Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnic Political Behavior in the Soviet Union

Author(s): Lee E. Dutter

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 311-334
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Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnic
Political Behavior in the Soviet Union

LEE E. DUTTER
Boston University

A pluralsociety is definedas one which is ethnicallydiverse andwhose ethnic divisions are

politically relevant.Extanttheoriesof politics in pluralsocieties focus primarilyon democratic
political systems-that is, societies which, duringsome periodof theirrecent political history,
have been characterizedby Western-styledemocraticpolitical and governmentalinstitutions.
As a consequence, there has been little effort to formulateand apply analyticalor theoretical
frameworkswhich arespecifically relevantto nondemocraticsystems such as the Soviet Union.
The principalobjectives of this article are: (1) to augment,modify, and reformulateexisting
theoretical ideas on ethnic political behavior in plural societies so that their scope includes
nondemocraticpolitical systems; and (2) to assess the applicabilityof these ideas to the Soviet
Union.

Explaining and predictingthe internalpolitics and externalbehaviorof a

nation-statedepend upon a mixtureof factors, some unique to each nation-
state and otherscommon to a wide cross-sectionof nation-states.Which are
given prioritydepends primarilyupon the specific targetof inquiry and a
judgment on the weight of the available evidence. Here our target is the
internalethnic politics of the Soviet Union. Our principalargumentis that
these politics may be best explainedand predictedwith primaryemphasison
theoreticalfactors and empiricalisomorphismsthatthe Soviet Union shares
with a wide spectrumof ethnicallydiverse societies.
The importanceof ethnic divisions to the internalpolitics of the Soviet
Union is indisputable.Mainstreamtheories of ethnic political behavior in
plural societies, however, have focused primarilyon democraticpolitical

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This is a revised and updatedversion of a paper delivered at the

September 1984 meeting of the American Political Science Association. The author thanks
Rasma Karklins,CrawfordYoung, and anonymousreviewers for their helpful comments on
earlierversions.

JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol. 34 No. 2, June 1990 311-334

X 1990 Sage Publications,Inc.
311
312 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

systems (i.e., societies which, during some period of their recent political
history,havebeen characterizedby Western-stylepoliticalandgovernmental
institutions)and have largely neglected nondemocraticsystems such as the
Soviet Union. The presentanalysis arguesthat with remarkablylittle refor-
mulation, extant theoretical ideas can be adaptedto cover nondemocratic
systems and that the Soviet Union representsyet anothervariationon the
general theme of politics in pluralsocieties.

THE FORMATION OF ETHNOPOLITICAL IDENTITIES

The development of a primordialgroup depends upon anthropological,

economic, psychological, and sociological variablessuch as region or terri-
toriality, means of livelihood, kinship, customs or ways of life, religion,
language and literature,and organization(Hall, 1979; Rothschild, 1981).
Group"markers"typically form the basis for a "collective identitysystem"
(Spicer, 1971), which is composed mainly of moraland culturalvalues and
beliefs, common perceptionsand interpretationsof historicalevents, and a
set of well-defined ritualsthat reinforceand perpetuatethis consciousness.
Contact with other groups can stimulate the development of a we-they
perceptionand transforma collective identitysystem into the foundationof
an ethnic identity.Ethnicitythen can be conceptualizedas a set of ascribed
and acquiredcharacteristicsthatderiveprincipallyfroman individual'sbirth
andupbringing.Althoughphysicalappearancemaybe relevant,it is, in essence,
composed of psychological elements that are not only self-perceptions,but
also other groups'perceptions.
These elements cannotbe shed or significantlyalteredas easily as purely
acquired or adopted characteristicssuch as occupation. The individual is
forever"stigmatized"by his or hergroupof origin,andif ethnicandpolitical
divisions coincide, the switching of ethnopolitical affiliations is a rare
occurrence (Connor, 1977; Esman, 1977; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972;
Rothschild,1981). Thus, political divisions based on ethnicidentitiesare, it
can be argued, qualitatively different from those based on individuals'
socioeconomic characteristicsor adoptedideology.
A varietyof factorscan be cited to supportthis last point.Horowitz(1985:
131-135,2231,345,565) found,for instance,thatethnicpolitics typicallydoes
not concern "materialinterest,"but symbolic claims, which often are not
amenable to compromise. Dutter(1981) and Rabushkaand Shepsle(1972)
arguedthat, theoreticallyand empirically,the logic of voting and electoral
competition is quite distinct in plural societies. Post (1984) identified two
distinctterrorist"mindsets,"the anarchic-ideologue(e.g., Baader-Meinhof,
 Dutter / ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 313

Red Brigades) and the national-secessionist(e.g., ETA, IRA). The latteris,

of course, distinguishedby its ethnopoliticalcharacter.
Hostile contactswith outgroupscan stimulatenot only the development
of a we-they perception,but also a perceived need for collective action by
the group to both defend itself and preserve its identity.Thus, a "political
agenda"develops and a "hierarchyof values" emerges in which individuals
believe thatgroup loyalty and political action directedtowardgrouppreser-
vation take precedentover all potentialor real competing loyalties such as
social class, which may cut across group boundaries (Horowitz, 1985:
131-135; Rabushkaand Shepsle, 1972).
Following these comments, a preliminaryquestion is: Does the Soviet
Union satisfy these basic definitional components of ethnic diversity and
identity?The question is almost rhetoricaland the answer more than self-
evident. In 1979, for example, although 52% of the Soviet Union's 262
million people were listed as ethnic Russians, 22 groups (or "nationalities"
in Soviet parlance)numbered1 million or more. More than50 groupswere
officially recognizedas titularnationalitiesof administrative-territorial units
in the Soviet federal structureincluding, at the highest level, 15 soviet
socialist or union republics,named for each's dominantgroup; 20 autono-
mous republicswithin the union republics;8 autonomousprovinces;and 10
autonomousdistricts.Finally, almost every one of the 90 officially recog-
nized groups had its own language (Andersonand Silver, 1984: 1020).
Given this extremediversity,the first difficulty in assessing the relevance
of the theoreticalideas synthesizedin subsequentsections is where to begin.
Logically,it makessense to startsimply,so we focus on unionrepublicgroups
for two basic reasons.'First,by forming15 nominallyequal republicsaround
these groups, the Soviets themselves explicitly recognized their economic,
political, and social importance. Second, they are the primary foci for
contemporarySoviet specialistswho areinterestedin the economic,political,
and social implicationsof Soviet ethnic divisions.

NATION-STATESAND TERRITO AL-STATES

Building upon the preceding definitional considerations,a question of

particularimportanceis: Why do some ethnically diverse societies experi-
ence the developmentand persistenceof ethnopoliticalidentities and activ-

1. For convenientreference,the 14 non-Russianrepublicscan be regionallyidentifiedand

grouped as Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), non-Russian Slavic (Belorussia, Moldavia,
Ukraine), Transcaucasianor Caucasian (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), and Central Asian
(Kazakhstan,Kirgbizia,Tadjikistan,Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan).
314 JOURNALOFCONFLICTRESOLUTION

ities while othersdo not? Relevantto its answeris the distinctionbetween a

"nation-state"and a "territorial-state" (Rejai and Enloe, 1969).
The modem nation-state has three principal features: (1) a bounded
geographicarea;(2) centralizedandcomplex governmentaland administra-
tive structures,an incumbentregime which controls,monitors,or otherwise
regulateseconomic, military,political,andsocial affairs;and(3) an attitudin-
ally, culturally,or ethnicallyhomogeneouspopulationwhich is legitimately
or effectively governedby the incumbentregime.Typically,in the successful
or stablenation-state,the developmentof (3) precededthe appearanceof (1)
and(2). In short,the modernnation-stateis a majormanifestationof a group's
culturalor ethnicidentityandthe principalmanifestationof its ethnopolitical
identity.It representsthepsychological boundaryof a regime's legitimacy.
On the otherhand,a territorial-state has (1) and(2), butto some noticeable
extent lacks (3)- that is, the physical boundaryof the regime's authority
exceeds the psychological boundaryof its legitimacy.Thus, the transforma-
tion of ethnic heterogeneityinto a competitive or conflictual ethnopolitical
heterogeneityin a territorial-statedepends largely upon the psychological
"milieu"of groupmembers.This milieu is rootedin the collective memories
and historical experiences of the groups.2Moreover, it depends upon the
answers to five basic questions about the origin and composition of the
territorial-state.3
First, did the existence of its groups precede the establishmentof the
territorial-state?If the answer is yes, then (also dependingon how long the
groupshave been in existence) the greaterthe probabilitiesof ethnopolitical
identityformationandthe appearanceof ethnopoliticalactivity.Verysimply,
individualswill find it difficult to transferquickly, if at all, allegiance and
loyalty from their natural group of origin to any new and artificial
supragroup'sorganizations or institutions. Regarding Soviet groups, al-
thoughtheir senses of identityhave developed unevenly and are still evolv-
ing, all 15 union republicgroupscan be identifiedin some form priorto, and
often many decades before, the foundingof the Soviet territorial-state.

2. Historical events and memories, which are kept alive by ethnopolitical leaders, are
essential underpinningsfor contemporaryethnic perceptionsand grievances.In the (Northern)
Irish case, for instance,Stewart(1977: 16) observedthat:

To the Irish all History is Applied History and the past is simply a convenient quarry
which providesammunitionto use againstenemies in the present.

See also Douglas (1988), Segal (1979), and Zariski(1986: 19).

3. Althoughexplicit in a few andimplicitin manytheoreticalandempiricalwritings,these
five questionsremainto be thoroughlycodified, synthesized, andextensively addressedin one
comprehensive analysis. Here, following the discussion of Dutter (1987), we offer only a
summaryoutline.
 Dutter/ ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 315

Second, how did its constituentgroupscome to be in the territorial-state?

If coercion was involved, then the probabilitiesof identity formationand
politicalactivityareincreased.Such actions,which can be called "primordial
encroachments," typically reinforce group identity and loyalty and
strengthen individuals' contemporarysense of ethnohistoricalgrievance.
Here the 14 non-Russian,union republicgroups were, by and large, invol-
untarilyincorporatedintothe Czaristterritorial-stateandits Soviet successor.
For example, in the years after WorldWar I, Baltic independence(Raun,
1987) and armedresistancein the Ukraine (Mace, 1984) and CentralAsia
(Ritter,1985) indicatethatthese groupsprobablywould not have voluntarily
joined the USSR.
One resultof this processhas been, of course,to addhistoricalgrievances
to the collective memories of these groups. Consider, for example, the
Ukrainian famine of 1933, which effectively ended resistance to Soviet
agriculturalcollectivization and was apparentlycontrivedby Stalin for just
this reason(Mace, 1984), andthe harshCzaristtreatmentof Islamin Central
Asia (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1986: 5-12). And with regardto the Balts
duringthe nineteenthcentury,Alexiev (1983: 3) observedthat:
crude attemptsat denationalizationand Russificationby the Czaristregime
engenderedactive oppositionand the strengtheningof the Baltic peoples' will
to self-determinationand political independence.It also left bitter political
memoriesand a traditionof Russophobia,which were nurturedin the ensuing
periods.

The contemporarypresence of Russians in importantunion republic

positionsof economic andpoliticalpowerandday-to-dayintergroupcontacts
serve as continuousremindersof this history,thuscontributingto the perpet-
uationof group identitiesand reinforcingindividualpsychological disposi-
tions to distinguishbetween the good "us" and the bad "them"(Karklins,
1986b: 30, 43, 63-65, 212). Summarizingthe results of interviews with a
multiethnicsampleof 50 individualsin Tbilisi, the capitalof Soviet Georgia,
Kolack (1985: 130) observedthat the
entirefabricof Soviet society is subtly but unmistakablypermeatedby ethnic
antagonismsandcompetitionbetweenthe dominantRussiansandall the others
in political, economic, social and culturallife.

In addition to coercion, the specific terms of incorporationinto the

territorial-statemay furtherraise ethnic consciousness and intergroupten-
sions. Consider CentralAsia. When it was formally incorporatedinto the
Soviet Union in the 1920s, the Soviet governmenttook steps that have, if
anything,heightened currentethnic awarenessand tensions. For example,
the five main groups were each given their own union republic. Thus, a
316 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

territorialdimensionwas addedto theirnascentgroupidentities(Bennigsen

and Wimbush,1986: 31-35; Burg, 1979, 1984; Horowitz, 1985: 601-613).
The evolution of the CentralAsian groups also illustratesa "demonstra-
tion effect" in identityformation(Connor,1977: 29-30). More specifically,
Karpat(1983) arguedthatSoviet policies have raisedIslamicconsciousness;
thatMuslimshave learnedethnicandlinguisticnationalismfromthe Russian
example; and that while reducingtraditionalreligious influence, economic
developmenthas encourageda separatesense of culturaland nationalout-
look, an example of the "law of colonial ingratitude"(Seton-Watson,1986:
27). Karpat(1983: 74-75) concludedthat the
contemporary Muslimsof theUSSRareemergingnotasRussifiedincarnations
of homosovieticusbutas dynamic,progressive deeplyattachedto
individuals
theirIslamicidentityandculturalheritage,thoughwithoutthereligioustrap-
pingof old.Thisdevelopmentmayinfactbeagreatif totallyinadvertent
Soviet
contributionto theMuslimcause.
Third,how many groups does the territorial-statecontain?If groups are
few in number,then the probabilitiesof identity formation and political
activity are increased. In this instance, group members can more easily
identify themselves and members of outgroups, perceive the issues that
divide them, and organize to pursue ethnopolitical goals with a higher
probabilityof success. On the other hand, a territorial-statewith numerous
groupscomplicatesthese mattersandis likely to facilitatedominationby one
or a few relativelylarge groups.
Besides the 15 unionrepublicgroups,the Soviet Union contains,as noted,
dozens of others.Thus,we would arguethatRussiandominanceis facilitated
by the complicatedlogistics of intergroupcontacts and cooperation,which
also have been limited by the Russian-dominated,centrallydirectedsystem
of controls(Karklins,1986b: 93-96). Despite these formidableimpediments,
however, some intergroup cooperation has appeared (Alexiev, 1983;
Kowalewski, 1980).4
Fourth,whatproportionof the populationdoes each groupconstitute?The
distributionproportionis, of course, correlatedwith the numberof groups.
But, ceteris paribus,if grouppopulationsare close to balance, then identity
formationand political activity are more likely. Again, it is easier for group
members to identify themselves and outgroupsand relevant issues. Also,
relativelylarge numbersenhancethe probabilityof achievingethnopolitical
4. An intriguing variation on intergroupcooperation has been suggested by Karklins
(1986b: 216), who speculates that, in the long run, regionalblocs may form via the physical
mergingof many smallergroupswithin and between the 14 non-Russianunion republics,thus
enabling these new and largerblocs to bargainmore effectively with the Russian-dominated
center.
 Dutter / ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 317

goals. By contrast,if one grouppredominates,thenit can moreeasily acquire

sufficient influence to achieve its goals and is more likely to have sufficient
numbersto enforce,howevertenuously,its political will and social peace on
other groups.
Russians,of course, dominatethe Soviet populationwith approximately
50% of the total (three times more than the Ukrainians,the second largest
group),thusfurtherstrengtheningRussiancontrol.But even thoughthey will
continueto be the largestgroup,recentdemographictrends,particularlythe
comparativelyhigh birthratesamong CentralAsians, ensurethat in the near
future,if not already,Russianswill dropbelow thepsychologicallyimportant
thresholdof majoritystatus. If anything,this will heighten their feelings of
insecurityand make them even more sensitive to non-Russianexpressions
of nationalconsciousness.A variationon this point also is relevantto union
republicgroupswithin each republic.Ethnictensions have been heightened
by rapidincreasesin the nonindigenouspopulation,mainly Russians, espe-
cially where the indigenous nationality has become, or is in danger of
becoming,a minorityin its own republic- forexample,Estonia,Kazakhstan,
Kirghizia,and Latvia(Karklins,1986b: 212).
Fifth, are group members regionally concentratedor widely dispersed
throughoutthe territorial-state?Dispersion can facilitate control by one
relativelylargegroup.On the otherhand,if groupmembersareconcentrated,
then some of the disadvantagesof small numbersare attenuated.Localized
majoritiescan, ceterisparibus,more easily organizeto pursuepolitical goals
with a higherprobabilityof success than might otherwisebe the case. Thus,
the probabilitiesof identityformationand political activity are increased.
On this question,regionalconcentrationis the normfor the non-Russian
groups.Withfew exceptions, a largemajorityof each grouplives within the
boundariesof its designatedrepublic,and a large majority-usually two to
one or more- of each republic'spopulationconsists of thatgroup.Moreover,
the available evidence indicates that most individualsstrongly prefer resi-
dence in theirtraditionalhomelandsand will continueto do so (Burg, 1979;
Karklins,1986b: 211). Thus, from a theoreticalpoint of view, the mainte-
nance of each group's identity has been facilitated and to some extent the
political handicaps imposed by Russian dominance are ameliorated.For
instance, Kowalewski (1979) estimatedthat, from 1966 to 1977, the Baltic
republicsaccountedfor approximately19%of all dissidentpoliticaldemon-
strations in the Soviet Union, while constituting only 2% of the Soviet
population.Finally,Karklins(1986b: 207) observedthat the
territorialrooting and history of the non-Russian republic nations set the
baseline for their perceptions and evaluations. They view their traditional
318 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

homelands as their very own territorywithin which they have the right to
cultural,communal,and politicaldominance.This is in contrastto the percep-
tions of the Russianpopulationwhich perceives the borderlandsas an exten-
sion of Russia and themselves as political and economic benefactors and
Kulturtraeger.

In sum, the origin of the Soviet territorial-stateis largely consistentwith

the theoretical points that would lead us to expect the development and
persistence of ethnopoliticalidentities and activities involving the 14 non-
Russian union republic groups. It should be emphasized, however, that
answersto these questionsrelateto theprobabilities,not the certainty,of the
developmentandpersistenceof ethnopoliticalidentitiesandactivities.These
probabilitiesare significantly impactedby six mitigatingfactors,which are
consideredafterour discussion of the phases of ethnopoliticalactivity.

THE PHASES OF ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTIVITY

The primaryfactorsin the developmentandpersistenceof an ethnopoliti-

cal identity are group members'collective memories and interpretationsof
ethnohistoricalevents. Ethnopoliticalleaders are not only the carriers,but
also the principalarticulatorsand interpretersof these memoriesand events.
Indeed, they are typically chosen or elected primarilybecause they are best
able to performthese functions (Frohlich,Oppenheimer,and Young, 1971;
Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Tilly, 1978). Thus, the first phase of
ethnopoliticalactivity is the appearanceof ethnopolitical"entrepreneurs,"
who engage in threemajoroverlappingbut analyticallyseparableactivities:
defining and articulatingethnopolitical goals; presenting these to regime
incumbents,or as policy alternatives,if regimeincumbentsarealreadydrawn
from their group;and mobilizing and recruitingethnic followers into orga-
nizations for political action in their pursuit,which overlaps with the next
phase.
The second phase can be labeled "normal"politics. In the democratic
context, this phase includes, for example, the appearanceand development
of organizations and political parties, as well as differential patterns of
ethnopoliticalbehaviorin competitiveelections. Hereentrepreneursbuild an
organizationalnexus that is necessary for the persistence of ethnopolitical
activity.As discussedby Houska(1985: 36), this nexus performstwo crucial
functions.
Organizationsaffect politicalandsocial behaviorin two ways: througheduca-
tion andencapsulation.Educationrefersto the processwherebyelites transmit
the beliefs, attitudes,and historyof the subcultureto the masses. ... Encapsu-
 Dutter I ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 319

lation is a strategymore specifically characteristicof the political subculture.

It is a process in which elites isolate followers by attractingthem to a broad
network of subculturallylinked organizationsand thereby prevent member
contactwith competingorganizationsor even politically neutralgroups.

Entrepreneursattractfollowers into these organizationsby offering sym-

bolic and tangiblerewards(Salisbury,1970)- that is, public goods - which
followers can obtain only by formally joining, or at least supporting,the
organization(s)(Olson, 1971). Symbolic rewardsinclude the promotionof
intergroupsolidarityby giving verbal expression to traditionalgroup goals
and organizingcommemorationsof importantethnohistoricalevents. Tangi-
ble rewardsinclude direct action against"enemy"groups or the promise of
governmentpolicies favorableto the groupif the entrepreneurswin office at
the next election.5
Given the typical situationof potential entrepreneursand ethnic groups
in nondemocraticcontexts, a differentconceptualizationof these first two
phases of ethnopoliticalactivity is needed. Ratherthanentrepreneurs,orga-
nizations, political parties,candidates,issues, voters, campaigns,and elec-
tions, we should thinkin termsof the available,formal,or legal avenues for
ethnopoliticalexpressionthatare open to officially designatedethnic repre-
sentativesin officially sanctionedforumsor organizations.6
Adapting a concept from Hirschmann(1970), we should ask: In what
ways can ethnic groupsvoice their identity and political objectives through
the existing institutionalframework?In the Soviet case, while tightly regu-
lated and closely supervised,various avenues of ethnoculturalvoice (e.g.,
Baltic song festivals, formaleducationin a group'snativelanguage,practic-
ing Islam underthe coopted Islamicclergy in CentralAsia) have typically,if
not consistently,been available.
Regardingethnopoliticalvoice, Biddulph (1983) observed that, as long
as specific norms of expression are followed, union republicparty leaders
have been allowed to criticize past policies, complainaboutlocal problems
resultingfrom these policies, and advocatenew or modified policies. All of
the examples that he describedat length were from the non-Russianrepub-
lics. Forourpurposes,perhapsthe most interestingwas a planfor the massive
diversion of Siberian rivers to the Central Asia republics, proposed by
5. Here one importantvariationis that intraethnicdivisions may appearover the strategy
and tactics requiredto achieve ethnopoliticalgoals, but not over the goals themselves (Dutter,
1985, 1988).
6. At some point, however, the officially designated ethnic representativesmay find
themselves in competition with unofficial representatives(e.g., dissidents), a nondemocratic
variant on intraethniccompetition, and the official representativesthus are likely to lose out
unless they move to preemptethnicpolitical positions, a pointnoted in the Soviet case by Motyl
(1989: 152, 167-168).
320 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

Moscow and supported by those republics, that stimulated a nationalist

reactionamongRussians(Petro,1987). Ultimately,the projectwas scrapped.
An additionalform of voice, or exit, as it might be called by Hirschman
(1970), is emigration, which appears to occur disproportionatelyamong
non-Russiangroupsandto be used by Moscow as a type of safetyvalve - that
is, curbing ethnic dissent by allowing the most vocal dissidents literally to
exit (Salitan, 1989). Apparent interactioneffects also are observed. For
instance, Gitelman(1979: 76-77) noted that even though
in the [Russian republic] only 6% of Jews have requested ... emigration
affidavits ... and only 13% of the UkrainianJewish population... between
1968 and 1976, 49% of Lithuanian Jews and 35% of Latvian Jews have
requestedthese affidavits[emphasisadded].

Anotheravenue for the Soviet masses to voice theirattitudeshas been the

electoralprocess. In the past, of course, Soviet authoritieshave consistently
reported99.99% turnoutsand a similarpercentagevoting for official candi-
dates, but recent research indicates that over time, abstention or voting
against the officially sanctioned candidate had become importantacts of
political disaffection and that 5-10% of the eligible populationengaged in
these practices(Karklins,1986a). Kerblay(1983: 295-296) also noted that
the highestproportionsof abstentionsandadversevotes were typicallyfound
in the Baltic republics.Thus, we observe anothernecessary deviation from
the "standard"interpretationof voting behavior.In democraticsystems, we
look for votinginfavor of ethnicpartiesor candidatesas an indicatorof ethnic
dissent. In the Soviet case, abstentionhas been an avenue for ethnic groups
to express disaffection.
The third phase of ethnopolitical activity can be labeled "abnormal"
politics (e.g., whetherspontaneousor organized,the occurrenceof ethnically
based, politically motivated marches,demonstrations,protests, or strikes).
Thefourthphase can be labeled "sporadic"violence (e.g., the occurrenceof
ethnically based, politically motivated but essentially spontaneous riots,
killings, or bombings).The fifth phase can be labeled "organized"violence
(e.g., the occurrenceof ethnically based, politically motivatedand premed-
itated riots, assassinations,bombings, terrorism,coups, or civil war). For
these three phases, however, it is not necessary to distinguish between
democraticand nondemocraticcontexts.
In the Soviet case, before the 1980s, innumerableactivities subsumed
under phases three, four, and even five occurred.A small sample of these
includes: Lithuanianreligious dissidence; the appearanceof a dissident
journalin Belorussia;ongoing Russian-Ukranianfrictionand various forms
of dissidence by individuals in the lattergroup; expressions of Moldavian
 Dutter / ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 321

irredentism vis-h-vis Rumania; protest demonstrations and attacks on Soviet

officials, including rumored attempts on the life of the First Secretary of the
Georgian Communist Party, and bombings by Armenians, Central Asians,
and Georgians; and the reappearance in Central Asia of Sufi brotherhoods
that are hostile to the Soviet regime and its officially appointed "collabora-
tionist" Moslem hierarchy.
In this context, Karklins(1986b: 67-68) has strongly emphasized the point
that, given the constraints on ethnopolitical voice in the pre-Gorbachev
period, a wide variety of activities that in the West would not be recognized
as overtly political (e.g., literary allusions) also should be surveyed. The most
extreme view, summarized by Krasnov (1987: 258), has been articulated by
a contemporary Russian dissident:
Timofeev. . . [argues]... thatthe West"is unableto see [theextentof] societal
opposition" in the Soviet Union, because it is used to such conventional
manifestations of discontent as labor strikes, petitions, and demonstra-
tions.... The Soviet regime, itself unconventional,gives rise to unconven-
tional forms of resistance against it. One such form of resistance of the
populationagainstthe regime is a slow-down-and-take-it-easyattitudetoward
work which undoubtedlycountersall official drives to increaseproductivity.
Timofeev sees anotherform of resistance to the regime in such widespread
activities as bribery,swindle, fraud,moonshiningand black-marketeering.

Finally, the late 1980s have witnessed an upsurge in all of these activities,
the most significant of which were: the development, rapid escalation, and
persistence of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute; petitions and demonstrations
on language policy in Belorussia, Moldavia, and the Ukraine; the intensifi-
cation of local identities in Central Asia and further development of parallel
Islam, which is at odds with the officially approved Islamic clergy; and a
veritable explosion of activities by the Balts.

MITIGATING FACTORS

For any territorial-state, progression through the phases of ethnopolitical

activity and the observed frequency and severity of activities subsumed under
each is related to six mitigating factors. These are: (1) formal state structure
and decision-making processes; (2) the behavior of regime incumbents
within the state structure; (3) the extent to which regime incumbents are
drawn from a single ethnic group; (4) the nature of ethnopolitical goals; (5)
external threat; and (6) generational dynamics.
Formal state structure and decision-making processes cover such consid-
erations as unitary versus federal and, in the democratic context, the method
322 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

of election of public officials. For example, if the state is federal and

proportionalrepresentationis used, then it is reasonableto expect that the
probabilitiesof ethnic identityformationandpolitical activitywill be lower.
As with any generalization,there are, of course, exceptions. For instance,
Horowitz (1985: 601-613) noted that in some situations, federalism, by
providing a territorialdimension, has intensified ethnopolitical conflict.
Thus, this factor is highly context-dependent(Dutter, 1988; Rudolph and
Thompson, 1985; Zariski, 1986). The key, however, is whether groups are
directlyinvolved in the processes of governing,giving them a tangiblestake
in the existing system and reassuringgroup members that their collective
identitieswill not be threatened.In short, ethnic representativesmust have
real influence on collective decisions. They should not be "pseudorep-
resentatives,"elected or appointedprincipallyto appease and attractethnic
followers ratherthan representthose followers' interests(Brichta,1972).
On the related issue of the extent to which decision making and actual
policies take ethnicityinto account,relevantconsiderationsare:proportion-
ality in governmentalprograms;acceding to the principalgoals of a group;
offering specific incentivesto ethnopoliticalleadersin orderto co-opt them;
and positive discriminationtargetedon a particulargroup (Etzioni-Halevy,
1975; Lijphart,1975; Nordlinger, 1972; Smooha, 1978). Such practices,
however, can be problematic(Etzioni-Halevy,1975). They can, at least in
the short run, defuse conflictual or potentially destabilizing ethnopolitical
demands,but they also can, in the long run,perpetuateindividuals'percep-
tions of political issues in ethnic terms. New, less accommodating,or less
skillful leaders may come to power, or new issues may arise that are less
amenable to accommodation,which stimulate new demands and, in turn,
leads to the developmentor renewalof conflict (Despres, 1975; Dutter,1985,
1988). Moreover,disproportionategovernmentbenefits or positive discrim-
ination are likely, over time, to stimulate resentmentand related political
action by othergroups (Smooha, 1978).
The second mitigatingfactorrelatesto the behaviorof regimeincumbents
who occupy the key decision-makingpositionsin governmentalandpolitical
institutions.In the face of latent or manifest ethnopoliticaldemands,these
incumbents can follow one, or a mixture, of three basic approaches:do
nothing,accommodate,or repress.Doing nothingalmostinvites progression
throughthe phases of ethnopoliticalactivity.Accommodationwould appear
to be a more promising avenue, although in some situations it may not be
feasible or even desirable.First,as noted, special benefits to one groupmay
provoke hostile reactions by other groups. Second, concessions may solve
one set of problemsandcreateothers(e.g., a dissatisfied,militantProtestant-
British minorityin a "united"Ireland).Third,regime incumbentsand their
 Dutter / ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 323

followers may be unpreparedto tradetheir existing, if tenuous, economic,

political, and social positions for, from their point of view, an uncertain
future.
Althoughit mightbe effective in the shortrun,the active repressionof the
ethnopoliticalleadersand theirfollowers does not constitutean efficacious,
long-runsolution,particularlyif it is used againstvariousformsof nonviolent
political behavior.7First,the territorial-statemay quickly lose the substance,
if not the appearance,of democracyor, in nondemocraticcontexts, legiti-
macy. Second, repression is likely to add incidents and martyrs to the
dissident group's collective memory,which will reinforcepast feelings of
grievanceanddemonstratethe incurableevil of the subjugatinggroup.Third,
it may stimulatethe very behaviorthat repressionis intendedto control or
prevent.'Repressionis also likely to have two additionaleffects:heightening
groupmembers'feelings of insecurityregardingtheirphysical survival,and
hasteningthe spreadof risk-acceptantattitudesamonggroupmembers- that
is, increasetheirwillingness to supportor engage in physically riskypolitical
behavior.These effects will, of course,increasethe probabilityof progression
throughthe phases of ethnopoliticalactivity, as well as the frequencyand
severity of activities subsumedundereach.
Similarly, quasi-coercive actions (e.g., homogenizing educationalpoli-
cies), which are ostensibly designed to reduce group differencesgradually,
are likely to incite short-runresistanceas well as to fail in the long run to
destroy,or even weaken, a group heritageand collective memorythat have
been generations,perhapscenturies, in the making. They are likely to be
perceived as sinister attemptsto emasculate group culture. A "salami"or
"domino"hypothesismay then evolve in the mindsof groupmembersunder
which such actions, however mild in form and regardlessof the true inten-
tions of policymakers,are perceived as the first step(s) down the slippery
slope of groupdestruction.Thus,fromthe group'spointof view, these actions
must be resisted because if they are not, then other, harsherones will soon
follow.
Another relevant question is: Can long-run noncoercive or naturalpro-
cesses (e.g., economic development, emergent value consensus, intermar-

7. A middle ground,which includeselements of both accommodationandrepression,has

been sketchedoutby Lustick(1979). But as with theinaccuracyof earlyanalysesof preindepend-
ence pluralsocieties, critiquedby Rabushkaand Shepsle (1972: 2-22), the effectiveness of such
measuresis severely boundedby context and time.
8. As discussed by Clark(1983), for example, Franco'sprohibitionof any expressionsof
Basque identity triggeredan upsurgein ETA activity, especially violence. See also Douglas
(1988) and Ramirezand Sullivan (1987). Similarly,preemptiveBritishcurfews, areasearches,
and internmentwithoutchargeor trialwere catalystsfor the rebirthand rapidgrowthof the IRA
in NorthernIreland(Kelly, 1972).
324 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

riage, social integration,cross-cuttingorganizationalmemberships,demo-

graphic changes) eliminate, or at least diminish, ethnic divisions? This is
possible and,of course,ethnopsychologydoes change and evolve over time,
but the available evidence suggests that, in plural societies, such processes
typically resultin, at best, cosmetic changes in intergroupperceptionsand a
superficialhomogenization(Connor, 1977; Esman, 1977; Hassanpourand
Weinbaum,1986; Smooha, 1978; Zariski,1986). Considereconomic devel-
opment. If intergroupcontactsfollow a superior-inferiorpattern,accompa-
nied by perceived incidents of discriminationagainst the latter, then eco-
nomic progressmay do more to heightenethnic awarenessand tensionsthan
alleviate them, even if everyone's standardof living is rising.
The thirdmitigatingfactor involves the extent to which regime incum-
bents, especially key decision makers,are drawnfrom one ethnic group. If
one grouppredominates,then nonmemberswill likely expect,justifiably or
not, thatpolicy decisions will systematicallyfavor the incumbents'groupof
origin (Horowitz, 1985). This expectationcould easily be reinforcedif the
incumbentsare perceived to be slow or unwilling to respondto reasonable
ethnopoliticalgoals (e.g., redress of economic disparities),which an ag-
grieved group has voiced throughthe normalor legal channels of political
expression. Exacerbatingthis possibility is how long regime incumbents
have engaged in such practices.If these conditions obtain, then the further
will be the expected progressionthroughthe phases and the greaterwill be
the frequencyand severity of activities undereach.
Regardingthese first three factors, althoughfederal in form, the Soviet
Union is, of course, unitary in substance, and the future evolution and
operationsof the system are ongoing sources of tension and debate, most
notably since Gorbachev's rise to power (Karklins, 1986b: 66; Lapidus,
1984: 566; Motyl, 1989). Regardingthe behaviorof regime incumbents,the
Russians have generally kept a tight rein on decision making and policy
implementation,which in the perceptionsof many non-Russiansand despite
some formsof affirmativeaction,appearto favorthe dominantRussiangroup
(Burg, 1979, 1984; Karklins,1986b: 93-96; Lapidus, 1984).
Moreover,even though union republic institutionsare, on paper,"inte-
grated,"Russianstypically hold the decisive positions in the party,govern-
ment, and economy, despite the presence of indigenous elites in positions
thatnominallyoutrankthese Russians(Lapidus,1984: 568). In otherwords,
at the highest levels, affirmativeactionhas been practicedin such a way that
the status quo is not undermined,even at the risk of perpetuating,if not
exacerbating,ethnictensions(Karklins,1986b:93-96). Finally,Gorbachev's
shiftof regimeresponsesto politicalexpressionsof ethnicidentityaway from
 Dutter / ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 325

an immediateresortto Stalinist-stylerepressioncontributedsignificantlyto
an upsurgeof ethnopoliticalactivity in the late 1980s.
The fourth mitigatingfactor involves the natureof ethnopoliticalgoals.
At least five categories of goals can be identified in rough orderof each's
implicationsfor the long-runviability of an existing territorial-state.These
are:substantive(e.g., economic or political advancementor reform);proce-
dural (e.g., decision-makingpractices); symbolic (e.g., recognition that a
group'sgoals arelegitimate);constitutional(e.g., restructuringthe state);and
fundamental(e.g., dismantlingthe state).In general,the greaterthe potential
consequences of ethnopoliticalgoals for the survival of a territorial-state,
then the greaterthe resistanceof regime incumbents,the furtherthe progres-
sion throughthe phases, and the greaterthe observedfrequencyandseverity
of activities under each (Hassanpourand Weinbaum,1986; Rudolph and
Thompson, 1985; Smooha, 1978; Zariski, 1986).
This factor,as well as the earlierones, are well illustratedby the case of
the Balts, who probably have the most highly developed ethnopolitical
consciousness of all of the non-Russianunion republicgroups. Moreover,
althoughanalogies are hazardous,the Balt experience may provide a para-
digm for futuredevelopmentselsewhere in the Soviet Union, especially for
CentralAsia (Broxup, 1987; Burg, 1984).
First,as articulatedby theirmost radicalethnopoliticalentrepreneurs,the
Balts' ultimategoal, falling in the fundamentalcategory,is unambiguous:the
restorationof nationalindependence.Second, this goal andthe intensitywith
which it is held are indicatedby the nature,scope, and frequencyof entre-
preneurial activities (e.g., petition submissions, protest demonstrations),
which also indicatethe Balts' highly developed political consciousness and
organizationalabilities (Alexiev, 1983; Eklof, 1989; Kowalewski, 1979;
Raun, 1987; Vardys,1980). Finally, the past conduct of many "extralegal"
activities, when faced by a regime with few compunctions about using
repression,furtherdemonstratesintensityof feeling, as well as risk-acceptant
attitudes.
With Gorbachev'sreforms and the easing of repression,the late 1980s
witnessedan explosion of activitiesby Balt entrepreneursandtheirfollowers.
As far as their ultimategoal is concerned,this included:large-scaledemon-
strationsto observethe anniversariesof Baltic independencefromthe Czarist
Empire in 1918 and forcible incorporationinto the Soviet Union in 1940;
calls for autonomyin economic decision making and eventual home rule;
formationof nationalor popularfronts or committees to promotethis goal
of autonomy and, in the case of a few individuals, independence;official
restorationby local authoritiesand renewed use of flags and othersymbols
326 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

of nationalidentity;adoptingthe local language as the official language of

the republic;a declarationof sovereigntypassed almostunanimouslyby the
Estonian Supreme Soviet; fielding candidates in the March 1989 Soviet
elections who openly called for independencefrom Moscow; the defeat of
Communist Party regulars by many of these candidates;and Lithuania's
unilateraldeclarationof independence.
Also importanttheoreticallyare the parallelsbetween Balt activities and
Soviet policy responses and the correspondingactivities and responses in
otherpluralsocieties. For instance,the Balt experienceclearly illustratesthe
cross-cuttingnatureof political cleavages in thepluralsociety. Here,Alexiev
(1983: 22, 34) observedthat
This analysishas thrownmuch light on the political significanceandpotential
of Baltic political protest.It has revealed,for instance,a surprisingdegree of
organizationaltalent,discipline,andpurposefulness.... In most cases,partic-
ipation bridges the generations and cuts across socioeconomic class lines,
though there is a clear overrepresentationof the working class and the
youth.... Public protest in the Baltic has not been limitedto the larger cities
but has manifesteditself at all communallevels.... Thereare also indications
that protestorsand demonstratorsin the Baltic enjoy tacit supportamong a
significant portion of the population at large. One good indication is the
reluctanceof the authoritiesto use a volunteer militia . . . which is largely
recruitedfrom the local population, for the suppressionof demonstrations.
[emphasesadded].

Thus, as illustratedby the Balts, socioeconomic divisions withinan ethnic

group are largely irrelevantpolitically.What relevancethey have lies in the
observedpatternsof leader-followerrecruitmentandrelations.Typically,the
ethnic upperand middle classes, especially the intelligentsia,constitutethe
bulk of the entrepreneurshipor leadershipgroup,which then mobilizes and
organizesethnicworking-or lower-classfollowers.Second, unless economic
grievances are the specific catalysts for ethnopolitical activity, tangible
incentives or rewards cannot buy off the pursuit of ethnopolitical goals
(Horowitz, 1985: 131-135).
The Balt experiencealso illustratesan importantvariationon this second
point. Despiteenjoyinga generallyhigherstandardof living thanotherunion
republics,ethnopoliticalobjectivescontinueto be intenselyheld andpublicly
expressed.Here political entrepreneurswould be quick to point out thatthe
groupis doing well despitethe handicapsof foreign rule,so thinkhow much
better things would be if "we" governed. And whether it is objectively
correct, a perceptionmay develop and persist that their advancedregion is
being economicallybled, furthersolidifying ethnopoliticalgrievancesand a
 Dutter I ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 327

willingness to take action (Clark, 1983; Douglas, 1988; Horowitz, 1985:

229-288; Ramirezand Sullivan, 1987; Zariski, 1986: 9).
The Balts do not appearto be alone in these perceptions.For instance,
Karklins(1986b: 93-96) notes that CentralAsians generally perceive their
advancesas resultingfrom theirown efforts, ratherthanfrom the help of the
elder brotherRussianrepublic.In short,even if benevolently and efficiently
governed, which is demonstrablynot the situationin the Soviet Union, rule
by one's own still is preferred,and, as is typically the case in pluralsocieties,
socioeconomic conditionsand issues are perceived, filtered,and interpreted
throughan ethnopsychologicalprism.
The fifth mitigatingfactorinvolves the answerto the following question:
Is there or has there ever been an external threatto the existence of the
territorial-stateandall of its inhabitants?If the answeris yes, then,depending
largely upon the magnitudeof the perceived threat, the less the expected
progression through the phases and the less the expected frequency and
severity of activities undereach (Esman, 1977; Lijphart,1975; Nordlinger,
1972; Seliktarand Dutter,1983).
Even though the pure form of this factor does not apply, coercive Russi-
fication and ideological indoctrinationcan be interpretedas a form of
externalthreatto the survivalof non-Russiangroups,which has strengthened
ethnic identities and transformedculture,especially language, into a major
political issue (Bruchis, 1987: 234; Motyl, 1989: 163). In otherwords, there
is a vast differencebetween acculturation(e.g., learningRussian),which has
occurred,and assimilation(e.g., feeling Russian),which has not (Gitelman,
1983). Karklins(1986b: 215) also emphasizedthe distinctionbetween func-
tional integration(i.e., behavioraladaptationsto specific situations),which
can be observed, and attitudinalintegration(i.e., convergence of beliefs,
values, attitudes,andopinions),which generallyhas not developed.Accom-
panyingthis has been the appearanceof variousformsof ethnicself-assertion
such as the exploration and glorification of ethnic roots, even before
Gorbachev(Lapidus,1984: 573). Thus, membersof ethnic elites, especially
intellectuals (Karklins, 1986b: 141), are "mining the historical quarry"
mentionedby Stewart(1977: 16), or, perhapsmore aptly in the Soviet case,
opening the historicalgraves.
As just mentioned,one key ethnic marker,language,has become a major
political issue, which is also true of religion.9As in other plural societies,
however, these are the keystones in an elaboratematrix of markers(Hall,
9. There is, however, some regional variationin their relative importance(e.g., language
in the Baltic, the Islamic way of life in CentralAsia). See Karklins(1986b: 56).
328 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

1979) that defines group identityand its way of life, and conditionspercep-
tions of and relations with outgroups, especially the dominant Russians.
Thus, recalling our salami or domino hypothesis, any perceived attackon
one of these two markerswould generallybe perceivedas a directattackon
the group and is likely to provoke a strong response. For instance, several
observers have reportedthe occurrenceof spontaneousriots in Georgia in
1978 over a draftconstitutionthatfailed to mentionGeorgianas the official
language of the republic.The draftwas quickly withdrawnand rewrittento
include this designation.
In addition,the cumulativeeffect of pastattacksis to perpetuatea festering
resentmentthat will occasionally erupt into protest at lesser provocations
(e.g., localized food shortagesin the Baltic), or in forms,as suggestedearlier,
that are unexpectedor nontraditionalfrom the Westernpoint of view (e.g.,
riotsat soccermatchesinvolvinga unionrepublicteamversusa Russianone).
Relatedissues thatalso have the potentialto stimulateethnopoliticalactivity
areeconomic developmentandthe competitionfor resources,the succession
process,education,professionaladvancement,andunionrepublicleadership
positions, issues thatare, of course, criticalones in Gorbachev'sprogramof
perestroika (Burg, 1984; Eklof, 1989; Karklins, 1986b; Lapidus, 1984;
Motyl, 1989).
The sixth factor, generational dynamics, concerns repetitions of the
phases. For example, if regime incumbents adopt and retain repressive
policies, thenrisk-acceptantattitudesarelikely to intensifywithinthe current
generationandto spreadto groupmembers'descendantsvia the socialization
process. This will impactnot only the probabilityof progressionthroughthe
phases in the currentgeneration,but also the probabilityof reprogression
through subsequent generations.10Thus, the failure of one generation to
achieve its ethnopoliticalgoals does not mean thatregime incumbentshave
solved the problem,but simply that it becomes dormantuntil a new ethnic
generationhas reachedmaturity,ready to resumethe struggle.
Once again,the Balts providea good illustration.We can roughlyidentify
three generationalprogressions.First, CzaristRussia's defeat in WorldWar

10. For instance,throughoutthe twentiethcentury,the IRA has failed to achieve its goal of
a unitedIreland,independentof Britain,andIrelandhas seen fourperiodsof majorIRAactivity:
1916-1923, 1938-1945, 1956-1962, and 1970 to the present(Buckland, 1981). Each pre-1970
periodwas met with repressionby both the Britishand Irishgovernments,followed by 10 to 15
years of "peace," sufficient time for the next generation of children and adolescents to be
socialized, to reachadulthood,andto resumethestruggle.Similargenerationalpatternsarefound
in the post-1948 generationof IsraeliArabs, many of whom are active in the intifadah(Peretz,
1988; Seliktar, 1984; Smooha, 1980); the Basques in Spain (Clark, 1983; Douglas, 1988;
Ramirez and Sullivan, 1987); the South Moluccans in Holland (Herman and van der Laan
Bouma, 1980); theArmenians(Gunter,1986); andtheTamilsin Sri Lanka(Arasarantnam, 1987).
 Dutter / ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 329

I and the Bolshevik Revolutionpresentedone generationwith the opportu-

nity to gain independencein 1918, which lasted until 1940 when Soviet rule
was imposed. By then, anothergenerationhad matured,containing many
who welcomed the Germaninvasion,theirpresumedliberationin 1941. They
collaboratedduringthe occupationand then engaged in armedresistanceto
the reimpositionof Soviet rule in the late 1940s, until they were not only
defeated,but also literallydestroyedby Stalin.Left essentiallyleaderless,the
populationat largewas relatively quiet until the late 1960s, by which time a
new generationof potentialentrepreneursandfollowers had come of age and
renewed ethnopolitical activities, exemplified by the LithuanianCatholic
movement(Vardys,1980), as well as variousformsof unalloyedethnopoliti-
cal dissent (Alexiev, 1983), which continues to the present.
Generationalpatternsalso are observed in other regions of the Soviet
Union. We see from 1918 to the early 1930s, for instance,Ukrainiancollab-
orationwith the Germansin 1918, a brief periodof independenceduringthe
Russian civil war, and various forms of resistance to Soviet rule until the
1933 famine (Mace, 1984), and in CentralAsia, Basmachi and otherarmed
resistanceto Soviet rule (Olcott, 1981; Ritter,1985). In the early 1940s, we
also see widespread collaborationwith the Germans in the Ukraine and
Caucasus(Alexiev, 1982), triggeringharshreprisalsby Stalin after the war.
Finally, as noted earlier, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed an upsurge of
ethnopoliticalactivities in all of the non-Russianrepublics.

CONCLUSION

This article has arguedthat the Soviet Union is an exception that proves
the rule as far as generaltheoriesof politics in pluralsocieties areconcerned.
After many decades of repression,sometimes of the most brutalkind, the
ethnocentricism of the Soviet Union's principal ethnic groups not only
survived,but also resurfacedand strengthenedin the 1970s and 1980s. Our
analysis should be regardednot only as an explanationof currentdevelop-
ments, but also as a predictionof their continuation,their furthervertical
development in the republics primarilyaffected so far (Baltic and Trans-
caucasian),and theirhorizontalproliferationto and vertical developmentin
the republics that are as yet only partiallyaffected (CentralAsia, the non-
RussianSlavic, and Russia as well). These predictionsare, of course, condi-
tional on Moscow's policies, especially on the continued relaxation of
repression.
Also as noted, relativelylittle effort has been made to examine the Soviet
Union with explicit referenceto the extanttheoreticalandempiricalliterature
330 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

on ethnopoliticalactivityin pluralsocieties. Ourbrief theoreticalandempir-

ical survey has revealedthe remarkabledegree to which the Soviet case can
be subsumedunderthis literature.At the very least, ouranalysisshouldpoint
the way toward a more general approachto thinking about and analyzing
Soviet ethnopoliticalprocesses. In partialcontrast,one recentbook (Motyl,
1987), with a specific focus on the Ukraine,poses the question, "Will the
non-Russiansrebel?"While obviously an importantand relevantquestion,
threecommentsare in order.
First, Motyl's analysis implicitly assumes, as do many analyses of other
ethnically diverse territorial-states(Jordan,1987: 317-318), that escalating
interethnicviolence is the most importantform of ethnopoliticalactivity,if
not the inevitable consequence of the development and persistence of
ethnopoliticalidentitiesand activities. Second, he may be asking the wrong
question. Perhapsmore to the point is: Will the non-Russianscontinue to
fester and, given opportunities,agitateand disrupt?We might answerprob-
ably not to the rebellionquestion,but we would answermost definitely yes
to this one. Third,althoughprobablythe most importantnon-Russianrepub-
lic, the Ukrainemay not be the pacesetterin this realm.For instance,Eklof
(1989: 149-157) observes that, as in the past, the Baltic republics are the
apparentlaboratoriesin which manyof Gorbachev'sreformsareto be tested.
They could very well turn out to be laboratoriesof a different kind and
provide a demonstrationof successful ethnopoliticalassertiveness toward
Moscow.
In the broadercontext,ouranalysisanddiscussionmay have led thereader
to believe thatevery ethnicallydiverseterritorial-stateteeterson the brinkof
violent upheavalsor disintegration.Any perceivedexaggerationor simplifi-
cation in this regardshouldbe interpretedto mean thatno ethnicallydiverse
territorial-statecan be automaticallyassumedimmuneto the appearanceof
ethnopolitical activity and the potentially serious consequences that can
result. We have outlined, however, the foundation for a comprehensive
approachto assessingtheprobability,not the certainty,thatsuch activitywill
appearin any territorial-state.
This brings us back to the issue of prediction and, especially, timing.
Except for occasional referencesto the short and long runs, little has been
said aboutthe exact time framefor ethnicupheavals,or even the development
of ethnopoliticalactivity.It is possible, of course, to identifythe background
conditions under which ethnopolitical activity is likely to appear and to
evolve, but the predictionof specific occurrences,or even phases, remainsa
little like predictingearthquakesor volcanic eruptions.We generally know
what the main preconditionsare and where they exist, and we can monitor
 Dutter / ETHNICBEHAVIORIN THESOVIETUNION 331

events, identify tremors,and issue warnings.But we cannot, as yet, confi-

dently predicteven majorupheavals.We can only say that, ceteris paribus,
occurrencesthat may be very unlikely to appearin any given year may be
very likely to do so within a generation.Also, regardlessof the time frame,
it is incumbent upon researchersto explain not only why ethnopolitical
activity develops and persists, but especially if the majorpreconditionsare
present,why it does not.

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