1AC Reduce TNW From Turkey Cameron PBS

Reduce Turkey Bombs The Bomb Squad
1 Table of Contents-Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Turkey
2-9 1AC
10 Harms Extensions
13 Inherency Extensions
20 Solvency Extensions
23 A2 Ruins Aliances within NATO
28 Advantage Russia Extensions
30 Advantage Iran Extensions
1
1AC Reduce TNW from Turkey Cameron PBS
Observation I Harms
A. TNWs are susceptible to theft and use by terrorists
Davida Higgin 05 CND and Lakenheath Action Group“US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe”
October 2005 http://www.cnduk.org/pages/binfo/nato2005.pdf
TNW are more vulnerable than strategic nuclear weapons to terrorist acquisition, because of their
generally smaller size, greater numbers, wide distribution, lack of monitoring in many areas, and ease
of use (because they usually have less sophisticated locking and safeguard technology). They are
considered as ‘low yield’ weapons, with a variable explosive force between 0.1 kilotons and 1
megaton; the US B61s have a variable yield between 0.3 and 170 kilotons. The Hiroshima bomb had a
yield of about 12 kilotons. Thus, TNW can cause enormous damage, death and radiation
contamination, and ‘low yield’ has to be seen as a purely military/technical term. Moreover, even
without a nuclear detonation, TNW detonated by impact (for example, in a road or air accident, or
deliberately) can cause extremely serious damage by dispersal of highly toxic fine particles of
plutonium.
B. Terrorist Use of Nuclear weapons would be devastating
1. Even a terrorist dirty bomb could kill thousands and paralyze the US.
CDI Terrorism Project “What if the terrorists go Nuclear?’ Oct 2001
Extreme versions of such gamma-ray emitting bombs, such as a dynamite-laden casket of spent
fuel from a nuclear power plant, would not kill quite as many people as died on Sept. 11. A
worst-case calculation for an explosion in downtown Manhattan during noontime: more than
2,000 deaths and many thousands more suffering from radiation poisoning. Treatment of those
exposed would be greatly hampered by inadequate medical facilities and training. The United
States has only a single hospital emergency room dedicated to treating patients exposed to
radiation hazards, at Oak Ridge, Tenn. A credible threat to explode such a bomb in a U.S. city
could have a powerful impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign and military policy, and could
possibly have a paralyzing effect. Not only would the potential loss of life be considerable, but
also the prospect of mass evacuation of dense urban centers would loom large in the minds of
policy-makers.
2
2. A Nuclear terrorist attack will kill hundreds of thousands
CDI Terrorism Project “What if the terrorists go Nuclear?’ Oct 2001
The threat from radiological dispersion dims in comparison to the possibility that terrorists could build
or obtain an actual atomic bomb. An explosion of even low yield could kill hundreds of thousands of
people. A relatively small bomb, say 15-kilotons, detonated in Manhattan could immediately kill
upwards of 100,000 inhabitants, followed by a comparable number of deaths in the lingering aftermath.
3. The impact is extinction

Sid-Ahmed – 2004 – Graduate of Cario University’s School of Law (54) & Cario University’s School of
Engineering (55) [Mohamed Sid-Ahemd (political analyst for the ‘Al-Ahram’ newspaper), “Extinction!”,
Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 705, 26 August – September 2004, pg.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm]
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists ? Even if it fails, it would further
exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies
would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights,
tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would
also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative
if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to
a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends
when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear
pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
3
Observation II Inherency
A. Nukes in Turkey are of no strategic value
The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey By Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke | 23
November 2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these
bombs are reportedly PDF assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for
delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter
wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly PDF not certified for
NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would
need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes
clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In
fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to
hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but
the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid
reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to
because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be
deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its
nuclear umbrella.
4
1. The US is committed to maintaining Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,

Obama still sees value of tactical nukes in spite of commitments to disarm
Arms Control Today » October 2009 » Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren
The principal issues with the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons are political and
conceptual, rather than straightforwardly military, with the single but critical exception of the
risk of terrorist seizure. The notion of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, with tactical weapons serving as
a real or potential down payment on a security commitment, particularly in Europe, still has
significant traction within the Obama administration. Key factions in the Pentagon and perhaps
in the Department of State argue that the United States must still provide allies substantial
security support, especially with Iran and North Korea deeply engaged in nuclear programs. This
is the case despite the indifference of many NATO allies toward technical weapons or, in some
cases, direct demands for elimination. Some European countries, especially elites in the newer
central and eastern European member states, attach a high symbolic importance to the
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil as evidence of U.S. security
guarantees. Turkey also is thought to be particularly concerned about any withdrawal because it
faces a more direct threat from Iranian missiles, although it is now included in the new U.S.
plans for a European missile defense system.[3]
5
Plan. The USFG will remove the B61 gravity bombs hosted in Turkey and the
troops and infrastructure that support them.
6
Observation III Solvency
A. Removal eliminates threat of terrorist acquisition
Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads Canapés and Kalashnikovs > Alexandra Bell on August 25, 2009
Alexandra Bell is a Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security
Fellow.
Turkey has quietly held NATO tactical nuclear weapons since the Cold War. Removing them will
be a critical step towards a safer world. But it won't be easy.
B. Removal reduces tensions and proliferation

“Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” Claudine Lamond
and Paul Ingram, Basic Getting to Zero Papers, No. 11 January 2009
Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation.

Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful
example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkey's legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by
the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support.[22]
C. NATO can maintain guarantees to Turkey without TNWs

Arms Control Today » June 2010 » Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey
Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey Mustafa Kibaroglu
One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood
deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the
aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity
principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not
be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear
guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-
weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently
stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors[27] and
should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies. One cannot argue that once
U.S. nuclear weapons that are stationed in Turkish territory are sent back, the nuclear deterrent of the
alliance extended to Turkey will be lost forever. Currently, three NATO members are nuclear-weapon
states. Of the NATO non-nuclear-weapon states, only five, as mentioned above, are known to host U.S.
nuclear weapons. The remaining 20 members have no nuclear weapons on their territories. Yet, these
members enjoy the credible nuclear deterrent of NATO, which remains the most powerful military
organization in the world. Hence, the simple outcome of this analysis is that, for NATO members to feel
7
confident against the threats posed to their national security, they do not have to deploy U.S. nuclear
weapons on their territory.[28] Turkey need not be an exception to this rule
Advantage 1 Russian Nuclear Threat decreased, steps toward disarmament

made.
A. U.S. and Russia on a Path for Conflict

Schorr June 2007- Daniel Schoor (senior news analyst) www.npr.org
Conditions, however, are much different. It must rankle President Vladimir Putin that Poland and the
Czech Republic, once Soviet satellites, are now planning to provide bases for elements of a system that
Putin seems convinced is targeted on Russia. It must also occur to Putin that the Baltic resort where the
G-8 summit is being held was once located in Soviet-dominated East Germany.
In the run-up to the summit, Presidents Bush and Putin have been exchanging some nasty words. Bush
accuses Putin of derailing economic and political reform and suppressing free expression. Putin, in a
Victory Day speech last month in Red Square, without mentioning the United States by name,
complained of new threats to human life as during the Third Reich era.
Putin, with billions of dollars a year in oil revenues, apparently feels he can bait an America bogged
down in a war in Iraq. The tension between the two may boil over during the G-8 summit or it may not.
Bush has invited Putin to the senior Bush's compound in Kennebunkport, Maine, on July 1st and 2nd.
Assuming the invitation is not withdrawn, that will provide an opportunity for clearing the air if they are
so minded. But these soulful(ph) days seemed to be over. Clearly, Putin has decided that he no longer
needs to cater to America, the winner of the Cold War. And relations are likely to remain strained as
long as the American president continues to torque up his missile defense plans.
B. Removal of TNWs causes Russians to reduce their weapons and reduces

threat of war.
Davida Higgin 05 CND and Lakenheath Action Group”US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe”
In addition, withdrawal is a precondition for TNW negotiations with Russia, which has a longstanding
desire to rid Europe of nuclear weapons. On June 2nd this year Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov
said, “We are prepared to start talks about tactical nuclear weapons only when all countries possessing
them keep these weapons in their own territory. Russia stores its TNW on its own territory, which
cannot be said about other countries.” This would pave the way for further reductions in Russian and US
tactical nuclear weapons. A US/Russian arms control and reduction agreement would provide more
8
secure storage and effective monitoring and verification. This would greatly reduce the opportunities for
terrorist acquisition and the spread of nuclear equipment and technology around the world.
Advantage 2 Iran’s Nuclear threat is decreased

A. Weapons in Turkey encourage Iranian weapons efforts
Arms Control Today » June 2010 » Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey Mustafa
Kibaroglu
There is a common belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats
such as Iran’s nuclear program and the possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in
response to Tehran’s program. Others contend that if Turkey sends the weapons back to the United
States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to develop its own such
weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deployment of U.S. nuclear
weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons’ presence in the country will keep Turkey away from
such adventurous policies.[23] Similar views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts
who are concerned about Turkey’s possible reactions to the developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities
in case U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkish territory.[24] The negative effects of the
weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian security
analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a “nuclear-
weapon state.”[25] There is, therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually
spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify
the country’s continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities
B. Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East likely if programs are not checked
“The Threat of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation from Turkey” Nuclear Awareness Project Media
Backgrounder June 1998
It is very likely that nuclear-armed confrontation is in the future of the middle east if nuclear
development is allowed to continue unchecked. Israel already has a well developed nuclear
weapons program. Iran has two reactors under construction by the German company KWU, with
two more to be built there by China. Iraq's nuclear program was destroyed only during the Gulf
War.
9
C. Not only will removing TNWs stabilize the region, Turkey is key in dealing with Iran
The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey By Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke | 23 November
2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the
United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor
between Iran and the West. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be
underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established
pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively
influence Tehran's behavior. More largely, if the United States and European Union task Turkey
with a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara
(and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a
closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger
footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary
conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.
10
Harms Extensions
Tactical Nukes in Turkey are Attractive to Terrorists
Alexandra Bell is a Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow.
There are approximately 23,335 nuclear weapons held between nine nations: the United States,
Russia, China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Less widely known are
the five other states that hold nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, NATO deployed
nonstrategic or “tactical” nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Turkey. Today these aging weapons are more of a liability than an asset—their size and
portability makes them attractive to terrorists.
Tactical Nukes in Turkey are liable to theft.
Nevertheless, there are hints of change to come. Robert Einhorn, an adviser to Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton, floated one idea in a presentation at the July STRATCOM
conference. Einhorn, who said he was speaking personally rather than in his official capacity,
said the United States might consider removing “some or all of its tactical nuclear weapons
from Europe to encourage Russia to consolidate its own arsenal of nonstrategic bombs.”[11]
Einhorn argued that tactical nuclear weapons have minimal, if any, military value in Europe and
that their previous deterrent value is no longer relevant to the current debate. He emphasized
the common U.S.-Russian need to think about current security requirements, particularly the
need to secure nuclear weapons and materials against terrorist theft.
Nuclear materials are stolen at an alarming rate
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was quoted on
October 28th 2008
“The number of incidents reported to the Agency involving the theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive
material is disturbingly high . . . ,” he continued to say “Equally troubling is the fact that much of this
11
material is not subsequently recovered. Sometimes material is found which had not been reported
missing.”
Nuclear terrorism is our biggest threat

Valerie Plame Wilson, CNN.com April 8, 2010 Nuclear terrorism is most urgent threat
But I did not lose my belief that the danger of nuclear terrorism was the most urgent threat we face.
Nor did I lose my passion for working, albeit in a new way, to address that threat. I am working on
this issue now as part of the international Global Zero movement, in which political, military and faith
leaders, experts and activists strive for the worldwide elimination of all nuclear weapons.
We know that terrorist groups have been trying to buy, build or steal a bomb.
In the past two decades, there have been at least 25 instances of nuclear explosive materials being
lost or stolen. There is enough highly enriched uranium, or HEU, in the world today to build more
than 100,000 bombs.
Terrorists looking to buy or steal HEU could look to the approximately 40 countries with nuclear
weapons materials. And then there are rogue individuals out there who are running black markets
selling nuclear materials and technology.
Pakistan's Dr. A. Q. Khan did it for years before my group at the CIA brought him down in December
2003 after catching him red-handed selling a full-scale nuclear bomb to Moammar Gadhafi's regime
in Libya.
If terrorists manage to get their hands on enough HEU, they could smuggle it into a target city, build
a bomb and explode it. A hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium could fit in a shoebox, and
100,000 shipping containers come into the United States every day
A stolen nuclear weapon would be devastating
The Huffington Post – April 11, 2010 – Obama: Al Qaeda Would Use Nuclear Weapon If It Could –
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/11/obama-al-qaeda-nuclear_n_533409.html
"The single biggest threat to U.S. security, both short-term, medium-term and long-term, would be the
possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon," Obama said. "This is something that
could change the security landscape in this country and around the world for years to come. If there was
ever a detonation in New York City, or London, or Johannesburg, the ramifications economically,
politically and from a security perspective would be devastating," the President said. "We know that
organizations like al-Qaida are in the process of trying to secure nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction, and would have no compunction at using them.”
12
US Nukes in Turkey are destabilizing to the region
Inspecting illegal nuclear weapons Feature story – Greenpeace May 24, 2005
"These US nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey are a danger to regional stability and global
security",says Aslýhan Tümer, our Nuclear Disarmament campaigner in theMediterranean, "We're
bearing witness, and calling on Prime minister Erdogan to say no to any US nuclear weapons in Turkey"
13
Inherency Extensions
Nuclear Weapons unnecessary for Turkey’s Security
Turkey has a vastly superior military force and would not be directly threatened by Iran (a few people I
spoke to flippantly noted that it was Israel who would be in trouble). Nevertheless, nations acquire
nuclear weapons not only for security, but also for pride and prestige. Having a nuclear capability
elevates a nation into an elite, if dubious, club.
Tactical Nukes in Turkey are of no strategic value.
The weapons, however, are no longer integral to the NATO military mission. In fact, their readiness
posture is such that it would take months to prepare them for battle.
14
Nukes in Turkey are of no strategic value
Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs
are reportedly PDF assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the
Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik,
and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly PDF not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning
nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs
were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical
nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is
measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed
as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of
guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot
significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely
to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its
nuclear umbrella.
15
Turkish Air Force not involved in use of TNWs
Turkey has hosted U.S. nuclear weapons since intermediate-range Jupiter missiles were deployed there
in 1961 as a result of decisions made at the alliance’s 1957 Paris summit. Those missiles were withdrawn
in 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. Since then, no nuclear missiles have been stationed
in Turkey. The only nuclear weapons that have been deployed are the bombs that would be delivered by
U.S. F-16s or Turkish F-100, F-104, and F-4 “Phantom” aircraft at air bases in Eskisehir, Malatya (Erhac),
Ankara (Akinci/Murted), and Balikesir.[12] All such weapons, whether on U.S. or Turkish aircraft, have
been under the custody of the U.S. Air Force.
Turkey still hosts these U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, albeit in much smaller numbers.
[13] They are limited to one location, the Incirlik base near Adana on the eastern Mediterranean coast of
Turkey.[14] All other nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the bases mentioned above.[15]
Moreover, the Turkish air force no longer has any operational link with the remaining tactical nuclear
weapons deployed at Incirlik.[16] F-104s have not been in service since 1994. F-4s are still in service
after modernization of some 54 of them by Israeli Aerospace Industries in 1997. Yet, only the F-16
“Fighting Falcons” of the Turkish air force participate in NATO`s nuclear strike exercises known as
“Steadfast Noon,” during which crews are trained in loading, unloading, and employing B61 tactical
nuclear weapons.[17] The Turkish aircraft in these exercises serve as a non-nuclear air defense escort
rather than a nuclear strike force.[18]
16
Turkish Citizens favor withdrawal of TNW
“Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” Claudine Lamond and
Paul Ingram, Basic Getting to Zero Papers, No. 11 January 2009
There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from
Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are
against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would
support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said
they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.[21] There may be several
causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states,
budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of
Greece, a NATO member and Turkey's historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing
in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency.
Turkish citizens are either unaware of or disapprove of US Nukes
Inspecting illegal nuclear weapons Feature story – Greenpeace May 24, 2005
Polling data in Turkey has shown that less thanhalf of the population is aware that US nuclear weapons
are actuallypresent in their country, and 72% support Turkey being a nuclear freezone.
17
Better relations are key to withdrawal in Turkey
Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to
international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward
withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses
are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly
fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy
will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns.
18
Attitudinal Inherency: Nukes in Turkey are a relic of the Cold War
For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. During the
Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a
bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet
strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one
of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus,
over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from
Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control
agreements.
There are US nuclear weapons in Turkey
Trend, July 10, 2010
Turkey has nuclear weapons of the U.S, NATO Ex-Secretary General George Robertson was
quoted as saying by the TİME TURK Web site.He said that these weapons are kept in the
Incirlik military base of U.S in Turkey's territory. According to the source, the number of these
weapons in turkey is 40-90.
19
Symbolic InherencyTactical Nukes are more of a problem than they are worth
Strategically, the weapons have little real value in the post-Cold War climate. They are vulnerable to a
rogue or terrorist attack, too small or risky for independent military use, and unpopular with military
forces and most political audiences. Lately, maintaining these weapons has provided many more
disadvantages than advantages for the countries that possess them in their arsenals—France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States—at least as measured in terms of the costs of safety and
security, of the operational burden of dedicating and preserving delivery aircraft, and of
ensuring ongoing certification of forces. Even within NATO, for all but a few countries, tactical weapons
have come to represent a decreasingly meaningful symbolic commitment rather than a concrete
deterrent or escalation tripwire. From a U.S. standpoint, the relatively low numbers of such weapons
that still exist, at approximately 1,000 in the U.S. arsenal with only 20-25 percent of that number located
outside U.S. borders, would seem to make it easy to secure and verify their ultimate elimination.[2]
Tactical Nukes are still seen as a symbol of support and security
The Utility of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO: A European Perspective

Oliver Schmidt Proliferation Analysis, April 27, 2010 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Militarily, the antiquated tactical U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe serve little to no purpose to
NATO. But they remain a valuable bargaining chip and a strong symbol of U.S. security
assurance to its European allies and partners.
20
Solvency
Nuclear Weapons unnecessary for Turkey’s Security
Turkey has a vastly superior military force and would not be directly threatened by Iran (a few people I
spoke to flippantly noted that it was Israel who would be in trouble). Nevertheless, nations acquire
nuclear weapons not only for security, but also for pride and prestige. Having a nuclear capability
elevates a nation into an elite, if dubious, club.
TNWs are not the only way to maintain NATO commitment to Turkey, outdated
The issues have now changed, however, and the mechanisms needed to provide reassurance
and to allow for consultation on nuclear matters should be updated and changed as well.
Moreover, a physical down payment of tactical nuclear weapons as the only credible evidence
of U.S. commitment seems a concept long since overtaken by the enduring interactions of the
transatlantic community. It is also well out of step with current military thinking and practice or
even the logical requirements of extended deterrence doctrine.
21
Other weapons can deter, NATO Commitment to Turkey is not dependent on TNW
One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood
deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the
aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity
principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not
be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear
guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-
weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently
stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors[27] and
should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies. One cannot argue that once
U.S. nuclear weapons that are stationed in Turkish territory are sent back, the nuclear deterrent of the
alliance extended to Turkey will be lost forever. Currently, three NATO members are nuclear-weapon
states. Of the NATO non-nuclear-weapon states, only five, as mentioned above, are known to host U.S.
nuclear weapons. The remaining 20 members have no nuclear weapons on their territories. Yet, these
members enjoy the credible nuclear deterrent of NATO, which remains the most powerful military
organization in the world. Hence, the simple outcome of this analysis is that, for NATO members to feel
confident against the threats posed to their national security, they do not have to deploy U.S. nuclear
weapons on their territory.[28] Turkey need not be an exception to this rule
22
Better relations are key to withdrawal from Turkey
Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to
international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward
withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses
are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly
fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy
will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns.
23
A2 Withdrawal Harms Alliances
Withdrawal of NTWs does not harm close alliances
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and Belgium host US B-61 'gravity' bombs that, in the event of war
or hostilities, could be delivered by aircraft and pilots from the host nation (with the exception of
Turkey, which simply hosts a US base deploying B-61s). These host states could op-out of the
arrangement without the loss of security or political influence within NATO. US nuclear weapons have
been withdrawn from other allies, such as South Korea, Japan, Greece and the United Kingdom, while
maintaining strong and close alliances
24
A2 Turkey will feel a lack of commitment.

Including Turkey solves for security concerns
By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect
Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--
Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis
missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later
deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation
could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face
of a potential Iranian bomb.
25
(Could be used as extension to Russian advantage)
Reducing Tactical Nukes in Turkey key to reductions in the Russian arsenal and gives
Turkey a sense of security.
Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian

strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The
United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And
treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should
involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any
such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees.
Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to
prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise,
Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner.
26
Nato/US –Turkey relations improving
The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush
administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly
received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial:
Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it
undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part,
Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a
boon to U.S. efforts there.
27
Ship based missile defense can protect Turkey from an Iranian threat .
By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and
other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could
further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the
backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based
interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and
perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb.
28
Advantage 1 Russian Arms Reduction
Reduction of Tactical Nukes a crucial icebreaker in overall reductions with Russia
Even proportionate reductions would leave the Russians with a larger arsenal, but such cuts
could be an effective component of a larger bargain involving tactical and strategic weapons.
Such cuts could mark a crucial icebreaker, demonstrating the overall U.S. commitment to
making real progress toward a world without nucle.ar weapons. Some officials within the
Obama administration seem to recognize this point. It will remain challenging to sell this
argument to congressional opponents and domestic critics on the right who accuse the Obama
administration of being soft on the Russians, weak on defense, and generally having an overall
naïve worldview. The military establishment will likely present a less difficult sell, given its
fundamental dislike of these weapons and the taxing formal and informal requirements for
their deployment.[10]
Removal key to Russian disarmament
Negotiations with Russia will not prove easier. The number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons is
significantly higher than that of the active U.S. forces or stockpiles, and the Russians assign them greater
strategic importance in offsetting conventional weakness and deterring future threats from their south
and east. There are also clear competitive political stakes. Official Russian statements have explicitly tied
drawdowns in tactical weapons to a general geopolitical rebalancing, given U.S. conventional superiority
and the ongoing Russian opposition to NATO expansion, past and future. The Russians have also
stated that they will not consider reducing their tactical nuclear stockpile until all U.S. weapons are
removed from European territory. As a principle, they have essentially declared that all tactical weapons
should be based on national territories of nuclear-weapon states.[4]
29
US is key to withdrawal of TNW
Davida Higgin 05 CND and Lakenheath Action Group”US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe”
Writing in the Financial Times (23rd June 2005), the late Robin Cook and Robert Macnamara stated,
“It will be up to Europe’s leaders to push Washington to remove the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons
deployed in Europe and to push Russia to agree to meaningful talks on verifiable tactical nuclear
weapons reductions... The decisions we take now will help determine the safety of the world we
bequeath to our children. The task of dealing with this dangerous legacy of the Cold War will not be
simple but it must be done, and soon.”
30
Advantage 2. Iran Relations

Nuclear Power production is a step to Nuclear Weapons
The dark underside of nuclear power has always been its potential for nuclear weapons
proliferation, either through the reprocessing of spent fuel to produce plutonium - - an inevitable
byproduct of reactor operation - - or through the transfer of sensitive nuclear information,
technology and materials. Canadian nuclear cooperation with India and Pakistan provides a
chilling example of how the transfer of so-called "civilian" nuclear technology can contribute
directly and indirectly to the development of nuclear weapons. Canada provided the technology
at the foundation of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs and continues to provide vital
information and assistance to maintain those programs through the CANDU Owners Group
(COG).The Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission Company (TEAS - - a state-owned
utility) is expected to soon make a long-awaited announcement about the winner of a bidding
process to build a nuclear power station at Akkuyu Bay on the Mediterranean. Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited (AECL) is bidding to sell two 700 MW CANDU reactors to Turkey at a cost of
about $4 billion (CDN). It is bidding against a German/French consortium (Nuclear Power
International - NPI - is a cooperative venture between Siemens/KWU and the French national
nuclear company Framatome). The third consortium bidding is a partnership of Westinghouse
and Mitsubishi.
Iran is acquiring nuclear weapons
Leon Panetta, World Tribune.com June 28, 2010
Give Leon Panetta points for candor. The CIA director has offered the frankest assessment to date
from the U.S. intelligence community about Iran's nuclear progress and America's plans to stop
Tehran from acquiring the bomb. Appearing on ABC's Sunday show "This Week," Mr. Panetta buried
for good the discredited and politically motivated 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which claimed
31
that Iran halted work on nuclear weapons in 2003. Now the agency, which helped put together that
report, believes the Iranians are close to acquiring multiple bombs. "We think they have enough low-
enriched uranium right now for two weapons," Mr. Panetta said. "They do have to enrich it, fully, in
order to get there. And we would estimate that if they made that decision, it would probably take a
year to get there, probably another year to develop the kind of weapon delivery system in order to
make that viable." He said Iran also continues to develop missiles and warheads.
Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East likely if programs are not checked
It is very likely that nuclear-armed confrontation is in the future of the Middle East if nuclear
development is allowed to continue unchecked. Israel already has a well developed nuclear
weapons program. Iran has two reactors under construction by the German company KWU, with
two more to be built there by China. Iraq's nuclear program was destroyed only during the Gulf
War.
Turkey can be key in non-proliferation

Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending
nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to
neighboring states and strengthen Turkey's legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish
government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction would receive overwhelming public support.[22]
32
33

1AC Reduce TNW From Turkey Cameron PBS

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Reduce Turkey Bombs The Bomb Squad

1 Table of Contents-Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Turkey

23 A2 Ruins Aliances within NATO

28 Advantage Russia Extensions

30 Advantage Iran Extensions

1AC Reduce TNW from Turkey Cameron PBS

October 2005 http://www.cnduk.org/pages/binfo/nato2005.pdf

B. Terrorist Use of Nuclear weapons would be devastating

CDI Terrorism Project “What if the terrorists go Nuclear?’ Oct 2001

2. A Nuclear terrorist attack will kill hundreds of thousands

CDI Terrorism Project “What if the terrorists go Nuclear?’ Oct 2001

3. The impact is extinction

1. The US is committed to maintaining Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,

Observation III Solvency

A. Removal eliminates threat of terrorist acquisition

B. Removal reduces tensions and proliferation

Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation.

C. NATO can maintain guarantees to Turkey without TNWs

Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey Mustafa Kibaroglu

Advantage 1 Russian Nuclear Threat decreased, steps toward disarmament

A. U.S. and Russia on a Path for Conflict

B. Removal of TNWs causes Russians to reduce their weapons and reduces

October 2005 http://www.cnduk.org/pages/binfo/nato2005.pdf

Advantage 2 Iran’s Nuclear threat is decreased

Tactical Nukes in Turkey are liable to theft.

Nuclear materials are stolen at an alarming rate

Nuclear terrorism is our biggest threat

A stolen nuclear weapon would be devastating

US Nukes in Turkey are destabilizing to the region

Nuclear Weapons unnecessary for Turkey’s Security

Tactical Nukes in Turkey are of no strategic value.

Nukes in Turkey are of no strategic value

Turkish Air Force not involved in use of TNWs

Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey Mustafa Kibaroglu

Turkish Citizens favor withdrawal of TNW

Turkish citizens are either unaware of or disapprove of US Nukes

Better relations are key to withdrawal in Turkey

Attitudinal Inherency: Nukes in Turkey are a relic of the Cold War

There are US nuclear weapons in Turkey

Trend, July 10, 2010

Tactical Nukes are still seen as a symbol of support and security

The Utility of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO: A European Perspective

Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey Mustafa Kibaroglu

Better relations are key to withdrawal from Turkey

A2 Withdrawal Harms Alliances

Withdrawal of NTWs does not harm close alliances

A2 Turkey will feel a lack of commitment.

(Could be used as extension to Russian advantage)

Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian

Nato/US –Turkey relations improving

Advantage 1 Russian Arms Reduction

Reduction of Tactical Nukes a crucial icebreaker in overall reductions with Russia

Removal key to Russian disarmament

US is key to withdrawal of TNW

October 2005 http://www.cnduk.org/pages/binfo/nato2005.pdf

Advantage 2. Iran Relations

Iran is acquiring nuclear weapons

Leon Panetta, World Tribune.com June 28, 2010

Turkey can be key in non-proliferation

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