Fahes 1

KADESH: WAR AND PEACE

Fadi A. Fahes
3903 Words

Geography dictates nations’ access to natural resources or to trade routes. In turn, wise
rulers seek to establish strategic-depth, defined as the distance between a potential frontline and
the “heartland” of a certain state, or an economic sphere of influence.

Discord between states is a product of technological, demographic, cultural, and military

elements. In the thirteenth century B.C.E, two superpowers in the eastern Mediterranean basin
were the Hittites in the North, and the Egyptians in the south. In the middle, Syria and Palestine
were the home of numerous states ruled by aristocrats and lesser chieftains (Zangger). The
prolonged interest of the two great powers was to exploit the economic resources and trade
routes of the middle region. The fertile and resource-rich Syria “was the crossroads of world
commerce […] land routes were used by merchants who brought raw materials.” It offered much
"to predatory powers seeking to use such wealth for their own benefits"(Healy 9). What was the
state of affairs in these two empires around that period?

In the 17th century B.C.E, the Hyksos invaders took control of Lower Egypt and reduced
the rest of the Egyptian Kingdom to vassaldom. Circa 1570 B.C.E., Amosis was crowned king. He
established the 18th Theban Dynasty, and launched a 15-year liberation war against the Hyksos.
Eventually, Egypt became the overlord of Canaan and the Levant as far north as the River
Euphrates (Healey 89). The Egyptians regarded Canaan and the lands north of it as a strategic
territory that could provide them not only with economic benefits (products, resources, and work
force), but also with a security zone, a buffer, between the Egyptian heartland and any possible
Asiatic threat (9).

However, foreign interests gave in to internal strife in Egypt. Amenhotep IV, also known as
Akhenaton, attempted to change the Egyptian religion to the worship of Aton. Tel el-Amarna
correspondences reveal the deterioration of Egyptian authority over Canaan and the Phoenician
ports, particularly between the second part of the reign of Akhenaton (until 1352 B.C.E) and that
of Tutankhamen (until 1345 B.C.E) (Cavaignac 44). Naturally, desires to recover Amurru and
Kadesh were set aside in the face of the need to reorganize Egypt after the troubled reign of
Akhenaton. With the demise of Tutankhamen, the army seized the reins of power in Egypt. Over
the next 32 years, three Generals occupied the Egyptian throne. While setting the house in order,
it had become clear to the Egyptians that the use of proxies as a substitute for military power had
its shortcoming, and the notion of direct military occupation became more appealing (Healy 15).
Seti (1318-1304 B.C.E), Rameses’ father, successfully reestablished Egyptian control over
Amurru and Kadesh, but shortly afterwards, they fell back to the Hittites (Santosuosso 428).

The region was no stranger to conflict: the first struggle for domination broke between the
Egyptians and the Kingdom of Mitanni. The conflict ended with a treaty between Artatama - King
of Mitanni - and the Egyptian Pharaoh Tuthmosis IV circa 1425 B.C.E (Santosuosso 426 & Healy
89). Both parties agreed on a clear demarcation of the borders between the two empires in central
Syria: The coastal regions and Palestine, including Damascus went to the Pharaoh, and the rest
of Syria went to the Mitannians (A.P 158). The treaty recognized Egypt's claim to Amurru, the
Eleutheros valley and Kadesh. The Mitannians would have one less enemy to worry about, given
the growing power of their Hittite neighbors to the North, and the Egyptians would have a clear
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sphere of dominance and yearly tributes paid by their allies. Still, Syria “consisted of a collection
of petty states, a complex group of peoples and territories which even the Egyptians themselves
never completely succeeded in disentangling” (Maspero).

North in the Anatolian Plateau, a new regional power was growing. During the early
decades of the seventeenth century B.C.E., and for the next five centuries, the Hittite empire
extended across much of the Anatolian landmass, into northern Syria to the western borders of
Mesopotamia. That period was known to current historians as the Late Bronze Age (Bryce 8).
Hittites became a serious challenge during the decline of Egypt’s power under the reign of
Akhenaton. They “were one of the great powers of the Middle East, rivaling Babylonia, Assyria
and Egypt—and superior to all three in statesmanship, lawgiving and warfare” (The People that
History Forgot). The Hittite capital was in Hattusa near the Kizihrmak in north-central Anatolia
(Zangger). By 1350 B.C.E, the empire encompassed central Anatolia, northwestern Syria, and
upper Mesopotamia including vassal states in Northern Syria and the coastal region of Ugarit
(Hittit). “In Syria lay [the Hittite’s] most valuable and most profitable vassal kingdoms, like Ugarit
and Amurru. […] Through this region lay the major trade and communication land-routes of the
Near Eastern world” (Bryce 103).

The fall of Mitanni to the Hittite King Suppiluliuma, roughly four decades after the Egypto-
Mitannian treaty, disrupted the status quo, and reopened the issue of control over that area. Hatti
had political, strategic, cultural and commercial interests in the region, which overlapped with the
Nilotic Kingdom’s economic and security requisites. The local kings in Syria took advantage of the
Mitannians’ demise to try to maintain independence vis-a-vis both Hittites and Egyptians. Among
those were the rulers of Amurru and Kadesh. Amurru was strategically situated on the border of
the two empires, south of the Orontes River and along the Mediterranean coast. The city of
Kadesh was located on the Upper Orontes, and it was important to any foray northward into the
Hittite Empire or southward against the territories held by the Egyptians (Santosuosso 427-8).
In 1301 B.C.E, King Benteshina of Amurru repudiated his vassal treaty with the Hittites
and defected to Egypt. Rameses II launched a rapid campaign that drew Amurru back into the
Egyptian camp. For King Muwatallish of Hatti, this was the call for war, the direct cause for the
Battle of Kadesh.

Significance and Sources of the Battle of Kadesh

The battle of Kadesh was engaged on the 10th day of Shemu [end of May circa 1300
B.C.E.] between the Egyptians of Pharaoh Rameses II (1304-1237) and the Hittites of King
Muwatallish (1315- 1296 B.C.E.) (Santosuosso 423). Other sources believe that Rameses’
accession was in 1279 B.C.E. For the sake of consistency, in this paper, I will abide by the dating
used by Santosuosso, who maintains that the Battle took place in 1300 B.C.E.

It represents the first battle in history of which we have the details recorded with any
approach to accuracy and precision (Burne 191). The significance of the battle of Kadesh, in
addition to its scale, was the use of various elements of offensive, maneuvers, military tactics and
strategies. Little has changed in the art of war ever since.

The drawback is that most of the sources come from the Egyptian side. Rameses II
recorded the Egyptian version of the battle on numerous temples. Other sources come from a
letter by Rameses II written in Akkadian to the Hittites, a series of reliefs with their captions; two
texts-one a literary composition known as "The Poem," and a shorter version of the battle called
"The Report or Bulletin" or "The Official Report or Bulletin”(425).
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No discoveries were made of Muwatallish personal traces of the encounter. “Kadesh is

mentioned briefly in two Hittite texts, a treaty and a historical account, both written in the
reign of another king”. The Hittite version allows a truer assessment of the battle; it does not
offer an anal of the campaign. It is not a shortfall in recording battles by the Hittites: Muwatallish II
moved the seat of the capital from Hattusa to Tarhuntassa (Bryce 67), and then early in the
twelfth century B.C.E., Hattusa (which recouped its role as capital after Muwatallish) went up in
flames (3). The last possible justification for the lack of Hittite sources is the fact that the Hittites
were forgotten for 30 centuries—from the end of their power around 1200 B.C.E. until their
rediscovery in the late 19th century (The People that History Forgot), which leaves room for future
discoveries, and possibly more details of that expedition.

Weaponry and Characteristics of the Egyptian and Hittite Armies

There were many differences between the Hittite and the Egyptian armies. The Hittites
had a small standing army and relied heavily on their allied states and mercenaries. In contrast,
the Egyptians had a long record of accomplishment of organization and training.

The chariot was also among the major developments in warfare at the time. "The
Egyptians and Hittites were the foremost exponents of chariot warfare at this time, and Kadesh
was notable for the manner in which both sides sought to impose their will upon the other by the
employment of distinctive chariot tactics that had evolved over some centuries" (Healy,
Introduction). In addition to the Chariot, some weapons were developed during that period:

i. The Sickle-Sword, with a sickle-shaped blade that gave a long curved cutting and
chopping edge, and a hilt and blade that was stronger than an axe: it was cast in one
piece. The sickle-sword became a standard hand weapon in every army.
ii. The Composite Bow, made from several materials glued together—wood, animal horn,
tendons and sinews—this new type of bow had a range of three to four hundred yards.
iii. Scaled body armor: the extensive use of more powerful bows and swords made stronger
covering that is more resistant necessary. Body armor of bronze scales sewn on cloth was
commonly associated with charioteers. The bulk of an army went without armor.
Infantrymen needed mobility, so weighing them down with body armor was simply not
practical (Ward).

Moreover, what supplemented the development of new types of weapons at the time was the
establishment of an administrative non-combatant arm to keep records, arrange and transport
enormous quantities of supplies and manufacture and repair weapons.

The Egyptian Army

Egypt had maintained standing military forces in the Old and Middle Kingdoms. However,
that military organization of the armed forces changed radically from the mid-16th century B.C.E.
to meet the Egyptian's defensive and expansionary needs. Egypt maintained a professional
standing army equipped with "the full panoply of weaponry consistent with Late Bronze Age
chariot warfare, and a state organized for supporting such on a large scale" (Healy 28). Service in
the Egyptian Army opened the prospects of wealth from booty and social status through
advancement in military ranks. Pharaohs took care to nurture and develop soldiery as a
professional caste through granting farmland to officers and even to simpler ranks, and even tax
exemptions for the families of men in army service (29).

At the late Bronze Age, the Egyptian army used bronze for armor, shields, helmets of the
infantry, and the bronze scale armor for the charioteers. Wall paintings at Thebes of the Egyptian
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Troops of the New Kingdom (1567-1085) show heavy infantrymen armored with smaller shields
and secondary weapons, which included short swords and a new form of axe. Archers were
equipped with the composite bow. The Hyksos invaders had introduced weapons and equipment
(scale armor and composite bow). The Hyksos introduced the horse as well (Wise & McBride 22).
The army of the Egyptian New Kingdom had a chariot-mounted force to support the spear
phalanx and archer units (16). Egyptian weapons, based on archaeological discoveries were
spear, straight sword, khopesh, pole-axed, eye-axe, epsilon axe, hurling stick, maces, daggers,
and metal arrowheads, one having small projections from the tang to prevent it splitting the shaft
on impact (18).

The regular army in Egypt was organized of a platoon (40 men with a junior officer),
Companies of four or five platoons, battalions of four or five companies (totaling around 500 men)
commanded by a “commander of the Host”. Ten battalions formed a division totaling around 5000
men. Slingers and most archers were light troops. The heavy infantry, the spearmen of the
phalanx, used a khopesh as a secondary weapon (16).

The reliefs of the battle of Kadesh show the formation of the phalanx for the attack: ten
ranks deep, the men in each section forming a file, one behind the other. Such a phalanx could
march in a column ten men wide, and could easily deploy to either flank by a simple left or right
turn.

The Hittite Army

The core Hatti army existed in the form of a small standing force. This force was expanded
during campaigns from men in fulfillment of the feudal obligations to the King. The expense of
maintaining the chariot and teams was part of the feudal obligations of the landed nobility to their
King. It seems that the departure of the Hittite army on campaigns weakened the Hittite Empire’s
homeland defense capabilities (Bryce 102). The Hittite homeland was for some reason under-
populated because of prolonged droughts and a lethal plague, which broke out at the end of
Suppiluliuma I’s reign [1344–1322 B.C.E.] (Bryce 82 &101). Outsourcing mercenaries was not
cheap. Sources mention, “Muwatallish stripped all his land of silver to swell his ranks with hired
Troops” (111). The need for mercenaries might have stemmed from the shortage in supply of
work force, requiring the king to make hard decisions as to whether or not he could afford the
commitment of his work force resources to a particular campaign. In addition to the security
concerns and the price tags of warfare, prolonged campaigns deprived the food production sector
from valuable workforce (Singer 102). The soldiers were not paid (possibly with the exception of
mercenaries); therefore, the prospect of booty was an incentive to fight well (Healy 21).

Hittites owed a large part of their fantastic growth to the use of iron weapons. Iron
weapons were costly and difficult to produce in quantity, however, sometime around 1400 B.C.E,
the Hittites discovered a process for producing good quality iron in bulk. The Hittites kept the
process secret, enabling them to gain an immense advantage over their enemies, who were still
using bronze weapons (24).

The principle assault arm of the Hittites was the chariot, with infantry being a supporting
force. The Hittite chariot carried three men, pulled by two stallions (Bryce 111). Warriors were
armed with spears and shields as well as bows. At least fifty per cent of the infantry were Hittite
spearmen formed in phalanx, but the remainders were mercenary archers, light troops capable of
moving quickly, many of them recruited from the Sutu desert tribes (Wise & McBride 25).
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Units in Asia Minor contained of 30-100 chariot. Every 50 chariots fell under the command
of a “captain of 50”. This suggests that Hittite troops organized much like the Egyptians: a “troop”
of ten, a squadron of 50, and perhaps a regiment of only 100. The crews fought as mounted
archers. The spearmen were organized in a phalanx much like that of the Egyptians, with a ten-
man section forming a file in combat, a rank when in column (25). The Hittites used their chariots
primarily for close combat, while Egyptians used their lighter chariots as missile platforms, as a
result, the Hittite chariot: The Axle under the center of the body of the chariot, necessary to carry
the heavier load, made the chariot less maneuverable and slower compared to the Egyptian
equivalent (28).

The Battlefield
Towards the end of April or end of May, in the fourth year of his reign, Rameses left Egypt
with four divisions: Amun, Re’, Ptah, and Seth. Amun was the elite division of Rameses. There
were around 2000 (?) chariots with the army. The four Egyptian regiments, having marched for
around 30 days, were spread out along the line of march “that when the lead regiment was
making camp before the walls of Kadesh, the second regiment was still crossing the Orontes
River seven miles away,” while the other two regiments were further behind (Ward).

The army raised by the Hittite for this battle was most probably the largest army ever
assembled by that empire: 3500 chariots and 8000 to 9000 infantry (Healy 21). The Hittite king
Muwatallish II put some 47,500 troops into the battlefield against the pharaoh Rameses II (Bryce
102). The Hittite army was composed of allied and vassal forces from all regions of the Hittite
empire, and at its heart, the army of Hatti (Healy 21), and was supplemented by mercenaries from
states outside Hittite control (Bryce 111).

En route to Kadesh, two captured Bedouin scouts misguided Rameses by telling him that
the King Muwatallish’s army was way north. Rameses probably wished to set camp at a specific
site to make use of the natural lines of defense by the waters of Lake Amorites (modern Lake of
Homs). The Hittite army ambush was set on the north-west side of Kadesh (Sayce 26). “About
the Amun division there is no doubt. It was setting up camp northwest of Kadesh. Scholars also
agree that Re was somewhere south of Amun and that it was the first division the Hittites
attacked” (Santosuosso 434). So, while the Egyptian regiment of Re’ forded the Orontes, a
detachment of Hittite chariots crossed the river Orontes and launched one of the great chariot
attacks of ancient history” (Ward). The Egyptian soldiers fled in disarray towards the Amun camp.
Rameses was at the head the Amun division; with the surprise attack by the Hittites on the Re’
division, he was cut off from the rest of his army, faced capture or death (Roberts 35). The
Rameses account, at the heart of the battle, was that "he was abandoned in the midst of the
enemy, not a prince, not a captain was with him," but in the middle of this destitute, "Amon
reached out his hand". The pharaoh, ostensibly singlehandedly, slaughtered the attackers (Sayce
27).

The Hittite army had been stationary and hence presumably fresh as opposed to the
Egyptian army that was a month’s march from base (Brune 192). The element of surprise was
added to that of exhaustion. The Egyptian army would have been annihilated had it not been for
the arrival of the Canaanite Nearin, from the West. Another scenario was that another Egyptian
division had successfully forded the river and had arrived to the rescue of the beleaguered
Pharaoh and Egyptian fellow soldiers. Whichever was the case, the incoming division caught the
Hittites unaware as they were pillaging the camp (Wasilewska). The Egyptians’ fortunes turned
around, and many of the fighters were either killed or drowned while trying to swim to the other
bank of the Orontes.
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Critique of the Battle

While history provided us a conceited Ramessian narrative, from the Muwatallish side, we
have no accounts. It was the battle of the chariots; the Hittite infantry and the vassal forces,
comprising 40,000 men, did not fight. The rest of the Egyptian divisions did not engage in the fight
either. It is safe to state that the battle ended in a draw. Neither force chose to engage the enemy
beyond the first day.

The Hittite infantry alone was twice the size of the entire Egyptian army. For unknown
reason, the Hittite king "pause[d] apparently irresolutely." Then he sent the remainder of his
cavalry, but he did not commit the infantry. Possibly, the ford was over deep for infantry to cross.
The delay in taking further action allowed the Egyptians to recover their equilibrium (Burne 195).
The King of Hattusa had successfully utilized the tactics of surprise (the spies, the chariot attack),
but the remuneration package of his soldiers meant that they had their eyes on the loot, not on
victory, on that Shemu day. It could also be that Muwatallish had successfully marked his territory,
and did not wish to lose more lives, given the shortage of manpower in Hittite homeland (Singer
102). In general, it was customary that the Hittite King always “sought to represent himself as one
who took the field only in reaction to unprovoked aggression by his enemies” (Bryce 100); “A king
could give sufficient proof of his abilities as a mighty war-leader by conducting successful
expeditions against rebel vassals or independent tribes and kingdoms – particularly if he achieved
victory relatively quickly and cheaply, and brought home substantial spoils from his campaigns.
On the other hand, declaring war on a fellow Great King was a much more hazardous enterprise –
with far more risk that the contest would be drawn out, costly, and ultimately inconclusive” (Bryce
1 – Eternal Treaty). Muwatallish was possibly very aware of that fact.

The Pharaoh boasted his fighting skills and his victory, “but this concentration on the royal
heroism could be done only at the expense of the royal followers whose behavior must have
seemed rather cowardly” (Goedicke 71). The truth of the matter is that the exhausted Egyptian
soldiers were more loyal and organized than their Hittite counterparts. It might be the case that
Ramses had courageously escaped defeat on the battlefield, “but in reality all he had managed to
do was to rescue his army since he was unable to capture Kadesh (Grimal 256). Shortly
afterwards, his armies retreated southwards and ultimately returned to Egypt.

Shortly after Rameses’ retreat, Muwatallish deposed Benteshina, the Prince of Amurru
and replaced him with Shapilis, thus putting an end to the Egyptian province of Upi and effectively
creating an anti-Egyptian buffer zone in Syria (256). On the ground, it went according to the silent
King’s wishes; the Pharaoh on the other hand dominated the Bronze Age media attention.

The Eternal Treaty

Fifteen years after the battle of Kadesh, the successor of Muwatallish, Hattusili III, drew up
a treaty ‘peace and brotherhood for all time’ with the pharaoh Rameses II (Bryce 1 – Eternal
Treaty). The treaty was inscribed on a silver tablet and later on a mortuary temple in Thebes
“Ramasseum” in hieroglyphics. The cuneiform tablet was discovered in Hattusa (Roberts 193).
The treaty was reinforced 14 years after its signature when Hattusili III visited Egypt and gave his
daughter in marriage to Rameses II (Roberts 193).

The Battle of Kadesh did not settle any accounts, as neither side could achieve total
victory. The treaty however established a prolonged status quo between two of the superpowers
of the ancient Near East. It confirmed the sovereignty of both empires over their border territories.
Further expansion was not justifiable or desirable.
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The Hittites were faced by a new threat from Adad-Nirari I of Assyria in the East, and the
Kaskan tribes of the Pontic zone to the North. Rameses in turn had to maintain the stability of his
homeland, and was forced to turn west to deal with the incursions of the Libyans (Grimal 256),
and directed his efforts to monumental construction projects (Bryce – Eternal Treaty). The treaty
was more about “establishing strategic alliances than with peace for its own sake” between two of
the four superpowers of the region. The Near Eastern world was shared between the kings Egypt,
Hatti, Assyria and Babylon (Bryce 1 – Eternal Treaty).

The mutual defense pact and extradition clauses resulted in a peace “that remained in
effect for several generations and defined the boundaries of the Egyptian and Hittite spheres of
influence in Syria. [..] It marks the establishment—probably for the first time in military history—of
a balance of terror more than 3,000 years before anyone got around to coining a phrase to
describe it. It also suggests an unsettling fact: that the survival of man and his empires has
depended for a disturbingly long time on the efficiency of military strategy and the technology of
weaponry” (Ward).
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