lonthly. intelli pnoe report No. 3.

AAF
ntisubmarine Camand.... r- ..

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
DOCUMENT NO. R 145 COPY NO. _

CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P3-1966-20 Mar 53-5M

SM .,. K1
 CONTENTS

I ANALYSIS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

A. Allied Shipping Losses. . . . . . . . .
B. Attacks on Convoys. . . . . . . . . . .
C. Genrman Strategy in Disosition of ubma

Protection . . . . . . . . .....
.t Bases . . . . . . . . . . . ....
Submarine Warfare . . . . . .....

IV AT THAT

VII THE

WEATHER

X OPERATIONAL STATIS

highly

caution
 A
2
M1 j
_ / L~jE

ANALYSIS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

CHART I

A. ALLIED SHIPPING LOSSES

During the month of February the downward trend of sinkings of Allied and neu-
tral merchant vessels evident since November was abruptly reversed. In March, the
enemy submarines were even more successful with the result that losses were more than
60% greater than in February, reaching the high level of last October. Reports for
the early part of April are more encouraging, indicating a sharply lower rate of
sinkings.

Chart I shows the record of monthly tonnage losses as a result of submarine

action since September 1939, as well as the tonnage loss of tankers and cargo passen-
ger vessels. The curves shown on the chart are based on British figures prior to
September 1942, and American figures thereafter. The American figures include ships
that may have been used for transporting troops, regardless of whether the ships were
classified as commissioned auxiliaries.

The loss of ships from enemy action of all types, including mines, air and sur-
face craft, as well as submarines, is shown in the following table for the months of
March and February 1943. The February figures have been revised slightly from the
totals shown in this report last month as more accurate information concerning sink-
ings during the month became available.
-~r~w ~ <n Qi7: r
I~i~2
 OF SINKINGS
T S SUNK BY ENEMY ACTION

March 1943 February 1943

Are a Ships Gross Tons Ships Gross Tons

North Atlantic Convoy Area . . . . . . 37 231,135 34 216,130

Mid-Atlantic Area . . . . . ... . .... . 2 11,090 1 4,312
Gulf Sea Frontier . . . . . . . . ... . 1 2,493 -

Caribbean Sea Frontier - Eastern. 1 7,957

Caribbean Sea Frontier - Western ... . 5 27,386 -

Brazilian Area. ........... . 6 32,343 2 9,528

Northeast Atlantic - Northern . . . 20 95,436 7 35,541
Northeast Atlantic - Southern . . 15 87,800 8 48,547
Southeast Atlantic .. . . . . . . . . 9 68,640 5 27,915
Mediterranean and Red Sea ....... . 13 73,467 5 17,316
Indian Ocean Area . . . . . . . . . . . 3 19,339
Pacific - Central ... . . . . . . . . 2 7,363
Pacific - Southwest . . . . . . . . . 3 7,435 2 11,988

TOTAL 114 656,564 67 386,597

Talkers . . . . . . . . ... 6 47,890 16 125,531

Cargo and Passenger Vessels . 107 608,546 49 260,931
Small Vessels 50-1000 tons.. 1 128 2 135

TOTAL 114 656,564 67 386,597

Note: Tabulation includes 9 vessels overdue and presumed lost in March.

AREAS: This month marked the return of the U-boats to coastal waters with a conse-
quent increase in the number of sinkings in these areas. One ship was sunk in the
Gulf Sea Frontier,-the first since September; five in the Caribbean, and five more
off the bulge of Brazil. Shipping around the southeast coast of Africa also suffered
from increased submarine activity during March, nine merchant vessels being lost.

In addition to these successes in areas at considerable distance from their

bases, the U-boats intensified their efforts against merchant shipping along the
northern convoy routes. Indeed, the increase in sinkings was very general, extend-
ing to almost all parts of the North and South Atlantic.

LOSS OF CONVOYED SHIPS: The percentage of ships lost that were either in convoy or
were stragglers from convoys remained high during March, 84 of the 114 merchant
vessels sunk falling in this category. It is noteworthy that 34 of these losses were
concentrated in three convoys. All of these heavily attacked convoys were east-bound
and presumably loaded with highly strategic war materials. In previous months the
heaviest attacks fell on west-bound convoys carrying less essential cargoes. Further
detail on the North Atlantic convoy operations for the month of March is included in
Sections I-B and II-C.

A. SF.EI
TYPE OF SHIPS SUN1qER A-L:
of the 114 vessels lost in o
March were tankers. This
proportion is markedly lower
than in previous months. In
February, for example, 16 o

tankers totalling 125,531 t

gross tons were sunk. VOY
AREA (NORT)

TYPE OF ENEMY ACTION: The MID-ATLANTIC .

U-boat fleet accounted for

101" of these merchant vessel o
sinkings or a total of , csF
\EAS'T N

587,835 gross tons. Twelve .

vessels aggregating 67,861 0 ° a

gross tons were lost due to SE.ATLANTIC
action of enemy aircraft, and AZLI AREA
one small vessel was sunk by
a mine in the North Sea.

MARINE CASUALTIES: There was s 6- 0 20 0 20 40

an unfortunately large number CHART I

CHART II
of marine casualties in March.
Sinkings, March 1943
Twenty-three ships, as well as
their cargoes, were removed from further service in the war effort by this cause.

DAMAGED BUT NOT SUNK: In addition to vessels destroyed, forty-two ships were damaged
by enemy action during the month but either succeeded in reaching port or were beached.

B. ATTACKS ON CONVOYS

A wealth of interesting data on convoy activities between the general region of

Newfoundland and the United Kingdom is contained in the March report of the Commander
of Task Force 24, United States Atlantic Fleet. Selected significant figures from
this report are given below:

January February March

Number of Ship Crossings. . . . . . . 581 510 617

Average Number of Convoys at Sea. . . . . . 5.64 4.89 5.52
Average Number of M/V's per convoy.. . . . 38.5 45.5 44.0

Average Number of U/B's at Sea. . .... . 44.7 47.0 56.7

Average Number of U/B's per Convoy ..... 8.0 9.6 10.3

Average Number of Escorts per Convoy. ... 6.3 7.2 7.1

Average Number of M/V's per Escort. .... 6.1 6.3 6.3

Number of M/V's sunk. . . . . . .........

. 2 24 35*
Percentag oI /V's sunk.......... 0.35 4.71 5.68

*This report apparently wasl bas - data available early in April.

It ap ahL t total~~i 42 shps re lost in this general area
duri ng atnch i

L~Ct~I
ailb er in 3
 Important March changes in the convoy battle in the North Atlantic appear to
have been, first, the volume of shipping increased, second, the average number of U-
boats increased relatively more than the volume of shipping and, third, sinkings
gained more than either of these factors, with the result that both the percentage
of shipping lost and the sinkings per U-boat increased.

Ship crossings numbered 617 during the month with the average number of convoys
at sea amounting to 5.52 in March as compared with 4.89 in February, while the aver-
age number of ships per convoy was only slightly smaller than in the preceding month.

The loss in terms of shipping volume was heavy with 5.68% of the merchant ves-
sels lost as compared with 4.71% in February and 4.44% in December. A somewhat en-
couraging factor, however, is that enemy successes per U-boat operating in the area
were smaller than in December, although slightly larger than in February. The sink-
ings were largely concentrated in four badly hit convoys, HX-228, SC-122, SC-121, and
HX-229. Each of these four convoys was beset by a large pack of U-boats; those on
SC-121 and HX-228 being estimated at ten each, while as many as 26 were thought to be
in the vicinity of HX-229 and SC-122 at the time when they were being attacked simul-
taneously.

Variations in the volume of shipping and in convoy protection were not suffi-
ciently great to account for the marked increase in sinkings and it appears that the
following factors were primarily determinative:

(1) Increase in Submarines. The number of U-boats at sea in this area

averaged 56.7 as compared with 47.0 in February, 44.7 in January and 37.0 in December.
In addition, each U-boat had somewhat better operating results since, on the average,
the sinkings per U-boat-month was .6 ships in March as compared with .5 in February.
This increase in sinkings per U-boat was due probably to other factors such as unfor-
tunate routing, weather and, possibly, the use of new weapons and equipment.

(2)Routing. Storms, ice-floes or other factors required routing three of

the four badly hit convoys south of the great circle route,--an area that is outside
of normal air range and one that had proved excessively dangerous to.convoys in Febru-
ary and in December. Only one convoy on the most northern routes suffered a very dam-
aging attack.

(3) Weather. Weather, particularly on the routes south of the great circle,
was less severe than in February which made it easier for U-boats to sight, trail and
attack convoys.

(4) Possible New Weapon. It is believed that some enemy submarines are
using a new torpedo that is probably acoustically controlled. The extent to which
such a torpedo is being used is not known but conceivably it could account for some
increase in sinkings. It is also believed that U-boats are now equipped with detec-
tion devices which may be giving them in certain cases an an- warning of the
approach of surface craft or aircraft.
C. GERMAN STRATEGY IN DISPOSITION OF SUBMARINES

The enemy's main use of U-boats during March was in the North Atlantic in an ef-
fort to intercept European bound convoys. Roughly, there were about 57 U-boats oper-
ating along the North Atlantic convoy routes or slightly more than one half of the
U-boats believed to have been at sea in all areas. In addition, there was a wide
dispersal of U-boats to the United States coastal waters, the Caribbean, the Brazilian
Coast, the West African Coast and the Cape of Good Hope-Nozambique area. To accom-
plish this concentration in the North Atlantic convoy routes and this dispersal to
distant areas without increasing the totalnumber of U-boats at sea, it,was necessary
for the enemy to reduce the heavy concentration that was formerly maintained in the
Azores-West African region.

The best available intelligence has indicated for some months that the enemy had
in the neighborhood of 450 U-boats and, furthermore, that production was so outstrip-
ping destruction that his total U-boat force was increasing at a rate of ten to
fifteen submarines per month although some recent unsupported reports have indicated
that air bombing has reduced U-boat production below this level. Under such condi-
tions it was expected that the total number of U-boats at sea would tend to increase
steadily or, at least, rise to a peak with the start of spring. There is, however,
no evidence to indicate such a result. In fact, it is estimated that the total of
U-boats at sea has been relatively constant for several months and well below a
temporary peak of nearly 130 in November during the effort to hamper the expedition-
ary force to Africa. Moreover, it appears that a further decrease took place in the
early weeks of April. The reduction of U-boat concentrations in the Azores area in
order to harry shipping in distant areas is also strange if the enemy is actually
capable of sustained operation of a much larger fleet at sea.

Various explanations of this situation have been offered, such as shortages of

oil or torpedoes, lack of trained crews and the hampering effect of bombing opera-
tions on the U-boat bases. There is little evidence of an oil or torpedo shortage
and the training of twenty-five crews per month to man new U-boats and to replace
crews lost should not be an impossible task. The most logical explanation seems to
lie in the effect of bombing of the bases and the increasingly aggressive nature of
air and surface attacks on U-boats at sea and air attacks on those in transit in and
out of the Bay of Biscay. It is known that havoc has been wrought by bombs in these
ports through the destruction of workers' homes, storage facilities, power and trans-
portation facilities. It has long been known that if the layover time of U-boats in
port could be lengthened as little as one week the effect would be to reduce the
total number of U-boats at sea by as much as twenty-five per cent assuming that the
enemy did not offset this result by drawing on additional reserves. In addition,
increasingly strong air patrols over the approaches to the Bay of Biscay have been
maintained which tend to force frequent submergence and thus lengthen the transit
time in both directions. It is quite possible that destruction in the bases has been
so great as to cause congestion and force U-boats to return to smaller and less well-
equipped bases along the Norwegian coast. Except for those operating in the Iceland
Area the useof such bases will result in a longer time in transit. Thus it seems
not unlikely that the cumulative effect of'the strong RAF ard USAAF efforts to damage
the primary U-boat bases is becoming apparent.
 It would be a mistake,
o 0 however, to assume from this
that the enemy's striking
* ... power is in the process of
00 0
0 0 o0 . immediate and complete des-
00 o°°o$° truction, since it is possi-
Oo° 0 o000
°o°° - ble that a substantial force
000 o of U-boats is being held in

0 0 0 0 0 reserve for use later in the

° year if important Allied

landings are attempted in
oEurope. 0zo~

0 0\0
The following are the
0 more important capabilities
0- 0 0 0 0
of the enemy in the North and
S 0 o South Atlantic, stated in the
- order of their probability:
(1) Continuing heavy
S concentrations of U-boat packs
Sfor the purpose of interdict-
as shipping the
'o ' a0d ' ' o Ioo
r
I + ing Allied
convoy routes betweenalong
Newfound-
CHART III land and United Kingdom.
Estimated distribution of enemy (2) Attacking shipping
U-boates toari the end of March along convoy routes between the
Ubotsthetoward
end of March United States and Gibraltar or
West Africa.
(3) Operating minor groups of U-boats in various coastal and island areas of the
Atlantic Ocean for the purpose of containing disproportionately large Allied anti-sub-
marine forces in areas remote from the enemy's main effort.
(4) Holding a portion of his forces in reserve to be utilized as a striking
force if the Allies attempt a European invasion.
(5) Operating U-boats for the purpose of laying mines in or near Allied harbor
installations and of landing enemy agents and saboteurs along Allied shores or main-
taining communications with them.

While it is probable that he will exercise all of these capabilities in part,

emphasis doubtless will continue to be placed upon the intercepting of convoys to
Europe and Africa. This is the enemy's most vital strategic objective. To it he has
been devoting over half of his U-boat forces at sea. A reasonably proportionate
counter-effort of the Allies in these areas appears essential, not only because it is
equally vital to the Allied cause that shipping through these areas should reach its
destination, but also because the density of the U-boats in proximity to such shipping
provides the most fruitful "hunting" for offensive activities.

The protection of the more concentrated Allied shipping in other areas is of con-
tinued importance, especially in the light of greater sinkings per U-boat in some of
these scattered coastal zones. This, however, must be accomplished without lessening
vigorous offensives against U-boats by sustained air hunts in areas of concentration
at sea, by constantly attacking submarines in the Bay of Biscay bottleneck and by
demolishing the enemy's bases and construction yards.

The U-boat continues to be a major threat to all Allied military operations, but it
appears that the continued growth of Allied air power is being reflected in the U-boat
operatic-is just as it is on land in Tunisia and in the war output of Europe itself.
6
 II
ANALYSIS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

A. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS BY AIRCRAFT

Eastern Sea Frontier and Gulf Sea Frontier

The average daily density of submarines estimated in these areas in March was
1.8. Less than two submarines per day in over a million square miles of water is
hardly a formidable concentration, but it is a significant increase over the February
average of 0.3.

The number of hours flown by Army and Navy aircraft in these frontier showed a
corresponding increase of more than 8,000 hours. A contributing factor to this trend

is the gradual acquisition by AAFAC units of B-24 aircraft with their long endurance.
As of March 31 three entire squadrons and a few detacbments had completed their tran-
sition at the Operational Training Unit, and were equipped with B-24's. At the present
time, it is estimated that two additional squadrons per month will be processed at,

Langley. It may be expected then that not only a further increase in hours flown will
result but the area that can be covered by land based aircraft will be greatly extended.

A summary of hours flown by Army and Navy aircraft is presented in the following
table. Detailed operational statistics for AAFAC Wings and Squadrons may be found in
section X.

PATROL ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL HOURS

AAFAC.......... 4592 742 684 6417 1279

Army CAPCP* . . 9382 2275 - 115 11772

TOTAL 14334 3017 684 6532 24567

Navy Planes*. . . 9396 4302 1065 - 14763

Navy Blimps . . . 3016 1617 239 5072

TOTAL 12412 6119 1304 - 19835

TOTAL ARMY AND

NAVY.. ...... 26746 9136 1988 6532 44402

*Civilian Air Patrol planes are light, single-engine civilian types, and
their patrol area is limited to a narrow zone along the coast where the
depth of the water restricts submarine activity. The majority of the
planes used by the U.S. Navy in the Eastern Sea Frontier are single-
motored observation types which have a limited radius of action compared
with the Navy PBY type and the medium and heavy bombers used by the
Antisubmarine Command.

Squadrons on Foreign Service

1st and 2nd Antisubmarine Squadrons: During March the 1st and 2nd Antisubmarine
Squadrons, operating as the 2037th Provisional Wing, changed station from United King-
dom to Northwest Africa. The first plane arrived at Port Lyautey on March 9, 1943
and operations in cooperation with the Navy were begun on March 19th. Three days
later the first German U-boat sunk in this theater by an AAFAC aircraft was credited
to Lt. W.L. Sanford and his crew, of the 2nd Aron. Details of the attack are pre-
sented under a subsequent heading.
 The 1st and 2nd Antisubmarine Squadrons have done valuable work in England and
have pioneered in solving the problems incidental to foreign detached service. A
record of their operations, attacks and sightings according to records available at
these Headquarters 1s as follows:
Missions U-boats
Number Hours Sighted Attacked
November, 1942 9 74 0 0
December 30 257 2 2
January, 1943 56 .483 0 0
February 94 928 10 6
March - From England 10 113 2 1
March. - From Africa 43 372 1 1

Seven times aircraft of the Squadrons encountered enemy aircraft and three enemy
planes were damaged or destroyed as a result. One of our aircraft is believed to
have been lost as the result of attack by enemy aircraft.
Of especial interest was an effort in February made in cooperation with the Coastal
Command during a period when it was believed an unusually large number of U-boats were
passing through the approaches to the Bay of Biscay. This consisted of intense
patrolling in an outer area, largely west of 150 W., by the 1st and 2nd Squadrons and
in an inner area by British aircraft. Based on estimates of the U-boats in the area
and on the assumption that they would remain fully surfaced all day, it was believed
in advance that 12 sightings should be made. Actually 13 sightings resulting in 7
attacks were made in this area, - most of them by AAFAC squadrons. In the inner area
the British aircraft made 9 sightings and 3 attacks.
According to reports received the experience gained by these squadrons in Eng-
land was of great value and they are high in their praise of the Coastal Command which
the Commanding Officer describes as the "best organized and trained anti-submarine or-
ganization in existence." The Coastal Command Review for February 1943 states that
the impending withdrawal of "the two Anti-Submarine Liberator Squadrons (U.S.A.A.F.)
is noted with real regret." In fact, these two Squadrons made 30% of the sightings
and 19% of the attacks recorded by anti-submarine flights from the United Kingdom and
Iceland during February.
Port Lyautey situated between Casablanca and Spanish Morocco, is a United States
base, from which PBY's have been flying antisubmarine missions for several months.
Facilities for replacement, parts and repair of B-24 type aircraft were non-existant
so that one of the tactical B-24's had to be earmarked as a spare parts plane. In
order to conserve aircraft, the number and duration of missions had to be temporarily
decreased. From the 19th to the 31st of March, 43 missions were flown totalling 372
hours.

9th Antisubmarine Squadron: The 9th Antisubmarine Squadron based at Trinidad

flew 910 hours on patrol during March, resulting in 3 sightings and two attacks. Al-
though.the 9th Antisubmarine Squadron flew less than ten percent of the total hours
flown in the Trinidad area during March, it was fortunate enough to record three of
the four sightings made in the area during the month. The attacks were described in
the February issue of this publication under the title, "Killer Hunt in the Caribbean."
Although equipped with B-18 airplanes only, which lack sufficient range to cover the
area adequately, the 9th Antisubmarine Squadron flew a total of 3,783 hours out of
Trinidad since November 1942, resulting in 7 sightings and 2 attacks.
Before the end of March this squadron returned to the United States and the 7th
Antisubmarine Squadron was moved to Trinidad to replace it, beginning operations
late in the month.

19th Antisubmarine Squadron: The 19th Antisubmarine Squadron moved to Newfound-

land during March to augment air coverage in that area and began operations from
Gander. An exhaustive survey of the base facilities and flying conditions in Green-
land was made by the AAFAC Staff and it was decided to reinforce anti-submarine units
in Newfoundland that would utilize Greenland as an advance operating base. A new
provisional headquarters, temporarily under the 25th Wing, has been established in
St. Johns, Newfoundland. This development is one of the most important in the history
of the Antisubmarine Command and it involved a large amount of planning and action.
Substantial progress on it has been made in April. As a result, trans-Atlantic con-
voys should have greatly increased protection in the entire area stretching between
Newfoundland and Iceland in the very near future.

20th Antisubmarine Squadron: The 421st Bombardment Squadron, located in New-

foundland, was redesignated as the 20th Antisubmarine Squadron and assigned to AAFAC
on February 8, 1943. Although the Squadron has only a limited number of aircraft in
service, it flew 370:30 hours during March and made seven sightings resulting in two
attacks. Two airplanes on March 16th made six sightings of submarines, -- of which
two sightings are believed to have been of the same U-boat. Each airplane made an
attack but in both instances the bomb bay doors failed to function properly with the
consequence that only one depth bomb could be released in each attack. A slight oil
slick was observed after one attack but there was no other evidence of damage.

B. ATTACKS ON ENEMY SUBMARINES

During March, air and surface craft delivered a total of at least 113 attacks on
enemy submarines for an average of approximately one attack per U-boat at sea. This
is substantially more than the forty-five attacks reported in February and thirty two
in January. However, a direct comparison is not possible on the basis of these
figures as a number of attacks in the eastern half of the Atlantic are included this
month, whereas, in previous months, little information of action in this area was
available for inclusion. This unusually high figure attests both to the growing ef-
ficiency of Allied anti-submarine operations and to improved inter-Allied coordination
and communications. It also reflects the fact that in a month of high sinkings of
merchant vessels, U-boats were forced to be more reckless and to increase their expo-
sure to attack.
More than half the attacks were delivered by Coastal Command of the RAF, sixteen
of them the result of an unusual air blitz over the Bay of Biscay. It has been noted
that U-boat traffic in the Bay tends to fluctuate;- at times there are many in transit,
at other times but few. An operation was planned whereby increased and continuous
coverage would be maintained during a period when a concentration of submarines was
 expected to be passing through these
waters. This plan had been carried
out with considerable success during
a period in early February. Again in
March, in the course of one week,
1,340 hours were flown resulting in
27 sightings and sixteen attacks.
No final evaluation of these
attacks has been received but a num-
ber of them appear very promising. In
" . seven instances, the U-boat was sur-
faced or partly surfaced when the
a depth bombs were dropped. No survi-
vors are reported but the appearance
of significant quantities of oil and
AICRAFT
ATTACKS
ON U BOATS bubbles is mentioned. More than two
FEBRUARY-MARCH,
1943
EYattacks per day in so restricted an
area attests to the success of the
operation and justifies repetition
CHART IV under similar conditions.
In the North Atlantic Convoy area, surface escorts made a number of excellent
attacks. Preliminary reports indicate 22 attacks resulting in at least four kills.
U-444 was rammed and sunk on March 11 by joint action of Harvester and Aconite and
four prisoners were taken. Later the same day, Aconite attacked and sank U-432,
yielding twenty one prisoners. Harvester was subsequently torpedoed and sunk as she
stopped to repair damage incurred in the ramming.
Aircraft patrolling in the North Atlantic delivered 35 attacks of which some
record has reached this Command. No evaluation of these actions has been received.
However, two U-boats attacked on the surface southeast of Iceland were last observed
in almost vertical positions and machine gun fire was directed against the keel of
one of them. After both attacks, large quantities of oil were seen and in one in-
stance considerable debris appeared. In ten other reported instances, attacks were
made on surfaced U-boats, of which at least three were probably sunk.
In the Mediterranean, two attacks by RAF planes were assessed as lethal. One
attack In the vicinity of the Canaries by a B-24 of the 2nd Antisubmarine Squadron
resulted in the sinking of the U-boat and is reported in detail in Section VI-A. In
the waters northeast of Trinidad, a PBY executed a successful attack which was des-
cribed last month.
Although assessments are preliminary and incomplete, it is estimated that a
total of 15 to 20 attacks will be evaluated as resulting in U-boat sinkings or prob-
able sinkings during March. Three fourths of these were accomplished by aircraft.
Thus, March appears to have been one of the most successful months on record, ex-
ceeded only by November when a large number of attacks were made on the concentra-
tions attempting to prevent the landing of the expeditionary force in Africa.
The accompanying chart shows the positions of all aircraft attacks on submarines
during February and March on which information has been received at these Headquarters.
Attacks in which presence of a submarine is doubtful are not shown and it is probable
that the actual number of aircraft attacks on submarines exceeds the number shown. It
is evident that U-boats have reason.for increasing fear of aircraft, and the number of
attacks by land-based aircraft carried out far from land is particularly worthy of
note. More and more attacks far from land are, certain as additional VLR aircraft
become available.

C. INCREASED CONVOY PROTECTION

Land Based Air Coverage. Substantial increases are being made in the number of
VLR aircraft available for escort and protective sweep operations around convoys. De-
velopments in this respect are important and promise nearly to eliminate the mid-ocean
gap in coverage on the more northerly routes. Newfoundland and Greenland are becoming
important bases from which long range aircraft can reach far at sea and increased
forces are contemplated for the Caribbean, Brazilian and African areas.
Heavier Escorts. The Commander of Task Force 24 reports that the number of es-
corting vessels at sea with the North Atlantic convoys, having shown no change during
several months prior to March, has now begun to increase and the average for March was
11% over that for February.
In the matter of escorting vessels the Allied Nations are fortunate in that three
British support groups have now been assigned to duty in the North Atlantic. One of
these is already in operation and gave valuable assistance during March. She joined
SC-123 at a critical time and may well have assisted in averting attacks. When the
threat to SC-123 passed, this group shifted to HX-230 which was being threatened. In
neither case did attacks on these convoys develop, the one ship sunk out of HX-230
being a straggler when torpedoed. It is expected that as the DE (Destroyer-Escort)
program gains momentum, escort strength will be progressively increased.
Aircraft Carriers. March marked the beginning of planned aerial escort of con-
voys in the North Atlantic by carrier based aircraft.
One carrier was at sea for eight days. Because of weather, flying was possible
on only five of these days with occasional showers and snow on four of the five. The
sea ran moderate to heavy swells on three of the five days and was relatively calm
with a few white caps on the other two. Eighteen flights were made for a total of 38.9
hours, an average of 2.16 hours per flight. All flights were by TBF planes having ASV
radars. Two attacks were made, one on a certain U-boat and the other on a possible
one, more probably a fish. Another possible sighting of a periscope was also made.
A preliminary report from another carrier operation indicates 23.3 hours of fly-
ing with no contacts by aircraft. However, shortly after planes had searched the
region of the convoy and landed on the carrier, a D/F contact was obtained and a U-boat
sighted and attacked 20 miles astern the convoy by a surface escort vessel. This last
incident suggests the use of a radar detecting device by the U-boats, or that an es-
pecially alert lookout for planes is now maintained even when out of range of land
based planes, - a natural immediate consequence of the enemy's discovery that we are
using carrier-based coverage, but one that should give small comfort to U-boat crews.
Helicopters. Section VII deals with the possible future use of helicopters. As
far as is known at these Headquarters, use of helicopters at the present time is
purely experimental in spite of stories that have appeared in the press indicating
extensive use of these craft as an anti-submarine weapon.
 " "

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ActivityAVE 1943
D. ATTACKS ON U-BOAT BASES

Although the month of March saw a new record established for the number of tons
of bombs dropped on Europe, there was a decrease (as against the February figures) in
the number of attacks directed at the home bases of Germany's submarine campaign. In
February seven attacks were made on operating bases and eight on construction yards.
In March there were four attacks on the bases and three on construction yards. Several
industrial cities such as Berlin, Essen, Duisberg and Stuttgart which produce compon-
ent parts of submarines have been targets for repeated attacks. Chart V indicates
the number of raids that have been made on U-boat bases and related strategic objec-
tives during the first three months of 1943.

During March the RAF and U.S. Eighth Air Force bombed three of the operating
bases on the west coast of France: St. Nazaire (twice), Lorient and Brest. Both of
the St. Nazaire raids were heavy; yet they were carried out by the RAF at a total
cost of only three aircraft. On the 22nd 300 RAF bombers attacked this base success-
fully despite bad weather conditions, a significant sign of progress in the mastering
of this important meteorological problem. On the 29th another heavy and concentrated
attack, which has been compared in effectiveness to the 1,000-ton raid of February
28, scored hits on docks and started large fires. Brest and Lorient were pounded by
USAAF bombers on March 6th. In this operation AA fire was reported as moderate to
intense, while the fighter reaction was only moderate.

After the second attack on St. Nazaire some observers estimated that the heavy
battering this port has received may necessitate its abandonment as a major submarine
base. This prediction seems over-optimistic at this time, but there can be no doubt
that great damage is being done to St. Nazaire. The Lorient attack is believed to
have stopped traffic for several days, while the electric power station is thought
to have been put out of action and the arsenal destroyed. Photographs show most of
the houses in the town roofless and gutted.

Several centers of submarine construction and repair activity were lined up in

the sights of RAF and USAAF bombardiers; Rotterdam, Wilhelmshaven, Nuremburg,
Hamburg and Vegesack among them. Especially noteworthy was the attack on the
U-boat construction yards at Vegesack - an outstanding success which was cited as
final proof of the efficacy of the daylight precision-bombing tactics of the
USAAF. More than 115 bombers made the 800-mile round trip, penetrating deeper
into the Reich than they had yet gone. A record load of high explosives was
dropped with a high percentage of hits. Photographs of the submarine-building
ships revealed that seven of the fifteen U-boats under construction at Vegesack
were severely damaged, and interpreters who examined the pictures estimated that
the yards would be unable to make a substantial contribution to Germany's sub-
marine construction program for many months. The unescorted Fortresses and
Liberators which made the raid lost only two of their numbers in fighting off
150 attempts at interception. Meanwhile, they ran up an imposing score against
the German pilots; 52 enemy fighters destroyed, 20 probably destroyed, and 23
damaged.
 Among the related targets bombed in March, transportation centers figured prom-
inently. Important junctions on railroad lines leading to the coast and the U-boat
bases were given special attention: Rouen was hit three times, Morlaix (where a
300-foot viaduct offers a particularly attractive target) twice, and Rennes once.

Two interesting defensive moves were noted during the month. A redistribution
of German fighter strength was effected, apparently with the intent of bolstering
defenses over the sensitive west coast of France. And on the 22nd heavy bombers
over Wilhelmshaven and St. Nazaire had to find their targets through a smoke screen.
Judging from results this screen was not overly effective, for the USAAF Fortresses
and Liberators packed the target with hits at Wilhelmshaven, and the RAF raid on
St. Nazaire was termed successful.

Evacuation of the civilian population continues along the European coast line.
Lorient has long since been abandoned by its non-essential inhabitants, and St.
Nazaire recently lost 55,000 of its occupants. For "security reasons" La Pallice
is being evacuated by civilians, and "a state of emergency" has been proclaimed for
the entire Netherlands coastal area. Extra trains carried all women and children
from Wilhelmshaven after the February 26th bombing. Obviously, bombing of submarine
bases is not solely responsible for these moves; the fear of invasion plays a large
part in the decision to issue evacuation orders. Still, there is evidence in the
Lorient, St. Nazaire and Wilhelmshaven evacuations of the power of the anti-submar-
ine bombing campaign.

E. SUMMARY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

The pattern of intensified anti-submarine warfare is now becoming clear and

consists of increased protection of convoys through heavier escorts plus the full
weight of growing air power utilized in four ways:. (1)augmented convoy protection
through nearly continuous air coverage and protective sweeps by strategically lo-
cated VLR aircraft and carrier-based aircraft, (2)concentrated offensive air opera-
tions in the approaches to the Bay of Biscay, (3) intensive air operations in other
areas of frequent U-boat concentration such as the Caribbean and the North African
coast and (4), continued air offensive operations against the U-boat bases, yards and
component parts factories.

Differences of opinion exist as to the relative efficiency of these various air

offensive operations with proponents of each advancing excellent arguments. Irre-
spective of the merit of the opposing contentions, the air offensive against the
U-boat appears to be gathering momentum in all phases and, as noted in the section
on German strategy, may account for the apparent lack of increase in the U-boats at
sea. With additional aircraft and new weapons soon to be available and with the
new offensive spirit supplanting the older one of simply protecting shipping at sea,
it is expected that U-boat casualties will soon begin to outstrip production.
 III
VALUE OF AIR ESCORT TO CONVOYS

It has long been known that aircraft are of immense value in protecting convoys
and recent issues of this report have outlined the history of several convoys and
shown pertinent charts bearing on the subject. Data has been lacking, however, to
make a comprehensive study that would evaluate accurately the degree of safety pro-
vided by air escort. A most comprehensive study of the subject has been made re-
cently by British authorities. While, admittedly, data is still insufficient for
complete accuracy, the results are convincing as to the extraordinary value provided
by air coverage.

Much of the report deals with surface craft protection, the size and speed of
convoys and other factors that are not of primary concern to those engaged in the air
war on submarines. These conclusions may be summarized briefly as follows:

1. The present scale of surface escorts is not adequate to ensure relative

safety of convoys unless there is air cover.
2. Increasing the average surface escort from 6 to 9 vessels would reduce
losses by about 25%. It is estimated that as the result of both offensive and de-
fensive activities each escort vessel saves about 2 ships per year from being sunk.
3. Sinkings per convoy do not appear to increase substantially as the size
of convoys is enlarged.
4. The number of U-boats attacked per U-boat operating does not increase with
the escort size which suggests that surface escorts have mainly a protective and de-
fensive value.
5. The value of speed in the convoy is clearly marked. An increase in speed
from 7 to 9 knots serves to reduce losses by 43%.

The portion of the report of chief interest to the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine
Command is that which.deals with the protection afforded to convoys through air cover.
This section concludes that for the convoys studied air cover of four eight-hour
sorties per day served to reduce losses by 64% as compared with theoretical reduc-
tions of 25% if escorts were increased from 6 to 9 or 43% if speed were increased
from 7 to 9 knots.
In making this report, study was given to the records of all shadowed convoys in
the North Atlantic from August to December 1942. The principal factors were the num-
ber of days and nights during which U-boats were known to be in contact, the size of
the pack, the ship losses during the period and whether or not air cover was provided.
It was found that there were 43 convoy days (dawn to dawn) when shadowing took place
while no air cover was available, and during these days, 75 ships were torpedoed by
packs averaging 5.3 U-boats in size. On the other hand, there were 38 days of shadow-
ing in which air cover was provided through 147 sorties and only 24 ships were torpe-
doed by packs of the same size. The average air cover was only two hours per sortie,
yet 62 sightings and 43 attacks on U-boats were made or 2.4 sorties per sighting and
3.4 per attack.
 This comparison indicates that if it had not been for air cover these convoys
would have been expected to lose 67 ships rather than 24 or a saving of 43 ships; --
one-third of a ship per sortie. The report estimates the operational life of a B-24
or a B-17 at 40 sorties but this may be unduly pessimistic since past experience of
the Coastal Command indicates a life of roughly seventy sorties. Even on the basis
of a 40-sortie life, however, savings of one-third of a ship per sortie indicates
savings of 13 ships by defensive action for each aircraft expended.

The report goes on, however, to compute the offensive value of these sorties by
using the experience of the Coastal Command that 8% of the attacks by aircraft on
U-boats are lethal. In these air covered convoys, one attack was made for every 3.4
sorties which, on an 8% lethal basis, means one U-boat sunk for every 42 sorties.
It is further computed that the sinking of one U-boat is equivalent to saving 3
ships. Thus the report estimates that each long range aircraft during its operation-
al life will save 16 ships; -- 13 through defensive action and 3 through offensive
action.

While all of these figures are based on somewhat inadequate data and while the
computed savings through offensive action may be questioned if the U-boat destroyed
is immediately replaced by another one from the U-boat reserve, the comparison of a
savings ,of 2 ships per year per escort vessel, with a saving of 16 ships in the 40-
mission operational life of an aircraft is very convincing. This large saving would
be made in a five month period on a basis of two missions per week. Even if due
allowance is made for inadequate data or statistical error, the value of aircraft
seems amply demonstrated.

It should be recognized that the value of aircraft to threatened convoys has

been due primarily to two factors:
(1) The use of aircraft forces U-boats to operate further at sea, thus making
interception more difficult and limiting the area in which large scale attacks can
be developed.
(2) The use of aircraft forces U-boats to remain submerged and to proceed at a
very slow speed with the result that packs are hampered in gathering in time to make a
large scale attack or the contact with the convoy is lost through its evasive action.

The extremely high value of VLR aircraft in this connection is due largely to
the favorable circumstances for action around a convoy in which a large number of
U-boats are present in a relatively small area and during a period in which most of
them will be on the surface a large proportion of the time in order to keep up with,
or gather around, the convoy. No such return would appear if all routine coastal
patrols were included but this study was limited to convoy protection and, as often
pointed out in these reports, the submarine war is rapidly becoming a struggle primar-
ily between the trans-Atlantic convoy and the U-boat pack. The sporadic attacks by
U-boats in coastal areas are in the nature of holding attacks designed largely to dis-
perse and to contain our anti-submarine forces in areas far removed from the place
where the enemy is making his main effort, i.e., the North Atlantic.
 Iv
ATTACKS THAT FAILED AND WHY

It was reported in last month's issue of this publication that a recent study of
attacks on submarines in the U.S. Strategic Area during the year 1942 had revealed
that only 4% of the attacks could be assessed as lethal. The percentage of attacks
that failed to prevent the return of the U-boat to its base was, therefore, as high
as 96%. This was true of attacks by both air and surface craft.

In order to determine, in the case of the aircraft attacks, the reasons for the
failure of so many attacks, a further more detailed analysis was made of the attacks
during the last six months of 1942. In this period, there were 296 aircraft attacks
in the U.S. Strategic Area, of which 219, or 74% were assessed to have been attacks
where a U-boat was present.* These attacks may be summarized as follows:

No. of Attacks
Estimated Results of Attack July-Dec., 1942

Sunk or probably sunk 11

Probably damaged 50

Insufficient evidence of damage 67

No damage 91

TOTAL 219

It will be noted that, during this period, 5% of the attacks resulted in sinking
or probably sinking the U-boat and 23% damaged the U-boat but did not sink it; indi-
cating a somewhat better record for the second than for the first half of the year.
In another 31% of the cases there was insufficient evidence of damage. Comparison
of this last group with the attacks which resulted in either sinking or damaging
the enemy submarine has disclosed no very significant differences in either the con-
ditions surrounding the attack or the tactics employed by the attacking crew.

However, the remaining 41%, that is, the 91 attacks which resulted in no damage
to the U-boat, reveal certain very interesting facts when studied in detail. The
report submitted,by the pilot of the attacking aircraft, the comments of the Com-
manding Officer of the squadron, and all other endorsements have been noted. An
effort has been made to determine from these data the principal cause of the failure
of each attack. The results are summarized in the following table:

*Attacks by blimps and CAP aircraft are excluded from this analysis because of the
different circumstances involved. Also excluded are attacks involving more than
one aircraft or aircraft coordinated with surface craft.
 REASONS FOR FAILURE OF ATTACK
(Aircraft Attacks on U-boats, Assessed as Resulting in No Damage)

A. Attack Delivered Too Late

U-boat detected plane at too great a distance . ........ . 8
Too slow in executing attack. 5
Insufficient opportunity to make attack ............. 1
Reason undeterminable ...... ............ .... 4
18
B. Tactical Errors
Bombing error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Insufficient number of bombs dropped. . . . . . . . . . . 3
Fuze setting too deep . . ..................... . 3
Poorly coordinated attack, evidencing insufficient experience . 4
39
C. Mechanical Failures
Bombs failed to release .... ....... . . . . . . . . . . 6
Firing switch failed to opperate . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Intervalometer failure. . ................ . 2
Rack failure ................... .... . 2
Depth Bomb duds .......... . . ............ . 3
Inadequate night illumination . ................. 1
10
D. Miscellaneous
Attacked oil slick. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 3
Disappearing radar contact, attacked swirl ................. . 1
Neither A/S equipment nor personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Insufficient data to permit analysis. . .............. 20
28
E. Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 95*

*In four instances, the bombing error was accompanied by mechanical fail-
ures of sufficient importance that it seemed unwise to attempt to select
a single "cause". This accounts for the total of 95.

A. Attack Delivered Too Late., The importance of flying at the best patrol alti-
tudes, maintaining a vigilant lookout, and making proper use of sun, moon and cloud
cover in order to avoid detection by the U-boat, the importance of speed and the
finest coordination on the part of the crew in delivering the attack, all these are
strongly reemphasized by the figures on lateness of attack found under this
heading.

There were seventeen instances where the U-boat had been down so long when the
depth bombs exploded that its location could not be known with any degree of accur-
acy, either in plan or depth. In eight of these attacks it was felt that the sub-
marine detected the plane at a distance such that even the fastest anti-submarine
plane and crew could not have arrived in time to make a successful attack. Slowness
in executing the attack (the fault 'could lie with either the crew or the
plane) accounted for another five cases. In addition, one attack failed when
the depth bombs were hurriedly released on a submarine which was sighted just
below the surface directly beneath the plane. In the remaining four in-
stances, the reasons for the tardy arrival could not be determined from the
data available.
 During the last six months of 1942 and up to the present time new tactics and
equipment have been adopted to aid the crew in searching for and approaching a target.
It is known, for instance, that on a clear day, aircraft are most easily spotted by
U-boats when the planes are patrolling at 500 to 2000 feet. In cloudy weather the
most effective patrol is maintained by flying in and out of the base of the clouds.
Camouflage is a further aid in avoiding detection and has been discussed in previous
issues. The latest development in this field is artificial lighting which tends to
eliminate the silhouette of a plane in a head-on approach. Experiments are now being
conducted with a B-24 equipped with these lights and preliminary results are promising.

No matter how elaborate the equipment, however, the approach and bombing run de-
mand the greatest skill and judgment on the part of the pilot and bombardier. Inten-
sive training must be followed by constant practice. S.0.P.'s and directives on
searches, approaches, bombing runs, baiting tactics, radar, etc., should be not only
read and memorized, but practiced again and again while on routine patrols.

Confirmation of the value of arriving over the submarine before it has had a
chance to submerge to any great depth or change its course drastically can be ob-
tained from a study of the degree of sub trim at the time of attack. Comparing the
attacks which resulted in sinking or severely damaging the U-boat with those which
caused no damage, it becomes evident that the enemy submarine was surfaced or par-
tially surfaced in 87% of the first class while only 17% of the non-damaging attacks
were on surfaced U-boats.

U-Boat Trim at Time of Attack

Attacks Which Sunk or Non-Damaging

Trim Severely Damaged U-Boat Attacks
Fully surfaced . . . . . 9 (39%) 6 (8%)
Decks awash. . . . . . . 3 (13%0) 1 (1%)
Stern and Conning Tower. 2 (9%) 2 (3%0)
Stern or Conning Tower 6 (26%) 4 (5%)
Periscope... . . . 3 (4%)
Down 0-15 seconds. . 2 (9%) 11 (15%)
Down 15-30 seconds . 17 (23%)
Down 30-45 seconds . . . 1 (4%) 9 (12%)
Down over 45 seconds 18 (24%)
U-boat sighted submerged 1 (1%)
Object other than U-boat 3 (4%)
Total 23 (100%o) 75 (100%)

B. Tactical Errors. Thirty-nine of the attack failures are ascribed to this

group which is made up of incidents where the crew, upon arriving near the submarine
or swirl, apparently made mistakes in the further execution of the attack.

By far the majority of these errors were bombing errors. Present efforts to
reduce this high wastage through more and more bombing training and practice, through
the development of bomb sights particularly adapted to this type of bombing, and
through the proper spacing of bombs in the train were described in the February issue
of this publication. Flat nose depth bombs, torpex, MAD, and sono-buoys are other
recent developments with which our anti-submarine aircraft are already, or soon will
be, equipped. These and other related subjects have been presented in detail in pre-
vious issues of this summary. Meanwhile, experiments continue on other improvements.

Unquestionably, the greatest opportunity for improvement of the overall results

of aircraft attacks on U-boats lies in this field. And the most important single
factor affecting the accuracy of bombing is training. A number of attacks, for in-
stance, failed because of nothing but "buck fever". Bomb bay doors opened too late,
firing key switch in wrong position, practice bombs dropped instead of live bombs --
these are errors resulting from lack of sufficient training and experience.

Practice in dropping dummy bombs on friendly submarines or suitable submersible

tow targets is the most valuable type of training to increase bombing accuracy. The
February issue described a program of bombing practice inaugurated in the 26th Wing
and also an improvised tow target developed by the 22nd Aron. It is expected that
intensive bombing training with actual submarines and adequate tow targets will be
available for all AAFAC units in the near future.

C. Mechanical Failures. It must be remembered that the table presented only

the principal reason for failure of each attack. Therefore, there were more instances
of mechanical failures in the 91 non-damaging attacks than the table indicates, but in
these additional cases, the location of the bombs or the period of time since the U-
boat disappeared was such that it was believed that the attack would not have been
successful even if there had been no mechanical failure.

For the sake of the record, however, there were, among the 91 attacks, nine in-
stances of depth bomb duds and nine cases where some of the bombs failed to release.
Some of these failures can be blamed on faulty maintenance and others on inexperience.
Improved equipment, the result of continual research by the armament and ordnance sec-
tions of both the Army and the Navy,will eliminate some of the mechanical failures. Ex-
perienced combat crews and efficient ground crews will prevent the others from occurring.

D. Miscellaneous. This final category includes twenty-eight attacks of which

twenty could not be analyzed from the meager data available. Four attacks were made by
planes and personnel neither trained nor equipped for anti-submarine operations. In the
four remaining instances, the U-boat was never seen by the attacking crew, three of the
attacks being on oil slicks and the other on a swirl following a disappearing radar
contact.

E. Summary. The analysis of these 91 attacks has confirmed the urgent need for
training, especially in bombing, and the necessity of avoiding detection while patrol-
ling. It is expected that significant improvement in both phases will follow the current
intensive training program. The end to be achieved is exemplified elsewhere in this
issue--the second attack described in the article "Tidewater Tillie Tames Two"
 ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE BY SUBMARINES

Lately there appears to be a growing tendency on the part of U-boat commanders

to initiate attacks on Allied aircraft, or to counter attack them by machine gun or
cannon fire.

Various instances of this character have occurred in the Natal area where U-boats
apparently have been lying in wait for passing aircraft on the east leg of the Natal
radio range. On January 16th east of Natal, aircraft from a U.S. Navy carrier de-
livered three separate attacks on a fully surfaced submarine. A total of four D/C's
were dropped with no evidence of significant damage resulting. During all three
attacks the U-boat stayed on the surface and fired on the planes.

A PBN3 of Patrol Squadron 74, flying an anti-submarine patrol in the area from
Rocas Rock to Fernando de Noronha, sighted a Spanish ship, the "Monte Igueldo", at
0940 on February 24th. Shortly thereafter an explosion was seen at the bow of the
ship. By searching in the direction of the wake of the torpedo, the crew of the
plane later discovered the submarine three or four miles off the ships port bow
clearly visible about 25 to 35 feet beneath the surface. An attack was made on the
U-boat which resulted in possible slight damage.

The report of this action is not clear, but it is stated that the submarine sur-
faced and fired on the attacking plane with two machine guns located in the conning
tower and both deck guns. These guns, evidently dual purpose, opened up on the air-
craft at a range of about one mile and were said to be quite accurate, firing at a
rapid rate with shells exploding in black and white bursts. After following the tor-
pedoed ship, which sank in half an hour, the submarine submerged at 1045 before relief
planes arrived. Continuous coverage of the area produced no further contact.

The experience of Lt. Cormier and his crew is a B-18B of the 9th Antisubmarine
Squadron was described on page 18 of the February issue of this publication. In this
case the U-boat fired tracer bullets at the landing lights of the plane coming in for
a night attack. Evasive action was taken by the plane, which lost its radar contact
when the submarine crash dived. A subsequent attack was made two hours later when
the U-boat resurfaced.

A B-24 on a recent anti-submarine patrol sighted a submarine stationary on the

surface at 1221 about 150 miles south by east of Santa Maria in the Azores. The U-
boat fired on the plane. At 1354 a second B-24 arrived on the scene and was also
fired on. The first B-24 attacked at 1430 and 1440 while under fire. The second
plane attacked, also under fire, at 1505. All three attacks were unsuccessful, and
the aircraft departed at 1510. The submarine remained on the surface and headed west.

On March 23, a Coastal Command pilot, while flying a Wellington at an altitude

of 400 feet over the Bay of Biscay sighted a U-boat which opened fire with light can-
non. The aircraft was hit between port engine and fuselage. It took evasive action
and the U-boat continued firing until the plane was half a mile distant. The rear
gunner replied and continued firing at the submarine until his guns jammed. The air-
craft then circled the submarine which again opened fire, this time very inaccurate-
ly. The plane attempted to get into position to attack with.depth bombs but the
U-boat submerged before the aircraft could make its run.

Damaged submarines, incapable of submerging, have been known to counterattack

aircraft by machine gun or anti-aircraft fire. However, if the enemy should gain the
impression that gun fire will keep the would-be attacker at bay until fuel shortage
forces him to retire, it is not unlikely that a "stay-and-fight" policy might be
tried out by U-boat commanders.

Moreover, it is not inconceivable that when a pack engages a convoy, the first
one or two U-boats sighted and attacked by Allied aircraft might be instructed to en-
gage in a diversionary anti-aircraft counterattack on the plane, while other submar-
ines in the pack press home the main attack from other angles. In fact, preliminary
reports have been received of antiaircraft fire by some of the submarines during the
course of a running four-day fight by Coastal Command planes against U-boat packs
attempting to converge on two eastbound convoys in March, about 1000 miles west of
Land's End.
For these reasons it would seem advisable for anti-submarine aircraft crews to
be prepared for such a contingency - not only psychologically, but by predetermined
technique developed to meet increasingly audacious tactics of the enemy.
Notwithstanding anti-aircraft fire from the U-boat the bombing attack should be
vigorously pressed home as promptly as circumstances permit lest the submarine sub-
merge and escape. If enemy personnel are topside, whether or not manning their guns
at the moment, the plane's machine gun fire should be concentrated first against them.
In the absence of personnel on deck, the guns should be trained on the hull at the
base of the conning tower, simultaneously with the bombing attack. The accompanying
photographs of actual attacks illustrate machine gun action against U-boats in the
Bay of Biscay.
Successful attacks, however, have been made in the face of AA fire. A Coastal
Command Sunderland piloted by F/0 Robertson, sighted a submarine eight miles distant
while on a sweep West of Ireland.
Diving to attack, the aircraft was
met by fire from the forward gun
and the cannon aft. The aircraft
pressed home the attack replying
with front and midships guns and
dropped six 250 lb. Torpex depth
bombs from a height of thirty feet
while the U-boat was still sur-
faced. Two of these straddled the
U-boat just ahead of the conning
tower. Air bubbles were seen
immediately after the explosion
subsided and the U-boat's bow pro-
jected at an angle above the sur-
face and remained so for five
minutes. It then slid under,
stern first, and nothing further
was observed.

An excellent attack in the

face of U-boat gun fire was made
by F/0 Samuel and his crew in a Fortress of the Coastal Command on March 27, south-
east of Iceland. While on anti-submarine sweep at an altitude of 2000 feet the pilot
sighted a surfaced submarine three miles distant on the starboard bow. As the plane
dove to attack approximately 7 to 10 men were seen, some in the conning tower and
some on the deck, and the U-boat opened fire. Six 250-lb. Torpex depth bombs set at
25 feet, and spaced at 100 feet were released from a height of 100 feet. One ex-
ploded close alongside the U-boat on the starboard quarter; the remainder overshot
to port. The tail gunner also fired 200 rounds. The submarine remained visible for
about 15 seconds, then submerged, but the bow reappeared 10 to 15 seconds later at a
gradually steepening angle.

A second attack was then made, a single 250-lb. Torpex depth charge being re-
leased from 50 feet, which was seen to enter the water in foam patch. Tail gunner
was too busy firing guns to notice explosion of depth charge, but eight to ten
seconds after the second attack, he saw the U-boat slide down almost vertically, and
observed a large upheaval of the water followed by air bubbles. At this time he was
actually firing at the underside of U-boat before it disappeared. A minute later, a
foam patch was still effervescing and a large quantity of Diesel oil had collected
about 100 yards across. There was no sign of wreckage or the men that had been seen
on the deck.

A brief report has been received of an attack on April 15th by two U.S. Navy
planes near Natal, made under fire from the submarine and resulting in the latter's
sinking. About 50 survivors are said to have been seen in the water, but no further
details of this attack are presently available.
 VI

INTERESTING AIRCRAFT ATTACKS

A. TIDEWATER TILLIE TAMES TWO

"Tidewater Tillie" is the B-24

PA4JC/ OF CHVLR/D in which 1st Lt. W.L. Sanford and his

. 94TER APPEARED crew of the 2nd Antisubmarine Squadron
:. 4-7AER J[COND RUN. have recently executed two attacks on
HAD NVO APP-
,BOAT enemy submarines which resulted in
:AR/NT 4Y DUR/i/6 one probably sunk and one known sunk.
. .•i
-.. L THREE ATACS. The first attack, illustrated by
the accompanying diagram, took place
on February 10th about 800 miles west
S. of St. Nazaire while the squadron was
' ~j.*:
..-.::' operating out of Great Britain. While
4 ®!,:.. " patrolling at 300 feet at the base of
- 2a solid overcast, the left waist
230'
".."
".- gunner sighted a U-boat on the sur-
FI'RST ::.. face 10 degrees off the port bow
---SECOD / : about four miles away. A radar con-
------- T//RD A'/ ... tact had been obtained in the same
J/B PART14ZY J'OR- position a few seconds before, but
FACED DUR/NG F/RST :. . due to sea conditions it had not
TWO ATACKST , 'JB/a0[RG- '.. been verified until the visual sight-
-D /6 JECO/YDS WHFVE/'7V ",\ ". 900 ing was made.
/0,//& /2 ERE DROPPED :
200 FFT" AHEAD OF - When first observed, the conning
/AS/. . tower was clearly seen, but as the
.. aircraft approached it disappeared
and about forty feet of the stern was
seen projecting out of the water at an angle of 20 degrees. As the aircraft attacked
no churning was visible from the screws of the apparently motionless U-boat. Six
Mark XI Torpex depth bombs spaced for 19 feet were released from 200 feet at 200 mph.
The entire stick overshot; the first depth bomb was observed to explode about 30 feet
to starboard of the submarine as the tail gunner fired 75 rounds at the exposed part
of the hull.

As the pilot circled to port. the U-boat settled back on an even keel with the
conning tower visible and both decks .awash. A second attack on the still motionless
submarine was made with three more depth bombs. The tail gunner fired another 75
rounds and saw the first depth bomb explode on the port side, while a second exploded
to starboard. The U-boat appeared to lift slightly, lurching with the force of the
explosion,, and then remained motionless on the surface.

While Lt. Sanford circled to make a third run the sea was seen to be churned
just astern of the U-boat, and the conning tower settled beneath the surface without
way sixteen seconds before the last three depth bombs were released. The detonations
occurred about 200 feet ahead of the patch of disturbed water, but no plume resulted.
Instead, a dome shaped bubble appeared followed by a large circular slick of brown
fluid which was described by the crew as definitely not DC residue. Nothing further
was seen and thirty minutes later the B-24 set course for base.

Photographs were taken but are too thin to be of any value. When first sighted
the-U-boat apparently was attempting to dive at too steep an angle without sufficient
way. This gave the pilot an opportunity to maneuver for two additional attacks which
resulted, according to official Admiralty assessment, in "Probably Sunk".

On March 22, while operating out of a North African base, Lt. Sanford, again in
Tidewater Tillie, made another attack in the vicinity of the Canary Islands which re-
sulted in the complete destruction of the U-boat.

The B-24, camouflaged Mediterranean Blue on its upper surfaces and cloud white
underneath, was patrolling at 1200 feet in and out of the base of the cloud cover
when the co-pilot sighted a broad wake about five miles on the starboard beam. The
pilot continued on his course into the next cloud, then made a 90 degree turn, imme-
diately losing altitude. As the plane emerged from the cloud, the wake, still about
five miles distant, was observed to be caused by a U-boat proceeding fully surfaced
on course 1800. Lt. Sanford decided to continue his run straight ahead and attack
from the beam with the sun behind him rather than maneuver for a quartering or follow-
ing attack. With the aircraft at 200 feet and making about 200 mph, the bombardier
released four MK XXIX depth bombs spaced at 60 feet, allowing about 1000 feet range
on the water.

After the drop the plane continued on its course for eleven seconds to allow the
Miller mirror camera to function. The bombs were observed to straddle the U-boat,
hitting the water as follows:
#1 - short 130 feet, directly abeam the submarine;
#2 - short 70 feet, directly abeam the aft portion of the conning tower;
#3 - short 10 feet, directly abeam the aft portion of the conning tower;
#4 - long 50 feet.

The explosions enveloped the after portion of the U-boat which continued on its
course for eleven seconds, then began to settle by the stern. The entire bow section
from the conning tower forward was projecting out of the water and in about one minute
slipped beneath the surface. Several survivors were observed clinging to debris which
was strewn about-the area, and a large oil slick developed. Half an hour later, as
the plane was about to depart, a mass of brown, paint-like substance came up in the
middle of the slick. This may have been rusty bilge oil discharged when the U-boat
began to break up on the bottom.

The accompanying photographs were taken with the Miller mirror camera and with
the personal camera of the radar operator, who took them upon his own initiative. The
submarine was described as painted white with no markings. It had a streamlined con-
ning tower and a very sharp bow. Three men were observed in the conning tower as the
plane passed over. One of them tried to man the anti-aircraft gun.
U-boat on the surface after the plane DC explosion. Bow and conning tower of
passed over. Spray caused by DC's U/s visible. U/B is attempting to crash
hitting water. Small splash ofMfC dive. Large bow wave and spray probably
burst visible forward of conning tower. caused by sudden sideward movement of hull.

Seven survivors clinging to a cylinder like object

and two others (arrow) swimming towards it.
 The attack was evidently a complete surprise and was achieved by a combination of
effective camouflage, clever use of cloud cover, attacking out of the sun, and accur-
ate bombing. Both of Lt. Sanford's attacks attest to the skill and efficiency of this
crew and to the value of B-24 aircraft in anti-submarine operations. The success of
these actions was due in part to the long range of the aircraft and its great bomb
load capacity. More aircraft like Tidewater Tillie, capable of delivering attacks
1000 miles off shore with bomb loads of 3000 lbs. or more, promise increasing success
against the U-boat.

B. AN ENGLISHMAN CELEBRATES ST. PATRICK'S DAY

Flight Officer Esler of the Coastal Command celebrated St. Patrick's Day by at-
tacking three enemy U-boats and driving down two others which were attempting to
shadow a convoy. The entire action occurred within an hour while the Liberator was on
convoy escort over 700 miles from base.

While flying at 3,500 feet, a surfaced U-boat was sighted ten miles away on the
port bow. The aircraft dived to attack and, eight seconds after the U-boat's dis-
appearance, five 250 lb. Torpex depth bombs, set at 25 feet and spaced at 36 feet,
were dropped from a height of 100 feet. The explosions were observed close to the
swirl with the center of the stick estimated 80 feet ahead of it. Immediately after
the explosions the submarine resurfaced, bows first, then in a few seconds submerged
again. Nothing further was seen.

Thirty minutes later the Liberator had resumed patrol and from 4,000 feet sighted
three U-boats on the surface. F/C Esler singled out one and attacked up track dropping
one depth bomb from a height of 200 feet while the submarine was still fully surfaced.
The explosion was seen at the stern of the U-boat, which remained on the surface for
30-40 seconds apparently unable to dive. The aircraft continued the attack with ma-
chine gun fire but no significant results were noted.

Ten minutes later another U-boat was sighted and attacked. Presumably F/0 Esler
had expended all his depth bombs for this attack was carried out with machine gun fire
and marine markers. Hits were registered all around the conning tower and one direct
hit was made with a marker. A man was seen in the conning tower and is probably a
casualty either through machine gun fire or drowning, at the U-boat submerged directly
after the attack.

The extent of damage accomplished by F/0 Esler's one-plane show may never be
known, but it is likely that he succeeded in breaking up or at least disorganizing an
incipient pack attack on a mid-ocean convoy.

C. RCAF ATTACKS OFF NEWFOUNDLAND

Correction: Under the title "Convoy Protection off Newfoundland,." on page 16 of

the February issue of this publication two interesting attacks on U-boats by Royal
Canadian Air Force planes of the Eastern Air Command were inadvertently referred to
as attacks by R.A.F. aircraft.
 UNCLASSIL THE HELICOPTER

Under the guidance of Igor Sikorski - the helicopter developed in 1942 from a
highly experimental stage to one of "fool proof" performance. Originally designed
for use as an air "flivver", this craft has certain capabilities which may be of
some importance in anti-submarine operations. The Sikorski-Helicopter has five
fundamental performance-capabilities:

1. Vertical flight - straight up or down.

2. Sideways flight - it can cruise with any angle between its long axis
and its course - it can fly backwards as easily as forwards.
3. Hovering - it can maintain itself at any point in space under its
service ceiling.
4. Rapid and smooth transition between cruising and hovering.
5. Safety - the vertical thrust rotor can be shut off, whereupon the
craft will settle safely to the ground.

On the other hand the helicopter has three principal disadvantages for anti-
submarine warfare:

1. Slow speed - maximum speed of current models - 85 mph.

2. Limited lifting capacity - present model can carry only 1 pilot and
1 DC. Other models are being developed, however, which are expected
to carry a two man crew, special equipment and two or more depth
bombs.
3. Limited range - the longest recorded flight to date is ninety-two
miles. Subsequent models are expected to have a range of 300-500 miles.

At this date no evaluation of the helicopter as an anti-submarine weapon can be

made. The models now in use are inadequate particularly in load carrying capacity.
Projected models, however, are promising enough to have aroused considerable in-
terest.

The most hoped for use of these aircraft has been for convoy escort. Capable
of taking off and landing from suitable, cleared deck space, several helicopters
could provide air coverage in mid-ocean areas beyond the normal range of land-
based heavy bombers (it is interesting to note, however, that "normal range" is
being extended so that even mid-ocean areas are now occasionally reached by land
based aircraft). Nevertheless, helicopters equipped with special equipment such
as M.A.D. or sonobuoys, for intance, may be of great value in maintaining contact
with a submerged U-boat. Whether actual attacks can be made or whether this new
development is best suited for scouting or tracking remains to be seen.

Two helicopters will be delivered to Sea Search at Langley for specific anti-
submarine experimentation. Tests will be conducted to determine:

1 - weather worthiness
2' - ability to take off from and land on merchant vessels at sea
3 - ability to attack surfaced and submerged U-boats
4 - ability to track submerged U-boats
5 - ability to evade anti-aircraft fire from U-boats

The results of these tests will determine what functions can be best accom-
plished by the helicopter.

28

AP7 ti'y
'qh

n
2:1:
F:

I
Technical Details:
The unique performance and capabilities of the helicopter are the result of new
aeronautical principles. In the case of the airplane and dirigible, the sensitivity
and power of the rudder control and elevators depends on the forward velocity of the
craft, while in the helicopter, which may move at 80 or 8 or even zero miles per hour,
the control is determined by the tip speed of the rotor blades which are always moving
at about 300 miles per hour. The auxiliary rotor at the tail provides directional
control and torque compensation.
The pitch of the main rotor blades may be increased or decreased at will as they
pass any desired point of rotation with a corresponding but opposite variation of
pitch at 180 degrees. The points at which pitch is increased determines whether the
helicopter will fly forwards, sideways, or backwards. Simultaneously increasing or
decreasing pitch on all main rotor blades governs climb and descent. A synchronizing
mechanism opens the throttle as pitch is increased, thereby maintaining constant en-
gine r.p.m. This pitch control mechanism is actuated by the stick, which acts in
flight much like a normal control stick connected to aileron and elevator.
In order to take off, the engine is started with the rotor clutch disengaged and
the rotor brake on. .The brake is then released and with the main pitch control in
low pitch position, tie rotor clutch is engaged. The blades are now turning and are

29
brought up to the des creased the ship leaves the

ground and the flight n e failure, a freewheeling device

is adjusted and the h n d t round.

The current model illustrated in the photograph is powered by a 165 hp. Warner
engine which permits a maximum speed of 80 mph and a gross weight of 2400 lbs. In a
future model it is planned to use an engine with more than double the hp. capable of.
lifting almost twice the present load and allowing speeds in excess of 100 mph.

VIII

SUMMARY OF MARCH WEATHER

A. GENERAL CONDITIONS

Weather for March showed no improvement over the weather in February. Flying
weather in general was evenly distributed this month over all areas.

The 25th Wing averaged 78.7%7 contact weather during operating hours, with the
area in the vicinity of Langley Field and Cherry Point obtaining the highest average
of 85%0, with the lowest average of 70% occuring in the Otis, Nitchel and Westover
Fields area. Contact weather in the area north of Cape Hatteras averaged 75.1%70,
while south of Cape Hatteras it averated 83.3%.

The 26th Wing averaged 90.7% contact weather during operating hours, With Flori-
da and Cuba reporting 96.5% and the Gulf area averaging 82.0%.

B. SEVERE THUNDERSTORM HITS JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

Jacksonville experienced a very severe thunderstorm with tornado characteristics

on the morning of March 6th that caused damage to the town and at the Air Base.

The thunderstorm with rain, which began at approximately 0730Q, developed into
moderate intensity by 0830Q and steadily increased in intensity so that by 0940Q the
wind had attained a velocity estimated at between 85-90 mph at the Air Base. The
Jacksonville Naval Air Station recorded a wind velocity of approximately o100 mph
before power failed. During the early part of the storm, trees were observed to bend
westerly, but later when the storm reached its greatest velocity, buildings fell
easterly, in the opposite direction. The barometer made a sudden fall of about 4
millibars; this was immediately followed by a sudden rise to a higher level than be-
fore the storm.

The path of the storm was mainly from South to North, and observations from the
air after the storm showed its track of destruction to vary up to one-half mile in
width. In the path through the wooded areas, the trees were observed to have fallen
haphazardly and the path indicated skippings which is a characteristic of tornadoes.

The weather maps showed the synoptic situat n not to be unusual, except that
the tropical maritime air s e m t and convectively unstable:-

30
conditions necessary for the formation of thunderstorms. The thunderstorm ended
about 1200Q, dtt}2,

C. SUMMARY O 1,J
'i 3 i 1)
DH

The following table shows the number of days of weather for the first quarter
of 1943 which permitted anti-submarine patrols to be flown by each Wing:

% Contact Weather No. Days Patrols Flown

JAN. FEB. MAR. JAN. FEB. MAR.
25th AWIG . . . . . . 74.4 78.8 78.7 23.2 25.4 26.1
26th AWIG ... . .. . 78.5 90.2 90.7 27.8 25.6 28.4

IX

AIR MEDAL AWARDS

Air Medals for "extraordinary achievement while participating in more than

200 hours of anti-submarine patrol" have been awarded to 638 officers and enlisted
men of the Antisubmarine Command during recent weeks. Additional awards are to be
announced in the near future.

Three of the 638 men received two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Air Medal having
been won twice previously by these men, and eleven were awarded one Oak Leaf clus-
ter to Air Medals previously awarded. The directive authorizing award of the
medals was issued by General H.H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air
Forces, and the awards were made by Brigadier General Westside T. Larson, Com-
manding General of the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command.

The citation with each award reads: "For extraordinary achievement while
participating in more than 200 hours of anti-submarine patrol. As members of com-
bat crews these individuals displayed outstanding initiative, resourcefulness and
a high degree of skill under many trying conditions such as restricted visibility,
low ceilings and icing conditions encountered on the large number of flights
necessary to perform this hazardous patrol of great responsibility.

"Possibility of encountering enemy ships of fighter type or antiaircraft fire

added to the hazards of these missions. The outstanding service of these indivi-
duals reflects the highest credit on the military forces of the United States."

Approximately 2,500 American Theater Medals have been awarded to officers and
enlisted men participating in patrol duty over water. In lieu of medals, ribbons
have been gven to the winners of the Air Medals and American Theater Medals.
Medals wi truck when metal conservation ceases to be necessary.
ei
a ff1
1_ / t
OMB169 RESEARCH BRAR

OPERATIONAL S STICS - MARCH, 1943

PATROL ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL

2037 Prov. Wing
1 ARON Det. Serv. 485:00
2 ARON 485:00

25th Wing
3 ARON. . . . . . . 203:40 217:40 75:50 285:25 780:35
4 ARON. ........ 157:55 150:55 50:40 170:35 530:05
5 ARON. . ...... 216:35 16:10 87:50 244:50 565:25
6 ARON . . . . . . 233:35 8:05 7:45 155:20 404:45
11 ARON . . . . . . 36:40 31:15 15:35 332:05 415:35
12 ARON . . . . . . 293:20 3:40 11:15 417:25 725:40
13 ARON . . . . . . 82:05 634:05 716:10
14 ARON . . . . . . 131:05 149:50 121:05 556:50 958:50
16 ARON . . . . . . 297:55 4:00 13:15 550:15 865:25
19 ARON* . . . . . . 139:00 9:55 148:55
20 ARON Det. Serv. 370:30 370:30
22 ARON. ........ 448:20 67:15 32:00 259:10 806:45

TOTAL 25th WING. . . 2610:40 648:50 413:15 3615:55 7288:40

26th Wing
7 ARON* . . . . .. 17:55 21:20 358:30 397:45
8 ARON . ...... 446:35 72:05 149:20 668:00
9 ARON In U.S. 13:45 38:45 52:30
Det. Serv. 910:00 910:00
10 ARON. . ...... 116:10 67:05 283:05 466:20
15 ARON . . . . . . 281:55 10:55 589:00 881:50
17 ARON. ........ 398:00 457:15 855:15
21 ARON . . . . . . 446:45 15:00 310:35 772:20
23 ARON . . .. . . 769:15 83:35 10:40 863:30

TOTAL 26th WING. 3400:20 93:00 177:00 2197:10 5867:30

0. T. U.
18 ARON......... 221:15 94:05 603:50 919:10

TOTAL AAFAC .. ... 6717:15 741:50 684:20 6416:55 14560:20

CAP,CP
ESF . . . . . . . . 4362:15 2019:45 6381:55
GSF. . . . . . . . . 5020:15 255:20 114:35 5390:10

TOTAL CAP,CP .. . 9382:30 2275:00 114:35 11772:05

*In transit for detached service during part of month.

CLINTON A. BURROWS,
Lt. Col., Air Corps, A. C. of S.,- A-2.

iPT~