Creativity Enhancement in Problem Solving: Through Software or Process?

Author(s): George M. Marakas and Joyce J. Elam

Source: Management Science, Vol. 43, No. 8 (Aug., 1997), pp. 1136-1146
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 Creativity Enhancementin Problem Solving
Through Software or Process?

George M. Marakas * Joyce J. Elam

Departmentof InformationSystems, Collegeof Business Administration,
University of Maryland,CollegePark,Maryland20742
Departmentof Decision Sciencesand InformationSystems, Collegeof Business Administration,
FloridaInternationalUniversity,Miami, Florida33199

T his paper reports the results of a controlled laboratory experiment in which the work of
Elam and Mead (1990) was both replicated and extended to explore how knowledge and
use of a creativity-enhancing process employed both manually and delivered via computer
software affect the level of creativity in response to a problem-solving task. The results suggest
the enhancement of creativity in response to open-ended problems is significantly affected by
the process employed by the decision maker rather than the vehicle by which the process is
delivered. Further, the results indicate that the capability of a decision support system (DSS) to
provide directed guidance in the application of a process combined with user knowledge of the
underlying process model improves creativity enhancement over use of either the DSS or the
process alone.
(CreativityEnhancement;Problem-solving;Decision Support;DSS Design)

1. Introduction A study conducted by Elam and Mead (1990) demon-

The rate of change in both what we know and are ex-
pected to do in the course of our daily lives is rapidly
accelerating. Many of today's seemingly common prob-
lems require more unique approaches than those pro-
vided in the past. Compounding the obstacles associ-
ated with finding solutions to new problems is the fact
that we can easily become blinded by our own thinking
and are often unable to break out of our customary
solution-seeking processes (Tversky and Kahneman
1974, Simon 1969). In the last decade, the information
systems (IS) research community has contributed sig-
nificantly to the amount of reflection, research, and writ-
ing associated with the stimulation and enhancement of
creativity by focusing attention on increasing our un-
derstanding of the relationship between creativity in
problem solving and the uses of computer technology
as a vehicle for its achievement (Young 1983; Proctor
1988; Elam and Mead 1987, 1990; Couger 1990; Coll,
Coll, and Rein 1991; Durand and VanHuss 1992;
MacCrimmon and Wagner 1992, 1994).
strated the presence of a relationship between the use of
computer software intended to enhance the level of rela-
tive creativity in responses to open-ended problems and
the measured level of relative creativityin these responses.
The results of their study led to two primary conclusions:
(1) a computer-based decision support system (DSS) can
influence the decision process adopted by its user, and (2)
the use of software designed with the intention of im-
proving its user's relative creativity can lead to greater
relative creativity in the solutions than those produced
without the aid of such software. While the Elam and
Mead study suggested that the software was the primary
factor relating to the enhancement of relative creativity,
it remains unclear whether the capabilities of the soft-
ware served to affect the final solutions or whether the
creativity-enhancing process model embedded within
the software was the primary contributor to enhancing
the level of relative creativity in the responses.
Through a controlled laboratory experiment, this
study replicated a portion of the work of Elam and

0025-1909/97/4308/1136$05.00
Copyright ?) 1997, Institute for Operations Research
1136 MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997 and the Management Sciences
 MARAKAS AND ELAM
CreativityEnhancementin ProblemSolving
Mead (1990) and additionally extended their work by
exploring how knowledge and use of a creativity-
enhancing process employed manually in a problem-
solving task as well as delivered via computer software
affects the enhancement of relative creativity. Three hy-
potheses, focusing on the effect of creativity-enhancing
software and the use of a manual creativity-enhancing
process model for decision making, were tested.
2. Creativity Enhancement in
Problem-Solving
Creativity has been referred to as one of the most vague,
ambiguous, and confusing terms in education and psy-
chology. Ancient views of creativity were closely related
to the concept of geniuses, who were thought to be born
rather than made. The definition of creativity has
evolved, however, from such ancient views and has de-
veloped itself into two main approaches (Table 1): (1)
origin-orientedand (2) process-oriented.
The origin-orientationapproach is generally more con-
cerned with the origins of creativity than with what it
actually is. The psychoanalytical perspective within this
approach is best represented by Sigmund Freud who
held that creativity arises from conflict within an indi-
vidual. A stark contrast exists, however, between
Freud's conceptualization and the process-orientation ap-
proach. While the former focuses on the origin of crea-
tivity, the latter emphasizes the thought processes sur-
rounding it. The various perspectives within the
process-orientation view creativity as a property of a
thought process that can be acquired and improved
through instruction and practice (Ripple 1989). This
suggests that the potential for creative thinking exists to
Table 1 TheoreticalApproachesand Perspectivesto Creativity
ORIENTATION
ORIGIN
Psychoanalytic
Creativityarises from conflictwithinan individual.
Humanistic
Creativityarises from the removalof conflictand inhibition.
Psychometrician
Creativityis limitedby genetic endowmentbut can be measured.
MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997
a greater or lesser degree in everyone (Fredricksen 1984,
Hocevar 1981).
An important perspective within the process-
orientation to this study is the InformationProcessing
group. Proponents of this perspective see creativity in
the problem-solving process as present when one or
more of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the
solution is novel and valuable, (2) the thinking is con-
sidered unconventional, (3) the initial problem is vague
or ill-defined, and (4) the solution process requires high
motivation and intensity and generally takes place over
a considerable span of time (Newell et al. 1962, Mum-
ford and Gustafson 1988). Additional supporters of this
perspective see creativity as present when a solution is
considered meaningful rather than random or idiosyn-
cratic (Richards et al. 1988) or when the right combi-
nation of particular problem-solving skills and individ-
ual and social elements come together (Tardif and
Sternberg 1988).
Although no widely agreed upon definition of crea-
tivity exists (Ripple 1989), the definition provided by
Amabile (1983), as adopted by Elam and Mead (1990),
was employed in this study. Amabile states that a prod-
uct or response will be judged as creative to the extent
that it is a novel and appropriate, useful, correct or valu-
able response to the task at hand.
Amabile (1983) proposed a five-step model of the cre-
ative process that closely parallels many of the stepwise
decision models present in the literature. Amabile's
model contains the following steps: (1) Problemor Task
Presentation,where a specific problem statement is for-
mulated, (2) Preparation,where recall of information
and solution approaches that appear to be relevant to
the problem at hand occurs, (3) Response Generation,
PROCESSORIENTATION
Associationist
Creativityis the act of associating remote responses to a problem
such that they create a new response.
Gestalt
Creativityresults from a conscious redirectionof thought processes
and can be learned.
InformationProcessing
Focuses on the developmentof informationprocessing models of
problem-solvingand creativity.
1137
 MARAKAS AND ELAM
CreativityEnhancementin ProblemSolving
where alternative solutions are produced, (4) Response
Validation, where the alternatives solutions are evalu-
ated, and (5) Outcome, where a successful solution is
selected, no acceptable solution is found, or a conclu-
sion is drawn that a loopback to a previous process step
is necessary. As with the Elam and Mead (1990) study,
this research adopted the model of the creative process
as proposed by Amabile (1983).'
The partnership between the computer and the prob-
lem solver is celebrated as being one of desirability, if
not necessity, in our fast-paced environment. Recently,
a great deal of research has been conducted with regard
to the integration of IS technology in the decision pro-
cess (Coll et al. 1991, Forgionne 1991, Te'eni and Ginz-
berg 1991) and in the use of decision support systems
as computer-based assistants (Jacob et al. 1989). In gen-
eral, this stream of research represents the computer as
being able to support and amplify the skills of decision
makers faced with complex, unstructured problems. Sil-
ver (1991) argues, however, that research in this area
has been somewhat fragmented and generally techno-
logically oriented rather than focusing on the behavioral
effects of the technology use. As such, one finds nu-
merous supporters for IS technology as a vehicle for
enhancement of the decision process but little empirical
evidence to support their claims.
Recent efforts (cf. MacCrimmon and Wagner 1992,
1994; Durand and VanHuss 1992) serve as evidence of a
more concerted effort to obtain such empirical evidence,
however. In addition to this increased focus on individ-
ual creativity, recent research into the study of creativity
enhancement in group problem-solving environments is
appearing (Connolly et al. 1990).
In summary, the recent research into enhancement of
idea generation and creativity through the computer gen-
erally suggests the existence of a positive effect on the out-
comes. To this end, a number of software programs have
been developed with the intention of enhancing the level
of creativity in response to problem-solving tasks.2
' A more detailed description of the individual component steps of the
creativity model and its influencing factors can be found in Amabile
(1983) and in Elam and Mead (1990).
2Though not a comprehensive listing, examples include: Quad Micro-
systems BRAIN, ESL'sIdeaGeneratorand Thoughtline,Mindlink, Inc.'s,
Mindlink, IdeaBank's, IdeaFisher,Process Consultant's ORACLE,and
Organizational Development's od/CONSULTANT.
1138
3. Hypotheses
The independent variables in this study are the use of
creativity-enhancing software and knowledge of the
creativity-enhancing process delivered by the software.
While a number of creativity-enhancing software pack-
ages are currently available for a variety of platforms,
Process version 1 in od/CONSULTANTwas the software
treatment of choice in the Elam and Mead (1990) study
and the desire to replicate and extend their work dic-
tated its use in this study. A series of design specifica-
tions for a DSS intended as a creativity-enhancing tool
(see Elam and Mead 1987) was used in the selection of
od/CONSULTANT. Although the focus of the present
study was not concerned specifically with DSS per se,
the rigorous selection process employed by Elam and
Mead (1990) in the selection of the software makes odl
CONSULTANT an excellent example of a typical
creativity-enhancing software package. Process 1 gen-
erated the highest level of creative responses in the Elam
and Mead (1990) study and, as can be seen in Figure 1,
bears a comparable stepwise and functional resem-
blance to both the general model of decision making
proposed by Coll et al. (1991) and to Amabile's (1983)
model of the creative process.3
The dependent variable is the relative degree of cre-
ativity generated by the decision maker in the solution
to an open-ended problem. One important research
question in the Elam and Mead (1990) study was
whether the use of software intended to enhance crea-
tivity actually serves to provide such enhancement. This
research effort extends that question by exploring
whether the software provides the primary creativity
enhancement or simply serves as a structuring facility
for the embedded creativity-enhancing process. Moti-
vation for hypothesizing a positive relationship be-
tween use of a specific process for enhancement of cre-
ativity is rooted in the general beliefs of the process-
oriented perspective of creativity (Mumford and
Gustafson 1988, Tardif and Sternberg 1988), which ar-
gues that creativity can be learned and developed
3All further use of the word software,unless otherwise stated, will refer
specifically to od/CONSULTANT.In addition, the term process,unless
otherwise stated, will refer to the specific creativity-enhancing process
(Version 1) embedded within the software package.
MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997
 MARAKAS AND ELAM
in ProblemSolving
CreativityEnihancement

Figure1 Comparisonof SoftwareProcess Modelwith GeneralModelof Decision Makingand Amabile'sModelof Creativity

(GeneralModel Amabile'sModel
od/Consultant of of
Decidon-Making Creativity
Describe
Problem Poblem
G,ather Awareness PreTsenato
FactsPrsnair

Assess
~~~~~~~ProblemPrpato
Rdevanc-y AnalysisPepato
/01re,Facts

Devedop Alternative Respnseato

Explanation 3eeration Gnrto

Test Afternative Rsos

Explanation Evaluation Validation

Identity Sokutlon
Solutions Selection

Impoement
Fdiow-tIp
Finetuning

through systematized approaches to problem solving. HYPOTHESIS 2. Subjectswho receiveinstruction in the

As such, the following hypothesis was advanced:
HYPOTHESIS 1. Subjectsusing either the softwareor the
processwill generatea relativelyhigher degreeof creativity
in their solutions than subjectswho do not.
To answer the question of whether the software or
the embedded creativity-enhancing process provides
the primary enhancement to the level of creative solu-
tions requires that the effect of the creativity-enhancing
process embedded within the software be isolated from
the software test. If the contention that the software is
the primary factor in the enhancement of creativity is
tenable, then it seems logical that no knowledge of the
process contained within the software should be nec-
essary for creativity enhancement to occur. If, however,
the process is the primary contributor to creativity en-
hancement, it seems equally logical that a thorough un-
derstanding of the process should serve to heighten the
creativity-enhancing effects of the process. It follows
then that the manual application of the creativity-
enhancing process using a distinct sequence of steps in
arriving at a response to an open-ended problem solv-
ing task should, therefore, result in higher levels of rel-
ative creativity in the solutions generated.
process will generatea relativelyhigher degreeof creativity
in theirsolutions thansubjectswho do not receiveinstruction
in the process.
Quite often discussions of computers and software
are focused on the information technology's utility and
contribution to productivity. Despite the prevalence of
this forum, however, questions still remain regarding
the computer's actual contribution to productivity and
the actual improvement to task performance and du-
ration (Banker et al. 1989). What is less often noted is
that many people see the computer not just as a practical
tool but as a source of pleasure as well (Webster and
Martocchio 1992, 1993).
Computers are undeniably liberating. Children can
escape from their world of structure and obligation by
immersing themselves in a computer game that hope-
lessly befuddles the adults around them. Writers can
escape the tedium of typing draft after draft and can
instead sculpt and hew their sentences and words to a
high level of refinement. Engineers can repeatedly build
and tear down intricate mechanisms in an attempt to
achieve the exact end-product without ever setting foot
in, or waiting for, a machine shop. The essence of
computer-using pleasure appears to be the machine's

MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997 1139

 MARAKAS AND ELAM
CreativityEnhancementin ProbleniSolving
responsiveness (Webster and Martocchio 1992, 1993).
Elam and Mead (1987, 1990) extended this pleasurable
"sense of liberation" to imply a sense of freedom on the
part of the problem solver to be involved with the task
at hand in whatever way he or she chooses. Further,
they posit that such an environment of freedom will
allow for deeper task involvement and will create a
sense of playfulness that is believed to be critical to the
creative process (Koestler 1964, Proctor 1991).
Support for this perspective is not limited to con-
ceptual or anecdotal arguments but exists empiri-
cally, as well. Numerous scholars have studied the
effects of process management on the cognitive effort
associated with the performance of a decision-making
task (cf. Johnson and Payne 1985). More specifically,
work by Gallupe et al. (1988), Jarvenpaa (1989), Todd
and Benbasat (1991), and Webster et al. (1993) fo-
cused on the role played by the computer in manag-
ing all or part of the underlying process associated
with solving a complex decision task. These collective
works provide strong evidence that the computer
serves as more than a simple delivery mechanism or
structuring device in a decision-making environment
and that cognitive effort can be reduced, thus allow-
ing the decision maker to focus more effectively on
the solution, when appropriate application of auto-
mated resources and display formats are utilized.
HYPOTHESIS 3. Subjectswho receiveinstruction in the
processand who use the softwarewill generatesolutions at a
relativecreativelevel higher than those subjectswho receive
instructionin the processand apply it without the aid of the
software.
4. Method
Software treatment was manipulated over two levels:
(1) a no software treatment, where the subjects were
supplied with pencil and paper for note taking, but no
use of software, and (2) a software treatment where sub-
jects made use of the creativity-enhancing software.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four
groups (see Figure 2) and were recruited from a wide
variety of sources, including systems professionals from
a local information center and senior undergraduate
and graduate MIS students from a local university. All
subjects using the software received a brief description
of the use of the help facilities contained within the soft-
1140
ware and were allowed to freely explore the various
menus and command structures prior to receiving the
task. No information regarding the intended applica-
tion of the software other than that of a decision aid was
provided, however.
Two levels of decision process treatment were also
manipulated: (1) a no-instruction treatment, where the
subject received no instruction in the use of the
creativity-enhancing decision process under the study,
and (2) an instruction treatment level, where the sub-
jects received instruction in the creativity-enhancing
process.4
All subjects were told that the experiment dealt with
problem-solving skills and methods and that they
would be solving problems that are open-ended situa-
tions with no right or wrong answer. The task was
adapted from the business-related task used by Elam
and Mead (1990).5 At no time before, during, or after
the experimental session was creativity discussed with
the subjects. This was to prevent the subjects from trying
to be creative in their response generation, thus possibly
confounding the results. Each treatment group was
tested during a separate experimental session and the
subjects were individually isolated during the problem-
solving activity.
For groups T3 (no software/process training) and T4
(software/process training) a request was made that
they attempt to follow the sequence of the problem-
solving process presented to them during their training6
and to make as much use of it as possible in performing
the task. While this procedure may raise some question
of method bias in the final results, it was nevertheless
felt to be an essential element in isolating the process
from the delivery mechanism.
Since the relative level of creativity across each group
is the dependent measure, a method of ensuring that no
group possessed a significantly higher level of creative
4 The creativity-process referred to is the sequence of steps contained
in Version 1 of the old CONSULTANTsoftware package (and listed in
Figure 2). The experimental treatment subjects were given a brief train-
ing session regarding the application of each step in the sequence in
reaching a solution to a problem-solving task.
5The complete text of the task and experimental materials used in this
study is available upon request from the first author.
6
The process sequence referred to is that of Version 1 in old CON-
SULTANTas shown in Figure 1.
MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997
 MARAKAS AND ELAM
CreativityEnhancementin ProblemSolving

Figure2 of Experimental
FlowDiagram Procedures

NoSoftware Problem H Adjecve Post-Test

Ti NoProcess OrientaUon Solving Checklist Survey
LFL..J ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~TaskH
~~~~~
T2 | Software Software Problem H Adjecve Post-Test

T2 Only Orientation Introduction Solving Checklist Survey

T3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ts

BothSoftwar Process Requestto Software Problem Adjectve Post-Test

T4 andProcess Orientation Training UseProcess introducton Solving Checklist Survey

potential than the others was needed. The Adjective
Check List was used as a measure of baseline creative
potential (Gough 1979). This widely used instrument
(cf. Domino 1970) asks the subject to indicate which ad-
jectives out of a total of 300 presented best describe his
or her personality characteristics. Within this list, 59 ad-
jectives have been identified that serve to statistically
differentiate between known groups of high and low
creatives with a remarkably high degree of discriminant
ability. Upon completion, the subject's raw score of the
number of key adjectives checked is converted to an
ACL score using a simple table. ACL scores are linear
in nature and can range from 1 to 126 representing a
low to high potential for creativity. The results obtained
from the checklist indicated that no significant differ-
ences across groups regarding baseline creative poten-
tial were present.
Finally, a brief demographic questionnaire was com-
pleted by all subjects. The instrument collected data re-
garding level of education, number of years of profes-
sional business experience, age, range, years of personal
computer experience, and overall comfort level with a
personal computer. In addition, this instrument asked
the subjects to respond to a series of yes/no questions
regarding the process they used in solving the problem
task. The responses to these questions were used along
with a review of any notes generated by the manual
subjects or computer logs generated by the software
subjects during the experiment as a manipulation check
to determine if the subjects were using the creativity-
enhancing process where expected.
5. Operationalization and
Measurement Procedures
Measurement of the dependent variable employed a
technique of consensual assessment developed by Ama-
bile (1982). Consensual assessment of creativity is a sub-
jective technique that calls for a group of qualified
judges to independently assess the relative creativity of
a set of responses (Elam and Mead 1990). Amabile
(1982) defines appropriately qualified judges as being
familiar with the domain in which the product is cre-
ated or the response is articulated. Thus, creativity can
be regarded as the quality of products or responses
judged to be creative by appropriate observers, and it
can also be regarded as the process by which something
so judged is produced. Provided the interrater reliabil-
ity of the judges is high, Amabile argues that we must
accept the validity of their judgment (Amabile 1982).
Variations of this assessment technique are commonly
used to judge competitors in athletic events that involve
the relative appraisal of multiple criteria to construct a
final score. Further, the ability of independent judges to
distinguish creativity from other constructs such as in-
telligence, achievement, and originality has been em-
pirically demonstrated (Bachelor 1989).
Three judges were used in this experiment.7 Each of
the judges received a packet containing all responses
generated by the subjects transcribed so as to appear
'All judges were members of the Business School faculty at a local
university.

MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997 1141

 MARAKAS AND ELAM
CreativityEnhancementin ProblemSolving

similar in format. The only identifying marking on the
page was the unique subject identification number. The
judges were instructed to use their own subjective def-
initions of creativity and were reminded that their ob-
jective was to provide a relative creativity ranking that
reflected a comparison only among the responses
judged and not against any absolute standard or
referent.
A single overall ranking was calculated from the
mean of the judges' ranks for each subject's response. A
set of interrater reliability indicated a significant level
of agreement among the three judges (X2 = 79.8585, df
= 39; W = 0.6826, p = 0.0001; a = 0.7660). This level of
agreement is in keeping with the measure obtained by
Elam and Mead (1990) with a much smaller sample size
(n = 12). In addition, no significant relationship ap-
peared between the creativity ranking and word count
(r = 0.0865; p = 0.596). These results suggest that no
bias resulting from the length of the response entered
into the judge's decisions regarding relative ranking.
6. Results
No significant differences were found among the treat-
ment groups with regard to demographic characteristics
or baseline creativity scores (F = 0.690, p = 0.564). In
addition, the answers to the binary response questions
on the posttest questionnaire were used as manipula-
tion checks to make inferences regarding the degree to
which the process was followed. Further, the computer
logs generated by the software groups were reviewed
for evidence of process utilization. Sufficient evidence
was collected to conclude that all subjects who were
expected to use the specific creativity-enhancing process
under test did so.
Table 2 displays the mean creativity rankings for
each of the treatment groups. The results of a Kruskal-
Wallis one-way ANOVA test showed that differences in
the relative creativity of responses between the four
cells were highly significant (X2 = 22.8160, df = 3, p
< 0.0001). These results parallel those obtained by Elam
and Mead (1990) using the same version of the software
and suggest support for Hypothesis 1. Further, the re-
sults of the post-hoc comparisons of the individual
treatment group means show all software and process
treatment group means to be significantly different
from the control group means, thus providing further
support for Hypothesis 1.
The mean creativity ranks for both T3 and T4 were
also found to be significantly different (p < 0.05) from

Table2 CreativityRankings

Hi: Subjects using eitherthe softwareor the process will generatea relativelyhigherdegree of creativityin their solutions than subjects who do not.
H2: Subjectswho receive instructionin the process will generatea relativelyhigherdegree of creativityin theirsolutions than subjects who do not receive
instructionin the process.
H3: Subjectswho receiveinstructionin the process and who use the softwarewill generatesolutions at a relativecreativelevel higherthan those subjects
whoreceiveinstruction
in the processandapplyit withouttheaidof thesoftware.

Kruskal-Wallis
1-WayANOVA: forTies
Corrected

Treatment
Group n MeanRank x2 D.F. p-value

Ti: NoSoftware/No
Process 10 31.75 22.8160 3 <0.0001
T2:SoftwareOnly/No
Process 10 25.55
T3:NoSoftware/Process
Only 10 16.00 Note:A lowermeanindicatesa higherlevelof
T4:Software
andProcess 10 8.70 judgedrelative
creativity.
Post-HocComparisons U p-value U p-value

Ti-T2 24.0 0.0491 T2-T3 20.5 0.0256

Ti-T3 10.5 0.0028 T2-T4 3.0 0.0004
T1-T4 3.0 0.0004 T3-T4 26.0 0.0693
Tl2-T34 37.0 0.0000

1142 MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997

 MARAKAS AND ELAM
CreativityEnhancementin ProblemSolving
those of Ti and T2, indicating support for Hypothesis
2. The difference in relative creativity between the com-
bination groups of Ti, 2 and T3, 4 was also found to be
significant (U = 37.0, p < 0.0001 [corrected for ties]).
Hypothesis 3 was tested by comparing the mean cre-
ativity rank of T3 with that of T4. The mean creativity
score for T4 was lower than that of T3 (T4 = 8.70 versus
T3 = 16.00). The results of a Mann-Whitney U test show
the difference between the two treatment group means
to be statistically significant (U = 26.0, p = 0.0693).
Based on these results, support for Hypothesis 3 was
found at the 0.10 level. It is possible that the lack of
support for this hypothesis at the 0.05 level may be the
result of a smaller than necessary sample size to detect
an effect of moderate magnitude. Nevertheless, these
results provide evidence suggesting that while the pro-
cess employed enhances the level of creativity in the
solution response, the software is serving as more than
simply a delivery mechanism for the embedded process
model. It appears that the capabilities of the DSS to
guide the delivery and application of a multistage de-
cision process serve to materially enhance the conscious
application and use of the underlying principles of the
delivered creativity-enhancing process model.
7. Discussion
While the results obtained in this experiment appear
encouraging, several important limitations need to be
taken into consideration in their evaluation. As in most
controlled studies, generalizability is a concern. The
study used a relatively straightforward problem task
from the general business domain. Actual business en-
vironment decisions might involve many more alter-
natives and constraints than those present in the task.
In addition, no manipulation was present to make the
subjects feel any sense of personal responsibility for the
final decision product. In other words, issues such as
job stability or job security did not come into play in the
solution selection process. These emotional forces may
have a material effect on how a decision maker ap-
proaches a problem such as the one used in the exper-
iment. In addition, the generalizability of the current
results is tempered by the rest of a single process and a
single software application. We have much to learn
about the human mind and its creative potential. We
have, however, seen evidence of a change in relative
MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997
creativity associated with the application of the specific
process chosen in a controlled environment.
Second, the sample size, while significantly larger
than in Elam and Mead (1990), may nonetheless be
small with regards to the measurement of more modest
enhancement effects to the relative creativity in a solu-
tion. As discussed previously, the moderate sample size
may have contributed to the lack of .05 level support
for Hypothesis 3.
Finally, the study of creativity is, admittedly, a com-
plex area and its measurement can be expected to be
somewhat difficult. While many studies, including this
one, have found success in the use of surrogate mea-
sures of baseline creative potential and relative creativ-
ity enhancement, we have yet to fully understand the
construct with regard to developing truly effective and
generalizable measures of human creativity. Future re-
search must strive toward improvement of this issue of
measurement while simultaneously being cognizant of
the limitations imposed by current measurement tech-
niques.
Taken within the context and limitations of the study,
it appears that the initial research questions have been
answered. The improvement in the relative level of cre-
ativity between groups Ti and T2 was in keeping with
the findings of Elam and Mead (1990). The larger sam-
ple size and the focus on a single task used in this study
both respond to limitations identified by Elam and
Mead (1990) and, therefore, serve to strengthen support
for their conclusions. It seems clear that the capabilities
of a process-oriented DSS to deliver an explicit model
for enhancing creativity and to create an environment
conductive to such enhancement are effectual. Further,
the results lend support to the proponents of a process-
oriented perspective of creativity by suggesting that cre-
ativity can be learned, externally supported, and en-
hanced through such learning and support.
More notable, however, are the results obtained by
groups T3 and T4. The knowledge derived from being
trained in a specific creativity-enhancing process com-
bined with conscious application of the process showed
improvement in the relative level of creativity over the
unconscious use of the process in an automated envi-
ronment (T3 and T4 versus T2). The problem fragmen-
tation and reformulation inherent in the process al-
lowed for a redirection of the problem solver's thought
processes believed to be essential in the enhancement of
1143
 MARAKAS AND ELAM
CreativityEnhancementin ProblemSolving

creativity. Further, the knowledge gained from being
trained in the creativity-enhancing process may have
served to make the subjects more aware of certain self-
imposed constraints to their own problem-solving
mechanisms, thus allowing them to exert more control
over the process.
The performance of group T4 (process knowledge
and software use) may be best explained by the concep-
tual work of Silver (1991) and Elam and Mead (1987)
with regard to guidelines for DSS design. Elam and
Mead (1987) proposed a reclassification of the compo-
nents of Amabile's (1983) theoretical framework of cre-
ativity into two segments (see Table 3): (1) internal
factors-those directly related to personality and cog-
nitive characteristics of the DSS user and (2) external
factors-those more directly influenced by the DSS en-
vironment. The resultant guidelines for DSS design fo-
cused on the inclusion of the external factors related to
creativity enhancement.
It is clear that the majority of the external and envi-
ronmental factors shown in Table 3 were present in
varying degrees in each of the experimental groups. For
example, all subjects exposed to the application of the
creativity-enhancing process were beneficiaries in vary-
ing degrees of all of the external factors thought to con-
tribute to creative outcomes. Any differences within the
groups regarding the effect of such factors on their so-
lutions can be argued to be the result of differences in
both the understanding of the process involved and the
conscious application of that understanding in reaching
a solution product.
A stronger explanation, however, comes from a re-
view of the presence of the environmental conditions
across the three treatment groups, the degree to which
each was present being quite different. First, task mo-
tivation and perceived task control may have been in-
creased through the process training received by T3 and
T4. The T2 subjects were not presented with any train-
ing other than a brief introduction to the menuing and
help mechanisms of the software whereas the T3 and
T4 subjects received training on the application of a spe-
cific problem-solving process. Elam and Mead (1987)
suggest that this perceived control nurtures a deeper
involvement in the task, which serves to enhance crea-
tivity. The T2 subjects would presumably not feel the
same level of control over the task given that their at-
tention had to be divided between reaching a solution
and becoming comfortable with the software environ-
ment.
A higher level of stress in T3 subjects over T4 subjects
may also contribute to the performance of Ti (cf. Jar-
venpaa 1989, Todd and Benbasat 1991). The manual
manipulation may have created a more "testlike" en-
vironment in the subjects than would have been created
by the software. Thus, despite their understanding of
the process to be applied to the task, the T3 subjects
likely faced increased stress through the conditions im-
posed on them and possibly fatigue and boredom. The
T4 group was given an environment that fostered cre-
ativity and increased competence while minimizing the
stress-related conditions associated with subjects in T3.
One additional explanation for T4 can be found in
Silver's (1991) typology of deliberate decisional guid-
ance in DSS design. Silver's framework, shown in Table
4, outlines the dimensions available to designers in
which directed guidance can be built into a DSS envi-
ronment.
Silver asserts that the objective of directed support is
not to point to a specific outcome, but rather to strongly
influence the way it is reached. A surprising number of
parallels can be drawn between Silver's framework and
the experimental manipulations. First, the targets of
guidance (both structuring and execution) were present
in escalating degrees for the three treatment groups.

Table3 Reclassificationof Amabile's(1983) ComponentialModelof Creativity

INTERNAL FACTORS EXTERNAL FACTORS ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

DomainRelevantKnowledge
CreativePersonalityTraits
CreativityRelevantSkills
BreakingPerceptualSet
BreakingCognitiveSet
DivergentThinking
DelayedJudgment
Task Motivation
Incubation
RetainedControlOver
ProblemSituation
A Sense of Competence
Stress

1144 MANAGEMENTSCIENCE/Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1997

 MARAKAS AND ELAM
CreativityEnhancementin ProblemSolving

Table4 Silver's (1991) Typologyof DeliberateDecisionalGuidance

TARGETS FORMS MODES

(WhichAspects of Decision-Makingthe (Whatthe GuidanceOffers (Howthe GuidanceMechanismWorks)
GuidanceAddresses) Decision Makers) Predefined
Structuringthe Decision-MakingProcess Suggestive Guidance Dynamic
(choosing operators)
Executingthe Decision-MakingProcess InformativeGuidance Participative
(using operators)

Each succeeding manipulation provided a greater
amount of directed guidance toward enhancement of
creativity in both structure and execution with the com-
bination of process knowledge and software environ-
ment (T4) providing the greatest degree.
Second, both forms of directed guidance were present
in proximate degree. Either through software, training,
or a combination of both, all experimental subjects re-
ceived both suggestive and informativeguidance in both
the structuring of the process and its subsequent exe-
cution. The primary difference in form of directed guid-
ance among the three groups lies with the presence or
absence of training intended to heighten the subjects'
understanding of the application of the process. This
served to increase the degree of suggestive guidance
during both structuring and execution of the process by
informing the subjects where to go next and how to go
about organizing or reconciling the data in each step.
Finally, the modeof directed guidance was clearly pre-
definedfor all treatment groups. Again, it appears that
the difference between the groups lies with their degree
of understanding of the application of the process com-
bined with the capability of the DSS to both deliver the
process and create an environment conducive to crea-
tivity. Silver (1991) asks if directional guidance can be
implemented. The results of this study suggest that
it can.
8. Conclusion
The challenge raised by the work of Elam and Mead
(1987, 1990) and many others is for research to pursue
an experimental approach toward the extension of our
knowledge of how creativity is influenced by decision
support systems. In parallel, researchers such as Silver
(1991) mandate that research investigate the effects of
specific design criteria on all aspects of the decision-
making process and its outcomes. This study represents
a singular response to those challenges. As with most
empirical efforts, the results presented here provide a
basis for more extensive and targeted research efforts.
Future research in the enhancement of constructs
such as creativity, originality, and decision-making ef-
ficiency and effectiveness must concentrate on the type
and degree of support needed within each step of a
problem-solving task rather than continuing to focus on
the more macro-level approach to supporting the entire
process. An emphasis on increasing our understanding
of decision making from an effort perspective rather
than from a purely stepwise factor approach becomes
important to furthering our understanding of the role
that the computer can play in reducing the effort asso-
ciated with solving a complex problem.
Though modest in scope, this study has provided
some additional insight into our efforts to understand
the link between creativity and problem solving. It is
hoped that the results obtained here will encourage re-
searchers to continue a vigorous and systematic agenda
in the area of creativity enhancement.8
8 The authors wish to thank Jon Beard, Nicole Wishart, MartinSantana,
the associate editor, and the four anonymous reviewers for their con-
sistently insightful comments and suggestions bringing this manu-
script to publication.
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