What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?

Author(s): Kurt Godel

Source: The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 54, No. 9 (Nov., 1947), pp. 515-525
Published by: Mathematical Association of America
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2304666
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 WHAT IS CANTOR'S CONTINUUM PROBLEM?
KURT GODEL, InstituteforAdvancedStudy
1. The concept of cardinal number. Cantor's continuumproblemis simply
the question: How many points are thereon a straightline in Euclidean space?
In other terms,the question is: How many differentsets of integersdo there
exist?
This question, of course, could arise only after the concept of "number"
had been extended to infinitesets; hence it might be doubted if this extension
can be effectedin a uniquelydeterminedmannerand if,therefore,the statement
of the problemin the simple termsused above is justified.Closer examination,
however,shows that Cantor's definitionofinfinitenumbersreally has this char-
acter of uniqueness,and that in a verystrikingmanner.For whatever "number"
as applied to infinitesets may mean, we certainlywant it to have the property
that the numberof objects belongingto some class does not change if, leaving
the objects the same, one changes in any way whatsoever their propertiesor
mutual relations(e.g.,theircolorsor theirdistributionin space). From this,how-
ever, it followsat once that two sets (at least two sets of changeable objects of
the space-timeworld) will have the same cardinal numberif theirelementscan
be brought into a one-to-onecorrespondence,which is Cantor's definitionof
equality betweennumbers.For ifthereexistssuch a correspondencefortwo sets
A and B it is possible (at least theoretically)to change the propertiesand rela-
tionsofeach elementofA into those ofthe correspondingelementofB, whereby
A is transformedinto a set completelyindistinguishablefromB, hence of the
same cardinal number. For example, assuming a square and a line segment
both completelyfilledwith mass points (so that at each point of them exactly
one mass point is situated), it followsowing to the demonstrablefact that there
exists a one-to-onecorrespondencebetween the points of a square and of a line
segment,and, therefore,also between the correspondingmass points, that the
mass points of the square can be so rearrangedas exactly to fillout the line seg-
ment, and vice versa. Such considerations,it is true, apply directly only to
physical objects, but a definitionof the concept of "number" which would de-
pend on the kind of objects that are numbered could hardly be considered as
satisfactory.
So thereis hardlyany choice leftbut to accept Cantor's definitionofequality
betweennumbers,which can easily be extended to a definitionof "greater"and
"less" forinfinitenumbersby stipulatingthat the cardinal numberM of a set A
is to be called less than the cardinal numberN of a set B if M is different from
N but equal to the cardinal numberof some subset of B. On the basis of these
definitionsit becomes possible to prove that thereexist infinitelymany different
infinitecardinal numbers or "powers," and that, in particular,the number of
subsetsof a set is always greaterthan the numberof its elements;furthermore it
becomes possible to extend (again without any arbitrariness)the arithmetical
operations to infinitenumbers (includingsums and products with any infinite
515
516 WHAT IS CANTOR'S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? [November,

number of terms or factors) and to prove practically all ordinary rules of

computation.
But, even afterthat, the problem to determinethe cardinal number of an
individual set, such as the linear continuum,would not be well definedif there
did not exist some "natural" representationof the infinitecardinal numbers,
comparable to the decimal or some othersystematicdenotation of the integers.
This systematicrepresentation,however,does exist owing to the theoremthat
foreach cardinal numberand each set of cardinal numbers1thereexists exactly
one cardinal numberimmediatelysucceedingin magnitudeand that the cardinal
numberof every set occurs in the series thus obtained.2This theoremmakes it
possible to denote the cardinal numberimmediatelysucceeding the set of finite
numbersby N o (whichis the powerof the "denumerablyinfinite"sets), the next
one by N1, etc.; the one immediatelysucceeding all R where i is an integer,by
X, the next one by N,+1, etc.,and the theory of ordinal numbers furnishesthe
means to extend this series fartherand farther.

2. The continuum problem, the continuum hypothesis and the partila

results concerningits truthobtained so far. So the analysis of the phrase "how
many" leads unambiguouslyto quite a definitemeaning forthe question stated
in the second line of this paper, namely,to findout which one of the R's is the
numberof points on a straightline or (which is the same) on any other contin-
uum in Euclidean space. Cantor, after having proved that this number is cer-
tainly greater than N o, conjectured that it is RI, or (which is an equivalent
proposition)that every infinitesubset of the continuumhas eitherthe power of
the set of integersor of the whole continuum.This is Cantor's continuumhy-
pothesis.
But, although Cantor's set theoryhas now had a developmentof more than
sixtyyears and the problemis evidentlyof great importanceforit, nothinghas
been proved so far relative to the question what the power of the continuum
is or whetherits subsets satisfythe condition just stated, except (1) that the
power of the continuumis not a cardinal numberof a certain very special kind,
namely, not a limit of denumerably many smaller cardinal numbers,3and
(2) that the propositionjust mentionedabout the subsets of the continuumis

I
As to the question why there does not exist a set of all cardinal numbers,see footnote 12.
In orderto prove thistheoremtheaxiom of choice (see: A. Fraenkel,Einleitungin die Mengen-
2

lehre, 3rd ed. Berlin, 1928, p. 288 ff.) is necessary, but it may be said that this axiom is, in the
presentstate of knowledge,exactly as well foundedas the systemof the other axioms. It has been
proved consistent,provided the other axioms are so. (See my paper quoted in footnote 13.) It is
exactly as evident as the other axioms forsets in the sense of arbitrarymultitudesand, as forsets
in the sense of extensions of definable properties,it also is demonstrable for those concepts of
definabilityforwhich, in the present state of knowledge, it is possible to prove the other axioms,
namely,those explained in footnotes17 and 21.
3See F. Hausdorff,Mengenlehre,1sted. (1914), p. 68. The discovererofthis theorem.J. Konig,
asserted more than he had actually proved (see Math. Ann. 60 (1904), p. 177).
1947] WHAT IS CANTOR'S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? 517

true for a certain infinitesimalfractionof these subsets, the analytical4sets.f

Not even an upper bound, however high, can be assigned forthe power of the
continuum. Nor is there any more known about the quality than about the
quantity of the cardinal numberof the continuum.It is undecided whetherthis
numberis regularor singular,accessible or inaccessible,and (except forKonig's
negative result) what its characterof confinality4 is. The only thingone knows,
in addition to the resultsjust mentioned,is a great numberof consequences of,
and some propositionsequivalent to, Cantor's conjecture.6
This pronouncedfailurebecomes still more strikingif the problem is con-
sidered in its connection with general questions of cardinal arithmetic. It is
easily proved that the power of the continuum is equal to 2Vo.So the con-
tinuum problem turns out to be a question fromthe "multiplicationtable" of
cardinal numbers,namely,the problemto evaluate a certaininfiniteproduct (in
fact the simplestnon-trivialone that can be formed).There is, however,not one
infiniteproduct (of factors > 1) forwhichonly as muchas an upper bound forits
value can be assigned. All one knows about the evaluation of infiniteproducts
are two lower bounds due to Cantor and Konig (the latter of which implies a
generalizationof the aforementionednegative theoremon the power of the con-
tinuum), and some theoremsconcerningthe reductionof productswith different
factors to exponentiations and of exponentiations to exponentiations with
smaller bases or exponents.These theoremsreduce' the whole problemof com-
puting infiniteproducts to the evaluation of Nayf( a) and the performanceof
certain fundamentaloperations on ordinal numbers,such as determiningthe
limit of a series of them. Na/f( a), and therewithall products and powers, can
easily be computed8if the "generalizedcontinuumhypothesis"is assumed, i.e.,
if it is assumed that 28a = Ni+l forevery a, or, in other terms,that the number
of subsets of a set of power Na is Ra+. But, without making any undemon-
strated assumption, it is not even known whetheror not m <n implies 2m<2n
(although it is trivial that it implies 2m< 2n), nor even whether2o <2'1.
3. Restatementof the problemon the basis of an analysis of the foundations
of set theoryand results obtained along these lines. This scarcity of results,
even as to the most fundamentalquestions in this field,may be due to some ex-
it seems, however(see Section 4 below),
tent to purelymathematicaldifficulties;
that there are also deeper reasons behind it and that a complete solution of

4See the list of definitionsat the end of this paper.

5 See F. Hausdorff,Mengenlehre,3rd ed. (1935), p. 32. Even forcomplementsof analytical sets
the question is undecided at present,and it can be proved only that they have (if they are infinite)
eitherthe power ffoor t4 or continuum (see; C. Kuratowski, Topologie I, Warszawa-Lwow, 1933,
p. 246.)
6 See W. Sierpinski,Hypothese du Continu, Warsaw, 1934.

7This reduction can be effectedowing to the results and methods of a paper by A. Tarski
published in Fund. Math. 7 (1925), p. 1.
8 For regular numbersRa one obtains immediately:
f(LAa) == 2 =
faa+,.
518 WHAT IS CANTOR S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? [November,

these problemscan be obtained only by a more profoundanalysis (than mathe-

matics is,accustomed to give) of the meanings of the terms occurringin them
(such as "set," 'one-to-onecorrespondence,"etc.) and of the axioms underlying
their use. Several such analyses have been proposed already. Let us see then
what they give forour problem.
First of all there is Brouwer's intuitionism,which is utterlydestructivein
its results.The whole theoryof the R's greaterthan RI is rejected as meaning-
less.9 Cantor's conjectureitselfreceivesseveral different meanings,all of which,
thoughveryinterestingin themselves,are quite different fromthe originalprob-
lem, and which lead partly to affirmative,partly to negative answers;'0 not
everythingin this field, however, has been clarified sufficiently.The "half-
intuitionistic"standpoint along the lines of H. Poincare and H. Weyl" would
hardly preservesubstantiallymore of set theory.
This negative attitude towards Cantor's set theory,however,is by no means
a necessary outcome of a closer examination of its foundations,but only the
resultof certain philosophicalconceptionsof the nature of mathematics,which
admit mathematical objects only to the extent in which they are (or are be-
lieved to be) interpretableas acts and constructionsof our own mind,or at least
completelypenetrableby our intuition.For someone who does not share these
views thereexists a satisfactoryfoundationof Cantor's set theoryin its whole
originalextent,namely,axiomaticsof set theory,underwhichthe logical system
of Principia Mathematica (in a suitable interpretation)may be subsumed.
It mightat firstseem that the set theoreticalparadoxes would stand in the
way of such an undertaking,but closer examinlationshows that they cause no
trouble at all. They are a very serious problem,but not forCantor's set theory.
As far as sets occur and are necessary in mathematics (at least in the mathe-
matics of today, includingall of Cantor's set theory),they are sets of integers,
or of rational numbers (i.e., of pairs of integers),or of real numbers (i.e., of sets
of rational numbers),or of functionsof real numbers (i.e., of sets of pairs of real
numbers),etc.; when theoremsabout all sets (or the existenceof sets) in general
are asserted,they can always be interpretedwithoutany difficulty to mean that
theyhold forsets ofintegersas well as forsets of real numbers,etc.(respectively,
that there exist either sets of integers, or sets of real numbers, or. . . etc.,
which have the asserted property).This concept of set, however,according to
whicha set is anythingobtainable fromthe integers(or some otherwell defined

9 See L. E. J. Brouwer, AttidelIV CongressoInternazionale

dei Matematici(Roma 1908),p.
569.
10See L. E. J. Brouwer,Overde gondslagenderwiskunde(Amsterdam and Leipzig,1907) I,
9; III, 2.
11See H. Weyl,Das Kontinuum,2nd ed. 1932.If the procedureof construction of sets de-
scribedthere(p. 20) is iterateda sufficiently
large(transfinite)
numberoftimes,one getsexactly
therealnumbers ofthemodelforsettheoryspokenofbelowinSection4, in whichthecontinuum-
hypothesis is true.But thisiteration
wouldhardlybe possiblewithinthelimitsofthehalfintuition-
isticstandpoint.
19471 WHAT IS CANTOR'S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? 519

objects) by iterated application"2of the operation "set of,"13and not some-

thingobtained by dividingthe totalityof all existingthingsinto two categories,
has never led to any antinomywhatsoever; that is, the perfectly'naive" and
uncriticalworkingwith this concept of set has so far proved completelyself-
consistent.14
But, furthermore, the axioms underlyingthe unrestricteduse of this concept
of set, or, at least, a portion of them which sufficeforall mathematical proofs
ever produced up to now, have been so preciselyformulatedin axiomatic set
theoryl5that the question whethersome given propositionfollowsfromthemcan
be transformed,by means of logistic symbolism,into a purely combinatorial
problem concerningthe manipulation of symbols which even the most radical
intuitionistmust acknowledge as meaningful.So Cantor's continuumproblem,
no matterwhat philosophicalstandpoint one takes, undeniablyretains at least
this meaning: to ascertain whetheran answer, and if so what answer, can be
derived fromthe axioms of set theoryas formulatedin the systems quoted.
Of course,ifit is interpretedin this way, thereare (assumingthe consistency
of the axioms) a priori three possibilitiesfor Cantor's conjecture: It may be
either demonstrable or disprovable or undecidable.16The third alternative
(whichis only a preciseformulationof the conjecturestated above that the diffi-
culties of the problemare perhaps not purelymathematical) is the most likely,
and to seek a proofforit is at presentone of the most promisingways of attack-
ing the problem.One resultalong these lines has been obtained already, namely,
that Cantor's conjectureis not disprovable fromthe axioms of set theory,pro-
vided that these axioms are consistent(see Section 4).
It is to be noted, however, that even if one should succeed in proving its
undemonstrabilityas well, this would (in contradistinction,forexample, to the
proofforthe transcendencyof ir) by no means settle the question definitively.

12 This phraseis to be understoodso as to includealso transfiniteiteration,thetotalityofsets

obtainedbyfinite iterationforming
againa setand a basisfora further applicationoftheoperation
"setof."
13 The operation"setof x's" cannotbe defined satisfactorily(at least in the presentstateof
knowledge), butonlybe paraphrased by otherexpressions involving againtheconceptofset,such
as: "multitude of x's," "combinationof any numberof x's," 'part of the totalityof x's"; but as
opposedto theconceptofset in general(ifconsidered as primitive) we have a clearnotionof this
operation.
14 It followsat oncefromthisexplanationof theterm"set"thata set ofall setsor othersets
ofa similarextensioncannotexist,sinceeverysetobtainedin thiswayimmediately givesriseto
further applicationof theoperation"setof"and, therefore, to theexistenceoflargersets.
15See, e.g.,P. Bernays,A systemof axiomaticset theory, J. Symb.Log. 2 (1937), p. 65; 6
(1941),p. 1; 7 (1942),p. 65; p. 133; 8 (1943),p. 89. J.von Neumann,Eine Axiomatisierung der
Mengenlehre, J.reineu. angew.Math. 154(1925),p. 219;cfalso: ibid.,160(1929),p. 227; Math.Zs
27 (1928),p. 669. K. G6del,The Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis(Ann.Math. Studies
No. 3), 1940.
16 In case of theinconsistencyoftheaxiomsthelastone ofthefoura prioripossiblealterna-
tivesforCantor'sconjecturewouldoccur,namely,it wouldthenbe bothdemonstrable and dis-
provableby theaxiomsofset theory.
520 WHAT IS CANTOR' S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? [November,

Only someone who (like the intuitionist)denies that the concepts and axioms of
classical set theoryhave any meaning (or any well-definedmeaning) could be
satisfiedwith such a solution,not someone who believes them to describesome
well-determinedreality. For in this reality Cantor's conjecture must be either
true or false, and its undecidabilityfromthe axioms as known today can only
mean that these axioms do not contain a complete descriptionof this reality;
and such a beliefis by no means chimerical,since it is possible to point out ways
in which a decision of the question, even if it is undecidable fromthe axioms in
theirpresentform,mightneverthelessbe obtained.
For firstof all the axioms of set theoryby no means forma systemclosed in
itself,but, quite on the contrary,the very concept of set17on which they are
based suggeststheirextensionby new axioms which assert the existenceof still
furtheriterationsof the operation "set of." These axioms can also be formulated
as propositionsassertingthe existenceof very great cardinal numbersor (which
is the same) of sets having these cardinal numbers.The simplestof these strong
"axioms of infinity"assert the existence of inaccessible numbers (and of num-
bers inaccessible in the strongersense) > K 0. The latter axiom, roughlyspeak-
ing, means nothingelse but that the totalityof sets obtainable by exclusive use
of the processesof formationof sets expressedin the otheraxioms formsagain a
set (and, therefore,a new basis for a furtherapplication of these processes).'8
Other axioms of infinityhave been formulatedby P. Mahlo.19 Very little is
known about this section of set theory,but at any rate these axioms show
clearly, not only that the axiomatic system of set theory as known today is
incomplete,but also that it can be supplementedwithoutarbitrarinessby new
axioms which are only the natural continuationof the series of those set up so
far.
That these axioms have consequences also far outside the domain of very
greattransfinitenumbers,whichare theirimmediateobject, can be proved; each
of them (as faras they are known) can, underthe assumptionof consistency,be
shown to increase the number of decidable propositions even in the field of
Diophantine equations. As for the continuum problem,there is little hope of
solvingit by means of those axioms of infinitywhich can be set up on the basis
of principlesknown today (the above-mentionedproofforthe undisprovability
of the continuum hypothesis,e.g., goes through for all of them without any
change). But probably thereexist othersbased on hithertounknownprinciples;
also there may exist, besides the ordinaryaxioms, the axioms of infinityand

17 Similarlyalso theconcept"property ofset" (thesecondoftheprimitive termsofsettheory)

can constantly be enlarged,and furthermoreconceptsof "property of property of set" etc.be in-
troducedwhereby newaxiomsare obtained,which,however, as to theirconsequencesforproposi-
tionsreferring to limiteddomainsofsets (suchas thecontinuum hypothesis) are containedin the
axiomsdepending on theconceptofset.
18 See E. Zermelo, Fund. Math. 16 (1930),p. 29.
19See: Ber.Verh.Sachs.Ges.Wiss.63(1911),pp. 190-200;65 (1913),pp.269-276.FromMahlo's
presentation ofthesubject,however,it doesnotappearthatthenumbers he definesactuallyexist.
 1947] WHAT IS CANTOR'S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? 521

the axioms mentionedin footnote 14, other (hithertounknown) axioms of set

theorywhich a more profoundunderstandingof the concepts underlyinglogic
and mathematicswould enable us to recognizeas implied by these concepts.
Furthermore,however,even disregardingthe intrinsicnecessityof some new
axiom, and even in case it had no intrinsicnecessityat all, a decision about its
truth is possible also in another way, namely, inductively by studying its
"success," that is, its fruitfulnessin consequences and in particular in "veri-
fiable" consequences, i.e., consequences demonstrablewithout the new axiom,
whose proofs by means of the new axiom, however, are considerablysimpler
and easier to discover, and make it possible to condense into one proof
many differentproofs.The axioms for the system of real numbers,rejected
by the intuitionists,have in this sense been verified to some extent owing
to the fact that analytical number theory frequently allows us to prove
numbertheoreticaltheoremswhich can subsequently be verifiedby elementary
methods. A much higherdegree of verificationthan that, however,is conceiv-
able. There might exist axioms so abundant in their verifiableconsequences,
shedding so much light upon a whole discipline,and furnishingsuch powerful
methods for solving given problems (and even solving them, as far as that is
possible,in a constructivisticway) that quite irrespectiveof theirintrinsicneces-
sity they would have to be assumed at least in the same sense as any well
established physical theory.
4. Some observationsabout the question: In what sense and in whichdirec-
tionmay a solutionof the continuumproblembe expected? But are such consid-
erations appropriate for the continuum problem? Are there really any strong
indicationsforits unsolubilityby the knownaxioms? I thinkthereare at least two.
The firstone is furnishedby the fact that thereare two quite differently de-
finedclasses of objects which both satisfyall axioms of set theorywrittendown
so far.One class consistsof the sets definablein a certainmannerby propertiesof
their elements,20 the otherof the sets in the sense of arbitrarymultitudes,irre-
spectiveof, if,or how theycan be defined.Now, beforeit is settledwhat objects
are to be numbered,and on the basis of what one-to-onecorrespondences,one
could hardly expect to be able to determinetheir number (except perhaps in
case of some fortunatecoincidence). If, however, someone believes that it is
meaninglessto speak of sets except in the sense of extensionsof definableprop-
erties,or, at least, that no othersets exist, then,too, he can hardlyexpect more
than a small fractionofthe problemsofset theoryto be solvable withoutmaking
use of this, in his opinion essential, characteristicof sets, namely, that they are
20 Namely,definable"intermsofordinalnumbers"(i.e.,roughlyspeaking,undertheassump-
tionthatforeach ordinalnumbera symboldenotingit is given)by meansoftransfinite recursions,
the primitivetermsof logic,and the e-relation,
admitting, however,as elementsof sets and of
onlypreviouslydefinedsets. See mypapersquoted in footnotes13 and 19,
rangesof quantifiers
wherean exactlyequivalent,althoughin its definitionslightlydifferent,
conceptof definability
(underthe nameof "constructibility")
is used.The paradoxof Richard,ofcourse,does notapply
to thiskindofdefinability, notdenumerable.
sincethetotalityofordinalsis certainly
522 WHAT IS CANTOR'S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? [November,

all derived from (or in a sense even identical with) definable properties.This
characteristicof sets, however, is neither formulatedexplicitlynor contained
implicitlyin the accepted axioms of set theory.So fromn either point of view, if
in addition one has regard to what was said above in Section 2, it is plausible
that the continuum problem will not be solvable by the axioms set up so far,
but, on the otherhand, may be solvable by means of a new axiom whichwould
state or at least imply somethingabout the definabilityof sets.2'
The latter half of this conjecture has already been verified;namely, the
concept of definabilityjust mentioned (which is itself definable in terms of
the primitivenotions of set theory) makes it possible to derive thegeneralized
continuumhypothesisfromthe axiom that every set is definablein this sense.22
Since this axiom (let us call it "A") turnsout to be demonstrablyconsistentwith
the otheraxioms, under the assumption of the consistencyof these axioms, this
result (irrespectiveof any philosophical opinion) shows the consistencyof the
continuumhypoth-esis withthe axioms of set theory,providedthat these axioms
themselvesare consistent.23 This proofin its structureis analogous to the con-
sistency-prooffor non-Euclidean geometryby means of a model within Eu-
clidean geometry, insofar as it follows from the axioms of set theory
that the sets definable in the above sense form a model for set theory in
which furthermorethe proposition A and, therefore,the generalized con-
tinuum hypothesisis true. But the definitionof "definability"can also be so
formulatedthat it becomes a definitionof a concept of "set" and a relation
of "element of" (satisfying the axioms of set theory) in terms of entirely
differentconcepts, namely, the concept of "ordinal numbers," in the sense
of elements ordered by some relation of "greater" and "less," this ordering
relation itself,and the notion of "recursivelydefined functionof ordinals,"
which can be taken as primitiveand be described axiomatically by way of an
extension of Peano's axioms.24[Note that this does not apply to my original
formulationpresented in the papers quoted above, because there the general
concept of "set" with its element relationoccurs in the definitionof "definable
set," although the definablesets remain the same if, afterwards,in the defini-
tion of "definability"the term "set" is replaced by "definableset."]
21 D. Hilbert'sattempt at a solutionofthecontinuum problem(see Math.Ann.95 (1926),p.
161), which,however,has neverbeen carriedthrough,also was based on a consideration of all
possibledefinitionsofreal numbers.
22On theotherhand,froman axiomin somesensedirectly oppositeto thisone thenegation
of Cantor'sconjecturecould perhapsbe derived.
23 See mypaperquotedinfootnote 13and noteProc.Nat. Ac. Sci. 25 (1939),p. 220. I takethis
opportunity to correcta mistakein thenotationand a misprintwhichoccurredin thelatterpaper:
in the lines25 to 29 of page 221, 4 to 6 and 10 of page 222, 11 to 19 of page 223,thelettera
shouldbe replaced(inall placeswhereit occurs)by,. Also,in Theorem6 on page222 thesymbol
"=" should be insertedbetween 0<a(x) and ?a(x'). For a carryingthroughof the proof in all de-
tailsthepaperquotedin footnote13 is to be consulted.
24For suchan extension
see A. Tarski,Ann.Soc. Pol. Math.3 (1924),p. 148,where,however,
thegeneralconceptof "setofordinalnumbers" is used in the axioms;thiscouldbe avoided,with-
out anyloss in demonstrabletheorems, by confining oneselffromthebeginning to recursively
de-
finablesetsofordinals.
1947] WHAT IS CANTOR'S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? 523

A second argumentin favorof the unsolubilityof the continuum problemon

the basis of the ordinaryaxioms can be based on certainfacts (not knownor not
existingat Cantor's time) which seem to indicate that Cantor's conjecturewill
turnout to be wrong;25 fora negative decision the question is (as just explained)
demonstrablyimpossibleon the basis of the axioms as known today.
There exists a considerablenumberof facts of this kind which,of course, at
the same time make it likelythat not all sets are definablein the above sense.26
One such fact, for example, is the existence of certain propertiesof point sets
(asserting an extreme rareness of the sets concerned) for which one has suc-
ceeded in provingthe existenceof undenumerablesets having these properties,
but no way is apparent by means of which one could expect to prove the exist-
ence of examples of the powerof the continuum.Propertiesof this type (of sub-
sets of a straightline) are: (1) being of the firstcategoryon every perfectset,27
(2) being carriedinto a zero set by every continuousone-to-onemapping of the
line on itself.28Another propertyof a similar nature is that of being coverable
by infinitelymany intervalsof any given lengths.But in this lattercase one has
so far not even succeeded in provingthe existenceof undenumerableexamples.
From the continuumhypothesis,however,it followsthat thereexist in all three
cases not only examples of the power of the continuum,29 but even such as are
carriedinto themselves(up to denumerablymany points) by everytranslationof
the straightline.30
And this is not the only paradoxical consequence of the continuum hy-
pothesis. Others,forexample, are that thereexist: (1) subsets of a straightline
of the power of the continuum which are covered (up to denumerably many
points) by everydense set of intervals, or (in other terms) which contain no
undenumerable subset nowhere dense on the straight line,31(2) subsets of a
straightline of the power of the continuumwhich contain no undenumerable
zero set,32(3) subsets of Hilbert space of the power of the continuumwhichcon-
tain no undenumerablesubset of finitedimension,33 (4) an infinitesequence Ai
of decompositionsof any set M of the power of the continuuminto continuum

25Viewstendingin thisdirectionhave been expressedalso by N. Lusin in Fund. Math. 25

(1935),p. 129ff.See also: W. Sierpinski, ibid.,p. 132.
26That all sets are "definablein termsof ordinals"if all proceduresof definition, i.e. also
quantificationand theoperationx withrespectto all sets,irrespective ofwhether theyhaveorcan
be defined,are admittedcouldbe expectedwithmorereason,but stillit wouldnotat all be justi-
fiedto assumethisas an axiom.It is worthnotingthattheproofthatthecontinuum hypothesis
holdsforthedefinablesetsor followsfromtheassumptionthatall setsare definable, does notgo
through forthiskindofdefinability, althoughtheassumption thatthesetwoconceptsofdefinabil-
ityare equivalentis, ofcourse,demonstrably withtheaxioms.
consistent
27 See WV.Sierpinski,Fund. Math.22 (1934),p. 270and C. Kuratowski, TopologieI, p. 269 ff.
28 See N. Lusinand W. Sierpinski, Bull. Internat.Ac. Sci. Cracovie1918,p. 35, and W. Sier-
pinski,Fund Math. 22 (1934),p. 270.
29 For the 3rdcase see: i.c. 6, p. 39, Th. 1.
80 See W. Sierpinski,Ann.Scuol. Norm.Sup. Pisa 4 (1935),p. 43.
81See N. Lusin,C. R. Paris 158 (1914),p. 1259.
32 See W. Sierpinski,Fund. Math. 5 (1924),p. 184.
8 See W. Hurewicz, Fund. Math. 19 (1932),p. 8.
524 WHAT IS CANTOR S CONTINUUM PROBLEM? [November,

many mutuallyexclusive sets A' such that, in whicheverway a set A' is chosen
foreach i, Hli(M-A') is always denumerable.34Even if in (1)-(4) "power of
the continuum" is replaced by "X1" these propositionsare very implausible;
the propositionobtained from(3) in this way is even equivalent with (3).
One may say that many of the resultsof point-settheoryobtained without
using the continuum hypothesisalso are highly unexpected and implausible.35
But, true as that may be, still the situation is different
there,insofaras in those
instances (such as, e.g., Peano's curves) the appearance to the contrarycan in
general be explained by a lack of agreementbetween our intuitivegeometrical
concepts and the set-theoreticalones occurringin the theorems.Also, it is very
suspicious that, as against the numerousplausible propositionswhichinmply the
negation of the continuumhypothesis,not one plausible propositionis known
which would imply the continuum hypothesis. Therefore one may on good
reason suspect that the role of the continuumproblemin set theorywill be this,
that it will finallylead to the discoveryof new axioms whichwill make it possible
to disprove Cantor's conjecture.
Definitions
ofsomeofthetechnical
terms
Definitions 4-12 referto subsetsofa straight line,butcan be literally
transferredto subsetsof
Euclideanspaces of any numberof dimensions;definitions 13-14 referto subsetsof Euclidean
spaces.
1. I call "character ofconfinality" ofa cardinalnumberm (abbreviatedby "cf(n)") thesmallest
numbern suchthatm is thesumofn numbers<m.
2. A cardinalnumberm is regularifcf(m)=m, otherwise singular.
3. An infinite cardinalnumberm is inaccessibleifit is regularand has no immediate predecessor
(i.e.,if,althoughit is a limitofnumbers<m, it is nota limitoffewerthanm suchnumbers);
it is inaccessiblein thestronger senseifeach product(and,therefore, also each sum)offewer
thanm numbers<m is <m. [See: W. Sierpinski andA. Tarski,Fund.Math. 15 (1930),p. 292;
A. Tarski,Fund. Math. 30 (1938),p. 68. Frointhegeneralized continuum hypothesis follows
theequivalenceofthesetwonotions.This equivalence,however,is a muchweakerand much
moreplausibleproposition. to evidentlyis inaccessiblein bothsenses.As forfinite numbers,
0 and 2 and no othersare inaccessiblein the stronger sense (by theabove definition),which
suggeststhatthesamewillholdalso forthecorrectextensionoftheconceptofinaccessibility
to finitenumbers.]
4. A setofintervals is denseifeveryintervalhas pointsincommonwithsomeintervaloftheset.
[The end-points ofan intervalare notconsideredas pointsof theinterval.]
5. A zero-setis a set whichcan be coveredby infinite sets of intervalswitharbitrarilysmall
lengths-sum.
6. A neighborhood ofa pointP is an intervalcontaining P.
7. A subsetA ofB is densein B ifeveryneighborhood ofanypointofB containspointsofA.
8. A pointP is in theexterior ofA ifit has a neighborhood containing no pointofA.
9. A subsetA ofB is nowheredenseon B ifthosepointsofB whichare in theexterior ofA are
densein B. [SuchsetsA are exactlythesubsetsof thebordersof theopensetsin B, but the
term"border-set" is unfortunatelyused in a differentsense.]
10. A subsetA ofB is ofthefirst categoryinB ifit is thesumofdenumerably manysetsnowhere
densein B.
34See S. Braunand W. Sierpinski,
Fund.Math. 19,(1932),p. 1,proposition
(Q). This proposi-
tionand theone statedunder(3) in thetextare equivalentwiththecontinuum hypothesis.
35See, e.g.,L. Blumenthal,
Am. Math. Monthly47 (1940), p. 346.
1947] PERSONNEL AND TRAINING PROBLEMS IN STATISTICS 525

11. Set A is ofthefirstcategoryon B iftheintersection A *B is of thefirstcategoryin B.

12. A setis perfect ifit is closedand has no isolatedpoint(i.e.,no pointwitha neighborhood con-
tainingno otherpointof theset).
13. Borel-sets are defined as thesmallestsystemofsetssatisfying thepostulates:
(1) The closedsetsat Borel-sets.
(2) The complement ofa Borel-setis a Borel-set.
(3) The sumofdenumerably manyBorel-sets is a Borel-set.
14. A set is analyticifit is theorthogonalprojectionof someBorel-setofa space of nexthigher
dimension.[EveryBorel-settherefore is, of course,analytic.]
15. Quantifiers are the logisticsymbolsstandingforthe phrases:"forall objectsx" and "there
existobjectsx." The totalityofobjectsx to whichtheyreferis calledtheirrange.
16. The symbol"x" means"theset ofthoseobjectsx forwhich* * * "

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING PROBLEMS IN STATISTICS

S. S. WILKS, PrincetonUniversity
1. Introduction.A report*has been preparedby the Committee*"on Applied
Mathematical Statistics of the National Research Council to: (1) analyze some
factorscontributingto the recent extraordinarygrowthof interest in the use
of statistical methods, (2) presentsome informationon the currentand future
needs of statisticallytrained personnel,(3) examine the impact of these needs
on present trainingfacilities,and (4) indicate some steps which might estab-
lish a trainingprogramadequate to meet these growingneeds. This is a summary
of the report.
2. Statistical organizations.As a simple indication of growthof interestin
statisticalmethods,the Committeedescribesthe formationand recentgrowthof
statistical organizations. The American Statistical Association, founded more
than 100 years ago, had a membershipof 1700 in 1935. By the end of 1946 it
had nearly 4000 members.The Institute of Mathematical Statistics, formedin

* "Personnel and TrainingProblemsCreatedbytheRecentGrowthofAppliedStatisticsinthe

UnitedStates," a reportby theCommittee on AppliedMathematical Statistics,NationalResearch
Council,Washington, D. C., NRC Reprintand CircularSeriesNo. 128,May, 1947,17 pp.
** LutherP. Eisenhart,Chairman,FormerChairmanDivisionofPhysicalSciences,National
ResearchCouncil
SamuelS. Wilks,Secretary,Professor of MathematicalStatistics,PrincetonUniversity
ChesterI. Bliss,Biometrician,Connecticut Experiment
Agricultural Station
EdwardU. Condon,Director,NationalBureauofStandards
Harold0. Gulliksen,Professor of Psychology,PrincetonUniversity
LowellJ. Reed, Vice-President and Professor
of the University, of Biostatistics,School of
Hygieneand PublicHealth,The JohnsHopkinsUniversity
CharlesF. Roos, President,The EconometricInstitute,Inc.
WalterA. Shewhart,ResearchEngineer,Bell TelephoneLaboratories
Hugh M. Smallwood,Director,Departmentof PhysicalResearch,GeneralLaboratories,
U. S. RubberCompany
FrederickF. Stephan,Professor of Sociologyand Statistics,CornellUniversity