best surveys

MR. VUCINICH is professorof historyat Stanford University.

1W. MontgomeryWatt, Islam and the Integration of Society (London, 1961), p. 220.
598 Slavic Review

are still the multivolume works by J. von Hammer-Purgstall2and J. W.

Zinkeisen,3 both published in the nineteenth century. Although less
useful, the five-volumehistoryby N. Iorga4 is also a serious attempt to
provide a complete coverage of Ottoman history. Since the appearance
of these three works, however, no study of comparable magnitude on
the historyof the Ottoman Empire has been undertaken. To be sure,
H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen with their unfinished multivolume
study, Islamic Society and the West, and Bernard Lewis with his re-
cently published book, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, have
supplied authoritative assessments of important features of Ottoman
society.5 It is a pity that historians have not given this important
civilization, which has influencedthe destinies of several African,Asian,
and European peoples, the attention it deserves. What explains this
neglect?
Modern Turkish scholars, preoccupied with the investigation of
positive moments in Ottoman history,have deliberately ignored the
period of decline and chaos. Some of them write with strongnationalist
bias and a modernist aversion for Ottoman history. Although Turkey
has produced several first-ratehistorians,6it has not trained an ade-
quate number of professionals capable of covering the extensive span
of Ottoman history.
Marxist historians of the Balkan countries7 are vigorously investi-
gating and reinterpretingthe Ottoman period of their national his-
tories. Yugoslav scholars have published many documents as well.
Balkan historians,Marxist and nationalist alike, are mainly concerned
with their own people's histories. Whereas Turkish scholars tend to
make little of the histories of the subject peoples, Balkan historians
tend to present their people's past in a vacuum and often disregard the
dominating Ottoman influence.
Despite the vacillation in Western historiographybetween disdain
and sympathyfor the Turks and a profuse quantity of substandard
literature,Western historiographyon the Ottoman Empire has yielded
many outstanding works. Those listed above, for example, have not
been surpassed in any language. Together with propagandistic dia-
tribes,a few useful books have also been published by Soviet scholars.8
But as yet neither a good social historyof the Ottoman Empire nor an

2 J. von Hammer-Purgstall,Geschichtedes osmanischenReiches (10 vols.; Pest, 1827-35).

3 J. W. Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa (7 vols.; Gotha,
1840-63).
4 Nicolae Iorga, Geschichtedes osmanischenReiches (5 vols.; Gotha, 1908-13).
5 H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Societyand the West,Vol. I: Islamic Society
in the Eighteenth Century,Part 1 (London, 1950), Part 2 (London, 1957). Bernard Lewis,
The Emergenceof Modern Turkey(London, 1961).
6 0. L. Barkan, F. K8pruilui,
I. H. Uzuncarqili,H. Inalcik, E. Z. Karal, and others.
7 B. Tsvetkova, D. Angelov, B. Djurdjev, G. Elezovic, N. Filipovic', H. gabanovic, H.
Kresev1jakovic,H. Hadzibegic, and manyothers.
8 Iu. Krachkovsky, V. A. Gordlevsky,A. Miller, N. A. Smirnov,and others.
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 599

up-to-date of Ottomanhistoryas a wholehas been forthcoming

synthesis
fromanyone.

Ottomansocietyhad itsrootsin local Anatolian,Muslim,and Turkish

sources,9but as timepassedit absorbedelementsof othercultures.The
indigenous Anatolian (Hittite, Greek, and other) influencesupon
modernTurks are acknowledgedby mosthistorians.Byzantineinflu-
ence was a result of protracted"cohabitation" of the Seljuks and
Byzantium10and was somewhat intensifiedafter the conquest of
Constantinople.But the Byzantineinfluenceon Ottomancivilization,
accordingto mostmodernTurkishand Westernhistorians, was not as
greatas lorga (who referredto Istanbul as the Turanian Rome) and
certainotherwriterscontend.11
Muslim influencerepresentedthe most basic elementof Ottoman
society.Islam firstreachedtheTurks along thebordersof thecaliphate
in Central Asia, and, fromthen on, developed into a religiousform
with a frontierquality. The influenceof Central Asia on Ottoman
society,whichwas largelyovershadowedby Islam and almostforgotten,
was revivedin the fourteenth centurywhen the Ottomansconquered
largenumbersof Turkishnomadsin Anatolia. These nomadsaroused
Ottomanawarenessof theirTurkish origin and led to a momentary
manifestation ofTurkish"nationalconsciousness."The Ottomansultans
assumedtheold Turkishtitleof "khan" and adoptedtheOghuz legend
as the explanationof the origin of their dynasty.12Apart fromthis
temporarynational awareness,the Turks did not become nationally
mindeduntil the nineteenthcentury.
Feudalismwas unquestionablyone of the major pillarsof Ottoman
society. Research on Ottoman feudalismhas been pursued largely
froma legal and theoreticalstandpoint.There is a considerabledis-
crepancybetweenfeudalismas definedand regulatedby laws (kdinuin-
name)and feudalismin practice.The lawswereissuedat long intervals
and did not alwayscoincide with changedconditions. The degree to
which the classical Ottomansystemof land tenurewas implemented
in a given region of the empire depended on local geographyand
economyand on the religion and customsof the population. Most

9 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 3-17. Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin, "How

Does Islam Stand?" in Gustave E. von Grunebaum, Unityand Varietyin Muslim Civiliza-
tion (Chicago, 1955),p. 11.
10 Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization,"in Grunebaum,op. cit.,pp. 317-18.
11See especiallyKopriiliizade Mehmet Fuat, "Bizans MiiesseselerininOsmanli Miiessesele-
rine Te'siri hakkinda bazi Miilahazalar," Tilrk Hukuk ve Iktisat Tarihi Mecmuasi, I
(1931), 165-313.
12 P. Wittek, "Le R6le des tribus turques dans l'empire ottoman," Melanges Georges
Smets(Brussels,1952),pp. 665-76.
600 Slavic Review

knowledge of the Ottoman systemof land tenure and Ottoman society

has been based on scatteredand fragmentarylegalistic data.13
Ottoman feudalism, a synthesis of Arabo-Persian, Seljuk, and
Byzantine elements, survived, with changes and adaptations, until the
nineteenth century. Late Byzantine feudalism exercised powerful
influence in shaping "the Ottoman systemof military fiefs,"just as it
had itselfbeen reshaped "under the impact of the Frankish feudalism
of the Latin Empire of Constantinople and its dependent and successor
principalities."14 But whatever its origins, the heart of Ottoman feu-
dalism was the so-called timar-sidahisystem.15It was the keystone of
the politico-military and socio-economic structure of the Ottoman
Empire. To a very large degree, the timar-sidahi system governed
social relations in the empire.
There has been much discussion about Ottoman feudalism as an
instrument of social "progress." The question is whether Ottoman
feudalism induced or impeded social "progress" and whether the
conquered peoples would have advanced more rapidly had they re-
mained under their own feudalistic regimes. While most historians
seem to think that Ottoman feudalism curbed social progress, their
views differin many details. There is a divergence of opinion, for
example, as to whether Ottoman feudalism was "retrogressive" from
the beginning or only after the sixteenth century, when it became
transformedinto the so-called sift!i relations.
One group of writerscontends that a high degree of prosperityand
social harmony prevailed during the firstperiod of Ottoman historyas
a result of centralized rule, victorious foreign wars, moderate feudal
exactions, and long intervals of peace.16 But, in the opinion of this
group, the military defeats and territorial losses after the sixteenth
century undermined and caused the deterioration of Ottoman feudal
institutionsand the "barbarization" of many parts of the empire. The
Ottoman Empire began to lag economically as well as in military and
other technological matters. Hence, the central power weakened.
Widespread corruption and the abuse of authoritybecame the order of
the day. Feudal exactions increased. Socio-religious and national rebel-

13 Gibb and Bowen, op. cit.,p. 235.

14 Lewis, Emergenceof Modern Turkey,p. 43.
15 The most common fief(sipdhilik) was the smallest of the landed estates called timar.

The holder who rendered militaryservice (cavalry) in exchange for the grant was called
the sipaha. Hence the systemis known as the timar-sipahasystem."A fiefyielding revenue
amounting to from2,000 or 3,000 to 19,999ak?(es[aspres-a piece of silver] a year was called
a Timar." Gibb and Bowen, op. cit.,p. 48.
16 A.
Horopiin, Hcmopia Buoapiu (St. Petersburg,1910), pp. 127-81. K. Jirecek,Istorija
Srba (4 vols.; Belgrade, 1922-23), translated by J. Radonic. Nicolae Iorga, Geschichte des
osmnanischen Reiches (5 vols.; Gotha, 1908-13). Vasil Zlatarsky,Geschichte der Bulgaren
(2 vols.; Leipzig, 1917-18). Stojan Novakovic,Srbi i Turci XIV i XV veka (Belgrade, 1893).
Momc'ilo Nincic, Istorija agrarno-pravnihodnosa srpskih tezaka pod Turcima (Belgrade,
1903). Branislav Nedeljkovic, Istorija bagtinskesvojine (Belgrade, 1930).
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 601

lions occurred in all parts of the empire. The social, ethnic, and reli-
gious cohesion of the Ottoman society loosened, and the social balance
was upset. The attempts begun in the early eighteenth century to
reformthe Ottoman state by halfheartedgraftingof European practices
upon defunct Ottoman institutionswere foredoomed to failure.
Many historians,especially Marxist writers,1Tcontend that the Otto-
man feudal order impeded the development of subject peoples from
the very start. Most often cited in support of this contention are the
confessional element in Ottoman feudalism, the material destruction
that accompanied the Ottoman conquest, huge losses in human resources
(especially among the upper classes), and general social and economic
dislocation. The Marxist writers also maintain that the "primitive
character" of Ottoman feudalism discouraged the growthof "productive
forces." According to their views Ottoman feudalism was more back-
ward than the Balkan feudalism that it replaced.
In point of fact, however, the Balkan peasants, who constituted the
bulk of the people in that area, improved their lot during the initial
period of Turkish rule; they were less abused, paid lower feudal taxes,
and as a result of the centralized Ottoman rule had somewhat greater
security. In the cultural field,on the other hand, the Ottoman regime
unquestionably set the Balkan people back; it destroyed their upper
classes, abolished the medieval states, and isolated the Christian com-
munities from urban centers. The assertion that the stagnation and
"barbarization" that occurred after the sixteenth century were the
primary causes of Balkan backwardness seems convincing.
II
With the passing of time, some classes within Ottoman societydegener-
ated and disappeared, and otherswere born. Many of those that existed
throughout Ottoman history,moreover, were not always of the same
relative importance. Whatever the case, social differentiationprevailed
in both the Muslim and Christian societies of the Ottoman Empire.
In Muslim society,the high-rankingmembers of the Ruling Institu-
tion (men of the sword) and the Muslim Institution (men of the pen),
whether they were government leaders, palace officials,commanders of
armed forces, teachers, or judges, constituted the upper class. To be
sure, differencesbetween individual categories of the upper class re-
sulted fromdisparities in wealth and power. In theory,however, there
was no hereditary aristocracy, since the fiefholders(timariots, za'zm
and hass holders) held their estates on condition.
The Balkan Christianshad theirown well-to-doclasses. The medieval

feudalizma
17 Branislav Djurdjev, "Prilog pitanju razvitka i karaktera tursko-osmanskog

-timnarsko-spahiskog uredjenja," Godi?njak Istoriskog Drustva Bosne i Hercegovine, II

(Sarajevo, 1950), 19-82. Nedim Filipovic, "Pogled na osmanski feudalizam sa narocitim
obziromna agrarneodnose," ibid., IV (1952), 5-146.
602 Slavic Review

Christian feudatories who collaborated with the Turks were some-

times allowed to retain their estates. Others of the erstwhile Christian
nobility who survived the Turkish conquest either fled abroad or ac-
cepted Islam and, under new religious garb, retained their privileges.
Some of the Christian collaborators became the Christian sipahi's, pow-
erful and respected but never numerous.18 By the end of the sixteenth
century,these Christian sipah is, who, like their Muslim counterparts,
had earned their fiefsthrough militaryand other services to the sultan,
had gutteredout.
Other privileged Christian groups were either created by Ottoman
rulers or developed through wealth. Among these were the Greek
archonts ("elders," "primates"), a kind of officialaristocracy,who ad-
ministered their own affairs,lived well, and acted as agents of Turkish
dignitaries, and the Phanariots, the patrician Greek families of the
Phanar districtof Istanbul, many of whom became prominent govern-
ment functionaries, Rumanian hospodars, and higher clergy of the
Orthodox Church. The Phanariots were sometimes called the "Chris-
tian Turks," a term that seems to describe their "moral and political
position."19
In many sections of the empire the Christian tribal leaders, like the
Muslim tribal leaders, retained their positions, served as links between
their followers and Ottoman authorities, and enjoyed special rights
and privileges. Whether elected, hereditary,or appointed, the Serbian
community or village elders (knez, primuc'ar) sometimes derived bene--
fitsthat set them apart from the ordinary raya (or subjects proper).
Among the least known privileged Christian elements were those that
served as militaryauxiliaries or guards (voynuks, nmartolosi, derbentgi,
zampites,armatoloi,etc.),20 cared for horses and provisions, or carried
on reconnoitering and police duties. They sometimes differedfrom.
their fellow Christians in that they were paid, granted lands, or ex--
empted from feudal obligations. The Marxist historians classifysome
of them as an "in-between class," because even if they were tax-
privileged landowners, they tilled their land themselves. These are but
a few of a number of such social groups.
The high-ranking Christian clergy (patriarchs, bishops, metropoli-
tans) also constituted a privileged class. Despite established electoral
procedures, simony was widespread. Especially after the sixteenth
18 Halil Inalcik, "Timariotes chr6tiensen Albanie au XVe si&le, d'apres un registrede

timars ottomans," Mitteilungen des dsterreichischenStaatsarchivs, IV (1952), 118-38.

Branislav Djurdjev, "Kris'ani spahije u severnoj Srbiji u XV veku," Godignjak Istoriskog
Drustva . . ., IV (1952), 165-69. Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization,"in Grunebaum, op. cit.,.
p. 317. B. UnBeTioBa, <<HoaBIe,annabe o XpHcTnaHaEax-ciIaxHaaa BaB auciox uIoJIyoCTpoBeB.
HepHoA TypeAsoro roCIoIOCTBa,>>BuMannuicxu epe4temucn, XIII (1958), 184-97.
19George Finlay, A History of Greece fromIts Conquest by the Romnansto the Present
Time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864, rev. ed. by Henry F. Tozer (7 vols.; Oxford, 1877), VI, 11.
20 Branislav Djurdjev, "O vojnucima," Glasnik zemnaliskog muzeja, II (Sarajevo, 1947),.
75-137. Istorija Naroda Jugoslavije,II (Belgrade, 1960), 72-76.
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 603

century, the higher Christian clergy bought their sees, just as the
Turkish pashas bought their posts, and, like the pashas, they obliged
the people to pay back "what they had expended.''21 The higher clergy
were opportunistic and ready "to sacrificethe interestsof their nation"
to achieve material gain and to satisfy personal ambitions. Finlay
observes that there was "no more selfish and degraded class of men"
than the archonts and Phanariots, fromamong whom the higher clergy
'were selected.22 Obtaining a substantial revenue from taxes and large
monasterial properties,the higher clergylived well. Their jurisdiction
was not confined to spiritual matters but extended, to a large degree,
to political mattersas well.
Both the Muslim and Christian sectors of Ottoman society were
divided into two basic parts-rural and urban. But since the Balkan
city population was predominantly Muslim and the Balkan rural
population predominantly Christian, the city symbolized the place
of the Muslim ruler, tax collector, and securityagent. Conversely, the
village symbolized the home of the oppressed and exploited Christian
peasant, taxpayer, and food-producer. The two societal components
came to representa strugglebetween two ways of life, which deepened
and expanded as time went on. The protracted separation of village
fromcitywith hardlyany interchangebetween them led to a dichotomy
of mores,habits, and customs. The citydweller and the peasant differed
in many basic aspects of their lives-in their food, dress, song, speech,
folklore, and world outlook. After the Ottoman Empire expired, the
village-cityconflictcontinued, even though the citylost its Turkish char-
acter. This unbridged chasm is one of the major present-dayproblems.
The largest social class in the Ottoman Empire was made up of
peasants and nomads. The Christian village served as the main reservoir
of human and material resources. National rebirth came from the
village and not from the city. In Ottoman days only the village
nourished "sentiments of manly vigour and true patriotism."23It per-
petuated national oral tradition and remembrances of medieval inde-
pendence and glory. By living in compact settlements,with their own
social organization, the peasants were able to resist the penetration of
alien cultures and to preserve their ethnic individuality. From them
alone could the energy necessary for the recovery of "national inde-
pendence" be derived.24 The peasants were the backbone of the
insurrectionarymovements against Turkish rule. Extinction of the
peasantry would have been tantamount to extinction of the nation.
The degree of Ottoman influence on the village and the conditions
of peasant life were determined in part by the formsof social organiza-

21 William Miller, The Ottomnan

Empire and Its Successors(Cambridge,Eng., 1936),p. 25.
22 Finlay,op. cit.,V, 150.
23 Ibid., p. 155.
24 Ibid.
604 Slavic Review

tion of the particular community,the proximityof the Ottoman land-

lord and official,access to the important roads, density of Christian
population, and, of course, by the whims of Turkish authorities. The
peasant was obliged to pay a poll tax (cizye), land tax (harac), and vari-
ous other dues and fees, including the church tax, which went to his
bishop and patriarch. He was expected to provide free labor (kullitk)
on his landlord's estate and to performmany other chores as well.
Some peasants were less oppressed than others,but, as a rule, Christian
peasants paid higher taxes than their Muslim counterparts. This is
clearly indicated in Islamic fiscal laws and in "discriminatoryrates of
assessment." According to Lewis, the Ottoman codes recognized these
rates: "the lowest for Muslims, the highest for Harbais, and a medium
rate for Zimmais. The believer, the hostile infidel, the subject infidel-
thesewere the threerecognized categories,and nationality,even political
allegiance had no bearing on them."25
Among the Muslims, local religious teachers and judges (kadi, na'ib,
and hoca) had substantially less economic means and personal prestige
than those of provincial or higherrank (kad1i,mufti',khazz'asker,seyh-iil-
Isldn, etc.). A similar social differencewas to be found between the
lower and higher Christian clergy. The monastic Christian clergy,who,
supplied the bishops and patriarchs,constitutedthe clerical upper class,
while the secular clerics, who served in the parishes and often shared
the common lot, constituted the lower class. Although they lacked
learning and possessed little if any power, the secular clergy, because
of their relation to the peasantry,exercised an influence over the fate
of their nation "quite incommensurate with their social rank." They
supplied some of the "moral strength" which enabled the Greeks,.
Serbs, Bulgars, and others "to resist the Ottoman power."26
The peasants respected the parish priest because he was one of them.
The parish clergy in the town were less influential,because the small
Christian urban element had not yet developed a politically minded
and literate class to articulate their national aspirations effectively.
Moreover, the hard life and "bad city" influence corrupted many
parish clergywho "displayed the vices of theirown low grade of society."
The life of the city priest stood in glaring contrastto that of the village
priest who "lived and died in the same social circle" in which he grew
up.27 To eke out a living the village priest tilled his own fields,while
the city priest was frequentlyengaged in trade and crafts.
The city population included Muslim officials,feudal landlords,
military personnel, merchants,artisans, the 'ulema (the learned class),
and the city poor-workers, porters,and servants. Although nearly all
city dwellers were Muslim, a few cities contained Christian and Jewish
25 Lewis, Emergenceof Modern Turkey,p. 324.
26 Finlay,op. cit.,V, 150-53.
27 Ibid.
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 605

quarters(mahalle).A numberofcities,particularly in theGreekregion,

were predominantlyChristian. Many cities had special quartersfor
Gypsies,who paid a specialtax and weresubjectedto restrictive
laws.
In Bulgarian and Serbian cities, the indigenouselementwas very
negligible,and the non-Turkishcity population consistedmostlyof
Greeks,Jews,Armenians,Tsintsars,and foreigners(Ragusans, Ger-
mans). The urban class of populationwas farmore developedamong
the Greeksthan among the Bulgariansand Serbs. Jews,Armenians,
and Tsintsarsin the Balkans were almost exclusivelycommercially
engagedas moneylenders, merchants,or artisans.From the eighteenth
centuryon, the numberof Serbianand Bulgarianmerchantsand arti-
sans increased,28and well-to-dogorbaci29
began to appear among them.
Christian city-dwellersoften adopted "the philanthropic selfishnessof
the archonts,regular clergy,and Jewishcolonists,with whom theylived,
and with whom theystruggledforprefermentin the Ottoman service."30
III
The Muslim theocratic system was the dominant social force in the
Ottoman Empire. After the conquest of Constantinople (1453), the
Orthodox Church was organized as a millet (community)31 under the
Patriarch. His election was confirmed by the sultan, and he was
ceremoniously installed. The Patriarch was given many rights,includ-
ing his own court and prison and almost absolute jurisdiction over the
zimmis. His officeranked in honor with that of the pasha with three
tugs (horsetails).82Here it should be added that the so-called Ecumenical
Patriarch of Constantinople was considered by the Porte as the head
of the millet but that in reality the Orthodox Church was administered
by "an oligarchy of patriarchs" (those of Antioch, Alexandria, and
Jerusalem), each of whom had complete control over the affairsin his
own domain.33
The millets into which various groups were organized were based
on a confessionalrather than an ethnic principle. There was "a Muslim
millet,but no Turkish or Arab or Kurdish millets."34 The Gregorian
Armenians and several other denominations were recognized as a millet
in 1461. Since the Catholicos was beyond the frontiersof the empire, an
Armenian patriarch was appointed and accorded the privileges that the
28 H. H. TpeTmKOB,ed., Ilomopun loAapuu (2 vols.; Moscow, 1954), I, 225-36.
J. RoceM,
ed., Hemopwa na BzA.apu, I (Sofia, 1954), 303-5. Caic HaTaH, HIemopumamonoiuueccowo
paMunmui BoAtaptuu (Moscow, 1949).
29 Once a title of an officer
in charge of an orta (a company or "center") of Janissaries
(Yeniferi), the term eventually came to mean "well-to-do person."
30 Finlay,op. cit.,V, 155.
referredto as the Rum milleti-"the Roman community."
31 Officially
32 Gibb and Bowen, op. cit.,Part 2, pp. 215-16.
33 F. Steen de Jehay,De la situation legale des sujets ottomansnon-musulmians(Brussels,
1906),p. 81.
34 Lewis, Emergenceof Modern Turkey,p. 329.
606 Slavic Review

Orthodox patriarch received. Since all the non-Orthodox Christians

were classified as Armenians, the Armenian became in a sense "the
millet of heretics." Nominally, the Armenian Patriarch was in charge
of various confessionsunder his jurisdiction; in reality each denomina-
tion had its own religious officials.35The Jewish millet was recognized
in the fifteenthcenturyand represented all four divisions (Rabbanites,
Karaites, Ashkenazim, Sephardim) of Jews. The Catholic community
was not formallyrecognized as a millet, because many of its members
were treated as "foreigners." Although the devsirme (the levy of boys)
was applied only to the Orthodox millet,36the Armenian community
was referredto as the Millet-i Sadika (the loyal community) until the
nineteenth century.37
The non-Muslims were never able to mix freelyin Muslim society.
As subjects infidels(zimmis), theywere socially castigated and deprived
of rights belonging to the ruling Muslim elite. The new state was in
the hands of the Muslims, and the officiallanguage was Turkish. It was
Islam and not Turkish "national identity" that separated the rulers
from the ruled. The Turks thought of themselves "almost exclusively
as Muslims." Not until the nineteenthcenturydid concepts of "a Turk-
ish nationality"and "Ottomanism" develop under European influence.38
The word "Turk" was generally used "to denote the nomads or peasants
of Anatolia," in much the same way as felladh is used in modern Arabic.39
The term "Ottoman" was used in referenceto the dynasty.
The Ottoman systemdeliberately fosteredsocial and cultural differ-
entiation. Consequently, the Ottoman European possessionswere never
assimilated "either to Islam or to the Turkish language," and the
peasant masses "remained Christian, alien in language and culture as
well as in religion, outside the cultural horizon of the Turks."40

IV
The Ottoman conquest abruptly halted the political and social develop-
ment of the Balkan subject peoples, who found securityin withdrawal
to their own patriarchal institutions,which, having either disappeared
or being on their way out,41 were now resuscitated and given new life.
In other words, the conquered peoples were set back in their social

35 Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., Part 2, p. 232.

36 Ibid., p. 223.
37 Lewis, Emergenceof Modern Turkey,p. 350.
38 Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization,"in Grunebaum,op. cit.,p. 314.
39Bernard Lewis, "History-writingand National Revival in Turkey," M11iddleEast
Affairs,No. 4 (1953), pp. 218-27.
40 Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization,"in Grunebaum,op. cit.,p. 317.
41 For more recent appraisals of the historical significanceof Ottoman conquest of the
Byzantine Empire, see for a Marxist point of view, BU3C11sankcstcui epe.1neiti'u, VII (1953),
and for a non-Marxistview 1453-1953: Le ci?7q-centiemeanniversaire de la prise de Con-
stan tintople (Athens, 1953).
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 607

evolution. This was classicallyexemplifiedin theregeneration of tribal

societyin Albania, Montenegro,Hercegovina,and the Sanjak of Novi
Pazar, which,under the conditionsin the OttomanEmpire,was able
to surviveuntiljust recently.Many of the modernBalkan tribeswere
eitherborn or regeneratedafterthe Ottomanconquest. In otherparts
of theempire,theOttomanpoliticaland social climatealso fosteredthe
developmentof triballife.
What was the juridical and administrative statusof the tribes,the
nature of their customarylaws and social customs? How were they
coordinatedwiththeOttomanstatesystem? The tribesand thephratries
were enormouslyimportantas preservers of traditionand the cultural
individualityof particularpeoples. Tribal organization,social stratifi-
cation, militarysystem,religious life, ethical codes, and intertribal
relationswere all importantaspectsof the subjectsocietieswithinthe
rulingOttomansociety.
Very little is known about the formationof tribesfromdifferent
ethnicand social groupsand the ethnogenesisof peoples. The trans-
formation of theVlachsand the fusionof the "old" and "new" peoples
-of Illyrians,Romanized groups,and Slavs-are significantbut still
obscuredevelopmentsin the historyof Balkan social relations. Such
tribesas thosewhichwere partlyMontenegrinand partlyAlbanian,or
thosewhichweredividedintofamiliesprofessing bothChristianity and
Islam, epitomize the nature of Ottoman society. The role of the
Turkish nomadic tribesin the evolutionof the OttomanTurks is of
primesocial importance.Althoughthesenomadsdid not constitute"a
rulingelement,"theydid represent"an ethnicreservoir"on which"the
ruling class drew."42
Some tribesin the OttomanEmpiredisappearedearly,othersin the
nineteenthcentury;and still others,such as the Arab, Albanian, and
Kurdishtribes,surviveduntil the present.But even wheretribeshad
disappeared,tribal reminiscencesand social characteristics
have sur-
vived. The nomadsand seminomads,whetherTurkomanYuruks43of
Anatolia,Arabian bedouin, Balkan Kutso-Vlachs,or ordinaryGypsies
of differentreligiousbackgrounds,survivedand flourishedunder the
Ottomansystemofgovernment. Some enjoyedvariousprivileges,while
others,suchas the Gypsies,weresubjectedto specialdiscriminatoryleg-
islation.But, by and large,the Ottomansystemwas conduciveto their
preservation.Each group remaineda legal entity-sociallyexclusive
and culturallyself-contained.

42 Bernard Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 1-17. In the thirteenthcentury,

according to Claude Cahen, the term "Turk" was used exclusively in reference to the
"barbarous" Turkoman frontierpopulation. Grunebaum,op. cit.,pp. 329-30.
43 H. Vambery,Das Tiirkenvolkin seinen ethnolog-ischen und ethnographischenBezie-
hungen (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 601-7. C. Truhelka, Macedonski Juruci (Zagreb, 1941). D.
sopova, Mlakedoi?ija v XVI i XVII vek (Skopje, 1955),pp. 47-62.
608 Slavic Review

Ottoman rule perpetuated the Serbian zadruga-the joint family.44

By living together,the joint familysecured economic advantages-labor
power and lower taxes. Taxation by hearth apparently encouraged
people to band togetherunder a single roof. The zadruga's democratic
organization of the household, rigid discipline, and high code of
moralitysubstantiallycontributed to the preservationof Serbian ethnic
and cultural individuality. In most Serbian areas the joint family was
the principal form of social organization. The leader of the zadruga
representedit and managed its affairsin consultation with the members
of the family. The joint familybecame the backbone of Serbian society
under Ottoman rule.
Another ancient institution that came to life in many parts of the
Balkans as a result of Ottoman conquest was the katun-a pastoral
community. The Serbian self-governingcommunity (knezina)45 and
probably also the Greek "free communities" (eleutherochdria and
others) were not only tolerated by the imperial authorities but inte-
grated into the Ottoman administrativesystem. For a long time, it was
of advantage to both the ruling Turks and the subject peoples to
perpetuate organizations of this kind, even though their existence
promoted social exclusiveness, minimum social interaction, and the
perpetuation of old social forms.
The most important Christian institutionthat survived the medieval
states was the Orthodox Church. With the political power once vested
in temporal rulers gone, the church assumed some of "Caesar's" preroga-
tives and incidentally maintained a link between each nation's past
and future. The church conserved the cultural heritage of particular
peoples, kept freshin their minds their medieval glory and independ-
ence, and preserved the ethnic individuality of the faithful.
In the Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox Church acquired "a universal
state," which it needed but was "unable to establish itself."46 The
Orthodox Christians, writes Toynbee, "had to pay for their social
incompetence by ceasing to be mastersin their own house. The Muslim
conquerors who established and maintained the Pax Ottomanica in
the Orthodox Christian World exacted payment,in the formof religious

44 V. Popovic, Zadruga: Istoriskarasprava (Sarajevo, 1921). V. Popovic, "Zadruga, teorije

i literatura,"Glasnik zemnaljskogmuzeja, XXXIII-XXXIV (1921-22), 73-114. Jovan Cvijic,
La peninsule Balkanique (Paris, 1918), pp. 103-10. Vladislav Skaric, "Uticaj turskogzivota
na dru'stvenizivot," in Knjiga o Balkanu, II (Belgrade, 1937). Vladimir Dvornikovic,
Karakterologija Jugoslovena(Belgrade, 1939), pp. 859-60. Most recent on zadruga are two
works by I-mile Sicard: Problemes familiaux chez les Slaves du Sud (Paris, 1941), and La
Zadruga dans la litteratureserbe (1850-1912) (Paris, 1943). Philip E. Mosely, "The Peasant
Family: The Zadruga," in Caroline F. Ware, ed., The Cultural Approach to Histowy(Newv
York, 1940),pp. 95-108.
45 Branislav Djurdjev, "O knezovima pod turskomupravom," Istoriski casopis, Nos. 1-2
(1948), pp. 132-66. Ruzica Guzina, Knezina i postanak srpske burzoaske drzave
(Belgrade, 1955).
4-LArnold J. Toynbee, A Studyof History(Oxford,1947),p. 130.
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 609

discriinination, for the political service they were rendering to their

Christian subjects."47
The Orthodox Church was an instrumentof the Ottoman state, and
the relations between church and state were in some regards analogous
to the relations between church and state in today's Communist coun-
tries. The state tolerated the church so long as it served as an auxiliary
of its power. Sometimes for political, and sometimes for other reasons,
the Turks permittedthe creation of separate autocephalous ecclesiastical
administrations. The Serbian Patriarchate of Pech, for instance, was
restored in 1557, and in 1766 abolished once more.48 The animosity
between the Orthodox and Latin churches, so important a cause of the
Byzantine fall, continued after the conquest. There were many in-
stances of Orthodox persecution of Catholics and of the sultan's inter-
vention in favor of the Orthodox. The Porte protected its "native"
zimmis froimnCatholic proselytism. The situation enabled the Porte
to play churches against each other, to exact heavy payments from the
Patriarchs and other religious dignitaries, and to banish, dismiss, and
even execute the leading clergy. When conditions were intolerable,
there were instances of discussion between high religious spokesmen
aimed at union of Orthodox and Latin churches.49Treasonable action
by church leaders was vigorouslyprosecuted. Depending on the magni-
tude of the crime committed, clergy were executed, congregations
decimated, churches desecrated, and rights of autonomy curtailed.
The parishes and dioceses of the Orthodox ecclesiastical administra-
tion united peoples who were otherwise divided by geography and
social organization. In this way, the church fulfilled certain political
functions in the community. The church represented its followers
before the Ottoman authorities and even led them into rebellion on
occasion. Besides serving as a repositoryof national culture and tradi-
tion, the church kept touch with the outside world (the papacy, Venice,
Austria, Russia) and facilitated the passage of a small amount of
European influence through the Ottoman curtain. But above all else,
the church was the center of social life.
The long period of restrictiveexistence and close association with the
Ottoman government had, however, a negative effecton the develop-
ment of the Orthodox Church. Once a source of spiritual strengthand
intellectual power, the church began to ossify. Under the existing
circumstances,it was forced to concern itselfprimarilywith the physical
preservationof its members. Theology and learning acquired a second-

47Ibid.
48 Literatureon the Orthodox Church under Turkish domination is scanty. Among the

best works,see Theodore Papadopoullos, Studies and Documents Relating to the History
of the Greek Church and People Under Turkish Domination (Brussels,1952). LUszl6 Had-
rovics, Le peuple serbe et son eoglisesous la domination turque (Paris, 1947).
49 J. Radonic, Rimska kurija (Belgrade, 1950).
610 Slavic Review

ary importance, and in these fields the church stagnated. The church
was compelled, moreover, to adjust to the needs of patriarchal society
and to tolerate much that was undesirable.
V
The Ottoman Turks were unable to develop a dynamic civilization
through an integration of the cultures of conquered peoples. At the
same time, they failed to provide the conquered peoples with the
requisite conditions for developing their own cultures.
Made up of "a varietyof illiterate population," the Ottoman Empire
was regulated by "an anti-literate elite." Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq
writes that the Turks refused to print books because the "scriptures
would no longer be scriptures if they were printed."50 The firstpress
and paper factorydid not appear in Turkey until 1728-29,51although
several subject peoples of the empire had them by the sixteenthcentury.
But "the Christian channels to the West operated mainly as closed
circuits," and, as a result, "independent rates of social change occurred
the Christians modernizing fasterthan others."52
The influence of the few Ottoman poets, literati, historians,artists,
and men of learning was largely limited to a small number of persons,
and had very little influence on the non-Muslim communities. To say
that the Ottoman Empire was a "worthy heir" of Byzantium seems
somewhat exaggerated.53Nor can we accept the position of the "Urqu-
hart's School of Orientalists," who trace the malaise of the Ottoman
Empire to the fall of Constantinople, when the Ottomans supposedly
gave up their institutions to ape the Byzantines.54 Although "highly
conservative," the Ottoman artisan groups actually tried "from time
to time" to liftthe empire out of its spiritual lethargy. But, as Gourhan
puts it, "they turned in a horizontal spiral around their techniques,"
and the civilizations "moving their feet in one spot but not going be-
yond themselves" were characterized by "proliferatingdetail."55
What happened to the culture of the subject millets as a result of
Ottoman conquest? The learning virtuallydried up. The art deterior-
ated fromexquisite medieval masterpiecesto simple primitivecreations.
Much of the population was simply cocooned in medievalism. Once on
a level with Europe in spiritual and material development, the Balkan
peoples were centuries behind by the nineteenth century.
The Ottoman conquest disrupted the historical development of the

50 The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq (Oxford, 1927), p. 135.

51Donald E. Webster, The Turkey of Atatiirk: Social Process in the TurkishiReforma-
tion (Philadelphia, 1939),p. 20.
52 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, 1958), pp. 113-14.
53 Robert Brunschvig,"Perspectives,"in Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 58.
54W. S. Blunt, "The Sultan's Heirs in Asia," FortnightlyReview, July,1880,pp. 22-23,25.
55Brunschvig,op. cit., p. 58. Quotes Andre Leroi Gourhan, Elvolution et techniques,
Vol. II: Milieu et techniques (Paris, 1945),p. 341.
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 611

Balkan peoples,impededthegrowthof "productiveforces,"and caused

the Balkan peoples to become "the mostbackward"in Europe.56Only
the GreekPhanariots,who had both the meansand privileges,demon-
stratedcreativegenius in art and learning. The stageof development
thatGreeceachievedin educationduringtheeighteenth and nineteenth
centurieswas, to no small degree,the resultof theirwork. The pros-
perous Greek merchantsand the well-to-doexpatriateslikewisecon-
tributedto the social upliftingof Greece. The Greeks'attainmentof
impressive progresscamedespiteOttomanruleratherthanbecauseofit.
Like the Turks themselves, the Balkan peopleswerebypassedby the
Renaissanceand Reformation.When humanismstartedto cast itsrays
overWesternEurope,Ottoman"darkness"descendedovertheBalkans.
In many instances,their national life centeredaround "small tribal
cells" under the protectionof the church,which "insulated the na-
tionalityand culture"and eventuallybecamea nucleusof a new state.57
Once again, the Balkan nations had to undergo the metamorphosis
fromtribalstatusto statehood.
The limitedcommunicationbetweenconstituentpartsof the Otto-
man Empire was one of the main causes of cultural stagnation.Yet
the lives of most individualswere not "completelycontrolledby the
state" and "manyvillagesand othercorporateunits" were not totally
controlled.58 But thisrepresentedonly"a politicallyirrelevantformof
self-government," describedby one expertas "a Beggars'Democracy."5
The communications,integratedinto Ottoman administration, were
designed"not to enlightenand persuadeopinion,but to prepareand
prescribebehavior."60The public criers,forexample,"were not used
for officialannouncementto non-Muslims,"but instead their heads
weresummoned"to receivethenewson behalfoftheirconstituencies."'6

VI
Despite the segregationpolicy and the division of the societyinto
Muslim and non-Muslim,far more social mobilityprevailedin Otto-
man societythan is generallybelieved. Frequentwars,epidemics,and
caused largeshiftsof populationthatproducedsignificant
insurrections
demographicchangesin the Empire. From the verybeginning,the
by whichnomadicand
rrurksadopted the policyof "sedentarization,"
seminomadicpeoplesweresettledas agriculturistsor militaryauxiliaries

56 H. H. TpeTKROB,ed., IHomopuf Boatapuu (2 vols.; Moscow, 1954),II, 163.

5' Dvornikovic,KarakterologijaJugoslovena,pp. 859-60.
58 Karl A. Wittfogel,Oriental Despotism (New Haven, 1957),p. 108.
59 Ibid., pp. 126-296.
60A. E. Yalman, The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press (1914).
Yalman, "The Press," in E. G. Mears, ed., Modern Turkey: A Politico-EconomicIntepreta-
tion,1908-1923(New York, 1924).
61 Leriner, op. cit.,pp. 113-14.
612 Slavic Review

(as was the case with the Vlachs). This method of "settlementand colo-
nization," called siirgiin,was not uncommon and was sometimesdictated
by penal and sometimesby political, economic, and militaryneeds.02
The people settled mostly along the frontierand were constituted
into military auxiliary units. Thousands of Serbs settled along the
Austrian and Venetian frontiersor emigrated to border territoriesheld
by Venice and Austria. On several occasions, Austrian authorities
invited the Serbs to settle on their side of the frontierand to join the
frontierarmy on a permanent state of preparedness for war with the
Turks. Of great significance for the national future and immediate
social dislocation were the two "great" migrations of Serbs, led by
patriarchsArsenius III in the 1690's and Arsenius IV in 1739 to south-
ern Hungary and Austria. These migrations extended the influence of
the church and planted Serbian colonies in the heart of Hungary and
in Croatia.
The scrambling of the population in the Ottoman Empire produced
ethnic and cultural fusion. Protractedmixing of Serbs and Croats in the
frontier regions, on both sides of the Austro-Turkish and Turko-
Venetian frontiers, leveled them and facilitated eventual Yugoslav
unification. At the same time, the constant flow of the people from
the Dinaric region to the depopulated fertile Serbian and Pannonian
plains served to rejuvenate physicallythe survivingindigenous element,
to refresh the national tradition, and to revive the patriarchal social
organization.63
After the Turkish conquest of Constantinople, the Greek nation
"declined both in civilization and numbers."64 Moreover, "the trans-
locations of the inhabitants,"65caused significantchanges in the eth-
nographyof Greece. In addition, the coasts of Greece were depopulated
by frequent maritime expeditions of Christian powers.66 The punitive
measures by Ottoman authorities against the Greeks who collaborated
with Christian enemies caused losses of life and dispersion of popula-
tion. The establishmentof the timar-sipahafeudal systemin "the rich
agricultural districts" of Greece also accounted for the decline of
population. Under Turkish pressure, the Greek rural population
"abandoned extensive districtsto the Albanian race," which colonized
the whole of Boeotia, Attica, Megaris, and several other districts. Large
sections of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly were settled by Yuruks or
granted to the Seljuk Koniarides (Iconians).67 Greeks emigrated to
62 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 10. Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization,"in
Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 321. Omer Lutfi Barkan, "Les Deportations comme m6thode de
peuplement et de colonisation dans l'Empire ottoman," Revue de la Faculte' des Sciences
Aconomiques de l'Universitdd'Istanbul, XI (1949-50),67-131.
63 Jovan Cvijic, Balkansko poluostrvo,I, 154-55.
64 Finlay, op. cit.,V, 55.
65 Ibid., p. 58; III, 522; IV, 266.
66 Ibid., V, 104-5.
67 Ibid., pp. 125-26.
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 613

Apulia, Corsica,and to otherpartsof Europe.68The Greekpopulation

decreased,particularlyin theseventeenthcentury,and theresultwas an
ethnicratiomorefavorableto Turks and Albanians. Changesin Greek
and Slav populationwere also effectedby the institutionof devsirme
(the levyof boys)introducedin the fourteenth century.As a resultof
the "levy,""countlessBalkan Christiansenteredthe politicaland mili-
and became Muslims. The practice,however,
taryelites of the Emnpire"69
was abolishedat the end of the seventeenthcentury.
Beside the ethnicand cultural"Hellenization,""Slavonization,"and
"Albanization"whichoccurredin somedistricts, theprocessesof "Islam-
ization"and "Turkification"also affectedsocial change. In Greece,the
Islamizationof indigenouselementswas slight,and the Muslimpopula-
tion was primarilythe resultof Turkish and Albanian colonization.
In Bulgariaand Yugoslavia(Macedonia,Bosnia),both the Islamization
of Slavsand thecolonizationof Turks wereextensive.The withdrawal
of the Serbs from their "medieval cradle" of the Kosovo-Metohija
region and the colonizationof the region by Albanians shiftedthe
Serbianethniccentrumand significantly influencedthenation'sfuture.
A fewsmallergroups,such as the Donme (membersof the Sabbatayan
sect of Jews),also went to Islam. The settlementof SpanishJewsin
Turkish cities in the fifteenthcenturyand the conversionof some of
themto Islam produceda highlycompetitiveelement,whichtookover
manybranchesof tradeand industrythathithertohad been a Greek
monopoly. The Jewsbecame physicians,bankers,and merchants, and
manyof themoccupied a highsocial position.7o
Justwhat classesof the populationacceptedIslam and under what
circumstances has neverbeen thoroughlyinvestigated.Nor is therea
good study the social relationsbetweenthe born Muslimsand con-
of
verted Muslims (mawali)or between the Muslims and non-Muslim
scripturarians (zimmi)and foreigners (ecnebi).Yet thesecategoriesof
populationgreatlyinfluencedone another. The resultis thata Chris-
tian and a Muslim peasantin the Balkans have more in commonwith
each other than either of them has with an Anatolian or Arabian
peasant. The Muslim,Christian,and Druze Arabs have more in com-
mon than any of themhas witha Balkan peasant. The minorityand
majoritycomplexesand thefrontier conditioningofthepopulationhad
much to do withmoldingsegmentsof Ottomansociety.The activities
of theearlyakritoiand ghazis,and, later,klephts,hajduks,and uskoks,
and the mystiquethatshroudedthemproduceda special mentality, a
special typeof men, and a distinctionbetweena Muslim and a non-
Muslim,a landlordand a peasant.

68 Ibid., pp. 125.

69 Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization,"in Grunebaum,op. cit.,p. 317.
7 0 Finlay,op. cit.,V, 149-50.
614 Slavic Review

There was a surprising degree of vertical mobility in the Ottoman

empire. A Christian could become rich and a Muslim poor. A Chris-
tian could become a prominent warrior,an imperial official,a prosper-
ous merchant or artisan. By adopting Islam, one could raise himselfin
the social scale from a tolerated scripturarian to a favored Muslim.
Although not so pronounced as in the time of the early caliphate, the
distinction between a born Muslim and a converted Muslim did exist
(i.e., potur).
The Ottomans repopulated, renovated, and enlarged the old cities of
Anatolia and the Balkans and built new ones. For a time, separate
Turkish and Christian cities existed, but gradually all cities became
Turkified. While the early period of Turkish rule was characterized
by Turkification of cities in the Balkans, the final period, especially
after the eighteenth century,was characterized by their de-Turkifica-
tion.
Not until the eighteenthcenturydid Slavs startdriftingto cities, and
not until the nineteenth century did they develop a national middle
class of shoppers and artisans.2 Until then, the Serbs did not regard
their co-nationals in cities as a part of their nation, and in Greece,
Bulgaria, and Serbia, the overwhelming majority of peasants were
looked upon as "the real representatives"of the nation.73
The de-Turkification of Balkan cities since the eighteenth century
is a fascinating chapter in the history of urban communities. The
emigration of Muslims to Turkey and the influx of Christian peasants
into cities altered the ethnic and social structureof Balkan cities. The
mosque with its affiliates(han, hamam, schools, orphanages) and the
church were social and educational centers in the city. The part of the
city in which the commercial and artisan shops were located was called
the parsi (cars?ija), and those who controlled the economic life of the
citywere known as the parsili.74 The parsi,now national in appearance,
remained influentialeven afterthe Turks were gone. Every city had its
kahvehane, which became the local forum and place of entertainment.
Here the customers discussed political and religious issues, conducted
business transactions,and plotted schemes against the imperial authori-
ties.75
One of the most important Ottoman institutions wvasthe esnaf, the
71 Evlija celebija, Putopis (2 vols.; Sarajevo, 1954). Translation by Hazim sabanovic from
Turkish original entitled "Evliya Celebi Siyahatnamesi Istanbul 1314/1896-1318/1900."
72 Traian Stoianovich, "Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," Journal of Economic

History,June, 1960,pp. 234-313.

73 Finlay, op. cit.,V, 122.
74 Hamdija Kresevljakovic,"Gradska privreda i esnafiu Bosni i Hercegovini,"Godiswnjak
IstoriskogDrustva Bosne i Hercegovine, I (1949), 168-209. Kresevljakovic,"Esnafi i obrti
u Bosni i liercegovini," Zbornik za narodni Vivoti obicaje (Sarajevo, 1935). V. Skaric,
Sarajevo i njegova okolina (Sarajevo, 1937).
75 V. Skaric, "Uticaj turskogzivota na drustveni zivot," in Knjiga o Balkanu, II (Bel-
grade, 1937),p. 141.
 The Nature of Balkan Societyunder OttomanRule 615

guild. Trades and craftswereorganizedintoguilds,whosepurposewas

to protecttheirmembersand to aid thosein need. The craftsmen and
merchants in a particularplace who engagedin thesameactivityorgan-
ized themselvesinto a guild. With their tightorganization,officials,
initiations,ritual,and symbols(as well as theirfunctionas auxiliaries
of thestate),theguildswereso powerfulat the timethattheyvirtually
controlledthe city'slife. Betweenabout 1700 and 1851, the powerof
theseguildsin Sarajevowas so greatthattheyconvertedthecityliterally
into something like an "esnaf republic."76
The statutesof the Muslim guilds were confirmedby Ottoman
authoritiesand those of Christiansby church elders. Following the
exampleof the Patriarchof Constantinople,who confirmedthe Greek
guilds, the Patriarchof Pech confirmedthe Serbian guilds. Beside
Muslim and Christianguilds, therewere also mixed guilds. Certain
craftswere almosta Muslim monopoly,and otherswere open to the
Christians.This division of craftsand the esnaforganizationaland
professionalnomenclaturesurvivedlong afterthe collapseof Ottoman
power.
The citieswere avenues throughwhich Westerninfluencewas dif-
fusedin the OttomanEmpire. In additionto importsof foreigngoods,
occasionalWesterntravelersvisitedthe Ottomancities. But European
influencewas imperceptibleuntil the eighteenthcentury.The styles
and voguesofIstanbulsetthetoneforcitylife.
VII
Ottomaninfluencein the Balkanswas multifarious and lasting. It was
much greaterin urban centersthan in mountainousand inaccessible
regions. Yet the Ottomansdid not assimilatethe indigenouscultures
but insteadrefreshedearlierorientalinfluencesand added theirown
flavorto them. Ottomaninfluenceis apparentin dress,crafts,arts,and
diet.
Practicallyeverypartof the Montenegrinnativedresshas a Turkish
(Arabic, Persian) name. The celebrations,including weddings,are
accompaniedby profuseTurko-Arabicterminology.The borrowings
fromthe Turkish lexicon are enormous,especiallyin the domain of
food, agriculture,livestock,mining,crafts,trade, home furnishings,
tools, and social customs. The words of Turko-Arabicand Persian
originhave enteredthe vernacularof the Christiansubjectsso deeply
that the Balkan Slavs, for example,unconsciouslycreate termsbased
on Turkishword-roots.
The subjectinfidelsaped theTurksand learnedto "act" and "swear"
like the Turks. Even the personwho made a pilgrimageto Jerusalem
was honored with the Islamic hadjj.The city life of Muslims and

76 Enciklopedija Leksikografskog
Zavoda, II (1956), 610.
616 Slavic Review

Christians was similar. They spent much of their time in the coffee-
house, conducted business in the same way, adhered to the same social
code and daily habits (greetings, table manners, etc.), and went on
outings (teferriig). Like her Muslim sister the Christian woman ab-
sented herselffromthe city streets,wore similar though more conserva-
tive dress, and covered her head with a veil similar to the ferace or
yasmrak.The daily habits and chores of both women were the same, and
theysufferedfromthe same social interdictsand taboos.
The social and psychological effectsof Ottoman rule are apparent in
both Muslim and Christian communities: the technical and intellectual
conservatism, attachment of low social value to work, suspicion of
government, economic wastefulness and inefficiency. Ottoman feu-
dalism stifled the creative potential of the people. Many of the long-
established habits that are part of the Ottoman heritage have been
difficultto eradicate. The Muslim religious exclusiveness served to
intensify similar tendencies among the Christians. If the Muslims
raised the fez and ferace to the level of a cult, the Montenegrins lifted
theirzavrata to a symbol of patriotismand faith. To a good Muslim, an
acceptance of infidel headgear implies social degradation and religious
betrayal. The Muslims regulated the Christian dress and forbade the
Christians to wear Muslim dress. By wearing discriminatoryclothing,
the Muslims encouraged the Christianisto styletheir own discriminatory
dress. The Muslim clothing also had a class connotation; it was the
garb of the rulers. Consequently, the dress had deep sociopsychological
implications. A suppressed desire to look like Turks or to free them-
selves of social suppression by wearing Turkish-styledclothes became
deeply ingrained. The firstimpulse of liberated Serbs in 1804 was to
don the Turkish dress. Only aftersatiating their egos did theygradually
adopt part-Westernand part-local dress.
The Balkan Muslims have taken into their religion many pagan
and Christian practices and beliefs. Some continue to honor the saints
of their family before it accepted Islam. They celebrate the Chris-
tian St. George and St. Ivan, and sometimes both Muslims and
Christians revere the same shrine. The Muslims and Christians
exchange visits on Bayram and Christmas. Belief in miracles, super-
stition,and fortunetellingare extensive among both.
The dominant Ottoman Turkish societyand the numerous subsocie-
ties that functioned within the encompassing systemof social relations
preserved their distinctive characters and yet influenced each other.
The long period of coexistence and interminglinghas given the Turks
and their erstwhilesubjects many common characteristicsand a similar
outlook on life. The Ottoman Empire vanished, but its influences
survive.