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APPENDIX III

HEAP LEACH PAD SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS



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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM

.GOlder :Associates

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Golder Associates Ltd. 500 - 4260 Still Creek Drive

Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5C 6C6

Telephone: 604-296-4200 Fax Access: 604-298-5253

TO:

FROM:

CC:

Western Copper Corporation Christopher Anderson

John Hull

DATE: March 26, 2007

JOB NO: 06-1413-077 DOC NO: 028

EMAIL: chrisanderson@golder.com

RE: GEOTECHNICAL STABILITY ANALYSES AND DESIGN HLF CONFINING EMBANKMENT AND EVENTS POND CARMACKS COPPER PROJECT, YUKON

The following describes the design criteria, methodology and results for the geotechnical stability analyses and design performed for preliminary design of the Heap Leach Facility Confining Embankment, Events Pond, and Sediment Pond for the proposed Carmacks Copper Project.

1.0

INTRODUCTION

The slope stability assessment has been carried out as part of the preliminary design of the Heap Leach Facility (HLF), in conjunction with a thermal analysis and a foundation assessment, which were undertaken in order to estimate the response of the foundation soils to the increase in temperature and pressure resulting from heap construction and operation. The methodology and results of these related analyses can be found in Appendices I and II for the thermal analysis and foundation settlement assessment, respectively.

This assessment has been carried out using the data collected from previous geotechnical site investigations and site information obtained by others. No additional site investigations or site visits were undertaken by Golder Associates (Golder) prior to completing the analyses for the current preliminary HLF design.

1.1 Current Site Conditions and Proposed Development

It is understood that site development to date has consisted of clearing trees and brush from the Heap Leach Pad and Events Pond area, and developing access roads across the site. The extent of ground disturbance, in particular removal of surficial organic soil, has

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not been quantified, and as such, any potential improvement or disturbance to foundation conditions can not be assessed at this time. However, it is assumed that complete removal of all organic soils will occur prior to construction, and as such, the presence of the organic layer is neglected for assessment of slope stability.

The planned development of the Carmacks Copper project calls for construction of a heap leach facility in a valley leach arrangement. The primary structures of the HLF include, the heap leach pad, the Confining Embankment, and the Events Pond. The heap leach pad covers an area of about 38 hectares. The base of the pad will consist of a composite soil and synthetic liner placed over the site foundation soils. The moderately sloping of the valley floor (approximately 17% overall slope) will require a confining embankment at the down-slope toe of the heap pad, and a retaining berm along the south western toe of the heap pad for stability and to provide lateral containment of the pregnant leachate solution (PLS).

The change in elevation from the toe of the confining embankment to the top of the heap pad is approximately 155m, with a maximum pile thickness at any location of about 90m.

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The geomembrane liner at the base of the heap provides containment of the PLS, however, it also reduces friction at the base of the stacked ore, reducing the stability of the facility. The overall layout and allowable slope angles are directly impacted by the geomembrane at the base of the leach pad.

The Events Pond will be a lined solution storage pond, constructed partially in cut, with a downslope embankment of up to 20 m height. The pond will be lined with a geomembrane liner system, however, this liner system will be exposed at the surface, with no materials on the liner, and as such, the design of the structure is governed by stability of the foundation and slopes of the impounding dam.

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1.2 Existing Subsurface Information

Geotechnical site investigations have previously been carried out by others across the planned area of the Heap Leach Facility (Knight Piesold, 1995, 1996, and EBA 1997), for which borehole, trench, and testpit information was provided to Golder.

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Based on the available information, the subsurface soil stratigraphy across the HLF area generally consists of the following soil layers:

• Organic and/or Ash Layer;

• Glacio-fluvialiGlavio-lacustrine silts and clays;

• Well-graded Glacial Till;

• Weathered/Frost shattered Bedrock; and

• Bedrock.

The material properties of the above soil and bedrock materials are described in additional detail in the main text of the report.

For the purposes of this analysis, thaw-weakening of the foundation soils resulting from permafrost degradation was not considered, as it is assumed that foundation improvement to remove unsuitable soils would be carried out prior to construction. During detailed design, it is recommended that detailed foundation stability analyses be carried out to assist determination of required foundation treatments.

2.0

DESIGN CRITERIA

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This section provides the design criteria used for design and analysis of the Heap Pad, Confining Embankment, Events Pond, and Sediment Pond Dams. The criteria were derived from CDA Dam Safety Guidelines, and discussions with WCC, and based on previous experience by Golder with similar structures at other mine sites.

2.1 Yukon Government Regulations and Guidelines

The 2005 agreement between WCC and the Yukon Government identifies specific Performance Standards for the Carmacks Copper Project (Yukon Government, 2005a). Within these Performance Standards are "Critical" Issues related directly to the Heap Leach Pad, including "Physical Stability of heap and associated earth works, such as berms constructed to constrain leachate". The applicable guideline identified for the issue of physical stability is the Canadian Dam Association's "Dam Safety Guidelines" (1999).

The design criteria and methods of analyses utilized herein have been selected in general accordance with the CDA Dam Safety Guidelines.

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2.2 Consequence Categories

The Canadian Dam Association Dam Safety Guidelines requires determination of a consequence category (Very Low, Low, High, or Very High) for the structure, based on risk to downstream and upstream facilities, and on potential loss of life. The expected life of mine is approximately 10 years, with additional activities on site for an unspecified period of time for decommissioning and closure.

For the heap pad and confining embankment, significant downstream facilities are present, including the Plant Site and Events Pond. The resulting risk of loss of life, damage to infrastructure, damage to the environment, and loss of process results in a Consequence Category ranking of High for this structure.

The Events Pond is located below the plant site, and the primary consequence of failure would be loss of process and damage to the environment. The resulting Consequence Category ranking is deemed to be High.

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The sediment pond is not located above other infrastructure, and is not expected to retain highly contaminated water, resulting in a relatively low risk to the environment. As such, the Consequence Category ranking for the Sediment Pond is considered to be Low.

2.3 Regional Seismicity

The seismic risk in the Carmacks Copper Project area has previously been characterized by a seismic hazard assessment carried out for the project site (Knight Piesold, 1995). The hazard assessment provided probabilistic and deterministic values for the maximum ground acceleration. From the probabilistic analyses, the maximum ground accelerations for the 475-yr return period earthquake was 0.085g, and for the 1000-yr return period earthquake was O.l03g. The deterministic method provided a Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) of Magnitude 8.5, at a distance of 250 km, with local, firm ground, peak horizontal acceleration of 0.13 g.

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The CDA Dam Safety Guidelines provides minimum criteria for design earthquakes based on consequence category, as follows:

Maximum Design Earthquake
Consequence Category (MDE)
Deterministic Probabilistic
Very High Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) 1110,000
High 50% to 100% MCE 111,000 to 1110,000
Low - 11100 to 111,000 Based on the CDA guidelines, and considering the relatively short life of mine anticipated, the design earthquake for the High consequence structures (Heap Pad and Events Pond) should be the greater of 50% of the MCE, or the 111 ,OOO-yr earthquake. The resulting Maximum Design Earthquake (MDE) would subsequently be the 111,000-yr event, with a local firm ground acceleration of 0.103g. For the Low consequence structures, the design earthquake can similarly be taken as the 1I1,000-yr earthquake for consistency in this preliminary design.

The peak horizontal ground acceleration is subject to amplification at the top of earth structures. However, for this preliminary assessment, no amplification of acceleration has been applied to the analysis of these embankments.

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2.4 Geotechnical Design Criteria

The structural fill portions of the Heap Pad Embankment and Events Pond embankment will be constructed primarily of coarse mine waste rock. The specific geotechnical properties such as gradation, angle of friction, and hydraulic conductivity, used in the analyses have been estimated based on limited field data, typical values used in the literature, and past experience with such structures.

The geotechnical criteria used for the design and analyses of the structures are summarized below:

Embankment Height:

Determined by required storage capacities (Ore, Solution, or water).

Heap Pad Embankment: 30 m.

Heap Pad: up to 80 m.

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Events Pond Embankment: 22 m.

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Crest Width:

Heap Pad Embankment and Events Pond embankment sites and alignments previously selected by others.

Based on requirements for equipment access, stability and constructability.

- Heap Pad Embankment and Events Pond: 6 m crest width.

Alignment:

Slope Angles:

Based on requirements for stability, erosion resistance and to reduce maintenance requirements.

Heap Pad Embankment:

3H: 1 V Upstream; 2.5H: 1 V Downstream

Overall Ore Slope:

3.35H:IV.

Inter-Bench Ore Slope: 2.5H:IV.

Events Pond Embankment:

3H: 1 V Upstream; 3H: 1 V Downstream.

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Seismic Criteria

Based on CDA Dam Safety Guidelines: Greater of Deterministic (50% of Maximum Credible Earthquake), or Probabilistic (1000 yr Return period) Criteria.

Maximum Design Earthquake = Probabilistic Criteria:

Maximum Firm-Ground Acceleration = 0.103 g. Seismic Coefficient = 0.0515.

Structures must be stable under unfavourable conditions caused by seepage and earthquake forces. The Factors of Safety for used for design were:

F.S.2: 1.5 for Static conditions with an empty impoundment. F.S.2: 1.15 for Dynamic (pseudo-static) stability.

The trial Failure Surfaces considered were:

Heap Pad: Sliding along the membrane, and/or through the confining embankment.

Events Pond: Deep-seated rotational surfaces that would result in loss of 50% or more of the crest width.

Stability:

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Dam Fill Materials

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Spillway Design:

Freeboard:

Liner System:

Structures will be constructed of non acid generating mine waste rock andlor locally excavated granular materials with the following assumed soil parameters:

Internal Angle of Friction = 35 degrees. Unit Weight = 20 kN/m3.

Sized to safely pass the 200-year, 24-hour design flow routed through the pond with freeboard. Location selected based on hydrologic and stability considerations.

1 m minimum during the 200-year, 24-hour design event. Based on BC ML-ARD Guidelines identified in 2005 Project Agreement.

Heap Pad and Embankment: Soil-Geomembrane interface friction angle, ~ = 17°.

Events Pond: Geomembrane exposed, therefore, no effect on stability.

2.5 Hydrological Criteria



The impoundment volumes for the Events Pond, and details of the spillway have been designed to safely convey the flows resulting from the design storm events. The embankments have been designed with either a 3H: 1 V downstream shell in order to resist erosion to the structure in the event of overtopping resulting from exceeding the design precipitation and runoff event during an extreme or emergency event.

Further details regarding the Events Pond design can be found in the main text of the report.

3.0 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 Site Location and Layout

The general locations of the Heap Pad facility and Events Pond been previously selected by others. No on-site review has been conducted to confirm the adequacy of the overall site and layout of the structures.

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The heap pad location and configuration was required to provide sufficient capacity for the required quantity of ore, and to maintain positive drainage at the base of the leach pad in order to contain and collect the leaching solution. Re-configuration of the previous leach pad layout was required based on slope stability results, discussed further in Section 4.1.2.

The confining embankment alignment was previously selected by others. The adequacy of the size and location of the confining embankment to provide support to the heap pad was confirmed as part of this stability analysis.

The Events Pond was required to be located below the heap pad and plant site to allow gravity drainage of solution from both the heap and plant. The layout was modified from the preliminary layout provided by M3 in order to obtain the required storage capacity and to minimize the required fill volume.

3.2 Internal Stability

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Based on requirements of site location, the geotechnical analysis and design of the structures was based on considerations of internal stability. The internal stability of the structures is based on the specific geometry of a particular structure including original ground surface topography, overall height, crest alignment, overall and interim slope angles, internal phreatic surface, foundation conditions, and construction materials.

To the extent possible, crest alignments of the embankments were selected based on localized topography, such that fill quantities were minimized while providing the required impoundment volume.

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The foundation conditions of the embankments are subject to localized topographic and subsurface soil and bedrock conditions. Detailed subsurface soil information was not available for most of the embankment locations. Therefore, only a generalized interpretation of dam foundation soil conditions was used in analysis. Based on available information, fluvial sand and gravel and glacial till overly bedrock for thicknesses of 2 to 20 m in most locations. For the purpose of these analyses, the foundation soils were assumed to consist of compact to dense sand and gravel extending to depth, which is considered conservative.

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Thaw-weakening of the foundation soils resulting from permafrost degradation was not considered in this analysis, as it was assumed that foundation improvement to remove unsuitable soils would be carried out prior to construction. It should be noted, however, that long term creep deformation of ice-rich soils under the high loads of the heap leach

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pad and confining embankment could potentially result in delayed distress or failure of the facility. Such deformations would not be readily apparent, and would require monitoring of the structures in order to detect such deformations. The potential for creep deformation could be reduced with improvements to the foundation soils. During detailed design, it is recommended that detailed foundation stability analyses be carried out to assist determination of required foundation treatments.

It is understood that the embankments will be constructed using mine waste rock fill. These materials generally provide reasonably high internal shear strength, while also providing relatively high permeability.

The Heap Pad was modelled using a thin weak layer to simulate the geomembrane element. Both the heap pad and the Events Pond also included a layer to simulate a lower strength fine grained soil liner material. The filter zone material and drainage blanket material were neglected for these preliminary analyses, as these materials would consist of granular materials of reasonably high strength.

The internal phreatic surfaces differ for each structure, based on the conditions of seepage of impounded water/solution through the particular embankment. Each structure was analysed for "dry", and "full" conditions, where applicable. For the Heap Pad and Confining Embankment, the maximum height of the phreatic surface within the crushed ore was assumed to be the elevation of the spillway for the lower portion of the facility, and a height of 1 m, corresponding to localized mounding, for the upper portion of the facility. The embankment was assumed to not experience an elevated phreatic surface due to the coarse fill that would be used to construct the embankment, and the provision of a drainage blanket. The Events Pond was similarly analysed for dry and full pond conditions with no elevation of the phreatic surface within the embankment due to the liner on the surface of the embankment, and the presence of a blanket drain.

3.3 External Risks

The stability of the embankments, as influenced by the internal factors noted above, may further be affected by external influences such as seismic risk and natural hazards.

The regional seismicity of the project area is discussed in Section 2.4 of the main report. The effect of a seismic event on the structures would be to cause cyclical lateral acceleration of the structures and result in a transient lateral forces acting to destabilize the structures. The seismic risk to the structures has been taken into account in the design of the structures by considering dynamic (pseudo-static) loading on the structures during slope stability modelling.

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Natural geologic hazards may also potentially have a significant impact on the stability and performance of the structures. The topography surrounding the impoundment areas consists of moderate to steep slopes which may pose a landslide hazard. The Events Pond and Heap Confining Embankment are at less risk because the slopes above the impoundment areas will be excavated / constructed to a stable design shape.

4.0 STABILITY ANALYSIS

4.1 Methodology

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The principal criterion for the structures is to provide adequate stability during the life of mine, and for long term post closure conditions. The embankments should have adequate static Factors of Safety as well as during a design earthquake event (dynamic condition), and high impounded water levels. The structures should also be stable with respect to failure through the embankment, or sliding along their foundations. In the evaluation of the long-term stability of the structures, multiple scenarios were considered: the absence of water within the impoundment areas (dry condition), and an elevated water level to the full height of the spillway representing functioning during design-storm runoff collection and retention.

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For the Heap Pad and Confining Embankment, the critical failure mode was identified in preliminary trials to be a block-sliding style failure along the crushed ore / geomembrane contact, rather than the classic rotational failure through the foundation soils, and as such, subsequent analyses did not consider foundation failures. In the block-sliding analysis, a non-circular failure surface was obtained by specifying a failure surface following the thin weak layer used to simulate the geomembrane. Where the confining embankment or berm was present, the failure surface was allowed to either follow the weak layer up the internal slope of the confining embankment, or to extend through the embankment to simulate failure of the embankment, by either internal failure, or sliding along the base.

For the Events Pond, circular failure surfaces were identified as the critical failure mechanism. In the circular analyses, deep-seated rotational surfaces pose a risk to the integrity of the dam, whereas more shallow failures typically result only in sloughing requiring minor maintenance and repair. Therefore, the analysis focused on deep-seated trial surfaces, which were defined as a minimum of 50% loss of crest width, and exiting at or beyond the base of the slope.

The dam stability analyses were performed with the commercially available computer program SLIDE, version 5.0 (Roc Science, 2003). The dynamic stability of the dam was analysed using a "pseudo-static" approach which applies a horizontal force due to the

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earthquake event in the direction tending to cause failure. This approach of modelling a seismic load is generally considered to be conservative. The dynamic analyses for this design were performed using a design horizontal ground acceleration of 0.132 g. In addition, the yield acceleration (defined as the ground acceleration producing a Factor of Safety of 1.0) was computed for both upstream and downstream failures in both dry and full conditions for each dam.

4.1.1 Static Stability

The proposed modifications to the liner materials for the heap pad consequently reduced the anticipated interface friction angle between the overliner and geomembrane materials. The resulting reduction in slope stability of the heap, in conjunction with changes to the arrangement of the solution collection sump and riser, required modification of the layout of the heap pad in order to confirm a stable configuration with adequate capacity for crushed ore. The typical section and stability results of the resulting centerline profile is presented in Figure I1I-2.

Due to the highly irregular shapes of the original ground surface and ultimate heap configuration, a number of sections were analysed, including cross-sections at locations supported by the confining embankment, supported by the retaining berm, and where the toe of the heap does not require support, however, results have not been presented at each of the analysis locations. Results are included for the typical section and stability results for the southwest portion of the heap, where a retaining berm will be required, and are presented in Figure 111-3.

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The cross-sections presented on Figure I1I-4 and III-5, show typical sections and stability results for the Events Pond, as well as the critical upstream and downstream failure surfaces for the embankment. Both the empty and full impoundment conditions are illustrated.

In all cases, the calculated static Factors of Safety for the block-sliding and deep-seated failure surfaces exceed the required minimum value of 1.5 for static stability for both dry and full impoundment conditions.

4.1.2 Dynamic Stability

The Heap Pad, Confining Embankment and Events Pond are to be constructed of mine waste rock, and are expected to be founded on a prepared foundation surface. As such, it was assumed for this analysis that neither the embankments, nor their foundations are

susceptible to liquefaction.

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The CDA Dam Safety Guidelines specify a minimum Factor of Safety of 1.15 for the design acceleration, whether the impoundment is full or empty. Psuedo-static analyses of the structures were performed at a range of horizontal accelerations in order to determine both the factor of safety at the design acceleration, as well as the actual yield acceleration of the structures for both upstream and downstream trial surfaces. The results of these analyses are presented with the static analyses on Figures III-2 through III-5, inclusive.

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In all cases, yield accelerations of at least 0.13 g were determined for all of the structures. It is expected that the structures will perform satisfactorily during the design earthquake. However, for the Heap Pad and Events Pond, where liner systems may be damaged by excessive crest deformations, deformation analyses due to dynamic loading should be carried out during detailed design.

5.0 SUMMARY

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The slope stability assessment has been carried out, in conjunction with a thermal analysis and a foundation assessment in order to estimate the response of the foundation soils to the increase in temperature and pressure resulting from heap construction and operation. The following provides a summary of the findings of the slope stability assessment:

Long term creep deformation of ice-rich soils under the high loads of the heap leach pad and confining embankment could potentially result in delayed distress or failure of the facility. Such deformations would not be readily apparent, and would require monitoring of the structures in order to detect such deformations. The potential for creep deformation could be reduced with improvements to the foundation soils.

Natural geologic hazards, including earthquakes and landslides could potentially impact the stability and performance of the structures. The landslide hazard would likely be highest during or shortly after high rainfall events, and a landslide into a full impoundment could potentially result in a wave of water overtopping the embankment, causing flooding downstream and potentially destabilizing the embankment.

From the slope stability analyses, the critical mode of failure of the heap leach pad and confining embankment was identified to be a block-sliding type failure along the geomembrane.

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The general arrangement of the heap leach pad was modified to provide a suitable factor of safety against sliding. The resulting arrangement consists of an inter-bench slope angle of 2.5H : 1 V, and overall slope of 3.35H : 1 V, with a bench width of 30 m at elevation 850m, and 60 m at elevation 890 m.

A retaining berm will be required along the southwest side of the proposed heap leach pad in order to achieve a suitable factor of safety.

For the Events Pond the critical failure mode was found to be a classic circular failure surfaces through the embankment and foundation soils.

The general arrangement of the Events Pond that provided an acceptable Factor of Safety was found to be 3H: 1 V upstream and 3H: 1 V downstream embankment slope angles.

It is expected that the structures will perform satisfactorily during the design earthquake. However, for the Confining Embankment and Events Pond, where liner systems may be damaged by excessive crest deformations, deformation analyses for should be carried out during detailed design.

It is recommended that a detailed site investigation be carried out in order to provide sufficient information regarding foundation and frozen ground conditions to carry out detailed stability analyses as part of detailed design.

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REFERENCES

Canadian Dam Association, 1999. Dam Safety Guidelines, Canadian Dam Association, Edmonton, AB.

EBA, 2005. "Heap Leach Pad Liner Design, Carmacks Copper Project near Williams Creek, YT", Report submitted to Western Silver Corporation, May 2005.

Golder, 2007a. "Surface Water Management", Report submitted to

Western Copper Corporation Ltd., in preparation.

Knight Piesold, 1996. "Report on Detailed Design", Report submitted to Western Copper Holdings Ltd., August 14, 1996.

Knight Piesold, 1995. "Report on Preliminary Design", Report submitted to Western Copper Holdings Ltd., May 1, 1995.

RocScience Inc., 2003. Slide, v5.0 ~ Two-Dimensional Limit Equilibrium Slope Stability Analysis.

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